The mechanisms through which differential access to education in Kilimanjaro has been manipulated to insure the reproduction of a local ruling class are examined. Section I describes the regional advantages which have made Kilimanjaro the most educated area of the country. Section II discusses the church role in education prior to and following independence in 1961. The relationship between geographic and ethnic differentiation within Kilimanjaro is described generally in section III, followed by a more detailed description of ethnic and class groups in sections IV and V. Links between the ruling class and state institutions, which have produced a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, are discussed in section VI. Section VII analyzes Kilimanjaro's economic dependence upon coffee production and concludes that social mobility and the relative economic development of the area obscure class differences and minimize social and educational demands of the lower classes. Section VIII identifies class formation, ruling class perpetuation, and underdevelopment as mechanisms through which differential access to education has been manipulated in Tanzania and concludes that educational policies adopted by Tanzania and other African nations will determine which segments of society will govern by determining who will attend school. References are included in the document.
EDUCATION IN TANZANIA:

CLASS FORMATION AND REPRODUCTION

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At least since the beginning of this century, access to education has been the proximate determinant of class differentiation in Tanzania, and in much of Africa. Despite several initiatives to overcome this legacy of European rule, perhaps more focused in Tanzania than in many other African countries, education and class situation continue to be firmly linked.

There is widespread agreement on the significance of education in Tanzania's efforts to overcome its poverty (good starting points are Resnick, 1968, and Cameron and Dodd, 1970). One line of thought emphasizes the massive and rapid expansion of educational opportunity as a key element in the development strategy. Both the commitment to universal primary education by 1989 and the campaigns to eliminate adult illiteracy are examples of this perspective. An alternative line of thought focuses less on the expansion of schools, though that is not neglected, and more on the content of the curriculum (Nyerere, "Education for Self-Reliance," in Nyerere, 1968; Saul, 1968).

Here, I wish to complement the attention to how many people get into school and what sort of schooling do they experience with an exploration of who gets into school. In Tanzania, access to education is the major route to power and wealth. In Tanzania, that access is far from equitably distributed across regions, age groups, social strata, religions, and ethnic clusters. And in Tanzania, that differential access to education has facilitated the perpetuation of a particular pattern of social stratification, which in turn has fostered class differentiation.

Thus, I am concerned at the outset, with the role of access to education in class differentiation in Tanzania, and, I think, in much of Africa. To explore that relationship, I will use the examination of the situation in one local area of northern Tanzania to raise several larger issues of class in Tanzania.
Table 1 PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: KILIMANJARO'S LEAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro</th>
<th>Mainland Tanzania</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro as % of Mainland Tanzania</th>
<th>Per 1000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>14,229b</td>
<td>113,000c</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>29,620b</td>
<td>364,006e</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>63,597g</td>
<td>769,348h</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>126.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>64,837j</td>
<td>829,169k</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>120.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kilimanjaro refers to Kilimanjaro District as defined in 1969; statistics for other years adjusted to correspond. Tanzania refers to mainland Tanzania.

- bTanzania National Archives 5/47/14.
- cCameron and Dodd:102.
- eCameron and Dodd:104.
- gKilimanjaro District Education Office records.
- kExtrapolated from 1967 Census.

responded to and on occasion stimulated local pressure for more primary schools. That is, when local government councils were unable to finance further educational expansion, or when central directives blocked further primary school expansion within Kilimanjaro, the churches were able to organize the establishment of new schools. At the outset often ill-equipped, overcrowded, and staffed by untrained teachers, these schools permitted large numbers of local children who were unable to find places in regular schools to go to school. My calculations in 1968 found that perhaps one-third of the primary schools operating were unrecognized by the Ministry of Education (Samoff, 1974:42-43).

When expansion of primary education became possible, the most common pattern in Kilimanjaro was for the local council to assume responsibility for these previously unregistered schools, since in that way the council could both respond to pressure from parents to accommodate their children in the national educational system and at the same time acquire functioning schools for much less money than it would have required to create these schools itself. As a result, until the 1970s, three-quarters to four-fifths of the registered schools were church-operated and/or church-assisted. In other words, the independent Tanzanian government, partly by design and partly due to local pressures, was following the colonial pattern--initiative in organizing and operating primary schools was left to the churches (see TABLE 2).

As it became clearer to the national leadership that the regional disparities inherited from British rule were persisting, several related policy changes were directed at eliminating these inequalities. First, control over primary schools was transferred from the voluntary agencies to the central government. Second, central educational resources were to be allocated to favor those regions with the lowest enrollment rates. And third, the achievement of universal primary education by 1989 would necessarily eliminate inter-regional differences.

These initiatives have had some success. Almost all primary schools came under direct government control. As the data presented in TABLE 2 suggest, the gap between Kilimanjaro and the rest of the country has ceased to widen. And Kilimanjaro Region ranked only fourth among all mainland regions in the percentage of the relevant population who began primary school in 1972 (Mali ya Uchumi, 1973).

Kilimanjaro residents and their leaders, however, have sought to maintain their advantage. The regional disparity was so great that restraining primary school expansion within Kilimanjaro could have little short-run equalizing impact. In
Table 2 CHURCH ROLE IN PRIMARY EDUCATION* IN KILIMANJARO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Government Schools (National and Local Government)</th>
<th>Voluntary Agency Schools (All Denominations)</th>
<th>Voluntary Agency Schools as Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro District</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Rural</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moshi Town</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilimanjaro District</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Rural</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moshi Town</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilimanjaro District</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Moshi Rural</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moshi Town</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rombo</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilimanjaro District</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refers to assisted schools only. If unassisted and unregistered (bush) schools were included, the church role would be substantially greater. All schools: Standards I-IV, V-VII and V-VIII.

In addition, although the assertion of government control over the church-supported primary schools restrained the church initiative for a time, the churches have again begun assisting local parents to open new schools in Kilimanjaro. As before, at the outset most of these schools employ poorly-trained teachers, operate in makeshift buildings, have large enrollments for few staff, and are usually limited to Standards I-II. And, as before, the long-range goal of both the local parents and the church officials is clear: that these schools and their pupils be incorporated into the national educational system. Although an exact census was impossible, reports from church and Ministry officials indicated that such schools numbered about 100-150 in Kilimanjaro in 1974, on the order of half again as many as the government primary schools. A related trend is the effort by local parents and churches to create "kindergartens"—two-year pre-schools intended to improve children's chances of getting into and doing well in Standard I. The teachers generally have a primary school education and are paid by parents and parishes.

These kindergartens are the same as the old Bush Schools. Almost every school or church on the mountain has its Bush School. Thus, the combined enrollments of these unregistered schools and the regular primary schools make primary school attendance in Kilimanjaro significantly higher than the official inter-regional comparisons indicate. And clearly the churches continue to retain the initiative for expansion of primary education in Kilimanjaro.

The most important effort to maintain the Kilimanjaro advantage, however, has been the shift of attention from primary to post-primary education.

The point is that the government, with its plan to provide universal primary education, will do the job for primary schools, so we will put our efforts elsewhere.

For the first decade of independence, secondary education remained largely a government monopoly. But at about the same time that the government took firmer control over primary education, parents in Kilimanjaro, with church support, began opening private, fee-paying secondary schools. In 1974 there...
were eight government secondary schools in Kilimanjaro, all opened prior to 1969. Those schools were outnumbered by the eleven private secondary schools, most opened since 1969. By 1974, private secondary schools accounted for almost one-third the secondary enrollment in Kilimanjaro, and more than half the schools (see TABLE 3).

Table 3 CHURCH ROLE IN SECONDARY EDUCATION IN KILIMANJAROa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Schools Enrollment</th>
<th>Voluntary Agency and Private Schools Enrollment</th>
<th>Private Schools Enrollment</th>
<th>Percent of Total Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>3351</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>19.5% 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>3779</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>23.4% 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>3818</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1366</td>
<td>26.4% 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>3907</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1783</td>
<td>31.3% 47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aKilimanjaro District as defined in 1969; figures for other years adjusted to correspond. Unless otherwise noted, data from Kilimanjaro Regional Education Office.

It is clear that Kilimanjaro’s advantage in primary education has progressed to the secondary level. While the equalization ratio has apparently restrained the intake of Kilimanjaro residents into government secondary schools (5% of Kilimanjaro primary school students are to be offered places in government secondary schools, compared to a national average of over 10%), that ratio is not applied to the private secondary schools, which draw approximately 80% of their enrollment locally. By 1973-74, fully one-quarter of all private secondary schools in Tanzania were located in Kilimanjaro (Tanzania, 1974:22).

Thus, since the period of British rule, Kilimanjaro children have had a much better chance of finding a primary school place than other children in Tanzania. In the past few years that advantage has been extended to the secondary level, where pupils who finish primary school in Kilimanjaro now have a much better chance of finding a secondary school place than their counterparts in the rest of Tanzania. And since the national educational system does not differentiate public and private secondary school students as they compete for further education and training—they have equal access to the Form V examination, to admission to Teachers' Training Colleges, and so on—clearly Kilimanjaro students are likely to continue to fill a large portion of the higher skilled and decision-making positions in the society.

Simultaneous with this expansion of secondary education has been a similarly church-assisted expansion of other post-primary education in Kilimanjaro, particularly agricultural and vocational training. In 1974, the Catholic Diocese operated a large vocational school in Moshi town, with an enrollment of over 500, and 12 other programs throughout Kilimanjaro, with a combined enrollment of over 1000. Subjects offered included typing and other secretarial skills, carpentry and other artisanry, sewing, and modern farming, along with English, Social Doctrine (Moral), and Politics.

In short, the situation continues. Under British rule the mission schools provided to Kilimanjaro residents an advantage over other Tanzanians. The same institutional arrangement in the post-colonial setting, where education is an even more important determinant of access to power and wealth, has continued to provide to Kilimanjaro residents an advantage over other Tanzanians. Since this arrangement
permits an expansion of opportunity that the government cannot manage from its own resources, there is little objection, despite the regional inequalities it perpetuates. As the government asserts control over these local initiatives, the local residents and their churches combine to find new means for improving their situation. As one church official commented,

If they take what we are doing now, we will open something else.

**Differentiation Within Kilimanjaro**

The evidence presented thus far has demonstrated Kilimanjaro's regional advantage in access to education. It is necessary now to examine the links between that geographic differentiation and class differentiation.

Data gathered in 1968-69 and 1974 indicate that within Kilimanjaro the ruling group was more successful in gaining access to education for its children than were their neighbors (Samoff, 1974:158-159; Samoffs, 1976:16-20). A survey of Kilimanjaro leaders in 1969 indicated that virtually all of their children of primary school age were in school. In the same year, fewer than half the children in Tanzania who had reached primary school age were actually in school, and within Kilimanjaro the comparable figure was on the order of 70-90% (Samoff, 1974:42-44; Day and Mogil, 1973:125). More important, at a time when Tanzania's secondary school enrollment was under 3% of the relevant age group, more than half of the Kilimanjaro leaders' children had nine or more years of schooling. In the same year, 8-11% of the relevant age group in Kilimanjaro were in secondary school. A similar survey in 1974 proved impossible. But it is not an unreasonable presumption that the differential access to post-primary education found in 1969 has continued. Partly that is so because the absolute number of school places open has increased rapidly. Partly, it is that leaders were able to intercede with Ministry officials to permit their children a second chance at the secondary school examination. Partly it is that leaders are more likely to provide the sort of household environment that is conducive to and supportive of rapid educational progress. But most important, leaders are more likely than others to be able to pay the fees of the private secondary schools and to be convinced of the importance of post-primary education. Thus, although it is the case that the regional advantage permits some widening of the base of the ruling group, the pattern of educational intake favors the children of the current leaders. In fact, challenges to the ruling group have come from within the upper stratum of the local society, rather than from other strata.

As Rachel Samoff and I have argued,

... access to wealth leads to access to schools, which in turn provides access to power. Church initiative and finance enable more schools to be opened, which enable Kilimanjaro children to be more educated, which enables them to provide a major portion of the national leadership. And it is the ties to the metropole, in this case via the churches, which both in the past and in the present provide access to the wealth used to expand schools. (Samoffs, 1976:20)

Finally, all of this suggests that central initiatives concerned with overcoming the elitist orientation and regional and class disparities of the national educational system are not likely to succeed if they are limited to expansion of opportunity and revision of curriculum. At least as important as how many schools there are and what is taught in them is who gets selected for entrance. Recent policy changes may reflect increasing recognition of this relationship. The 1974 decision to require vocational and political experience for entrance to the University of Dar es Salaam may mark the beginning of the development of alternative criteria for recruitment. Universal primary education would also overcome this differentiation, but it is still too far away to affect short-term trends in Tanzania; universal secondary education is of course at this point impossible to project.
Class Differentiation

Thus far, the main focus has been on regional, and to a large extent therefore, ethnic, disparities in access to education in Tanzania. Although there is some evidence to suggest that differential access to education has fostered class formation and reproduction within Kilimanjaro, it is necessary at this point to enlarge the scope of the discussion. What is the nature of the ruling group in Kilimanjaro? How does this local ruling class differentiate itself from other ruling classes? How are regional/ethnic and class ties related? And what are the links between class power and state power?

A comment on relevant theory is in order here. My thinking on these problems derives insight from marxist analyses of society, particularly of the Third World (Foster-Carter, 1974, which includes a useful bibliography), and of the state (Poulantzas, 1973a, 1973b, 1976; Miliband, 1969, 1973; Laclau, 1975; Wolfe, 1974; Bridges, 1974; Girardin, 1974). I am, however, less concerned with marxist doctrine and marxist historical interpretation than with marxist method. For my work, that orientation has two specific consequences.

First, I take that method to require a specific analysis of concrete societies in their time and in their contexts. That there is conflict over the control and uses of production in Africa is, I think, clear. But the precise constellation of classes and class alliances is specific to place and time, and, as well, changes over time. Therefore, the particular definition of contending groups appropriate to 19th Century Europe may, or may not, be appropriate to post-colonial Africa. Those categories must inform the analysis, not delimit it. This perspective is, despite the tradition of dogmatic and unspecific (and therefore, ahistorical and unscientific) analyses from both communist and non-communist marxists, not new to students of Marx:

The whole spirit of Marxism, its whole system, demands that each proposition should be considered (a) only historically, (b) only in connection with others, (c) only in connection with the concrete experience of history. (Lenin, 1916, quoted in Shivji, 1975:125)

The second consequence that flows from this orientation is that I take classes to be formed by their role in production and their opposition to other classes. Class is neither static nor a positivist category. To take classes as dynamic categories defined by production roles requires that we discard the simplistic equations of class with social stratification, and of class with wealth. Studies of stratification by wealth and socioeconomic status may provide insights into class alignments, but they do not encompass the dynamic of classes and class conflict. And to understand classes to be defined by their conflict with other classes requires that we discard the simplistic equations of class with occupation. The petty bourgeoisie cannot be defined solely by its occupations (shopkeepers, artisans, teachers, and so on), but must be understood in terms of the tension between, for example, shopkeepers and trans-national corporations on the one hand and shopkeepers and smallholder farmers on the other. Since the nature and form of these conflicts change over time, so must the structure and alliances of classes change over time. The point is not that a shopkeeper may occasionally come to own a factory and thus change class situation, but that small shopkeepers challenged by chain store monopolies will appear and behave differently from shopkeepers challenged by the urban unemployed.

That classes are defined by both production roles and opposition to other classes and that the form and organization of production and the resultant conflicts change over time pose special problems for empirical research. Like physicists studying sub-atomic particles, social scientists studying classes and class conflict cannot force the object of their study to hold still to permit detailed observation. Rather,
the dynamic nature of our concern requires us to concentrate on traces and impacts. That is, if we ascribe to classes static characteristics—for example, if we define classes as occupational groups—we cannot see their core quality, their existence only in opposition. Hence, we must examine the impact of classes in concrete political arenas. Our understanding of class becomes more precise to the extent that that understanding provides the most satisfactory explanation of political behavior and institutions. The most suitable arenas for such study are those in which there has been a self-conscious effort to induce change, since the initiative for change will generate oppositions, whose outlines will reveal the underlying structural relationships.

The Kilimanjaro Petty Bourgeoisie

Rachel Samoff and I have argued that over the last 30 years the petty bourgeoisie has become the local ruling class in Kilimanjaro (Samoffs, 1976: esp. 31-34). Kilimanjaro is not unique in this regard (Feldman, 1975). That class had its origins in both salaried employment and successful coffee farming during the period of British rule. Largely by allying with the local peasantry and partly by allying with the national anti-colonial movement, that class displaced the chiefs, whose own position both in the local economy and as political officers had been supported by the British administration. Though forced to make some accommodations, that class has largely opposed socialist initiatives from the center. But simultaneously, due primarily to the access to education that its role in local production fostered, that class has supplied a significant portion of the national leaders in Tanzania.

The behavior of that class, however, cannot be explained simply by reference to its interests as a petty bourgeoisie. Here is the importance of understanding classes as defined by conflict with other classes—we must understand this class not by its position but by its oppositions. The interests of the local ruling class in Kilimanjaro are defined by several different conflicts, all of which occur contemporaneously.

First, the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie has historically been in conflict with the Europeans who settled within Kilimanjaro. As the settlers sought to monopolize markets and guarantee labor supplies by manipulating coffee growing regulations and marketing arrangements, the petty bourgeoisie allied with local peasants to form growers' associations and cooperatives to protect their access to markets, new technology, and even land. The most recent, and perhaps final, battle in this conflict was the nationalization of settler coffee estates in 1973, through an alliance linking the petty bourgeoisie both with the party at the national level and with the local smallholders. That the petty bourgeoisie was the dominant class in the alliance is clear from the allocation of the nationalized estates: not to the smallholders directly, not to the estate workers and neighboring farmers collectively, and not to some form of ujamaa village organized to institute either local control or central direction, but to the coffee cooperatives, institutions controlled by the petty bourgeoisie. That the rules defining which estates were to be nationalized were devised to exclude most of the holdings of the petty bourgeoisie provides further evidence of that class's dominance.

Second, the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie achieved power at the expense of the Chagga chiefs, and thus was defined in part by its conflict with the chiefs, the institutions of chiefly power within Kilimanjaro, and the links between the chiefs and the British administration. The politics of that struggle were complex. Each recognition by the petty bourgeoisie of the links between their efforts to control the local coffee economy and their anti-chief struggle, and between their anti-chief struggle and the larger anti-colonial struggle, was repulsed by the British administration, which
kept narrowing the grounds of the conflict and returning it to Kilimanjaro (Rogers, 1972; McCarthy, 1972: Chapter VII; Samoff, 1974:19-31). In this conflict, the petty bourgeoisie allied with clan heads unhappy with the loss of their authority to the chiefs and with sub-regional factions within Kilimanjaro, and finally prevailed as the national anti-colonial movement gained momentum in Tanganyika.

To some extent, as the chiefs and the British administration became less consequential opponents of the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie, they were succeeded by a third opposing force, perceived locally as the "center" in Tanzanian politics. That is, the petty bourgeoisie regarded its struggle against the chiefs not only as a claim for local power but also as an effort to avoid control from outside Kilimanjaro. The brief period of the elected paramount chief in the 1950s was marked by the creation of a Kilimanjaro anthem, flag, and newspaper, and the celebration of Kilimanjaro holidays. The historic alliance between the party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie to oust the chiefs notwithstanding, TANU in independent Tanganyika (and subsequently Tanzania) had its own sense of direction for the country, which did not permit to Kilimanjaro the autonomy its ruling group desired. As the policy initiatives from the center became more explicitly socialist, they were directed at curtailing the aggressive entrepreneurship and individual accumulation, as well as the commercial and institutional links with Europe, that characterized the behavior of the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie. Just as the petty bourgeoisie's class interests had brought it into conflict with British control and its local officers, the chiefs, so did those interests bring it into conflict with the vijamaa policy of independent Tanzania (Samoff, 1976:34-37).

This conflict between the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie and the center has thus far served largely to forge a regional alliance across classes within Kilimanjaro. Most often, the local ruling class has been able to persuade other local residents that their interests lie in maintaining the regional alliance and not in allying with outsiders against the local rulers. I shall return to this point shortly.

The fourth conflict defining the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie is that which pits it against the smallholders, the poorer urban strata (many of them immigrants to the region), and the wage laborers. Objectively, it is this conflict that we might expect to be primary in Kilimanjaro. Land pressure on the mountain has been severe for much of this century. When coffee prices decline, all farmers suffer, but those with access to advanced technology (irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides) and with fields planted to other crops suffer less. And the locally elected officials, merchants, and transporters are the most available focus for antagonism, even when they have only middle-level roles in a chain of underdevelopment that extends far beyond Kilimanjaro. But to the present, this conflict has remained submerged. In part, the local ruling class is able to rely on ties of ethnicity and kinship to...
overcome (and disguise) conflicts of class. In part, central initiatives can be portrayed as threatening to the entire region, thus overcoming conflicts of class with the ties of regionalism. In part, central initiatives are depicted as specifically Muslim (Bienen, 1970:43-48), thus emphasizing religious ties among the predominantly Christian populace of the mountain (where most prominent local leaders have well-publicized church affiliations). In short, class conflicts become blurred in the assertion of other associational links.

Equally, if not more, important, much of the objective tension between classes within Kilimanjaro can be displaced elsewhere. That is, through a whole variety of mechanisms, Kilimanjaro's unemployment and underemployment can be eased both by outward migration from Kilimanjaro and by the transfer of wealth accumulated elsewhere (even as far as Uganda and Kenya) back into Kilimanjaro. These are difficult points to document systematically, but unsystematic observation and extensive interviews suggest the importance of these two mechanisms: outward migration and inward transfer of wealth.

The point here is that the local ruling class in Kilimanjaro, the petty bourgeoisie, is neither a static grouping that has remained relatively unchanged over time nor a fixed cluster of occupations and positions. Because it is involved in several different conflicts simultaneously, the structure and behavior of the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie are necessarily dynamic and thus always somewhat obscure to an observer with only one vantage point at any given time. The very ambiguity of its interests in the current situation permits the petty bourgeoisie some autonomy of action (Saul, 1974:357-359). Similarly, the class alliances of this petty bourgeoisie are continually remolded, and may include links with classes from which it appropriates surplus as well as links with classes for whom it generates and transmits surplus. While sections of this class entrench their opposition to socialist initiatives, other sections can take anti-capitalist positions. Those alliances, too, are frustratingly imprecise to an observer with but a single vantage point.

A parallel analysis is appropriate at the national level for much of Africa. Though the origins of national leaderships in Africa lie in the political economy of European rule, and though structurally leaders remain linked to the metropole, they are not entirely its agents. For segments of the national leadership their objective interests require and their assertions of nationalism permit an alliance with the mass of the population against continued external domination. The very intermediary position of this leadership permits there to occur within it conflicts over which alliances to pursue, and thus over which strategies of development should prevail (Saul, 1974:354-359; Cabral, 1969: "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea" in *Theor; Roch,q, 1971). Those conflicts are manifested in efforts to control state power.

Class Structure and the State

Class conflict, of course, has to do with state power. Classes competing for control over production and wealth seek to control state power to secure their goals, and particularly to fashion the institutions of the state to reflect their interests (Girardin, 1974). Day-to-day management is a lot simpler when state institutions themselves screen out challenges and cloak decisions favoring the ruling class with the legitimacy of apparently universal norms (Miliband, 1969:161-195).

The links between the ruling class and state institutions are particularly close in the Third World, where the structural relations of dependence preclude the emergence of a local bourgeoisie with real ownership of the means of production (Ake, 1976:3; Harris, 1975:30-33). Since the organization of monopoly capitalism precludes local owning classes in the major branches of the economy (Coulson, 1973:24-25), local
Elite seek to use state power to gain control over production and distribution. Hence, the apparent trend toward nationalization of foreign enterprises and creation of joint stock companies (private foreign company plus local government) suits both the Third World critics of foreign domination and the local rulers attempting to use their political positions to gain more substantial economic leverage.

There emerges in Africa what Shivji has called the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie": citizens whose political positions for them some control over the local economy (Shivji, 1975: Part II, Harris, 1975:24-25). Shivji's construct, which has not gone unchallenged (Cliffe and Saul, 1973:331-358), might be divided into two sections--first, those local citizens who hold managerial positions in the nationalized and joint-stock companies (parastatals); and second, those whose positions in the government administration permit them to exercise some control over the behavior of the parastatals (through, for example, permitting monopoly markets, or setting pricing policies, or fixing import quotas, or allocating power and water, or protecting terms of employment, or simply awarding contracts). Although this construct has been developed for analysis of the national political economy, it is also usefully applied at the local level.

In Kilimanjaro, the emergent petty bourgeoisie has, at least from the 1920s, been concerned with gaining control over coffee production and marketing. To achieve that, it has used whatever levers it has been able to grasp. It has formed growers' associations and cooperatives. It has organized local political parties. It has opposed the British administration and the chiefs, and their nominees for local positions. It has made alliances within the region, and it has sought alliances outside the region. It has established direct links with the European coffee buyers. And throughout, it has sought to dominate local politics.

Dominating local politics in Kilimanjaro has, since the 1920s, meant dominating both the institutions concerned directly with the production, transport, and marketing of coffee and the institutions of local government. Changes in the leadership of the coffee cooperative, the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), have been mirrored in changes in local government office and in leadership of local party units (Samoff, 1974:19-31, and Part IV). This effort by the local ruling class to capture control over state institutions has occurred elsewhere in Tanzania as well (Feldman, 1975:155; Bailey, 1975:6).

The local petty bourgeoisie in Kilimanjaro, then, has historically had two branches. Though both have their origins in coffee production, one has remained largely in agriculture and commerce, while the other branch has occupied political positions. Among the earliest founders of the growers' associations were subordinate officials of the colonial administration, especially clerks and teachers (McCarthy, 1972:247-253; McCarthy, 1975). Thus, from the outset, one strategy of the petty bourgeoisie's effort to become a bourgeoisie has been to secure control over the local state institutions by assuming their leadership positions to become a local petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In significant local conflicts, the local petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been able to protect the interests of its class allies, for example in the allocation of the nationalized settler coffee estates discussed above and local liquor licenses (Samoff, 1974: Chapter 3).

In the post-colonial setting, that local control—the behavior of the local petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie—has been the primary obstacle to socialist initiatives emanating from the center (Samoffs, 1976). The mechanisms through which this has occurred have included both direct opposition to those initiatives and also interpreting and controlling their implementation (Feldman, 1975:161). That control by the local ruling class has been necessary to secure the conditions of its reproduction. To use Carchedi's distinction, that control has permitted the reproduction of the agents of
the local ruling class through its continued preferential access to the educational system. At the same time, that local control has permitted the reproduction of the positions of the local ruling class by resisting initiatives to transform the local political economy. In other words, the function of the local petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been not only to protect the interests of the local ruling class but also to insure its reproduction. Control over state power has been the primary mechanism for securing class power.

The Kilimanjaro Political Economy

We must now return briefly to a point raised earlier, the local opposition to the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie. Since the local ruling class has its origins in coffee production, since the sale of coffee plots has been common for many years (Dundas, 1924:301), and since land scarcity has been recognized as a problem for half a century (Annual Reports of District and Provincial Commissioners rarely failed to mention it), we might expect to observe a concentration of land in a few hands with the concomitant emergence of farmers with so little land that they were forced to sell their labor. Yet, although local officials have predicted political turmoil due to land pressure for some 30 years, and although the average acreage per grower fell sharply in the 1960s (see Figure A), there is little evidence in the 1970s of a significant local group of landless farmers on the mountain.15

Several hypotheses can be proposed to explain this lack of a local landless class, all of them plausible but none of them yet well supported by the available research. Foreign laborers (both other Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians) who have come to Kilimanjaro to seek work have largely found employment on the sisal plantations south of the mountain or in the urban setting of Moshi. Those few who did work on coffee estates have largely been incorporated within the local populace, even to the extent of securing their own coffee plots and acquiring rights comparable to those of the local ethnic group (Samoff, 1974:167). The movement of labor from the drier eastern side of the mountain, Rombo, has largely ceased as that area has become more productive. To some extent, this former labor reservoir may now have begun to attract inward migration. The more widespread use of fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides, and improved seedlings, together with better cultivation practices have led to increased production and quality and thus permit smaller plots to provide adequate income. The availability of additional land within the region which, though unsuitable for coffee, can be used for annual

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**Figure A** COFFEE ACREAGE PER GROWER IN KILIMANJARO, 1923/24-1972/73

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food crops has facilitated crop diversification. Thus, it seems likely that one outcome of land pressure in Kilimanjaro has been to reduce the need for outside labor, or rather, for local labor--by farmers on nearby land on a short-term, seasonal basis--to displace imported labor. In addition, as noted above, there has been migration out of Kilimanjaro, much of it to agricultural settlement and urban employment in other areas of northern Tanzania.

The point here is that thus far there has not emerged a significant objective conflict of interest between the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie and the poorest of the local peasants, almost all of whom continue to farm some coffee on their own (see TABLE 4). There is a danger, however, of adopting too static a view of the local political economy which could obscure the actual objective conflicts. In the changing political economy of Kilimanjaro, coffee production may come to have a very different role from that which it has had over the past half century.

Coffee farming has indeed been the major source of cash income for Kilimanjaro farmers since the beginning of this century. The introduction and extension of coffee farming was the change in the pattern of production that led to the formation of a new class able to challenge successfully the chiefs then in power. But coffee farming may no longer be the most dynamic sector of the local economy.

Coffee prices, determined by market factors largely beyond the control of the coffee producers, have fluctuated widely. Since the 1960s, increases in income from coffee farming have required higher quality beans which in turn have necessitated expensive technological inputs (irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, processing equipment) and increasingly expensive labor. At the same time, there has been little new land available for expanding coffee production. Hence, individuals with significant capital available for investment have begun to look elsewhere. Available surplus capital that is not invested in commerce and transport is likely to be invested in annual crops grown on fields at lower levels of the area, which are both more readily available and more accessible to transport. Because the application of technology may well bring a better return on the annual crops than on coffee, particularly since producer prices on food crops are set nationally rather than on the world market, local investment capital is likely to be diverted away from coffee and toward the annual crops. Recent evidence does indicate the significance of other crops in the local economy (see TABLE 5).

This evidence is supported by the perceptions of the local petty bourgeoisie:

Coffee is just pocket money. By the time you hire someone to prune it, spray it, pick it, and pay for chemical sprays and so on, what you have left is very little. I have uprooted some of my coffee and replaced it with grass [fodder].

These changes in the most dynamic sector of the local political economy are still too recent for their long-range implications to be clearly visible. But they do suggest that a static view of the situation may obscure the changing nature
Class Formation, Reproduction, and Underdevelopment

The major argument of this paper has been concerned with the mechanisms through which differential access to education has been manipulated in Tanzania to insure the reproduction of a local ruling class. The immediate context has been the coffee growing area of northeastern Tanzania, where in the 20th Century a new pattern of production led to the formation of a new local class. Up to the present rooted in coffee production, that class used its access to education to differentiate itself from other classes and to insure that new generations of local leaders have values and orientations similar to those of their predecessors. This mechanism for the reproduction of the agents of a local ruling class functions elsewhere in Tanzania as well (Feldman, 1975:167; M. Mbilinyi, 1974).

This argument at the local level corresponds to the larger scale analysis of Africa, and of much of the Third
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World. The first level explanation for the [poverty] of Africa focuses on the roles of African states in the capitalist world system (Rodney, 1972; Saul, 1974). The second level explanation, to overcome the second level explanation for the emergence of objective conflicts of interest between classes than with the mechanisms by which new sets of leaders are recruited from particular classes. Carchedi has argued that the reproduction of social classes depends on the reproduction of both positions and agents..." (Carchedi, 1975).

My use of class differentiation is concerned with the latter, the reproduction of agents. I will come later in the paper to a more general discussion of the study of class in Tanzania.

Since it is often the case that authors—Tanzanian or expatriate—who attempt a critical analysis of Tanzania's development strategy are perceived to be aligning themselves either with the anti-socialist or with the doctrinaire Marxist critics of Tanzania, it needs to be reiterated here that Tanzania's efforts to overcome its underdevelopment are among the most impressive, and perhaps among the most successful, in the Third World. It is in the spirit of Cabral's "Tell No Lies, Claim No Easy Victories" (Cabral, 1969), and Nyerere's "Leaders must not be Masters" (Nyerere, 1968) and "To Plan is To Choose" (Nyerere, 1973), that this analysis is developed.

As used here, Kilimanjaro refers to an area of political action that corresponds roughly to the area immediately surrounding the mountain. Formerly Kilimanjaro District, that area is now administratively organized into Moshi, Rombo, and El Districts, all in Kilimanjaro Region.

Church official, Kilimanjaro, 1974. Unless otherwise specified, information and quotations are taken from research in Kilimanjaro in 1968-69 and 1974, with the anonymity of the sources preserved.

Comparing Kilimanjaro and the rest of Tanzania in this regard is a difficult task, since secondary school students
The nature and behavior of this group are discussed in more detail below.

That much of the current social science writing reflects all of these equations is obvious. Unfortunately, even many of the radical critics, perhaps attempting to embrace a positivist methodology on a dialectical theory of similar constructs (Shivji, 1975, is one example—see Anderson, 1974: esp. 121-123).

That terminology is unfortunately awkward, since, as the thrust of my argument thus far suggests, we are just beginning to understand the nature of this class. As we have seen, petty bourgeoisie refers to small-scale capitalists whose proximate model for behavior is the large-scale capitalist. That class includes the educated elite, some of whom held political or administrative positions and have little direct involvement in capitalist enterprise. Although the origins of the class are now clear, the dynamic of the larger context permits that class some autonomy of action—to consolidate or transform its capitalist role or to transform itself. Freyhold prefers the term “Nizaras” from those whose position stems from Africanization (Seal, 1974:354-367).

Not all estates were nationalized. Those affected were coffee estates in the heart of the coffee-growing area (thus excluding estates in West Kilimanjaro and those on which coffee was not the major crop) larger than 50 acres (thus excluding all but the largest of the African-owned estates).

What is involved is not just migration but rather movement of individuals toward a sector which was located outside the core. Local leaders have facilitated movement in large numbers, though an analysis of the data thus far indicate a net non-regional migration of 1,711 in Kilimanjaro Region’s total population (Claesson and Egero, 1974:66).

It is important here to maintain a distinction between class power and state power. Due to the dependent structure of African economies, control over state power by the ruling class is the primary condition for its own reproduction. On the importance of differentiating class power from state power, see Hallin, 1975:95-101.

The structural interpenetration of government and party in Kilimanjaro makes it reasonable to regard both as state institutions (Samoff, 1974:161-164, 17-105).

This effort to apply at the local level constructs developed for national analysis leads to unfortunately awkward terminology. The African petty bourgeoisie of the period of European rule (often termed “African middle class” and “educated elite”) constituted the leadership of the nationalist anti-colonial movement. At the termination of direct European rule, that class became the national segment of the bourgeoisie (the other, dominant, segment remaining in the metropole). Although individuals from the Kilimanjaro petty bourgeoisie have become part of that national segment of the Tanzanian bourgeoisie, I am concerned here with the local ruling class in Kilimanjaro, which has retained a distinctly petty bourgeoisie. Hence, that branch of the local ruling class whose power stems from political and administrative positions can appropriately be described as the local petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The projections of political turmoil due to land scarcity that fill the historical record have led several
In a survey of Kilimanjaro farmers, it was reported there was no land shortage at all (Mbilinyi, 1973:159). See also Conyers, et al, 1977. Mbilinyi reported that 55% of the families in the coffee growing areas hired labor (1973:159, 160).

The transport needs of 1 ton of maize and 50 kilograms of coffee, with approximately equivalent market values in 1969, are very different.

To encourage food production, producer prices for maize were raised 6% in 1973-74 and 43% in 1974-75 (Uchumi, 1974:56).

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