The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between psychological traits and voting behavior. Investigated is the thesis that psychological traits are useful concepts for political scientists as predictors of consistency in behavior. Contending that previous trait theory research has been generally unimpressive, the author hypothesizes that traits may be specific to individuals as well as situations. This reform of trait theory is applied to six politically relevant traits: tendermindedness, radicalism-conservatism, F-scale, social desirability, locus of control, and machiavellianism. The criterion variables include 18 measures of electoral and non-electoral participation, ideology and partisanship, including: votes in campus, local, state and national elections, anti-war activity, party identification, political discussions, and attempts to persuade others. Findings indicate that segregating the sample into trait-relevant and trait non-relevant groups is meaningful since predictive power is distinctly enhanced in the trait-relevant groups. In addition, the analysis shows that the 18 criterion items cluster according to trait-predictability in highly interpretable ways. References relating to personality types, psychological studies, and political participation are included. (Author/DB)
PERSONALITY ANTECEDENTS OF THE VOTE

Bruce A. Campbell

The University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia

1976
Personality Antecedents of the Vote

by

Bruce A. Campbell

University of Georgia

Personality Antecedents of the Vote

Bruce A. Campbell
University of Georgia

The idea that certain identifiable personality traits can be found to explain inter-situational consistency in behavior has attracted political scientists from the times of Plato. Surely, if we could only develop reliable and valid measures of these traits, we could introduce new levels of predictive regularity into the study of politics. Unfortunately, in spite of our intuitive convictions that behavioral consistency should emerge, it rarely has in empirical investigations by political scientists. The following analysis is therefore a continuation of a dialogue. We expect to succeed where others have failed because of a recasting of the theory of trait influence on behavior. Trait theorists generally concede that traits are situationally specific. That is, a trait can be expected to produce regularities in only a certain selected set of situations. However, that set has often been imposed a priori by the investigator. We shall attempt to allow our respondents to determine for themselves the relevant situation set.

A second reform which we shall propose for trait theory is that traits are not only situation-specific, but are also person-specific. This view rejects the traditional assumption that all individuals possess a particular trait, in favor of the idea that for some, a trait may simply have no meaning. We should expect consistency in behavior only for those who organize their world views according to a relevant trait.
This paper explores new theoretical ground in political science, and its main contribution should be the assessment it makes of the fruitfulness of the paths it follows. If the substance of our results can be seen as a contribution to our knowledge of attitude and behavior in the area of political participation, then the success of our effort will have been two-fold.

Trait Theory

Trait theory rests on a simple and intuitively attractive postulate: There are certain elements of the personality, called traits, which are relatively stable, highly consistent, and which exert widely generalized causal effects on behavior (Mischel, 1973). We all find in our day-to-day affairs that we tend to form expectations about our friends and colleagues in terms of certain traits which we have assigned to them. We can expect one individual to deprecate our achievements because we think he is deficient in self-esteem and has difficulty accepting the notion that others are doing quality work. We predict that another individual will typically be the one to take the initiative in organizing social activities because we have assigned to him the trait of compulsive orderliness. These sorts of informal observations have led to the fundamental assumption of this theoretical approach to personality: "Personality comprises broad underlying dispositions which pervasively influence the individual's behavior across many situations and lead to consistency in his behavior" (Allport, 1937).

One can easily understand how trait theory arose before the Depression. Freud's work formed a dominant part of the thinking on personality and led to a view which reduced the personality to a very few, or even to one,
dimension. Moreover, the intuitive factor reinforced this view. Bem and Allen (1974; p. 506) note that for our intuitions "the assumption of cross-situational consistency is virtually synonymous with the concept of personality itself. There are few other beliefs about human behavior which are as compellingly self-evident."

The great misfortune of trait theory has been that, as increasingly sophisticated measurement techniques have been applied to the various trait concepts, empirical research has consistently failed to find much cross-situational predictive power. Mischel (1968), in reviewing both past and current research, observes that the cross-situational correlation coefficients reported generally fail to exceed .30. That is to say, individuals who are scored as helpful or persistent (Hartshorne and May, 1928), introverted (Newcomb, 1929), or punctual (Dudycha, 1936), for instance, fail to behave consistently across a variety of situations in which these traits are expected to be manifested.

The fact that behavior varies from situation to situation is certainly not denied by anyone, not even the classical trait theorists. Quite to the contrary, numerous sensitive analyses appear to have isolated two basic reasons why traits, which "ought" to determine behavior, do such a poor job of it. These we may label "specificity of the situation" and "specificity of the person."

Of these two factors, by far the more familiar is the specificity of the situation. Psychologists have long recognized the value of the Lewinian paradigm:

\[ B = f \left( C, E \right) \]
Figure 1

The Interaction of Situation and Person in the Expectation of Trait-Consistent Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Behavior is Consistent</th>
<th>Behavior is not Consistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait is Engaged</td>
<td>Trait is Relevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait is Not Engaged</td>
<td>Trait is Not Relevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior is Consistent</th>
<th>Behavior is not Consistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait is Engaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait is Not Engaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
That is, behavior is a function of the interaction of the organism and its environment (Davies, 1973; Greenstein, 1975). An example of one of the more popular traits in the literature, and one which we discuss at length below, is authoritarianism. This trait is generally found to predict hostile and aggressive behavior in situations of interpersonal interaction, but only in the case where the authoritarian individual occupies a superior position. That is, the trait is not served by a certain typical behavior in all cases. In the instance in which the authoritarian individual encounters someone who is superior to him, his typical behavior pattern will be submission. In sum, a trait may be served by different behaviors in different situations.

The specificity of situation concept continues beyond this, however. It is clear that a trait is simply not engaged in many, if not most, of the situations encountered by the individual. This may be true even though the investigator may have good reason to think that, in theory, a situation ought to be trait-related. Bem and Allen (1974) maintain that much of the failure of empirical work in trait theory to show the expected correlations arises from this problem. The investigator determines a priori which situations he will test, ignoring the fact that he may be forcing situations on his subjects which they do not feel are relevant to the trait in question. The result is a deflated correlation. In their own work, these authors discover that the trait "conscientiousness" predicts rather well to getting school work in on time, but fails miserably to predict who will maintain the most orderly room.

The second factor which appears in Figure 1 involves the specificity of the person. The idea that traits cannot be expected to determine
behavior in all situations is generally well-established (although less
well in political science than in psychology). A much more unusual
idea is that traits may not determine behavior in all individuals, either.
The influence of Freud, who spoke of personality universals, has perhaps
preempted our thinking in this particular area. Nonetheless, it appears
reasonable to think that while certain individuals may be very authoritar-
ian or very non-authoritarian, certain others may not organize their world
view along those lines at all. The dimension of authoritarianism may
simply not be relevant to their behavior in any situation. This will be
true regardless of the fact that these latter individuals may be perfectly
capable of generating a score of the F-scale.

These two factors must each be taken into account, therefore, if we are
to expect behavior to be consistently related to traits. As Figure 1 indicates, both are necessary but not sufficient conditions.

The Use of Trait Theory in Political Science

The use of the trait concept to explain consistencies in the political
behavior of individuals has a long, if not particularly crowded, heritage.
Plato, the source of so much of the inspiration in our discipline, included
personality traits in his study. His three types of leaders, the aristo-
ocrat, the timocrat, and the tyrant, were each identified in terms of a
central motive. These individuals acted in pursuit of honor, wealth,
or power, and from those underlying traits, the characteristics of the
rule of each could be predicted.

Among the later classics, a number can be viewed as the outline of
the governmental form which would be expected to follow if a single
psychological orientation is made the premise. "Thus, Hobbes Leviathan
may be considered as a discussion of the society and government which would follow if human beings were sadomasochistic and paranoid; Machiavelli's *The Prince* may be considered as a discussion of government where the elite is competitive, anxious and possessed of psychopathic personalities, and J. S. Mills' *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government* represent a Utopia where men are assumed to have democratic personalities, are thought to have their libidinous drives well under control, and are guided by reason" (Lane, 1963; p. 467n).

It is perhaps more typical to identify three contemporary names with the use of trait theory in political science: Lasswell, Greenstein, and Davies. Lasswell, in fact, is generally acknowledged as the father of this approach within the discipline, Plato et al. notwithstanding. "He was the first to insist successfully on the need to bring psychology into political analysis. He, more than any other person, insisted that unconscious forces which so significantly determine how people behave must be subjected to analysis" (Davies, 1973; p. 20).

The basic statement of Lasswell's position on the role of personality in political life takes the form of the following equation:

\[ p \rightarrow d \rightarrow r = P \]

That is, political man is produced by the displacement of private motives onto public objects, and their subsequent rationalization in terms of the public interest.

The key element in this formula from our perspective is of course the \( p \), or private motives. These are shared by all men; political types arise when certain motives are displaced and rationalized. Lasswell's analysis focuses on three basic types of political man. The "agitator" is animated by a "drive to obtain prompt indulgence from large audiences
in terms of values such as affection and respect." The "administrator" is identified with a need to keep destructive impulses under control, and is generally seen as a "power-centered" rather than a "permissive" type. Finally, the "theorist" stresses "enlightenment and skill values," and is identified with frustrations met early in life. In spite of the fact that these characteristics would not be immediately recognized as traits by many classical personality psychologists, it is not difficult to see in them the core of the "pervasive predispositions which have a generalized effect on behavior" which lie at the center of the standard definition.

Both Davies and Greenstein have taken up Lasswell's crusade to have personality included in the study of politics, a crusade which had not made much headway in the thirty years following the publication of Psychopathology and Politics. Davies (1973) takes a particularly aggressive position, seeking to "compensate for what I regard as a hyper-trophy of research in epiphenomena, phenotypes, and other evidences of the sometimes self-evident or long since demonstrated . . ." (p. 27). He deplores the study of political behavior for concentrating on the "precise validation of the self-evident in each of its infinite nuances." More fundamentally, his position is that the truly basic questions which political scientists ask (or ought to ask), cannot be answered without a grounding in political psychology. The question of why men institute governments or why they seek to alter or abolish them must be approached, says Davies, through a systematic knowledge of psychology.

Although he shares a common belief about the validity of the political personality concept, the thrust of Greenstein's work (1969) is in a
direction quite different from Davies'. Here, the primary concern is not to attack the empirical study of political behavior for its neglect of the personality, but to strike down whatever logical arguments may have been raised to defend that neglect. In a review of five of the major objections which have been brought to the study of personality in political science, Greenstein concludes that there is no reason why, in principle, we should not focus more precisely in this area in our attempts to understand political man (1969; chapter 2). He then presents a schema of the personality which was originally developed by Smith (1968), laying out the various elements and processes upon which research into this realm must focus.

So we find that Lasswell has laid the modern foundations for the study of personality and politics, Davies exhorts us to make more use of personality concepts, and Greenstein assures us that personality is in fact relevant in the study of political behavior. We are left, in this brief review, with a consideration of the shock troops, those scholars who have attempted to collect data and to demonstrate empirically that some link exists between personality traits and political behavior.

Even if we restrict ourselves to studies with some bearing on politics, we face a bewildering variety of work in this area. Fortunately, Greenstein has recently completed a magistral review (1975), to which all can refer, and which relieves us of the necessity of attempting one here. (Other compendia are Greenstein and Lerner, 1971; Knutson, 1973).

It is perhaps worth a moment, nevertheless, to point out the basic details of Greenstein's organization, so that the main features of the landscape in this subfield will be clear. The studies treated in Greenstein's review are divided into three groups. The first involves
case studies of individual political actors. Here we find two major areas of focus. The first is the familiar technique of psychobiography. The lives and actions of major political figures have been variously dissected, usually from a heavily psychoanalytic perspective. Thus, we find Erikson's two works on political and religious leaders, *Young Man Luther* (1958) and *Ghandi's Truth* (1969); George and George's analysis of Woodrow Wilson (1956), and Tucker's analysis of Stalin's formative years and rise to power (1973).

Not all case studies have dealt with political elites, however. Of much greater interest for our own analysis are the case studies carried out in the general population by Smith, Bruner and White (1956), and by Lane (1962). In both of these studies, extraordinarily long interviews (on the order of 30 hours in the former case) were conducted with 10 or 15 men. The main service performed by this work has been to demonstrate the complex and contingent nature of the relationships between personality characteristics and political behavior. If nothing else, these studies suggest that "there evidently are connections 'in the real world' between personal disposition and political behavior that are too segmental and varied to be trapped in the form of measured general relationships" (Greenstein, 1975; p. 35).

The second major grouping of personality and politics work in Greenstein's review centers on the political typology. Here we focus most directly on the subject of the present paper, for by typology, Greenstein means "syndrome classifications that identify interdependent constellations of traits with distinctive origins, dynamics and behavioral links ..." (p. 44). Since we will deal at greater length with certain traits in a
later section, we will simply mention here some of the studies which fall under this rubric.

Perhaps the most well-known study of a politically-relevant trait is the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, et al., 1950). Designed originally to study the psychological correlates of anti-Semitism, the principle trait developed by this work -- the F-scale -- has come to be applied to all manner of political behavior as well. This effort has met with indifferent success, as we discuss below.

Another example of the application of trait psychology to political behavior is Rokeach's The Open and The Closed Mind (1960). This typological formulation was an attempt to isolate the dogmatism trait in a way which would be free from ideological contamination. Rokeach hoped to escape the criticism leveled against the F-scale which held that it was a measure only of right-wing authoritarianism. Although the scale is weakened somewhat by Rokeach's validation procedure, which is limited to a sample of 13 English Communists, the general potential of the dogmatism trait should continue to attract the attention of political scientists.

A third prominent attempt to construct a politically-relevant trait involves the Machiavellianism scale. This, too, was an effort to escape the problems of the F-scale and to develop an ideology-free measure. The scale was designed "to identify individuals disposed to fill manipulative social and political roles -- individuals low in affect invested in interpersonal relationships, concern with conventional morality, and intensity of ideological commitment and sufficiently lacking in 'gross psychopathology' to use these permissive proclivities to act as 'operators'
or manipulators" (Greenstein, 1975; p. 50).

The final main division of Greenstein's review incorporates aggregative analyses. The best known part of this literature, though not always the most respected, is that which deals with national character. These studies, which have subsequently been roundly criticized, generally identified a linkage between some aspect of child-rearing practices and personality structure, and between personality structure and the behavior of whole cultures. During the Second World War and the cold-war period, these analyses were studiously applied not only to the explanation of our enemies (Benedict, 1946; Dicks, i950; Gorer and Rickman, 1949), but also our friends (Mead, 1942).

On the more reputable side, a number of studies have attracted attention. McClelland (1961), for instance, has sought to demonstrate the link between the level of need-achievement in a population, and the rate of economic growth. And Talcott Parsons' (1947) essay on the sources of aggression in international affairs hypothesized that private tensions which arise from the strain of trying to learn occupational roles, are displaced outward and lead finally to aggressive impulses in the international sphere.

While Greenstein has assembled a truly impressive list of work, when we look down to consult the bottom line, the empirical demonstrations of trait-behavior links in politics have failed to impress. Milbrath and Klein (1962), for instance, conclude: "We are not aware of any study which has isolated a personality trait which drives people specifically into politics." McClosky (1958), while he finds an extraordinary number of links between clinical measures of personality (such as rigidity, hostility or contempt for weakness), and conservatism, goes on to conclude
that people do not seem to make political judgements on the basis of their liberalism-conservatism. Schneider (1973), speaking of psychological research more generally, concludes that "there has been no research attention to relatively stable inferential relationships between behaviors and traits. Finally, the authors of the American Voter (1960) review personality factors in voting behavior. Their research on the effect of authoritarianism on the prediction of attitudes about public policy reveals that for the 80% of the population which lacks a college education, "results stand at a dubious trace level." Similar findings were made in the area of partisan choice.

While we fully intend to close this section on a negative note, it would perhaps be circumspect to point out that the effort to link personality traits with political variables has by no means fallen into neglect. A major on-going project is being sustained by McClosky, who has now passed this interest on to his students. Of specific note in this context are Sniderman (1975), and Sniderman and Citrin (1971), who focus on the link between self-esteem and democratic politics.

Specification of Person and Situation

Throughout this review of applications of trait theory in political science, we note a marked lack of sensitivity to the concept of specificity. Our earlier review observed that psychologists have generally conceded that no personality trait will be manifest in all behavioral situations. In many cases, the trait will simply not be engaged, and in others, the trait may be served by inconsistent behavior (as in the authoritarian's dominance of subordinates and submission to superiors).
Conscious even of this 'imitation of trait theory and selecting situations with great care, a ceiling of +.30 seems to exist for cross-situational correlation coefficients (Mischel, 1968). Indeed, Mischel concludes that "the predictive utility of a trait-based approach to personality still remains undemonstrated and that situational specificity of behavior appears to be the rule rather than the exception" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 507).

Bem and Allen (1974) refuse to accept this indictment. In spite of the several reasons to accept at face value the failure of empirical studies to produce correlations in excess of +.30, these authors believe that this lack of cross-situational consistency arises from an error which was pointed out forty years ago by Gordon Allport (1937). The fallacy resides in the fact that this entire research tradition is predicated upon nomothetic rather than idiographic assumptions about the nature of individual differences. That is, nearly all the research in the area of trait theory has assumed that a given trait is relevant for all individuals and that individual differences can be identified with different locations on that trait (or set of traits). What Allport proposed was that "individuals differ not only in the ways traits are related to one another in each person, but that they differ also in terms of which traits are even relevant" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 509).

Thus, the nomothetic impulses of the behavioral scientist result in the imposition of a set of equivalence classes, determined by the choice of behaviors and situations to be sampled. Inconsistency in behavior, then, does not necessarily arise from the irrelevance of the trait but from the fact that a nomothetic structure has been forced upon an
essentially idiographic situation. Bem and Allen summarize as follows (1974, p. 510):

... traditional trait-based research study will yield evidence of cross-situational consistency only if the individuals in the research sample agree with the investigator's a priori claim that the sampled behaviors and situations belong in a common equivalence class and only if the individuals agree among themselves on how to scale those behaviors and situations ... The traditional verdict of inconsistency is in no way an inference about individuals; it is a statement about a disagreement between an investigator and a group of individuals and/or a disagreement among the individuals within the group. The fallacy is a direct consequence of the traditional nomothetic assumptions about individual differences.

In its pure form, Bem and Allen allude to a totally idiographic sort of investigation. We are instructed to observe each individual and note in what ways his behaviors are consistent. One subject might always do his schoolwork early, be meticulous about his personal grooming, and be always punctual. We might be tempted to ascribe the trait "conscientious" to this person. What of the second individual, however, who is conscientious about his schoolwork but neglectful in the other two areas? Should he be described as inconsistently conscientious? No, say these authors. Here is a student for whom conscientiousness is not the relevant trait at all, but who is instead highly dedicated as a student and has no time for anything else.

This is not the forum to debate the relative merits of the idiographic and nomothetic approaches to the study of behavior. Suffice it to say that we are in no position to study large samples in the idiographic manner.
described above. What we do propose is to back off from what we have characterized as the nomothetic position; that is, the assumption that certain traits are relevant to everyone, at least in certain situations. If we can come up with an operational definition of "relevant trait," then we will be in a position to limit our investigations to the upper left-hand quadrant of Figure 1. That is, we will be able to specify, to a degree at least, not only the situations in which a trait is relevant, but also, that subset of individuals for which the trait is relevant. This latter step constitutes a major departure from earlier trait research and has high potential for yielding greater intersituational consistency in behavior.

Thus the compromise between the nomothetic and idiographic centers on an idiographic assessment procedure which allows us to use each individual's unique characteristics to determine the relevance of a set of traits. This procedure, as developed by Bem and Allen (1974), centers on the calculation of an ipsatized variance ratio, a statistic which is intended to capture the meaning of the idea of trait relevance. Unless an individual is cross-situationally consistent on a trait dimension (that is, unless he responds in a similar manner to the various items which constitute the trait scale), then by definition he cannot be meaningfully characterized by the investigator's construct. The ipsatized variance ratio is simply a measure of the extent to which an individual's variance on a particular trait relates to the amount of variance present in a larger pool of items. "It reflects the degree to which an individual 'extracts' the particular trait-scale items from the total pool of items and 'clusters' them into an equivalence class" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 515).
Returning to Figure 1, the use of the ipsatized variance ratio allows a two-pronged attack on the problem of increasing the predictability of political behavior from psychological traits. First, we are now able to separate a sample of individuals into trait-relevant and trait-irrelevant groups. That is, we can restrict our investigation to those individuals in the left-hand column of Figure 1 through the application of the ipsatized variance ratio.

The second step is a purely empirical one. Once we have determined whether a trait is relevant, we are able to turn our attention to the array of political behaviors which we hope to predict. We may find, for instance, that certain classes of political behaviors respond very strongly to prediction by traits, but that others are not so affected. This methodology will thus allow a mapping of these criterion variables, determining whether they are relatively more trait-related, as opposed to being socially determined.

A Short Review of the Selected Traits

We should reiterate at this point that this study is highly exploratory in nature. Therefore, we make no claim that the set of scales which we have used constitutes the exhaustive listing of politically-relevant traits. Quite to the contrary, it would be most surprising if this were true. Nor do we present extensive theoretical arguments that all of these six traits which we have included should be found to be politically relevant. Our goal in this analysis is simply to apply the idiographic approach proposed by Bem and Allen to the political sphere. Our selection process has been based on the writings of earlier scholars (reviewed briefly below), who have suggested in
more or less rigorous ways that the traits which we have finally selected should bear some fruit when cultivated in the political realm.

The first two scales employed in our analysis were developed by Eysenck (1954) specifically for the purpose of explaining why radicals of the right (fascists) and left (communists), seem to resemble each other in identifiable ways. Strictly speaking, these measures were not intended to be specific personality variables, but rather emerged as the result of an attempt to construct the dimensions which underlie people's social attitudes and beliefs (Robinson and Shaver, 1969). Eysenck's proposal is elegant in its simplicity. He conceives of modern politics as a two-dimensional arena. One of these dimensions is the familiar radical-conservative one, which seeks to persuade us that communists are fundamentally different from fascists. In order to correct this error (as he perceives it), Eysenck proposes a second, orthogonal dimension of tendermindedness. On this scale, fascists and communists supposedly appear as very similar personalities, both at the tough-minded end.  

Conceptualizing these two traits presents something of a problem. An examination of the items in the radical-conservative cluster reveals only one "concept." That is, conservatism is attached to a preference for things as they are or used to be, while radicalism is characterized by a taste for change. The items of this scale treat such topics as the nationalization of industry, the return to religion, the power of Jews, and the inferiority of colored people. Eysenck found, not surprisingly, that this factor differentiated Socialists rather well from Tories.

The second scale, tendermindedness, does not offer even this meager conceptual content. Here we find items referring to the death penalty, flogging of criminals, and treating conscientious objectors as traitors.
They suggest that an opposition of humane and inhumane is present here, which is of course suggested by the words "tender" and "tough." This is also reminiscent of the "hard-soft" dimension isolated by Weisberg and Rusk (1970) which differentiated Wallace from Rockefeller and McCarthy in the 1968 presidential election.

The third scale which we have included is the well-known authoritarianism, or F-scale (F for fascist). The monumental work which presented this scale (Adorno, et al., 1950) has attracted so much scholarly attention that the concept of trait has practically become synonymous with authoritarianism (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967; Christie and Jahoda, 1954).

The critical difference between the F-scale and Eysenck's scales lies in the intellectual nature of their respective origins. Recall that the Eysenck scales were not conceived a priori, but rather emerged as the dimensions which best describe the clustering of 40 items. (It should be noted that Eysenck claims that his tendermindedness scale is in fact an ideology-free authoritarianism scale.) Robinson describes the approach used in the construction of the F-scale (1969, p. 224). "The F-scale was not constructed by the method of selecting items from a large pool on a statistical basis; rather, each one was written specifically for the original scale on the basis of the authors' previous experience and theoretical considerations. Each item was meant to be related to both prejudice and one or more of nine personality variables... In addition, each item had to be indirect and had to reflect a balance between irrationality and objective truth."

What the authoritarian personality is, or what the authoritarian individual is actually like, is not immediately apparent from the original volume. However, Kirscht and Dillehay (1967, pp. vi-vii), in their review
of The Authoritarian Personality, do present a reasonably comprehensive composite of the syndrome.

Authoritarianism characterizes the basically weak and dependent person who has sacrificed his capacity for genuine experience of self and others so as to maintain a precarious sense of order and safety that is psychologically necessary for him. In the type case, the authoritarian confronts with a façade of spurious strength a world in which rigidly stereotyped categories are substituted for the affectionate and individualized experience of which he is incapable. Such a person is estranged from inner values and lacks self-awareness. His judgments are governed by a punitive conventional moralism, reflecting external standards towards which he remains insecure since he has failed to make them really his own. His relations with others depend on considerations of power, success, and adjustment, in which people figure as means rather than as ends, and achievement is valued competitively rather than for its own sake. In his world, the good, the powerful, and the ingroup merge to stand in fundamental opposition to the immoral, the weak, the outgroup. For all that he seeks to align himself with the former, his underlying feelings of weakness and self-contempt commit him to a constant and embittered struggle to prove to himself and others that he really belongs to the strong and good, and that his ego-alien impulses, which he represses, belong to the weak and bad.

The fourth scale included in our analysis is the Crowne-Marlowe scale of social desirability (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; 1964). This measure was developed initially to be applied as a methodological corrective in the area of personality testing. One of the early failures of this methodology was the fact that subjects seemed "miserably uncooperative" (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964, p. vii). Subjects simply failed to respond to test batteries as was theoretically anticipated. It soon became clear, of course, that the reason underlying this recalcitrance was that subjects were responding not only to the content of an item, but also to its
form. In particular, it was feared that respondents were displaying a
tendency to "fake good," to answer questions in ways which appeared
acceptable, rather than in ways stemming from their true views.

To attack this problem, Crowne and Marlowe developed a set of 33
items which they felt, from a conceptual perspective, would reveal a
tendency to respond in socially desirable ways. Two types of statements
were created; one culturally acceptable but probably untrue ("I never
hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.") and the other
true but undesirable ("I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.").
These items were winnowed from 50 to 33 by a set of judges, and 15 were
then keyed false.

Although the origins of this scale are in the realm of methodology,
the scale has considerable interest in the area of motivation as well.
The authors present it, in fact, as a scale which measures the need to
present oneself in a favorable light (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). It
reflects the need of the subject to obtain approval by responding to
questionnaire items in a culturally appropriate manner.

This scale, unlike the three previously presented, has no obvious
application in the political realm. At second glance, however, a number
of reasonably cogent expectations may be generated. The need-for-approval
motive may well lead individuals down certain paths of political belief
or behavior. We would expect, specifically, that the more visible and
consensually approved aspects of participation, such as voting, would be
significantly related to this need, while controversial participatory
behaviors, such as demonstrating, would be eschewed.

The fifth trait employed in this analysis is Rotter's scale of locus
of control (1954, 1960, 1966). The concept which underlay the development
of the measure is the "degree to which individuals perceive the events in their lives as being a consequence of their own actions and thereby controllable, or as being unrelated to their own behaviors and therefore, beyond personal control" (Lefcourt, 1972). This perception is seen by Rotter to constitute a generalized expectancy, grounded in social learning theory. A 29-item scale to measure this trait was developed after several revisions based on item-analysis, social desirability controls and studies in discriminant validity (Robinson and Shaver, 1969; p. 143).

Lefcourt (1972), in a recent analysis, has detailed five major areas in which the locus of control has been shown experimentally to have discriminating ability. Those whose locus of control is internal (who feel they are masters of their fate) tend to be more resistant to coercion. They tend to display greater cognitive activity, engaging more in data gathering, which is in turn seen as leading to a greater probability of task success. Internals show a greater ability to defer gratification if they are white, although experimental evidence indicates that all blacks tend to prefer immediate reinforcement. Internal control is associated with high academic achievement among children. Finally, internals respond more appropriately than externals to success and failure, adjusting more appropriately to past experience to ensure future success.

To our knowledge, the political relevance of locus of control has not received much attention. Lefcourt cites only one study in his review (Ritchie and Phares, 1969) which borders on the political world. This study was primarily focused on resistance of subjects to changes in attitude. Externals were found to be more conforming than internals to suggested changes but only when the influence arguments were attributed to high-status sources.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the locus of control concept should have political ramifications. The resistance to influence has obvious relevance in the area of issue attitudes, which lie beyond our present scope. Focusing on participatory behavior and ideology, we might expect to find the typical internal to feel more politically efficacious, because of his greater ability to collect information about the system and to receive feedback which would lead eventually to effective behavior. Indeed, the very core of the locus of control concept, that events are the consequence of one's own actions, must certainly include things like the election of candidates to office. We would therefore expect a relationship to exist between voting turnout and locus of control.

As to the measures of political ideology, the locus of control trait provides fewer cues. The external individual might tend to prefer the "hard" candidate, like Wallace or Reagan, who dictomizes societies' problems and proposes simple solutions. In this, however, we are really moving into the areas covered by the F-scale and the tendermindedness scale. At least one study has shown the relationship between locus of control and F to be near zero (Wrightsman and Cook, 1965). We therefore entertain no expectations as to the relationship between this trait and political ideology.

Finally, our sixth measure is Christie's Machiavellianism scale (Christie and Geis, 1970). Not surprisingly, this scale is derived from an extended analysis of items drawn from the writings of Machiavelli. Unlike the F-scale, which leans heavily on the irrational components of human behavior (thus revealing its debt to Freud), the Mach scale is concerned, as was Machiavelli, with overt behavior, and the "how" of interpersonal relations, rather than the more Freudian "why."
Machiavellianism, in essence, refers to a lack of concern with conventional morality, an emotional neutrality in interpersonal relationships, a lack of commitment to ideological goals and a willingness to engage in the manipulation of others. In sum, it encapsulates the idea that an individual is willing to do whatever is necessary, in the interpersonal arena, in order to achieve (usually his own personal) ends (Kraut and Price, 1976).

Christie has to point out, however, that machiavellians are not necessarily hostile, viscous, or vindictive. A better summary phrase might be "cool detachment" which makes them freer to act where others would be bound by emotional involvement or conventional morality (Robinson and Shaver, 1969; p. 508).

This role model appears to be more readily applicable to the political leader than the political follower, and indeed, Christie reveals that his first work with the scale was stimulated by just such people (Christie and Geis, 1970; p. 2). Nonetheless, by examining the major dimensions of the machiavellian profile, certain expectations about the political behavior of the mass electorate do emerge.

We recall that earlier, the notion was advanced that those scoring high on social desirability would be more likely to vote, because voting is seen as "the right thing to do." By this same token, we would expect the Machiavellians to turn out to vote at a lower rate because of their lack of sensitivity to the conventional morality. On the ideological side, we find that machiavellians are conceived as low on ideological commitment of any kind. They are seen, rather, as striving for more short-range and concrete ends, rather than for an ultimate idealistic goal. This means that if ideologies are to be found, they should arise from those who score low on the scale of Machiavellianism.
Data and Method

The data from which the present analysis arises were originally collected in 1968 from male members of the freshman class at the University of Georgia. We have drawn the tendermindedness scale, the radicalism-conservatism scale, the F-scale, the social desirability scale and the locus of control scale from this study.

In 1970, a subset of these subjects was reinterviewed in a study conducted in the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia. At this time, the Machiavellianism scale (Mach IV) and all the political items used in this analysis were collected. Of the 1037 males responding to the 1968 study, 857 valid targets were selected for reinterviewing in 1970. These 857 individuals were contacted in three separate waves at the time of the 1970 elections. Response rates of 52%, 72%, and 51%, and the deletion of any missing data cases yield a usable N of 300 for the present study.

Following Bem and Allen (1974), the ipsatized variance ratio was calculated for each individual, for each of the six scales. This was done by calculating the total variability produced by the pool of items which constituted all six scales (a collection of 144 items in all). This was expressed as an average variance (total variance over all six sets of items, divided by six), and was divided into each of the variances produced by the six subsets of items, one for each scale, to produce the ipsatized variance ratios.

The basic analysis reported below is simply the intercorrelation of the trait score with a number of political criterion variables, with a control for the magnitude of the ipsatized variance ratio. For the 100 cases with the smallest ratios on a given trait, that trait is
considered to be relevant. For those 100 subjects with the largest ratios, the trait is not considered to be relevant.

The choice of dependent variables was dictated primarily by empirical criteria: We sought to present our subjects with a variety of types of behaviors in which they might engage in the political world. We have, accordingly, tested a fairly wide variety of political attitudes and behaviors. These are split into four main categories. First are those which measure the frequency of habitual voting. This is ascertained by questions of the "do you usually vote" kind, asked for different levels of government from local to national.

The second category of criterion variables is really a subset of the first. Here we have placed questions which ask whether the respondent has voted in a specific election.

The third category is a catch-all which we have labeled "non-electoral participation." Here we have included anti-war activity, as well as the more conventional measures of opinion leadership and attempted political persuasion.

Finally, the fourth category includes measures of ideology and partisanship. Ideology is measured by a simple five-category scale, and partisanship is derived from the familiar party identification item and the 1968 presidential choice.

Results

The first step in the examination of our data involves the display of the simple correlation coefficients between the six trait measures and the criterion measures, divided into the four categories mentioned above. (Appendix 1 contains the wording and direction of coding of all variables.)
Table 1 presents what must be a familiar profile to students of
trait psychology. Of the 108 correlations presented in this table, only
16 achieve significant levels ($p < .05$). And of these 16, only six
exceed .20, and only three achieve the .30 level which Mischel observed
to be the ceiling for trait-behavior associations.

Looking at Table 1 in a bit greater detail, it becomes clear quite
quickly why authoritarianism has attracted so much attention among political
scientists. Six of the significant correlations are produced by this
trait, including one (with political ideology) of -.35. The radical-
conservative scale of Eysenck also produces significant associations;
more impressive, in fact, than those produced by the F-scale. Fully nine
of the 18 correlations associated with the radicalism-conservatism trait
are significant, including one of .32 (with anti-war activity), and one
of .46 (with political ideology).

In spite of these occasional salient points, the landscape of
Figure 1 remains rather dreary. And even a correlation of .46, we remember,
means that only 21 percent of the variance in political ideology can be
attributed to the radicalism-conservatism trait.

Bem and Allen would confront this table with observations something
like the following. The reason that we do so poorly in unearthing strong
trait-behavior relationships is because we are forcing a preconceived set
of equivalence classes on our subjects. That is, we expect that all
subjects will behave in ways which are consistent with their measured
position on each trait, and furthermore, we expect that this consistency
of behavior will generalize over the 18 particular behaviors and attitudes
which we have chosen as our criterion variables.
Table 1
Correlations of Six Traits with Four Sets of Political Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Vote in Campus Elections</th>
<th>Vote in Local Elections</th>
<th>Vote in State Elections</th>
<th>Vote in National Elections</th>
<th>Never Vote</th>
<th>Vote in Recent Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tendermindedness</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desirability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>299-</td>
<td>299-</td>
<td>299-</td>
<td>299-</td>
<td>299-</td>
<td>299-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 300
Table 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Voting in Particular Elections / Non-Electoral Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait</td>
<td>Voted in 1970 Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendermindedness</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>223-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait</td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendermindedness</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>249-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels of Significance

* = p < .05  
** = p < .01  
*** = p < .001  

H_0: r ≠ 0 (two-tailed test)
We know, from our earlier discussion, that these are hasty conclusions, derived perhaps from the canons of nomothetic theory, but ill-suited to reveal patterns of relationship in which are embedded important idiographic elements. Therefore, we proceed with two ameliorative steps. First we calculate the ipsatized variance ratio for each of the six scales, for each individual. We then recalculate the trait-behavior correlations for those for whom each trait is most relevant and those for whom the trait is least relevant.

The second step in our procedure involves the inspection of these correlations in an effort to sort out the domain of behaviors over which a trait appears to hold sway for those who hold it to be relevant. By identifying such clusters, we move toward a position of judging whether certain classes of participator, behavior are alike or different in terms of the motives which underlie them.

The first set of criterion variables to be examined in Table 2 involves questions which relate to habitual voting patterns. The typical form of the question is "Do you generally vote . . . ?" Of the 36 trait-criterion correlation pairs displayed, 24 show that those individuals with low variability on the trait in question had a higher direct correlation than those with high variability, ten showed lower correlations, and two were tied.

While this ratio of confirmations to failures is reasonably satisfactory from the point of view of the hypothesis that specification of persons is both relevant and meaningful, a glance at the magnitude of the correlations displayed fails to generate much excitement. While trait-relevant individuals
Table 2

Correlations of Six Traits with Four Sets of Political Variables, Controlling for Trait Relevance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Habitual Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote in Campus</td>
<td>Vote in</td>
<td>Vote in</td>
<td>Vote in</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Vote in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Recent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undemindedness</td>
<td>.12/.13</td>
<td>.12/.08</td>
<td>.09/.06</td>
<td>.04/.03</td>
<td>-.07/.05</td>
<td>.07/.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td>-.02/-01</td>
<td>.10/.04</td>
<td>.18/.15</td>
<td>.11/.12</td>
<td>-.04/.07</td>
<td>.07/.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>-.04/-08</td>
<td>-.05/-24</td>
<td>.02/-30*</td>
<td>.01/-26*</td>
<td>-.02/.12</td>
<td>.19/-09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>.13/.07</td>
<td>.14/.06</td>
<td>.17/.13</td>
<td>.12/.12</td>
<td>-.15/.00</td>
<td>.21/-12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egoism of Control</td>
<td>-.15/-06</td>
<td>-.08/-10</td>
<td>-.03/-18</td>
<td>-.04/-00</td>
<td>.05/.00</td>
<td>-.15/.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>.03/.01</td>
<td>.09/.03</td>
<td>.00/.02</td>
<td>-.03/.15</td>
<td>.09/-16</td>
<td>-.09/.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>99-100</td>
<td>99-100</td>
<td>99-100</td>
<td>99-100</td>
<td>99-100</td>
<td>99-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting in Particular Elections</th>
<th>Non-Electoral Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voted in 1970 Primary</td>
<td>Voted in 1970 General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lermindedness</td>
<td>-.09/.07</td>
<td>-.10/.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calism-</td>
<td>.14/-.15</td>
<td>-.15/-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ervatism</td>
<td>-.07/.15</td>
<td>-.20/.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ale</td>
<td>-.19/.12*</td>
<td>-.23/-.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rability</td>
<td>-.17/-.25**</td>
<td>.27/-.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s of Control</td>
<td>.06/-.13</td>
<td>.06/-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iavellianism</td>
<td>68-83</td>
<td>99-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>99-100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36
Table 2 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>Party Identification (Independents omitted)</th>
<th>1968 Presidential Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tendermindedness</td>
<td>.18/-.26**</td>
<td>.01/-08</td>
<td>.01/-.12</td>
<td>.00/-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td>.62/.23**</td>
<td>.28/.08</td>
<td>.43/.10</td>
<td>-.44/-0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>-.35/-.31</td>
<td>.09/-14</td>
<td>.12/-0.21</td>
<td>.14/0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>.01/-.09</td>
<td>-.03/-13</td>
<td>-.05/-0.19</td>
<td>.00/-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>.03/-.05</td>
<td>-.01/-09</td>
<td>.07/-.17</td>
<td>.05/0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>-.26/-.15</td>
<td>-.13/04</td>
<td>-.22/0.07</td>
<td>-.03/-0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N  
76-89 69-86 33-45 86-96  
79-86 76-84 32-46 88-95

Key
Trait-relevant group/Trait-irrelevant group

Significance
* = p < .05
** = p < .01

H₁ : r₁ - r₂ ≠ 0 (two-tailed test)
do tend to show higher correlations, in only one case does this exceed .20. Fully 22 of the 36 coefficients produced by trait-relevant individuals fail to reach .10. From the point of view of prediction, this is far from satisfactory.

Some interesting inferences regarding the motivational profile of these attitudes may be made from the patterns of association, however. Most importantly, we note that the strongest direct correlations, as well as the largest relevant-nonrelevant differentials, are produced by the scale of social desirability. As we discussed in an earlier section, this scale is meant to tap the extent of the respondent's social conformity and the extent to which his appearance in the eyes of others is important to him. The success of this trait in conforming to our expectations leads us to infer that a good deal of motive underlying voting turnout is socio-centric. This view is bolstered by the fact that the radical-conservative scale shows no discrimination among these situations whatsoever, an indication that voting turnout is not ideology-based.

The F-scale, which has attracted so much of the attention of political scientists, presents a most puzzling pattern. It is true that the correlation for the trait-relevant group is higher in all of these pairs, in the sense that their correlation is closer to +1.0 than is that of the trait-irrelevant group (the "Never Vote" item reverses the sign). This pattern is counted as a confirmation of the hypothesis by Bem and Allen. It is our feeling, however, that a good deal more circumspection should be applied to the matter. What we are observing is a case where the trait-relevant group shows little or no correlation between authoritarianism and voting in local, state and national elections. The trait-irrelevant group, on the other hand, shows significant negative correlations (the less the authoritarianism, the greater the likelihood of having voted).
There are a number of explanations for these inversions of expected patterns which might be considered. First, we should not dismiss the possibility that the ipsatized variance ratio does not succeed in measuring the concept of "relevance" as we have used it. This possibility is diminished, however, by the fact that in several other instances, the division of our sample according to the relevance of the traits produces quite satisfactory results.

This leads to a second possibility, that authoritarianism does not relate directly to these behavioral indicators, but instead interacts with some third factor. In particular, those for whom authoritarianism is relevant may not exhibit consistency in their voting turnout behaviors. For those for whom the trait is not relevant, there may exist some mediating factor which is unmeasured here, which produces the associations which we have observed.

In sum, no explanation of the patterns generated by the F-scale can be made very satisfactory by the information currently available. Evidently, the results which emerge in the first section of Table 2 do nothing to dispel the confusion which the F-scale has produced for earlier waves of political science analysis (Campbell, et al., 1960).

The second set of criterion variables to appear in Table 2 also involves voting turnout. It differs from the first set only in that it refers to voting in particular elections: the 1968 Presidential election, the 1970 Georgia primary, and the 1970 general election. Overall, the expected pattern of higher correlations for the trait-relevant group is sustained here. Fifteen of the 18 pairs display this outcome.

In general, the patterns observed in the first section of the table are continued here. The radicalism-conservatism dimension fails to produce
much differentiation in two of three cases. The F-scale, once again, displays the theoretically uninterpretable results of higher correlations for the trait-irrelevant group than for the trait-relevant group in two of the three instances at hand.

As before, the social desirability scale produces the most consistent positive results. The higher the score on the social desirability scale, the more likely is the trait-relevant individual to vote. For the trait-irrelevant group, the effect is negligible or slightly negative. Once again, we have a strong indication that the underlying trait which is reflected in the participatory behavior of voting has to do with a need to conform, rather than with radicalism-conservatism, or authoritarianism.

There are other patterns worthy of note in this second segment of Table 2. Most notably, the locus of control scale shows nearly the same result as the social desirability scale: those for whom this trait is relevant are more influenced than those for whom it is not (the more internal the control, the greater the likelihood of voting). This conforms entirely with the conceptual meaning of locus of control. Those who feel they are the masters of their fates are more likely to attempt to control the political environment by voting than those who are not.

Here too, the relevance of the trait is shown to be meaningful. Those for whom the locus of control trait is not relevant, in two of three cases, show very little tendency to link their trait scores with voting turnout, while the trait relevant group displays one correlation (with a vote in the 1970 general election) of .27.

In sum, we feel that this evidence regarding the contribution of traits to turnout produces a significant increment to our understanding of the latter phenomenon. The link with the locus of control trait ties
in with a good deal of prior work which links feelings of efficacy with political behavior (e.g., Campbell, et al., 1960). Also of interest in this regard is the finding that of the six traits tested here, the social desirability motive appears to predominate. This leads to the idea that voting turnout, far from being an ideological act for the aggregate of the electorate, is instead a socially-motivated one. We tend to vote if that is seen as the thing to do within the relevant group. This view is corroborated once again by the failure of the radical-conservative trait to differentiate voters from non-voters.

Moving to the third segment of Table 2, we encounter four measures of non-electoral participation. Three of these involve the standard items of opinion leadership and political persuasion. The fourth determines whether the individual ever participated in anti-war activities. Twenty-four correlation pairs are produced by these variables. The pattern expected by the application of the Bem and Allen criteria, that trait-relevant correlations will be stronger than trait-irrelevant correlations, occurs in 14 of these 24 cases. However, these confirmations are concentrated in an intriguing way. Six of them are produced by the measure of anti-war activity. For the remaining 18 pairs, ten fail to conform to expectations. Furthermore, for these 18 pairs, the highest trait-relevant correlation is -.14. In sum, the attempt to link political discussion and opinion leadership to underlying traits does not produce satisfactory results. This may be because these measures deal with the interaction of individuals with others. To the extent that this interaction arises from the behavior of those other individuals, it will tend to be random from the perspective of the tested subjects. Whether this behavior is indeed idiosyncratic, or is socially, rather than trait determined, it seems reasonable to conclude
that our analysis has failed to show interpretable links between the six tested traits and these three criterion measures.

The anti-war activity measure presents a different profile entirely. Here, not only are there satisfactory patterns of association in the case of all six pairs, but we find two traits in which the trait relevant group relates to the two variables reasonably strongly. These two traits are radicalism-conservatism and machiavellianism (the F-scale is also strongly related, but there is not much difference between the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant groups).

It is immediately apparent that these are not the same traits which we found to be most relevant in the case of voter turnout. Rather, we discover that the individual who takes the side of change on the radicalism scale is, not surprisingly, the one who tends to report anti-war activity. A similar tendency can be seen among those who reject the manipulative posture of the typical machiavellian. These results indicate that the sort of behavior embodied in the act of protesting the war differs in its basic motivational profile from the measures of turnout. We feel intuitively that this should be true; these results provide an empirical demonstration of the case.

The final segment of Table 2 collects three variables which fall under the rubric of ideology and partisanship. They include an index of political ideology, two measures of party identification (the second omits Independents), and the presidential preference in 1968. Among these 24 pairs of correlations, 21 satisfy the requirements that the trait-relevant correlation be direct and stronger than the trait-irrelevant one (although the latter may be stronger in the inverse direction).
Although the number of acceptable pairs is high in this final segment of Table 2, a glance at the magnitude of the coefficients shows that the actual results are less impressive. Numerous of these are so low as to be meaningless and others (as, for instance, the pair involving social desirability and 1968 presidential choice) yield the questionable pattern of a stronger, but inverse, correlation for the trait-irrelevant group.

In spite of these difficulties, two traits do emerge with great clarity which predict the behavior of the trait-relevant group far more strongly than for the trait-irrelevant group. They are radicalism-conservatism and machiavellianism. The success of the former trait scarcely comes as a surprise, of course. Although this scale is not intended to measure political ideology directly (but rather contrasts taste for change with a preference for things as they are), the sorts of items which make up this scale do smack of the political issues of the day. References to the death penalty, capitalism, socialism and abortion all appear. While these items may well tap some general personality trait, it is clear that at a more superficial level, they are bound to be highly correlated with ideological position.

This point does attenuate the interest which we might otherwise show in the very large correlation coefficients of the trait-relevant group between radicalism-conservatism and the variables in segment four of Table 2. There is a more meaningful datum here, however; the fact that large differences in the correlations' magnitudes exist within each pair. We have here the clearest evidence of the entire table that the division of the sample into trait-relevant and trait-irrelevant groups is a meaningful and indeed, a necessary procedure. In terms of variance explained, the radicalism-conservatism trait is between seven and 18 times more
successful for the trait-relevant group than for the trait-irrelevant group.

The machiavellianism scale also displays highly satisfactory patterns of correlation with the ideology and party identification variables, although the magnitudes are not as great as they are in the case above, for reasons already discussed. We find that the machiavellian tends to be a conservative and a Democrat. This is particularly interesting and puzzling because, unlike the case of the radicalism trait, here there is no outward link between the scale items and these dependent variables. We note also that the trait-relevant group is decidedly more influenced than the trait-irrelevant group, with the exception of the 1968 presidential choice variable.

Summary and Conclusions

To bring together the threads of the discussion which have flowed from Table 2, we present the following figure.

```
- - - - - - - -
Figure 2 about here
- - - - - - - -
```

This figure is intended to give a summary indication of which traits were on the one hand most strongly related to the group of criterion variables in question, and on the other hand, showed the greatest differentiation between the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant groups.

What conclusions can be drawn from these results? We recall first one of the studies cited earlier in this paper. Milbrath and Klein (1962) have written that they are unaware "of any study which has isolated a personality trait which drives people specifically into politics."
Figure 2

A Schema of the Relevance of Traits to Four Areas of Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tendermindedness</th>
<th>General Voting</th>
<th>Voting in Specific Elections</th>
<th>Non-Electoral Participation (anti-war activity)</th>
<th>Ideology and Partisanship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our most basic substantive finding, perhaps, is that there are personality traits which can be linked with various measures of political participation.

The most significant theoretical finding of this paper arises from the application of the concept of specification of person in the political realm. Working from Bem and Allen's basic statement (1974), we have demonstrated—the error of believing that traits can be applied to all members of a group. The idea that a trait may be relevant to only some people represents a fundamental departure from the thinking of earlier trait psychologists. Nonetheless, in repeated examples we have shown that this process of specifying persons for whom a trait is relevant reveals far stronger levels of association than are obtained for the entire group, or for those who do not find the trait to be relevant.

As to the patterns of association observed, we have revealed information both about traits and about the various measures of political behavior. Regarding traits, we see that the tendermindedness trait, over the entire range of tests, contributes rather little to our understanding of political participation. Since this scale was intended to score extreme radicals and extreme conservatives together (Eysenck, 1954; 1956), it is no surprise that no discrimination on the ideological and partisan measures is uncovered. Perhaps this same argument can be applied to turnout as well. In any case, we have found that such trait elements as rationalism, intellectualism, idealism, or optimism, which are subsumed in the tenderminded-toughminded scale, do not appear to provide a guide to citizens regarding voter turnout.

The F-scale must also be included as a trait which fails to contribute greatly to our understanding of these areas of political behavior. We
make this statement not on the basis of the initial correlations shown in Table 1, which are, in fact, relatively high. Rather, when we examine Table 2, we find that the F-scale has consistently failed to reveal results which are interpretable from the theoretical framework which we have adopted. In Table 1, six F-scale-criterion correlations reached the level of significance. We can see in Table 2 that the first three of these are produced by the situation where the trait-relevant group shows no correlation with the criterion variable, and the trait-irrelevant group shows a relatively strong inverse correlation. As we have discussed above, this pattern has no ready interpretation.

The second triad of the significant correlations produced by the F-scale in Table 1 shows another deviant pattern. In these cases, both the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant groups show relatively strong correlations with the criterion variables. While the trait predicts at significant levels, the relevance factor once again fails to produce meaningful patterns.

We naturally hesitate to reject the F-scale from the family of politically-relevant traits. We have argued, after all, that it is sometimes valuable to follow our intuition rather than the results of empirical research, and our intuition certainly tells us that a measure of authoritarianism ought to relate to politics. We cannot, however, present an explanation of the failure of the relevance concept to differentiate. Discovering the reasons underlying the strong correlations produced by the trait-irrelevant group must await future work.

Figure 2 shows that four of the six tested traits do produce theoretically-satisfactory patterns, in varying combinations with the four groups of dependent variables. These varying patterns allow us to focus on the differences which exist between the attitudes and behaviors
measured. One of the salient contributions provided by Verba and Nie (1972) is the discovery of four distinct modes of political participation. Their methodology employed factor analysis, which ultimately relies on arbitrary naming of factors in order to draw substantive significance from the findings.

The present work provides a complement to that approach. We have presented an alternative way of classifying measures of political behavior. It has one distinct potential advantage over the factor analytic method, however. Once the criteria are satisfactorily grouped according to the trait profiles, there exists a very rich conceptual and experimental background which can be drawn upon to attach meaning to the clusters.

The present results display a high level of crudity, although even here, an interesting detail or two emerges. The clear division of the criterion measures into a turnout class and an ideology class merely corroborates past work, to be sure. The inclusion of the anti-war activity measure with the ideology and partisanship cluster is likewise self-evident. On the other hand, the fact that the trait which underlies turnout is predominantly the scale of social desirability is one which speaks a bit more strongly to problems of democratic theory. Is the primary motive to vote one of approval seeking? If so, what can we predict about the future levels of participation in the American polity, and what steps will be most effective in maximizing those levels?

The refinement of the present procedures and the pursuit of these trait profiles constitutes the primary objective for future work. We must turn our attention as well to the area of issue opinions, for it seems clear that traits should be found relevant in that area as well
(cf. Sniderman and Citrin, 1971). Both in the realm of theory, and in the realm of new information about political behavior, the study of traits has a contribution to make. The attention of political scientists should be rekindled, for this area has been too long ignored, and holds much potential.
## APPENDIX

### Text and Coding for All Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Text</th>
<th>High Code is</th>
<th>Low Code Is</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tendermindedness</td>
<td>tenderminded</td>
<td>toughminded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism-Conservatism</td>
<td>radical</td>
<td>conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Scale</td>
<td>authoritarian</td>
<td>non-authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>high approval motive</td>
<td>low approval motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below is a list of some social and political activities seen on campus. Please place a check mark beside those activities in which you participated.

- Voted in campus elections  
  - did vote  
  - did not vote

- Took part in anti-war activities (marches, rallies, demonstrations)  
  - took part  
  - did not take part

Which of the following kinds of elections have you voted in, in the past? (check all correct responses)

- Local  
  - have voted  
  - have not voted

- State  
  - have voted  
  - have not voted

- National  
  - have voted  
  - have not voted

- Never Vote  
  - have never voted  
  - have voted
Please check all the ways you were involved in the recent political campaigns.

Discussing politics with friends

Voting

Attempting to persuade others to vote for someone

Did you vote in the primaries in Georgia last month?

Did you vote in the 1970 general election?

Did you vote in the 1968 Presidential election?

Compared with the people you know, are you more or less likely than any of them to be asked about your views about politics by people you know?

In dealing with most political issues, would you say that you are an ultra-conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or radical?

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Independent, or Democrat?

Who was your choice for President in 1968 (whether you voted or not)?

have discussed  have not discussed

have voted  have not voted

have attempted  have not attempted

No  Yes

No  Yes

No  Yes

Less likely  More likely

Radical  Ultra-Conservative

Democrat  Republican

Wallace  Humphrey
1It should be noted, however, that Lasswell did not select the title of his book inadvertently. He felt that the impact of the personality on behavior could be most easily seen in those individuals who displayed a "pure" personality type. These individuals, Lasswell reasoned, would be most readily found in mental institutions, hence the stress on pathology.

2Whether the tendermindedness scale actually clusters Communists and Fascists is a matter of lively debate. See Christie (1956 a,b); Rokeach and Hanley (1956).

The items in this scale and all others with the exception of the Machiavellianism scale are taken from W. A. Owens (1968).

3This scale is located in Christie and Geis (1970; pp. 17-18).

4The director of this study was William A. Owens, Department of Psychology, University of Georgia. The data were collected under a grant from NIH (Grant Number HD-10135).

5The director of this study was Robert T. Golembiewski, assisted by Keith R. Billingsley, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia.

6Remember that the minimum voting age in Georgia has been 18 since the 1940's. All respondents are Georgia residents.
REFERENCES


55


