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ABSTRACT
                A message-centered dramatistic theory of
communication was used in conjunction with Q-sort technique and
factor analysis to build and test a message-centered foreign-policy
inventory that contained three dramatic interpretations of U.S.
involvement in foreign affairs: cold war, power politics, and
neo-isolationism. Analysis of results from two groups of 30 subjects
indicated that the power-politics drama was the most accepted
rhetorical vision in Peoria, Illinois. Cold war was a close second,
but it appeared to polarize Peorians. Neo-isolationism was a distant
third. The results were interpreted as providing empirical
verification not only for the typology of foreign-policy dramas but
also for Bormann's dramatistic theory of communication. The design
used in the study indicates that rhetorical messages may be tested
for their persuasiveness, producing a direct relationship between
message production and audience analysis without risking the
credibility of a speaker. (Author/AA)

FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATION DRAMAS: HOW

MEDIATED RHETORIC PLAYED IN PEORIA IN CAMPAIGN '76

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FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATION DRAMAS: HOW

MEDIATED RHETORIC PLAYED IN PEORIA IN CAMPAIGN '76

In 1972 Ernest G. Bormann set forth a dramatistic communication theory.[1] The starting point for his theory is not the speaker, the audience, the channel, nor the situation, but the message. To him, the message is dramatistic in form, filled with heroes, villains, scenarios, and scenes. Bormann argued that large groups of people get caught up in shared symbolic dramas or visions and that since the meaning, emotion, and motive for action are contained in the drama, the object of study is not the people but the message.

The utility of using Bormann's theory as a lens for describing, interpreting, and evaluating rhetorical discourse has been demonstrated by a number of scholarly works. Bormann applied his theory to the Eagleton Affair, Kidd to interpersonal communication in popular media, Hensley to religious rhetoric, Cragan to radical Indian rhetoric, and Bantz to the rhetoric of network news.[2] However, the major concepts and structure of the theory have yet to receive empirical verification. In the absence of empirical objectivity, the possibility exists that the reconstructed visions are merely the product of the filtering process of the critic's mind. As with any filter, some elements pass through. Others remain excluded. The result may be highly artistic and creative. Yet, the objectivity of the reconstruction may be dependent on the bias of the filter and not the form of the object. Indeed, the possibility exists

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that the personal reconstruction of a communication drama is more a
product of the critic's mind than the social reality of the collecti-
vity being studied.

Consequently, in 1974, Donald C. Shields conducted research
that demonstrated the feasibility of validating Bormann's dramatistic
communication theory.[3] Using William Stephenson's Q-Methodology and
N. Van Tubergen's Quanal program for Q-type factor analysis, Shields
took one of the theory's concepts (heroic personae) and validated it.[4]
Nevertheless, the basic task of grounding the dramatistic theory remained.
In order to provide empirical confirmation that people framed reality and
cognitively assimilated events in dramatistic form, rich rhetorical
dramas in competition with one another were required. John F. Cragan's
reconstruction of American foreign policy dramas (Cold War, Neo-Isola-
tionism, and Power Politics) that appeared in the media between 1946 and
1972 identified the competing dramatic visions needed for validating the
theory's major concepts and structure.[5]

To us, the three foreign policy dramas combined with Q-Methodology
and Q-type factor analysis provided a mechanism for designing a study
to ground Bormann's communication theory, while at the same time creating
a rich descriptive frame for analyzing American foreign policy mediated
messages.

In light of our concerns as communication theorists and consid-
ering our pragmatic rhetorical interests in the political rhetoric of
Campaign '76, a useful question for us to ask was, "How do American for-
eign policy mediated messages play in Peoria?"[6] In addition to provid-
ing a literal answer to this question, we hoped our research would shed
light on two additional questions: (1) Do people process foreign policy

mediated messages dramatistically? and (2) Is public opinion data gathered in a rhetorical form via a small sample research technique useful in political campaigns?

Procedure

In doing a field study to discern whether the foreign policy dramatizations that occur in the media also exist in the heads of Peorians, we first built a structured Q-sort data-matrix derived from the foreign policy discussions in the media from January to July, 1976 with the structure of the dramas coming from Cragan's analysis of American foreign policy rhetoric from 1946-1972.[7]

The top of the structured matrix (columns) contains three archetypal foreign policy dramas: Cold War, Neo-Isolationism, and Power Politics. Cragan argued in his initial research that the Cold War drama is a vision that portrays the international scene as a struggle between the free world and communism. In this drama, America's role is to defend the free world from communist aggression. The Neo-Isolationism drama depicts a world in which the United States cannot be the policeman of all conflicts. America's role in this vision is to provide the world with an example through the great experience of democracy, but America should not impose our system on other people. Reason must replace force or we will perish. The Power Politics drama describes a world in which a balance of power among the major nations must be stabilized and managed. America's role in this vision is to provide world stability through the diplomatic successes of its statesmen, who use a combination of military power and negotiation to maintain world order.[8]

The side of the structured matrix (rows) includes elements of the

dramatic structure, dramatic situations, and issue scenarios. We selected the categories for the side of the matrix through the use of an intuitive strategy that led us to examine more than 150 foreign policy articles cited in the Reader's Guide for the period January to July, 1976. The items, selected from content appearing in the media, provided representative dramatizations of here-and-now foreign policy phenomena proportionately across the three dramas.[9] Thus, we built twenty Q-cards for each drama producing a sixty-item structured Q-deck.[10] The foreign policy matrix appears as Table I.

[Insert Table I Here]

Late in July, 1976, we conducted a pilot study involving thirty Illinois State University students. The students sorted the dramatizations on a forced choice continuum from most reflective to least reflective of their view of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Our sixty-item forced distribution was 2-3-6-11-16-11-6-3-2 for a nine-category sort.[11] The administration of the pilot study indicated that the sixty items could be sorted and recorded in under sixty minutes and that two researchers were needed to conveniently administer the Q-sort to groups of ten to fifteen respondents.

The structured Q-deck provided the observations about American foreign policy when considered from the perspective of Q-type factor analysis. Two different sets of thirty Peorians constituted the variables in the study.[12] Peorians were selected to participate in the study by the Peoria Chamber of Commerce. The subjects in each group represented the key demographic variables of urbanized Peoria; i.e., sex, education, occupation, and income. The data was gathered in Peoria on August 11 and

12, 1976.

The use of the two groups of thirty Peorians provided a simple design consideration to enable a determination of the construct validity of the Q-analysis factor types by comparing the factor solutions and the derived Q-arrays from the sorting behavior of the two groups. Data was factor analyzed by means of Tubergen's Quanal Program for Q-analysis, providing the Principal Components Solution with Varimax rotation to simple structure and a Weighted Rotational Analytical Procedure that ranked dramatizations for each factor by means of descending z-scores.

How the Mediated Messages Played

Factor analysis of our data provided a composite picture describing how foreign policy mediated messages played in Peoria and graphically illustrated the interplay between the three foreign policy dramas. In general, the computer analysis revealed that the dominant drama in the minds of Peorians is Power Politics. Peorians clustered about this drama as the major factor-type. The second largest factor-type presented the Cold War drama, but those loading on this factor type were polarized. As many respondents rejected the Cold War drama as accepted it. Neo-Isolationism played to some extent, but the factor-type that resembled it was very small and somewhat diffused.

Specifically, the factor analyses of the two sets of Peorians produced Principal Components solutions accounting for 52.4 percent and 51.0 percent of the total variance in sorting behavior. Both solutions included six factors and the three major factors in each solution accounted for 76.6 percent and 74.3 percent respectively of the variance within each six factor solution.

The factor type accounting for more than 30 percent of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior in both factor solutions was Power Politics. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective of persons who loaded highest on the Power Politics type is reported in Table II. Table II contains the fifteen cards most reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor and the fifteen cards least reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table II Here]

Clearly, the sorting behavior represented by the data in Table II indicates that this factor-type is accurately labeled Power Politics. The top two messages in the typal array for this factor depict the dramatic scene and dramatic hero of Power Politics. Those messages read respectively: Today's international scene is one in which the major powers have reached military parity. What we must do is manage and stabilize our relationship with each other and maintain the balance of power. In a nuclear age we cannot escape the responsibility to build a safe future through wise diplomacy; and America's major role in foreign affairs is to provide world stability through the diplomatic successes of its statesmen who use a combination of military power and negotiation to maintain world order.

Henry Kissinger is the player enacting the heroic role within today's Power Politics drama. It therefore follows that he and his policies should receive at least token support by Peorians participating in the Power Politics drama. As can be seen from Table II, Henry Kissinger is applauded politely (ranked twelfth) as his policies receive a standing

oyation. Detente is ranked third, Middle East is ranked fourth, and Arms Control is ranked fifth.

The villain of the Power Politics drama is basically the uninformed emotional citizenry that either crusades to make the world safe for democracy or retreats into isolationism. So, it is not surprising that Peorians participating in this drama would reject with equal vigor elements of the Cold War drama and the Neo-Isolationist drama. The data in Table II supports this kind of behavior. For example, Peorians loading highest on the Power Politics factor rejected an American hero who is the defender of the free peoples of the world and at the same time rejected the Neo-Isolationist position on dismantling the CIA. A typical Cold War situation card that the Power Politics type rejected is the one pertaining to Panama. It reads: <u>The Panama Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is sovereign U.S. Territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all the States that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase. The U.S. has no obligation to relinquish the Canal Zone to Panama.</u>

The data in Table II indicates that Peorians loading highest on this Power Politics factor-type did not strongly reject any Power Politics mediated messages. However, they did strongly accept two Neo-Isolationist messages and one Cold War message. It is not surprising that Power-Politics Peorians would deviate from their vision with respect to the sale of grain to Russia. Peorians do not want agricultural products used as strategic weapons; they want to sell their products to the highest bidder. Also, Peorians representing this factor-type can accomodate the Neo-Isolationist hero which is an American that provides a model democracy for the world to emulate if they so desire. Finally, the Peorians in this

factor-type accept the Cold War interpretation of the lesson of Vietnam, which is that we rightfully tried to stop the spread of communism, but acted indecisively.

A second factor-type accounting for an average of nearly 30 percent of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior across the two samples was Cold War. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective of persons who loaded highest on the Cold War type is reported in Table III. Table III displays the fifteen messages most reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor and the fifteen messages least reflective of the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table III Here]

The sorting behavior represented by the data in Table III illustrates that this factor type is accurately labeled Cold War. Three of the four top-ranked messages in this typal array depict the dramatic villain, dramatic scene, and dramatic hero of the Cold War drama. These messages read respectively: The major obstacle to world peace is still the Communist ideology which is bent on world domination; and Today's international scene is still a Cold War. It is a struggle between the free world and Communist domination. A struggle for the minds and hearts of the peoples of the world. A struggle that we must not lose; and America's major role in foreign affairs is to defend ourselves and the free peoples of the world from Communist aggression.

Peorians loading on this factor strongly defend the CIA. The media message the Cold-War Peorians ranked second states: Open attacks on the CIA seriously harm America's capability for conducting a covert

fight against the spread of Communist power. The destruction of the CIA demoralizes the anti-communist forces, threatens the freedom and independence of other countries, and endangers freedom here at home.

Since the dramatic structure of the Cold War drama depicts the international scene as a bi-polar world with the U.S. as an active defender against Communist expansion, it is not surprising that Cold-War Peorians reject the Neo-Isolationist drama and view isolationist mediated messages antagonistically. For example, Peorians loading highest on the Cold War factor rejected the message calling for dismantling the CIA, and rejected the view that America should sign a new Panamanian Canal Zone treaty bringing our troops home, thereby staying out of the affairs of Panama. Indeed, the Peorians loading highest on the Cold War type felt so strongly about Panama that they also rejected the Power Politics message that the U.S. should negotiate a new treaty in the best interests of both parties. The fact that the Peorians strongly accepted the Cold War mediated message on Panama, and strongly rejected the Neo-Isolationist and Power Politics mediated messages speaks to the strength of the Panama issue and the intensity of the Cold War position for the respondents loading highest on this factor type. Another situation message stemming from the Neo-Isolationist drama that the Cold War type rejected was one pertaining to Angola. It reads: The U.S. should stop fighting on the side of oppression in places like Angola, and instead provide a model of democracy and decency. The U.S. should dramatize our commitment to African Anti-Colonialism by avoiding both overt and covert interventions into civil wars like Angola. Peorians participating in the Cold War drama want the U.S. to maintain a world-wide commitment.

The data in Table III indicates that Peorians loading highest on

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the Cold War factor type did not view the Power Politics mediated mes-
sages antagonistically. Negotiation is often viewed as a holding action,
and sometimes the Cold Warriors interpret the military moves of the
Power Politician as supporting their cause. For example, their reaction
to the NATO troops, and Arms Control issues as well as the lesson of
Vietnam reflect adherence to the "stick" Power Politics position. How-
ever, the Cold-War Peorians do deviate from the expected on the issue
of grain, in a manner similar to the Power-Politics Peorians factor type
reported above. Once again they accept rather strongly the Neo-Isola-
tionist message on grain. Foreign markets for grain appear more impor-
tant than grain as a negotiating tool or strategic weapon.

It is important to note that the Cold War factor-type is a reflect-
ed factor. Reflected means that it was extracted with a nearly equal num-
ber of persons correlating highly positively and highly negatively with
the essence of the factor. In the description above, the positive de-
piction is reported. But it must be remembered that other Peorians who
loaded highest on the factor rejected it and what it represented. Thus,
the Cold War drama is a polarizing drama in Peoria, and Cold War mediated
messages, while creating intense feeling, may create as much repulsion
as they do acceptance in Peoria.

A third factor type accounting for an average of about 15 percent
of the variance in Peorians' sorting behavior across the two samples was
Neo-Isolationism. The view of foreign policy mediated messages reflective
of persons who loaded highest on the Neo-Isolationism type is reported
in Table IV. Table IV contains the fifteen messages most reflective of
the view of foreign affairs of the people loading highest on this factor
and the fifteen messages least reflective of the view of foreign affairs

of the people loading highest on this factor.

[Insert Table IV Here]

The sorting behavior represented the data in Table IV indi-
cates that this factor type is les   1 Neo-Isolationism, in
that the sorting behavior is not   ributable to a classical
isolationist position. What we mean by this is that some Power Politics
and Cold War mediated messages are accepted by what is otherwise a Neo-
Isolationism type. Nevertheless, the Peorians loading highest on this
factor type do accept the dramatic scene and dramatic hero of Neo-Isola-
tionism and reject the dramatic heroes of both the Cold War and Power
Politics dramas.

A fourth factor type accounting for an average of only 10 percent
of the variance in Peorian's sorting behavior across the two samples was
small but worth reporting.

[Insert Table V Here]

It is worth reporting because it does not fit the typology under-
lying the foreign policy dramatistic matrix. There are two possible in-
terpretations for the sorting behavior of people loading highest on this
factor. Either our research instrument did not test these people or
the dramatistic communication theory as represented by these three foreign
policy dramas cannot explain their behavior. The instrument used in this
study demands a high level of literacy and an extended period of concen-
tration (approximately 45 minutes) that some subjects may not have been
capable of with respect to foreign policy mediated messages. On the other
hand, the Peorians in this factor may be sorting the messages on foreign

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policy from a dramatic vision not encompassed by our typology. What-
ever the case, Table V presents the data for the factor type. Two
examples illustrate the difficulty in interpreting this factor. For
one, it is difficult for us to understand how the three mediated mes-
sages on the CIA could all be reflective of one viewpoint, especially
since we had pre-tested them for their discreetne.. Also, the accept-
ance and rejection of various mediated messages appears almost random
across the three foreign policy dramas.

The fifth and sixth factors in both factor solutions do not de-
serve an extended report. They did not account for much variance and
they are merely variations of the previously reported factors of Power
Politics and Cold War. They differ from the reported factors only in
the intensity and kind of foreign policy messages they reject.

Theoretical Implications

Our theoretical question guiding this research was: Do people
process foreign policy mediated messages dramatistically? The data pro-
vides strong support for an affirmative answer. The factor solutions
for both samples clearly resemble the three dramas underlying the struc-
tured Q-deck data-matrix as the above explanation of Tables II and III
indicated. Furthermore, in terms of statistical verification it is im-
portant to point out that the Tubergen Quanal program provides three
tests for the discreetness of the factor solutions. One is the use of
orthogonal rotation itself which means that the extracted factors are in-
dependent since the vectors in factor space are rotated at 90 degree angles.
Second, the program also computes Pearson Correlation Coefficients between
the factors within a solution. In our first sample of Peorians the

correlation between the Power Politics factor and the Cold War factor
was .089 and in the second sample, .048. Finally, the program searches
for concensus items, i.e., items that are viewed similarly across the
factor solution. There were no concensus messages in the first sample,
and only two in the second.

We took two samples of thirty Peorians primarily to assess the
invariance of the derive^   The Principal Components Solution
extracted six factors i.   ˻les, and both solutions accounted for
nearly equal percentages of variance. Also, the major factor in both
studies was Power Politics, the second factor was Cold War, and the
third factor was Neo-Isolationism. We computed Spearman rho Coeffi-
cients on the rank-order z-scores in the typal arrays of the major fac-
tors and found positive correlations hovering around .65 between the
corresponding factors in both solutions. These are high correlations
given the fact that the computation is based on the rank-order variation
of the sixty messages. When one looks at the messages in terms of what
drama they represent there is an even better fit between the two solu-
tions. For example, the Power Politics factor in both samples can be
compared by a simple table that illustrates message placement on the
basis of dividing in half the descending array of z-scores. The top
half includes accepted messages; the bottom half rejected. See Table
VI.

TABLE VI

COMPARISON OF POWER POLITICS FACTOR

	Sample A Factor I					Sample B Factor I		
	Accept	Reject				Accept	Reject	
P.P.	16	4	(20)		P.P.	15	5	(20)
C.W.	3	1⁷			C.W.	4	16	(20)
N.I.	11	9	(20)		N.I.	11	9	(20)
	(30)	(30)	N=60			(30)	(30)	N=60

As Table VI indicates, both factor solutions reflect similar message dis-
tribution. In both solutions the vast majority of the twenty Power Poli-
tics cards are accepted, while the vast majority of Cold War messages
are rejected.

However Tables IV and V display data that m   dicate that
our three-part typology cannot account for all major   gn policy dramas.
Our Neo-Isola tonism factor is not as coherent as one   nt expect and
our fourth factor is simply not comprehensible when interpreted via our
typology.[13] It may be that more than three dramas could be included in
our typology in order to explain the remaining variance in sorting be-
havior.

In validating our foreign policy typology, we have necessarily
provided stron evidence that people process messages dramatistically.
There is a close empirical fit between the major factors in both samples
and the typol gy. The factors representing the three foreign policy
dramas account for approximately 75 percent of the variance in sorting

behavior within each six factor solution. Closer examination of the data provides additional evidence that people process information dramatistically. In the Power Politics and Cold War factors in both solutions, the mediated messages representing the dramatic structure of the dramas took precedence over the situation and issue messages. Finally, this research appears to provide empirical confirmation that people frame reality and cognitively assimilate events in dramatistic form.

Rhetorical Applications

The combination of Bormann's dramatistic communication theory, Stephenson's Q-sort technique, and Tubergen's Quanal program for Q-type factor analysis has several applications to speech making. Through this approach rhetorical messages can be directly tested for their persuasiveness. Other widely used approaches such as semantic diffrential scales, Likert scales, or single response public polling techniques gather data about targeted audiences, attitudes, and beliefs without testing the primary relationship between the message and the audience. Thus, the data may converted to rhetorical messages and the messages themselves remain untested. The possibility exists that the speech writer's intuitive analysis of such data will produce messages that are not related to the symbolic reality of the targeted audience. Currently the most popular way for correcting the disparity between the speech writer's reality and the audience's reality is a trial-and-error method such as the revising of campaign speeches during the primaries. However, this approach risks the integrity of the speaker for the rhetor can be easily accused of inconsistency.[14]

Although any communication theory can be used for building

structured Q-decks of rhetorical messages, this paper concerns itself
with the benefits of using Bormann's dramatistic communication theory.
There are two direct applications of this approach. First, rhetorical
messages can be tested to determine how well they play, and second, a
factor analysis produces a composite picture resembling an effective
speech since the thematic ingredients are rank-ordered and compared across
dramas.

Our structured Q-deck of three foreign policy dramas essentially
provided three different dramatic interpretations of twenty pieces of
phenomena on foreign policy. Using the raw data derived from respondents'
sorting behavior, a speech writer can compare different rhetorical treat-
ments of the same phenomena. The data gathered in Peoria provides an
example of how such an analysis might proceed. Table VII displays six
of the twenty items from our 3 X 20 matrix.

[Insert Table VII Here]

An analysis of the table quickly reveals a number of ideas that
would be valuable for a speech writer who is preparing a candidate's speech
on foreign policy for delivery before a Peorian audience. For example,
the speech writer would not want to depict the CIA as an immoral agency
that should have its covert powers stripped away (Neo-Isolationism, +3,
-12), but should take the position that a covert response stands between
a do-nothing policy and nuclear confrontation and thus is a necessary
part of our diplomacy (Power Politics, +7, -1). However, the speech
creator could identify with the Neo-Isolationism hero of the U.S. as a
moral model of democracy (+10, -1) at an idealistic level and still argue
the practical Power Politician heroic role of providing world stability

through the diplomatic success of its statesmen (+15, -2). A similar analysis could proceed with regard to dramatic situations and dramatic issues. The speech writer would avoid the Neo-Isolationist dramatization of Panama (+1, -12), while strongly emphasizing the Power Politics depiction of the Middle East (+9, -1). The speech designer would not describe American grain as a strategic weapon (Power Politics, +1, -11), but would accentuate our negotiated posture with respect to arms control (Power Politics, +10, -1). Finally, on these six items, the speech writer would avoid the Cold War dramatic interpretation of American foreign policy because of the polarizing reactions that are in evidence.

Although the raw data analysis of the Q-sort responses provides a speech writer with a means for avoiding mistakes on specific themes, it doesn't enable an assessment of how the specific themes are arranged within a drama or the overall configuration of competing dramas. The combination of Stephenson's Q-technique with Tubergen's Quanal program for factor analysis provides the means to such an assessment.

We felt that the best way to demonstrate the second application of this approach to speech making was to write a speech that is essentially created from the computer printouts that the Weighted Rotational Analytical Procedure of the Quanal program provides. The WRAP phase of this program arrayed the sixty messages on the basis of z-scores from most accepted to most rejected for each of the factors. In addition it used z-score differences to compare individual messages across the factors for their similarities and differences.

Since we were trying to build a foreign policy speech that would please the most and offend the least, we took the messages appearing in the dominant vision receiving the highest z-scores and combined them with

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the messages scoring high in the other factors of Cold War and Neo-Isolationism, but not strongly rejected by the Power Politics drama.

The computer-derived speech contained in Table VIII is presented to show the utility of building the rhetorical messages into the audience analysis instrument. In this case we simply "glued together" the successful messages as indicated by the O type C or analysis and WRAP phase of the Quanal program. Since the elements of this speech have already been pre-tested for their acceptance by the targeted audience (Pecrians), via the construct validated factor analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the derived speech would also be successful if presented to that audience.

[Insert Table VIII Here]

Conclusions

The use of a message-centered dramatic communication theory in conjunction with Q-sort technique and factor analysis allowed us to build and test a message-centered foreign policy inventory that contained three dramatic interpretations of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs: Cold War, Power Politics, and Neo-Isolationism. The inventory contained mediated messages for each of twenty foreign policy items across the three dramas, producing a sixty message structured Q-matrix. The mediated messages came from an analysis of 150 articles on U.S. foreign affairs listed in the Reader's Guide for the period January to July, 1976. The Q-deck was administered to two sets of thirty Peorians and the data obtained was construct validated via Q-type factor analysis to determine what foreign policy mediated messages played in Peoria.

The Power Politics drama was the most accepted rhetorical vision

in Peoria. Cold War was a close second, but it appeared to polarize Peorians. Neo-Isolationism was a distant third. The most accepted foreign policy mediated messages might be said to be somewhere between a hard Power Politics and soft Cold War position.

Theoretically, this research provides empirical verification not only for the typology of foreign policy dramas, but for Bormann's dramatistic communication theory. It appears that the utility of Bormann's theory of rhetorical vision goes beyond its use as a descriptive schemata for critiquing rhetorical communication. It may provide us with a why explanation of communication phenomena that is predictive. This research grounds the dramatistic concepts. Subsequent research might work toward prediction.

Pragmatically, the design used in this study indicates that rhetorical messages may be tested for their persuasiveness, producing a direct relationship between message production and audience analysis, without risking the credibility of a speaker.

Also, the study demonstrates the utility of using a Q-type factor analysis of dramatic themes as a means for writing pre-tested dramatistic speeches.

TABLE I

STRUC__RED Q-MATRIX: FOREIG__ __LICY MESSAG__S;
__MENT IN FOREIGN __?S
__AMAS (COLUMNS) __MENTS (ROWS)

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Plotline			
Dramatic Scene	1a	1b	1c
Hero Persona	2a	2b	2c
Villain Persona	3a	3b	3c
Main Actors			
U.S. Self-Image	4a	4b	4c
Russia	5a	5b	5c
Supporting Players			
Kissinger	6a	6b	6c
CIA	7a	7b	7c
Africa	8a	8b	8c
Angola	9a	9b	9c
China	10a	10b	10c
Latin America	11a	11b	11c
Mid-East	12a	12b	12c
Panama	13a	13b	13c
Vietnam Lesson	14a	14b	14c
Arms Control	15a	15b	15c
Detente	16a	16b	16c
Grain	17a	17b	17c
Intervention	18a	18b	18c
NATO Troops	19a	19b	19c
Terrorists	20a	20b	20c

D r a m a t i c   S t r u c t u r e

S i t u a t i o n

I s s u e s

TABLE II

FACTOR TYPE 1
POWER POLITICS DRAMA
ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15)   REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Plotline			
Dramatic Scene			1
Hero Persona	55	7	2
Villain Persona			10
Main Actors			
U.S. Self-Image	51	46	
Russia			14
Supporting Players			
Kissinger	59	54	12
CIA		48	
Africa		52	
Angola			
China		56	13
Latin America			9
Mid-East	47		4
Panama	50		8
Vietnam Lesson	15		
Arms Control	57		5
Detente	60		3
Grain	58	11	
Intervention	53		6
NATO Troops			
Terrorists	49		

D r a m a t i c   S t r u c t u r e — S i t u a t i o n s — I s s u e s

TABLE III

FACTOR TYPE 2
COLD WAR DRAMA
ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15)   REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Plotline			
Dramatic Scene	3		
Hero Persona	4		
Villain Persona	1		
Main Actors			
U.S. Self-Image		48	
Russia	10	55	
Supporting Players			
Kissinger			
CIA			
Africa		49	
Angola	11	57	
China		52	
Latin America	12		
Mid-East			51
Panama	5	59	50
Vietnam Lesson	8	54	13
Arms Control	15	53	9
Detente			
Grain		7	58
Intervention		46	
NATO Troops	47	56	14
Terrorists	6		

The left margin reads vertically: "Dramatic Structure", "Situations", "Issues".

TABLE IV

FACTOR TYPE 3
NEO-ISOLATIONISM DRAMA
ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15)   REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Plotline			
Dramatic Scene		1	
Hero Persona	46	11	59
Villain Persona			
Main Actors			
U.S. Self-Image	52	50	
Russia			12
Supporting Players			
Kissinger	51	13	
CIA			
Africa		14	
Angola	55		
China		6	
Latin America	58		
Mid-East	7	53	4
Panama	15		
Vietnam Lesson	48	8	
Arms Control	56	5	
Detente	57		2
Grain	54	3	60
Intervention			10
NATO Troops	49		
Terrorists		9	47

Left margin labels: Dramatic Structure / Situations / Issues

TABLE V

FACTOR TYPE 4
UNKNOWN DRAMA
ACCEPTED MESSAGES (RANKED 1-15)   REJECTED MESSAGES (RANKED 46-60)

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Plotline			
Dramatic Scene	1		
Hero Persona		2	
Villain Persona		53	4
Main Actors			
U.S. Self-Image			49
Russia	9		
Supporting Players			
Kissinger	57	58	48
CIA	6	11	8
Africa		14	13
Angola			
China		10	
Latin America		3	59
Mid-East			
Panama			47
Vietnam Lesson	5		
Arms Control	54		46
Detente	55	51	
Grain	56		
Intervention	60	50	15
NATO Troops	52		
Terrorists		7	12

(Left vertical labels: Dramatic Structure — Situations — Issues)

TABLE VII

FREQUENCY OF MESSAGE PLACEMENT:
RAW DATA TEST FOR SALIENCY*   N = 60 RESPONDENTS

	Cold War	Neo-Isolationism	Power Politics
Dramatic Structure			
Hero Persona	+ 8, - 6	+10, - 1	+15, - 2
CIA	+10, - 7	+ 3, -12	+ 7, - 1
Dramatic Situation			
Mid-East	+ 6, - 6	+ 3, - 4	+ 9, - 1
Panama	+ 6, - 6	+ 1, -12	+ 4, - 7
Dramatic Issue			
Arms Control	+ 5, - 8	+ 2, - 7	+10, - 1
Grain	+ 4, -10	+ 9, - 2	+ 1, -11

*Saliency determined by extreme ranking in top

two cells (N = 5) or bottom two cells (N = 5)

of nine-celled distribution of 60 messages.

- numbers for times rejected

+ numbers for times accepted

TABLE VIII

COMPUTER-DERIVED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH

I'd like to take this opportunity here in Peoria to set forth
clearly and specifically my position on foreign policy. In order to do
that I'd first like to explain how I see the world today and indicate
to you what I believe America's role in world politics should be. First
of all let me say that the U.S. is not a failure. For 200 years we have
provided the world, through the great experience of democracy, a model--
a model that the world is free to follow, but one that we will not im-
pose. Ideally, we would prefer merely to be this model. Unfortunately,
the pragmatic realities of the international scene force us to play
other roles.

The international scene today is highly complex. In some ways
it is still a struggle between the free world and communism. For despite
all claims to the contrary, Russia is still a communist state. But,
1976 is not 1956. Russia has acquired nuclear and conventional military
parity with us--and China and the Middle East make all dealings with the
Russians more difficult. Therefore, in the day-to-day affairs of world
politics, we must strive to manage and stabilize our relationships with
other major powers. In a nuclear age we cannot escape the responsibility
to build a safe future through wise diplomacy.

Now please do not misunderstand me. A policy of detente with the
Soviet Union does not mean that we're "Uncle Sucker." I recognize that
it's foolhardy to unilaterally disarm, but I also know that it's easy
to talk in a mock and tough way and run the risk of war. Neither response
reflects my position. Detent meo   me   of affairs marked by
the absence of significan   could lead the U.S. and Russia

‑‑‑c ‑ nuclear confr‑‑‑ . Detente does not mean that all ‑‑fferences
‑‑‑‑ be resolved, ‑ ' ‑‑ssia will not a‑tempt to expand he‑ influ-
‑‑ ‑‑. It does me‑‑ ‑‑ceful co-existence is the only rati‑nal
‑ ‑native.

I don't int‑‑‑‑ "lip-flop" on a‑y foreign policy issues. Nor
d‑ I intend to spe‑ generalities. I came here to talk speci-
f‑cally about Ameri‑ ‑‑ ‑ policy and that's what I mean to do.
First of all, the ‑ Vietnam. The lesson of Vietnam is one of
indecision. The U‑‑ ‑ wrong in the purpose for which we fought.
While South Vietnam totally a free government, they still enjoyed
more liberty than any ‑ ‑ist regime in Eastern Europe allows. Our
mistake was in not mo‑ ‑cisively when we first militari‑y intervened
to discourage furthe‑ ‑ist aggression in that country.

Which brings ‑ ‑he issue of possible future U.S. interven-
tions. I believe t‑‑‑‑ ‑vention is a diplomatic tool tha‑ is needed
even if it is only ‑ ‑‑‑ to maintain a balanced internati‑nal scene.
Intervention is n‑ ‑ wrong. But, it may be used ri‑‑tly or
wrongly.

Of course, ‑‑t talk about intervention without talking
about the CIA. I d‑ ‑ believe that we should dismantle the CIA, for
many times it is the CI‑'s covert capability that stands between a do-
nothing policy and nuclear confrontation. I oppose unnecessary secrecy,
but I believe in a strong national defense. And unfortunately, in
today's world, the CIA is needed.

There has been a lot of talk about Europe in this campaign.
Let me again state ‑ ‑n. The NATO alliance and the "trip-wire"

TABLE VIII (continued)

prese[...] American troops stationed in Germany a[...] important part[...] of
Ameri[...] [...]fense. It woul[...] be fooli sh to withdraw [...] can troops
from t[...] [...]tire[...]t of Europ[...] [...]chou[...] negotiating a [...] [...]r withdrawal
of Russia[...] [...] from Eastern Eu[...]

The [...] East is again [...] a no-war, no-peac[...] stalemate and
is likel[...] [...] r[...]ain so for some time. Step-by-step d[...] macy, treating
all p[...] an even hand, is the only means for [...] intaining a
deli[...] [...] [...] in the Middle East

[...]he [...]ed States must ground its China poli[...] in morality.
We sh[...] wor[...] to improve our relationships with her. The People's
Republ[...] of Ch[...]na is a sovereign state, but we must not forget to
suppor[...] our [...] y, The Republic of China, on Taiwan. I believe both
gove[...]t [...] learn to live with [...]he reality of each other.

In [...][...], a specific American presence is necessary if we are
to pr[...] [...]er communist inroads and a tarnishing of America's
infl[...] [...] [...] awakening continent. The communists should know that
we are pr[...] [...] to come to the defense of sovereign nations and the
Afr[...]s [...]ul[...] know that we stand ready to help them negotiate a peace
among [...] [...]ves.

In Latin America, we should avoid "big stick" tactics, but we
should not [...]k our heads in the sand to what's going on down there.
With respe[...] [...] Panama, the U.S. neither owns nor has sovereignty over
the Canal Zone[...] But, Panama granted us rights by a 1903 treaty. We
should re-n[...] [...]te a new treaty that protects America's vital interests
in the Can[...] [...]

On [...] [...]ts, my position [...] clear[...] Int[...]tional terrorism,

TABLE VIII (continued)

such as bombing   hijackings is deplorable.   the U.S. should
not put itself   a position committed to meet s   ations whenever
and wherever the   might occur. I will go to the U   d Nations and g
an international   against terrorism

I should not leave Peoria without stating my opinion on grain
sales. First of all, I think the embargoing of fo   immoral given
the starving million   world. Second, whether   we sell or do not
sell grain to Russia   alter her behavior in international a airs.
Russia should pay   price   r grain just like anyone else.

As I stated   opening remark, the U.S. is not a crip led
giant. We have not lost confidence in   selves. We are a proud demo-
cratic nation that must play a major role of leadership in inter   tional
affairs. I trust you will agree that my foreign policy is base   a
realistic and mature   f how to maintain world order and peace.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetor... ...icism of Social Reality," QJS, 58 (Dec. 1972), 396-407.

[2] Ernest G. Bormann, "The Eagleton Affair: ... ... Theme Analysis," QJS, 59 (Apr. 1973), 143-159; Virginia ... Happily Ever After and Other Relationship Styles: Advice o... Inter...sonal Relations in Popular Magazines, 1951-1973," QJS, 6... Feb. ...5), 31-39; Carl Wayne Hensley, "Rhetorical Vision and t... ...sion of a Historical Movement: The Disciples of Christ in N...teenth Century American Culture," QJS, 61 (Oct. 1975), 250-264; J... ...ragan, "Rhetorical Strategy: A Dramatistic Interpretation ...lication," Central States Speech Journal, 26 (Spr. 1975), 4-12; ...les R. Bantz, "Television News: Reality and Research," Western S...... 39 (Spr. 1975), 123-130.

[3] "The Fire Fighters' Dramatis Personae: A S... y of Private Projected, and Public Character From the Perspective ... Rhetorical Vision" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minn...ta. 19-4).

[4] The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its ...... (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); N. Van Tubergen, "Q-Analysis (Quanal)" (unpublished program manual, University of Iowa,

u at

[5] "The Cold War Rhetorical Vision 1946-1972" (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1972).

[6] We selected Peoria as the test site for both content and
sampling reasons. Since the days of vaudeville, the expression "How
does it play in Peoria?" has been taken to mean that if an act played
well in Peoria, it would play anywhere and the Watergate case gave
this expression political meaning. In market research, the metaphor
also has held true since Peoria is a mid-western test market for several
national corporations.

[7] The use of a structured Q-matrix as a means to validate a
theory has been established by Stephenson, The Study of Behavior and
by Jack Block in The Q-Sort Method in Personality Assessment and Psy-
chiatric Research (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961).

[8] For a more extended depiction of the attributes of these
visions, see Cragan, "The Cold War Rhetorical Vision," Chs. II and III.

[9] Items were tested for internal consistency within each vision
generally following the procedure outlined by Block in The Q-Sort Method.
Basically the procedure consists of using experts in the discipline (in
this case, political communication and foreign policy) to sort the 50-
item set into three stacks that correspond to the three dramas. This
procedure allowed us to identify several messages that were not discreet
across visions. These cards were re-written until they were consistently
sorted as part of the applicable drama.

[1] The procedure of using to the Reader's Guide and selecting relevant articles for building a document on foreign policy has been previously used and reported by Stephenson in "Application of the Thompson Schematic to the Current Controversy Over Cuba," Psychological Record __ (196-), 275-290. The rationale for using this intuitive strategy for building the latter of the matrix is provided by Lewis Goldberg in his "Parameters of Personality Inventory Construction and Utilization: A Comparison of Prediction Strategies and Tactics," Multivariate Behavioral Research Monographs. 72 (1972), 1-59.

[2] For a discussion of how to administer forced-choice structured Q-tech, see William D. Brooks, "Q-Sort Technique," appearing in Philip Emmert and Brooks, Methods of Research in Communication (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1970), 165-181.

[3] When doing Q-type factor analysis, items and people are treated the opposite of what they in R-type factor analysis. In Q, people are variables and items are observations. Moreover, Q-observations (messages) must exceed Q-variables (people) by at least a 2:1 ratio. For a detailed discussion of these things, see Raymond B. Cattell, "The Meaning and Strategic Use of Factor Analysis," appearing in Cattell, ed., Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 174.

[4] In the pilot study of college students, we did find a strong Neo-Internationalism drama, so another explanation may be that there is simply not a strong Neo-Isolationism drama playing in the minds of Peorians at this time.

14 In the 1976 presidential Campaign, the terms "flip-flopping" and "waffling" were used to describe the inconsistencies arising from such experimentation.