STUDIES OF INTERACTION

Mary Rainey,
Carol Pfeuffer, Sybil Lyn Mehan, Abigail Sher,
Janet Tallman, Sheila Seltel and Linda Hubbell

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STYLE SWITCHING IN A HEAD START CLASS

Paper Presented to Summer Workshop Participants of Language, Society and the Child

University of California

by

Mary Rainey
Reason for study

Rosenthal's research points out that children's behavior can be changed by changing teachers' expectations. His research did not establish how the expectations were communicated by the teachers to their students. Teachers in the eighteen classrooms on which his research was based did not recall if they behaved differently toward any subjects in the study.

Focus

Does style and/or code switching convey any part of this message? To answer this question requires, one, describing the switching that occurs in a given classroom and two, ascertaining the meaning of that switching for the student. The second task will not be dealt with in this paper. This discussion is concerned only with the first of these two problems, "Are different speech styles used in the classroom and if so how can they be described?"

Subjects Described

The data considered was obtained from tape recordings and investigators' notes made during a story telling session in a Head Start class. Twenty pupils around five years old were present. The children were mostly Negro. One Chinese-American and several Mexican-American pupils were also present. One of the latter, a boy, was a Spanish monolingual.

The teacher was white, a woman in her twenties and a holder of a bachelor's degree in psychology. She was assisted by a salaried teacher's aid, a middle-aged woman who was bilingual in Spanish and English. A teenaged Negro boy and girl and two Negro grade school girls also helped the teacher.

The teacher sat in a corner. She used a felt board on her right. The pupils sat on the floor around her. The teacher held a story book in her hand, paraphrasing from it. She was the main focus of the classroom interaction. The teachers' assistants sat on chairs around the perimeter of the circle. The bilingual teaching assistant periodically prompted the Spanish monolingual. The grade school girls joked among themselves, sometimes drawing the attention of nearby pupils.

Source of Data for Interaction Patterns

The tape recorder was turned on shortly after the story telling started. It was placed at the perimeter of the circle with the mike held towards the teacher. Since the focus of this paper is on discovering and describing style switching in the teacher's speech, her speech is used for the basis of this
Transcription

The data was transcribed in regular English orthography. Morphophonemic differences obvious to the investigator such as -in verses -ing suffixes were noted as well as pauses, loudness and changes in the speed of utterances.

Notions of Speech Style

In approaching the data the investigator had certain notions about what speech styles looked like and how style switching could be identified. A speech style was thought to contain a set of linguistic characteristics such as phonological, morphological and/or lexical items which were in contrast to speech characteristics found elsewhere in the speaker's speech. It was thought that certain features would occur together either in the same utterance or in the same group of utterances. (An utterance is here considered a stream of speech separated by pauses.) These features that tended to occur together were thought to share certain phonological characteristics and/or be judged by the speaker as being appropriate to use in the same series of utterances.

Notions of Channel Cues

Changed from one style to another were thought to be accompanied by channel cues. Preconceived notions of channel cues were that they might consist of exaggerated changes in volume, speed and/or extended pauses.

First Technique

Three techniques were used to analyze the data and were applied in the following order. First, the teacher's speech was examined for contrasting pairs. Six pairs of allomorphes were identified. Formal and informal labels were tentatively assigned. Assignment was made by reference to Fisher's And Labov's work and by consulting the investigator's own culture which was arbitrarily considered shared in greater part by the teacher. The six pairs were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
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<tr>
<td>you</td>
<td>ya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>them</td>
<td>em</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have to</td>
<td>hafta, gotta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>going</td>
<td>goin</td>
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<tr>
<td>running</td>
<td>runnin</td>
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<tr>
<td>wearing</td>
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Second Technique

Secondly, the text was examined to see if there were any examples of lexical items that always occurred with formal or with informal features. None were found with the possible exception of "fall" which always took an "ing" suffix. "Fall," however, always occurred in the sentence, "the sky is falling." This sentence appeared throughout the story, being a kind of punchline. As such it is judged as a special case standing stylistically apart from the rest of the story.

Third Technique

Third, the recording and text were examined to see if formal and informal features were grouped in any recognizable way. This was done by looking at the way individual related to each other. The class session was structured by the teacher in three ways. In the first part she was story teller; in the second she had the pupils help her retell the story; in the third she directed the pupils' exit to recess by telling and singing instructions.

Situation One: Story Telling

In situation one, story telling, the teacher changes from the story teller to teacher and back. The occurrence of formal and informal features reflect this change. They are distributed as follows:

One, as story teller, the teacher uses a mixture of half formal and half informal features.

Two, when the punchline is imbedded in another sentence only formal features occur with it. An example is "I have to go see the king because the sky is falling in."

Three, as story teller, the teacher uses formal features to help emphasize as illustrated by em and them in the sentence, "He took 'em to a cave and he ate them all up."

The occurrence of formal and informal features differs in the teacher's pedagogical style in situation one.

One, teaching utterance which are usually comprehension questions, contain formal features as exemplified in the sentence, "Who was the first one going?"

Two, informal features occurring in teaching utterances are used as distance closers. An example of this is found in the sentence, "No, who was the first one going?" The use of an informal feature in this particular example is interpreted as an attempt.
by the teacher to close the distance between herself and the pupils in order to elicit an appropriate answer. Two questions containing formal features immediately before this sentence had failed to get the proper response.

**Situation Two: Shared Story Telling**

In situation two, shared story telling, the teacher seeks the pupils' help in retelling the story. This situation is distinguished from the first by more rapid speech and a higher background noise level. Formal and informal features are distributed as follows:

One, formal features occur only in the same sentence with the punchline and nowhere else. Compared with the first situation, formal features are dramatically absent.

Two, often the story line is advanced and a question asked in the same utterance. This strategy as well as the cropping of formal features brings about a blurring of the distinction between story telling and question asking.

**Situation Three: Directed Exit**

In situation three the teacher tells and sings direction to pupils, informing them when to leave. (The song line is, "If you have something blue on then skip outside.") Formal and informal features in this situation occur as follows:

One, formal features are found in utterances where the teacher is issuing directions to the class.

Two, informal features are found in utterances in which additional prompting is given to the pupils. An example is "I see a lot of people wearing blue." This is interpreted as another example of the teacher shifting to an informal level thus closing the distance between herself and her pupils in order to elicit an appropriate response.

In reviewing these three situations, if the investigators interpretations are correct, one finds that the teacher adopts speech with a larger number of informal features when she wants to draw closer to the pupils. Her speech contains a greater frequency of formal features when she is maintaining a greater distance.

A second interpretation is possible, that two unmarked styles exist.
The first style is a pedagogical one with unmarked speech containing a higher frequency of formal features and marked speech containing informal features. The second style is a story telling style with unmarked speech containing formal features.

Summary Table of Speech Styles in a Head Start Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation One, (Story Telling)</th>
<th>Unmarked Speech</th>
<th>Marked Speech</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
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<td>T</td>
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<th>Situation Two, (Shared Story Telling)</th>
<th>Unmarked Speech</th>
<th>Marked Speech</th>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Informal</td>
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<th>Situation Three, (Directed Exit)</th>
<th>Unmarked Speech</th>
<th>Marked Speech</th>
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<td>T</td>
<td>Formal</td>
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Revisions

The analysis described in this paper has led the investigator to make new hypothesis and to revise techniques. First, the concept of informal features and formal features might be broadened to contracted forms (such as whad'dy say for what did he say) and no contracted forms.

Secondly, the three analysis techniques need to be reordered. In considering what characterized relationships, the investigator found that she tended not to consider features beyond those already identified by earlier techniques. If the third technique of looking at how individuals related to each other is employed first, a more complete listing of stylistic features characterizing these relationships would be made.

Thirdly, channel cues were thought to accompany style changes. However, the analysis showed that while they often did, channel cues did not always accompany style changes. Channel cues such as sudden increases in the rate of and volume of speech seemed to frame whole passages. These speech features characterized styles as well as serving as channel cues.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has found that two speech styles were utilized by a teacher in a Head Start class. It has described these styles by employing three techniques. It has offered suggestions for a more refined continued analysis.
Language Acquisition in the Deaf: Some Suggestions for Inclusion in the Field Manual

Carol Pfuderer
Speech 260 & 299
Mrs. Ervin-Tripp
Summer, 1968
Language Acquisition in the Deaf: Some Suggestions for Inclusion in the Field Manual

The study of language acquisition in deaf children has many obvious areas of application to and importance for psycho- and socio-linguistics. In the process of attempting such studies, however, the experimenter who is not already a member of the deaf subculture will find himself called upon to deal with unfamiliar variables in the formulation of his sociolinguistic rules; to analyze a symbolic system whose components may have vague counterparts or no counterparts in his native spoken symbolic system; to deal with criteria of personal worth which he had never dreamed could exist in this subculture-within-his-own-culture. Added to these problems, some of which have counterparts in the culture shock any field worker in a foreign culture can experience, is the fact that there are neither books he can read which are tailored to his needs, nor people he can contact who can advise him from their own experience. As is likely to be the case with pioneering work in a culture, there are no hopefully-objective ethnographies corresponding to those of anthropology (and indeed, a great many highly-colored accounts exist); as is likely to be the case with any pioneering work in a discipline, there are no human resources to whom the experimenter can go. From my own experience in attempting this type of research, I can predict that the educator of the deaf; the teacher of sign language; the deaf themselves, high verbal or low verbal, born deaf or deafened; the social worker; the sociologists; and the psychologist—that all of these people will have backgrounds and theories that are in some sense inadequate for the psycho- or sociolinguist studying the language of deaf children. In the case of those involved in education of the deaf, or formally educated by educators of the deaf, or whose
prestige depends on the opinion of educators of the deaf, the experimenter will definitely discover that everybody has a theory to push or a philosophy to peddle. Such vested interests mean less reliable second-hand information for the experimenter, of course, and, at times, a reluctance to supply information at all. Because the Field Manual seems the most appropriate place to collect what little pertinent work has been done with the deaf which pertains to psycho- and sociolinguistics (Boe's work most recently, though perhaps the studies of Fry and Hirsch (in Genesis of Language) et al., could also be summarized), and because of the afore-mentioned problems which confront the experimenter who will want to study the language used by deaf children as well as adults, I propose that a separate section or at least sub-section of the next edition of the Field Manual be devoted to language acquisition in the deaf child. I will suggest in this paper some general areas of psycho- and sociolinguistic research which are especially relevant in the experimenter's exploration of the deaf child's language; some general difficulties and cautions which may be easily overlooked by the experimenter, largely because he does not expect to have need of the same considerations in dealing with his own society that he would with a foreign culture; and, along the way, recommend some possibilities for further study, some methods, and some reading material. Many of these suggestions arise from my own unsatisfactory experiences in participating in a project in language acquisition in the deaf child. I realize that research of this type will be taken up by relatively few people; yet, because I feel it is so important to psycho- and sociolinguistic study, and because I feel that many of the mistakes which I have made could have been prevented, I think that it would add to the quality of what research is done to incorporate at least a few germane comments on the subject into the Field Manual. If the result given here comes off as a little sketchy and uneven, it is probably due to the brief nature of my own work on the subject--and also due to the fact that I am as subject to the same type of "cultural shock" and misinforming informants that I have mentioned.

First of all, it will be useful to describe some of the implications which the emotional problems associated frequently with deaf children will have for the scope and nature of the experimenter's research. For the hearing child who signs and has at least one hearing parent and for the deaf child of deaf parents, there are usually relatively few problems of adjustment. For the hearing child with two deaf parents and for the deaf child of hearing parents, however, there may be serious problems of adjustment for the young child: in the first case,
he may have little contact with the hearing community and its communicative system and social practices will seem foreign to him; in the second case, the child is often rejected in some way by his "normal" parents who feel that there is a stigma attached to having deafness in the family. The experimenter will probably want to include as his research subjects all possible combinations of hearing and deaf, signing and oral, children of various ages. The task of finding suitable subjects will be made all the more difficult because of the shyness, introversion, and sometimes autism, which he will find in some of the children. Once he does find himself able to communicate with a particular child, his problem will quite simply be one of establishing sufficient trust in the child to carry out his program of research. The significance of this for the major research tasks schedule of the Field Manual is the longer period of time which I feel will be necessary to build that initial communication and trust with certain of his subjects: how much longer is unclear, but I feel that two years should provide some sort of a minimum comparable to the one-year period proposed by the Manual; the three-year span of my own project would seem to me to give even more solid ground for scientific conclusions. What I have said here may seem over-dramatic to the experimenter who has had no experience with the often-hysterical behavior of the deaf educator when the word "sign" is mentioned, or with the well-grounded wariness of a five-year-old deaf child who has a vocabulary of, at the most, five surreptitiously-learned signs. If the experimenter tries to duplicate the Roger Brown method of enticing the child into immediate communication by means of an attractively-destructive game (recommended on p. 39 of the Field Manual), he will be sadly disappointed at the results. More than likely, the experimenter—especially if he is not a proficient signer—will be "tuned out" by the deaf child or hearing child who does not speak; and while it is possible to get the hearing child's attention by noise, the experimenter will find that it is almost impossible to get a deaf child to look at you once he has decided he doesn't want to.

Also relevant to the major research tasks described in the Manual is the determination of the child's development. In working with his deaf subjects, the experimenter will have to be more of a medical detective than he would in working with hearing subjects. There are sometimes other physical abnormalities in the deaf child, and deaf child, and deafness may only be one mani-
festation of a syndrome. This is frequently true when Rubella has caused deafness, and the experimenter should be aware of such conditions so that his judgement of the child's physical development will not be colored.

There is one more important point that must be made pertaining to the experimenter's preparation and expectations in dealing with children who use signs alone: this is the necessity of becoming competent in signing before your introduction to the child, which was perhaps the most serious oversight in the project I am working with. The experimenter should realize the importance of presenting himself as a person with whom it is possible to communicate from the very start, if only because of the emotional considerations remarked on before. For the sociolinguist who plans to study the codes or styles of his subjects, too, this signing competence will be useful to give the experimenter the option of presenting himself as either a signing or speaking person. For instance, I am working with a 23-month-old hearing child with one hearing parent and one deaf parent. She seems to have the following styles: to people she notices her hearing mother using speech alone to, who speaks; to people who are signed to (these are the low-verbal deaf, and the child's older brother is a member of this group), she signs to; and to people who are both signed and spoken to (where mouthing or speaking softly are sometimes used instead of normal speech), she combines signs with whispering. I would have liked to have had the option of presenting myself as a low- or high verbal deaf person when first introduced to her, as it is rather hard to be present at a sufficient number of times when she has occasion to interact with deaf people with these differing capabilities. (note: seems to be too late now, since once she connects a style with a particular person, she sticks to it.)

Other difficulties may arise when the experimenter who is trying to learn sign language. Here, it is absolutely necessary to study with an instructor who uses the regional signs of the area in which the experimenter plans to work. I made the mistake of innocently assuming that all handbooks on signing were more or less standardized, only to discover that the manual I was using was written by a Mid-west signer. Since I attempted to learn some signs on my own before beginning formal instruction, there were many embarrassing mala-propisms in class: the most salient in my mind (for obvious reasons, I think) concerns my usage of a Midwest sign for "airplane" which is the California slang for "I love you." Similar mistakes can be avoided by early enrollment
in a sign class; there will usually be a Mental Health Services center in the larger cities of the experimenter's area which can advise him of the location of these classes. There is no simple, neat, and organized method yet devised for writing down signs, and the experimenter will, at some point, have to resort to the literature on signing. He should, however, keep the dialect bias of the two most widely-used and popular books in mind, both of which are in Midwestern signs: these are David O. Watson's *Talk with Your Hands* (available from the author, Winneconne, Wis., 1964), which is the more substantial treatment, containing elaborate drawings and examples of conversation; and Louie J. Fant's *Say It with Hands* (Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C., 1964), which is a shorter and more basic work. The advantage of Lottie Riekelof's *Talk to the Deaf* (Springfield, Mass., 1963) is its use of photographs rather than the sometimes ambiguous and confusing drawings of Watson and Fant. There is also a sign language dictionary written by W.C. Stokoe, but this is more an application of the unwieldy system of sign-notation created by Stokoe than a practical reference book for the experimenter.

Another area in which the experimenter studying language acquisition in the deaf will have problems largely unforeseen in the Field Manual is that of discovering parallels in signs to the concepts of phoneme, morpheme, allophone, allomorph, and so on. Although there is an unpublished thesis written on the syntax of sign language, there are relatively few works which give an organized account of the sign counterparts to these lower-level concepts and a reformulation of them to fit the requirements of sign language. The two that I think are regarded as based on linguistic principles (and therefore free from the haphazard kind of overgeneralization often issued by the oralist deaf educator, i.e., "sign language is inferior to spoken language because you can't express abstract terms, because tense is optional, etc.") are Bernard T. Tervoort's "Esoteric Symbolism in the Communication Behavior of Young Deaf Children" (in *American Annals of the Deaf*, Nov. 1961, Vol. 106, No. 5, pp. 436-480) and W.C. Stokoe's *Sign Language Structure: An Outline of the Visual Communication Systems of the American Deaf* (University of Buffalo Studies in Linguistics: Occasional Paper No. 8, Buffalo, New York, 1960). The first is especially helpful in finding equivalents to supersegmental phenomena in sign language: for instance, the author cites examples from his studies with Dutch and
American deaf children aged seven to twelve to uphold his hypothesis that mimicry and an expanded or truncated version of the normal sign to the same end that the speaking child uses intonation. Tervoort's analysis is directed to finding whole units of meaningful sign, however, and will therefore not help the psycho-and sociolinguist attempting to go below what might be called "morphemic" level. Stokoe's system will be of more use here: Stokoe's subjects were the adult deaf of Gallaudet College for the Deaf, and he arrived at his analysis by watching filmed conversations between them. Stokoe considers his system a parallel to a phonemic inventory, and most of his work is in finding the complements to the phone and phoneme. (note: this is quite a brief synopsis of Stokoe's system, actually, and the Field Manual inclusion would warrant a more detailed one.) He describes signs as made up of a series of contrasted movements that are patterned and form a system. These movements differ systematically with respect to location (a tab, in Stokoe's formulation), configuration (a dez), movement (a sig), and the part of the body they use as a reference. Stokoe has the chereme as an analogue to the phoneme, and defines it as "that set of positions, configurations, or motions which function identically in the language; the structure point of sign language." (I think, if a selection on deaf children is added, the "Table of Symbols" found on pp. 71-74 of Stokoe's book should be reproduced; it is not a particularly easy system to learn, but it seems to be the only complete and formal one going, and will help the experimenter describe the child's versions of adult signs, which is especially important in investigating whether they differ from the adult signs in some regular way.)

The experimenter will also find it necessary to find equivalent ways of testing the linguistic competence of the signing or signing-and-speaking child. Once the idea of imitation has been grasped by the child, there would seem to be no particular problems connected with that type of experiment: the one great caution that should be given to the experimenter is that he must constantly be on guard against the temptation to consider sign language a direct translation of spoken English syntax. (This warning holds generally for sign-to-spoken English translation, where similarities between the two codes may cause the experimenter to credit the child with extra word or inflection because these are necessary in the spoken translation; and the reverse problem, of course.) The many inflections which are available for Berko's experiments in
morphological competence simply do not exist in English signing. There are, of course, finger-spelled tense inflections and plurals, but these are a sure sign to the deaf that the signer is not a native signer and is subject to much interference from the spoken language. Some inflections similar to those mentioned in the Field Manual I have noted are the signs for -er (the agentive suffix), and -er and -est (the comparative and superlative suffixes). The experimenter may also expect to find a primitive grammar in the signing child similar to the initial appearance of the pivot class-open class combination in the speaking child. As far as I can tell from the children I have been working with, this construction is found in such usages of the deaf or hearing-signing child as the signs for more eat, where more is a pivot sign and eat may be replaced by other appropriate signs; and as the signs for Baby crying, where the sign for Baby is the open class sign and crying the pivot sign.

The problem of inventing nonsense signs through which he may test the signing child's ability to handle inflections and other questions of sign language morphology will usually be solved by the children themselves. The experimenter will find that the children readily invent new signs for unfamiliar objects, and that individual families often have private signs which replace the normal adult usage in signing to the child; both of these prove excellent sources of signs which will be suitably meaningless outside of the families in which they were invented, and at the same time fit the "morpheme-structure conditions" of signing which the experimenter may be too inexperienced to handle at first. One example is a sign designating any fierce-looking, toothy beast, created by a 2.5-year-old child: a finger caught suddenly between clenched teeth (since the child is hearing, there is an optional growl sometimes included).

More pertinent to sociolinguistics, and definitely deserving further research, are address system and baby-talk style used in signing. The "name sign" of a person is simply the finger-spelled initial of the person's first or last name; if a married woman, the initial of her maiden name is sometimes retained in preference to her married name. Associated with the initial is usually a place on the body where the letter is signed, a place which may be symbolic of the person's personal or physical characteristics or occupation: a person with a prominent nose may have their initial signed along-side the nose; a psychiatrist may have the sign for "Doctor" plus the initial of the last name signed on the forehead. Somewhat akin to the use of nicknames is
the increasingly personal number of variants which may be added when greater familiarity is reached. The psychiatrist of the previous example, for instance reports that her deaf students began by addressing her as "Doctor S." signed on the forehead, which, when she got to know them better, gave way to "Doctor H." the initial for her first name, signed in the same place. At a still later date, she got to know some students on a social level as well, and on one occasion brought her boyfriend to a party given by one of the students. News of her romantic interest apparently spread fast, for when she returned to teach her class the following Monday, she found she had been given a third alternate name sign: "Doctor H." signed on the heart. Signs for all the kin terms exist, and it would be interesting for the experimenter to study the acquisition of these address terms and nicknames in signing children.

Attitudes of parents toward baby-talk style and their characteristic behavior when using this style is another fruitful area for study. I have noticed that signing mothers sometimes use signs which I know to be incorrect, yet are vaguely recognizable as the standard signs. When I ask them why, they respond that the child is too young to make the proper sign, and their version is "simpler." This simplicity, as is often the case with spoken baby-talk lexicon, is often imaginary, at least as far as ease of movement and economy of motion are concerned. Sometimes, as I have mentioned, there are "family signs" parallel to the "family words" of spoken baby-talk. I have noticed the same "baby-sign" versions of adult signs in two separate families, both of whom designate them as "family signs." Perhaps there are general characteristics of "baby-signing" to be specified in much the same way as are Ferguson's possible baby-talk universals; at any rate, more work would be necessary to state the complete characteristics of baby-signing and the relation of these to baby-talk. I have also noticed a definite shift in the complexity of signing syntax when the addressee changes from adult to child: there is an overall reduction in length, increased number of \( \text{N} \overline{\text{V}} \text{N} \) and \( \text{N} \overline{\text{V}} \text{PredNom} \) sentences, and almost exclusive use of concrete nouns. All of these recall the similar characteristics of baby-talk style.

Another problem, unique to work with signing or signing-speaking children, is the necessity of a videotape machine to replace the tape recorder. Since the children I have been working with do not go much beyond the initial two-word construction stage, a combination of fast note-taking and speaking out
laid into a tape recorder has sufficed so far. The project has recently bought videotape equipment, and I have no doubt this will be indispensable for an accurate study of the later stages of the children's grammars, and for a description of their use of styles and codes. The proposed section in the Field Manual will have to include, therefore, some instruction in videotape techniques.

The difficulties in obtaining the parents' permission to use videotapes at all bring up the many similarities between the linguistic situation in the deaf community and in the newly-Westernized bilingual or diglossic country, as described in the Manual. There are striking parallels both in the social attitudes and linguistic beliefs and in the strategies and discretion the experimenter will have to use as a result of these attitudes and beliefs. In the Manual section on "Multilingualism and Multidialectism," for instance, the experimenter will do well to use the sample questions regarding values concerning languages (p. 178), as well as additional questions specifically designed for the signing-speaking dichotomy. I have already suggested that the experimenter is likely to encounter such opinions as the impossibility of expressing abstract and logical thought in signing. In addition, further experiments may disclose that greater intelligence is imputed to the high-verbal deaf and to the spoken variety of English in general; that the interference of signs or sign syntax into spoken English is discouraged; and that those fluent in spoken English are thought of as the more ambitious members of the community, those who have the greatest leadership potential. These are, of course, only guesses on my part, and hints of what I think would be discovered with more lengthy research. Because of the hierarchy of the deaf community, where the high-verbal deaf are the elite, and because they are the first members of the community the experimenter is likely to meet, some of the admonitions given in the Manual under "Problems of Social Change" (p. 87) about Westernized informants are also applicable. Since the speech of the high-verbal deaf is much easier for the experimenter to understand, unless he is already used to deaf speech, it is they that he will probably choose for his informants, assistants, and interpreters. As with the Westernized bilingual, however, the high-verbal deaf constitute a marginal part of their own subculture. This situation may not immediately occur to the experimenter, who is in the position of studying a small minority within his own culture; he may not expect to find people judged by the type of educational philosophy they espouse, the fine points of what may seem at first
to him a very unified communication system, or other criteria which appear to
him "foreign" in his own culture. In reality, he will find that the same ten-
dency to give the experimenter the information they think he wants, such as
describing a more complicated, spoken English translation of a low-verbal deaf
person's signing. This would be in accordance with the higher value placed on
spoken interference into signing. Parents are also prone to give this type of
misinformation; sometimes the intent to deceive is not intentional, but the
parent or informant will try to give the experimenter the picture of the deaf
community which they think will be best received by the experimenter's superiors.
Boese has reported that, while he was conducting a wide-scale survey on the
communicative practices of the deaf. One question concerned the particular
places or situations in which the deaf person spoke or signed; in tabulating
the results, he noticed that a great many of the deaf, whom he knew personally,
gave "speaking" answers he knew to be wrong. When he asked them about their
misrepresentations, most replied that they realized when they signed and when
they spoke, but did not want to get him in trouble by admitting that they signed
most of the time.

Attitudes such as these reflect the long-standing oral-manual controversy
in the education of the deaf and give the experimenter some idea of how strong
the fears and prejudices stemming from it still are. If the experimenter intends
to do any work with the formal education of deaf children, or if his subjects
attend any of the classes for deaf children, he should be forewarned that his
psycholinguistic knowledge that any one communication system is as good as any
other should be temporarily abandoned. These schools are virtually all oralist,
and from my own experiences, I can predict that the unusual and vehement ans-
wers that the experimenter will derive from linguistic beliefs interviews with
oralist educators and oralist parents will write his thesis for him. The fol-
lowing is an excerpt from a conversation with the head therapist in an oralist
school for the deaf. I was innocent of the school's oralist policies at the
outset, but gradually realized the doctor's persuasion:

(Discussing instruction in a class for three-year-old deaf
children, few of whom had any residual hearing at all.)

Ex: How do you communicate with the children?

Doctor S.: Well, our philosophy is that, if we put enough
language in to the children—and I'm talking about language,
not speech—we figure that eventually something has to come
out.
EX: What's the difference between language and speech?

Dr. S.: We try to use words in context, not just speak to them. At this age, though, we think they're really too young to have anything forced on them, you know. I've read in the biographies of many deaf people who say that they weren't ready to use language until they were twelve or so; then they say, it just dawned on them, all of a sudden...

EX: Then you don't try to teach them to speak?

Dr. S.: No, no, not yet.

EX: (taking the plunge) Do you use signs?

Dr. S.: Well, no; none of the children know signs. We use gestures a lot with them.

Upon further investigation, I discovered that some of the "gestures" used by Dr. S. were very similar to the standard signs, although he did not know signs. In order to prevent what could become a heated exchange, and thereby cause the experimenter to lose some of his subjects, I recommend that he be aware of the philosophy of as many of the people in the deaf community with whom he will come in contact with before he meets them. To help the experimenter understand the background of the oral-manual controversy and the rationale of each side's stand, these books will be useful: Herbert R. Kohl's "The Education of the Deaf Child as a Culturally-Deprived Individual" (in The Deaf American, April 1967, pp.7-10) and his Language and Education of the Deaf (Center for Urban Education, New York, 1967); and Kathryn Meadow's The Effect of Early Manual Communication and Family Climate on the Deaf Child's Development (University of California, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley 1967) and her "The Multiple Dilemmas of the Parents of Deaf Children" (in The California News, Vol. 83, No. 6, (Feb. 1968), pp. 1-4).

Another interesting aspect of working with deaf children is the opportunity to study how their hearing siblings and other neighborhood children use signs. I do not know that this fits into any category pertinent to socio- or psycholinguistics; it might serve, by merely noting that other children the deaf child interacts with know signs, as an indication of a wider available communication network. A three-year-old deaf child I am working with has a two-year-old hearing brother with a very sophisticated grammar, but almost unintelligible phonological system. Whenever someone cannot understand the two-year-old's
speech, he will resort to signs after a few unsuccessful repetitions. Other
cchildren sometimes reserve signs for labelling games; the two-year-old just
mentioned has a routine of naming five or six animals by signs alone and in
a fixed order.
Observations of a Mother-Child Interaction

Sybillyn Mehan
Like many of us in the summer workshops who viewed the videotapes made by Barry Gordon\(^1\) of his 17-month-old daughter, Heida, and her mother, Cathy Gordon, I was struck by the tremendous effort, or so it seemed, on the part of the parents and the child to communicate with each other. One can think of an adult model of communication as consisting of (at least) two interlocutors who share a common grammar and have access to a common lexicon. However, in the situation before us of a 17-month-old child and her parents, neither a common lexicon nor a shared grammar can be assumed. Clearly the adults bring a lexicon and a grammar to the scene, but what the child brings is undetermined. Solely on the basis of this one 75 sec. instance of communication which comprises the data before us, I cannot construct either a grammar or a lexicon for Heida.\(^2\) Despite this curiously unbalanced situation, many of us who viewed the videotapes felt that Heida was communicating with her parents and they with her. What then, do we observing take to be communication in this setting? For the

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1. Barry Gordon, a graduate student in psychology at Berkeley, very graciously made available these videotapes for our viewing and discussion.

2. To construct a lexicon for Heida, one would need to know what distinct utterances, perhaps "words", Heida had at the time the tape was made. With vocables that seemed to occur with many intonation and intensity patterns, one would have to look for regular occurrences of the vocables in specific contexts. Dr. Charles Ferguson, in one session, suggested that despite the independent variability of the phonological material, e.g., /ne, eh/, one could perhaps separate the vocable(s) into morphemes. Such a semantic separation is not possible on the basis of this 75 sec, as there are not enough instances of the contexts in which the vocables occur.
purposes of this analysis, I should like to talk about communication as the joint accomplishment of understanding. That is, that an interlocutor can act upon the talk or movements of another interlocutor. This acting upon, be it talk or movement, I will take as constituting interpretation. The purpose of the present analysis is to describe the interaction between Heida and her parents as a first approximation to the question of how understanding is, or perhaps is not, accomplished among them.

The first question I had as I viewed the tapes, and the reason for selecting this particular 75 sec. slice of tape, was: How does Heida get her parents to focus on something she appears to want? By the same token, how do the parents get Heida to pay attention to or look at something they want her to; in other words, how is commonality of focus obtained? This question of focus has given rise to other considerations, and what I should like to offer here are some possible things to look at in this particular 75 sec. sequence. I will follow a few of these considerations through the entire sequence to see in what ways they provide a perspective for observing the data.

Let us first look at the gross movements of the participants in this scene. What are their spatial relationships to each other in the on-going scene? In the following figure the general movements of Heida, her mother, and father are diagramed.
Figure 1. Movements of Heida and her parents
What can we learn from observing the movements of the participants toward and away from each other? Is it possible to say that Heida gets her parents to look at what she "wants"; can we see the parents maintaining their initial positions for 50 sec. as treating Heida as an equal participant in this scene? Or is this just an instance of their relaxation of control of their child's activity as long as it in no way can harm her and does not require their intervention? Is their paying attention to Heida simply an artifact of the fact that she is being filmed? Obviously, we as observers have no way of knowing Heida's intentions or if she has an intention. It looks as though the movement that takes her off the couch and away from her mother melts into the movements that bring her back toward her mother to the fireplace which, perhaps, attracts her attention. In her reaching out and looking at the fireplace she may notice the graham cracker. If she does indeed see the graham cracker and want it (or a fresh one from the kitchen), all we have as an indication of her directing the focus of her parents' activity is the length of time she maintains her position before the fireplace -- 20 sec. before her parents come over to her and 14 sec. after they join her there. Is that evidence enough for an observer to impute intentionality to Heida; is it even evidence enough that her parents see her stance in front of the fireplace as intentional? I have said that I would take an interlocutor's acting upon the talk or movements of another as constituting an interpretation. It seems as though Heida's
parents act upon her movements or talk in that they come to her at the fireplace. Further Heida, herself, seems to act upon the last movement of her mother in this scene in that she follows her away from the fireplace to the kitchen.

By repeated viewings of the 75 sec. of videotape it was possible to (1) write down the verbal string of each participant, (2) construct the setting in terms of the movements of the participants toward and away from each other, and (3) coordinate movements of the major body parts with the verbal string. The coordination of body movements and talk was possible only for Heida since there was only one camera in use, and it was focused upon her. Thus the data tells us very little concerning the non-verbal input to Heida. We were, however, able to ask: What is Heida doing with her body when she talks or when her parents are talking? Are there any gestures or are there features of gesture and sound or gesture or sound that accompany her focusing on her mother as opposed to her looking at the fireplace?

Consider, first, the verbal string for Heida as given in Appendix I. What sounds can be distinguished; what is their phonological shape? Does a certain specifiable vocable always occur with the same intonation, loudness, and duration? Or do

3. My husband, Bud Mehan, spent many hours viewing the tape with me and constructing the detailed description given in Appendix I.
we hear short sounds vs. long sounds, loud vs. soft, rising vs. falling intonation, and do these features spread across all the distinguishable utterances? Does any sound seem to have a given meaning?

Solely by listening to the verbal stream in this 75 sec., it does not appear possible to assign phonologically distinct vocables such as /ne/ or /a ye ye ye/ a specific meaning. If we look at features of these utterances we can observe that a short, slightly rising sound, whether /eh/ or /ne/ is directed toward the fireplace (see Appendix II), while a longer, comparatively louder sound is directed toward the mother. As Dr. Ferguson suggested (cf. footnote 2) for vocables which appear to be in "equal variation," e.g., /ne/ and /eh/, one might try to assign meaning by looking at "sociolinguistic" factors. Along these lines one might suggest that a loud sound of longer duration, whatever the intonation, when accompanied by the clenching of a fist seems to mean "demanding." With short, slightly rising sounds, when Heida's focus is directed toward the fireplace, the gesture accompanying is one in which the fingers of the hands are outstretched though her arms may be raised or down at her sides. Heida's fists are never clenched when she is looking into the fireplace only when she is looking at her mother (though, of course, they are not always clenched when she is looking at her mother).
Assignment of meaning by reference to context probably requires more than this 75 sec. slice of tape. In the 25 sec. that Heida stands in front of the fireplace (see Appendices I and II) she says /ne/ six out of the twelve times that she speaks. Twice her gaze is at the fireplace, twice at her mother, and twice it moves back and forth from her father to her mother to the fireplace. The vocable /ne/ is accompanied by: no arm and hand movement, a clenched fist, fingers extended, arms pumping up and down, and a head nod. The occurrence of /ne/ and a specific intonation, intensity, and gesture are not consistent. The tape just does not provide enough instances of the contexts in which /ne/ occurs.

However, on the basis of the analysis of the congruence of phonological material and gestures or points of focus, one might, perhaps, consider looking at other sequences of tape taken at about this same time to see if there are regular occurrences of certain combinations of vocable, focus, gesture, intonation, intensity, and duration. For example, does it hold in other contexts that a clenched fist plus /ne/ can be used to distinguish whether Heida is looking at some object or at her mother? Would such a statement provide greater evidence for attributing a 'meaning' to /ne/ + intonation + gesture + focus? The analysis of Heida's verbal stream and congruent body movements suggest that, for an observer, and perhaps even for the parent, understanding Heida is not simply a matter of listening
to what she says while keeping an eye out for a special cuing
gesture.

Such an admission brings me to the next consideration, namely, what efforts do Heida's parents make, throughout the interchange, to understand what she is saying and doing? Further, can we detect efforts on Heida's part to get her parents to look at what she appears to "want"? One approach to this question treats communication as the creating or accomplishing of understanding between adult interlocutors who use "interpretive procedures" (Cicourel, forthcoming) or [the "documentary method of interpretation" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 76-103)]. The interpretive procedures are in the form of a series of statements about what every interlocutor must know and use to make sense of or assign meaning to the ongoing situation in which he finds himself. It is assumed that the interpretive procedures are features of and evidenced in any interaction. The data to which the interpretive procedures are to be applied (or the data gathered by the use of the interpretive procedures) is the talk of the interlocutors. The model assumes that evidence for members' making sense of their environment can be inferred from their talk. Members give accounts of their activities, and, in order to give these accounts, it is assumed that interpretive work must have been done. Applying this model to the 75 sec. before us entails going through the interchange looking for the making sense or
accomplishment of understanding on the part of each interlocutor by the use of the interpretive procedures. However, in doing this it must be remembered that the model was designed for describing adult interaction, and what we have before us is the interaction between an adult and a child. Do we find evidence of sense making only on the part of the adult, or does the child say or do anything that can be taken as making sense? In this question I am asking what is the status of the child qua interlocutor.

From the beginning, accounts are offered by the mother for Heida's actions. When Heida throws down the book and climbs off the couch, her mother says, "Heida is very emotional these days." When Heida walks across the room her mother asks, "What are you doing?" Later, when Heida is in front of the fireplace, her mother says, "It seems like she wants the fire on...hot, hot, ne ne, sometimes she says that for hot." And after Cathy (the mother) has joined Heida at the fireplace, she says, "Oh, I think she wants the graham cracker." These are examples of the mother trying to make sense of what her child does and says.

The accounts Cathy gives of her daughter's activities change during the course of these very activities, that is, at one point Cathy says "I think she wants the fire on," and later she says, "I think she wants the graham cracker." Cathy does not carry one account throughout the whole scene, but rather her account is in-
fluenced by Heida's on-going activities, and one account gives way to other accounts [cf. Cicourel (forthcoming, p. 20) and Garfinkel (1967, p. 89) the "retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence"].

Cathy's statements "Heida's very emotional these days" and "What are you doing?" seem to indicate that she is imputing to Heida the capacity for emotion and intended action. Her direction to Heida to "Come and get your brown furry bear" assumes implicitly that Heida knows what "brown furry bear" means; it assumes that Heida can understand speech [cf. Cicourel (forthcoming, p. 18) "the etc. notion"]. Note here, that Cathy uses talk to get Heida's attention rather than carrying her over to the brown furry bear or displaying the bear to her. It may be that in response to Heida's "um" and gaze at her, Cathy repeats her direction. If so, this might be taken to indicate that Cathy assigns Heida the status of a hearer, if only for that moment, who can understand.

When Heida breaks in upon Cathy's repeating "Come and get your brown furry bear that is so close to me right now," Cathy finishes the sentence and there is a pause. This pause (of 12 sec.) may suggest that Cathy is listening to Heida, that she is, for that time, assigning Heida status as a speaker. Cathy may have just made this statement to keep Heida in the room (although Heida has already stopped at the beginning of Cathy's statement, see Appendix I). Heida never focuses on the brown furry bear, and Cathy drops this as a topic of conversation as soon as Heida offers some substitutable
point of focus. Further indication that Cathy is indeed listening to Heida is seen in Cathy's account of what Heida said and did during that 12 sec. Cathy assigns a meaning to Heida's utterances in saying, "Hot, hot, ne, ne, sometimes she says that for hot." Here it seems that Cathy is taking this particular utterance of Heida's to be intentional and interpretable [cf. Cicourel (forthcoming, p. 19) "normal form" and Garfinkel (1967, p. 94) "management of perceivedly normal values"].

Cathy's statement, "It seems like she wants the fire on..." may be directed to Barry or to herself, but it does not seem to be directed to Heida. At that moment, Heida is a topic of conversation, not a participant in the conversation. Another instance of Heida as topic of conversation is the interchange between Cathy and Barry in which they talk about turning the fire on. Their talk goes on right over Heida's. It can be observed, then, that at times Cathy does and at times she does not treat Heida as a speaker-hearer. Sometimes Heida's activities are taken to be interpretable in themselves, and Cathy acts upon them. At other times Cathy turns elsewhere (to herself or Barry) for an explanation or suspends interpretation until she has more to go on. On the basis of Cathy's accounts of Heida's talk and actions, I think it is possible to say that Heida's membership as a participant in the conversation is not taken for granted throughout the conversation. Rather, her status in the on-going
conversation is subject to moment-to-moment changes: as an equal participant ("Oh, do you want that graham cracker in the fire?"); as a less-than-equal participant ("I'll go get you a graham cracker, o.k., you wait here."); and as a topic of conversation ("I think she wants that graham cracker in the fire."). Is this change in accorded membership a general feature of conversations between adults and children? If so, is it a feature unique to interchange between adults and children, not to be found in adult interchanges or those between children? In Cathy's talk I believe there is evidence of her effort to interpret Heida's talk and movements. Is there any indication in Heida's talk and/or actions that she is working to interpret what her mother says?

In the case of the mother, the data available to us as observers is, with very few exceptions, her talk. In the case of the child, I have tried to show the difficulty in assigning a meaning to her talk and actions, thus it may be that data is not available to which the interpretive procedures may be applied. If this is a correct interpretation, one suggestion might be to look at other interactions between Heida and her mother both prior to and after the one being discussed and focus on the mother's efforts to understand Heida's activities. For example, at an earlier time, did the mother speak less? Would she have been more likely to bring the bear over to Heida than
to tell Heida to come and get the bear? The question here is how the mother's accordance of status to the child as a participant in the conversation changes over time?

I stated at the beginning of this paper that my purpose was to described the interaction between Heida and her parents as a first approximation to the question of how understanding is, or is not, accomplished. I think I have shown that the mother tries to interpret the child's utterances and actions. These efforts may be analyzed by applying the documentary method to the mother's talk taken as data. When it comes to showing the child's effort to understand her parent's talk I find myself on very shaky ground. I have, first of all, only one instance of an interchange between the child and her parents. This limits me in constructing a lexicon for Heida's talk or for her talk and movements. I have no theory which tells me what to take as data and no methods whereby to analyze the child's utterances and movements. Perhaps some of the considerations mentioned above will be of help in thinking about what a model of child-adult communication might look like. If communication is being accomplished in this 75 sec., it appears to be solely a construction by the mother; the child's part in it remains unavailable to an observer.
References


APPENDIX I

Heida and her Mother (C) are sitting on the couch looking at a picture book.

H shrieks (a long vocable which rises and then falls). She throws the book off her lap, gets off the couch, and walks away from the couch.

(Ç): Heida's very emotional these days.

—— 5 sec. ———— 5 sec. ———— 5 sec. ———— 5 sec. ————
...(H): /uh/ (rises, then falls). She is panting as she walks in the direction of the kitchen door. She takes two steps from the couch, slows, and stops by the entrance to the kitchen.

(C): What are you doing? (normal tone)

(H): Heida, come and get your...

Still panting goes up on the balls of her feet, takes a little step, and then begins a turn away from the kitchen door by pivoting on the ball of her right foot and throwing her left foot over. She is now at right angles to the kitchen doorway.

Body: erect
Eyes and head: toward mother who is on the couch
Arms: hang loosely
Hands: cupped
(C): brown furry bear.

(H) takes two steps till she stops in front of the fireplace.

- Body: erect
- Eyes and head: toward mother
- Arms: down at sides
- Hands: cupped, palms in toward leg, fingers extended.
- Feet: ahead, so that she is perpendicular to the fireplace.

(H): /um/ (short, rising)

[It is possible that Heida's /um/ gets (C) to repeat what she has just said.]

---- 5 sec. ----------------------------------

(C): Come and get your brown

(H) Head and eyes turn toward fireplace, torso pivots at waist so that shoulders and upper body are oriented at a 30 deg. angle toward the fireplace. She bends her knees slightly.

- L arm: raised from side to shoulder, outstretched in direction of fireplace.
- L hand: fingers outstretched, thumb bends.
- R arm: remains down at side
- R hand: opening and closing, fingers outstretched and down, palms in toward leg
- Feet: remain perpendicular to fireplace
furry bear that is...

(H): /ah, ah/ (short, rising sound)

[(H) breaks in upon (C)'s sentence.]

...so close to me right now.

(H)

Head and eyes: turn toward (C)

Torso: pivots at waist with slight knee bend so that

Shoulders and upper body: are straight ahead ( )

L arm: drops down to side
R arm: remains at side

Hands: open, palms in toward legs, fingers extended

Feet: remain pointed straight ahead and perpendicular to the fireplace.

[H]'s turn away from the fireplace toward her mother described above takes place very, very quickly.]

----------- 5 sec. ---------------
(H): / ne / (short, rising)

Head and eyes: remain oriented toward and down into fireplace. Body: remains oriented toward fireplace.
L arm and hand: not visible
R arm and hand: arm at side, hand open.

--- 5 sec. ---

(H): / ne / (long, louder, and rising)

Head and eyes: raise from their downward orientation to a level gaze at (C). Torso: pivots at waist. Shoulders and upper body: straight ahead. L arm and hand: not visible. R elbow: bends. R hand: clenches into a fist with index finger remaining pointed down. [Fist clenches is released at exact conclusion of ne. ] Feet: remain perpendicular to the fireplace.

(H): (drawing in a deep breath) /eh/ (loud, long, and slightly falling)

Arms: both are down at sides. R hand: makes fist which remains clenched for the duration of /eh/.
(C): It seems like she wants the fire on. I think she wants the fire on in the fireplace.

(H) turns eyes and head away from (C) back toward the fireplace.

Torso: pivots at waist so shoulders and upper body: are oriented toward fireplace
L arm/hand: not visible
R arm/hand: hang loosely downward at side, hands cupped
Feet: straight ahead

[H is quiet, she seems to be maintaining her posture and looking into the fireplace.]

(C): "Hot, hot, ne, ne... (softer)

(H) Head and eyes: turn toward (C)
Torso: pivots at waist so that shoulders and upper body: are straight ahead
L arm and hand: not visible
R arm and hand: extended downward at side
Feet: straight ahead

---------------------- 4 sec. ----------------------

---------------------- 3 sec. ----------------------
(C): ...sometimes she says that for hot.

(H): (mouth wide open, scream) /uh/ (loud, but softer than the loudest /ne/, even intonation)

Head: toward (C)
Eyes: tightened into slits
Shoulders and body: remain straight ahead, shoulders are tightened
Arms: both go out from sides, to a 45-deg angle, they rise with intensity of scream
Hands and fingers: clenched into fists
Feet: straight ahead

Father (B) walking back and forth from camera to fireplace says, "Well."

(H): /ne/ (loud, long, rises then falls)
(C): Should I turn it on?

(H) bends forward from waist and pivots, bends knees, and looks low into the fireplace.
L arm/hand: not visible
R arm/hand: arm at side, hand is palm down toward floor, fingers extended.

-------------------------------------------------- 3 sec. --------------------------------------------------
(B) is talking while walking, says, "Ah, yeah, I can't do anything with ah the fire there..."

(C): Oh.

(B) and (C) have now both moved to where (H) stands in front of the fireplace.

(H): "...but let's turn it on and see if she wants it."

(H) as he says this, looks at (B), pivots at waist, and looks over her right shoulder toward (B) who is now moving back to the camera. Feet: remain stationary

(C): o.k.

[As (H)'s parents move toward the fireplace, her hands are no longer clenched with fists opening and closing, but fingers of her right hand are extended. Her left hand cannot be seen.]
(C): Oh, do you want that graham cracker in the fire?
   [This is the loudest of C's utterances]

(H) / ne, ne / (softer, rising)

(H) Head: nods, full up and down
    Hamm: outstretched, hand drops
    from C's knee to her side

   [H's hands do not move after this.]
(C): Oh, I think she wants the graham cracker.

(H): /ne/ (short, soft, rising)

(H) Head and eyes: turn toward fireplace

(C): ... I'll go get you a graham cracker, o.k.? You wait here.

(H) Head and eyes: into fireplace

(C) leaves the room and then,

(H) pivots on the ball of her right foot, swings left leg over, walks out, following (C) to kitchen
During the past three years, several of us working with a research institute concerned with developing educational programs for the so-called "culturally deprived" or "educationally deprived" became concerned about the direction in which most of these programs were moving. Several factors stuck out in our minds, these were:

1. We observed a variety of behaviors in the classrooms some of which were no different from those usually observed in "middle class" schools, e.g., there were children who did actively explore their environment, who were reading competently at an early age, etc. Moreover, teachers in these classes often referred to some few children in their class as "their middle-class children".

2. Any adequate theory of social class differences must include some concept of mechanism of mobility between different levels. Most programs of educational enrichment are based on a very simple-minded deficit theory which proposes that these children are lacking something and that remediation should take the form of filling in the gaps in their experience. Our own view proposes that some children are learning something different in the years before school and what they are learning in some way conflicts with the social and developmental expectations of the school. One of the things that concerned us was finding out just what some children are learning before coming to school. Moreover, the current theories of deprivation have worked on the assumption that these children are deficient in cognitive skills and that skills learning is all that must be introduced. Our own bias is towards an affectively-loaded view of learning. We felt that one could find affective predictors of school performance which are as powerful as, if not more powerful, than cognitive predictors. In sum, we felt that the social relationships which surround learning are as important as specific content of the learning.
3. There is a fashionable claim that whatever problems these children have are derived from an underdeveloped ability to speak standard English. It is often heard that "these" children do not speak and cannot think.

4. Anecdotal incidents were numerous and often they pointed us in the direction of an "interference" model similar to much recent theorizing in clinical psychology.

Citing in part from our progress report, the study is conceived in the following manner.

The study is to be carried out in two parts. The first will attempt to study the relationship between the affective and cognitive dimensions of child-rearing that exist in lower class families. The second will attempt to relate systematic differences in these aspects of child-rearing to aspects of cognitive differentiation in lower class families.

It is our contention that some combination of affective and cognitive variables constitutes an orientation or climate for learning in the home, which will be systematically related to cognitive development in children. This position is related to the theoretical position of Bernstein who characterizes family relationships as personal or positional. Family interaction characterized by the acceptance of valuing of individual differences are called personal-relationships, where interactions governed by status and role-relationships of the family members are called positional relationships. One further contention is that the orientation of the parent may exist independent of his or her cognitive skills. Thus, while a parent may have a limited range of vocabulary, his or her style (attitude and behavior) in relating to the child may act to either facilitate or hinder the child's cognitive development.

In the past year, since funding, our efforts have been directed mainly toward the development of an interview schedule to be used to a sample
of close to 150 mothers in each phase of the study. A critical evaluation of
items from other interviews led us to a more parsimonious conception of the
child's early environment in terms of learning experiences in four major areas:
feelings (both intra-and interpersonal), role relationships, object relationships
(formal knowledge of conventional rules, concepts, and categories) and institu-
tional relationships. We felt that these four areas were likely to reflect the
bulk of a mother's system of beliefs and values—in other words, of her implicit
system of child rearing—which could be transmitted to her child either implicitly
or through direct teaching. In the area of feelings, we are investigating a
mother's feelings about herself and her own upbringing, the expression of feelings
between mother and child and between husband and wife. In the area of role rela-
tionships, we are investigating a mother's view of the roles of husband, wife,
father, mother, certain aspects of work rules, and level of aspiration for her
child. In the area of object relationships, we are investi-
gating the child's
experience with formal teaching in the home and the mother's response to the
child's speech and question-asking. In the area of institutions, we are investi-
gating a mother's attitudes toward work, school and certain aspects of level of
aspiration. In addition, we are studying the areas of obedience and praise, dis-
cipline and aggression.

In writing the questions, we evolved a five-step schema which attempts to
obtain information about the mother's general theory of child rearing as well
as specific behaviors with respect to her child and her feelings about her be-
behavior. The first step concerns the mother's basic beliefs in a particular area,
such as work roles. The second step asks the mother about a given behavior con-
cerning her child or herself as may be salient. The third step asks for the mother's
feelings about that behavior. The fourth step inquires into her response to
that behavior where applicable. And the fifth step asks for the mother's feel-
ings about her response. By examining the interrelationships among these levels,
we will be able to find out the consistency between a mother's stated beliefs and
her reported feelings and behavior in each of the various areas, as well as the
consistency of these stated beliefs, feelings and behaviors across all of the major
areas.

One of the major problems with interview data is that the results are depen-
dent upon how free the interviewee feels to express him- or herself and how rele-
ant the questions posed seem to him or her. Because of these difficulties, we
strove to find Negro, research interviewers who are themselves of lower SES back-
ground and who are themselves mothers intimately acquainted with the problems of
rearing children in the ghetto communities. Our interviewer-informants have been working with us since the funding of the project in March, 1967. They have worked not only on the initial construction of the interview schedule but have carried out all the pilot runs of schedule as well. Currently, they are completing the interviews for the first part of the study. The completed factor analysis of these data should be available by November 1.

Attached to this report are 1) some intercorrelations from the pilot interviews done last spring and 2) a copy of the interview schedule used for the first part of the study. A final and fifth revision of the schedule will be done in early November.
Correlations from the pilot data
of the child rearing questionnaire--IDS
(A. Sher)

I. Children should obey immediately (5 = very important)
+ how upset mother gets when he doesn't obey
+ how important it is that husband and wife go out together
+ how important it is that family has the # of children it plans
to have
+ how important it is for the husband and wife to be able to
express anger
+ who made the decision about what mother should do when she grew up

II. How mother feels when child doesn't obey immediately (5 = very upset)
- how often child is read to
- amount mother has done to improve the schools
+ mother's feelings when child talks (5 = upset)
+ what mother does or says when child talks (5 = punishes)
+ mother's feelings when child asks lots of questions (5 = very upset)
+ children should obey immediately
+ what mother does when child doesn't obey immediately (5 = beat)
+ what mother does when child talks back (5 = punishes)
+ how often mother beats the child
+ how often mother tells child she won't love him anymore
+ how often mother has time to play with child when child asks
+ how often child says critical things
+ how often child says affectionate things
+ how often mother says affectionate things
+ how mother feels about punishing (5 = what should do)
+ how often mother says angry things
+ how important it is for husband and wife to satisfy each other
sexually
+ how important it is for husband and wife to be able to express
anger
+ how important that husband and wife accept each other just as they
are
+ home atmosphere of mother when she was young (5 = very tense)

III. How often upbringer of mother hugged or kissed mother for no
particular reason
+ # of cultural activities of mother or others take the children
+ elaborated description of a good school
+ amount that can be done to improve the schools (5 = a lot)
- mother's feelings when child talks (1 = likes it, 5 = very upset)
- what mother does when child talks (1 = listens or talks, 5 = punishes)
- children should ask lots of questions (5 = strongly disagrees)
+ what mother does if child talks back (1 = talks, 5 = punishes)
III. (Continued)

+ how often mother tells child he's done something wrong without getting upset
+ how often mother has time to play with child when child asks
+ how often mother plays with child on impulse
+ how often mother gets angry with child
- how mother feels when child wants attention (1 = likes it, 5 = upset)
+ how easy or hard for child to do what mother wants him to do in the future (5 = easy)
- how important it is for husband and wife to like to do the same things
- how important it is for husband and wife to try to understand each other
- way to settle disagreement is for wife to give in to husband (5 = very good)
+ how often mother said affectionate things to her upbringer
+ how often upbringer showed she understood when mother was upset or unhappy
+ how often upbringer said affectionate things to mother
+ how often upbringer told mother she wouldn't love her anymore
+ how consistent was upbringer in punishing
- how angry mother felt when punished
- how much mother feels she can do when everything is going wrong (5 = nothing)

IV. How upbringer rewarded good behavior (5 = strong verbal praise)

- how often mother talks with child about school
+ children should be seen and not heard (5 = strongly disagree)
- how angry child feels when punished
- how father felt about mother's being pregnant (5 = very unhappy)
- empey rating of work mother would like child to do (5 = high ses job)
+ how hard or easy for child to do above job preference (5 = very easy)
+ how often upbringer said affectionate things to mother
- how often mother felt ashamed of herself when punished
GAMES, GROUPS, AND CHILDREN

Janet Tallman

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For John Gumperz
In this paper I examine two questions: what can be said about the social structure of a child's interactive world from an analysis of the kinds of speech play used, and how do children orient themselves to one another through the use of speech play. The first question indicates an analysis of speech play as a reflection of structure; the second indicates an analytical approach to the function of speech play. I would like to here review literature applicable to these questions, suggest further possible lines of study, and note briefly methodological problems which must be considered and dealt with before further research toward answers to these questions can continue.

The general framework in which I am working with these questions has three main components that need delimitation: children, groups and speech play. At this point only loose directing definitions can be made. The literature shows a wide range of definition. By children I mean infants to perhaps middle teen-agers. For group, Homans's definition is broad enough for my purpose:

a number of persons who communicate with one another often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all others, not at second hand, through other people, but face to face.

(1950, 1)

Homans also states "a group is defined by the interactions of its members" (1950, 84). By speech play I mean ritualized, repetitive verbal patterns. Included would be, for example, riddles, puns, songs, nursery rhymes, slang word games, taunts, and so on. These components are meaningful to social beings only in relation to one another, in the pattern of interaction.
However, they can be separated from one another and discussed separately, or compared to components outside the framework of the questions. For example, children can be compared to adults, groups can be compared to crowds, and speech play can be compared to normal or non-ritual speech. Two of the components can be discussed without reference to the third. Examples would be studies of the grammatical development of individual children, non-verbal behavior of children in groups, or speech play as it changes with the size of the group. Emphasis in studies can rest on one on another or the third component. The Opies did an extensive collection of what they called the language and lore of school children, emphasizing the forms of speech play (1959). Piaget's work emphasizes the individual child's cognitive development rather than his games or his group behavior (1962). Conklin studying speech play among unmarried youth stresses the nature of interaction in his description (Hymes, 1964). In the following section I shall review some of the literature on these various components and their relationships, specifying more precisely what is known.

From several sources comes indication that in all cultures children have forms of speech play in which are highly structured, widespread, and pervasive in their interactions. In large part this world is unknown to or ignored by adults. The Opies describe and explain this as follows:

By using slang, local dialect, a multiplicity of cultural terms, word twistings, codes, and sign language, children communicate with each other in ways which outsiders are unable to understand, and thus satisfy an impulse common to all underdogs.

For example, they found among five thousand British school children from
age six to fourteen two types of oral lore. They found:

the slany superficial lore of comic songs, jokes, catch phrases, fashionable adjectives, slick names and crazes, in short that noise which is usually the first that is encountered on the playground and street, spreads everywhere, but generally speaking is transitory. The dialectical lore flows more quietly but deeper; it is the language of the children’s darker doings: playing truant, giving warning, sneaking, swearing, snivelling, tormenting, and fighting. It belongs to all time, but is limited in locality.

Joy Watts, observing in Berkeley, discovered well defined, patterned taunting behavior among grade school children (n.d.), and Claudia Mitchell reported finding in Oakland several instances of speech play, including nursery rhymes, alphabet games, role playing games, poems, songs, stories, riddles, and word games. The presence of these games showed some correlation with age, with role playing games appearing especially among the older children, and nursery rhymes among children as early as age two (Workshop 8-15-68). The Opies indicate that in England these extensively used games and oral traditions tend to disappear in children around the age of fourteen (209), although Mitchell notes that at about this age elaborated verbal play such as the dozens begins (8-15-68).

Research indicates that some speech play is learned from adults, but the majority comes from the children’s peers: (Mitchell 8-15-68; Field Manual-Ervin Tripp xi, Bruckman 169; Opie and Opie 204; among others). The children themselves indicate awareness of the fact that they have special ways of speaking, although in the presence of non-children they tend to become self-conscious about their private behavior (Watts 13-14; Field Manual-Bruckman 170) and about their casual speech (Mitchell 8-15-68), and

-3-
change their way of communicating (Blount Workshop 8-8-68; Bernstein 181).

In some speech play, especially in role playing games, indications exist of sex differences (Mitchell 8-15-68; Conklin 1962). Density of population in the area where children are playing and presence or absence of rule-structured games seem to be contextual determinants for presence of taunting behavior (Watts 7). Watts also found that children show a tendency to form in unstructured situations groups of two or three, and recognize group boundaries at least by age six. Although schools are important for bringing children together into group interaction and speech play, speech play and grouping exist also in cultures where formal schools are not part of a child's routine, in, for example, Nigeria (Vlasek) and Samoa (Kernan).

The findings of the literature reviewed so far give hints of some of the variables involved in analysing especially the first question asked at the beginning of this paper. Much more information is needed before generalizations can be made about cultural, age, sex, class, status and role differences about children using speech play in groups, and about the upper and lower limits of age for use of different types of speech play. Taxonomies of the types of speech play found in many cultures are needed for cross-cultural comparative data. The Opies' work shows a large variety of forms of speech play in only one culture. Other categories and other emphases in other cultures must be documented. Settings for group interaction, sizes of group formed, ages when grouping begins, opportunities for children to meet and form groups, need description. General cultural limitations and influences on children, on their games, and on their groups must be documented.
For example, questions must be asked about the general process of socialization in each culture, about adult attitudes toward speech play and interaction, and about the opportunity for freedom from adult supervision. (See in the Field Manual especially sections 3.5.3--Bruckman and 3.5.5.--Stross for further development of these research ideas).

Some of the studies under review include material relevant to questions about the function of speech play, with speech play seen as a group boundary-defining and maintaining device. Bernstein's review of the Opie and Opie book mentioned above is especially rich in ideas about the function of speech play.

Children must learn in becoming social how to interact with others—most important, with their peers. From the literature come hints that the interactions are highly normative and conservative in nature, and that language, specifically, inhibits deviancy and maintains boundaries. According to the Opies' work, unpopular children were those who deviated from what other children defined as normal. Most frequently the targets of abuse were those peers who were too bright or too slow, too conceited, too well dressed, who wouldn't play or wouldn't play fairly, who were cowards or bullies. They were people who passed information to adults, or tried to be friends with the teacher. Especially disliked were those who seemed crazy, completely rejecting the rules given. The Opies note that "the most common and pertinent (and most resented) of all child-to-child abuse is saying that a person is daft in the head" (Ch. 10, 179). The children had a variety of ways of punishing those who broke rules. They isolated, intimidated, demanded retribution from, fought and subjected to ordeals,
torture and hair-pulling the "offenders of the juvenile code" (Ch. 10).

J. R. Firth, talking about the use of language in interaction, says as language is a way of dealing with people and things, a way of behaving and making others behave, we could add many types of function—wishing, blessing, cursing, boasting, the language of challenge and appeal, or with intent to cold shoulder, to belittle, to annoy or hurt, even to a declaration of enmity. The use of words to inhibit hostile action or to delay or modify it, or to conceal one's intentions, are very interesting and important "meanings". Nor must we forget the language of social flattery and love making, of praise and blame, or propaganda and persuasion. (In Hymes, 68)

The Opies give examples in children's speech play corresponding to almost all of Firth's categories. They include verbal expressions of affirmation, testing, truthfulness, betting, bargain making, swopping, giving, gaining possession, claiming precedence, avoiding, secret keeping, truce making and surrender (Ch. 8). They also indicate the existence of rhymes "which are essential to the regulation of the children's games and their relationship with each other" (17).

Children draw lines between themselves as members of a group and the rest of the world outside with verbal play, and structure and hierarchies are established within the group through such devices as riddles and verbal games (Bernstein workshop 8-15-69). Watts notes from her study that "taunting is only one of a large number of basically linguistic behaviors directed toward solidification of group identity for individual members of the group" (12). The Opies mention that a stranger wanting to join a group must first learn the local language, "the 'legislative' language of his new playmates. He must learn the local names for the playground games and the expressions
used while playing them. Unless he does this, he will not merely be thought peculiar, he will not be understood" (15).

Bernstein in his review of the Opies' book outlined some of the characteristics of the language used by children:

Because the speech is public, the language of a group, not an individual, the terms are global, direct, concrete, and activity dominated, and refer to a class of contents rather than a specific one, e.g., teachers, cowards, adults, school dinners, gluttons, etc. (180)

He also indicated that the function of the speech is to maximize solidarity of the group and minimize individual differences (179-180); and he points out the impersonality of ritualized speech, which "insulates or protects the child from responsibility or guilt for what he has said or done... and opens the way for rigid adherence to standards and ritualization which reinforce almost a tribal, mechanical solidarity" (180). Finally, he states that "the language use makes the child sensitive to the significance of role and status and also to the customary relationships connecting and legitimizing the social positions within his peer group" (180).

With speech play children socialize one another by directives, and control group boundaries, delineation of hierarchies within a group, and content of what can be discussed. Expressions of the whole range of emotions from love to fear and hate to trust are defined in ritual speech, thus making idiosyncratic interpersonal responses difficult to formulate. "The speech form does not 'cause' the subculture. The former is a function of the latter. As the Opies say, the child learns his society through the language, and in its use a form of social tie is progressively strengthened" (Bernstein 180).
The choice of method used to gather material pertinent to questions asked in this paper is limited by one major consideration: a child's interaction with his peers is private. An adult entering the child's world disrupts that interaction. Therefore, the methods used must allow for the unobtrusiveness of the observer. Several methods have already been used in gathering material, and several more could be developed.

The Opies did not explicitly spell out what methods they used for getting their material, but indications are that they had students in many high schools throughout Great Britain record instances of verbal play. Claudia Mitchell in Oakland became a familiar and so ignored person in the children's play area, and gathered information as she watched the children play. Keith Kernan in Samoa allowed the area in and around his living area to be used as a play area by the children, and thus got instances of unself-conscious games and speech play. Joy Watts observing in playgrounds in the Bay Area found that her out of place presence and her tape recorder inhibited and intimidated the children and stopped them in their spontaneous play. Unobtrusive observation by a person familiar and not distracting to the children seems to be the method with the most potential for gathering information on speech play. However, if the culture being studied is one in which the children have a large area in which to move, and habitually get away from the sight and hearing of adults, this method is inapplicable.

Other methods include using children as informants, although the truly secret information no self-respecting and well-integrated child should be expected or encouraged to divulge. An articulate child moving into a new
group might be encouraged, trained, and willing to share with another outsider the new speech behaviors he has to learn to be accepted by the group. The children of the observer could be sent into the children's culture as trained natives. Abby Sher in her work noted that children in a schoolroom situation could be taught to wear with little self-consciousness recording devices hooked up to a tape recorder. However, self recording is limited by the child's awareness of the importance of maintaining distance between him and non-children. Some amount of verbal play of a non-secretive sort can be gleaned from arranged interviews and story telling situations between the child and the observer, and carefully contrived play areas where children could play under the discrete eye of the observer also were to produce material.

This short review of the literature gives indications that some material exists applicable to the questions asked in the beginning of this paper. Definitive statements about the child's interactive world and speech play in this world cannot yet be made. Only more specific questions may be asked. I hold some general assumptions about a child's world which serve as a framework for such questions. Children actively form groups, socialize one another, and share a distinctive and definable sub-culture with its own morals, rules, age-grading, roles and so on. They use speech play to establish and express norms, to create and sustain boundaries, and to bring into line deviant members of the group. They practice roles and practice speaking through verbal routines and rituals. The values and problems of their groups are highly ritualized, shared by a large number of peers, and coded and reflected in the content of their verbal play. The questions which develop are many. Some question relate to the structure of the larger society in
which the children live. For example, what do adults feel about the child and the child's right to privacy? What are the sources from which children draw their speech play? How much choice do they have in the selection of sources? Do they have a right to privacy? By what means does the larger culture maintain boundaries, i.e. through verbal, physical, supernatural or other sanctions? Other questions relate to what speech-play data can say about the child's interaction with his world and with the larger world. What is the relation between adult verbal games and children's? What conclusions about group solidarity can be drawn when a child's world shows a relatively great amount of ritualization; a relatively small amount? What can be said about the child's view of the world, his sense of relevance and that which is problematic—from the amount and kind of speech play he uses?

The conclusion should by now be obvious. Much more work needs doing. Many gaps in our knowledge appear when we try to describe the child's view of the world. How he manages the complex transition from asocial infant to culture-sharing adult can be fruitfully examined through the speech play he uses for organizing and shaping up his universe.

REFERENCES


From workshops, private conversations, and sections of the manual: Ben Alpert, Jan Brodey, Susan Ervin-Tripp, Keith Herman, Claudia Mitchell, Brian Stross, and Rod Vlasek.
In 1966-67 I took part in a project (sponsored by OEO and directed by Dell Hymes) which was concerned with gathering information and developing concepts for the study of systems of language use. We were interested in developing a way to deal with language as one communicative means used in social action. As such we were concerned with speech. We wished to approach it as rule governed behavior learned by members of a society and sensitive to social contexts. It was felt that cultures might differ significantly in the roles they assigned to language in education and socialization, and that these differences of belief, practice and value not only impinge on the acquisition of language but also on the transmission of knowledge by means of language. If one views language as part of a "communicative economy", subject to cultural differences in patterning just as any other resource, then one must agree that the child acquires not only linguistic codes but also a sociolinguistic system comprising rules of use and evaluations of these usages.

Even though very little systematic ethnography has been focused on this area, we decided to utilize existing ethnographic data to document cross-cultural differences and to identify some of their dimensions.

An initial set of notes and queries was derived by Dr. Hymes and his research assistants from works on socialization and language acquisition. This guide was used as a topical framework for a preliminary search of the Human Relations Area Files. It was set up in order to make an ethnographic approach more explicit, and to give researchers an idea both of the breadth of the concern and the kinds of specific answers we were seeking.

The search of HRAF and also several guides to the study of socialization revealed that on cross-cultural differences in the role of language in education and socialization, there was an implicit (if not sometimes explicit) neglect of such language differences. The language categories already present in the HRAF World Outline of Cultures contained information such as the genetic classification of the language spoken by members of societies under study. The concept of a repertoire of codes and sub-codes was never mentioned nor suggested as a possibility. Occasionally these categories included etymologies of words or phrases which ethnographers considered

strange or interesting. In the other categories one could find information on language, but because the criteria for organizing and classifying this kind of information were so inconsistent one could not retrieve comparable data for cross-cultural purposes.

An important finding was that one could gain more insight into the speech system by reading the whole work. It was obvious that one needed to infer the significance which the author himself saw in the events he reported in order to understand what they meant for that society. One must have the context in which the author makes the comment because there is no common language among ethnographers for talking about these concerns.

The results of this search convinced us that we needed in-depth studies of particular societies. Reports were written on 23 societies in North, Middle, South America, India, Oceania, East and West Africa. Each graduate assistant worked in his own area of specialization and used the Guide mentioned above to insure comparability of findings and consistency of approach. My own work was done on Margaret Read's ethnography of the Ngoni of Malawi, and on Otto Raum's ethnography of childhood in Chagga society in Tanzania.

This paper will discuss the results of my own work on these two societies and will also utilize for comparative purposes work done by another research assistant, Helen Hogan, on two West African societies--Dogon, Ashanti.

Before discussing results, I would like to point out some problems encountered in reading ethnographies using an approach different from that of the author and to get data on which he did not intend to focus. One must ask what for the author constitutes data. One can then infer what kind of behavior the author is referring to when he does comment on language use. In order to answer this question one must know the theoretical framework of the ethnography, the author's purpose in writing it, and the field methods he used. As an example of the kind of reasoning involved, I shall discuss the answers to these questions when asked about the works of Raum and Read.

I was fortunate to find the works of these two authors because both focus on child socialization and both pay unusually close attention to language. Their stated purposes were quite similar—each wished to show that the complex of indigenous beliefs and practices which anthropologists call "socialization" contains both a fully developed philosophy of education and
efficient means for implementing it. Each defines socialization as the conscious and unconscious teaching to children the values, beliefs, and customs of their culture by parents or any other person who is a member of the society. The focus on socialization results in each author asking questions on the same range of topics and investigating the same aspect of social organization—the family system and its functions as an educating institution. Both stress the discontinuity between this system of education and that of the school. Ultimately each hopes that his work will make educators in Africa aware of the need to take into consideration what the child has learned and how he learned it before he comes to school for the first time.

Now although this goal sounds like it should lead to research on the learning process (perhaps comparing the kinds of things learned through different modes of transmitting ideas), it does not. This is because both authors see the problem as one of conflicting bodies of knowledge rather than one of conflicting means of communication. The authors focus on the content of bodies of knowledge, belief, value as expressed verbally in responses to interviews or as inferred from patterns of behavior and informants' exegeses on these.

This brings us to the field methods and how these reveal data sources. Both Read and Raum lived in the area of study for a number of years. Read stayed three years and lived in several Ngoni villages while Raum, the son of a missionary, spent the major part of his life in Chagga country but never lived in Chagga villages. Read worked through Nyanja, the lingua franca in Malawi, while Raum worked in Chagga and Swahili. Read used the methods of intensive interviewing and observations of village life (it is assumed), while Raum used written and oral reports of village life given him by five students at a teacher training course he was giving. Three of these men were Christian, and one out of the five was considered poor. Raum was frank in stating that he made few personal observations and that those which he did make were of children playing outdoors as he passed them. Raum was more explicit about his sources of information, thus one can only guess that Read's methods were similar to those reported by other British social anthropologists.

It is obvious that neither Read nor Raum was interested in the actual verbal output of children or adults. And neither intended to note patterns of speech. However, by focusing on custom—norms of behavior both ideal and observed—and by questioning for the values parents felt that children should
be taught, each has uncovered an important aspect of what should go into an ethnography of speaking. As far as finding dimensions of social context which underlie speech events, one can only attempt inferences drawn from reports of speech events such as life cycle and other important rituals, greetings, etc., and any other speech behavior which was reported because (1) it re-occurred or (2) because the parents made explicit note of its importance. Under "practices" one can find patterns of behavior which have to do with use of language—some are observations of actual behavior and others are parents' reports of what children should be taught or be able to do at various ages with regard to speaking.

It is important to ask why it is that each author pays attention to language and what kind of attention it is. Raum's approach includes "linguistic development" as one of the aspects of socialization which ought to be covered in any report. His method was to have three students with young children keep diaries of their children's progress. It is difficult therefore to interpret the results reported in this section. On the one hand if Raum did little editing and gave no special instructions to his students, these are the perfect ethnographic records for speech—they are reports produced by native speakers drawing on their own underlying speech system to interpret their children's speech output. One major finding thus is that all the parents interpreted their young children's first attempts at direct communication to be instrumental or persuasive in nature. Specifically, all reported that children tried to paly off parents and older siblings one against the other in order to gain greatest personal advantage. This is reported for children as young as two years. This use of speech was expected of children and pleased the parents who felt it revealed cleverness on the part of young children.

Another finding is that all parents noticed phonological "errors", tried to describe them as systematic, and recognized that they change as children get older. Parents again expected these errors to occur but did not correct them systematically. Another intriguing report is that children of 1.6 and up to 3 who are beginning to talk, leave off many of the noun class concord and other types of word like locatives and prepositional expressions (Chagga is a Bantu language with the typical large number of noun classes). These are the kinds of elements that Brown calls "functors". and which he finds American and Russian children omit systematically at certain
ages. The problem here is that one cannot tell what is the actual behavior of children and parents and what is the expected ideal pattern reported by parents. Again, one cannot use these reports to document actual verbal output patterns.

The last problem with Raum's material is that because parents were encouraged to pay close attention to speech and to see it as somehow patterned (at the least, developmentally), one cannot say how much and what aspects of their reporting would be noticed by most Chagga parents.

Read did not take this kind of systematic attitude to language. Her attention was drawn to speech by Ngoni informants themselves, who consider how a child speaks to be a major part of Ngoni identity, and an important way of differentiating themselves from the peoples among whom they live. (Since the Ngoni came into Malawi as a conquering people they are concerned to maintain an aristocratic position in their areas). Thus, Read notes the ideal speech patterns for children and adults, and observes to see how they are taught and how parents check on their children's progress. As with most ethnographers even when she gives the ideal criteria for "good speech", one cannot be sure exactly what the implications of these are for speech when it is actually produced in social situations. However, when she reports that when the child is in certain stages the parents try to see that he learns correct linguistic etiquette. They listen to his speech and correct him often, in contrast with the Chagga case. By the time the child was 12 or so he was expected to speak with no grammatical or pronunciation mistakes and to organize what he had to say in a "succinct and direct" manner. Parents felt that children could learn these skills by taking messages for adults from place to place, and so parents frequently relied on children for intra- and inter-village communication. Children then got practice in delivery and organization of speech. The greatest public test of children's speaking ability was their performance in courts and at the kraal gate where all the men in the upper three age-grades gather to discuss public and social affairs of the village. Younger boys were allowed to sit and listen to these discussions, could not participate, but were expected to store up questions to ask parents later. The speech of young men should become dignified, controlled and respectful. It should be succinct, should narrate incidents in "proper" order, and should use "good language". None of these adjectives are analyzed in.
Read was also forced to notice code repertoire (although she did not see it as such) because the old Ngoni language (closely related to Zulu, the group from which the Ngoni broke off) was dying out. It was a high prestige language but most speakers were old people. However even the use of Ngoni words and phrases conferred prestige. Although she noted this she did not note the contextual features governing such switching. Although she noticed that there was patterned vocabulary switching and that Ngoni had special functions in contemporary culture, her observations were so unsystematic one could never attempt to infer rules of code-switching from the material she presents.

Read's work however is of special interest because she reports a case in which competence in use of language rather than formal code competence alone is of explicit cultural importance. It would seem that since the Ngoni people had lived so long in Malawi and had used KiNyanja (the lingua franca there) that Ngoni itself was dying out. The patterns and valued ways of using language rose to paramount importance (for the reasons given above) and have lasted longer than the particular code which gave rise to them.

It is obvious then that one must read judiciously in existing ethnographies when searching for information about speaking patterns. In general, it is very difficult to write rules for such events as switching, but as will soon be seen, one can identify speech events and can begin description of them.
In this section I shall compare and contrast the reported beliefs about language and its use and patterns of speech as gathered and organized by myself and Helen Hogan for Chagga, Ngoni, Ashanti and Dogon societies. The Chagga are a patrilineal agricultural people about 200,000 strong who live in northeastern Tanzania at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro and in the area just south of it. The Ngoni are a patrilineal herding people who migrated to areas in Malawi, Rhodesia, Zambia and Tanzania after breaking away from the Zulu empire which existed in the 19th century in Southern Africa. Their original language was closely related to those spoken by groups such as the Zulu and Sotho. In these new areas, the Ngoni language has nearly died out and although they try to maintain a position of conquering aristocrats, they have gradually begun to learn and use the languages of the original inhabitants. The Ashanti are a large group of matrilineal agricultural people living in Ghana. The Dogon are a patrilineal savannah agriculturalist group living in the area north of Ivory Coast.

Although the information gathered for each of these groups is not of exactly the same kind, they do present some interesting contrasts in several areas: code repertoire and language allegiences, beliefs about the nature of language learning, the role of the child as a participant in communicative events, sexual role differentiation with regard to speech, speech events and situations connected with social control and the teaching of skills. For each of these topics, I shall compare or contrast as many of the four societies as possible.

I

The Ngoni have a word for those characteristics which one can be born with (mabididwe). These include one's physical characteristics, posture, carriage, control of temper, temperament (meanness, prone to jealousy, etc.), and the following speech related items—speaking voice quality, power to command, and "true" eloquence. Training can overcome weaknesses in voice quality, pronunciation, polite use of language, but eloquence "comes from the chest", and no manner of training can give this skill to any person. Children are watched carefully by parents to see if they have this gift. Those who appear to have it are encouraged to develop it, perhaps one day to become praise singers to the chief (the most prestigious speech role).

"True" eloquence, however, is not a role requirement set up for every
child to attain; skillful language use on the other hand is indeed an important component of Ngoni identity. It has been verbalized as such by parents, and has been elaborated to such an extent that parents can articulate the criteria they use to evaluate their children's progress.

An important question to ask here is what social circumstances have led to a major criterion of Ngoni ethnic identity being the skill with which one uses language. Here one must refer to the history and social situation of the Ngoni in their new northern areas. They came from a highly organized herding society, set up for military occupation of new territories. They entered the new areas as conquerors and set up a political hierarchy which superseded that of the inhabitants. However, once settled in these areas they could no longer be migrating herders. They had to settle permanently among the inhabitants. There was much intermarriage and in most cases the children claimed membership in the corporate kin groups of the Ngoni side of the family. During this initial period of cultural contact and political domination, the Ngoni referred to their very different language as a major means of differentiating themselves from all others. The fact that a child spoke Ngoni implied that both his parents were descendants of the original conquerors. However, because of the high degree of intermarriage, the Ngoni language began to die out. By the time Read did her work (1930) it had almost disappeared in one of the Malawi kingdoms and only old people spoke it in the other.

The Ngoni have always referred to language (that is, code in itself) as a criterion of their own and others' ethnic identity, and in fact language has remained a major component in ethnic identity. However, social circumstances have made it impossible to refer only to the code. Instead, a Ngoni differentiates himself from the original inhabitants and from descendants of intertribal marriages by his style of language use (any language he happens to speak), his voice modulation, his control of expressed emotion, and his physical carriage. Here, language use, and not a particular code, functions to differentiate the Ngoni from others in every communicative situation. The linguistic situation of the Ngoni could well be studied from the viewpoint of the "preservation of self", as this is explicitly the function served by the great attention paid to use of language. How these things are communicated to children will be discussed below and compared with other groups' philosophies.
In contrast, the Dogon believe that language learning is the result of a process of physical development in which the growth of certain clavicular bones facilitates the acquisition of speech. An infant is born without speech, but with the capability of acquiring it. Until he can eat semi-solid foods, these clavicular bones cannot begin to develop. Acquisition of speech proceeds gradually as food and liquids are taken in. To help its development, the child receives four names, each of which is associated with the development of one of the four clavicular gains. Speech will be completely mature at the time of marriage, when physical maturity has also been attained. Thus no person is born with a special speaking endowment. Each man (and there is a difference between men and women which will be discussed later) with the attainment of maturity and with experience can learn to speak well.

While the Dogon differ on their theory of language learning, they are similar to the Ngoni in that speaking skill is very highly valued and is a major role requirement in Dogon identity. The interesting contrast is that the Dogon emphasize a different aspect of language: regional variety (including characteristic usages and forms).

The Dogon are a patrilineal people whose kin groups occupy large section or neighborhood, a few of which make up each village. There is strong identification with the patrilineal kin group of one’s father (even with women who upon marriage must give up membership in this group and become members of that of their husband). Identification with the father’s kin group for both men and women means speaking the ‘dialect’ of the father’s village. This language is explicitly contrasted with that of the mother, who because of village exogamy comes from a different village (and often region). Women, however, use their own fathers' language to their young children. Until a child is weaned and walking about with other children, he hears only his mother’s language most of the day. (Unfortunately there is no discussion of what aspects of language are recognized as constituting the difference between his mother’s and father’s languages. However, I do have comments to the effect that these differences are very early made explicit to children of both sexes.)

Further, the Dogon recognize not only village language differences, they also group these varieties into regional sub-languages which have the names
of the geographical areas they occupy. These language areas are ranked as to which speaks the "purest" variety of Dogon. (Again, unfortunately, the criteria for pureness are not available in the literature. Here is one area for research that would be of importance to child acquisition of speech because the criteria are not only widely shared, they are explicitly communicated to children). Those who have relatives in that area, often send their sons to live with these relatives so that they can learn to speak the pure dialect with skill. It is not known what specific advantages accrue to speakers of one or another regional dialect, but there is one great advantage to being recognized as a good speaker. Often a woman who is being courted by two or more men will choose the better speaker over the others.

Thus a Dogon child's attention is very early drawn to criteria of differentiation of village varieties and criteria of excellence in use of all of these. He learns those speech peculiarities which are unique to his father's village and those criteria of excellence which are generally shared by the Dogon and which ultimately will be used to judge his speech no matter what variety he is using. A Dogon child learns very early that speech can be expressive of (1) allegiance to a group, here showing solidarity with one's patrilineal corporate kin group; or (2) personal skill and acumen, i.e. it expresses an individual's uniqueness in comparison with his kin or neighbors.

The Chagga present yet a third aspect both of language allegiance and of philosophy of learning. They believe that an infant is born with the capacity to learn language and that no one is born with any special language facility. The process is entirely learned and takes a long time--true skill not being attained until a man reaches 40 or 50 and has entered the highest age grade. Children must learn language as they learn other skills, through a process of practice (speaking) and asking questions and getting answers.

The Chagga, like the Ngoni and Dogon, highly value skill in the use of language, but they emphasize the use of Ki-chagga as opposed to the languages of their neighbors or Kiswahili, an indigenous lingua franca which is now the national language of Tanzania. Children hear their parents speak other languages but at home and in direct address they are spoken to and answer in Kichagga. Three regional dialects are recognized and have names. However, they do not seem to be ranked in any way (as are those of the Dogon) and no special prestige accrues to a good speaker of any of these.
The Chagga also recognize differences between the language of the mother and father. Being a patrilineal people, with village exogamy, the women often come from a different dialect region. (Again no one has investigated the criteria of differentiation which are considered important enough to recognize and explicitly point out to children.) After the child is weaned and walking, parents and especially paternal grandparents pressure the child to use only that of his father. Women eventually begin to use the language of their husband's family. Here, there does not seem to exist the same kind of function of language to express allegiance to the father's kin group, as there is among Dogon women. There is no conflict of identifications as expressed by language.

It is interesting to note that Chagga women (unlike Dogon women) remain members of their father's patrilineal group and can express their allegiance to that group by attendance at ceremonies, fulfillment of kin obligations, and by serving as goodwill ambassadors between their own and their husband's groups.

In the section on differences in men's and women's speech, I shall discuss the problem of using language for identification with sex groups as contrasted with kin groups or tribes. The Dogon, Chagga, Ngoni, and Ashanti seem to present four different ways of using language in this regard.

One last point of contrast is the view in each of these three groups of what constitutes competence in language acquisition. For the Chagga, speaking correctly includes appropriately as well as grammatically. The two are simply not separable. For the Dogon, it seems, the two are indeed separable. One can speak grammatically (and this is an early requirement), but this is not enough. One must use language with subtlety and skill in order to be considered a good speaker. For the Ngoni, it would seem that at one time they did make a distinction between the code per se and the skill one had in using it. For it seems that simply in using Ngoni, a person rose in prestige in social situations. However, this way of viewing language skill seems to have changed. The component of code is no longer distinctive in speech events. The skill of use and the form of the event have now become the distinctive features for conferring prestige on speakers in communicative events.
II

In this section I shall discuss (1) the differing roles and experiences of children in speech situations, (2) parents' expectations of speaking skills for children of differing ages, and (3) means of teaching these skills to children. Although there is not strictly comparable information on the culturally defined stages of the life cycle, I can say something about the role of children of different ages in each of the societies.

Infants in Chagga, Ngoni, and Dogon societies are considered not quite human, and hence, without language. Chagga say the child is natuma— incomplete—until he cuts his first tooth. After this he can receive a name and from then on he is complete—he becomes a member of the mwana age grade, child. Ngoni do not even place the child in an age grade until he is weaned. Then he is abatwana, child. The Dogon consider the newborn infant to be "without speech" because of its incomplete physical development (supra p. 3-4). Ashanti society, however, presents a sharp contrast. Infants are born with knowledge of their own separate language. Therefore, any infant must be kept away from the room in which a birth is taking place lest it tell the baby how hard life is and the latter refuse to come out. (This view of verbal communication as causing disruption of the social order will be discussed later).

In all four societies, the child is generally exclusively in the mother's care and company until about three months after its birth. By that time mothers have resumed full duties and participation in social activities. At this time in Chagga and Ngoni societies, the mother chooses a "nurse" to care for the child during the day. She is usually a female relative (but could be the trustworthy daughter of a neighbor). These girls of between 10 and 16 years of age carry the child about, care for it, and amuse it during the day. Often the child spends from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. in the company of the nurse and her companions (some who are also nurses and who bring their charges to a customary meeting place, some who are not nurses but come to play and talk with their peers). In both societies the child spends the whole day as a hearer in speech situations of the nurse and her peers.

Although it would seem that for both societies the nurse serves the same purpose, her relationship to the child, and her view of him as a communicator is quite different. In both societies the nurse and other females
concerned with the child are anxious to teach him to talk, to sing songs, to do the steps of dances which are done by older children. The nurse encourages all the child’s vocalizations as efforts to speak. In both situations the child is free to make all the kinds of sound he pleases from babbling to screaming. However, in Chagga society the nurse views these as inadequate attempts to communicate and she responds to them only when the child is very insistent. Her main communicative contacts with the child are to teach him to say words and polite phrases, to sing songs and do dance steps, to play games, etc. She does not see him as a competent communicator. Thus she does not initiate those kinds of speech events which need participants of equal competence and between whom information is exchanged.

The Ngoni nurse, on the other hand, views the child as a legitimate participant in conversation with herself, although not yet a competent one. She encourages his vocalizations and responds to them as attempts to converse. She, like the Chagga nurse, feels that it is part of her job to teach the child words, phrases, songs, games, etc. But in addition, she feels it incumbent upon her to talk to the child—find out what he wants, what he is trying to say, and answer him accordingly.

This contrast in communicative experience of young children would be interesting in itself, but it is all the more so when juxtaposed with the parental views of the child’s communicative role in these two societies. In both societies parents consider the child to be a non-understanding hearer. He can sit in on any sort of adult speech situation and not be intruding as long as he does not disrupt it by crying or in some way calling attention to himself in the presence of strangers or important guests. In Ngoni society, as the child gets older, the parents feel he can start controlling his speech and they pressure him to be silent, rather than removing him when he cries. (The importance of being silent for Ngoni speech patterns will be discussed later. It will suffice here to say that it is clear that this is one of the first manifestations of self control required of a child. It is interesting that self control in speech is an earlier requirement than in physical functions.)

In the Chagga case, the child’s communicative experience is one of continuity, he it with parents or with children—he is a non-understanding hearer and thus is given no chance to participate in adult speech events. As a potential participant, however, he can be a learner. That is, he can be a
participant in those speech events which those older than he see as appropriate to use for teaching children how to talk. In the Ngoni case, the child’s communicative experience is one of discontinuity. With parents and other adults, he is not a legitimate participant in speech events. He is a learner and as with the Chagga is a legitimate participant in speech events which adults consider appropriate for teaching the rudiments of language use. Any speech event, however, that presupposes participants of equal competence is not available to him with adults. On the other hand, with the nurse and her peers, the child has a chance to take the speech roles of a competent speaker, even though he is not considered to be one as yet. In fact, his participating in these speech situations is considered a good way for him to learn to speak correctly and appropriately.

The Dogon, in contrast to the Ngoni and Chagga, feel that the child learns to speak only after physical development of a certain kind. While this is going on, the child must be communicated with in very simple language. Thus, the mother and other adults use a baby-talk which is composed mainly of special vocabulary and one or two-word utterances. It is interesting that the parents are concerned with actually communicating with the child. They, therefore, judge the level of his competence and use what they feel to be language which the child can understand and respond to. Here, the child is a legitimate participant in speech events with adults, but the code used, the message forms and the structure of speech events are all tailored to suit communication with an as yet incompetent speaker. Until he has attained a certain level of physical development, this form of communication is considered the appropriate one between the child and all adults. It would be important to know whether his communication with older children is also in this form, or if (as in the Ngoni case) older children take the child as more competent and communicate with him in standard language and speech events. Unfortunately, this information is not available.

Although parents in the four societies view infants and small children in different ways, it is clear that for Dogon, Chagga and Ngoni a major point of discontinuity of communicative experience is the time of walking and weaning. In all three of these patrilineal groups, when a child begins to walk well, the father stops playing with and talking to his girl child. From then on her closest contacts are with her mother, sisters and other female relatives.
and neighbors. On the other hand, the father and the paternal relatives begin to pay much attention to a boy, both by playing with him and by verbally pressuring him to exhibit behavior appropriate to male roles in that society.

In Chagga and Ngoni societies children after weaning are sent to live with or sleep with (respectively) grandparents. In Ngoni society it is felt that sending a child to the paternal grandparents is a necessary part of his education because they begin to remove him from the influence of women, especially non-Ngoni mothers. This is considered the appropriate time to tighten performance requirements for both his verbal and non-verbal behavior. Adults begin to correct the child's errors very frequently, requiring him to correct himself on the spot. They also begin to apply verbal pressure such as direct rebuke and forms of direct and indirect ridicule. Parents also may use physical punishments at this time. However, the child as yet is still not entirely the master of his speech and behavior, so he cannot be held fully responsible.

The Chagga send the child to live with either set of grandparents depending on which ones need him most or are best able to care for him. The stay with the grandparents is considered the time for children to be introduced to the domestic responsibilities required of them. They begin to fulfill the roles appropriate to the sexual division of labor in the Chagga economy. At the same time they are introduced to the teaching situation—in this case the folktale. (The Chagga have a highly developed philosophy and means of teaching their children which will be discussed in detail later).

Grandparents are considered the appropriate people to begin the child's moral education, as they are the senior members of his family and his corporate kin group. At night these elders narrate the tales. The next day, they encourage the children to ask questions about the tales, and they patiently answer each one. For Chagga children, this is an entirely new speech situation. They are, for the first time not only treated as competent participants in speech events, but also are encouraged to initiate conversations with much respected elders.

For the Dogon, the age of three or four is also a point of major discontinuity. (I do not want to assert here that weaning is the turning point because it is not put explicitly that way in the information I have on Dogon. However, I include it here with the other comparisons of discontinuities at weaning because this is the age at which weaning often occurs in many African societies.) I mentioned before that after the child begins to walk well the
mother and all other people stop using baby-talk to him. However, the child often continues to use forms derived from this sub-code. At the age of three for girls and four for boys, the mother ceases to tolerate such "childish speech habits". Boys especially are pressured for the first time to speak only the language of their father's village. Also for the first time children of both sexes are expected to show measurable improvement in pronunciation and to use correct grammatical forms. Finally, children begin for the first time to participate in speech events not especially tailored for incompetent speakers.

It is interesting that in all four societies, children between weaning and adolescence are considered unable to keep secrets or to be appropriately discreet. Each society sees this as a problem and has a way of dealing with it. All of them keep family business and special affairs unknown to the children. Other special subjects are also taboo for discussion with children. Ashanti, Chagga and Ngoni will either give evasive answers to questions on sexual matters. Chagga do not teach the child the words for "meat" or "beer" until they feel he is old enough not to tell the whole neighborhood that his family has these foods in the house. The reason is simple--they will have to share it with all who come calling. This matter of verbal self-control will be discussed later in the section on the role of language in social control.

The second major point of discontinuity in communicative experience occurs in these three societies at the time when a youth is considered eligible for marriage. At this time they are expected to have fully learned the minimal rules of appropriate speech behavior required of adult men and women. The Chagga in particular are quite explicit that they are requiring a change in the youth's usual demeanor. In their initiation ceremonies the speech roles of men and women are verbally set out in the form of principles which should underlie the communicative behavior of each youth after marriage. Women must become quite reserved but keenly observant. They should give out little information about their families but should report much about the affairs and behavior of others (especially that kind of information which pertains to the interests of her husband's family). Men should become discreet but also verbally fluent. They should know what to say in all kinds of social situations. They should especially know what to say to persons of different statuses, and how to handle social relationships with all sorts of people. Men are expected to show great verbal skill in a larger variety of speech situations, while women should show merely discretion.
Ngoni men are expected after the time of marriage to be able to sit with the elders at the kraal gate and discuss with skill and understanding matters of political, legal and social import. They are allowed for the first time to argue cases in court, and to make public addresses at the frequent open meeting held by chiefs to discuss the latest political affairs on the region. Although this may not actually mean that an increased number of topics comes into a youth's range of discussion, it does mean that he becomes a legitimate participant in a wider range of adult speech situations, and is expected to have mastered the forms of two specialized speech events—court argument and public address. Ngoni women are expected to show their skill in language use by running an efficient and peaceful household. They also may for the first time be witnesses in court and they can take part in conversations which their husbands have with important guests. Although this does not call for knowledge of different forms of speech event, it does call for skill to be exhibited on a wider range of topics.

Dogon men and women are expected to learn a number of new topics for discussion as a result of teachings given them before marriage. They are expected to learn a special kind of speech appropriate between husband and wife, and speech appropriate in courting. At marriage a woman's proficiency is expected to reach its highest point and not to get much better. The man, however, is expected to improve both his skill and the range of topics he can discuss. He can do this by attending special teaching sessions on matters of cosmology, mythology, law, inheritance, etc. held by qualified elders in the men's shelter. These sessions, however, can be attended only by those already recognized as good speakers. After marriage, however, all men can sit in the men's shelter and participate in the informal discussions and beer drinking going on there. At these times they both exhibit their skill in language use and improve that skill through additional practice.

I will now turn to a comparison of teaching means and philosophy in the three societies for which information is available on this subject—Chagga, Dogon and Ngoni. In each of these societies, the child between infancy and weaning is able to participate as a legitimate communicator only in those kinds of speech events which are seen as vehicles for teaching him. In the Ngoni case, as we have said earlier, it is only with older children—the nurses—that the child is seen as a possible participant at all. In the Chagga case, the parents and nurse both use a similar form of speech event with the child. Whether they are trying to teach the child to say kin terms, proper greetings
or just new words, the interaction takes the form of a question/answer series. It can be initiated by either the child or the parent, and can be chanted, sung, or spoken. Some of these interactions are traditional games, while others are invented spontaneously by the interlocutors. It is interesting, however, that this form of speech event appears frequently in the sequence of educational means. Each time it appears, although it contains different content and different kinds of vocabulary, the question/answer form is retained. The Dogon, as mentioned earlier, use a form of baby-talk to the child and expect this form of language in return. In all three societies, only after weaning are more complex speech activities thought appropriate for verbal interaction between the child and adults.

All three societies have a concept of sequence both of subjects to be learned and ways of learning them. Least elaborate is that of the Ngoni, who feel that their upbringing of a child is good enough to teach him all he should know without attending any kind of initiation school or receiving explicit instruction from elders. This conscious policy separates them culturally from almost all other groups among whom they live. All others have initiation instruction and elaborate puberty rites. The Ngoni assert that they do not need these because their children learn by being interested in adult affairs and receiving strict training in the institution of the laweni (the boys' dormitory) which is unique to the Ngoni in their areas. The Ngoni restrict the child's attendance at adult events until he has entered the laweni. At that time (appearance of his second teeth), he is encouraged to sit quietly at places such as the kraal gate, the courts, the chief's court, with the father in his daily discussion with friends and important guests. Inside the laweni he receives casual instruction on sexual matters, on courting, and fighting. He learns also by listening to older boys about matters of wider interest like politics, law, etc. By the time he is ready to marry, he should have absorbed enough knowledge about the workings of his society to raise a family and defend their interests.

The laweni and personal observation are two ways older children and adolescents learn the things they need to know to get along as adult members of society. However, learning to speak well is also a requirement of Ngoni education, and for children below adolescence there is a form of speech event which the Ngoni feel is designed especially to give a child practice in speaking correctly and skillfully. This is delivering messages. Children, in fact, carried on a major
communicative network within the village. They took and delivered messages and answers, summoned adults to places and events, informally announced the coming of guests, delivered communications setting up family meetings, etc. All were done using a formal opening and closing (which Read did not make explicit), and a style of message delivery which required concise language, correct grammar and pronunciation, soft voice and respectful demeanor. Requirements of conciseness, correctness, subtlety of expression and dignified and respectful demeanor were all expected to be learned and exhibited later in court argument and at public meetings.

The Chagga and Dogon, in contrast, have not only a sequence of matters to be learned, but they also require different topics to be learned through different means at different stages of life.

One interesting feature which these societies have in common is that although a similar sequence of topics and rites is prescribed for men and women, their actual communicative experience is substantially different. That is, they experience different forms of speech and place differential emphasis on the role of language in these activities. But I shall go into this in detail on the section on men's and women's speech. Here I shall discuss the change of form or different content. This organization of teaching is motivated by expectations of the capability to learn at different ages. The Chagga start with simple question/answer forms played as games in which the message form may be a sentence which must be completed with a one-word answer, or reciprocal chant-game rehearsing the lines of routines such as greeting, thanking, taking leave. When the child goes to the grandparents' he is told folktales (in language simplified to suit his young age). He is expected at any time during the next day to ask questions about the tales, and these will be answered immediately by the grandparent of whom the question was asked. When the child returns home between age eight and eleven, his parents begin to use this question/answer form in more elaborated ways to test how well the child knows kin terms, personal names, honorific titles, terms of address, etc.

The usual domestic and agricultural skills are not verbally explained or elaborated but background knowledge on soil qualities, seed preservation, animal husbandry etc. is passed on verbally, from father to son, mother to daughter. Also at this age and until marriage specialized occupations like bee keeping, metal working, etc. are taught to sons of artisans by their fathers, or to
apprentices who pay a fee to learn the trade. Teaching is done in special sessions during which the expert delivers several entirely verbal explanatory lessons in ordinary conversational language (except for the use of specialized vocabulary). Later lessons are combined with practice which is supervised and which includes verbal elaboration on the required physical skills. Here too the specialist quizzes the apprentices to see what they have learned and is himself responsible for answering all their questions.

The high point and most intensive period of a child's education is the time from circumcision to the end of initiation. During this time boys spend 3 months in an initiation camp (known in some literature as the "bush school"); girls receive special instruction but do not attend school in the same sense. Before talking about this experience in detail, I shall discuss the Dogon educational sequence and then compare puberty education in Dogon and Chagga societies.

In the baby-talk stage, Dogon parents tailor teaching means to the child's judged competence. The mother teaches her child lexical items by pointing to objects which are available to the physical senses and saying the word for them. The child is encouraged to repeat the word until the mother is satisfied with his pronunciation—if he can say it, he has learned it. This association of speech and learning is found all through the Dogon educational process. After the mother ceases to use baby-talk, she starts giving the child a great deal of extra information along with each new word. If it is part of a taxonomy she often explains its place in this classification system and contrasts it with other objects in the same taxonomy. Until puberty, this process of informal elaboration on the meanings of words is one of the appropriate forms of education for both boys and girls.

The second form used with small and pre-adolescent children is the narration of folk-tales. These are told only at night by both men and women to the children. This situation, in fact, is the only one in which the girl is allowed to sit with and learn directly from her father. Girls listen at other times to women speaking about adult affairs. Boys can listen to their fathers and to their other male friends and relatives discussing adult affairs. However, most men prefer the all-adult, all-male company of the men's shelter when they talk and drink beer. The Dogon prefer to give their young people
a sequence of lessons on a range of subjects rather than discussing these informally or answering questions which the children might raise after listening to adult conversations. Here one sees a contrast both with the Ngoni practice of sitting down with an older child some time after the event and answering some of his questions, and with the Chagga practice of answering question as soon as they are raised (or as close to the event which gave rise to the questions as possible).

In both Chagga and Dogon societies, the rite of passage at puberty contains a cycle of initiation ceremonies which include special instruction to novices. Both groups perform circumcision and clitoridectomy after puberty, after which there follows a period of formal instruction on a wide range of topics. For Chagga men, the period during which formal instruction can take place lasts about one year. For Chagga women it only lasts 3 or 4 months. For Dogon women it lasts from the time of first menstruation until marriage (any where for one year to five or six). For Dogon men it lasts from circumcision until about age 22. However, it can last longer if a man wishes to receive further, specialized instruction.

Although I have no information for Dogon on the exact forms of speech used in these lessons, I do know that they are taught by specially qualified elders in a secret language which only men are able to master. This exactly parallels the Chagga pattern in which personnel are specialized for teaching at initiation, speech forms are carried out in a highly metaphorical language which is too esoteric for women and children to understand. Another close parallel is the more elaborate and secret nature of the men's rites as compared with those of the women. A third parallel is that although the range of subjects taught to men is much wider, the actual knowledge of the 2 groups by adulthood is quite similar.

The Dogon sequence for women starts after the first menstruation and confinement in the special menstrual hut. The girls are visited on each subsequent confinement by a senior woman who teaches them 4 bodies of knowledge, each named (the title containing the word for "speech" in every case). They are (1) "speech pertaining to the inside" about household management and cultication, (2) "speech pertaining to the bedroom" ba: maruru, about marriage and maternity, (3) "speech pertaining to the outside" about how to conduct oneself with the husband and his relatives, (4) "hidden speech", about sexual relations and courting, devi sə.: After marriage the
women's formal education is over. However women can learn about mythology, cosmology, intricacies of kin relationships and inheritance, political and legal affairs if they ask their elder female relatives in the context of weaving. This is an exclusive female speech situation during which subjects considered most confidential may be discussed without fear of sanctions being brought or that fact of their discussion being spread to unwanted hearers.

Dogon men, after circumcision, receive instruction from the head of their patrilineal kin group on genealogical relationships, kin terms and responsibilities, history of the kin group and names of its ancestors. Youths can then enter the men's society and receive instruction on the legal, political and social responsibilities of the adult man in Dogon society. This is carried on in a secret language. Not only are the subjects secret, but also the language is disguised to ensure exclusivity of men's knowledge. (However, very senior women can listen in on the lessons outside the men's shelter without fear of becoming barren. This is the punishment with which any woman who listens in on the lessons will meet). At age 22 the men receive 4 days of special instruction on inheritance and marriage, mythology, cosmology. These lessons have a verbal and non-verbal component. The head of the kin group gives the verbal part and his eldest son or successor traces special designs in the dust which amplify the verbal part. Later, a man can attend special instruction given by elders in the men's shelter. He must, however, be a good speaker. These lessons deal with the more esoteric aspect of mythology, the mythological foundations of the social relationships which obtain between kin groups etc. In these lessons the design system used in the former lessons is taught and explained. Although men and women learn a similar range of subjects, the men's knowledge is said to be deeper, and they are said to understand the subjects better than women.

Chagga men go through a series of rites including circumcision calle: ngasi. The rites for women are called shiga and are less extensive and not as physically trying as are the men's. The women's rites although attended exclusively by initiated women, are held in the homestead of the initiate. The men's rites are held in a special initiation camp site and are attended only by initiates, their assistants, and the instructors. Both men's and women's instructors are elders specially trained to perform this function. Their role is named (makuleri) and defined by great age, possession of a large
body of knowledge, and ability to transmit this knowledge in sets of lessons using special didactic songs and highly metaphorical language. In both ceremonies the novice has an assistant (mwichi or morika) who is an older sibling or relative, of whom he is to ask questions about each sets of lessons.

The makuleri in each sets of rites have a formal way of testing whether initiates have learned the information as well as the required formal way of remembering it. The test takes the form, again, of a series of questions and answers. These are traditional formulas taught to initiates by mwichi and morika and memorized so that all goes smoothly at the final test which will be the series of traditional questions put to the initiate by the makuleri.

Girls similarly are tested by the female makuleri and must memorize and then chant the answers to a series of traditional test questions. However, in the boys' rites, the initiates have a chance to go beyond the traditional answers using the metaphorical language of the rites. They can elaborate on answers or give original ones. Those who can go beyond the traditional minimal requirements are later encouraged to take up the role of makuleri. When their younger relatives are initiated they are chosen as mwichi and given second and third opportunities to hear the didactic songs and use the metaphorical language. These young men can also attend the beer parties of elders where again they are tested by the old men who informally challenge their knowledge by tossing traditional questions and riddles at them which come from the lore of the initiation rites. The answers are not memorized here, but rather demonstrate a man's ability to express himself in the language of the initiation rite, which is a highly valued code in Chagga society.

Another similarity in the rituals of Dogon and Chagga, is the use of nonverbal means to supplement the verbal lessons. The Dogon men receive this supplement in the form of designs drawn in the dust. Chagga teachers use a carved stick the symbols on which are used to set out the order of teachings about marriage, sexual relations and child rearing. The only difference is that both boys and girls receive this nonverbal instruction in Chagga society, while only men receive it in Dogon.

Another important similarity is that in each case men instruct men and women instruct women. Men use special secret or esoteric language and women
do not (except in the one case of the traditional questions and answers learned and sung by Chagga girls). Men are required to exhibit verbal skills and to improve them and women are not. This differentiation of men and women occurs in all four societies (although, interestingly enough, not as strictly in Ngoni society). The next section will deal with differences in expectations for men and women, and in their speech.

III.

In all societies but Ngoni, verbal skills and roles which require such skills are identified with men and are generally part of the adult man's role requirements. I shall discuss Ngoni society first because it contrasts with the other 3 societies with respect to differences between men's and women's speech.

In Ngoni society a person's way of speaking is one major way he expresses his Ngoni, and thus aristocratic, identity. In the other 3 societies, male and female capabilities and behavior patterns are differentiated with respect to speech. However, here male-female differentiation or separation is overridden by the political and social importance of a unified Ngoni identity. Thus, both men and women must be able to learn and exhibit those speaking skills which are part of the Ngoni identity. Both men and women may be born with the special speaking skill mentioned earlier (supra p. 2), both may become praise singers, both are required to use language skillfully, and the speech of both is judged according to one set of criteria of excellence. One does not speak like a man or a woman, but rather like a Ngoni.

The Ashanti identify verbal skills with men and expect them to show their ability in a greater variety of speech situations. However, the speech of women is thought to be more natural, i.e. women are natural beings, and thus their speech flows naturally. Since it flows naturally and unhampered or changed, women's speech is naturally good speech. Men on the other hand must be taught to use good speech. Their appropriate use of language is not a natural endowment.

In addition, although women naturally use language correctly they are not expected to use it manipulatively or particularly skillfully. In fact, they are naturally prone not to use it that way. Men on the other hand must be taught to use language correctly and are in addition expected to become skillful and eloquent speakers.
This view of the difference between men's and women's use of language is expressed in several ways. For instance, women's testimony in court is usually taken first as truthful, since women are users of a naturally flowing language, they are trustworthy speakers. Men's testimony is not taken as truthful, but rather as a usage of language to twist the truth for personal motives. Men's speech must be controlled, and is hedged about with all sorts of rules of usage. Women's speech need not be similarly regulated.

This differential evaluation of men's and women's speech correlates with differential speech expectations and experiences in childhood and adolescence. Girls are not trained in speaking, nor are they required to exhibit the kind of proficiency required of boys. A boy of 6 years is expected to speak ab il3 "self-assuredly". When a girl or woman talks it is taken for granted that she will use language appropriately. When a boy or man speaks his language is scrutinized to see if it measures up to the requirements of correct and appropriate speech. If a girl does exhibit speaking proficiency, she is praised for it. When a boy exhibits proficiency, it is not a praiseworthy act as he is merely fulfilling the minimal requirements for males. On the other hand, his lack of speaking skill is cause for comment.

This differential evaluation of men's and women's performances and natures is not confined only to the area of speech. It applies in evaluations of whether men and women are fulfilling all sorts of role requirements. According to Miss Hogan, women in this matrilineal society seem to be secure in their social roles which have a concrete, clear-cut set of requirements (e.g. child-bearing, keeping house, cooking, tending agricultural duties). In each case, failure or success is felt to be easy to determine. Competition with other women is unnecessary as degrees of failure or success are not a part of the system. Men on the other hand, are insecure in their social roles. In each case their success or failure depends on how they fulfill role requirements, and not (as with women) whether they fulfill them at all. There are indeed degrees of success and failure and thus competition between men is strong.

So it is with men's and women's use of language. When women speak it is taken for granted that their speech will be good. Their speech is not
object of evaluation by others and thus competition for recognition of speaking skill is not usual among women. Men's speech on the other hand, must be cultivated, trained, and then regulated by the application of many cultural rules regarding its use. When men speak they are evaluated on the degree of skill which they exhibit. Further, they are expected to exhibit this skill in a greater variety of speech situations. They are judged according to how they fulfill the speaking requirements of adult men. The fact that they speak appropriately will not be considered a sufficient performance as it is for women.

The Dogon view of differences between men's and women's speech resembles that of the Ashanti in that they also believe that their respective speech characteristics emanate from the basic natures of men and women. But the beliefs themselves are nearly the opposite of those of the Ashanti. In this patrilineal society, femininity is associated with psychic instability, inability to reason rigorously and unwillingness to acknowledge mistakes. This series of feminine weaknesses leads to a series of faults in the area of language. Women are more naturally prone to listen to bad speech, they cannot attain as great proficiency as men in speaking, they are prone to quarrel, and are liable to talk too much, say little and what is worse divulge secrets. (Quarrelling and divulging secrets are two of the worst speech habits a Dogon could have). To counteract these bad natural tendencies women must be carefully watched and taught to speak correctly. They also must go through a series of physical ordeals like ear and nose piercing to teach them verbal self-control and make them masters of their emotions. The ear piercing has another related function. After piercing the ears, women wear 8 to 10 cowry shells in each ear (around the perimeter and in the lobe). These shells prevent the bad speech from entering their ears and thus, their speaking habits.

Men on the other hand are naturally able to speak well, to reason clearly and ultimately to understand more things more deeply than women. The male principle is considered strong enough to permit mastery of emotions and verbal self-control. Thus, boys go through no series of physical ordeals other than circumcision. Further, another difference between the speaking abilities of men and women is in the use of gestures. Gestures in Dogon society are thought to make speech more intelligible to the listener and at the same time to help the speaker think more clearly. No female can talk without gesturing. However, many men can; and their speech is still

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intelligible and their reasoning clear.

The Dogon also talk about speaking in terms of male and female types of verbal expression. Male and female speech are differentiated on 2 dimensions; intonation (expressed as more or less oiliness), and subjects or emotions which each type is appropriate for expressing. A female intonation is a high and ascending one; a male intonation is a low and descending one. These can be used by men or women, and their use varies according to the psychological state of the speaker. Female speech and intonation express gentleness while male speech and intonation express excitement or anger. Female speech is most generally associated with a soft, gentle, smooth mode of speaking which a mother is required to use to her children (no matter what dialect she is speaking). Female mode of speech is highly valued but women themselves have to be taught to use it. Even then, they cannot use it as well as it should be used. Men in fact, are capable of surpassing even women in the skill of using the female mode of speech.

The Dogon contrast with the Ashanti however, in the following way. While in Ashanti society men and not women are identified with speaking skills and roles associated with these skill, this is because it is unnecessary for women to be skillful in speaking. Here women are required to be appropriate but men must be appropriate and skillful. In Dogon society men and not women are identified with speaking skill and roles associated with such skills. However, this is because women are considered incapable of attaining such proficiency and are trained in childhood and adolescence as are boys. Both men and women are required to be appropriate and skillful, but men only are fully capable of attaining real skill.

In Chagga society, speaking skill is not identified solely with men, nor is it by nature the property of either sex. Yet in general, speaking skill is associated more with men than women, and roles requiring speaking skill are filled more by men than by women. From early childhood boys are pressured much more than girls about their speech. Boys are expected to learn kin and address terms, linguistic etiquette, ceremonial formulas, etc. earlier than girls, and are tested in these matters by their fathers while girls are not. Boys are also pressured by the father and his whole family.
to use the dialect of the father's village and not that of his mother.

Here one can draw an interesting contrast in use and evaluation of code repertoire by women in Dogon and Chagga societies. The Dogon woman comes to her husband's family speaking her father's dialect, and she never stops using this variety altogether. She learns her husband's dialect and uses it to her children, but she also uses her own to them as well. This I have said earlier may be an expression of her original patrilineal identity, and an emphasis of her personal uniqueness in an entirely new and initially hostile environment her husband's village. The Chagga woman also comes to her husband's village speaking the dialect of her father's people. However, she stops using it and makes an effort to learn her husband's dialect and to use it to her children. She does not use her own dialect in her husband's village. Perhaps this is because the Chagga woman remains a member of her father's patrilineal kin group and keeps up ties with them, while the Dogon woman becomes a member of her husband's kin group and is responsible only to his family for subsequent kinship obligations. Contacts with her father and his people become difficult to arrange and few in number.

There is one other way in which both Dogon and Chagga use language to differentiate or emphasize the separateness of men and women. They exclude each other from certain pivotal speech situations in the life of each. Chagga women exclude men from the marketplace, the girls' initiation enclosure, and the birth of a child. Dogon women exclude men from the weaving situation and puberty instruction.

In the case of childbirth, the attending women close off the house in which the birth is taking place to all men, even the father. Further, they delay in telling the father the sex of the infant. Indeed, until she gets a gift from her son, the husband's mother will not give him the news of the child's sex or condition. In Chagga women's initiation rites men are warned away with clapping of hands and loud cries or singing. If they happen to intrude they are liable to be verbally abused or physically assaulted by a bevy of shouting women. The Chagga market is run entirely by women. Men may enter and do business, but at their own risk. For here, women are free to openly abuse or ridicule any men who for any reason have invoked their ire.
Dogon women exclude men from the weaving situation which is also the appropriate time to discuss matters which one considers secret, or which one wishes to keep from men. The old women who have learned men's knowledge teach it to other women only during the weaving sessions. Men are also excluded from girls' puberty instructions by the fact that these are given only during a girl's menstrual periods when she is confined to a building apart from all men in her family and neighborhood. The knowledge she gains in these lessons is considered the exclusive possession of women alone.

Similarly, men in both Chagga and Dogon societies use exclusivity of participation in certain speech situations as an expression of male solidarity and separateness. Chagga men exclude women from family sacrifices, public welfare rites such as rain-making and the chief's installation, and boys' initiation rites. Dogon men exclude women from the men's shelter and all activities held therein. These include a range from beer drinking and informal discussion to the formal lessons given in mythology and cosmology (supra p. 15). Women are also excluded from all the kinds of instructions given to men by their male elders and relatives. Similarly, the knowledge gained in these sessions is considered the exclusive possession of men. If a man or woman knows the teachings of the opposite sex, neither will admit to that fact, and neither is able to exhibit this knowledge in public by discussing the subjects included in the lessons.

IV.

This section will deal with beliefs and practices regarding the use of speech to affect the consequent actions of interlocutors. It will include the social controlling function of language in the socialization of children. First, however, in order to understand the kinds of speech used with children, one ought to investigate what persuasive and controlling power speech is thought to have in general. This, unfortunately, is not possible for all four societies with any consistency. However, where there exists information on the latter question which can elucidate answers to the former, I shall try to include it.
One pertinent view of language shared by Chagga and Ashanti (there is not information for the other two societies) is the division of speech into socially responsible and socially irresponsible categories.

In this regard, note that the same message form may be at one time responsible and at another, irresponsible. For instance, in Ashanti society, abuse, tale-bearing, and lying are irresponsible while ridicule, reporting the affairs of others to the members of one's abusua (matrilineal kin group), and lying to a child who asks about sexual matters are all responsible speech acts. In each case, the socially irresponsible speech causes an individual, some culturally defined injury and thus causes (in differing degrees) disruption of social harmony. The same messages forms however can be sanctioned by society as socially responsible usages when they maintain social harmony. For instance the above mentioned instance of tale-bearing preserves the interests and solidarity of the abusua, the instance of lying prevents a child from being interested in forbidden matters and hence of getting into trouble by being concerned about them, and abuse, when it singles out the faults of another to prevent, correct or punish wrong-doing is considered ridicule (a socially sanctioned form of social control).

In both Chagga and Ashanti societies parents teach children about these 2 kinds of speech and the consequences of using them. In particular, in Ashanti society children are expected to learn not to use abusive language by children or adults is a serious offense. It it one of the few misdemeanors for which an Ashanti child can be physically punished. Further, adults are forbidden to abuse not only other adults, but also children. There are 3 exceptions which occur in important Ashanti rituals: the destoolment of a chief, the Apo ceremony (the one time a year in which abuse of even public figures is permitted), and at the burial of a child which has died before 8 days have passed (abuse is heaped upon the corpse by the family). In 2 of these 3 cases abuse is sanctioned because the individual being abused has failed completely to fulfill his role in society (the child, the chief). In the 3rd case there exists a period of verbal license in which individual grievances not aired without further consequences for interlocutors. In none of these cases may the abuse cause offense,
quarreling or legal action. Usually, abusive speech which has no sanctioned punitive character is seriously disruptive because it is always provocative of further argument and often of lawsuits.

In Ashanti society one must be aware of a general evaluation of speech in itself as potentially dangerous because it is so easily socially disruptive. One can see this being reflected in the felt need to regulate men's speech because it is not a natural, unmanipulated phenomenon. Since it is used by the speaker to achieve his own ends, it is potentially injurious to someone. Ultimately such injury causes social discord. The same evaluation is expressed in the Ashanti view of witchcraft. A witch it is felt, possesses extraordinary verbal powers. When he is working his worst evil, he is using these powers to their fullest. Again speech is a dangerous force capable of doing injury to others.

The Chagga also make a distinction between responsible and irresponsible speech. They have an ample vocabulary for categories of irresponsible speech and speakers. As with the Ashanti, the latter kind of speech must result in a culturally defined injury to an individual. There is a difference, however, in their views of the relative severity of the injury caused by abusive speech. It would seem that to the Ashanti all abusive speech is equally injurious and socially disruptive. To the Chagga there are two kinds of abusive speech: one kind which if used between age mates is not as serious as if used between non-equals; another kind which is used at all lead to quarreling and usually to lawsuits. The former includes all forms of insult and derision. The latter includes calumny and accusations of witchcraft. Any insult from junior to senior is always abusive and a matter for punitive action. Between son and father, in fact, reconciliation must be ritually established for social harmony to be restored. Similarly, using to women words which are (as Gutman 1910 puts it) "indecent" is always verbal abuse, and can result in legal action.

There are also 2 examples of abuse which although said to an individual are taken as insult to a group. These are the scorning or maligning of the initiation teachings before others, and the abuse of women who are soiled because they have been taking care of children. Both of these can provoke collective action against the speaker by men or women of one's village or kin group. In the former case, they may destroy part of a man's banana grove.
In the latter case, women will openly insult the speaker if he goes near or into the market place.

To the Chagga, speech generally is not inherently a dangerous force. However, there are certain message forms which have power to effect both socially beneficial and disruptive consequences. These forms therefore are under strict regulation as to who may use them and for what purposes. Children are very early taught what these forms are, what their effect can be and who may use them. But if young children use them, they will not have any effect. I shall discuss these forms of speech next, and compare those in Chagga society with similar ones in Dogon and Ashanti societies.

After reading the material on these 4 societies, it became evident that one relevant question to ask regarding the controlling function of speech would be this: are there speech forms which in and of themselves have power to effect desired consequent actions by people? In 3 of the 4 societies here, there exist message forms which when uttered can do the following kinds of things:

1. Induce interlocutors to certain actions (oaths—Chagga, Dogon, Ashanti),
2. Effect in the moment they are spoken the very consequence they refer to (pronouncements, undoings—Ashanti, Chagga, Dogon),
3. Effect desired consequences in the lives of others (curses, blessings—Chagga, witchcraft—Ashanti).

In Ashanti society oaths are considered to have such efficacy that they need no aid of material objects to take effect. The structure of the messages requires a reference to some extreme misfortune in Ashanti past history. In the oath one cannot refer directly to the misfortune, so euphemisms are used. For instance, "saturday" is the way to refer to the oath which mentions the day when an important Ashanti king was killed in battle. Elders, chiefs, court officials and government officials all have their own oaths. A private citizen may also invoke his own personal god in a personal oath called the "fetish oath". This is used especially when giving testimony in courts.

There are certain oaths which can be used only for certain purposes, and the use of them at other times can result in a court case and a fine to the swearer. Here the swearer has abused the use of a powerful force and thus caused social discord, which must be alleviated.

Oaths are used to confirm statements about past behavior, to bind persons to certain future behavior (to obligate certain actions or to proscribe certain
future behavior (to obligate certain actions or to proscribe certain actions).
Witnesses in court swear that they actually performed in the past the actions of which they speak. A woman accused of adultery swears that she did not commit it. A deceased man's wife must swear that there exists no other male heir. At the funeral of a chief the elders must swear that they have not killed him.

Oaths sworn to effect future behavior are these: those to bind court witnesses to truthfulness, that which a bed-wetting child swears which promises he will cease this disapproved behavior, that used by elders and by military officers swearing allegiance to the chief. In all these, the oath is sworn by an individual before another (usually a senior in rank or age), and refers to his own future behavior. Another kind of oath binds a second person to prescribed behavior and is a public speech act whenever it is performed. Such oaths are used by a husband to bind his wife to a promise not to commit adultery. It is also used by the chief's herals when they publicly announce new laws. Here the herald binds the listening people to obey the law.

Oaths in Chagga society are used in similar ways: to confirm statements about past action (in courts), to bind speaker to future actions (reconciliation) between a quarreling father and son. There are two differences however—
(1) an oath cannot be binding on the actions of another, and (2) two parties can bind each other reciprocally to future actions if they swear the same oath together. The latter kind of oath is taken for instance on the eve of the transfer of power from one age set to another. In in-coming group swear allegiance to the chief, and that they will tell him when they are displeased with him (rather than plotting his overthrow). The out-going group swears they will act as intermediary between rulers and chief, and that they will explain to new officials all the basic principles of administration, keeping nothing secret.

The form of oaths seem to be that one wishes sickness or death on the offender who does not keep to the promised actions, or who has sworn to a lie. Dogon oaths have a similar form. Their oaths, however, can affect only the swearer himself. Oaths are especially used in court cases where two contestants have levelled counter-accusations at each other.

While the oath is the strongest binding speech act in Ashanti society, the curse is the strongest speech-form in Chagga society. Dogon also use curses which they distinguish from oaths by the fact that a curse is directed by the
speaker against someone else and an oath is directed by the speaker against himself. However, there is little information on the importance of curses in Dogon society. The information about Chagga curses on the other hand, is plentiful.

The curse and its complement, blessings, are the most powerful speech acts and they are also the most highly regulated and restricted in their use. There are several kinds all of which wish such misfortunes as sickness, barrenness, madness or death on the victim. Curses are such a potent force in Chagga society there is a whole class of medicine men who deal with the removal of them and subsequent purification of victims and their families.

A full taxonomy of curses is not available. However, there seem to be 3 kinds of divisions made: dying curse vs. other kinds, use of material objects plus the curse formula vs. verbal formula alone, and those curses publicly sanctioned vs. those privately performed for personal purposes. The dying curse is the most dangerous of the purely verbal kind because the curser has died and thus its effects are most difficult to remove. (removal requires a retraction pronounced by the curser and subsequent purification of the victim with certain medicines). The worst of those which use natural objects is that carried out with the help of the "cursing pot". Its use must be sanctioned by the chief or his courts. The pot itself is the property of the chief and his ancestors. The strength of the "cursing pot" points to an interesting feature of cursing in Chagga society, and also to a general evaluation of speech. Although the curse in itself is an effective force, it becomes more or less effective depending on who says it.

It can also be strengthened by the use of a material object which symbolizes or represents ancestral sanction for using a curse. The more senior in age or rank the speaker (or his supporters) is, the stronger are the effects of a curse. (I shall discuss later how this principles is also applied to speech in general). Similarly, a publicly sanctioned curse is stronger than a private usage of the curse formula. It is backed not only by elders, but by all elders collectively, and the ancestors they represent as well.

If a child curses another child the effect is considered negligible and he will be punished for using a dangerous form of speech. If a child curses an elder, he will be severely punished, but for the reason which applies in the case of insult by a junior to a senior. When an adolescent child uses the curse formula this is a serious offense as his curse begins to be effective. On the other hand,
One of the most effective threats used against children by parents is that they will be cursed by their grandparents (who can make them sick or sterile). Such uses of the curse within a family are, in fact, the grandparents' prerogative.

This pattern of beliefs about cursing fits in with the Chagga's general evaluation of speech in the following ways. First, they believe that a person attains full understanding of and skill in using his language only when he has reached the stage of elder. It follows then that the speech of elders expresses greater knowledge and contains greater authority. This is why only an elder can be a makuleri (supra p. 23-4); why the grandparents must be the first to teach the child with folktales; why at tale-telling sessions the adults always defer to the senior among them to start, and then they listen as attentively as do children. Thus, on the question of the power of speech to effect desired consequences, it would follow that seniority in age or rank leads to greater effectiveness in both curses and blessings.

In the material on Sahanti society, there are two other speech acts which can be put in category 3 above—witchcraft and confessions. I mentioned witchcraft earlier as an expression of the malevolent use of the power of speech to disrupt social order. It is, however, in the category of those speech acts which cause consequent actions in the lives of others. Confessions occur at 2 times in this material. Both times they are performed by women and refer to their alleged adultery. In the event of a difficult birth, the cause is often thought to be the mother's adultery. If she confesses the name of her lover, the birth should proceed with no more trouble or delay. If she does not confess, the midwives recite the names of suspected lovers. The name spoken when the child emerges is that of the father. Its pronunciation is said to be the reason the child finally emerges. Similarly, confession of adultery in a divorce proceeding can prevent the divorce from being completed. The husband must then bind his wife by oath to be faithful thenceforth.

The last category of speech acts—those which in themselves perform the consequence they refer to—are dealt with by Miss Hogan as "pronouncements" and "undoings". The former includes speech acts such as naming rites in which the pronunciation of the name confers it and all it may stand for on the child (found in Dogon, Ashanti and Chagga material). The latter includes speech acts such as the revocation of the fetish oath (Ashanti), renewal of curses (Chagga), destoolment of chief (Ashanti), settlement of disputes between father and son and their reconciliation (Chagga and Ashanti).
With this discussion of speech acts and evaluations of speech as a background I shall now comment on patterns of social control in the socialization of children. Information is available for all societies but Dogon. Here I feel the data is too fragmented to give a clear picture of patterns of language use.

Both Chagga and Ashanti societies prefer verbal means for maintaining discipline and for settling disputes. This preference covers controlling situations involving adults and children alike. The most prevalent form of verbal social control in Ashanti society is ridicule; in Chagga society it is threats. 

Ridicule in Ashanti society (as has been mentioned earlier) is characterized by singling out a person's faults or defects and then calling his attention and that of others present to them. Ridicule must have a punitive, corrective or preventative purpose in order for it to be socially responsible speech.

Ridicule is sanctioned by society because the victim is a wrong-doer. Because of this his status is lowered and he loses his right of reply. In all the cases of ridicule discussed earlier, and in all the instances of its use with children, the person who is the object of the ridicule is not permitted to reply at the time the ridicule occurs.

Ashanti use both overt and covert forms of ridicule. The latter kind is usually directed at adults by adults and uses the vehicle of the folktale told at night before the gathered villagers. The teller gives the characters in the tales personal attributes and faults which resemble the real attributes and faults of people in the village. In this way he weaves his rebuke or his comment on their unacceptable behavior into the tale itself. Although this form of ridicule is subtle its intent is never lost on the listeners.

Ridicule used to children is always of the overt type. Boys are more subject to it than girls, as they more often fall short of the higher standards set for them. (Supra p. 25-7) Boys who show effeminate characteristics are especially the targets of ridicule. However, girls are also ridiculed for failing to fulfill role requirements like agricultural and domestic chores properly. In these instances of its use to children, ridicule is seen as a corrective and preventative mechanism as well as a punishment.

Of the five public ridicule rites mentioned in Miss Hogan's thesis, one of these involves children. The chronic bed-wetter is subjected to a series of painfully embarrassing episodes. He is called by his father before a group of his peers and is dressed in nettles. He must then do a dance and is taunted by the other children.
Afterwards he is taken to a stream, thrown in, and is then sung ridiculing songs by the watching children. Finally he is taken before an elder who teaches him an oath which states he will not bed-wet ever again. He then takes this oath before all present. Thus, the child learns the structure and binding nature of oaths at a very early age, and at the same time is required to use and be bound by this speech act.

Chagga children, but never adults, can be subjected to ridicule at only 3 times. Boys who cry too much, who exhibit effeminate characteristics, who play with girls only, or who play with their female parallel cousins are fair targets of ridicule by parents and other adults. A herd boy who allows animals to be lost or killed, or who lets them get into people's fields and ruin crops is ridiculed in a public ceremony by the adults of his village. Later when his peers get together to dance or sing, he can be ridiculed in the songs they sing. The dancing situation is the third one in which ridiculing is permitted. However, this use of ridicule is allowed only between peers of adolescence or younger. Note that ridicule which occurs between peers of higher age grades is considered abuse and is not a sanctioned means of bringing to bear social pressure on a wrong-doer.

The most prevalent verbal form of social control in Chagga society for children is the threat. There are several kinds of message forms but all of them threaten punishments meted out by an authority above the child. For instance, "if you don't do X, (1) the Europeans will take you away, (2) a monster will eat you, (3) a nibster will kill me (mother), (4) your grandparents will curse you. Another kind states, "if you don't do X, (1) the elders will not circumcize you, (2) men will not seek you as a wife. A last type states, "if you don't do X, (1) I will beat you, (2) I will withhold other privileges (or food)".

While Ashanti ridicule is not only corrective but also punishment and prevention, Chagga threats are preventative only. There are three other means of preventing bad behavior. The first is narration of tales by grandparents so that the child will know what is expected of him. The second is an explanation to a child by his grandparents of the nature and powers of their curse. This occurs at the end of an older sibling's ear piercing rite. Finally, an adolescent boy can undergo the kisusa rite in which he is instructed about good behavior by the elders of his kin group. The instruction is given in the form of traditional songs used especially for this rite.
It is interesting to note that three of these four preventative means consist of telling a child first the consequences his actions will have. Two of the four tell him not only the consequences, but also what kind of behavior is expected of him. It seems that the appropriate way to teach this kind of information is to use verbal explanations in traditional forms and then to allow the child to ask questions about what he has heard.

Punishment includes scoldings and the kinds of actions which were mentioned in the threats. Correction occurs verbally in direct statement form parent to younger child; or from nurse to her charge (supra p. 8), or among peers. Correction never occurs between strange adult and child, or from junior to senior.

A second form of verbal control used with older children (those over 12 years) is the proverb. It is felt that with children of this age and over, a direct command might anger the child and he would refuse. Thus, the use of a proverb (being less direct and more subtle) can induce the child to obey willingly. Another difference in the handling of older children is the use of indirect ways of pointing to an and correcting errors. Proverbs and inferences are used to older children (1) because it is felt that they can now understand their meaning and (2) to keep from verbally offending the child.

The Ngoni material contrasts with that of the above two societies in several interesting ways. Although one could say that they prefer verbal to non-verbal means of social control, one must add an important qualification. The Ngoni seem to prefer verbal means in certain stages of childhood and physical means in others. For instance, between infancy and weaning no verbal means of control is seen as effective. Between weaning and the appearance of second teeth, both verbal statements and physical punishments can be effective, but the former is preferred. After the appearance of his second teeth, a boy enters the lawentu (supr p.16-17). Here social control is several kinds all of which are sanctioned by parents: ridicule, direct command, physical coercion. Parents feel that the increase of physical conflict over who is to obey whom is good training in self-discipline and respect for elders. The younger child quickly learns the ascendancy of age despite rank.

However, using this same kind of social control is not considered appropriate for parents themselves. Particularly the use of direct rebukes and
ridicule is felt to be too shaming for any child to be subjected to elders. The Ngoni feel that all adults and children beginning at this age are extremely sensitive to shaming brought about by these speech acts. Thus, parents, in order to accord a child his due in respect and allow him to maintain his dignity, refrain from these two kinds of verbal pressures. Rather they use indirect forms of rebuke like inference and proverbs. Both Ngoni and Chagga prefer with older children a subtle form of correction add rebuke. However, their stated reasons for using similar means are different. The Chagga wish to gently persuade a child to obey his parents' wishes. The Ngoni wish to spare him the shame of public ridicule or rebuke.

However, Ngoni parents do not refrain altogether from pointing out mistakes. In fact, any adult may correct any child's mistakes in behavior, speech, or dance, and will expect the child to correct himself immediately. The form of verbal correction, however, will never include ridiculing of the error or public rebuke for committing it.

One final contrast might be drawn between Ngoni and Chagga modes of social control. It is interesting to note that their goal of child training with respect to the relationship which should obtain between child and adult is quite similar. Respect for age must be an overriding principle guiding children's behavior. However, the way respect is expressed and the kind of relationship which actually obtains between children and their elders is quite different, as are their means for teaching this principle to the child. In Chagga society the grandparents are the repositories of tribal knowledge and the possessors of a powerful curse which they can use against a misbehaving child. Yet the stay with the grandparents is characterized by a leniency in social control and an intimate verbally communicative relationship between the child and the elder. In Ngoni society the grandparents are also repositories of tribal knowledge but they have no similar cursing power. Here the stay with grandparents is characterized by a tightening of social control and the instituting of social distance as the appropriate relationship between child and adults. In each case the child, it is believed, will learn respect for age and the appropriate ways of expressing this respect.

There is not complete enough information on these two groups to make possible an explanation of the similarities and differences in their ways of
handling the same problem. However this example is representative of the kinds of contrasts which can be brought to light by using the ethnographic approach outlined in the Guide written especially for this project.
METHODS FOR STUDYING THE CHILD'S ACQUISITION OF SOCIOLINGUISTIC COMPETENCE

Linda J. Hubbell
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METHODS FOR STUDYING THE CHILD'S AQUISITION OF SOCIOLINGUISTIC COMPETENCE

The child's acquisition of those parts of communicative competence which are not purely linguistic has often been avoided or even overlooked by researcher, probably because it is such a difficult subject to study. To me, this area covers mainly social rules (in which social meaning is conveyed by selection of behavioral alternatives – Manual 157-159) and knowledge of lexical domains (which is utilized in social interaction). Of course the two overlap; e.g., the domain of kinship terminology vs. rules for their use in address or membership categorization devices vs. rules for their application. The Manual recognized these two subareas of sociolinguistic competence as 'acquisition of usage patterns' (157-159) and 'acquisition of semantic distinctions' (121), but perhaps separates them too much considering their many intimate inter-relationships.

Some aspects of social rules and lexical domains have been looked at from the point of view of adult competence, and a few studies have been tried on children's competence (notably Casson 1967, Stross 1968, and Piaget's work). Somewhat analogously, Hymes (1964:36-39) has listed and discussed the 'abilities' which an ethnography of speaking must cover; but he was unable to list many substantive results for adults, much less for children. Some examples of the areas of competence which have been or could be attended to as social rules of lexical domains are as follows (asterisks mark those areas for which children's competence has actually been studied):

**Social rules:**
- code-switching rules (Blom and Gumperz 1967)
- *address rules (Geohegan 1968b; Sacks 1966 and Spier 1968 – re child's ticket to talk)
- *politeness routines (Hubbell 1967; Persky and Salutin 1968)
- rules for using membership categorization devices (Sacks 1966, 1968)
- residence rules (Geohegan 1968a)
- procedure for promising (Searle 1965)
- sequencing rules in conversation (Schegloff 1967)
- rules for formulating locations (Schegloff 1968)
- *rules for game-playing and for particular games (Piaget 1932).

**Lexical domains:**
- *kinship terminology (Casson 1967; Piaget 1928)
As well known, there are grave problems in attempting to study the competence of children. Trouble seems to arise from two main sources.

1) cultural rules which regulate social interaction 'interfere' with the researcher's contact with, or observation of, the child. For example, Jan Brückman (Class Discussion 1968) found that it took weeks to train adult Koya (India) to do the Berko Test, probably because Koya are unwilling to admit the existence of imaginary beings in the world (including 'wugs').

More importantly, Ben Blount (1968) discovered that many Luo (Kenya) social rules influence children's behavior in interview or testing situations. Luo children are taught by about three years of age to stay away from strange adult guests and to speak to all adults in a status-ascribed fashion. Many 4-6 year olds won't talk to adults unless other children are present. Unmarried girls 11-14 yrs. don't speak to strange men, although older and younger girls will. Obviously, such factors make both testing and recording of natural conversation difficult in the extreme. Further, even when data are obtained, these factors must be carefully taken into account in the analysis.

2) the 'generic nature of the child's mind' (whatever that might mean) can also interfere. I intend here to point to such things as short attention span, problems with tests of grammatical knowledge, and lack of 'introspective ability'. Such difficulties appear particularly in work with children under five, but can easily last into adolescence (and some, of course, into adulthood).

Braine (1967:7) states that, while the Berko test has been used (for English plurals) on children as young as 30 months, administering it to even younger children presupposes a command of syntax sufficient for understanding the instructions. Stross (Class discussion 1968) tried to use the Picture Comprehension Test to get at Tzeltal children's knowledge of pronouns. The test worked well with those who already knew the pronominal system; with younger children, it worked much less well.
Lack of introspective ability is an especially crucial problem for those who want to work on the criteria behind social rules or the organization of lexical domains. If the child can't talk with you, even at a very low level, about his behavior, you have only indirect means left. Brown and Bellugi (1964) tried to get grammatical judgements from children with the following type of result:

Experimenter: Now Adam, listen to what I say. Tell me which is better...some water or a water.

Adam: Pop go weasel.

Braine (1968:13,75) thinks this is a "hopeless task" (difficult enough with adults) and cites work on suffixes in Russian and compound nouns in English. Vygotsky (1934:517) gives data to show that the pre-school child can't separate names of objects from their qualities.

Experimenter: (Tells child to call a dog 'cow'.) Has a cow horns?
Child: Yes, it has.

Experimenter: But the 'cow' is really a dog, and has dog horns?
Child: Of course, if a dog is a cow, if it is called a cow, then there must be horns. Such a dog, which is called cow, must have little horns.

All these examples have been from studies of child grammar, but similar problems also appear in other areas. E.g., Stross (1968) briefly mentioned his largely unsuccessful attempts to get children to explain their criteria for classifying particular plants. I (Hubbell 1967:37) once asked a Negro girl (4'9") in a Berkeley Child Care Center what 'taking turns' meant:

Kim: it means... when you're running you take a bath cause you...
LH: no-o-o (disbelief)
Kim: what does it mean?
LH: what does it mean when the teacher makes you take turns?
each person at a different time.
Kim: um, how to take turns...
LH: what'd you gotta do that for?
Kim: because, because you don't have enough.
LH: o-o-oh.

I infer from this that Kim means that you take turns when there isn't enough of some good to go around. The vagueness of her answer, gotten after considerable prodding, was typical of my (half-hearted) attempts to ask children direct questions about social rules.

In this paper, I want to consider only the latter type of research problem - the type caused by the 'generic nature of the child's mind'. This
whole area can be clarified if we see that two distinct processes are actually involved in what has been labelled 'socialization', although there are innumerable links between the two (See Diebold's version of this idea, 1965:243).

a) psychobiological development — the innate structure of the human organism at birth (both psychological and somatic) plus the developmental changes in this structure (both cognitive development and physical maturation) as the organism grows to adulthood. This innate structure is approximately the same as the 'generic nature of the child's mind' discussed above. It is more or less independent of culture, although nutrition, etc., might well have effects. The Manual (121-124) discusses cognitive development only with regard to the acquisition of lexical domains, but certainly such development is important for the acquisition of social rules as well.

Without getting into this subject deeper than my scanty psychological training permits, I will mention a few aspects of this structure and its development which others have mentioned in the literature on child language. Piaget has done an enormous amount of work on the mental development of (European) children. [Since this in only meant as an example, I will ignore here the question of whether Piaget is getting directly at the child's mind or only at the child's language (see Diebold 1965:243-4 or Vygotsky 1934:520 for criticism of Piaget).] Of greatest interest here are such finding as "the egocentric factors of verbal expression...and of understanding itself..." (1926:125), and the "inability to understand relations" (1928:86-87, 200). Luria (1959, in Hymes 1962:22) has shown that the development of the directive function of language is dependent on physical maturation and is not dependable till 4 or 4½ yrs. According to Vygotsky (1934:517, see above p.4), the pre-school aged child cannot separate objects from their qualities.

A language Acquisition Device, if it exists, would also be included here (see Chomsky 1959:44,57). Braine (1968:86), Vygotsky (1934:510), Lenneberg (1964,1967), and others have distinguished the LAD from the somewhat independent development of conceptual skills (e.g., Vygotsky's 'thought' vs. 'speech'). But both these features of the child's mind fall within 'psychobiological development'; neither is cultural.

For all we know, there may also be a Culture Acquisition Device. Jakobson's hypothesis regarding the acquisition of phonological features (Jakobson and Halle 1956) might also hold for the semantic features involved in social rules and lexical domains. Such a hypothesis could, for example, be tested against
a fuller version of Casson's data on Oaxacan children's kinship terminology (1967).

b) Cultural development - all the learning which takes place in a culture, both social and linguistic. Covered here are social rules (including those which interfere with research, see pp. 2-3), lexical domains, knowledge of how to make cultural artifacts, etc.

Psychobiological development is by definition universal, except where (relevant) physical differences exist within the human species. Cultural development is by definition culture-specific, with the possible exception of a few universally learned items (see Hymes' caveat, 1964). Cultural development is not necessarily conditioned by psychobiological development, e.g., the LAD conditions language learning. The problem relevant here is that aspects of psychobiological development affect and interfere with our study of cultural development. Even knowledge which the child has acquired through cultural development may be hard to elicit or examine because of features of psychobiological development (e.g., inability to introspect). The problems then is to find methods which would enable us to get around, avoid, or overcome these difficulties as much as possible. I am convinced that most 'solutions' will be only partial and only appropriate for limited parts of sociolinguistic competence. But even this could be very profitable.

II.

In this paper, I want to bring together all the scattered and unorganized information on this point from published literature, the fieldworkers this summer, my own experience observing in a Berkeley Child Care Center (Hubbell 1967), etc. (Berko and Brown 1960 have done similar review of psycholinguistic research methods for children, describing experiments and their analysis.) The Manual (121-128) suggests no specific methods for studying the child's semantics, though it does discuss some for adult competence which might be extendable to children in some way. Only a few techniques are mentioned for working on the child's social rules (165).

It seems fairly obvious to me that we need to start out research on children's knowledge of social rules and lexical domains in the more simply structured, semantically concrete, and bounded areas of their competence. When testing out methods, it is usually easier to detect difficulties when the structure being investigated is fairly simple. The more semantically concrete
the subject being studied, the easier it would be to convey to children (or adults for that matter) what is meant, perhaps using objects or pictures. Working on bounded sets of rules or bounded lexical domains would enable you to get a 'complete' picture, without having to worry too much about 'fuzzy edges'.

Unfortunately, which areas these are undoubtedly varies between cultures and one might not be able to distinguish the simple from the complex, the concrete from the abstract, the bounded form the unbounded, before actually embarking on their study. Furthermore, the three criteria need not be co-extensive, i.e., the semantically concrete might be the most complex and least bounded, etc. In general, I think lexical domains would be easier to study on all three counts than social rules, so perhaps we should begin there. However, social rules are more interesting in some ways. (Personal prejudice probably solves the problem for the individual researcher.)

In examining methods which have been used in work with children, several distinctions must be made:

1) Knowledge of social rules should be kept separate from knowledge of lexical domains, mostly because different methods are probably necessary for studying them. (see definitions p.1).

2) Knowing the extent of the child's knowledge is not the same as knowing the child's criteria for using or organizing that knowledge. E.g., naming plants or addressing kin vs. the criteria for classifying plants or choosing address forms for kin. Certainly the former is the easier task. Especially for the younger age groups (under 5 yrs), we may have to be content with observing or eliciting the extent of the child's knowledge. The researcher may have to infer the child's criteria from his own ideas or his own knowledge of the adult system, without directly testing their psychological validity for children.

3) Observation of behavior in natural situations must be distinguished from special testing frames designed to elicit that behavior. Observing is probably better suited for studying social rules; testing frames for lexical domains (for reasons which I elaborate below, pp. 10).

4) Getting the data is different from analyzing it although how you intend to analyze the data should influence how you collect it. The main discussion (pp. 10-27) will be on how previous workers have gotten (or tried to get) data and what they have done with it. Possibilities for grand analysis will be treated briefly at the end (pp.27-30), with an example using...
III.
METHODS FOR STUDYING LEXICAL DOMAINS

For this area of sociolinguistic competence, observation of natural behavior (it seems to me) will produce little information relative to time spent in observation, especially considering the limited time available for most fieldworkers. So, some type of 'eliciting' or 'testing' frame will be necessary to increase the 'density' of occurrences of the labels (segments). E.g., how often can you expect to observe children spontaneously listing kin terms, identifying colors, etc. Of course, and this is very important, what observations you do happen to make of 'lexical behavior' (e.g., adults correcting children, children asking adults questions) can be crucial in examining things like -- what lexical domains are important in that culture, what degree of knowledge is expected of children of different ages, what domains are various children presently engaged in learning, perhaps even clues to the criteria used, and so on. To my knowledge, no one has attempted serious research on any lexical domain by observation alone.

Testing methods used have ranged from asking a child to list all the segregates he knows from a certain domain, to direct requests for definitions of terms, to tests involving identifications of concrete objects by labels from a certain domain. Following is a discussion of six methods (used by four researchers) which have come to my attention as at least partially successful.

Casson 1967 - kinship terminology

Casson used a sample of 19 children aged 6-12 yrs. from a monolingual (Spanish) village in Oaxaca to study acquisition of the domain of kinship terminology. He was particularly interested in the time and rate of acquisition, the meaning of the terms to the children, and the order of acquisition of semantic features. Casson already had the adult system, including a componential analysis which revealed sex, polarity (senor/junior within one generation?), generation, collaterality, and affinity as the relevant semantic features.

Casson first used a listing task to find out how much of the adult system was known at varying ages. If a child was asked (in Spanish), "Tell me all the kinds of family names you know", he responded by reciting all the kin terms he could think of. Casson then tried to elicit other terms,
which the child knew but couldn't freely recall, by asking, "What relation is X to you?" Since he had already obtained geneologies for most of the children's families, he could use the name of a real relative of the child.

Results showed a gradual increase from control over 12 kin terms (6-8yrs) to 16 (9-10) to 21 (11-12 yrs) (free recall list + elicited list). The adult system has 40 terms. Unfortunately, Casson doesn't state the ratio between the number of freely recalled vs. elicited terms, nor which particular terms were actually included and in what order.

I gather (personal communication) that Casson didn't have too great difficulties in obtaining the free recall lists, or in getting at least some answers to the question, "What relation is X to you?", except for short attention span. This method does seem to get at the extent of children's knowledge of a domain, though the test questions need to be adapted for each domain studied (and each culture). E.g., one probably wouldn't ask an American child, "Tell me all the numbers you know." However, the listing task might not be appropriate for a domain such as pronouns, which seems (to me) somehow less 'listable'.

Casson's second method was a triads test, to get at the child's knowledge of the "semantics of his kinship system". Patterned after Romney and D'Andrade's (1964) use of the same technique with American high school students, the triads test is assumed "to discover whether the components isolated in a componental analysis are the units of meaning by which the referents of the terms being analyzed are discriminated" (Casson 1967:6). Forty triads, constructed so as to get at the sex and collaterality components, were presented to each child, who is asked to choose the term he thinks is most different. Without going into the details of how Casson analyzed the data (since I am more interested here in getting words out of the child's mouth than in the mechanics of analyzing those words), I will briefly summarize his results. Children in this village acquire the sex and lineal/collateral contrasts between 8 and 10 yrs. Use of these two features is gradually extended from close to more distant kin.

Several problems arose in administering the triads to these children. Children under 6 years just didn't seem able to understand the task; even with the 6-7 year olds much training was necessary before they understood what to do. In addition, it took many 'sittings' for each child to go thru all 40 triads. Finally, Casson found it hard to get only one child at a time to come
into his house for testing – perhaps because they felt more comfortable in groups (this last is a problem created by cultural rules regulating social interaction – see p. 2).

This or other types of same/different tests could be used in other lexical domains, though probably only those subject to componential analysis (i.e., organized as some sort of semantic paradigm). Some domains do not have that type of semantic structure. I.e., one does not do a componential analysis of American names for days of the week and one can't really ask, "Is Monday more like Wednesday or like Thursday?" However, some kind of structure is present and one could question the child about it, based partly on knowledge of the adult system. E.g., 'week days' vs. 'week ends', though a child might have different labels for the categories – 'school days' vs. 'days Daddy stays home'.

Stross 1968 – plant terminology

Stross took a sample of 24 children 4-12 years of age from a Tzeltal-speaking settlement in Tenejapa, Chiapas. He was interested in the development of the naming process in children – what and how many plants were known at each age, what criteria were used, why are plant names learned in the order they are, etc. Work had already been done by others on the botany of the area and the Tenejapa naming system, although the criteria which adults use are not definitely known except at the lowest taxonomic levels.

Stross set up a trial along which 200 plants had previously been identified by an adult informant. Stross, his native assistant, and the child went along the trail, which took from half to a whole day to complete. The assistant pointed to each of the 200 plants and asked, "What is this called?" If the child gave a generic name (X) (e.g., 'banana'), the assistant asked, "What kind of X?", to draw out the specific name (e.g., 'white banana'). Children often volunteered the uses of plants, although not directly asked. Stross did ask adults directly about their criteria, but attempts at getting at children's criteria more or less failed.

Stross found that children learn plant terms at varying speeds and in various orders; family backgrounds were more important than age in determining performance on the test. By age four, the child has learned the four major plants categories (grass, herb, tree, vine) and can place any plant in one of the categories (though not always correctly); by twelve, he has learned almost as much as adults.
One problem which appeared with this identification task is that the child may tire before the end of the plant trail, since he goes on naming for several hours. Of course, this could be solved by having a shorter task or by breaking it into several sections. A more crucial point is difficulty in eliciting the criteria children were using in identification. Stross could conclude only that children employ various types of criteria: morphological features of the plants, their uses in daily life, resemblances to body parts, etc.

Such an identification task is well suited to finding out the extent of children's knowledge, for those domains whose segregates are concretely representable. I.e., while it works for plants and maybe colors, it isn't practicable with pronouns or membership categorization devices. However, by itself an identification task is not sufficient for discovering the child's semantic criteria. It must be coupled with some sort of eliciting frame which would compare segregates, etc. The inconclusiveness of Stross's direct questions about children's criteria (though his assistant) and the lack of complete knowledge about the adult system casts doubt on our ability at present to construct any test which would get at them either, but the possibility does remain. [Jan Brunskam has suggested that the fieldworker bring in an object strange to a culture and ask informants to classify it. Some of the criteria used in marking behavior might emerge from their efforts to do so.]

Piaget 1928 - kin terms ('family' and 'brother')

In Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, Piaget uses five 'absurd' sentences to investigate child logic at various ages. One of these sentences involves the concept of 'brother' and reveals the extent of children's ability to use the term correctly. Later in the same book, Piaget presents results of asking children to define 'brother' and 'family', which show some of the criteria used by children in their definitions. Although Piaget is concerned with child logic and not directly with the acquisition of kinship concepts, his method and data might be useful. Piaget's sample is an unknown number of European children (mostly French-speaking) from about 4-10 years old. Presumably the adult system involved is a dictionary definition of the terms; concepts used by the children's own parents were not considered.

In the "three brothers test" (1928:74-90), children were asked, "What is absurd about the sentence --- 'I have 3 brothers: Paul, Ernest, and myself'?" Some were later asked analogous questions about their own siblings. According
to Piaget, to answer correctly the child must distinguish between the "point of view of membership" (I am a brother) and the "point of view of relation" (I have a brother). Various stages in the child's ability to separate the two viewpoints were found. E.g., (1928:84):

Experiment: Raoul, have you any brothers?
Raoul (4'6''); Gerald
Experiment: And has Gerald a brother?
Raoul: No, only me has a brother.
Experiment: Oh come! Hasn't Gerald got a brother?
Raoul: Raoul? ... no, he hasn't got one.

The problem here is that a child under 10-11 years can't cope with the relationship between brothers, though by 6 yrs. he can talk about the whole group of siblings (1928:86-87).

This method - posing a logical problem to be solved by knowledge of the adult system - does not really reveal much about the child's criteria for 'brother-ship', although it does indicate the extent to which he understands adult usage. (Whether or not the method reveals 'child logic' is not the point here.) The technique might possibly be used for other concepts, perhaps even those involved in social rules, but seems not too promising.

Asking the direct question, "What is a brother (sister)?", of children of different ages showed three stages in the development of the concept 'brother' (1928:104-106).

1) Child says a brother is a boy (5-7 yrs). E.g. (1938:104),

Experiment: what is a sister?
Lo (girl 5'): a sister is a girl you know.
Experiment: are all the girls you know sisters
Lo: yes, and all the boys are brothers.

2) Child knows that there must be several children in the family for him (self) to be a brother, but still doesn't assign that title to all the children in the family (8-9 yrs). E.g., (1928:105),

Experiment: What is a brother?
Hal (boy 9'): When there is a boy and another boy, when there are two of them.
Experiment: Has your father got a brother?
Hal: yes
Experiment: why?
Hal: because he was born second.
Experiment: then what is a brother?
Hal: it is the second brother that comes.
Experiment: then the first is not a brother?
Hal: Oh no. The second brother that comes is called brother.

3) After about 9 years of age, the child sees the reciprocity of sibling terms and therefore has the correct (adult) usage. Until 10 or so, the definition does not involve blood relationship.

Piaget also asked, "What is a family?", and again found three stages (1938:115-119).

1) Child calls 'family' all people who live with him (7-8 yrs). He is not interested in blood relationship, although he can at this time define 'uncle' as 'brother of mother of father'.

2) Child makes use of the idea of blood relationship, but limits 'family' to those members in his immediate vicinity (usually his home) (9-10 yrs).

3) Child includes all blood relations.

Direct elicitation of definitions will work only in domains where the child can 'understand' the differentiating features. E.g., young children are unlikely to be able to express '2nd person' if asked, "What does 'you mean?'" or differing wave lengths if asked, "What is 'blue?'".

Geohegan 1968b - address terminology

In his work with the Samal in the Philippines, Geohegan used an elicitation method and form of analysis which might be applied to work with children, particularly older ones, though Geohegan himself worked with children only incidentally. He has used this method to describe both residence rules (1968a) and address terminology (1968b), the latter more tentatively.

Information is gathered in highly-structured interviews, later questions being closely determined by earlier answers.

E.g., Q: What are some of the things you call people?
A: /bapa/? and /mbo/? (see 1968b:5)
Q: How do /bapa/? differ from /mbo/??
A: One is 'middle-aged' (35-60 yrs) and the other is 'old' (60+).

This leads to the tentative rule:

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{age} & \quad a_4 \quad \text{bapa?} \quad \text{where } a_4=\text{middle-age} \\
\text{mbo?} & \quad a_5=\text{old}
\end{align*} \]

The results of further questioning enable the fieldworker to elaborate this
'flow diagram' till it represents the complete decision-making process (i.e., "How does the informant decide what to call X person?") (see complete rule, 1968b:5). Various sub-rules may also be necessary. Additional checks are done on the diagram to make sure that no contrasts between terms were missed and that all 'values' of each 'assessment' (e.g., "What age group does X fall in?") were included. Whatever observations are available are also used, to check on the diagram, to get the project started in the first place, and to determine in what situations the rule is actually used.

Geohegan found that different individuals can have different sets of rules, mainly in the sense of having more or fewer assessments. This is especially true regarding age - younger persons tended to lump people into unmarked categories. But informants of the same age may also disagree, especially as to items of behavior which occur more often (e.g., what to call an 'uncle' vs what to call the Sultan). Detailed results for two informants (man 42, boy 14) are presented in 1968b and reveal respect, relative age, kinship, sex, etc., as factors relevant to decisions about terms of address.

If successfully employed, this elicitation method could be very useful for getting at children's knowledge and criteria in domains which can be seen as involving the individual's 'decision' as to which segregate to use. It is probably not much good for things like pronouns, concepts of time, etc. But two problems must be pointed out: first, the flow diagram represents how the informant codes particular information, but not whether it is appropriate to send such a message. A separate investigation would be necessary to determine when the encoding formula was to be used. (Geohegan discussed this briefly). Second, does the ordering in the diagram truly represent the psychologically valid order in which individuals make assessments? or perhaps assessments can be simultaneous?

An additional difficulty would undoubtedly arise with children under 10 or so, since the method depends on answers to direct questions about the criteria being used. Since children probably could not answer such questions, the whole business might fall through. Still, with older children, information could be obtained which might then be compared to the adult system (see pp.
IV.

METHODS FOR STUDYING SOCIAL RULES

For studying the acquisition of social rules, I think adequate testing frames are 'naturally' harder to devise, and less useful. Because their operation requires particular setting, personnel, etc., social rules are less 'contact free'. Certainly it is rather difficult, if not impossible, to get adults, much less children, to directly describe or define their social rules, witness the disbelief of Blom and Gumperz' (1967:33) informants that they had switched codes. (However, see pp. 21-22). It is also hard to set up a situation with the 'right' people, in the 'right' place, etc., to test each output of some social rule (though this is sort of what Blom and Gumperz tried, 1967:27-33). The alternative of verbally describing a situation to an informant (as opposed to setting it up 'in-the-flesh') is even less suitable for young children. (But see pp. 22-23). [However, all three of these possible techniques have been tried, some with children, and will be discussed.]

Therefore, I think researchers must depend more on 'chance' observations of the operation of social rules, though certainly one can choose to observe at particular times and places which seem more 'appropriate' or 'likely'. In addition, one can ask questions to get members to elaborate, explain, and introspect. Finally, there are important differences in what one does with observational data once one has it - both in direct analysis and by using observations to set up 'test cases' (see p. 27). Because less actual work has been done on children's social rules than on their knowledge of lexical domains, though many suggestions have been made, my presentation of methods will not emphasize particular authors as much.

The most 'obvious' way to get at children's knowledge of social rules would be to ask children directly about their rules. This amounts to having members describe their own rules out-right, an unrewarding procedure, especially with rules which are not 'normally' verbalized. Asking questions about rules is not much more subtle. Look, for example, at what happened when I asked a 41/2 year old why on 'has to take turns' (p. 4). Or, can you imagine asking a child about his strategies for getting an adult to interact with him? (Speier 1968b). Geohagan's method, as described above (pp. 17-19) for lexical domains, falls here, since he actually used it (1968a, b) for studying social rules. However, as I explained there, that sort of detailed elicitation is not really practicable with young children; and even with older children is more likely to work with the 'concrete' lexical domains that with the greater 'abstraction' of social rules.
Piaget, in *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932:24-25), did have some success obtaining the rules for games this way, but, of course, children do teach each other and argue about such rules in natural situations (as they do not do with code-switching rules). Piaget 'played ignorant' and asked boys 4-13 years to teach him how to play marbles. As the boy explained the game, Piaget asked questions at various crucial points. For the very young boys (4-5 yrs), he had two children play marbles together while he himself asked them questions about their rules, whether rules could be changed, etc. From these 'experiments', Piaget could derive several stages in the development of game playing rules.

To conclude, this direct method has very limited usefulness especially for studying the social rules of younger children, except in special cases like the rules for games.

Story telling, story retelling, and story completion are other possible techniques of getting at the child's view of social rules. Especially with completion, this is equivalent to setting up a situation verbally to test the output of some social rule. I.e., the child is asked to describe 'his own' behavior (What would you do?) or the 'norm' (What should the little girl do now?), after a narrative has set up the situation. Of the three, only completion has been used with social rules (Piaget 1932), while retelling has been tried as a means of relating the child's linguistic output to adult input (John 1968). As far as I know, the telling of (original) stories has not been used as a research technique for getting at social rules, although I can see definite possibilities in using stories told about TAT-type pictures drawn to elicit stories about fighting, telling something to an adult, etc.

Piaget (1932:201-202) described the story completion technique he used to find out about children's conceptions of 'justice'. He told child A a story about another (imaginary) child B's misdeed. He then asked A what punishment would be appropriate for B. Piaget went on to list three possible punishments which the 'father' (etc) in the story had thought of. A was to choose which of the three punishments was 'fairest' and to explain why. (As usual) Piaget found several stages in the development of the concept 'justice'.

Vera John (1968) described briefly the story-retelling method being developed with 4-7 year old Navajo children. The real purpose was to relate what the child says to what he hears from adults (the adult tells, the child retells).
But since the stories are too long for children to memorize or recall verbatim, retelling would involve a certain amount of processing and reformulation, which would perhaps allow us to get at the child's ideas about the operation of social rules (stories could be constructed with particular rules in mind). Some pre-training was necessary to get children used to having stories read to them to talking about pictures, and to associate seeing pictures with listening to adult language. Story retelling itself went as follows: an adult read a story to the child making sure he looked at each picture; then, following the pictures as cues, the child was to retell the story. Results were analyzed into four stages ranging from one-word labels to longer stories with many elaborations and redundancies.

Despite the at least partially successful use of methods involving stories or direct explanation of rules, the analysis of natural observations and the testing (in natural situations) of hypotheses based on observational data still seem to me more fruitful (potentially, if not actually). By its nature, observation gets at a wider, more diffuse area of competence than the more structured methods, since the only means of controlling what kind of events will be observed lies in choosing when and where observation is done. I.e., in an experiment, subjects can be requested to perform certain tasks, whereas behavior will seldom be 'natural' when performed by request. This is not to say that the presence of an observer cannot make behavior 'stilted' or that there are not many ways to observe and record data when some event does occur. However, the recording and analysis of observational data requires no greater dependence on the researcher's inferences (or, the researcher's own competence as a member) than does the recording and analysis of 'experimental' data. Following are several examples of what has been or could be done with observation of natural interaction.

Last summer I spent two months observing 27 4-5 year olds in an integrated (40% white) Berkeley Day Care Center for children of working mothers (Hubbell 1967). My grandiose purpose was to investigate "mechanisms by which social concepts, [=rules] are internalized and the types of social situations in which learning takes place" (1967:1). I was interested in studying both accidental (unintended) and intended instances of socialization, inferring that learning could have been taking place in a particular situation, but not 'testing' in any way to see if learning had actually taken place (a most diffi-
cult task). I obtained about 20 hours (165 pp.) of adult/child and child/child interaction, by following the children around in their play with a taperecorder and notebook.

Analysis of the transcripts revealed that seven mechanisms of learning were present, ranging from an adult quoting or explaining a rule to reward/punishment to the child observing an adult spontaneously practicing a rule, etc. Eight main social rules were involved in the interaction: taking turns, sharing, telling the truth, consideration for others, etc. These very tentative results might be used (in future research) to guide more intensively problem-directed observation or to set up 'experimental situations' (à la Blom and Gumperz). Blom and Gumperz (1967:27) used observation as a source of hypotheses about code-switching rules, and set up experiments (self-selected social gatherings of friends) to test these hypotheses. In my own case, I might, for example, present a small group of children with a scarce good (divisible or indivisible) and see whether they share or take turns (respectively) and, more important, how.

Persky and Salutin (1968) present a transcript along the same lines as my own. Although I disagree with (or fail to understand) much of their analytic procedure, they suggest an interesting hypothesis about the acquisition of politeness routines (1968:22). Specifically, they propose "that there is graduated complexity with respect to how much of the cultural apparatus is invoked [by adults] with respect to politeness behavior". Four stages are set out:
1) Adult provides required term plus an injunction to utter it ("Say 'please'.").
2) Adult utters an implied question or reminder to be answered by the required term ("Don't you mean to say 'please'?").
3) Adult provides a 'fill-in-the-blank' form which the child is expected to complete ("What do you say?").
4) Adult invokes more generalized rules for politeness, which may include 'thank you', etc., as well as 'please'. ("Not till you ask politely.").

Unfortunately, Persky and Salutin provide no data to support this hypothesis in their paper, except for one example (1968:21). However, the hypothesis could be tested against a larger sample of adult/child interaction containing many more examples of 'please' corrections. My own transcripts (Hubbell 1967) include many examples which might be used here. Such a de-
velopmental scheme (developmental in terms of adult adjustment to the child's age or stage of social development) could be neatly tested on a mother(s) with children of differing ages, whom she did or did not correct differentially with regard to 'saying please' (i.e., according to Persky and Salutin's stages or not).

Hymes (1962:24) has suggested observation of role play in particular as revealing "conventionalized [linguistic] sequences" used in the child's family, which have recurred until the linguistic routine 'stands for' the situation to the child (e.g., "keep your elbows off the table" for "mealtime"). It seems to me that this might also be one of the few ways to get at young children's views of adults' rules which the children themselves are not yet using (e.g., rules for adult role behavior or even adult code-switching rules).

In all three above cases — mechanisms for learning social rules (Hubbell 1967), stages in the development of politeness routines (Persky and Salutin 1968) and role play — hypotheses derived from observational data could be tested by 'deliberate error'. Both the Manual (p.165) and Braine (1968:40) suggest that the observer make a deliberate error (in terms of adult rules or rules hypothesized for the child) in hopes of eliciting elaboration or correction from the child. Braine gives an example (for the missing grammatical subject of a sentence):

Jonathan: In kitchen. (clearly meaning 'mother' as subject).

Braine (father): Your car's in the kitchen? No, the car's over there, see.

Jonathan: Mommy in kitchen.

The only explicit suggestion which the Manual (p.165) makes about observation is that observation of adults' corrections of children's errors, of explicit teaching of rules by adults, and of role play may prove useful. I think it is important to add the further possibilities available based on observational data: setting up experimental situations (p.25), looking for crucial 'test cases' (p.26), and making deliberate errors (pp.26-27).
WHITHER FROM HERE?

I have examined in detail quite a few of the techniques which have been used to get data on children's sociolinguistic competence and have briefly presented the analysis and results derived from this data. I will now 'assume' that the data for each child has been analyzed and ask, where do we go from here? I think there are three possibilities.

1) Compare the patterns of acquisition (derived for each culture separately, as in suggestions 2) and 3) below) of two or more societies, looking for factors which account for the differences between them (if any). In my opinion, this is not at all feasible yet, especially considering that so little work has yet been done on establishing patterns within single cultures (though some efforts in this direction do exist for the acquisition of grammar proper).

2) Compare data for children of different ages within one culture to formulate a developmental scheme, i.e., a model of the pattern of acquisition. One would proceed from the hypothesis of stages to try to discover what factors influence the order of acquisition of segregates or components or assessments, differences between children in speed of acquisition, etc. Such developmental stages have been presented by Piaget (pp. 16-17, 22), by Vera John (p.23), and (provisionally) by Persky and Salutin (p.25). However, in none of these is adequate data presented to support the hypothesized scheme and in none of them is there any real effort to proceed beyond the hypothesis. On the other hand, Stross (p.14) found it impossible to set up stages of acquisitions, because children learned plant names in differing orders, etc. Therefore, it must be remembered that it may not always be possible (or 'correct') to establish cross-child developmental schemes.

3) Compare the child's social rules or lexical domain (for one 'stage') with the adult rule (the 'normal' form). This is possible only when both groups (adults and children of one stage) have a small enough amount of in-group variation to permit a 'generalized' version to be set up. Obviously, this is an extension of the stages in 2).

Following is an example (based on Geohegan 1968b) of how two sets of rules could be compared. Although Geohegan's data is for two individuals (a 42-year-old man and a 14-year-old boy), the same procedure could be followed for rules representing the 'normal' adult rule, etc. I have rewritten his flow diagrams as simplified trees.
Core-address form rules:

Man (42 years):

Boy (14 years):

Relative age, +

Kinship, -

Respect, +

+ ?addat
- ?addat:+ age:+ kin
- ?addat:+ age:+ respect
- ?addat:0,- age or
- ?addat:+ age:- respect

Comparison

# outputs

# assessments

# values for

Meanings of Common Outputs

1) no conflict
2) conflict re
   ?addat
3) conflict re
   ?addat
4) conflict re
   age

six (four in common)

excluding 'respect'

age, ?addat, kin

'-' : '0': '+'

+ age:+ ?addat: +kinship
+ age:0 ?addat:+ kinship
+ age:0 ?addat:- kinship
0,- age

137
N-rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{love} & : + \\
\text{respect} & : - \\
\text{0, } & + \\
\text{3} & : + \\
\end{align*}
\]

Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># outputs</th>
<th># assessments</th>
<th># values for love</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>'0, -: '+' : '+'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanings of Common Outputs:

- + love: respect
- 0, - love
- no conflict
- no conflict
- + love: + respect
- - love

Two other rules were also presented in Geohagan 1968b for each individual, differing only in number of values for certain assessments and in the total number of outputs.
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