The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forced the Canadian House of Commons to consider whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. This paper provides an overview of the debates and their milieu, identifies the issues involved, and analyzes the effects of the argumentation. The shifting and reformulating of opinions by the nation's press as the debate progressed demonstrated that oral arguments were a means of challenging and informing opinion-making groups such as newspaper editors and reporters. The debate resulted in the defeat of the Conservative party, the return of the Liberal party to power, and a change in Canada's nuclear weapons policy. (Author/AA)
ARGUMENTATION IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CANADA

By

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The overriding issue of our age is the avoidance of nuclear holocaust. People living in areas considered strategic targets for nuclear weapons reject the thought of such a tragedy. These people rationalize that either stockpiling weapons or unilaterally avoiding such action will deter assault by other nations. The Canadians have had to confront the alternative of developing a nuclear defense system or relying upon the deterrence of missiles based in the United States. A vital foreign policy problem faced by Canadian leaders during 1962 and early 1963 was "Should Canada's armed forces accept nuclear weapons from the United States?" The question has been resolved. The formation of the policy involved debates in two Parliaments and became the major campaign issue in a national election. This study provides an overview of the debates and surrounding milieu, identification of issues, and a depth analysis of effects of the argumentation.
An Overview

After smoldering through the latter period of the Diefenbaker administration, the urgency of the issue concerning acceptance of nuclear armaments from the United States forced members of Parliament to grapple with defense policy. The Cuban missile crisis thrust the issue to the priority item on the House of Commons' agenda.

The Cuban crisis of October, 1962, dramatically forced specific consideration of whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. Vague assurances and generalities no longer satisfied parties in opposition to the Diefenbaker government. Explanations of the Conservative position couched in ambiguous and vague terms, which could be given different interpretations, no longer sufficed to calm the gnawing fears of representatives of the people and of citizenry throughout Canada.

General Lauris Norstad, retiring allied commander of NATO, spoke at a press conference on January 3, 1963. He contradicted and challenged statements that had been issued by the leaders of the Conservative party. General Norstad asserted unequivocally that Canada was committed to nuclear warheads for special weapons equipment in NATO and NORAD. The leader of the Conservatives, John Diefenbaker, as well as other spokesmen for the party remained silent.

In a speech delivered at a meeting in Toronto, Liberal party Lester Pearson stated that he favored nuclear armament for Canadian forces. He
agreed with General Norstad that Canada was committed to such armament, that
the Diefenbaker government had not fulfilled the commitment, and that this
non-fulfillment jeopardized the defense of North America. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker agreed to a two-day debate after contending that he did not
favor a specific policy in a period of rapid change.

The first two days of the debate, January 24 and 25, resulted in the
Liberals assuming the position supporting nuclear warheads for special forces
equipment and the New Democratic Party opposing this position. The admin-
istration position was not clarified. Conservative party spokesmen avoided
direct confrontation with the issue. Mr. Diefenbaker reiterated his con-
tention that the fluid political situation made questionable a commitment to
nuclear weapons. He said that a communique issued after the Nassau Conference,
held by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great
Britain, stated that agreement had been reached by those nations to re-examine
defense roles. In a surprise statement, Diefenbaker announced that for a
period of two months he had been negotiating with the United States government
on the need for acquiring nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. No clarifica-
tion of administration position was evident after the two days of debate. No
formal motion was presented.

A press release from the government of the United States on January 30,
1963, stated that although negotiations concerning nuclear weapons continued,
no consideration as to the propriety of such weapons was underway. No practical
proposals had been presented by the Canadian government, the press release
asserted. Further, conventional weapons were not an effective alternative to
nuclear warheads, according to the communique.

Addressing the House on January 31, Diefenbaker accused the United
States Department of State with "unwarranted intrusion in Canadian affairs."
Overruling a government decision to adjourn, the three parties in opposition joined the administration in rebuking the action of the Department of State. Discussion of the press release resulted in the continuation of confrontation with the nuclear arms issue. In debate, Pearson, Thompson, and Douglas accused the Conservatives of evading clarification of defense policy. Minister of Defense Harkness maintained that the administration policy was clearly presented in House of Commons records. Paul Martin, reading from the formal record, contended that contradictory views had been presented by the Prime Minister and his Defense Minister. Defense Minister Harkness denied any differences in viewpoint.

However, on February 4, 1963, Defense Minister Harkness resigned. This announcement triggered another round of debate on nuclear arms. The resumption resulted in two motions of no-confidence in the Diefenbaker regime. The two following days of debate involved speeches by leaders of all four parties. Leaders of the Social Credit party called upon the Conservatives to confront the issue with forthright statements. The fact that the Social Credit party had formed a coalition with the Conservatives made their critical statements significant. Thompson, who had supported the Conservatives during the first period of debate during the day, reversed his posture after the recess.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his spokesmen attempted to counter the combined strength of the three parties opposing them, often with reliance upon argumentum ad hominem. On February 5, two motions of no-confidence resulted in the defeat of the Conservative regime by a vote of 142 to 111.

In the general election of April, 1963, a decisive victory was not obtained by the Liberals with the defeat of Diefenbaker. Lester Pearson,
leader of the Liberals, was now Prime Minister of Canada, but a coalition with the New Democratic Party was necessary to permit the Liberals and Pearson to function. John Diefenbaker was now leader of the Opposition.

The Pearson government met opposition because it favored acceptance of nuclear weapons for Canada. The last two days of debate on the nuclear issue resumed on May 20, 1963, and continued through May 21, 1963. Opposition to Pearson and his Liberals failed to unseat the new government. The Opposition accused the new Prime Minister of being influenced by persons outside Canada, but Pearson contended that he was merely carrying out the commitment which Canada had assumed under the previous regime. A vote on two no-confidence motions resulted in the Liberals retaining power by a narrow margin—113 yeas to 124 nays. The results signified that the Canadian House of Commons favored nuclear warheads for Canada's special weapons systems in NATO and NORAD.

The debate on the nuclear arms issue was not continuous; however, unexpected statements and other outside events frequently brought the issue into focus. When the debate which began on January 24, 1963 ended on May 21, 1963, seven days of Parliament had been consumed by the argumentation.

Issues in the Debates

Four major areas of consideration emerged during the debate:

1. Was Canada committed to acquisition of nuclear weapons for special weapons systems in NATO and NORAD? (2) Would Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons threaten world peace? (3) Should consideration of the issue of nuclear arms be postponed because of changing political conditions throughout the world? (4) Which political party was best qualified to provide leadership for Canada in policy-making regarding nuclear weapons?

Four relevant considerations within the area of commitments were:

1. Does participation in an international political organization entail
acceptance of the organization's entire commitments? (2) What, if any, effect did the Nassau declaration exert on Canada's role in NATO and NORAD? (3) Has Canada honored its defense commitments? (4) If nuclear commitments have been made, can Canada reject the nuclear armament or must the government accept these weapons, meanwhile reconsidering participation in such organizations?

A long term commitment for working toward world peace was involved in the debate. Would Canadian acquisition of nuclear warheads influence adversely the attempts for world peace? Would such acceptance escalate the arms race?

Two considerations developed in the area of effects of changing international conditions upon a Canadian nuclear weapons decision: (1) Did changing international political conditions warrant delaying consideration of the nuclear weapons issue? (2) Did the decision on such weapons lack urgency?

During the debate, the issue of party qualifications for leadership was discussed. Three disputes developed: (1) Had the Diefenbaker government provided effective leadership involving national defense? (2) Were Lester Pearson and his Liberals more realistic and could they implement a program that would provide the best defense policy for Canada? (3) Should a defense committee be established?

The major political parties of Canada participated in the debate on nuclear weapons acquisition. The formal recognized leaders of the four major parties were the major spokesmen for their parties.

Effects of the Argumentation

To appraise the effects of the debate concerning nuclear weapons on the destiny of Canada, the reactions of the Canadian people as expressed in representative Canadian newspapers must be considered. Canadian newspapers, like those in other nations of the free world, mirrored the reactions of
reporters and were interpreted according to editorial policies -- narrowly or broadly. The audience response reflected resistance to change, fear, and provincialism as well as a discernment for the importance of the debate, flexibility of attitude, and hope for clarification of the nation's policy concerning the nuclear arms issue.

Almost one month prior to the debate on nuclear armaments the imminence of such crucial argumentation could be ascertained by a critical reading of the nation's press. On January 3, 1963, General Lauris Norstad, retiring as supreme commander of NATO held a press conference at Ottawa, the Canadian capital. The Ottawa Citizen, over the byline of reporter Charles Lynch, printed the headline "Norstad's NATO Warning Puts Government on Spot." The article focused the attention of the readers on the lack of clarity and the indecisiveness in the Diefenbaker government's posture. The Globe and Mail, on January 4, 1963 commented editorially:

General Norstad, in his Ottawa statement, was only reminding us of a commitment which the Canadian government freely accepted in 1959.

But if there is little new in General Norstad's statement that Canada is committed to nuclear arms, he has succeeded in sweeping away the fog of confusion which has grown up around the simple fact since 1959.

The Ottawa Citizen, a representative anti-Diefenbaker newspaper, called attention to public confusion concerning the government's position. The Globe and Mail, representative of pro-Diefenbaker newspapers expressed relief that the issue of nuclear arms was emerging from "the fog of confusion." Thus, in the daily press was being written the prologue to the historic debate.

When Lester Pearson spoke, on January 12, 1963, in favor of nuclear armaments for Canadian defense, his speech was covered throughout the nation's press. Response to the Pearson position was generally favorable. Declared the editor of The Globe and Mail:
The Liberal Leader, Mr. Lester Pearson, took a long step toward resolving the nation's confusion about defence policy, particularly in relation to nuclear arms, with his forthright speech inScarboro on Saturday.  

In an editorial, The Ottawa Citizen expressed appreciation for the clarity of Mr. Pearson's position:

Whether or not one agrees with Mr. Pearson's defence proposals, they constitute a sharply-defined policy with which Parliament and the nation can come to grips. . . . The government, for its part, has advocated no policy at all.  

The exceptions to the favorable comments of most of the press were similar to the lead article in the Montreal Star. Readers who found the status-quo acceptable found agreement with their position in that newspaper on January 16, 1963, under the caption "Pearson Nuclear Policy Drives Liberal to N.D.P." The New Democratic Party had gained a member from the ranks of the Liberals because the status-quo was threatened by the Pearson remarks.

The clearly stated position of Pearson was in contrast to Prime Minister Diefenbaker's address before Progressive Conservative party leaders on January 17, 1963. Pleading for the time and freedom from his own party's intervention in determining a Canadian nuclear policy, he warned that changes might "in the next few months turn out to be ill-advised or premature." The Montreal Star reported the meeting as without a declaration of clarification of nuclear policy. The next day the newspaper stated in a headline: "Tories Sidestep Nuclear Issue." Complimenting the action of the Conservative party for resolving to refuse to commit the government to a nuclear weapons policy, The Globe and Mail added "We cannot go on pretending to have it both ways and retain any international respect or national self-respect." Diefenbaker had favored nuclear weapons before some audiences and before others, had opposed them. The "both ways" referred to this contradiction.
On January 24, 1963, following the opening speeches in the great debate before the House of Commons, editorial comment was more critical than commendatory. The Globe and Mail noted the lack of substance in the opening speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Howard Green:

It is unfortunate that a sore throat forced External Affairs Minister Howard Green to cut short his speech opening the foreign affairs debate after only 55 minutes and before he had been able to say anything of much interest or importance.28

Under the byline of Charles Lynch, The Province of Vancouver, British Columbia, opined: "Up to now, Prime Minister Diefenbaker has been the undisputed master of the indirect phrase, the endless sentence, and the incomprehensible proposition."29 Without naming T. C. Douglas, leader of the new Democratic Party, the Montreal Star editorialized:

Those who oppose nuclear weapons and want to remain in NATO and NORAD are like the small boy who wants to eat his cake and have it too, which can be moderately described as the trick of the week.30

The comment referred to Douglas’ insistence for continuing membership in the two alliances but argued against acceptance of nuclear armament. Unrest in minority leader support for Diefenbaker was evident in an article with the byline of W. A. Wilson: "Procrastination Pushed Diefenbaker to Brink." The article appearing in the Montreal Star of January 26 referred to Robert Thompson’s statement that Social Credit party support would continue in coalition with Conservative unless other political parties presented more believable and cogent arguments.31 The opening speeches resulted in focusing public awareness on the nuclear arms issue. Government policy and that of other political parties remained obscure. Lester Pearson’s speech was the only one of clarity.

The speeches of January 25 drew mixed response. Press attention was concentrated upon the majority party leaders, Diefenbaker and Pearson. Very little attention was given to remarks by Social Credit and New Democratic Party spokesmen Caouette and Brewin.
Hope for abandonment of a nuclear role was expressed in a headline in The Globe and Mail of January 25: "Acceptable Only in Emergencies; P.M. Hints at Arms Refusal." According to Walter Gray in the same paper:

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker today indicated that Canada is moving away from the acceptance of nuclear warheads for its armed forces, except in the case of emergency.

The Globe and Mail accused the Diefenbaker government of "Flexible confusion in defense" while the Montreal Star interpreted: "It seemed fair to infer that he wanted no nuclear arms on Canadian soil." Jack Best of The Ottawa Citizen under a title "Costly Equipment May be Scraped" referred to the ambiguities in the Diefenbaker speech:

Hours after Mr. Diefenbaker finished speaking, Parliament Hill observers were still disputing the significance and meaning of many passages in his masterfully non-committal statement.

The editorial in The Ottawa Citizen called attention to Diefenbaker's lack of clarity on the nuclear issue. The editorial charged Diefenbaker's "attempt to make Mr. Pearson, leader of the opposition, appear to be a tool of American policy makers was contemptible, and left a bad taste." According to The Winnipeg Free Press "His [Diefenbaker's] followers applauded widely and pounded their desks. Liberal members across the floor of the House shook their heads to indicate disagreement.

The Canadian press interpreted the speech of Lester Pearson as a clear indication of policy which enhanced his public image. Walter Gray of The Globe and Mail reported in a positive vein that Pearson favored acquisition of nuclear armament. Pearson's position on nuclear weapons was clear:

... [It] was as clear and forceful a defense statement as has been heard from any Canadian in many years with the possible exception of the New Democrats who could scarcely be more forceful in their outright-rejection of any nuclear weapons for Canada.

The implication that the Diefenbaker position lacked clarity appeared in an
editorial in The Ottawa Citizen:

The Liberal Party's stand is known: Mr. Pearson says Canada should honor its commitment now by accepting nuclear weapons, then negotiate for a conventional role in NATO. 42

Praise for Pearson's contention fulfill her nuclear com- ments was the contribution of Charles Mackie in The Province. 43 Victor Mackie, a reporter for The Winnipeg Free Press, observed that Pearson recognized Canada's nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD were not being fulfilled. Action must not await a Cuban missile type crisis, according to Mackie. 44 The speeches of Raoul Caouette and Andrew Brewin, representing the Social Credit party and the New Democratic Party, were interpreted in the newspapers as statements opposing nuclear armament for Canada. 45 The opinions of minority party leaders attracted far less attention than the representatives of the major parties. 46

In an effort to counteract seeming waning strength for the Conservative government, Defense Minister Harkness issued a statement to the press: "reports that the nuclear weapons carriers we have secured are to be 'scraped' and nuclear arms decisions avoided are completely incorrect." 47

Confusion rather than clarification resulted from the Harkness statement. "At the opening of today's sitting Liberal and New Democratic members peppered Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Harkness with questions about an apparent difference of opinion on nuclear policy." Norman Campbell queried in The Ottawa Citizen, "When is External Affairs Minister Green going to issue a statement interpreting Mr. Harkness' statementinterpreting Mr. Diefenbaker's statement?" 50 In The Globe and Mail Walter Gray frankly stated that the Harkness statement created an image of "cabinet confusion over the nuclear issue..." 50 Charles Lynch, in The Province suggested that "Defense Minister Harkness is fighting for his political life against Prime Minister Diefenbaker and External Affairs Minister Green." 51 The front page headline in the French Canadian Le Soleil simply
stated "Harkness dit que le Canada acceptera des armes nucleaires." 

From the Atlantic to the Pacific, Canadians found confusion in the newspaper headlines, articles and editorials. The press seemed unsure whether the government policy opposed nuclear weapons or whether such a nuclear defense policy existed or was to be determined.

George Bain compared Winston Churchill's remark concerning Russian policy with the lack of clarity in the Canadian nuclear armament policy. In The Globe and Mail he reiterated that the nuclear weapons policy was a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The same newspaper in an editorial accused the Prime Minister of vacillation on the nuclear issue. An editorial, referring to Diefenbaker's January 25 speech, described the Prime Minister's remarks as a "thick smoke screen." In the same issue the newspaper's James Stewart remarked: "No one really knows yet exactly what the speech meant, apparently not even his colleagues in the cabinet." Snidely hinting at change, the paper commented: "One fact emerges clearly: we have no defense policy now and we will not have one until the NATO meeting next May -- and only then, perhaps." Diefenbaker's repeated denials do not alter the fact that Canada is not honoring the nation's commitments. Scolding the Prime Minister the editorial continued: "Our own feeling is that the performance is a matter of shame and humiliation, and that Mr. Pearson's proposal to put an end to it is the only way to end the shame." The Ottawa Citizen saw no difference in the policies of the two parties. The Prime Minister's position was "about the same as Mr. Pearson's: meeting existing commitments then try to negotiate a different commitment." Maurine Western in The Winnipeg Free Press viewed Diefenbaker's speech as "... a masterpiece of confusion... Mr. Diefenbaker hinted at a good deal while committing himself to almost nothing." Across Canada the press was of one voice. Criticism concerning the government's lack...
of clarity concerning nuclear defense policy alerted the nation. 59

The Prime Minister's speech of January 25 produced a response from the United States Department of State on January 30, 1968. A press release on that date specifically and negatively referred to Diefenbaker's speech. A summary of the challenges to the Prime Minister from the United States government contradicting Diefenbaker were: Bomarc missiles installed by Canada were "not designed to carry conventional warheads." Canada's fleet of special jet interceptors "operate at far less than their full potential effectiveness" without nuclear warheads. During the Canadian United States negotiations concerning nuclear weapons "the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.... The agreements made at Nassau... raise no question concerning the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD obligations." Conventional forces "are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear capable weapons systems." Soviet bombers will continue as a threat throughout the decade. Canadian-United States control of nuclear armament would not result in "an increase in the 'nuclear club'." A system of joint control protecting Canadian sovereignty is achievable.60

Response to the release in the Canadian press was immediate. Newspapers drew both criticism and praise for the government while the extensive coverage throughout the country heightened the tension in the House of Commons as charges were exchanged in debate. Support and rejection of Conservative or Liberal postures shifted as spokesmen focused on varied aspects of the question.

"U.S. CONTRADICTS PM ON ARMS."61 The Globe and Mail, on January 31, reported that the press release surprised the Prime Minister; "The statement,
issued both in Washington and Ottawa. . . is reported to have hit Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and some of his government colleagues like a bombshell.\textsuperscript{62} Reported The Province:

"The nuclear weapons crisis that has split the Canadian cabinet threatened to rupture the defence alliance between Canada and the United States Wednesday in the wake of a statement from the U.S. State Department challenging Prime Minister Diefenbaker's interpretation of Canada's position.\textsuperscript{63}

Another example of evidence demonstrating surprise generated by the press release was the front page headline over Victor Mackie's article in the Winnipeg Free Press: "Attack by U.S. Checks Ottawa."\textsuperscript{64}

The press release was reported in the evening papers on January 30.

Response from leaders of Parliament came as soon as the House convened on January 31. The Prime Minister asserted that Canada would not become a satellite of the United States. Diefenbaker accused the United States of "unwarranted intrusion" and had recalled Canada's ambassador to that country, reported W. A. Wilson in the Montreal Star. According to Wilson, "all parties except the Liberals periodically and enthusiastically applauded the Prime Minister as he made his statement in a tone of controlled anger."\textsuperscript{65} Spokesmen in the House of Commons condemned "the United States for issuing a press release contradicting some of the Prime Minister's statements on Canada's policy on accepting nuclear arms."\textsuperscript{66} The Globe and Mail's Walter Gray then described the immediate evidence:

"The House of Commons was packed by diplomats, senior government officials, cabinet ministers' wives and an excited public to watch what some veteran Ottawa observers describe as the greatest political spectacle since 1926 when the minority government of Conservative Prime Minister Meighen lived precariously from day to day.\textsuperscript{67}

Langevin Cote observed: "Particularly loud applause greeted the Prime Minister as he stated that Canada would honor its obligations but would not be pushed around."\textsuperscript{68} This statement was included in the report by The Globe and Mail in a story under the byline of Langevin Cote.
Personal support, as evidenced in the above sample of responses to Diefenbaker's reaction to the United States press release, was counteracted by articles such as the one in *The Montreal Star* which portended the results of Conservative vacillation: "Government... lost control of the House of Commons." W. A. Wilson further reported: "The Government went all out to prevent a debate on the American press release... It lost the attempt. The Opposition voted solidly in upsetting a ruling by Mr. Speaker Lambert, which would, as the Government had hoped, have prevented the debate." Temporary loss of Conservative control of the House of Commons was attributed to the "ensuing political storm generated by the U.S. State Department" by Walter Gray of *The Globe and Mail*.

Debate was literally forced on the Diefenbaker government on January 31, 1963. Defence Minister Douglas Harkness rose in the House to defend his party's leader, John Diefenbaker. Walter Gray noted: "Thunderous applause rolled through the Commons... night when Defence Minister rose to take part in an emergency debate on nuclear weapons policy." Dave McIntosh, in *The Winnipeg Free Press*, noted that Parliament was responding to a beleaguered man. Support could not be sustained as Harkness attempted to engender support for the vague policy of the government. Audience reaction to the speech by Harkness was reported in *The Globe and Mail*: "To derisive laughter from the Opposition, Mr. Harkness have followed a clear and responsible policy." The final reaction of the Harkness statement as reported by Charles Lynch in *The Ottawa Citizen* stated that:

Mr. Harkness a little crow and tried to prove he was the jolliest cabinet ministers, and saved his job by manfully pushing his way through one of the least distinguished speeches ever made, at the most dramatic moment of his political

Reporters seemed to agree that Minister Harkness had been motivated primarily by the desire within his own cabinet post.
Interpretations of attitudes of spokesmen and parties changed as the debate continued. On February 1, W. A. Wilson observed in The Montreal Star: "The Opposition speeches became more anti-government, less and less anti-American." Praise for Lester Pearson increased in news reports. The headline for the day of February 1 in The Ottawa Citizen saw trouble ahead for Diefenbaker with "Day of Disaster" followed by praise for Lester Pearson from reporter Norman Campbell:

Thursday was a day of magnificent performance for Liberal Leader Pearson in what may well have been the best speech of his career.

Before Mr. Pearson was through some NDPers and some Social Creditors were thumping their desks for him, joining the Liberals in applause.

After the day's debate, The Ottawa Citizen reported the results of a poll that paper conducted as spectators left the galleries of the House of Commons on January 31.

Gallery spectators were interviewed on their way out. They were asked if they agreed with the Prime Minister's stand and if they thought a United States Department press release criticizing Mr. Diefenbaker's interpretation of the Canadian position was justified.

The great majority expressed vehement opposition to the government stand.

Some said they could not sensibly agree or disagree with anything so vague and indefinite.

A few were grateful for the Prime Minister's seeming reluctance to bring nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.

Many said the U.S. had no right to criticize Canadian policy through a press release. Others thought any type of motivation was acceptable.

Since there was no attempt made by the pollers to ascertain the representativeness of the spectators from the galleries, it is necessary to qualify interpretation of the results. It can be stated, with the qualification, that the effect of the speeches was a negative response to the Diefenbaker forces' arguments.
Editorial response to the United States press release and to the Diefenbaker spokesmen's rebuttal varied. Editorially, The Ottawa Citizen contended that "whether the government has been deceitful, or whether it has been incompetent -- it can no longer be considered fit to govern."78 "Canada will not be told what to do by a foreign power,"79 declared The Globe and Mail on February 1. Further study by that newspaper resulted in an editorial on February 4:

The defense of the North American continent, of which Canada is a highly vulnerable part, requires that Canada fulfill the commitments already made and accept nuclear weapons. The only alternative in fulfilling these commitments is to withdraw from our alliance into isolation. The Government has a duty to make a clear and unequivocal choice between these alternatives.80

The Montreal Star, editorially, called for clarifying statements:

Surely NATO has the right to speak up, and its principle spokesman, the United States, has done so. Was this unwarranted? The Prime Minister's statement has already been clarified once by his own Defence Minister. Further clarification from Washington is in order too.81

The advice offered in The Province suggested that the government announce a non-nuclear policy:

The logical thing is to acknowledge the obvious, give up nuclear posing and tell our big neighbor we stand ready to help out with any other assignment given to us but that the nuclear league is a little too much for Canada.82

The Winnipeg Free Press editorially condemned the Conservative regime:

Viewed against this background of confusion and misrepresentation of American policy by the Diefenbaker government, the Washington statement is both justified and necessary.83

The same paper continued condemnation of the Diefenbaker government the next day:

Canada's defence policy may not have been made in London or Washington -- but it has not been made in Ottawa either. It has not -- as far as the Canadian government is concerned -- been made at all.84
A summary of a sample of press reactions from news media in all sections of the country was the contribution of The Globe and Mail: The Edmonton Journal described the present regime as "inept". The Calgary Herald thought that the United States was clarifying the issue while the Montreal La Presse maintained that the southern neighbor enjoyed the role of master, while the Fredericton Gleaner warned that Canada must not be an "echo" of Washington. The Montreal Gazette considered both nations wrong while The Charlottetown Guardian labeled the United States press release a "diplomatic blunder." The Diefenbaker government's procrastination and the United States' press release dominated the news media.

By inference, the resignation of Defense Minister Douglas Harkness could be interpreted to be in response, in part, to the United States press release. But some news comment on February 4, the day of the resignation, and the days following, believed that the Diefenbaker speeches had been the trigger for the resignation. Harkness could not reconcile his opinions concerning the nuclear issue with those of the Conservative leader, according to W. A. Wilson in The Montreal Star. Gregg Connolly of The Ottawa Citizen agreed with reporter Wilson:

In a letter to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, he (Harkness) said it had become quite obvious that their views on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces could not be reconciled. The minister made plain his personal belief that nuclear warheads should be supplied to the armed forces both at home and abroad.

The Winnipeg Free Press on February 5, agreed to this assumption as to the cause of the resignation, editorially. The editorial concluded that the Harkness resignation was one of a series of events providing evidence that Canada had assumed commitment to a nuclear role.

Social Credit party member Thompson alluded to the possibility that a clarifying statement on defense policy was imperative if his minority group
continued to support the Conservative government. The possibility of withdrawal of support was made in the corridors outside Parliament and followed the Harkness resignation. No clarification of defense policy seemed required. Thompson, whose speech was interrupted by the dinner recess, shifted his position from support at the first session to a motion of no confidence at the second session. This sudden shift can be interpreted as a surprise effect of the earlier debate sessions together with the intermediate result -- the resignation of Defense Minister Harkness. Thompson stated that the no confidence motion was based on the absence of a statement by the government clarifying its nuclear weapons policy, poor management of the business of the House of Commons, and "failure to outline a positive program." Reported Don McGillivray in *The Ottawa Citizen*: "Mr. Thompson's speech signalled a dramatic turn by the party which has been the mainstay of the minority Conservative government since Parliament met last September."

Diefenbaker spoke for seventy-five minutes in a final attempt to save his regime. The *Globe and Mail* reporter Stanley Westall wrote that the speech "won thunderous applause from backbenchers and his cabinet colleagues." The speech "was regarded as one of his most effective oratorical efforts, but, at the end of it, Social Credit leader Thompson turned him down crisply with the words: 'Too little, too late.'" The responses could reasonably be anticipated by evaluating the audience and assuming the improbability that Thompson would again reverse his position.

The New Democratic Party chose another reason for its vote against the Conservatives, stating that the government had been "moving steadily, step by step, toward the acquisition of nuclear arms." The decision was reached at a noon hour caucus, so the Douglas speech of opposition evinced no surprise.

Several claims asserted by Lester Pearson and other leaders which were
reported in the productive of the Diefenbaker government. Canada had a mandate which demanded that special forces in NATO and NORAD be armed with nuclear armament, Pearson had claimed. The Diefenbaker government had not honored the commitment, he further asserted. But even more harmful to the defense of Canada and to the honor of the nation, Diefenbaker had no clear policy concerning the defense. Through the news media, these charges, when assessing the results, can reasonably be assumed to have defeated the Conservatives. The immediate support of the minor parties was not offered Pearson and his Liberals. Social Credit and New Democratic spokesmen attacked the Liberals. Their vote, against the Conservatives was not to be interpreted as a vote for the Liberals, according to a report by Charles Lynch in The Ottawa Citizen. 96

By February 4, public interest had been so aroused that, according to The Montreal Star, "The Commons galleries were packed for the second straight day and hundreds stood in the corridors waiting for a chance to get in." 97 The same day, The Ottawa Citizen announced: "Even before the House convened for the afternoon Monday, would-be spectators surpassed any of the session's wild proceedings." 98 On February 5, the same newspaper continued assessing the audience:

There were nearly 2,000 hopeful spectators Tuesday night, and hundreds waited in vain. The ranks of newsmen at least tripled. Reporters jammed like typewriter keys three and four deep in the gallery. The overflow was delegated to the public gallery and several could not even find standing room. 99

Greg Connolley of The Ottawa Citizen described the historic moment:

The voting was immensely tense and exciting in the jungle-like steam heat of the chamber, caused by the hundreds and hundreds of spectators packed like sardines in the galleries. 100

A final glimpse of the audience present at the final session on February 5 was provided by Walter Gray in The Globe and Mail: "The Commons chamber,
packed and perspiring, was a scene of pandemonium Tuesday as the Prime Minister moved the adjournment of the House."

The issue of nuclear armament for Canada and the sense of crisis brought into public focus by the news media and the actual events surrounding the dilemma precipitated the debate which resulted in a no-confidence vote of 142 to 111. Editorialized The Montreal Star:

The leader of the Opposition demanded that we honor our commitments. The Prime Minister replied that we had none but, if we had, they were being honored. The Defense Minister tried to 'clarify' the Prime Minister's statement and then resigned. Some acid clarification came from Washington. In the ensuing confusion the three opposition parties at last got together and threw the Government out.

A vague and indefinite defense policy had been rejected. A definite defense policy had not yet replaced it. An election and further debate on the nuclear arms issue would finally crystallize -- and Canada could once again claim to have a definite defense policy, but this time a policy founded upon the reality of nuclear power in a world in which no nation could be invulnerable.

Press coverage of the debate produced profound effect upon the reputation of Diefenbaker as a leader. The editor of The Globe and Mail had been considered "the Conservative party's most faithful supporter." But the debate resulted in an editorial in the paper which asserted, "The factor precipitating the election was the indecision of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. . . . For the sake of the party and the country, he should give up the leadership."

While The Ottawa Citizen declared:

Mr. Pearson's courage in grasping the defence nettle, at the risk of widespread dissent even among his own supporters, including this newspaper, is evidence of his ability to give leadership at a time when decisions are necessary.

The Winnipeg Free Press editorialized:

that it (Canada) needs above all else is what Mr. Diefenbaker, as he has demonstrated irrefutably in the last few days, seems tragically incapable of giving: leadership and a clear sense of purpose and direction.
Opposition in the press rose like a tide, as the weaknesses of the Diefenbaker regime were exposed to the public. A shocked electorate changed leadership in the April 8 election without giving Pearson and his Liberals a decisive victory. A coalition was formed with the forces of the New Democratic Party joining the Liberals.

The twenty-sixth Parliament officially opened with the Speech from the Throne on May 16, 1963. A representative of the Crown read the speech prepared by leaders of the Liberal party. According to The Globe and Mail new negotiations would soon begin between the governments of North America on honoring the commitment made by the Conservatives -- the acquisition of nuclear armament. The same editorial stated that the new Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, need not consult Parliament to honor an agreement made by a predecessor: "In taking steps to bring the nuclear argument to an immediate conclusion, he is kind to a nuclear-weary nation." In the Throne Speech, the new leadership contended that:

The armed forces of Canada should have available the modern weapons necessary to perform effectively the defensive tasks which Canada has undertaken in the (NATO) alliance.

Opposition parties challenged the statement, but national sentiment seemed more in harmony with what The Province editorial considered a step toward "co-operative defense measures with the U.S." The newspaper added, "Mr. Pearson has accomplished far more than would another impassioned arms debate in Parliament."

Unable to predict that the newly elected government was immediately to meet strong opposition, newsmen were impressed with Pearson's effectiveness. Charles Lynch of The Province reported:

Virtually every challenge thrown across the floor by Diefenbaker was tossed back by Pearson. The Liberal benches applauded wildly as their leader gained at least
a measure of revenge for the night in 1958 when Pearson made his first appearance as leader of the Opposition, and Diefenbaker mopped the floor with him.\textsuperscript{111}

The Montreal Star reported that Diefenbaker's motion of no-confidence was unlikely to gain substantial support.\textsuperscript{112}

An amendment to the no confidence motion offered by Douglas on May 21 expressed disagreement with the new government's decision to acquire nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{113} This motion revived the debate. In the words of Charles Lynch, "Mr. Diefenbaker accused Mr. Pearson of gyrations, sinuous turnings, political peregrinations, and devious hypocrisy."\textsuperscript{114} The Globe and Mail, a former supporter of the Conservatives, accused the former prime minister of "political opportunism."\textsuperscript{115}

The mood of excitement and air of expectancy immediately prior to the Diefenbaker defeat emerged again. Stanley Westall reported in The Globe and Mail that "... Lester Pearson's fledgling Liberal Government teetered on the brink of disaster."\textsuperscript{116} The new regime remained in power only because four members of the Social Credit party and two members of the Progressive Conservative party changed their allegiance to the Liberals at the critical moment. It may reasonably be presumed that the debate arguments exerted influence on the six minority party members who reconsidered their position and switched their votes. Various explanations for the closeness of the 124 to 113 victory for the Liberals appeared in the press throughout Canada. "Social Credit Split on A-Arms Issue," headlined The Globe and Mail.\textsuperscript{117} The Montreal Star recorded that "Varied Motives Save Liberals."\textsuperscript{118}

The two Conservative votes for the Liberals, were those of Douglas Harkness, former Minister of Defense in the Diefenbaker cabinet, and Jack McIntosh. Harkness' vote switch was predictable because of his resignation from the former regime. McIntosh explained his vote by stating that although
he did not wish to support the Liberals, his disapproval of that party's position on nuclear armament was based upon the belief that prior consultation with Parliament was desirable. Since a motion embodying this consideration had not been presented, he cast a vote for the Liberals.

The four Social Credit party members who voted with the Liberals explained their change in position. Thompson, leader of his party, approved of the Liberal's promise to activate a defense committee to reevaluate nuclear defense policy. He remarked that he favored the stated intention of the new government to encourage further discussion of that subject in the House of Commons. Another member who switched his vote, Bert Lebee, also approved the suggested defense committee. He added that he did not wish to "upset a government that has just started its work." H. A. Olson, another Social Credit party member who shifted his vote to Pearson's party, cited as his reason his approval of the defense committee. Although he continued to oppose nuclear armament for Canada, Gerard Chapdelaine changed his vote because he, too, favored study by a defense committee.

In 1963 the historic debate in the Canadian House of Commons culminated in focusing attention on the unavoidable fact that a new era had arrived which forced hitherto new considerations. Canada's position in the community of nations and the country's defense needs had irrevocably changed. In a democracy, because decisions finally rest upon support from the electorate, if they are to be implemented, it is public debate by representatives of the people, with adequate coverage, reporting and editorial analysis by a free press which decide political issues. The debate resulted in general acknowledgment of a Canadian commitment to accept nuclear armaments for the nation's special weapons systems in NATO and NORAD. Editorially, the nation's press agreed by a large margin,
that acquisition of nuclear weapons would not threaten world peace. Editors and reporters hoped for further consideration of permanently retaining such weapons for national defense. Such consideration, according to the press, should not delay acquisition of nuclear warheads. Most of the news media considered Lester Pearson and his Liberals better qualified to lead the nation in policy-making on this critical issue.

Conservatives and their leader, John Diefenbaker, emerged from the debate with the image of the former prime minister damaged. Political cartoons lamboned his procrastination and his ad-hominem attacks on his critics. The Winnipeg Free Press implied in a cartoon that Diefenbaker continued to live in an era which was irretrievably gone. The time had passed when the nation would or could finance a 500 million dollar special weapons system in which nuclear warheads were filled with sand or concrete. Nor did the necessary defense of the nation permit it.

When the debate was finally terminated with the nation favoring the change in government and in policy, Canadians understood the policy of the Liberals on the nuclear policy issue. But, the end of the debate did not result in a clarification of the Diefenbaker position. The Conservative policy remained an enigma -- and had become tiresome.
FOOTNOTES


8U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 48 (February 18, 1963), 243-44. See also the text released to the press by the American Embassy; Montreal Star, January 31, 1963, p. 22.


10Ibid., pp. 3292-3301, 3315-21.

11Ibid., p. 3325.

12Ibid., pp. 3325-27.

13Ibid., p. 3325.


Five newspapers geographically and politically representative of Canada serve as primary sources for this study: The Globe and Mail, Toronto; the Montreal Star, Montreal; The Ottawa Citizen, Ottawa; The Province, Vancouver; and the Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg. These newspapers constitute the representative choice made by the Center for Research Libraries, Chicago, Illinois. Two interviews provided additional rationale for including these five newspapers. Both Mr. J. R. Mitchell, Canadian Consul General in Chicago, and Mrs. M. Skipple, Head of Information, Canadian Consulate General's Office, Chicago, permitted interviews. Independent of each other, they indicated that the five newspapers were representative of the Canadian press.


A. Wilson's article, "Procrastination Pushes Lafrenière off Track," represents the general reaction to Thompson's January 24 decision. Wilson asserted that Thompson wouldn't abandon the coalition with the Conservatives unless the other political parties appeared to be gaining popularity with their arguments. See the Montreal Star, January 26, 1963, p. 3.


Ibid.


Jack Best, "Costly equipment may be scrapped," The Ottawa Citizen, January 26, 1963, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 20.


An editorial in the Montreal Star emphasized the Prime Minister's attempt to mean all things to all people. The editorial observed: "The speech January 25, 1963 was a small masterpiece of the 'on the one hand, but then on the other hand' technique of avoiding real commitment at all. Because it is human nature to concentrate on the passages that appeal, and to tend to forget the others (a fact on which success of fortune-tellers is based) a jingoistic Colonel Blimp and a dedicated Ban-the Bomber would probably have drawn about equal satisfaction from Mr. Diefenbaker's words." See: Montreal Star, January 30, 1963, p. 2.


Though reported in full or in commentary form by the Canadian press, the copy of the press release used for this summary was the version reported in U. S. Department of State Bulletin, 48 (February 18, 1963), 243-44.


Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 2.


Norman Campbell, "Day of Disaster." The Ottawa Citizen, February 1, 1963, p. 1. The title of Campbell's article is the headline for this issue of the newspaper.
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"Arms Debate Fi... The Ottawa Citizen, February 1, 1963, p. 9.


This editorial is unusual because it appears on the front page of this particular issue, a break from the traditional editorial practice of the newspaper.


This editorial examined and rejected each of Lafreniere's arguments.


This is the headline article on the first page.

"Pearl Controversy: Harkness Quits Over A-Bombs," The Ottawa Citizen, February 1, 1963, p. 1. This was a banner headline article.


92 "The most dramatic night," The Ottawa Citizen, February 6, 1963, p. 3.

102 "Diefenbaker. "Spectators pack galleries to see in on the finish," The Ottawa Citizen, February 6, 1963, p. 3.


119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.; also see Greg Connolley, "Govt. nuclear policy wins narrow victory," The Ottawa Citizen, May 22, 1963, pp. 1, 16.
See political cartoon in *The Winnipeg Free Press*, May 23, p. 25.