This kit presents a comprehensive introduction for students to arms control and disarmament issues. Included are copies of published and unpublished articles for each topic. Section I provides a self-survey to enable students to assess their own attitudes, values, and knowledge. The survey poses questions for which students select one of several given answers. Section II offers facts on current bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, plus a table indicating which nation-states have ratified them. Section III presents contending perspectives on the arms race from Henry Kissinger, Earl Ravenal, Homer Jack, and Bill Rose. Section IV discusses proposals concerning arms control and disarmament issues, from nuclear proliferation to conventional armaments. Sections V and VI present arms control and disarmament issues, respectively, at the United Nations and focus on how that institution's performance can be improved. Section VII suggests a peace initiatives approach that indicates how the United States can lead toward disarmament and how to gain the needed response of other powers. Section VIII lists seven major issues of arms control and disarmament, each followed by questions that will be dealt with in the future. The final section contains resource lists of organizations and newsletters, periodicals, World Without War publications, and national and international decision makers. (ND)
Basic facts: World Military Expenditures, 1976, $300 billion
Nuclear warheads
U.S., 8,900 U.S.S.R. 3,500; total available, over 40,000
Casualties per year from war since 1945, over 150,000
Conventional Arms Trade: Over 15 billion and soaring
U.S. Military Budget, FY 1977, $104 billion

Disarmed Areas: Antartica, Sea Bed, Outer Space
Nuclear Free Zone: Latin America

WORLD DISARMAMENT KIT

A World Without War Publication

LiberKartor, Stockholm
INTRODUCTION

This World Disarmament Kit is designed to enable an intelligent lay person understand and help resolve the critical issues which confront us in 1977 concerning the arms race. The kit begins with an assessment of the high stakes involved and with a self-survey. The survey highlights different perspectives on the arms race and presents alternative value choices as well as factual questions. PART II includes factual data indicating where 30 years of the arms race has taken us.

PART III presents contending perspectives on the arms race, each of which seeks to achieve some form of national security. PART IV presents a wide variety of proposals for reversing the arms race by gaining broader arms control agreements and by taking steps toward disarmament.

PART V describes the existing bi-lateral and multi-lateral arms control agreements and provides a table of countries indicating which treaties they have ratified. PART VI introduces the wealth of proposals which have been put forward in international organizations to reverse the arms race and suggests how such organizations' role in achieving disarmament could be improved.

PART VII introduces the Peace Initiatives Strategy for moving toward disarmament. It includes a statement of the related goals which must be achieved to aid in the disarmament process and presents over 30 specific peace initiative acts.

Disarmament issues which are likely to be decided in the near future are presented in PART VIII. The kit concludes with a set of resources for action on this problem.

The material selected for inclusion in this kit introduces the problem of disarmament and how to achieve it. The kit is based on these assumptions:

1. The trend toward higher and higher levels of armaments in more and more states threatens everyone and should be reversed.

2. The nuclear and conventional arms races are not a product of anyone state or anyone social, economic or political system.

3. There are specific acts which this country could initiate which it has not yet done, which could gain the agreement of adversary and allied states; these acts when part of a non-military, security strategy, are in the best interest of this country; they are not a threat to it.

4. International organizations have a constructive role to play in reversing the arms race.

5. Industrial, labor and community economic self-interests are not the primary reason for the arms race; conversion from military to non-military production is a problem which can be resolved if the security issue is resolved.

We are grateful to many for their contribution to this kit. Previously copyrighted material is indicated in the body of the text.

Robert Woito
Editor
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. At Stake

The stakes in a continued arms race, in achieving parity or in disarmament are extremely high. Thus, citizens of this country need to reassess their assumptions and attitudes toward the arms race and to consider alternatives to it. We need each to answer these questions:

1. Nuclear War: Will current policy lead to or prevent nuclear war?

Public concern about the threat of nuclear war has diminished significantly since the 1950's, but little has changed to justify current complacency. In the 18 years prior to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), 477 nuclear tests were conducted. In the thirteen years since the treaty, there have been 494 underground tests. The speed of delivery systems, the number of nuclear powers, and access to nuclear weapons technology has each increased.

The U.S.'s development of cruise missiles with pinpoint accuracy, along with the Soviet's "silko-killing" large missiles, have rekindled acceptance of the "counterforce" strategic doctrine. The counterforce strategy targets primarily military installations, thus making limited nuclear war thinkable.

Recently, five arms control experts concluded that, given continued proliferation of nuclear powers and weapons and the absence of effective international authority, nuclear war is "likely by 1999."

2. Conventional War: Will current policy lead to or prevent conventional war?

Until its last week, World War II was a conventional war. Since then, there have been over 113 conventional wars, with casualties averaging over 50,000 people per year.


*Barabas, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1975, pp. 231-232. Other estimates place the current total at closer to $12 billion dollars per year.

The world arms trade has increased from about $300 million in 1952 to the conservative estimate of about $4 billion in 1974, with the increase averaging 15% per year in the 1970's.* In addition, the domestic manufacture of weapons in developing countries and the level of armaments in nearly all 150 nation-states is increasing rapidly.

Conventional war and nuclear war are inextricably linked. To change one without altering the other is to transform radically the balance of power. We cannot realistically expect the nuclear powers to continue a nuclear disarmament process unless conventional forces are included. In addition, conventional war could escalate into nuclear war. Thus, a program aimed at general and complete disarmament which does not address conventional war, cannot hope to achieve its objective.

3. National Security: Does the arms race guarantee or threaten national security?

Without attempting to apportion blame, it is beyond doubt that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are currently committed to use, directly or indirectly, military force to retain or advance their interests. The Soviet Union's level of armaments and its actions in world politics are a major threat to world peace. The increases in Soviet strategic forces, the build-up of the Soviet fleet, the level of arms aid to North Vietnam after the 1973 cease-fire agreement and aid to Syria, Cuba, and a faction in Angola clearly indicate the Soviet Union's intention to use force to achieve its ends. For its part, the United States has continued qualitative refinements of its weapons systems, aided South Vietnam, Israel, Iran, and a faction in Angola, and continues to sell weapons at levels estimated from 4 to 12 billion per year.

4. World Community: Is military deterrence between hostile nations and ideologies essential to global problem solving or does it undermine any constructive effort?

The industrial revolution has created an economically interdependent world. The quality of life, threatened by war, is also threatened by problems no nation can solve alone: starvation, environmental deterioration, population growth, resource depletion and a complex of new economic problems, including inflation and trade. This generation has the opportunity to decide whether that interdependence will promote a world community capable of confronting these common problems or whether each sectarian interest will justify violence to achieve its particular end.

I. INTRODUCTION: At Stake (continued)

One of the most dramatic changes in world politics since World War II is the increase in the number and functions of international organizations. In addition to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, there is a family of functional U.N. and other agencies at work on specific problems like hunger and health. There are few patches of earth 10 miles square which have not been touched by their programs. These efforts have helped bring people of different nationalities, cultures, ideologies, races, and religions into cooperative efforts to overcome common problems. To the extent that such international organizations succeed, they help create a sense of world community: a feeling of commonality or political identity evident in the expectation that change in world politics will occur without violence. But when such institutions’ actions and resolutions produce the expectation that change can only occur through violence, they destroy a sense of world community and limit their own effectiveness.

Both the nuclear and conventional arms races starkly reveal the pre-eminent role of fear in world politics. If we can reverse those races and reduce that fear — so pervasive that it is a common, unstated, presupposition of contemporary culture — we will be creating a climate in which global problem solving is possible.

5. Resource Waste: Are valuable resources wasted in armaments or are their costs the price that must be paid for security?

In 1975 world expenditures for military purposes approached $300 billion dollars.* 400,000 of the world’s scientists and engineers are engaged in military research and development.*

It is tempting to look at the U.S. arms budget, then think of domestic programs that need funding, and conclude that cutting the one will finance the other. But it is misleading because before there can be much progress toward disarmament a non-military means of conducting international conflict must be created. Such an alternative to war will entail new costs, such as the cost of new inspection and verifications systems; it will clearly require new risks and new institutions. It will involve planetary bargaining over new terms of trade, access to markets and access to raw materials. While reversing the arms race will free many resources which could be used to improve the economic circumstances in which we live, it is difficult to forecast whether the savings will be used to reduce taxes, fund domestic programs, increase international assistance, fund new institutions or some combination.

People who disagree about how to spend such savings should be able to unite on creating the savings. Our conviction, however, is that resolving the security question is part of a successful disarmament campaign. Thus we have emphasized what is required to achieve that goal.

6. Democracy: Are democratic values applicable to international conflict?

Internally, the U.S. has little to fear and much to gain from disarmament. There would, of course, be problems for industry and labor of converting to peacetime production. But such adjustments can be planned. And overall, American democracy and the future of democratic practices will be enhanced if the arms races can be reversed. Centralization of authority, the relative power of the executive branch, the size of military organization, the role of intelligence agencies will all be diminished. Dictatorships, however, lose an important justification for repression when the threat posed by an external foe is diminished. Military power is an appropriate means for bringing to power and maintaining various forms of dictatorship. Work on disarmament by democracies which takes intelligent account of the war-making capacities of other powers, is not a threat to the democratic tradition. It seeks to fulfill a central value in that tradition: the achievement of institutions capable of nonviolent conflict resolution in world politics.

I. INTRODUCTION:

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ARMS RACE: A SELF-SURVEY

Most people agree about the cost and waste of resources involved in the current nuclear and conventional arms races. Nearly $300 billion is estimated to have been spent on armaments world-wide in 1975. Yet, we live in a time of increasing insecurity and fear growing out of the awesome dangers of nuclear war and the grim reality of conventional war.

But if people agree about the dangers and waste involved, there is little agreement about what alternative there is to either nuclear or conventional arms races. One point of division concerns the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and whether Communism is an expansionist ideology; others argue about the degree of the United States's responsibility for the arms race and its global purposes. Nothing has proved so effective in maintaining the arms race, as each side blaming the other for each new round.

Others point out that no one has died from a nuclear weapon explosion during a war since 1945. In the last 30 years over 150,000 people per year have died in nearly 130 conventional wars. These wars have rarely involved the super-powers directly and have often involved national, tribal, religious or social rather than ideological hostility.

This self-survey is designed to introduce contending perspectives on both the nuclear and conventional arms races. It should aid those committed to a position to rethink their assumptions and basic choices. It should help someone uncommitted to a position, to identify the choices between perspectives and between alternatives to the arms races. In addition, the factual questions help clarify where we are now.

A. Perspective Choices

1. Who is Responsible?
   a. The United States and particularly the military-industrial complex, has provided the pressure for the arms race.
   b. An expansionist Communist movement, with many centers but one ideology, has sought world domination and has blocked disarmament agreements.
   c. The rich elites in developed countries fear the power of the poor in developing countries.
   d. The fact of history is that what peace there has been, is a product of a balance of power. Blame human nature if you want.
   e. The interaction between the two super-powers provides the basic dynamic which is fueled by technological innovations and ideological political differences.

2. Why Have We Been Involved in the Arms Race?
   a. There is no good reason.
   b. Because we live in a deeply divided world with other armed powers and our own armaments are essential to our security.
   c. Because we have not developed and tried an alternative to military means for achieving security.

3. What Are the Obstacles to Disarmament?
   a. Psychological identification with nation-states now stronger than ever.
   b. The inability to negotiate agreements on significant disarmament steps despite many years of effort.
   c. A rapid pace of technological innovation and a recognition of how important such innovation was in deciding the outcome of World War II.
   d. The built-in momentum of the arms race.
   e. Societal identification of violence and manhood or strength.
   f. Peace organizations who seek to disarm one power in a field of many and who offer no alternative security strategy.

4. What Are the Realistic Goals the U.S. Should Seek?
   a. Military superiority at each level from guerrilla warfare to strategic nuclear.
   b. Parity or equivalence between the nuclear super-powers.
   c. Minimum deterrence—a small, invulnerable force which can destroy say 100 cities.
   d. Unilateral disarmament.
   e. General and complete disarmament under effective international controls.

5. Who Should Decide Such Basic Questions?
   a. The President and his top advisors.
   b. The Congress and its advisors.
   c. The U.S. public.
   d. International Organizations.

6. How Should Specific Decisions Be Made? Such as Whether to Build a Particular Weapons System or Not?
   a. By the President in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   b. By Congress.
   c. By popular referendum.
   d. By international organizations.

7. Whoever Decides, What Should Be the Principal Standard?
   a. Our national security.
   b. Our domestic needs.
   c. World social and economic needs.
   d. Whether or not the decision advances us toward a world without war.
II. Factual Questions

1. In fiscal year 1976, the U. S. Military Expenditure was approximately:
   a. $50 billion
   b. $70 billion
   c. $90 billion
   d. $100 billion

2. In 1975 world military expenditures are estimated at:
   a. $200 billion
   b. $300 billion
   c. $500 billion
   d. $600 billion

3. Which of the following spends the highest percentage of its gross national product (GNP) on military expenditures?
   a. the United States
   b. the Soviet Union
   c. the Developing Countries
   d. the NATO Allies

4. The World Arms Trade (sales and transfers of armaments between nations) in 1975 was estimated by the U. N. Secretary-General at about:
   a. $1 billion
   b. $3 billion
   c. $12 billion
   d. $20 billion

5. In 1974 the world’s per capita income:
   a. grew rapidly
   b. remained about the same
   c. decreased
   d. decreased dramatically

6. Between 1960 and 1974, the accumulated total of world economic aid was about:
   a. $14 billion (or $1 billion per year average)
   b. $60 billion (or $4.2 billion per year average)
   c. $125 billion (or $8.9 billion per year average)
   d. $400 billion (or $21.4 billion per year average)

7. In 1976, there are how many countries with nuclear weapons?
   a. five
   b. six
   c. seven (if Israel is counted)
   d. ten

8. Within two years, how many additional countries could go nuclear if they so decided?
   a. at least 12
   b. at least 30
   c. at least 60
   d. nearly all of them

9. In 1975, the U. S. and the U. S. R. possessed about how many strategic nuclear weapons?
   a. about 100 each
   b. about 1,000 each
   c. U. S. — 8,500; U. S. S. R. — 2,800
   d. U. S. — 10,000; U. S. S. R. — 10,000

10. In addition to strategic nuclear weapons, the U. S. possesses about how many tactical nuclear weapons?
    a. 1,000
    b. 5,000
    c. 10,000
    d. 22,000

11. How many of the following multi-lateral disarmament agreements has the U. S. signed?
    a. Antarctic Treaty (declares area a disarmed zone)  yes no
    b. Partial Test Ban Treaty (on nuclear explosions)  yes no
    c. Outer Space Treaty (prohibits orbiting nuclear weapons and all military activity in outer space)  yes no
    d. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America  yes no
    e. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  yes no
    f. Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed  yes no
    g. Convention prohibiting biological warfare  yes no

12. Which of the following bilateral treaties have the U. S. and the U. S. R. agreed to?
    a. Memorandum establishing the “hot line”  yes no
    b. Agreement to Reduce Risk of Accidental Nuclear War  yes no
    c. Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement—ABM Treaty  yes no
    d. Interim Agreement on SALT  yes no
    e. Threshold Test Ban Treaty  yes no

13. How is compliance with these various treaties currently verified?
    a. By international inspection
    b. By national means of verification (satellite reconnaissance and espionage) and consultative conferences
    c. By on-site inspections
    d. By electronic monitoring by international agencies

14. What international organizations are involved in arms control and disarmament issues?
    a. The U. N. Security Council
    b. The U. N. General Assembly
    c. The International Atomic Energy Agency
    d. The International Red Cross
    e. All of the above
III. To Reverse the Arms Race: What Should We Do?

1. Perspective Choices:
   a. The U. S. should immediately and unilaterally take steps toward a drastic reduction in its military establishment and should pursue such a course regardless of the response of other major military powers.
   b. We should continue our efforts to achieve multi-lateral arms reduction through negotiations, but we should be careful to maintain the stable balance of military power on which world peace depends.
   c. Reductions in our relative military capability have already led to a dangerous situation in which we can no longer be sure of the adequacy of our military posture. We should strengthen our defense establishment, before it is too late.
   d. The present situation is dangerous. Negotiation alone will not lead us out of it. Someone must take the initiative to create new pressures for agreement on arms control and disarmament. The U. S. should take unilateral steps which offer the best chance of securing reciprocal action by other nations, thus moving us toward the international agreement needed.

2. Which of the following values should influence your response to the arms race?
   a. Loyalty — to a nation-state.
   b. Nonviolent conflict resolution — now the accepted standard in family, small group and national life but not in world politics.
   c. Courage — to respond creatively to challenges without turning to hatred and violence or withdrawing.
   d. Justice — seen as gaining acceptance of your view of justice or as establishing the ground rules for contesting different conceptions of justice without war.
   e. Brotherhood — expressed in a concern for other’s human rights wherever they are denied or only when denied by your enemy.
   f. Equality — of opportunity, of access to participation, or of result.
   g. World Community — a sense of political identification with humankind evident in the expectation that change should come in world politics without war.
   h. Individualism — how can the integrity of the individual be maintained in a field of war.
   i. Democracy — what political processes are needed to make possible the resolution of conflict in world politics without war.

STATISTICAL ANNEX

II. FACTS: A. WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1976 (continued)

The statistics which follow have been assembled for the purpose of analyzing comparative progress on a broad front, primarily for the world as a whole or for groups of countries. It is believed that they are representative for this purpose.

Because of the interest in the national figures which make up these totals, we are showing them in full detail for 1973 (Tables II and III). It cannot be emphasized too strongly that caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from individual national figures, and particularly in making comparisons between nations. Some of the reasons why this is so are outlined in the statistical notes following.

Table III shows the country rank order on a per capita basis for the military and social indicators. It is hoped that the selection is large enough to offset some of the insufficiencies in the individual series and to convey a general impression of relative standing.

MILITARY AND SOCIAL TRENDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World, Developed, and Developing Countries, 1960-1974</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP (in billion US $)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP per capita (in US $)</td>
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<td>World</td>
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<td>Population (in millions)</td>
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<td>Armed Forces (in thousands)</td>
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<td>Physicians (in thousands)</td>
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<td>World</td>
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<td>Developed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Developed countries: 28 in number, are those listed in Tables II and III. They include the countries listed in North America, most of Europe, Oceania, Israel.
2. Developing countries: 104 in number, are the countries listed in Latin America, seven in Europe (Albania, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia. Turkey and Yugoslavia), Asia except Israel and Japan, all of Africa.
4. Projected.
THE DEFENSE
MONITOR

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION — A Project of the Fund for Peace

Volume Four  Number Two  February 1975

22,000 TACTICAL AND 8,000 STRATEGIC

30,000 U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The United States has nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons at home, at sea, in Europe, and in Asia. 8000 of these weapons are considered strategic weapons; 22,000 are considered tactical weapons. The main difference between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is the difference in range. Tactical nuclear weapons have a shorter range but are sometimes more powerful than strategic weapons.

The 8000* U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are on (1) the 1024 U.S. Minuteman and Titan land-based missiles, (2) the 456 Polaris/Posseidon missiles on the 41 U.S. ballistic missile submarines, and (3) the nearly 500 U.S. SAC bombers. The U.S. has been producing strategic nuclear weapons at the rate of three per day for the past four years, and the total promises to grow to about 21,000 U.S. strategic nuclear weapons under the limits set by the November 1974 U.S.-Soviet Vladivostok Agreement.

U.S. will have 8,500 strategic weapons by mid-1975.

DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF

- The United States has 30,000 nuclear weapons in Europe, Asia, the United States and at sea. Eight thousand of these are strategic weapons; 22,000 are tactical nuclear weapons.
- There are 7000 nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Navy ships and submarines. 4500 are strategic weapons on nuclear missile submarines. 2500 are short-range tactical nuclear weapons; 1400 of these are aboard U.S. aircraft carriers.
- There is no coherent doctrine for using land-based tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons create an impossible command and control problem and they invite pre-emptive nuclear strikes by an enemy. If tactical nuclear weapons were used in a war abroad the likely result would be the destruction of the country in which they were used.
- The very presence of tactical nuclear weapons abroad creates a dangerous situation for the United States. The likelihood is great that an exchange of tactical nuclear weapons would escalate into a full-scale nuclear war.
- The dispersion of so many tactical nuclear weapons around the world greatly increases the danger of theft, terrorism, and accidents.
- Most land-based U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should be removed. All land-based tactical nuclear weapons in Asia should be removed. All nuclear bombs and nuclear air-to-surface weapons aboard U.S. aircraft carriers should be removed. The safety and security of U.S. citizens would be enhanced by such a move.
- The excessive secrecy surrounding tactical nuclear weapons hinders oversight by Congress and is unnecessary to preserve U.S. security. A national debate on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is in the public interest.
7,000 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

In Europe the U.S. and its NATO allies have 2250 aircraft, missile launchers, and nuclear cannons that can deliver 7000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons carry a combined explosive capability equivalent to an estimated 460,000,000 tons of TNT — roughly 35,000 times greater than the nuclear weapon that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. These U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are in all NATO European states with the exception of Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, and France. France maintains its own tactical nuclear weapons in France and Germany. U.S. nuclear forces in Europe are most heavily concentrated in West Germany where 207,000 U.S. military personnel are based.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe include at least four different kinds of surface-to-surface missiles (Lance, Sergeant, Honest John, and Pershing), two sizes of nuclear artillery shells (155 mm and 203 mm), and over 500 U.S. nuclear capable fighter-bombers. The aircraft can be loaded with air-to-surface missiles or four different sizes of bombs or a combination of missiles and bombs. The largest tactical nuclear missile has over 400 kilotons in explosive power, equivalent to over 30 "Hiroshimas". Forward-based systems such as the Pershing surface-to-surface missile or the nuclear-loaded aircraft are capable of attacking targets inside the Soviet Union from Western Europe.

U.S. Has 2-to-1 Advantage in Europe

The first U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were introduced in Europe in 1954, three years before the Soviet Union. Since that time the U.S. arsenal has grown dramatically and has undergone extensive changes as new U.S. tactical nuclear weapons replaced older ones. Soviet tactical nuclear deployment has been later, slower, and shows little weapon turnover. Soviet weapons in Europe have accumulated without much retirement of earlier weapons. This resembles the pattern of their deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

Still, there are two U.S. tactical nuclear weapons for each Soviet tactical nuclear weapon in Europe. Altogether U.S. forces in Europe have 7000 tactical nuclear weapons to 3000 to 3500 for Soviet military forces in Europe.

The U.S. armed forces deployed nuclear weapons to Europe in the early 1950's to offset numerically superior Soviet forces in Central Europe. At the time the Eisenhower administration was seeking to check Soviet manpower advantages through a strategic policy which threatened "massive retaliation" and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe were part of that policy. When the U.S. first placed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe the Soviets had no tactical nuclear weapons. By the late 1950's the U.S. monopoly on tactical nuclear weapons was ended.

1700 U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Asia

Far less information has been released to the public by the Pentagon about the estimated 1700 tactical nuclear weapons that the U.S. maintains on land in Asia. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are in Korea and the Philippines as well as at U.S. installations on Guam and Midway. Most of these weapons are for U.S. fighter-bombers, except in the Republic of Korea where Army and Air Force tactical nuclear weapons are based.

Thousands of U.S. Nuclear Weapons at Sea

The U.S. today has approximately 7000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at sea. There are 284 ships and submarines in the U.S. Navy that can carry nuclear weapons. In 1965: only 38 percent of U.S. ships could carry nuclear weapons. Today 56 percent are nuclear capable and the percentage is increasing each year.

The U.S. Navy is capable of delivering up to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons in bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, and missiles. Many of these are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear explosives. Center for Defense Information estimates place the number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at sea at 2500*. This number of weapons carries an explosive punch equivalent to 150 million tons of TNT, more than 75 times the amount of explosives dropped from 1941 to 1945 on Germany and Japan by U.S. bombers. Over 90 percent of this nuclear destructive power is found in the 1400 tactical nuclear weapons aboard 14 U.S. attack aircraft carriers.

*This is a conservative estimate. The maximum loading of nuclear weapons would result in a number four times larger than the Center estimate. SUBROC (a rocket propelled nuclear torpedo) is assumed to be loaded one-third nuclear, two-thirds conventional. All other U.S. Navy tactical nuclear weapons are assumed to be one-quarter nuclear loaded and three-quarters conventional.

AWESOME TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN EUROPE

"The significance of our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, only in Europe, becomes all too apparent when one realizes that the destructive force, in TNT equivalent, of the nuclear weapons we have currently stockpiled alone is more than 20 times that of the combined total force of all the air ordnance expended in World War II, the Korean war and the war in Vietnam."

Senator Stuart Symington
March 7, 1974
II. THE FACTS: C. Conventional War, by Jeremiah Norris

CONVENTIONAL WAR

No one has died through the strategic use of nuclear weapons since August, 1945. During these same years between 38 to 50 violent conflicts by means of conventional weapons have died. Recently concluded SALT negotiations may reduce social and political tensions throughout the world, even though the military threat of nuclear war remains.

Sixty-one countries with 80% of the world's population participated in World War II. Seventy-four countries with 76% of today's population have been involved in the 115 conflicts since 1945. The total casualties for World War II are now less than those for all the violent conflicts since that time.

The territorial distribution of these conflicts, and the type of conflict (internal or international) are listed as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>International</th>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>South America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Middle East</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>91</td>
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The major powers are now the Soviet Union, China and the United States. They have been directly involved with troops in eleven of these conflicts; the China Civil War; China and the United States in Korea; China and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; the Soviet Union in Hungary; the United States in Lebanon; China in Tibet; India in China; the United States in Panama; the United States in the Dominican Republic; the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia; and the United States in Indochina. No reliable data was available on the Sino-Soviet border clashes to be included in this compilation of violent conflicts. This limitation to the three major powers is subject to some criticism, certainly for the exclusion of France in Indochina, Algeria and Chad. Yet it was held to the three powers under the assumption that they will orchestrate the coming Generation of Peace among the other nations in the world.

Some have found it useful to define war as a more or less continuous process of fighting which results in at least 1,000 casualties. This criterion was not used exclusively in this listing, although many of the conflicts would qualify in that regard. In most of these 115 conflicts over territory, borders, power, or rights, there existed the danger of involvement by one of the major powers when they perceived their foreign policy interests to be in jeopardy; i.e., Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Quemoy and Matsu. In some cases, casualties were well above 1,000, while in others there were less than 100. However, in each case the threat of an unsatisfactory outcome to the major power with interests at stake could have resulted in a wider war.
But all of these conflicts did have one or both of these factors in operation at the same time: the presence and engagement of the armed forces of the government in power; and a certain degree of organization on both opposing sides, even if this organization was simply for defensive purposes.

There was no attempt to impose a minimum time limit on these conflicts. The Arab-Israel War of 1967, and the numerous coup d'etats in Latin America suggest that there is no direct correlation between duration, the degree of danger to the government in power, and the ultimate consequences of war.

Ninety-one of these conflicts were internal, that is, they were conducted on the territory of a single country. This does not imply that they were all fought solely by participants indigenous to a single country. Outside armies do take part, as in Angola. This war is not being carried on across a frontier, though it is being conducted with troops trained and armed abroad. Still, it qualifies geographically as an internal war. These types of conflicts comprise 80% of the total since 1945, a marked contrast to a more comprehensive study covering the 296 conflicts between 1790 - 1960, which indicates that only 25% of them involved a sovereign nation fighting a group internal to itself.

Of these internal conflicts, 61 have been conducted with foreign participation. That is to say, military personnel, troops or advisory contingents from another country are involved in military operations within the country. The delivery of arms, either free or through trade channels, political and materiel support, do not qualify as foreign participation. For example, despite the massive American military assistance to the Nationalist Government of China during their civil war, that conflict is treated as one free from foreign participation.

The major powers could well have their Generation of Peace, but it is not known what will happen to the other nations of the world caught in the clank and clamor of these mighty giants striving for advantage in science, technology, trade, conventional arms competition and power. Violent conflict is certainly not the sum total of human experience in these past 25 years. But history today, with all its storm and strife, compels us to say that conflict is one of the essential dimensions of man. It is a reality. Unless we choose to ignore reality, we must find our values in it. Is it possible to find a rule of conduct among nation-states outside the realm of violent conflict? That is the question which the major powers should face when designing a Generation of Peace. The answer is not to be found in treaties to limit nuclear weapons among a few while developing more effective conventional ones, but through the use of knowledge by governments in a nuclear age to revolutionize the manner by which conflicts are to be resolved in the interest of the world community. "...it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies."

Jeremiah Norris
June, 1972
Washington, D.C.
III. CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARMS RACE

A. Strategic Equivalence, Henry Kissinger, March 22, 1976
B. Minimum Deterrence, Earl Ravenal, Foreign Policy, Spring 1976
C. Unilateral Disarmament, Homer Jack, 1971
D. Peace Initiatives, Bill Rose, War/Peace Report, 1975

Henry Kissinger is the former Secretary of State, Earl Ravenal a Professor of International Relations at John Hopkins University, Homer Jack the Executive Director of the World Conference on Religion and Peace and Bill Rose has worked for the World Without War Council and is currently a graduate student in Political Science at the University of California (Berk.).

Commentary

Probably the most commonly held position on arms and disarmament in this country is that of Strategic Equivalence. Also known as a position of parity, this has been the official position of the United States government for at least the last ten years and has widespread support among the American people. The talk by Secretary of State Kissinger highlights the main points of this approach.

The cornerstone of Strategic Equivalence is the perception of a genuine threat to our national security and national interests arising from the military power of adversary nations. The argument made is that it is necessary to counter this threat through military power. The focus of the Strategic Equivalence position is almost entirely on the U. S. and the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China, and much of the discussion centers on comparative nuclear power, although the quantity and quality of conventional forces also enter in. Presupposing that absolute military and/or nuclear superiority is either impossible or unnecessary, this perspective argues that it is sufficient for the U. S. to maintain a rough equality with its adversaries. Equality will insure that no nation could launch an attack on another without almost certainly guaranteeing its own destruction, and thus a kind of peace results through an equal threat to all. This doctrine is known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and is the current basis for relations among the major world powers.

Proponents usually assume with Secretary Kissinger that "we will live for as far ahead as we can see in a twilight between tranquility and open confrontation", and that Strategic Equivalence is the surest hope of avoiding cataclysm. In this perspective, any change in military power must be a mutual one to insure the stability of the relationship. The hope is expressed that multilateral and especially bilateral (U. S. and Soviet Union) negotiations will be able to halt the arms race and bring about reductions in weapons stockpiles. But a major difficulty with this approach is found in the differing definitions of equivalence; parity for one nation is perceived as disadvantage by another. History suggests that the maintenance of strategic equivalence is a reliable prescription for a continued arms race. It can also be argued that the logic of nuclear parity among super powers can only encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations.

Editor's Note: The Commentaries throughout PART III are by Leonard Hoffmann, Executive Director, United Nations Association of Illinois and Greater Chicago
I have come here today to talk to you about the vital and intimate relationship between America's foreign policy and our national security. It is appropriate that I do so in Texas, a State so long dedicated to a strong and resolute America; a State that has given our Nation three distinguished Americans who presently serve in Washington and whom I am proud to consider friends—Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Mahon, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives; and John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All three of these men have worked long and hard to assure a strong defense for America. All three deserve the grateful thanks of countrymen.

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, directly involved in the preparation of our defense budget or in decisions regarding particular weapons programs. But as the President's principal advisor on foreign policy, no one knows better than I that a strong defense is crucial for our role in the world. For a great and responsible power, diplomacy without strength would be empty. If we were weak we could not negotiate; we could only hope or accommodate. It is the confidence of strength that permits us to act with conciliation and responsibility to help shape a more peaceful world.

Other nations must not be led to doubt either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. If allies doubt our constancy, retreat and political shifts are certain.

And so, as Secretary of State, I am inevitably a partisan of a strong America and a strong defense as the underpinning of a strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility to make clear to the American people and to other nations that our power is indeed adequate to our current challenges, that we are improving our forces to meet changing conditions, that America understands its interests and values and will defend them, and that the American people will never permit those hostilities to shape the world in which we live.

I do not accept the propositions that other nations have gained military ascendancy over us, that the Administration has neglected our defense, or that negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. These charges sound remarkably like the "missile gap" claims which aroused anxieties in 1960 only to dissolve suddenly a few weeks after the election.

We do face serious challenges to our security. They derive from the unprecedented conditions of the thermonuclear age, the ambiguities of contemporary power, and the perpetual revolution in technology. Our task is to understand the real and permanent requirements of our security rather than to be seduced by the outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time.

What are the national security issues we face? What is the true condition of our national defense?

- First, the inevitable growth of Soviet economic and military power has produced essential strategic equality. We cannot halt this growth, but
we must counterbalance it and prevent its use for political expansion.

Second, America remains the most powerful nation in the world. It will remain so, if the Congress approves the President's proposed defense budget. But evolving technology and the military programs of others impose upon us the need for constant vigilance and continuing major effort.

Third, technology has revolutionized the instruments of war and introduced an unparalleled complexity into the perceptions of power and the choices that we must make to maintain it. The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally the decisions we make today will determine our defense posture in the 1980's and beyond. And the kind of forces we will determine the kind of diplomacy we are able to conduct.

Fourth, as nuclear arsenals grow, the horrors of nuclear war become ever more apparent while at the same time the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less than all-out aggression becomes ever less plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic equivalence, testing and probing at the global and regional levels become more likely. Hence, for the next decade we must increase and modernize our forces air, land, and sea - for local defense.

Fifth, while a weak defense posture produces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense does not necessarily produce a strong foreign policy. Our role in the world depends as well on how realistically we perceive our national interests on our unity as a people and on our willingness to persevere in pursuit of our national goals.

Finally, for Americans physical strength can never be an end in itself. So long as we are true to ourselves, every Administration has the obligation to seek to control the spiral of nuclear weapons and to give mankind hope for a more secure and just future.

Let me discuss each of these challenges.

Long-Range Challenge of Defense

To cope with the implications of Soviet power has become a permanent responsibility of American defense and foreign policy. Sixty years of Soviet industrial and economic growth, and a political system that gives top priority to military buildup, have inevitably brought the Soviet Union to a position of rough equilibrium with the United States. No policy or decision on our part brought this about. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it. Nothing we can do now will make it disappear.

But while we cannot prevent the growth of Soviet military strength, we can and must maintain the strength to balance it and insure that it will not be used for political expansion. There is no alternative to a substantial defense budget over the long term. We have a permanent responsibility and need a steady course that does not change with the fads of the moment. We cannot afford the oscillation between assaults on defense spending and cries of panic, between cuts of $40 billion in Administration defense budget requests over seven years and charges of neglect of our defenses.

This claim on our perseverance is a new experience for Americans. Throughout most of our history we have been able to mobilize urgently in time of war and then to disarm unilaterally when victory was achieved. After World War II we rapidly demobilized our armies, relying largely on our nuclear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thus when the Korean war broke out we were little better prepared than we had been 10 summers previously. Only recently have we begun to understand - and reluctantly - that foreign policy and military strategy are inextricably linked, that we must maintain defense preparedness over the long term, and that we will live for as far ahead as we can see in a twilight between tranquillity and open confrontation. We need a defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, comprehensible to our friends, credible to our adversaries, and that we are prepared to sustain over the long term.

Imperatives of Technology

Technology has transformed the conditions and calculations of military strength in unprecedented fashion.

The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a momentous increase in the element of power has eroded the traditional relationship of power to policy. Until the end of World War II, it would never have occurred to a leader that there might be an upper limit to useful military power. Since the technological choices were limited, strength was largely defined in quantitative terms. Today the problem is to insure that our strength is relevant to our foreign policy objectives. Under current conditions it matters how we or our adversaries improve the size or quality of our
strategic arsenals, one overriding fact remains: An all-out strategic nuclear exchange would kill hundreds of millions on both sides in a matter of hours and utterly devastate the nations involved.

Thus the current strategic problem is virtually the diametric opposite of the historic one. Planners used to pursue increased overall power. Today we have a total strength unimaginable a generation ago, but we must design, diversify, and refine our forces so that they are relevant to and able to support rational foreign policy objectives. Historically military planners could treat the technology of their time as stable; today technology revolutionizes military capabilities in both strategic and tactical forces every decade and thus presents policymakers with an ever increasing spectrum of choice.

And yet the choices we make now will not, in most cases, really affect the structure of our forces for from 5 to 10 years—the time it takes to design new weapons, build them, and deploy them. Thus the policies Administrations are able to carry out are largely shaped by decisions in which they took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's largely determined our strategic posture for the 1970's. We can do little to change the impact of those earlier decisions; the Administration in power in the 1980's will be able to do little to change the impact of the decisions we make today. This is a sobering challenge, and it turns national security policy into a nonpartisan responsibility.

In choosing among the options that technology gives us, we—and every Administration must keep certain principles in mind.

- First, we must not simply duplicate Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a different geopolitical problem, a different force structure, and perhaps a different strategic doctrine.
- Second, because of the costs of modern forces, we face complex choices. In many areas we face a trade-off between quantity and quality, between numbers and sophistication.
- Third, because of our higher wage scales particularly for our volunteer forces any increase in our forces will weigh much more heavily on our economy than on that of adversaries whose pay scales are only a fraction of ours. For this reason, and the value we place on human life, we have always had an incentive, indeed an imperative, to put a premium on technology where we are superior rather than sheer numbers.
- Fourth, we must see beyond the numbers game. Quality confers advantages as much as quantity and can sometimes substitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford every weapon that technology makes possible.
- Fifth, at some point numbers count. Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for numerical strength. The belief that there is an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the defense budget is an illusion. Reductions almost inevitably translate into a reduction of effectiveness.

America possesses the economic and technological foundation to remain militarily preeminent; we can afford whatever military forces our security requires. The challenge we face is not to our physical strength—which is unequalled—but to our will to maintain it in all relevant categories and to use it when necessary to defend our interests and values.

Strategic Forces and Strategic Arms Limitations

Our Nation's security requires first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that insure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

We have such forces today. Our technology has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. by at least five years; with appropriate effort we can insure that this will continue to be the case.

We are determined to maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required. We will never allow the balance to be tipped against us either by unilateral decision or a buildup of the other side, by a one-sided agreement or by a violation of an agreement.

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious "gaps." Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union; their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

In the middle 1960's we could have continued the deployment of heavy throwweight missiles, following the Titan or the Atlas. But the Administration then in office decided instead to rely in addition to our large bomber force on an arsenal of 1,000 new, relatively light, sophisticated, and extremely accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems rapidly,
halting our buildup of launchers in the 1960's when it was judged that technological improvements were more important than an increase in numbers.

The Soviet Union chose a different course. Because of its more limited technological capabilities, it emphasized missiles whose greater throw-weight compensated for their substantially poorer accuracy. But—contrary to the expectations of American officials in the 1960's—the Soviets also chose to expand their numbers of launchers beyond what we had. Thus the Soviets passed our numerical levels by 1970 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year—until we succeeded in halting this buildup in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement of 1972.

Therefore as a consequence of unilateral decisions made a decade ago by both sides—Soviet missile forces today are somewhat larger in number and considerably heavier in throwweight, while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication. We possess far larger numbers of warheads 8,500 to their 3,500 and we have several hundred more strategic bombers.

Whether we move in the direction of greater throwweight will largely depend on recommendations made by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is not essentially a foreign policy decision. But in making it we will be governed by our needs not by a compulsion to duplicate the Soviet force structure. The destructiveness of missiles depends on a combination of explosive power and accuracy. For most purposes, as accuracy improves, explosive power becomes less important and heavy land-based missiles become, in fact, more vulnerable. Since we have stressed accuracy, we may decide that we do not need to approach the level of throwweight of Soviet weapons although nothing certainly no SALT agreement prevents us from substantially increasing our throwweight if we choose.

Whatever our decision regarding technical issues no responsible leader should encourage the illusion that America can ever again recapture the strategic superiority of the early postwar period. In the 1940's we had a nuclear monopoly. In the 1950's and early 1960's we had overwhelming preponderance. As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union possessed less than 100 strategic systems while we had thousands.

But today, when each side has thousands of launchers and many more warheads, a decisive or politically significant margin of superiority is out of reach. If one side expands or improves its forces sooner or later the other side will balance the effort. The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; we matched it. We then added a lead in numbers of strategic missiles to the lead we already had in bombers; they caught up and surpassed us in missile numbers although we still remain far ahead in numbers of bombers. When our Trident submarines are in production by the end of this decade, we will begin to redress that numerical imbalance as well as improve the flexibility and survivability of our forces.

We were the first to put modern ballistic missiles on submarines and we were the first to put multiple warheads on missiles. Although we remain ahead in both categories the Soviets found ways to narrow the gap. And the same will be true in the future, whether in missile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or cruise missile technology.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by either side. A perceived inequality could shake the confidence of other countries, even when its precise military significance is difficult to define. Therefore, we certainly will not permit a perceived or actual imbalance to arise against us and the Soviet Union is likely to follow similar principles. The probable outcome of each succeeding round of the strategic arms race will be the restoration of equilibrium at a higher and costlier level of forces and probably with less political stability. Such temporary advantages as can be achieved are not strategically decisive. The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels.

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in modern wartime conditions or against an opponent possessing means of retaliation. Indeed neither side has ever tested the launching of more than a few missiles at a time; neither side has ever fired them in a North-South direction as they would have to do in wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise attack would depend on substantial confidence that thousands of reentry vehicles launched in care-
fully coordinated attacks from land, sea, and air would knock out all their targets thousands of miles away, with a timing and reliability exactly as predicted, before the other side launches any forces to preempt or retaliate and with such effectiveness that retaliation would not produce unacceptable damage. Any miscalculation or technical failure would mean national catastrophe. Assertions that one side is “ahead” by the margins now under discussion pale in significance when an attack would depend on decisions based on such massive uncertainties and risks.

For these reasons, the strategic arsenals of the two sides must be balanced with such a margin of difference in the forces of the opponent that in making certain that third countries perceive no inequality. In no recent crisis has an American President come close to considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since 1962 and perhaps not even then has the strategic balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it was not relevant to the outcome.

It is against this background that we have vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strategic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing such talks.

- Since successive rounds of competitive programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the competition and to maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case at lower levels.
- Stabilizing the strategic balance frees resources to strengthen our forces in areas where they are most needed; it will ease the problem of enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and in sea power - the areas where an imbalance could have serious geopolitical consequence.
- Agreed limitations and a more calculable strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to reduce political confrontations and crises.
- And, finally, the American people expect their leaders to pursue every responsible approach to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect them to support the sacrifices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided potentially massive expenditures and instabilities. We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for five years—a period in which, because of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity for deployment of our own. We intended to use that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive agreement based on numerical equality and, failing that, to close the numerical gap by our own efforts as our modernization programs developed.

America's ultimate strength has always been the conviction and basic unity of its people. And despite a decade and more of testing—despite assassination, war, and institutional crises—we still remain a vital and optimistic and confident people. It is time once again for Americans to hold their heads high. It is important to recall once again some fundamental truths:

- That we are still the strongest Nation on the face of the Earth;
- That we are the most generous Nation in history—we have fed the starving, opened our arms and our hearts to refugees from other lands, and given more of our substance to the poor and downtrodden around the world than any other nation;
- That we are needed to maintain the world’s security;
- That we are essential to any hopes for stability and human progress;
- That we remain the bulwark of democracy and the land of promise to millions who yearn for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children;
- That we, therefore, have a responsibility to hold high the banner of freedom and human dignity for all mankind.

Our record of achievements should be but prologue to what this generation of Americans has within its power to accomplish. For the first time in history we can work with others to create an era of peace and prosperity for all mankind. We shall not fail.

With faith in the goodness and the promise of America we shall master our future. And those who celebrate America's tricentennial will look back and say that this generation of Americans was worthy of the ideals and the greatness of our history.
MINIMUM DETERRENCE

Commentary

Like the argument for Strategic Equivalence, the Minimum Deterrence approach acknowledges the military threat posed by adversary nations, but proponents of Minimum Deterrence insist that U.S. military power is more than adequate to meet that threat and that, in fact, substantial unilateral reductions are possible without diminishing U.S. military security. Negotiations, in this perspective, are seen to offer little hope for substantial reductions in arms.

Most discussion of Minimum Deterrence concentrates on nuclear weapons and argues that we do not need the awesome "overkill" capacity we presently possess. It is suggested that, as long as we have the invulnerable capability (as from missile-equipped submarines) to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on an opponent, we are secure from military threat. Therefore, we can-and should-safely reduce our capability to that minimum level.

This approach is perhaps the most commonly held position among arms control experts out of government. It also has an attractiveness to the average American: it makes little sense to be able to destroy the same city thirty-six times, and it is believed that the money saved from halting the nuclear arms race could be better used elsewhere.

The article by Earl C. Ravenal begins with the economic question and takes the argument a step further. Little can be saved, he insists, from halting or cutting back on nuclear weapons. Real reductions in costs can only come from cuts in conventional military expenditures. This can be done only if the U.S. is willing to withdraw from some of its international commitments. Ravenal's Minimum Deterrence proposal is that this can and should be done.

Sharing much in common with the Minimum Deterrence approach are proposals to stop development or production of specific weapons systems. Opposition to the B-1 Bomber and the Trident submarine often is based on the arguments that "we don't need them" and that the money could be put to better use.

The Minimum Deterrence position calls for unilateral reversal of the arms race in a way that breaks the "log jam" of negotiations. The potential reallocation of public funds to non-military purposes represents another strength of this approach. Its weakness lies in the absence of mechanisms to generate similar actions in other nations, although the hope is often expressed that movement by one nation toward minimum deterrence will encourage others to reciprocate and will stimulate the negotiations process. Furthermore, even the minimal level of military power advocated in this approach entails a heavily armed world fully capable of destroying itself. Continued reliance upon nuclear armaments-even at a lower level--will not prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
Supporters of Unilateral Disarmament see little hope for reversing the arms race through negotiated agreements. This view they share with proponents of Minimum Deterrence. But they part company with the latter in their response to the threat posed by the military power of other nations. Some who propose Unilateral Disarmament ignore that threat, others deny its existence; still others would substitute a non-military defense system as, for example, a strategy of civilian defense. All supporters of this approach, however, argue for unilateral action to halt the arms race and move toward disarmament without regard for the response of other nations.

Unilateral Disarmament was more seriously debated during the 1950's than today. The article by Dr. Homer Jack summarizes the main lines of some of these proposals, especially those of Mulford Sibley, a leading proponent. The article also raises the critical questions prompted by this approach. Calls for Unilateral Disarmament today arise most frequently from pacifist and/or religious perspectives and are based on moral considerations rather than political.

The Unilateral Disarmament approach stresses the need for radical change in international systems and challenges customary reliance on national military power. It also frequently highlights the moral dimensions of the discussion and proposes a goal of total (if not universal) disarmament. These are its strengths. The failure to seriously consider ways of bringing other nations into agreement on similar measures is its greatest weakness. In addition, the potential risks in such unilateral action cast doubt on its political feasibility.

Unilateral disarmament is often based upon two presuppositions. One is that traditional modes of negotiations will not produce substantial disarmament. The second is that the policy of military deterrence has failed - at least over the long run and involving more than solely military considerations.

Professor Mulford Sibley in arguing the case for unilateral disarmament, succinctly listed the failures of the policy of deterrence as associated with U.S. foreign policy: "It has not led us to a better negotiating position. It has not provided security against the threat of mass annihilation. Democracy has not been extended. Communism has not been contained. While deterrence may have been partially successful here or there in the short-run tactical sense, its strategic failures have more than counterbalanced its transient gains. Deterrence has blinded our government to the genuine revolution of 'rising expectations', made appeasement to colonialist and dictatorial military allies an important part of policy, obscured the possibilities of international reconciliation, begun to transform the American way of life into a militaristic type of society and increasingly dulled the moral sensitivity of human beings."

*By Homer Jack. This essay is based on essays by Mulford Sibley and Gene Sharp.
There are other kinds of presuppositions which must be considered before unilateral disarmament can proceed. Sibley states some of them. First, the arms race itself is one of the greatest sources of international tensions. This statement is hardly novel, yet it must be underlined. Second, there must be "radical innovations" in viewing foreign policy. Third, there is no way to "avoid pain and suffering" and there would be risks, but "those risks (are) far less dangerous than the risks involved in a continuation of the arms race".

There is no one scenario for a major state undertaking unilateral disarmament but some of the proposals made in recent years contain a number of steps which might be combined. While much of the literature is written as if the U. S. would be the first state to begin, the first more likely might not be a superpower.

The state adopting unilateral disarmament would first undergo a preparatory first phase (to use the nomenclature of Sibley). This preliminary process would last some months or years and would involve at least the following steps: 1) the state would issue a "white paper" telling its people and the world that it was seriously considering a radically different approach to defense; 2) the state would attempt new efforts for multilateral disarmament negotiations; 3) the state would begin to plan to convert its economy to one based entirely on peace; and 4) the state would begin to train its citizens in the methods of non-violent resistance to invasion. Under the program of acquainting its people and the world, the state preparing for unilateral disarmament would: 1) announce that a portion of funds heretofore spent on defense would be allocated to development through the U. N.; and 2) alter its relationship with its allies by offering them economic aid in place of military aid.

The second phase would entail the actual process of unilateral disarmament. In the words of Sibley, "everything would depend on the boldness of the President (or chief executive of the state taking the initiative) and his ability to achieve the kind of leadership which would provide a rallying point". The following steps would at least be included: 1) halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons; 2) declaring that nuclear weapons would never be used; 3) requesting the U. N. to supervise all missile tests to ascertain if they would be used for peaceful purposes only; 4) dismantling all overseas military bases and recalling all men and weapons from them; 5) turning any early-warning radar line around so that it becomes a bilateral safety device; 6) the U. N. would be invited to establish ground inspection stations on the state's soil to ascertain that these disarmament steps would actually be carried out; 7) the state would urge the U. N. to develop a genuine world police system with international courts to judge individuals; 8) bilateral or multilateral negotiations would be intensified; and 9) the state would put into effect its plans both to convert its war industries to peaceful production and to begin a process of civilian defense.

The third phase would bring the state to the end of the disarmament process, including the following steps: 1) all research in chemical weapons would cease; 2) there would be a regular phased reduction of all categories of military defense (including weapons stockpiles) until the state possessed only a small, police-type force; 3) the development, testing and production of all weapons would be terminated; 4) the state would turn over all international waterways to the U. N. and urge other states to do so; 5) the state would abandon all military assistance programs; and 6) the state would abolish military conscription, but encourage a voluntary youth corps for domestic and overseas development.

Sibley emphasized that at every stage there would be a "skillful pacing of initiatives to encourage the maximum favorable response and statesmanlike mixing of bold unilateral steps with patient negotiation so that there could be a balance of prudence against necessary risk for the sake of the future".
The state which disarms unilaterally must face the prospect of aggression and war, even if disarmed. There are several contingencies. First, a nuclear power could initiate a nuclear war against the disarmed nuclear state, but war might be more likely between two nuclear armed states. Second, the disarmed state could be occupied by an armed state. But for what purposes? The occupation of states in modern times is usually to prevent their rise as a military threat, but this would not be true for a state which voluntarily and unilaterally disarmed (and had observers present to witness the process). The only other reason for occupation would be for the occupying state to acquire and remove its wealth. This would be a dubious objective for any rational state in modern times. In any case, if the unarmed state were invaded or occupied, the process of nonviolent resistance would begin. This would not be without difficulties, but it is felt that fewer injuries and deaths would result than with traditional war, using violence on both sides.

There are, of course, unanswered questions. First, would the possibility of war be greater between the unarmed state and its opponents under unilateral disarmament or under an arms race, or even under multilateral disarmament? Second, even if the unarmed state did not face war, would its voluntary disarmament so destabilize the world that its allies might be open to attack even if it were not? Third, would the abandonment of power politics by the unarmed state set in motion the abandonment of this system by other states and thus promote more quickly multilateral or further unilateral disarmament?

Does defense always have to mean military defense? Is there an alternative to military defense? Are there ways to deter occupation or other attacks on a state and, if invaded, to end the occupation? These are questions raised - and answered - by advocates of unilateral disarmament, because they insist that the road to this kind of disarmament does not automatically lead to invasion and occupation.

Dr. Gene Sharp, a student of nonviolent techniques, asserted in "Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives", that the assumptions are not valid that defense capacity and military power are identical and that military occupation of a state means military control. He wrote: "Military power today often exists without real capacity to defend in struggle the people and society relying upon it. Often it only threatens mutual annihilation." He also indicated that "military occupation does not necessarily give the invader political control of the country, and the occupation can be destroyed without military assistance".

Unarmed people - as well as armed soldiers - can defend a state. This approach has been called "civilian defense" and should not be confused with civil defense! The aim of civilian defense, according to Sharp, is to "defeat military aggression by using resistance by the civilian population as a whole to make it impossible for the enemy to establish and maintain political control over the country". Sharp and others showed that there is a long history of nonviolent political struggle, already having produced "some impressive results, even against high odds". Scholars have identified about 200 specific methods of nonviolent action. They can be classified under three broad categories: 1) protest, such as demonstrations and vigils; 2) non-cooperation, including social non-cooperation, economic boycott and strikes, and political non-cooperation; and 3) intervention, including fasting, nonviolent occupation, and parallel government. Sharp insisted that the use of a considerable number of these methods, "carefully chosen, on a large scale, persistently, with wise strategy and tactics, by trained civilians, is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems".

Erich Fromm, writing in 1962, gave reasons for the relevance of unilateral disarmament, a relevance which is, if anything, greater today than yesterday: "Thinking through the arguments for a radical - even though practically unacceptable - position contributes to breaking through the thought barrier which prevents us now from getting out of the dangerous circle of seeking peace by means of threat and counterthreat. Taking seriously the reasoning which supports the unpopular position of complete unilateral disarmament can open up new approaches and viewpoints which are important even if our practical aim is that of graduated unilateral action or even only that of negotiated bilateral disarmament."
PEACE INITIATIVES STRATEGY

Commentary

The Peace Initiatives Strategy incorporates elements of the three previously discussed approaches and differs at significant points with each. It acknowledges the potential threat of military power in adversary nations and sees the negotiation process as inadequate to reverse the arms race and initiate disarmament. It calls for unilateral actions to reverse the arms race, but it insists that these be designed to gain agreement and reciprocation from other nations. It sets a goal of total disarmament but proposes that it be achieved in carefully planned stages and that it be universal.

The article by Bill Rose sketches the main themes of this approach and offers some specific examples. It is suggested that the dynamic of action-response which fuels the arms race can be reversed to initiate a "peace race". In this approach, a government announces a "low risk" initiative action to halt or reverse the arms race and calls for a similar reciprocal action from other nations. If this response is forthcoming, a further initiative step is taken (and reciprocation sought) to maintain the momentum. The article from To End War provides additional background for this approach and broadens its application to other possibilities for international change.

This approach suggests the possibility of generating real movement toward limited disarmament goals while maintaining a vision of a disarmed world. Some kind of unilateral action seems necessary to break the negotiation deadlock, and the emphasis on initiative action coupled with reciprocation is one of the strengths of this approach. Further, as proponents of Minimum Deterrence point out, there exists in the U. S. a margin of safety to permit low risk initiatives without endangering national security. The weakness of this proposal lies mainly in its undeveloped character. Expert study is required to design a strategy of peace initiatives (as opposed to isolated action), and careful planning is needed for alternative forms of pressure to gain reciprocation when internal forces and world opinion prove inadequate.

* The selection from To End War by Robert Pickus is reprinted on pages 97-101.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REVERSING THE ARMS RACE

NEW APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Twenty-fourth Report of the

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

Louis B. Sohn, Chairman
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Working Group on Disarmament

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE
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NOTE

This document sets forth the 66 Recommendations contained in the 24th Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. A limited offset edition of the Report, 64 pages of text plus introductory material, was distributed to the information media on September 20. A larger offset edition, and eventually a printed edition, will be issued later.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Impact of Arms Production on Economic Resources

1. The United Nations General Assembly should call on the Governments of the principal arms-manufacturing countries to publish annual reports on the amount of non-renewable resources consumed in the production of arms and the amount of capital and manpower devoted to producing arms and conducting arms-related research and development.

2. The United Nations Secretariat should publish an annual report showing (a) the amount of total world production of non-renewable resources—petroleum, iron ore, copper, nickel, manganese, bauxite, and other key minerals—that are consumed in arms production; and (b) the amount of total world capital and manpower, including scientific and technical resources, that are devoted to arms production, research, and development.

3. The U.S. Congress should enact a law requiring that every military budget request contain a report by the Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Environmental Quality on the amount of resources—manpower, capital and physical—consumed in arms production during the previous fiscal year and to be consumed as a result of the proposed budget. Analysis of these reports should be undertaken by the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office.

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CONTROL

1. Controlling the Rate of Research and Development

   1. The Congress should exercise oversight over the issuance of contracts of research, development, test and evaluation of new weapons systems, especially potentially destabilizing ones, and should pay special attention to and provide maximum publicity for the arms control
and disarmament impact statements now required by law.

2. Governmental and non-governmental approaches should be made to officials and scientists in the Soviet Union and other countries, requesting discussion and negotiations about how best to treat the control of military research and development in the context of the Soviet system, as well as in the United States and other countries.

B. Arms Control Through Unilateral Policy Decisions Compared with Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations

1. The United States, for a period of two or three years, in order to encourage reciprocal reductions by the Soviet Union and other countries, should (a) initiate reductions in expenditures for both strategic weapons, particularly land-based nuclear missiles, and conventional forces; (b) postpone decisions on production of new weapons systems, and (c) propose that states making such reductions devote a substantial part of the amount of the reductions to economic and social assistance, especially multilateral, to those poor nations that are not wasting resources on excessive armaments.

2. The United States should forego authorization for development, production and deployment of weapons for use as "bargaining chips" in future negotiations.

3. In order adequately to inform Congress and the public, the Executive Branch should report more fully to them on bilateral and multilateral arms control talks, and together with the Soviet Government should issue frequent joint reports during sessions of SALT and other bilateral negotiations, and transmit them to the United Nations.

III. CONTROLLING AND REDUCING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

A. Control of the International Arms Trade

1. The United Nations should undertake to publish a Yearbook on arms trade, including licensing agreements, arms production, and military expenditures. One objective of such a Yearbook should be to develop uniform standards for accounts and categories of military trade, production, and expenditures. All nations should move as rapidly as possible to adopt these standards, recognizing their importance for arms control. Sources for the Yearbook should include official reports from governments and reputable non-governmental research organizations.

2. The United States should proceed immediately to convene a suppliers' conference among the NATO nations, with the objective of scheduling a full international conference in 1977 under United Nations auspices for the purpose of restricting arms sales. The conference should address the question of the need to provide more security to buyer states through regional arms control measures.

3. The President, for a limited period of time, should enunciate U.S. arms trade policy, in the form of a request for a law or by an Executive Order, setting an overall dollar limit on all licenses for the export of arms, with a view to inducing other arms suppliers to adopt similar policies.

4. The United States should enlist the cooperation of other arms suppliers in a joint proposal to the United Nations requiring the notification to that body of the nature, amount, and destination of all arms transfers and the registration with it of all licenses for exports of arms technology.
5. All proposed arms transactions by the United States should be accompanied by a Presidential finding, on the public record, detailing the considerations of the U.S. side which make the transfer desirable.

6. Licensing of exports of arms technology should be put under controls as strict as those for the export of arms.

7. The United States should seek in the United Nations the convening of negotiating conferences in the various geographic regions, including all interested parties, with a view to resolving disputes and achieving control of armaments in the area.

B. Restrictions on Deployment

1. The United Nations resolution, calling on all states to treat the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and to prevent a foreign arms race from occurring in the area, should be accepted and implemented. Specifically, the states outside the Indian Ocean region, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, and the littoral states, should agree that (a) outside powers should not station naval vessels, on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, in the Indian Ocean, but should retain all other high seas rights; and (b) outside powers should not maintain military bases or facilities in the region.

2. The United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union an agreement to restrain naval deployments in the Indian Ocean; pending attempts to negotiate an agreement, the Congress should refuse to authorize or appropriate further funds for the improvement of the existing facilities on Diego Garcia.

3. The UN Security Council, acting under Article 34 of the Charter, should send an Observer Team immediately to the Indian Ocean (a) to visit every port facility being used by naval forces from outside the region, and to report on its status and on any weapons that have been installed to protect it; and (b) to report periodically on the implementation of the steps set forth in paragraph 1 above.

IV. LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES

1. The United States should take an active leadership role in negotiations to curb military expenditures and allocate resources to non-military programs.

2. The President, backed by a Congressional resolution, should at the start of his term initiate the effort by a formal declaration of the U.S. intent to move toward a reduction of military expenditures. At that time he should invite the Soviet Union and all other states to join in this objective by making similar public commitments.

3. At the same time, the Executive Branch should undertake an overall review of priorities, including economic and social assistance to developing countries. Before the next budget is prepared, the President should recommend specific program alternatives for the use of labor and industrial resources to be released from military uses, including imaginative and far-reaching projects in the field of energy technology. The President's budget for Fiscal Year 1978 should reflect these program recommendations.

4. In his budget presentation, the President should encourage reciprocal actions by other states by identifying the specific military program elements which account for the reduction of expenditures.

5. The United States should seek agreement with the USSR to standardize their budget categories and accounting procedures and to adopt common definitions, so that the two military budgets will be comparable for purposes of analysis. Other states should be invited to join the agreement.
6. As a first goal of the United Nations program on standardization of budgets (see III. A. 1, page 3), agreement should be reached on standardization of budget accounts and the identification of the components of the military budget. All states should proceed quickly to put their accounts on a standard basis.

7. The United Nations should continue its study of the technical issues and differences associated with a reduction of military expenditures, increasing the emphasis on means of simplifying the verification process. The objective should be graduated disclosure with which all states could comply.

8. The contributions of private groups to the study and solution of verification questions should be encouraged both by the United Nations and by national governments. Private organizations should be invited to participate in United Nations studies.

9. International agreements for the reduction of forces or arms should in general incorporate provisions for a commensurate reduction of expenditures. A simplified reduction formula in the treaty should make savings explicit and public.

V. CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

A. Control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems

1. A SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok Accords should be speedily negotiated; negotiations should begin immediately thereafter on a SALT III agreement embodying reductions of strategic delivery vehicles on the following basis:

(a) Both sides agree to eliminate each year over a five-year period 20 percent of their existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and intercontinental bombers.

(b) The 20 percent of each class of weapons delivery system should be selected from a mix of the most recently deployed and older weapons systems.

(c) At the end of five years both parties shall review the progress of the agreement, including an assessment of relative strengths of forces of other nations, and work to continue the reduction process on a year-to-year basis thereafter.

(d) Both sides agree to halt all flight testing of new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental bombers, and cruise missiles over 600 kilometers range.

(e) Both sides agree to conduct no more than 10 flight tests per year, over agreed test ranges, of those types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles which are still in their operational inventory at that time.

(f) Definition of weapon types, and prescribed means of verification, including the resolution of ambiguities, should be consistent with the definitions and procedures worked out in the SALT I negotiations and in subsequent negotiations of the Standing Consultative Commission.

B. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Through the Spread of Nuclear Energy Plants Providing the Capability for Making Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Testing

1. The United States and the Soviet Union should agree to an immediate moratorium suspending all underground nuclear weapons tests for five years and should commence more
incentive negotiations to achieve agreement on a permanent ban of such tests. The proposed treaty banning underground nuclear tests as and peaceful tests down to a level of 150 kilotons, agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union, should not be accepted. Instead, it should be returned to the President for renegotiation so that a comprehensive treaty with a permanent test ban can be negotiated.

2. The United States and the Soviet Union, together with many members of the "suppliers' club" as possible, should agree to provide any nuclear material, equipment or technology to any non-nuclear countries to the latter under such conditions that:

- to accept International Energy Agency safeguards over all its nuclear reactors and facilities;
- not to conduct any nuclear explosions of any kind, whether for peaceful or military purposes;
- not to build or operate any enrichment or plutonium processing plant under national control.

3. The United States, the Soviet Union and the other supplier states should indicate their willingness to build regional, multi-national or international plants for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing which would be under IAEA supervision and control and jointly financed by two or more countries with help from the supplier states.

4. The United States and the Soviet Union should proclaim their willingness to conduct underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, either for themselves or for non-nuclear states, only when authorized to do so by some competent international authority to be established for that purpose, and that they would begin immediate consultations to convene a conference for the creation of a non-discriminatory and equitable special international regime for peaceful nuclear explosions.

C. Danger of Theft of Nuclear Weapons and Materials

1. The United States should meet periodically with other nuclear states to consider the best means for assuring the physical security of, and to review safeguard measures for, nuclear materials, plants and weapons, and should institute research programs in this field.

2. The nuclear powers should take special precautions, such as (a) making the fissionable material in reactors less suitable for explosives by mixing it with non-fissionable substances; (b) mixing radioactive material high in gamma rays with the enriched uranium or plutonium to make it dangerous to handle; (c) storing the highly dangerous spent fuel rods instead of reprocessing them; and (d) reducing the quantities in transit to a minimum and putting all transit of fissionable material under government control.

3. The nuclear powers should establish national and international command and communications centers for monitoring the movement of nuclear material and for responding to any thefts or seizure; and create special national and international agencies to deal with actual or suspected thefts and seizures.

4. The United States should press the International Atomic Energy Agency to set by treaty international standards for adequate national measures of physical security; to establish international or regional nuclear fuel cycle centers; and to prepare an international convention to cooperate in preventing theft, and in pursuing stolen material, and to refuse asylum to nuclear thieves and terrorists.
D. Restrictions on Use and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Congress, by passing a resolution, should indicate its support of a declaration of policy by the President that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any state which does not possess nuclear weapons of its own or allows the stationing of any foreign-owned weapons on its territory.

2. The United States should press for a treaty by the states possessing nuclear weapons by which they would agree to refrain from the use of such weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons of their own, nor allow the stationing of foreign-owned weapons on their territories.

3. While the general treaty on limitations of nuclear weapons, proposed in paragraph 2 above, is being negotiated, the states possessing nuclear weapons should participate in a series of regional treaties by which they would refrain from the use of such weapons against states in these regions which do not possess nuclear weapons of their own, nor allow the stationing of foreign-owned weapons on their territories.

4. All nuclear weapons states should:

   (a) undertake actively to support the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

   (b) Issue a joint or separate declarations that they will respect the status of any nuclear weapon-free zone and that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any such zone that is created.

   (c) Undertake to become a party to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America (this would apply only to the Soviet Union).

   (d) Undertake to become a party to Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (this would apply only to the United States and France).

E. Chemical and Biological Weapons

1. The Congress should pass the resolutions before it proposing that the Congress state that it would support the President in a declaration of policy against any further U.S. manufacture or possession of lethal chemical weapons (such as nerve gas, mustard gases, etc.).

2. The Executive Branch should undertake a phased program to destroy lethal chemical weapons and to convert or destroy their production facilities, with invited witnesses for verification; the USSR and other nations should be urged to do likewise.

3. The United States should promptly inform the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of its support of a draft treaty imposing such constraints on all states party to the treaty.

4. The United Nations should undertake studies of appropriate and effective means to monitor compliance by nations with the chemical warfare treaty proposed above.

VI. STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS TO ACHIEVE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

A. International Institutions

1. The United States should propose arms control and disarmament measures for study and negotiation by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; and the Congress should
call upon the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to prepare an agenda of such measures with an indication of priorities.

2. The United Nations General Assembly should (a) request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report directly to the Disarmament Commission; and (b) request the Disarmament Commission to meet annually, preferably in January.

3. The UN General Assembly, every other year, should hold a special session, at the foreign minister level, to review progress toward disarmament. To initiate these special sessions, a World Disarmament Conference should be convened.

4. The United States and other countries should work to obtain the full participation of China and France in disarmament negotiations, either through a restructured CCD or a replacement of this body.

5. The United Nations University should make arms control and disarmament one of the priorities of its curriculum and should undertake and promote research, training and educational programs concerning all aspects of arms control and disarmament in regional and national institutions throughout the world.

6. The UN General Assembly should encourage regional negotiations on arms control and disarmament and request that the results be reported to the Disarmament Commission, for consideration at its annual meeting, and to the biennial special session of the General Assembly.

7. The UN General Assembly should establish procedures by which appropriate international and national non-governmental organizations could offer their views and the results of their research to any UN organ that is considering disarmament.

8. The UN General Assembly should establish the post of Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament and a Research and Analysis Center for arms control and disarmament, and authorize the Secretary-General to convene groups of experts to present reports to the General Assembly and to provide technical advice to the Center.

9. The UN General Assembly should authorize the Secretariat to provide services upon request to all international conferences concerning arms control and disarmament, whether bilateral or multilateral, and to assist in preparing proposals, resolutions and conventions; and should authorize the Center to undertake research work in this field on its own initiative or upon the request of any group of states.

B. Regional Institutions

The Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the various European and Asian regional organizations and other regional bodies should devote continuing attention to all aspects of arms control and disarmament, and should establish special units in their respective secretariats to undertake research in this field.

C. National Institutions

1. The U.S. Executive Branch

(a) The President should have the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency play a major role in all arms control and disarmament negotiations.
(b) More information should be provided to the public concerning U.S. arms control and disarmament policy and programs.

(c) The Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should use more the powers he has under the existing legislation as the President's Disarmament Adviser, and arrangements should be made for more frequent meetings of the Director with the President. The Director of the ADA should participate as a full and active member of the National Security Council.

(d) In order to carry out ADA's mandate from Congress to prepare for and conduct negotiations, to advise the President, to construct impact statements concerning proposed weapons systems, and to provide the Congress and the public with the information necessary to make sound judgments, the Executive Branch should request substantially increased funds from Congress for personnel and research.

(e) The General Advisory Committee of ACDA should, at the request of appropriate Congressional Committees, present to them (and hence to the public) its viewpoint and conclusions on specific arms control and disarmament policies. Terms of members of the Advisory Committee should be limited, and the Committee should consist of knowledgeable persons who have demonstrated a real interest in the subject.

2. The U.S. Congress

(a) Congress should carefully evaluate the implementation of legislation directing ACDA to prepare arms control impact statements on proposed new weapons systems. Congress should effectively exercise its powers in decisions on arms sales abroad. Impact statements should become available to the public to the greatest extent possible.

(b) Congress should be represented by observers at all international arms control and disarmament negotiations.

(c) Congress should establish goals for disarmament and arms control progress, and the actions taken should be evaluated in terms of the extent to which these goals are being realized.

D. Private Institutions

1. Non-governmental organizations should intensify their interest, expand their expertise and increase their activities aimed at shaping public opinion and influencing decision-making on arms control and disarmament matters.

2. Governments, foundations and non-governmental organizations in as many countries as possible should encourage and support private research in all aspects of arms control and disarmament.

3. National governments should improve the channels for non-governmental organization input and consultation, and international governmental organizations should provide ways by which non-governmental organizations can influence decisions made at this level.

4. Non-governmental organizations should monitor governmental disarmament negotiations. This should maximize their impact on the deliberations and encourage positive results.

VII. TOWARD A DISARMED WORLD

1. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should undertake in-house and
contract research programs on the long-term utility of a policy of deterrence in preventing nuclear war and promoting the welfare of Americans with the objective of giving the government and the public realistic evaluations of the future.

2. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should, through in-house and contract research, propose plans for and means to move toward alternative security policies, including general and complete disarmament.

3. The Congress should require the Office of Technology Assessment to undertake in-house and contract studies similar to (1) and (2) above.

4. The U.S. Congress should establish a basic policy of providing specific funding to support U.S. efforts to define the goal of general and complete disarmament, to devise the steps necessary to achieve it, and to promote them nationally and internationally.

5. The proposed UN Research and Analysis Center for Arms Control and Disarmament should undertake a reexamination of the Zorin-McClory "Agreed Principles of Disarmament Negotiations", unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in 1961, and the U.S. and USSR draft treaties of 1962 on disarmament, with the view to proposing a new draft treaty for general and complete disarmament, for consideration by the General Assembly.

6. Interested groups of states should present their proposals to the Research and Analysis Center. Institutions such as the United Nations University, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Pugwash Conference should also be encouraged to present proposals.
IV.B. AMENDING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT),
by William Epstein

In order to help implement their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and in order to strengthen the Treaty, the nuclear powers might undertake to carry out the following measures.

1. To enter into a normal and binding way of amendment to the Treaty or otherwise, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear party that has no nuclear weapons on its territory. (A possible less comprehensive and less favored alternative to this pledge would be one committing the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear party unless it was engaged in an armed attack, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, against any other party to the Treaty.)

2. To begin immediate negotiations to draft a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests for military purposes with a view to completing the treaty within one year.

3. To end the production of fissionable material for military uses and transfer stocks to civilian uses.

4. To begin immediate negotiations to reduce and phase out all land-based ICBMs with a view to their elimination within six years, with the proviso that if China and France do not likewise agree, each party be entitled to retain up to 50 land-based ICBMs.

5. To begin immediate negotiations to reduce their submarine-launched nuclear missiles to 20 percent of the numbers permitted under the Interim Agreement Between the U.S. and USSR with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol thereto.

6. To begin immediate negotiations to ban all flight testing of nuclear-weapon missiles.

7. To begin immediate negotiations to ban the testing, manufacture and deployment of new nuclear weapons.

8. To undertake to respect and observe all regional treaties creating a nuclear-free zone or a peace zone.

9. To undertake to present new draft treaties for general and complete disarmament under effective international control with a period of one or two years.
Possible Amendments to the NPT or for Inclusion in a Declaration Designed to Strengthen the NPT

Article I
No transfer of nuclear weapons, etc. from a nuclear-weapon State to any other nuclear-weapon State.

Article II
No transfer of technology or assistance in regard to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices from a non-nuclear-weapon State to another non-nuclear-weapon State.

Article III (1)
The nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA safeguards on their power reactors and other installations and facilities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the same basis as non-nuclear-weapon States.

(2) The nuclear-weapon States to work out more up-to-date national and international safeguards relating to the production, utilization and transport of fissile material, to be approved by the IAEA and to be subject to IAEA safeguards.

(3) Strengthen paragraph 3 of Article III as indicated for Articles IV and V.

Article IV (1) No exchange of information or technology between parties to the Treaty and non-parties.

(2) No supply of equipment or fissile material by parties to the Treaty to non-parties.

(3) No construction of power or research reactors in the territory of non-parties to the Treaty.

Article V (1) As an interim measure - no underground tests of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless (a) advance authorization is given by the Security Council of the UN or the Board of Governors of the IAEA, or by some new committee of the General Assembly established for the purpose, and (b) the nuclear explosive device is inspected in advance by a committee of nuclear powers.

(2) As a permanent measure - establish an international regime by treaty whereby
(a) PNEs would be carried out by nuclear powers for non-nuclear powers cheaply and without discrimination.
(b) Pledges by non-nuclear powers not to conduct PNEs.
(c) Pledges by all nuclear powers, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, not to use PNEs for military purposes or to manufacture bombs.
Article VI

(1) The nuclear powers to enter into a formal and binding pledge, by way of amendment to the Treaty or otherwise, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear party that has no nuclear weapons on its territory.

(A possible less comprehensive and less favored alternative to this pledge would be one committing the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear party unless it was engaged in an armed attack, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, against any other party to the Treaty.)

(2) The nuclear powers to begin immediate negotiations to draft a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests for military purposes with a view to completing the treaty within one year.

(3) The nuclear powers to end the production of fissionable material for military uses and transfer stocks to civilian uses.

(4) The nuclear parties to begin immediate negotiations to reduce and phase out all land-based ICBMs with a view to their elimination within six years, with the proviso that if China and France do not likewise agree, each party be entitled to retain up to 50 land-based ICBMs.

(5) The nuclear powers begin immediate negotiations to reduce their submarine-launched nuclear missiles to 20 percent of the numbers permitted under the Interim Agreement Between the U. S. and USSR with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol thereto.

(6) The nuclear powers to begin immediate negotiations to ban all flight testing of nuclear weapon missiles.

(7) The nuclear powers to begin immediate negotiations to ban the testing, manufacture and deployment of new nuclear weapons.

(8) The USSR and U. S. to undertake to present new draft treaties, within one or two years, for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Article VII

The nuclear parties undertake to respect and subscribe to any regional treaties for the creation of a nuclear-free zone or a peace zone.
Article VIII (1) The parties to the NPT begin immediate negotiations to amend Article VII, paragraph 3, to provide that the next Review Conference should take place in 3 years and at intervals of 3 years thereafter.

(2) The parties to the Treaty create a Committee of Consultation consisting of the nuclear powers plus 10 members (2 each from Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and others) to be elected at each Review Conference, in order to consult on the implementation and operation of the Treaty, to make recommendations, and to submit an annual report to the Parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
DETENTE OR DISASTER?
A Proposal for Ending the Arms Race
by
John B. Massen, Director, Northern California Division, UNA-USA
December 1, 1975

The U. S. Government (should) unilaterally adopt the following disarmament policies and announce them publically to the world:

1. The U. S. will reduce its nuclear weapons stockpiles by 20 percent during each of the next five years beginning July 1, 1976.

2. The U. S. will completely cease all nuclear weapons tests and will sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

3. The U. S. will stop production of nuclear weapons and the materials from which such weapons are made.

4. The U. S. will stop production of new weapons systems, including but not limited to the B-1 Bomber and the Trident submarine.

5. The U. S. will stop research and development programs for new weapons systems.

The U. S. challenges the U. S. S. R. to match the U. S. unilateral disarmament actions described above with equivalent actions by the U. S. S. R., in a continuous mutual disarmament policy. It is recognized that the U. S. S. R. necessarily will begin its disarmament actions after the U. S. The U. S. will review its unilateral disarmament policies periodically and will determine whether there has been sufficient progress in U. S. S. R. disarmament to warrant continuation of its disarmament policies during the year.


The U. S. Government promptly adopts comprehensive and effective legislation to ease and facilitate the conversion of production and employment from military purposes to peaceful purposes that meet the enormous accumulated needs of the American people.

* Excerpts from the author's paper; available for $1.00 from 152 St. Francis Blvd., Daly City, California 94015
GRIT for MBFR in Europe

by Charles Osgood

Editor's note: Below is an edited version of testimony presented by Charles Osgood to the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 26, 1973.

Osgood is a professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois (Champaign) and develops his Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction (GRIT) strategy in An Alternative to War and Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962). MBFR is the acronym for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, the subject of talks concerning Europe in 1971 and again in 1976.

Application of GRIT to MBFR in Europe

Here I can only offer suggestions, not a full-blown step-by-step program. The reasons for this are several: For one thing, GRIT is a very complex process; it involves not just military considerations, or just political considerations, but rather military, political, cultural and psychological considerations all at the same time. One therefore must envisage the combined planning efforts of people in government representing all of these aspects of strategy, and more. For another thing, by the very nature of the GRIT process - particularly its dependence at each point in time upon the occurrence and the bonafideness of reciprocations - this strategy must be "played by ear", so to speak. One's own moves must be flexibly adapted to the past history of the process and the present context. However, ten general "rules" may provide guidelines for adapting GRIT to the European problem.

1. Retaining the Capacity for Nuclear Retaliation

Nuclear retaliatory capacity can serve national foreign policy (a) if it is viewed not only as a deterrent but also as a security base from which to take limited risks in the direction of reducing tensions, (b) if the retaliatory, second-strike nature of the capacity is made explicit, and (c) if only the minimum capacity required for effective deterrence is maintained and the arms race damped. Needless to say, none of these "if" conditions have been met to date by the two nuclear super-powers. In the European theater both strategic and tactical weapons are redundantly deployed - the former mainly in the Air Force (SAC) and the Navy (Polaris submarines), but the latter implanted in the soils of both East and West Europe. The tactical nuclear weapons pose a particular threat to civilians, are typically "soft" targets (and hence an invitation to surprise attack under high-tension conditions), and are in over-supply as far as capacity for graded response to aggression is concerned. Therefore, at some stage in the GRIT process graduated and reciprocated reductions in these weapons, along with the men that are assigned to them, should be initiated....
2. Retaining Capability for Graded Conventional Response to Conventional Aggression

Since the Berlin Crisis of the early 1960's - the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have developed a set of "rules" for controlling the process of confrontation.

However, given even present levels of tension, the general rule would be to initiate unilateral moves in the regions of least tension and gradually extend them to what were originally the most tense regions. The "thin blue line" separating NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has its Northern (Norway and Denmark), Central (the German/Belgium/Benelux heartland), and Southern (Italy, Greece and Turkey) regions (cf., Stanley in U. S. Troops in Europe, pp. 65 - 69). Soviet combat manpower in the Northern region is estimated to outnumber locally available NATO manpower by about five to one, but, given neutral Sweden and Finland as buffers, the main threat would be air or naval. It is doubtful if initiatives in this region would be considered significant by the Soviets. The Southern region is more balanced between NATO and Warsaw Pact total forces, but it is also much more unstable, particularly in the East (Greece and Turkey) because of proximity to the Middle Eastern tinderbox and the build-up of the Russian Mediterranean fleet. So the Central region appears to be the best locus for initiating GRIT.

In the heartland of Europe, especially in Germany, the balance between forces is in rough parity, but with the Pact ground forces closer at hand and the NATO forces more mobile (e. g., the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AME) which has been actively exercising since 1962). If, in the early stages of a GRIT process, U. S. ground troops were withdrawn to this country but not deactivated, then not only would they be much further away than withdrawn Russian troops but there would be an increase in support cost, if anything.

This suggests a two-stage withdrawal process for the U. S. (and perhaps also the S. U.), with troops first removed to a location away from the heartland of Europe but near enough for quick return if required. The loci of such first-stage bases should not be in the Southern NATO region for obvious reasons, but either the Northern (Norway, but not Denmark) or most Western (the British Isles) regions would be feasible if acceptable to these allies. Such a two-stage withdrawal process would also have the advantage of providing high visibility (i. e., verifiability) of both first-stage (arrivals from Central Europe) and second-stage (departures for the U. S.) initiatives. A similar procedure by the Soviet Union would offer like advantages.

3. Graduation of Unilateral Initiatives as a Function of Reciprocation

This is the self-regulating characteristic of GRIT that keeps the process within reasonable limits of security. If bona fide reciprocations of appropriate magnitude are obtained, the magnitude of our subsequent steps can be increased; if not, then the process continues with a diversity of steps of about the same magnitude of risk. In this connection, both sides have to be alert for evaluating and responding to reciprocations that are not of the same kind and/or not of apparently matching magnitude. This is primarily because neither side can be confident that its perceptions of the significance of steps are the same as those of the other. The Russians may not give as much weight to one of our unilateral acts as we do, or they may give more - and vice versa. The critical thing is that
all actions represent bona fide intentions to reduce tensions - and even this is susceptible to misinterpretation and must be carefully monitored.

(Such)....patterns suggest the following basic design for GRIT moves in the force-reduction sphere: (a) they should begin with graduated withdrawal of U. S. forces (of all conventional types, not merely ground troops); (b) it should be clearly indicated that if the Soviets reciprocate appropriately, there will be no NATO replacements of these forces (i. e., an over-all reduction in opposing forces will have been accomplished); (c) it should also be clearly indicated that if no appropriate reciprocation is forthcoming in a reasonable period, then the equivalent of the withdrawn U. S. forces will be supplied by our NATO allies. Such substitution of NATO forces for U. S. forces should not extend to tactical nuclear weapons; even turning control of such weapons over to, e. g., West German forces would be extraordinarily threatening to the U. S. S. R. and to other European states as well. Graduated and reciprocated reductions in nuclear capabilities of the superpowers could be included in the process, but would remain strictly on a bilateral basis.

4. Diversification of Spheres, Loci, and Initiators of GRIT

By "sphere of action" is meant the substance of the initiatives - whether in cultural, scientific, economic, political, military, etc. areas of inter-nation relations. By "geographical locus" is meant the nations primarily affected by our initiatives and involved in the reciprocation process - in the present case, which NATO countries, which Soviet forces, and which satellite countries. The reason for diversification of spheres and loci of unilateral moves is really two-fold: first, in maintaining security, diversification minimizes weakening one’s position in any one sphere (e. g., combat troops) or any one geographical locus (e. g., Greek and Turkish Thrace); second, in inducing reciprocation, diversification keeps applying the pressure of initiatives having a common tension-reducing intent and (hopefully) effect, but does not "threaten" the opponent by pushing steadily, in the same sphere of locus and thereby limiting his number of options in reciprocating.

5. Designing and Communicating GRIT So As To Emphasize Sincerity of Intent

The purpose of GRIT is to de-escalate inter-nation tensions and create an atmosphere in which political, rather than military, resolution of conflict becomes feasible. But the dynamics of this strategy are essentially psychological. Its success depends upon creating the conviction, on both sides, that the moves being made are motivated by a sincere intent to reduce tensions. Adoption of the GRIT strategy therefore must involve a complete rejection of the more familiar, traditional policy of deterrence by mutual threats; it substitutes an entirely different kind of "mutual deterrence" - self-determined rather than other-determined - but it can be even more effective, and much less costly. This is why escalation and de-escalation strategies cannot be "mixed" in the sense that military men talk about the "optimum mix" of weapon systems. The reason is again psychological: reactions to threats (aggressive impulses) are incompatible with reactions to promises (conciliatory impulses); each strategy thus destroys the credibility of the other.
It is therefore essential that the complete shift in basic policy be clearly signaled at the beginning. The President of the United States, in effect the leader of the NATO forces, must establish the right atmosphere - by stating the over-all nature of the new policy, by emphasizing its tension-reducing intent, and by announcing the first U.S. initiative.

6. Prior Announcements of Intended Actions and Identification with Over-all Policy

Prior announcements minimize the unstabilizing potential of unilateral acts, and their identification with total GRIT strategy helps shape the opponent's interpretation of them. In general, the tempo of unilateral initiatives (regardless of reciprocations) should be fairly constant; this is because initiators need time to evaluate and select actions which are appropriate to the context of the moment and, equivalently, potential reciprocators need time to evaluate the communicative actions received and plan their own return actions. On the other hand, the magnitude of unilateral initiatives is variable (and, as I have indicated, dependent upon the prior reciprocative behavior of the opponent). The opponent may, in fact, over-reciprocate, thereby assuming the role of "initiator".

7. Explicit Invitation to Reciprocate

The purpose of this "rule" is to increase pressure on an opponent, by making it clear that reciprocation of appropriate form and magnitude is essential to the momentum of GRIT, and to bring to bear pressures of world opinion. However, exactly specifying the form or magnitude of reciprocation has several drawbacks: having the tone of a demand rather than an invitation, it carries an implied threat of retaliation if the demand is not met; furthermore, the specific reciprocation requested may be based on faulty perceptions of the other's situation, and this may be the reason for failure to get reciprocation. But specificity is certainly a variable that itself can be manipulated.

8. Executing Announced Unilateral Actions on Schedule

This is the best indication of the firmness and bonafideness of our own intent to reduce tensions, and it again involves the crucial distinction between negotiations, requiring prior commitment, and GRIT, which substitutes post commitment. In this case the "negotiation" is informal, but the difference between promises and commissions, between words and deeds, also applies. The control over what and how much is committed is the graduated nature of the process (#3 above); at the time-point when each initiative is announced, the calculation has been made in terms of prior reciprocation history that this step can be taken within reasonable limits of security. Failure to execute an announced step, however, would be a clear signal of ambivalence in intent.

9. Continuing Unilateral Steps in the Face of Lack of Adequate Reciprocation

It is this characteristic of GRIT which at once justifies the use of the acronym and raises the hackles of most military men. No doubt this was what led one early critic to dub my proposal "surrender on the installment plan"! My reply was that both graduation and diversification of initiatives prevents unacceptable weakening of our position in any one sphere or locus of security.
10. **Maximizing Unambiguity and Verifiability of Both Initiatives and Reciprocations**

Positive sanctions (like "we will cut forces if you will") are really a form of negotiation, requiring prior commitment from the opponent, and negative sanctions (like "we will cease all spy flights over your territory") can only be tested in their violation. Unilateral actions, initiating or reciprocating, should be unambiguous as to their tension-reducing effect, and this depends upon their verifiability as well as their intent. Thus public deactivation of a specific overseas base has higher face validity than announcement of a budget shift from "soft" manned bombers to "hard" second-strike missiles. Inviting opponent verification via direct, on-the-spot observation or via indirect media observation (e.g., televising the act in question), along with requested reciprocation in the verification of his actions, is ideal - and what little might be lost in the way of secrecy by us or the Russians might be more than made up in a reduced need for secrecy on both sides. Prompt and clear verification is most important in the early phases of GRIT, when mutual distrust is high, and becomes less critical as mutual trust builds up.
Putting the brakes on the arms traffic

by Edward C. Luck

The United States, which accounts for almost one half of global arms transfers, is unquestionably the world's leading arms merchant. Foreign orders for US arms sales, under $12 billion in 1970, are expected to exceed $10 billion this year for the third year in succession.

Alarmed by the rapid escalation of both the quantity and quality of US arms exports, Congress is considering legislation which would considerably increase its oversight of arms sales (The Inter Dependent, April). Introduced by Senator Humphrey last November, this bill (S2662) greatly expands arms sales reporting procedures and establishes an overall $9 billion annual ceiling on US arms sales, subject to a case-by-case Presidential waiver. These provisions, if they become law, will no doubt dampen the growth of US arms sales. Yet the question remains of how best to translate unilateral US restraint into effective international controls.

Several possible approaches to this problem are suggested in the interim report of the United Nations Association Conventional Arms Control Policy Panel entitled "Controlling the International Arms Trade," released April 12. The report recommends a series of unilateral and multilateral actions for curbing the flourishing global arms traffic.

The report expresses particular concern over the shipment of some of the most sophisticated and deadly weapons in the US arsenal to third world countries. The transfer of large numbers of very advanced weapons to potentially explosive regions can introduce uncertainties into the local military balance and increase the likelihood of armed conflict. Therefore, in the long run, dependence on fluctuating foreign markets could be detrimental to the health of US defense industries. Perhaps more importantly, the current scarcity of global resources underlines the urgency of curbing arms expenditures in the developing world, which have been increasing more rapidly than those in the developed countries.

Economic rationales, such as aiding the US balance of payments or supporting our domestic arms industry, imply open-ended arms sales programs which may be inconsistent with foreign policy or arms control objectives. The report urges the US to restrict its shipment of high-technology weapons with primarily offensive capabilities to developing countries, while encouraging other suppliers to adopt similar restraints.

The shipment of fighter-bombers and surface-to-surface missiles with city-busting capabilities to conflict-prone third world areas has dangerous implications. The widespread bombing of cities in a local conflict would greatly multiply civilian casualties and increase the threat of direct superpower involvement. With the growing danger of nuclear proliferation, the export of nuclear-capable delivery systems could raise dangerous ambiguities regarding the intentions and capabilities of the recipient countries. The panel recommends that the US declare a moratorium on the export of these weapons to third world countries and encourage other suppliers to follow suit.

As the emphasis in US arms exports has shifted from aid to sales, which now make up more than 95 percent of US arms orders, economic motivations have gained prominence. Yet...
IV.H. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS,
Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A.

A. The United States should exercise greater restraint in its arms export policies. The long-range implications of arms sales for U.S. foreign policy and national security interests must be given greater weight.

1. Arms transfers should be more carefully coordinated with U.S. foreign policy interests. The United States should no longer commit itself to major arms sales to nations toward which it has only marginal foreign policy commitments, particularly if there is a risk that such arms transfers could have harmful consequences for U.S. foreign policy interests in the long run.

2. Economic motivations, such as aiding the U.S. balance-of-payments or supporting our domestic arms industry, should be subordinated to foreign policy, national security and arms control considerations in determining U.S. arms export policies.

3. Future U.S. arms export decisions should pay more attention to their effect on U.S. military capabilities. The export of arms and support personnel to friendly nations may help protect U.S. overseas interests, but this potential benefit must be weighed on a case-by-case basis against any possible reduction of the readiness or reinforcement capability of the U.S. armed forces.

B. The United States should place certain unilateral restraints on both the quality and quantity of its arms exports, particularly to conflict-prone regions, and should encourage other suppliers to adopt similar restraints.

1. The United States should declare a moratorium on the transfer of weapons with city-busting capabilities, such as strategic bombers and surface-to-surface missiles, to Third World countries and should encourage other suppliers to follow suit. The principle of city avoidance should be stressed in Soviet-American understandings regarding the Middle East and reflected in their arms trade policies towards the area. The shipment of Pershing and Scud missiles to the Middle East is inconsistent with this principle.

2. The United States should declare a moratorium on the export to Third World countries of weapons whose primary or exclu-
sive function is to deliver nuclear warheads and should encourage other potential suppliers to adopt similar restraints.

3. The United States should restrict its shipment of high technology weapons with primarily offensive capabilities to developing countries and should encourage other suppliers to adopt similar restraints.

4. The United States should place greater restrictions on the export of arms manufacturing equipment and technology to developing countries and should encourage other suppliers to adopt similar restraints.

5. The United States should approach the Soviet Union regarding a freeze on the shipment of very advanced arms to the Arab states and Israel. The objective would be to maintain a military balance with the minimum influx of advanced weapon systems.

6. The United States and the Soviet Union should agree to consult with each other before undertaking major shipments of arms to the Middle East. This system would involve prior notification and consultation, but would not give either country a veto power over the actions of the other.

7. The United States should discuss with its European allies the possibility of developing a coordinated and equitable arms sales policy, which would allow some specialization in arms production and export consistent with the goal of NATO arms standardization.

8. The U.N. Security Council, which includes the major arms-supplying nations, should be encouraged to formulate general guidelines concerning the shipment of armaments to conflict-prone areas. These might include limitations on the quantity and quality of arms exports, a discussion of their effect on regional stability and means of verifying limitation agreements. Once established, these guidelines could be implemented on a region-by-region basis.

C. The United States, in line with our stated position in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), should put its full weight behind regional initiatives towards controlling the arms trade.
1. U.S. arms trade policies should be designed to support regional agreements to reduce arms imports or military expenditures. In order to reinforce local initiatives which only include a portion of the states in a particular region, the U.S. should place the same, or stronger, restrictions on arms exports to regional countries which are not parties to the agreement as on those which are parties. Other major arms suppliers should be encouraged to follow the U.S. example.

2. At international discussions of economic development, the U.S. should emphasize the economic costs of arms races, especially for developing countries. Additionally, as an inducement to individual states or groups of states to reduce their arms acquisitions, the U.S. and other developed countries should take account of the reasonableness of local military expenditures as one factor in determining the level of bilateral economic aid programs. A decrease in local military outlays should, where appropriate, be rewarded by increased economic assistance.

3. Administrators of multilateral aid programs should be encouraged by U.S. representatives to include the reasonableness of local arms expenditures as a criterion in determining levels of aid to specific countries or regions. Thus, economic development could be stimulated both by an increase in economic assistance and by a decrease in the defense burden.

4. Congress and the executive branch should work together to insure the formulation and implementation of a coherent overall arms export policy based on the principles outlined above. Recent initiatives by Congress to increase its oversight of U.S. arms sales reflects a growing recognition of the long-term implications of these transactions.

1. Congress should pass legislation to phase out commercial sales gradually. Arms sales have important foreign policy, national security and arms control implications and should be handled solely on a government-to-government basis. This would allow for more streamlined decision-making procedures and would lessen the possibility of improper agents' fees and political contributions abroad.

2. Congress should retain its case-by-case veto power over large arms sales as an ultimate check on executive arms
sale's policy. Though rarely employed, this control measure may exercise a constraining influence on administration policy.

3. Recent Congressional efforts to open arms sales transactions to public scrutiny should be pursued, since increased publicity will inhibit the widespread use of agents' fees and bribery of foreign officials to obtain arms sales contracts. The U.S. government should discuss with other major arms supplying nations, particularly in Western Europe, measures to discourage such improper payments.

4. The important foreign policy and arms control implications of U.S. arms exports require that the locus of decision-making remain at the highest levels of the State Department and White House. The currently large number of transactions should not lead to a demotion of these decisions to lower levels of the State Department bureaucracy or to shifting them to the Department of Defense.
MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed June 17, 1925, entered into force February 8, 1928.

Prohibits the use of the named items in war. The U.S. ratified the Protocol and a separate Convention January 22, 1975, but reserved the right to use non-poisonous gases to save lives in non-combat situations.


Declares the Antarctic to be for peaceful purposes only and bans any measure of a military nature. In addition, the treaty internationalizes the area, encourages scientific cooperation and provides for inspection with disputes arbitrated by the International Court of Justice.


This nuclear test ban treaty prohibits nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and anywhere else if the results of such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted. As of June 1, 1976, France and China have not signed the treaty. 103 other nations have signed.


Prohibits the orbiting of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and the installation of military bases or fortifications or the testing of weapons on celestial bodies.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5, 1970.

The basic provisions of the treaty are designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons; promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including the sharing of technical data on peaceful nuclear explosions and commits the nuclear powers to reduce their armaments and make further progress toward general and complete disarmament under effective international controls.
Sea-bed Treaty, signed February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972. Prohibits nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed or the sub-soil thereof beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone (12 miles).

Biological Warfare Convention, signed April 10, 1972, entered into force March 26, 1974. Prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and calls for the destruction of existing stocks.

### Status of Multilateral Arms Control Agreements as of July 1976

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P—Party
S—Signatory

(1) Additional Protocol II
### Status of Multilateral Arms Control Agreements as of July 1976 (Continued)

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<th>Seabeds Arms Control Treaty</th>
<th>Biological Weapons Convention</th>
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<td>Antarctic Treaty</td>
<td>Limited Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>Total (4)</td>
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P—Party
S—Signatory
(1) Additional Protocol II.
(2) Additional Protocol I.
(3) Also ratified subject to preconditions not yet met.
(4) Byelorussian S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R. are excluded from totals.
(5) Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have also ratified.

### Bilateral Arms Control Agreements Between the United States and the Soviet Union as of July 1976

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<th>Agreement</th>
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<td>&quot;Hot Line&quot; Agreement</td>
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<td>Improved &quot;Hot Line&quot; Agreement</td>
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<td>Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms</td>
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<td>Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes</td>
<td>5/28/76</td>
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Hot-Line Agreement, June 20, 1963.
Establishes a direct communications link between the two countries in times of an emergency. A second hot-line agreement (providing additional terminals and including satellite communications systems) was signed September 30, 1971.

Nuclear Accidents Agreement, signed September 30, 1971.
Provides a number of safeguards against accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon or unintended launching of a strategic delivery system or against malfunctions of communication facilities designed to provide advance warning of strategic attack.

Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed May 25, 1972.
Provides measures to assure safety of navigation of the ships and planes of the armed forces of the two countries.

SALT ABM Treaty, signed May 26, 1972.
Limits the deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missiles to two areas in each country - one for the defense of the national capital and the other for the defense of some inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). National technical means of verification are authorized to provide assurance of compliance.

Provides a ceiling for five years on the aggregate number of fixed land-based ICBMs and SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles).

Each country agrees not to act in a way which threatens the other or the other's allies; moreover, if relations between them appear at any time to involve the risk of nuclear conflict, both parties shall immediately begin urgent consultations and make every effort to avert the crisis.

This protocol reduces the number of ABM sites from two to one and provides for selection of a different area than either of the two previously chosen.

Prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. National technical means of verification are accepted, but the data so gathered is to be exchanged between the parties.

Limits the size of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions to under 150 kilotons (10 times the size of the Hiroshima atomic bomb) and provides for on-site inspections on a limited basis.
For too many years the action, or rather inaction, of the U. S. at the U. N. and related disarmament discussions and forums has been obscured by "more important events". For too long the negative, truculent posture of the U. S. in the field of disarmament has been masked at the U. N. only because it has only been duplicated by similar actions by the U. S. R....

The 30th Session of the General Assembly adopted 25 resolutions on disarmament. All were acceptable resolutions - and a number of member states (such as Mexico, Nigeria and Romania) voted for all 25. Some resolutions were better and more important than others. None received less than 82 votes and eight were adopted by consensus. However, of these 25 resolutions, the U. S. voted in favor of only 12 or 52 percent. U. S. Ambassador Joseph Martin also admitted that, if the U. S. had a choice and there was no agreement for certain consensus votes, the U. S. would have abstained on another three resolutions.

The U. S. S. R. at least voted for 15 or 60 percent of these resolutions. China, which allegedly "is not yet ready for disarmament", also voted for 60 percent. And such allies of the U. S. as Canada and Japan voted for 20 and 21 resolutions respectively... The world is marching toward nuclear war and the U. S. voting record is about as constructive as that of Albania.

Summary of the Twenty-five Resolutions

1. Nuclear Disarmament Issues

1. SALT II: Resolution "regretting" the absence of "positive results during the last two years" of the SALT II bilateral negotiations. Further it expressed "concern for the very high ceilings of nuclear arms set for themselves by both States for the total absence of qualitative limitations of such arms and for the protracted timetable contemplated for negotiations of further limitations and possible reductions of the nuclear arsenals".

2. Comprehensive Test-Ban Agreement: Introduced by the Soviet Union, this resolution called for negotiations to reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. China opposed this as did the U. S. in part on the grounds that national means of verification are inadequate and peaceful nuclear explosions were excluded.

3. Suspension of Nuclear Tests: Called for a suspension of tests to encourage negotiations on a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests.
4. **Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE):** This resolution asks for implementation of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calling for a special agreement on PNEs. This resolution sought to ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions not contribute to the development or refinement of nuclear weapons.

II. **Nuclear Free Zones**

5. **Comprehensive Study:** The preceding (29th) U. N. General Assembly ordered a comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Finland urged that all Governments study this report and report by June 30, 1976 their views of this study.

6. **Concept:** Six states outlined the concept of a nuclear free zone and defined the principal obligations of nuclear weapons states to it in this resolution.

7. **Indian Ocean:** The U. N. General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. This resolution sought to gain the cooperation of the great powers with an ad hoc committee set up by the U. N. to realize this concept.

8. **South Pacific:** Favors making the South Pacific a nuclear weapons free zone.

9. **South Asia:** Separate resolutions by Pakistan and India were adopted by consensus. Their aim is to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia.

10. **The Middle East:** Seeks the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

11. **Africa:** Seeks the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Africa.

12. **Latin America:** Urges the U. S. and France to sign and ratify Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (declaring Latin America a Nuclear Free Zone). Protocol I would include treaties within the zone of the treaty such as the Canal Zone and Guantanamo.

13. **Treaty of Tlatelolco, Protocol II:** Urges the Soviet Union to sign and ratify this protocol which pledges a nuclear weapons state not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any member of the zone.

III. **Conventional Disarmament Issues**

14. **Indiscriminate Weapons:** This resolution urges the third session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (meeting in Geneva) to consider outlawing conventional weapons which are "excessively injurious or (which) have indiscriminate effects".
15. **Chemical Weapons**: Urges a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stocking of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States.

16. **Mass Destruction Weapons**: Calls for a treaty to be developed banning new types of weapons of mass destruction.

17. **Climate and Environment**: The U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have submitted identical draft conventions forbidding any hostile use of climatic or environmental modification. This resolution noted "with satisfaction" this circumstance.

**IV. Procedural Issues**

18. **World Disarmament Conference**: An Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, has been meeting at New York. It has not agreed to convene a Preparatory Committee for a World Disarmament Conference. This resolution kept the Ad Hoc Committee alive and asked it to report to the next General Assembly.

19. **Military Expenditures**: In 1973, the Soviet Union asked the five permanent members of the Security Council - China, France, U. S. S. R., U. S. and U. K. - to make a reduction of the ten percent in their annual military expenditures. This 1975 resolution urged the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to carry out reductions of their military budgets, pending agreement among the other U. N. Security Council members.

20. **Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race**: Calls for an updating of the 1971 report on this subject, by consultant-experts.

21. **Role of the United Nations**: Called for a review of the U. N.'s role to be made by an Ad Hoc Committee. This report will be submitted in July, 1976.

22. **The Disarmament Decade**: The 1970's were named a decade of disarmament. This resolution called on all member states to intensify their efforts on behalf of this decade which links development and disarmament.

23. **Disarmament Affairs Division of the U. N.**: This resolution called for strengthening this office within the U. S. Secretary-General's Office.

24. **Sea-Bed Treaty**: The Treaty prohibiting weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed is to be reviewed in May, 1977. This resolution assures preparation for the review conference.

## THE VOTING RECORD OF SELECTED STATES.

### Table 1. The Voting Pattern of 12 Selected States on 25 Disarmament Resolutions Adopted by the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, December 1975.

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*The U.S.S.R. announced that it had intended to abstain.

@ If put to a vote would not have participated.

(#) If put to a vote would have abstained.
Table 2. The Voting Record of 15 NATO States on the 25 Disarmament Resolutions.

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Nuclear Dis.
- SALT II: Ab Y Y Ab Ab Ab Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Ab Ab N
- CTB: 5-Power: Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab
- CTB: Suspen.: Ab Y Y Ab Ab Ab Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Ab Ab
- PNEs: Y Y Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Ab

N-Free Zones
- Comp. Study: Y Y Y Y Ab Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
- Concept: N Ab N N N Ab Ab N N N Ab Ab N N Ab Ab
- Indian Oc.: Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Y Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Y Ab Ab
- S. Pacific: Ab Y Y Ab Ab Ab Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Y Ab
- South Asia: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- South Asia: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Mid-East: Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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- TT, I.: Y Y Y Ab Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Ab
- TT, II.: Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Convent. Dis.
- Indis. Wea.: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Chemical: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Mass Destr: Ab Y Ab Ab Ab Y Y Ab Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab
- Climate: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc

Other Issues
- World Dis. Con.: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Military Bud.: Ab Ab Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab
- Econ. Conseq.: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Role U.N.: Y Y Y Y Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab
- Dis. Decade: Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc Yc
- Secretariat: Ab Ab Ab Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab Y Y Y Y Ab Ab
- Sea-bed: Y Y Y Ab Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Yc - Consensus: 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Y - Yes: 8 12 12 5 6 10 16 9 7 11 14 15 14 7 5
N - No: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ab - Abstain: 8 5 4 11 10 7 1 7 9 5 2 3 9 10
nv - Not voting: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
a - absent: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

* - Notified Secretariat vote should have been to abstain.
# - Notified Secretariat vote should have been in affirmative.
Ways and Means for Strengthening the International Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Regime

Report of a Policy Panel
Established by the Association
for the United Nations in the U.S.S.R.

Introduction

The turn from confrontation to detente is becoming to an ever greater degree the dominating trend in international relations. This is of paramount importance for the all-round strengthening of international security, for more resolutely curbing the arms race and, in the final analysis, for achieving general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, however, the detente process has not attained the desired rate of development in all spheres. One of the main reasons hampering this process is the danger of a possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. The reality of such a danger is above all due to the fact that reactionary, militarist and other forces exist in the world, which come out against the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is also necessary to take into account that there is a steady growth of economic, scientific and technological opportunities for states to develop their own nuclear weapons and there is a growing need for nuclear sources of energy, capable of becoming the material basis for setting up a nuclear potential.

These factors, under certain international-political conditions, may lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. The development of events in this dangerous direction would run counter not only to the trend of strengthening international security and cooperation, but also against the existing non-proliferation structure, elaborated with the participation of the majority of U.N. member-states, as well as against the efforts being exerted to limit the existing nuclear weapon arsenals.

Today the strengthening of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime has become one of the important problems in the sphere of international relations. There is a need for greater control so that assistance received by non-nuclear states, both through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or as a result of bilateral agreements, should not be used for developing nuclear arms. The Soviet U.N. Association is of the opinion that the enhancement of the effectiveness in the practical implementation of IAEA guarantees should be further developed at the forthcoming 1975 NPT Treaty Review Conference. Serious efforts in this sphere can result in greater stability to the detente process, in the relaxation and elimination of tensions existing in a number of regions, in the strengthening of international security, removing everything which gives rise to additional political and strategic uncertainties which threaten world peace.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), which was the result of taking into account the opinions of a large number of states and which came into force in 1970, has shown its vital importance and necessity. Its significance is today being still further enhanced under the changing international situation; in addition the Treaty is an important link in the system of measures aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war. We consider it a most urgent task to expand the number of Treaty participants, that countries which have signed the Treaty become parties to the NPT, and that they conclude corresponding control agreements with the IAEA. In other words, there is the urgent need for new efforts aimed at a more effective and universal implementation of the NPT. One can expect that all countries interested in preserving peace and the forthcoming NPT Review Conference will exert such efforts in order to still further strengthen the Treaty and thus make an important contribution to the consolidation of peace and international security, to rule out nuclear war.

As we see it, the main ways and means in solving this task are closely connected with making the process of detente irreversible. To achieve the irreversibility of detente, to supplement political detente with a military detente, means to provide each country with firm confidence in its security. The active participation of all states, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, in the solution of this paramount task will ensure a stable peace and international security, will eliminate the incentives themselves both for increasing existing nuclear arsenals as well as their buildup by new countries. We consider it possible here to limit ourselves to merely stating the obvious importance of detente for the non-proliferation problem, inasmuch as detente covers an exceedingly wide sphere. It is necessary to concentrate main attention on those ways and means for strengthening the non-proliferation regime directly linked with the NPT.

Safeguards System and IAEA Role

The Soviet U. N. Association is of the opinion that the system of safeguards set forth in Article III of the Treaty provides for ensuring reliable control that nuclear energy be used only for peaceful purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency is successfully carrying out its control functions. The achievement of an agreement among the depository countries, in accordance with which these countries would constantly inform the IAEA on envisaged supplies of nuclear materials to non-nuclear countries, would be of great importance. This would ensure that the IAEA has more favourable conditions for conducting its control functions. Considerable work has been carried out on standardization in applying safeguards, the modification of model complementary stipulations and supplements as regards installations, as well as in elaborating technical manuals on safeguards and a code of practical rules on their implementation.

The existing system of safeguards could be further perfected with an eye to enhancing the effectiveness of non-proliferation. We consider it expedient in the technical sphere to improve the system of processing information on safeguards, including the setting up of an automated system for processing data. Apparently, what is known as the "old" system of safeguards could be perfected and unified in order that it become more effective and economical. It is necessary to ensure the receipt of absolutely reliable data on the expenditure of nuclear materials, irrespective of the design of a particular plant.
The political aspects of perfecting the system of safeguards, and first and foremost the speeding up of the conclusion of negotiations on the signing of control agreements between the IAEA and a number of states, are of undeniable importance. It is at present most urgent to expedite the Treaty ratification process on the part of Euratom non-nuclear countries, and in the first place by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, as well as by Japan, and the speediest coming into force of the agreement between the IAEA and Euratom.

The Soviet UN Association attaches great importance to the agreement reached in 1974 between countries exporting fissionable materials and special equipment on the coming into force of the control mechanism in implementing Article III, Paragraph 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We highly appreciate the fact that not only parties to the NPT but also such countries as the FRG, Japan and Switzerland are participating in this agreement. This objectively facilitates the strengthening of the Treaty and the expansion of the sphere of its activities. The participation in this agreement of all the main exporting countries, both signatories to the Treaty and those which are not party to the Treaty, could facilitate the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

An important problem is the physical protection of nuclear materials. The possibility of the theft of nuclear material by diverse terrorist organizations, international gangster groups or even individuals, and their use of this material for political blackmail, extortion or other such purposes, should not be excluded. Subversive acts at nuclear reactors should also not be ruled out.

IAEA research in this sphere made it possible to elaborate special provisions for the physical protection of nuclear materials and to provide corresponding recommendations at the request of countries. The IAEA provision on the physical protection of nuclear materials is as yet, however, not of an obligatory nature. We consider that it is necessary to provide it with the strength of law by introducing corresponding amendments to the national legislation of states or by concluding a special international convention. It is important that corresponding research be continued in order that the system of safeguards be as reliable as possible and, simultaneously, not violate the sovereign rights of states. Taking into account the latter point, one can hardly consider realistic the proposals advanced by certain states on setting up a special international organ which would be in charge of all nuclear materials and would dispose of their use, as this would be contrary to the principle of respecting the sovereign rights of states.

As an incentive to increase the number of states party to the Treaty, we consider it important to step up IAEA activities in those spheres which are connected with the implementation of Article IV of the Treaty, which envisages the widest cooperation of countries in the development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. During the past five-year period, a number of states have on a wider scale placed financial means, information, materials, equipment and diverse services at the disposal of the IAEA. This should play a positive role in facilitating the development of peaceful nuclear power engineering, especially on the territories of non-nuclear weapon Treaty participants. The USSR, taking into account the importance of this aspect, is rendering economic, scientific and technological assistance to developing countries, both on a bilateral basis as well as through the IAEA. In 1974 the Soviet Union increased its voluntary contribution to the IAEA technical assistance fund, in order that this contribution be used for
the purchase of materials and equipment as well as for providing grants to scientists and specialists, in the first place to those developing countries which are members of the IAEA and parties to the NPT. As has already been pointed out, the problem of the accelerated development of nuclear power engineering is today of special urgency. The task arises of elaborating safety norms and rules in building and operating atomic electric power stations. We consider that this task should be solved within the IAEA framework with the participation of all interested countries.

The Soviet UN Association favors that Article IV of the Treaty be fully used. This would be of great importance for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Peaceful Nuclear Explosions**

The problem of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) has lately become the subject of discussions, as this is part of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and has been included in the Treaty. On the one hand, a nuclear explosive device designated for peaceful purposes, from the technical point of view, does not differ in principle from the explosive device of a nuclear bomb. The Treaty, on the other hand, while categorically banning the development of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty, establishes, in accordance with Article V of the Treaty, that these states have the right to potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions. The above-mentioned article envisages that services in conducting peaceful nuclear explosions in non-nuclear countries should be provided through an appropriate international body or pursuant to bilateral agreements, with the observation of necessary procedures.

Considerable work has already been carried out in implementing the stipulations of the above-mentioned NPT article concerning the practical rendering of services in the sphere of peaceful nuclear explosions. In 1971 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which provided the IAEA with the role of that competent international body capable of fulfilling the functions of an international agency in using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In accordance with this and other UN resolutions, as well as the stipulations of NPT Article V, the IAEA has drawn up provisions for the international inspection of peaceful nuclear explosions, as well as the procedures by which the Agency shall fulfill the functions of a corresponding international organ. In September, 1974, the Board of Directors adopted a decision to set up within the IAEA framework a special department on peaceful nuclear explosions. All this shows that the IAEA is already today actually that international body which is prepared to discharge responsible functions in organizing and conducting peaceful nuclear explosions.

At the same time, the problem of defining the corresponding international body has as yet not been fully resolved. The Soviet UN Association is of the opinion that the NPT Treaty Review Conference should in a positive manner consider this question in favor of the IAEA. It also considers it important to continue the study of scientific, technological, and economic aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions, including security norms and criteria when conducting such explosions, to complete the elaboration of documents determining the procedure for providing non-nuclear countries with services for nuclear explosions and the conditions for conducting PNEs.
Ending the Arms Race, Disarmament and Security Guarantees

The curbing and cessation of the nuclear arms race is of exceedingly great importance in solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. The corresponding undertakings of states parties to the NPT are contained in Article VI.

It is quite understandable that the nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty bear the main responsibility in carrying out the stipulations of the above article. This, however, does not remove the responsibility of other countries. It should be recalled that the Soviet Union's proposal on convening a World Disarmament Conference was aimed at drawing all countries into activities concerning the solution of disarmament problems. This proposal has as yet not been carried out due to the resistance of a number of states.

It is to be regretted that as yet necessary support is lacking as far as a number of other Soviet initiatives are concerned which, in the final analysis, would also considerably facilitate the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The ten per cent reduction in the military budgets of the permanent members of the U. N. Security Council, proposed by the Soviet Union, could also play an important role. On the one hand, it would be a real step towards ending the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, which would be in accord with the interests of not only the great powers but of the small powers as well. On the other hand, the allocation of part of the savings for rendering assistance to developing countries would stimulate their peaceful and not military development and would facilitate the strengthening of the peace policy of these countries. When considering matters from this point of view, the doubts raised by a number of Security Council members have a negative effect on disarmament, including the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet U. N. Association is of the opinion that a wider political approach is necessary in appraising the importance of reducing military budgets, also having in mind its influence on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The solution of the non-proliferation problem may to a considerable degree also facilitate the attainment of positive results in the discussion in the United Nations of the Soviet proposal to prohibit actions influencing the environment and climate for military and other purposes as being incompatible with the interests of ensuring international security and the well-being and health of people. The setting up of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world could be of great importance.

The U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., fulfilling obligations proceeding from the stipulations of Article VI of the Treaty, have in recent years exerted considerable efforts in the sphere of restricting nuclear arms. The Soviet-American 1972-1974 treaties in the sphere of the limitation of strategic arms, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests are in accord with the general policy of strengthening peace and international security. An important initiative was also the Soviet-American agreement to consider in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) the possibility of concluding an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. It stands to
reason that these are only the first steps towards general and complete disarmament, that further efforts of the two largest nuclear powers are necessary, but that they should be supplemented by the efforts of the other nuclear countries as well.

It is our opinion that a quick agreement between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. on the next two problems on the agenda - on the problem under discussion within the framework of SALT II, and that of the complete ending of nuclear weapon tests - would be of great importance in ensuring the success of the NPT Review Conference, as well as for non-proliferation in general. The Soviet U. N. Association highly appraises the agreement reached in Vladivostok between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. on the principles on which a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms will be elaborated. The Association fully supports the idea of a general and a complete ending of nuclear weapon tests.

Finally, the problem of security guarantees. The interest of non-nuclear countries in guarantees in case of a nuclear attack or threat of such an attack is quite understandable.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty facilitates a higher level of security for all states, the non-nuclear countries included. Security guarantees are further supplemented by the well-known U. S. Security Council Resolution 255, under which the Security Council and in the first place its permanent members possessing nuclear weapons are to act immediately in accordance with their commitments under the U. N. Charter in case of an aggression in which nuclear weapons are employed or there is a threat of such an aggression against a non-nuclear weapon state.

New steps were taken after 1968 within the U. N. framework on strengthening international security, including the security of non-nuclear countries. In 1972, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the XXVII Session of the U. N. General Assembly adopted a resolution in which, on behalf of U. N. member countries, "the renunciation of the threat or the use of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations in accordance with the U. N. Charter and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" was solemnly declared. The resolution also contained recommendations that "the Security Council most speedily take measures for the full realization of the General Assembly's statement." The Soviet U. N. Association considers it necessary to call attention to the fact that these measures have as yet not been taken by the Security Council.

The Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War is a weighty contribution in providing security safeguards. This agreement played a major role in strengthening international security. This agreement should not be undermined by unilateral actions, contradicting its spirit and letter, such as the conception of a "limited strategic war", which is being advocated by certain political figures in the U. S. A. All countries should have full confidence in the resolution of the two great powers not to allow any nuclear wars - big or small.

The Soviet U. N. Association considers it most important that other nuclear states also undertake such commitments as regards the prevention of nuclear war.
In this case, the guarantee of international security would be considerably strengthened. The relaxation of international tensions taking place, the energetic efforts by the majority of U. N. member countries on strengthening the non-proliferation regime, the concentration of U. N. efforts on upholding the aims and principles of the United Nations - all this should create the necessary prerequisites for a reliable solution of the non-proliferation problem. The coordinated approach of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. in solving this problem, including at the forthcoming review conference, is viewed as being of great importance. The agreement reached in Vladivostok at the working meeting of the leaders of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. on the importance and need for serious efforts in averting the spread of nuclear weapons creates the necessary basis for the joint actions of the great powers in further strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

We are glad to see detente progressing. But we know that its further progress is impossible without the stubborn and tireless struggle of all peace-loving forces and different non-governmental organizations against those whose activities undermine peace and are fraught with danger of war. The Soviet and American U. N. Associations can and must make their contribution and encourage the struggle for non-proliferation. It seems expedient in this connection to prepare and publish a joint memorandum on feasible ways of solving this problem and make it possible for all the participants of the forthcoming review conference in Geneva and for the United Nations Organization to study the memorandum. It might be also expedient to discuss a possibility of making the question of ways and means to strengthen the NPT an item on the agenda of the XXV Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations to be convened in Moscow in the Fall of 1975.

It is clear that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a long-term problem which cannot be solved without urgent and active common efforts of all states and all progressive people of the world. It is necessary to make possible a continuing exchange of opinions on the ways and means to solve the problem taking into consideration the results of the pending conference and probable changes in international relations. This decade, designated by the United Nations as the Decade of Disarmament, should be marked with intense public activities and actions of all peace-loving forces with the aim of stopping the arms race and establishing lasting peace on our planet.

To ensure progress in disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic energy, to raise the role of the United Nations in ensuring peace and international security - such are the immediate tasks of progressive peoples of the world. To carry out these tasks means to create conditions for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the further development of international relations in the spirit of mutual understanding and universal peace.

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COMPREHENSIVE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE DISARMAMENT DECADE

Introduction

1. The General Assembly in declaring the Disarmament Decade (2602(XXIV)) requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. A draft submitted by six States was considered by the General Assembly (2661(XXV)) and referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for its further work. This Program remains the most inclusive agenda for disarmament and constitutes one basis of the following Comprehensive Action Strategy.

2. This Strategy should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but all negotiations and other discussions on this issue in whatever forum and form they may take place.

3. This Strategy should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the coordination of such negotiations and other discussions and ensure that the U. N. General Assembly be kept informed of their progress so as to permit the proper performance of its functions, including constant review and reappraisal of progress.

4. The term, disarmament, in this Strategy is used as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the limitation, the reduction, or the elimination of armaments, or the reduction of military forces and expenditures.

Objective

The aim of the Action Agenda is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of General and Complete Disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and economic and social justice are attained.

Principles

A. The measures in this Strategy should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September, 1961 (1722(XVI)), taking into account all new elements and possibilities in this area, including obligations undertaken in various treaties on disarmament and relevant U. N. resolutions.

1. The goal is General and Complete Disarmament, with war no longer an instrument for settling international problems. Such disarmament must be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes according to the principles of the Charter of the U. N.

2. All measures should be balanced so that at no time could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.
3. All measures should be implemented under such strict and effective international control as would provide adequate assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations.

4. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. An international peace force should ensure that the U. N. can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the U. N.

5. The widest possible agreement should be achieved and implemented at the earliest possible date. Agreement on interim measures should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

B. Recent experience has led to general agreement on the following additional principles:

1. While both conventional and nuclear disarmament must proceed in balanced fashion, first priority should be given to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

2. Political settlements and disarmament agreements are closely interrelated and both must be pursued concurrently.

3. Security and disarmament are closely interrelated and both must be pursued concurrently.

4. Every effort should be made in concluding disarmament agreements not to prejudge or prejudice juridical or other unresolved issues in any outside field.

5. Every effort should be made in concluding disarmament agreements not to affect adversely the scientific, technological or economic future of States.

Elements of the Agenda

A. General and Complete Disarmament

1. The goal of General and Complete Disarmament is that all States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a U. N. peace force.

2. The program for General and Complete Disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for
   a. The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
   b. The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;
c. The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass
destruction;
d. The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to
organize the military efforts of States, the cessation of military training and
the closing of all military institutions; and
e. The discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. The program for General and Complete Disarmament should be implemented
in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and
stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage
in the process should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures
included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have
been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements
required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

4. All measures of General and Complete Disarmament should be balanced so
that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or groups
of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

5. During and after the implementation of General and Complete Disarmament,
the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such
control depending on the requirements of verification of the disarmament measures
being carried out in each stage. To implement inspection and control, an interna-
tional disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should
be created within the framework of the U. N. This organization and its inspectors
should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary
for the purpose of effective verification.

B. Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons

The following measures, and others, have been proposed in various disarma-
ment forums and discussions. They are not listed in the order of their priority
or importance and they are not of equal importance. The achievement of one or
more measures should be a stimulus to agree on further measures.

1. The banning of all underground nuclear weapon tests.

2. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapon States.

3. The prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons.

4. The prohibition of the use, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons.

5. The drastic, balanced reduction of nuclear strategic weapons in the
stockpiles of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

6. The cessation of production of fissionable material for military
purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses.
7. The extension and improvement of the safeguards on the sale or use of nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear reactors and of entire nuclear systems.

8. A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

9. The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon free zones.

10. A moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions.

11. The prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

12. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

13. The prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons.

14. The prohibition of the use of other weapons which are indiscriminate or inflict unnecessary suffering.

15. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of all States and the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons.

16. The flight testing of all new or improved means of delivering nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be halted by agreement.

C. Conventional Weapons

The following measures, and others, have been proposed in various disarmament forums and discussions. They are not listed in the order of their priority or importance and they are not of equal importance. The achievement of one or more measures should be a stimulus to agree on further measures.

1. The further prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

2. The establishment of ceilings on the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces.

3. The convening of regional conferences at the initiative of the States or the region for the prevention and limitation of armaments.

4. A freeze of military expenditures at existing levels, followed by progressive reductions.

5. Withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories.

6. Prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.
7. An international agreement which in phases would eliminate the sale and gift of arms.

D. Adherence to and Implementation of Existing Instruments

1. The multilateral treaties so far agreed in disarmament can be listed as follows:
   a. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925.
   d. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies of 1967.
   f. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.

2. States which have not yet adhered to any or all of the above treaties are urged to do so without further delay. Particular attention should be paid by all States to the fulfillment of the obligations contained in and arising from these treaties, to the review conferences provided for in some of them, and, where appropriate, to the adoption of measures intended to complete them. The entry into force of a treaty is the beginning rather than the end of an effective effort.
A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT?

Homer A. Jack*

1. What is a special session of the UN General Assembly and how can it be convened?

Article 20 of the UN Charter provides for the convening of special sessions of the General Assembly. It indicates that such a session can be convened by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of Member States. The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly make a distinction between an emergency special session, which can be convened within 24 hours by the Secretary-General under certain conditions, and a regular special session. The latter can also be convened upon the request of a single Member State with the concurrence of a majority of Member States. Since convening a special session is a procedural matter, the vote of any nine members of the Security Council is sufficient or indeed it can be convened by the request of a single Member State without reference to the Security Council, but with agreement by a majority of States members of the General Assembly.

2. How many special sessions of the General Assembly have been held?

In addition to several emergency special sessions, there have been seven (regular) special sessions between 1947 and 1975. The first was in April/May 1947 on Palestine and the second was in April/May 1948 on the same subject. The third was in August 1961 on Tunisia. The fourth was in May/June 1963 on the financial situation facing the world organization. The fifth in April/June 1967 was on peacekeeping operations. The sixth in April/May 1974 was devoted to the establishment of a new international economic order. The seventh in September 1975 discussed development and international economic cooperation.

3. Is a special session generally preferable to a world conference?

In recent years the UN system has sponsored successful world conferences on environment (Stockholm in 1972), population (Bucharest in 1974), food (Rome in 1974), women (Mexico City in 1975), and habitat (Vancouver in 1976). While these have served to focus world attention on these global problems, they often entailed new modalities which already existed within the Secretariat and the traditions of the General Assembly. Thus in recent years there have been proposals to schedule future world

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4. What has been the history of convening a World Disarmament Conference?

The first Summit meeting of the heads of non-aligned States at Belgrade in 1961 called for a Special Session or a World Disarmament Conference. The Second Summit at Cairo in 1964 urged a World Disarmament Conference. The 1965 General Assembly adopted a resolution to this end, but it was not implemented. The Soviet Union resurrected the idea in 1971 and in 1972 a Special Committee was established to try to make the idea acceptable to the two States opposed, China and the U.S.A. This Committee never met, for political reasons, but an Ad Hoc Committee on a World Disarmament Conference was established by the 27th General Assembly in 1973. This has continued meeting and will make its third report to the 31st General Assembly in September, 1976. However, China and the U.S.A. remain steadfastly opposed to the early convening of a World Disarmament Conference and so far it has been agreed that even a preparatory committee will not be established unless or until all nuclear Powers agree.

5. How did the proposal for a Special Session devoted to disarmament originate?

Yugoslavia initiated a discussion of the desirability of a Special Session at a meeting of foreigministers of Non-aligned States at Peru in August 1975. This meeting in its statement, Political Declaration, and Statement unanimously approved this paragraph (number 14): "If it becomes evident that it will not be possible to convene a World Disarmament Conference, the Foreign Ministers consider that a Special Session of the General Assembly of the U.N. devoted to disarmament issues should be convened as proposed in the Declaration of the First Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries." The proposal for a Special Session was echoed during the 30th General Assembly, both in the general debate and in the First Committee. It was further reflected in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the U.N. in the Field of Disarmament.

6. What are the advantages of a Special Session devoted to disarmament?

Most persons concerned with disarmament today would prefer the early convening of a World Disarmament Conference. However, if the impasse is to continue, interim measures and alternatives are being considered. Of the several interim measures, a Special Session appears attractive for at least the following reasons?
a. A Special Session would result in the presence, although this cannot absolutely be guaranteed, of all nuclear Powers, including China and the U.S.A. They are unlikely to boycott a Special Session.

b. A Special Session could serve to give world focus to disarmament, almost in the way a World Disarmament Conference is conceived.

c. If a Special Session is “successful”, it could serve as a stimulus for convening a World Disarmament Conference.

Thus Member States need not be in the position of favoring either a World Disarmament Conference or a Special Session. They could favor a Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held soon, as a step toward the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, held soon thereafter.

7. What would be some of the purposes of a Special Session?

a. To focus world attention and world public opinion on the necessity of disarmament to meet the continuing threat of the arms race. A result would be to create greater political will for disarmament in all States.

b. To stimulate international action to make disarmament more likely, especially the creation of better world security, including permanent U.N. peace-keeping machinery.

c. To develop a comprehensive program on disarmament, reaffirming the goal of general and complete disarmament and indicating the collateral steps necessary to reach its first stage.

d. To adopt steps for a major strengthening of the U.N. in the field of disarmament, beyond any initial measures recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Role of the U.N. In the Field of Disarmament and adopted by the 31st General Assembly.

e. To recommend the organization of a preparatory committee for a World Disarmament Conference.

8. What would a Special Session not do?

The objective of a Special Session is not to convene a World Disarmament Conference by another name. It is to constitute a bridge to convening a World Disarmament Conference. However, some of the objectives of a World Disarmament Conference could be fulfilled by holding a successful Special Session. It is not initially expected that a Special Session would accomplish the following:

a. To announce agreement on at least one collateral disarmament item.

b. To create a new, multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament in which all nuclear States and other militarily-significant Powers would participate.

9. How would a Special Session be organized?

It is much too early to suggest any but the broadest parameters of such a session. A Preparatory Committee would be established by the General Assembly and meet for perhaps 18 months, giving an interim report to the 32nd General Assembly in 1977. The Special Session would probably be held at Headquarters in New York, but not necessarily so — if a host country would provide the extra costs to the U.N. (Belgrade might conceivably be a venue if not New York). The duration would be three or, at most, four weeks. The time might be between February and August 1978. There would be pressures for the Special Session to act by unanimity. There would be a request that it be convened on a Ministerial level.

10. What are likely next steps in convening a Special Session?

The Summit Meeting of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries at Sri Lanka in August 1976 will discuss the proposal for a Special Session, and it appears likely to be endorsed unless there is progress toward creating at least a preparatory committee for a World Disarmament Conference — which appears very unlikely.

During the 31st General Assembly — especially if the Non-Aligned Summit endorses a Special Session and if the third report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference registers no progress — there will be increasing support to set up machinery to convene a Special Session.

The Soviet Union is now very critical of efforts to convene a Special Session, asserting that a World Disarmament Conference should be convened instead and a Special Session would only detract from it. Some of the Western States, but especially the U.S.A., at present appear to have “no position” on a Special Session but give the same reasons for opposing it as they do for opposing a World Disarmament Conference. The position of China is not yet clear.

At this writing, it appears that the 31st General Assembly will overwhelmingly endorse the convening of a Special Session. The General Assembly might set up a Preparatory Committee. It is felt that the date of a Special Session will not be until 1978.
Arms Control and the Reduction of Tensions

In addition to the beneficial effects mentioned above, arms control efforts may also contribute to reducing international political tensions. By encouraging countries to abandon military postures which appear threatening to their neighbors, arms control efforts can encourage the resolution of underlying political differences. By facilitating agreement on the fundamentals of an equitable military balance, arms control can ease or even eliminate the tensions that result from efforts to achieve small and transitory advantages. Finally, the process of negotiation itself can stimulate more intense attention to basic political problems and improve communication between adversaries. None of these results are certain, however. Relaxation of tension can be deceptive if fundamental sources of conflict are only temporarily concealed. Agreements can lead to mistrust if mutual confidence cannot be established. And communication can be used to mislead as well as to inform. But true dialogue, understanding and the trust that a long experience of faithful compliance with agreements can create are important products as well as ingredients of the arms control process.

Still, arms limitation alone is not enough to reduce the principal causes of antagonism in the world. These antagonisms are typically the cause of arms competition rather than its result. Arms control must therefore be a part of an overall strategy which seeks to resolve underlying causes of tension where possible, and at least to reduce the frequency and severity of confrontations in situations where tensions persist. As Secretary of State Kissinger has declared, "an equilibrium based on constant confrontations and mortal antagonisms will ultimately end in cataclysm."

Unilateral vs. Cooperative Arms Control

Although the term "unilateral disarmament" arouses justifiable skepticism, some unilateral arms control measures can promote both national and global security. They may be unilateral actions by which we reduce the risks of accidental use of our own weapons or reduce the possibility that another country might be tempted to attack us. For this reason we have introduced a wide range of technical devices designed to eliminate the possibility that one of our nuclear weapons could be fired by accident or without authorization. For this reason, too, we have invested enormous sums of money to forestall the possibility that a surprise attack might cripple our nuclear deterrent forces. In order to discourage the leaders of other countries from thinking, even in a severe crisis, that war is preferable to negotiation. Beyond these unilateral measures, the U.S. Government sees other steps that could reduce the risks of war, but these require the active cooperation of potential adversaries and thus require arms control agreements. Large-scale reduction of forces is an important step that cannot be simply unilateral, but must be reciprocated by potential adversaries. The ABM question had to be resolved by an explicit agreement or not at all. Simply giving up our own ABM system and permitting the Soviet Union to continue with its program would have been harmful to our national security. Agreed and equivalent limitations on American and Soviet ABM programs made it possible to avoid large investments in missile defenses (and countervailing offensive forces) whose effect might have been solely to neutralize one another.

If cooperative arms control of this kind is to succeed in maintaining and improving U.S. security, it is essential that we have confidence that other countries are living up to their commitments. Such arms control requires adequate means of verification. Unless we can establish confidence that agreements are being respected, arms control generates mistrust and fear, ultimately worsening tensions.

Negotiations vs. Unilateral Initiatives

Cooperative arms control is more complicated and difficult than unilateral measures, not only because of the requirement for verification but also because of the difficulty of negotiation. International arms control negotiation is frequently a protracted, even painful, process. Persuasion and discussion are helpful, but rarely sufficient by themselves to achieve agreement on complex and controversial matters involving supreme national interests.

Effective negotiations require that the United States maintains sufficient strength and momentum in its arms programs to impress its bargaining opponents that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the risks of competition. This means that decisions about our own force posture sometimes must be taken with a view to the likely effect on the negotiations, more specifically that we make clear what we will do if negotiations fail. It means, also, that we must be prepared to resist pressures by other countries designed to extract unwarranted concessions from the United States, even if this resistance sometimes makes negotiations protracted and difficult.
Thus it seems worth asking whether another way might not achieve results more quickly, avoiding the undesired secondary effects of prolonged negotiations. Could more be accomplished by having the United States take the lead unilaterally in reducing or limiting our military forces, and thereby encouraging other countries to follow our "good example"? In fact, this technique has been tried in the past. How well does it work?

On November 25, 1969 the United States took an important unilateral initiative when President Nixon announced that the United States was abandoning any use of biological or bacteriological weapons. This American initiative was followed by the signing on April 10, 1972, of the Biological Weapons Convention, a treaty banning development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

In announcing its intention to refrain from basing weapons in outer space, the United States also opened the way for an eventual treaty on this subject. On September 5, 1962, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric announced that we did not intend "to place any weapons of mass destruction in outer space" and expressed hope that the Soviet Union would similarly refrain. Although there was no Soviet response for more than a year, the Soviet Union did later join in supporting the "no orbiting" resolution in the U.N. General Assembly and ultimately signed the Treaty on the Use of Outer Space on January 27, 1967. By limiting military competition in outer space, this treaty should help to forestall the development of weapons which might reduce warning of nuclear attack while being highly vulnerable themselves.

One successful unilateral initiative actually occurred during wartime. During World War II, although neither the United States nor Japan were parties to the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of poison gas, President Roosevelt declared that we would not be the first to use chemical weapons. (Only in January 1975 did the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol.) Except for isolated uses by Japan against China, chemical weapons were not used in the war, even in situations where they might have had some marginal military utility.

While some unilateral initiatives to restrain arms competition have been successful, there have been noteworthy failures as well. On April 26, 1965; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson observed that:

Ambassador Stevenson called on other nations to reciprocate, declaring that these were "examples of restraint on the part of a nation which is capable, as I am sure everyone here knows, of far greater military production." In an interview that same month, Secretary of Defense McNamara asserted that "the Soviet rate of expansion today is not such as to allow them even to equal, much less exceed, our own 1970 force...the Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest...there is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours."

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union failed to show the restraint for which Ambassador Stevenson had hoped and which Secretary McNamara had predicted. Ambassador Tsarapkin instead attacked the American step-by-step approach and asserted that "the question can be solved only in the context of the total destruction of all delivery vehicles and the total destruction of nuclear weapons." It is only now, a decade later, after difficult negotiations and an unrelated Soviet strategic buildup, that long term limits on strategic offensive forces finally seem in sight.

Experience suggests that unilateral initiatives are not effective in changing positions on issues where there is basic disagreement. For several years in the 1960's, American officials publicly urged the benefits of mutual restraint in ABM deployment. In an interview on February 15, 1967, then Secretary of Defense McNamara stated his belief that the introduction of ABM systems "would be wasteful" and that "it would actually increase the risk to both of the parties were they to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems."

The Soviet view at that time was quite different. In response to whether a moratorium on ABM development was possible, Premier Kosygin stated rather emphatically at a London news conference on February 9, 1967:

I think that a defensive system which prevents attack, not is a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people. At present the theory is current in some places that one should develop whichever system is cheaper...An antimissile system may cost more than an offensive one, but it is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives. I understand that I am not answering the question that was put to me, but you can draw appropriate conclusions yourselves.

Only after the United States abandoned its earlier restraint and began vigorous pursuit of an ABM system did Soviet views about the value of ballistics missile defense change. Without this U.S. military effort, it is doubtful that we would have been able to negotiate the ABM Treaty.

All of the other major belligerents were parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The only uses of poison gas after World War I were by Italy, a party to the Geneva Protocol, in its 1936 attack on Ethiopia, by Japan in China, and during Egypt's intervention in the civil war in Yemen in the 1960's.
During the decade 1965 through 1975, the leveling off and subsequent decline in the U.S. military budget was accompanied by growing strategic initiatives by the Soviet Union. Even though the nominal defense budget increased during that period, the value of the dollar declined rapidly due to inflation, so that the actual cost of U.S. defense programs decreased until 1973 when it was below the 1965 level. As the comparative trend lines on the charts (Figure 1) show graphically, this unilateral restraint enabled Soviet military programs to outpace their American counterparts during the early 1970s. To realize these advances the Soviet Union had to spend up to twice as great a share of its national output because its economic production remained substantially smaller than that of the United States.

The Soviet Union has evidently been willing to bear heavy costs to maintain the momentum of its military programs. As long as this momentum continues, and the Soviet Union continues to value its growing military strength so highly, the prospects for reciprocal restraint are unpromising—even though it has approached, and in certain respects even exceeded, a position of military equivalence to the United States. Fortunately, we have temporarily succeeded, a position of military equivalence to the United States. The need for agreed limitations.

The Need for Agreed Limitations

If negotiations sometimes have unsatisfactory consequences, so, too, do “informal” arrangements that attempt to paper over a negotiating impasse. For a period of almost 3 years, from 1958 to 1961, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union suspended nuclear testing in an effort to facilitate negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty. That experience offers useful lessons in the pitfalls of informal restraint.

Unilateral initiatives designed to promote progress in arms control are sometimes difficult to distinguish from efforts to gain propaganda advantages. There had been unilateral offers, first by the Soviet Union and later by the United States and the United Kingdom, to suspend nuclear testing, but these offers came after the parties had just completed extensive test series. Not too surprisingly, the self-serving offers were not reciprocated. Then, on November 7, 1958, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would continue its suspension of testing despite the most recent Soviet test and a self-imposed test moratorium began.

Understandably, the parties to the informal moratorium had sharply conflicting views about the terms on which it should continue. The United States was concerned about the possible consequences of a prolonged and unverifiable suspension of testing. Accordingly, President Eisenhower’s initial proposal carried a time limit of 1 year. Toward the end of 1959, he announced that the U.S. moratorium on testing would expire on December 31st, but he pledged that the United States would continue to negotiate and would not resume nuclear weapons tests “without announcing our intention in advance of any resumption.” There were in fact no tests by the United States, nor any substantial preparations for tests, prior to the Soviet Union’s resumption of testing in August 1961.

On August 28, 1959, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. had announced that the Soviet Union would not resume testing except “in case of resumption [by the Western Powers] of nuclear weapons tests.” There was no time limit contained in this pledge. France had begun testing, however, and there were frequent Soviet warnings that the consequences of French testing would be the responsibility of “the Western Powers.” On May 15, 1961, following a French test 2 weeks earlier, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin told the Geneva disarmament talks:

The continuance of nuclear weapon tests by France places the Soviet Union in a situation which may compel it to resume atomic and hydrogen bomb tests...

The commitment of both sides to the testing moratorium was thus hedged and tentative. Tension was heightened enormously when the Soviet Union resumed testing on August 30, 1961 with an extensively prepared and highly publicized test series. There had not been any further French testing to provide even an excuse for this action, which was clearly intended to demonstrate Soviet power and influence the crisis over Berlin. The political impact probably was worse than if there had been no moratorium. American public opinion was shocked and embittered. When the Soviet Union completed its test series and proposed a new moratorium, President Kennedy, in an address on March 2, 1962 declared:

We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an unverified moratorium. Some may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep tight-lipped scientists concentrating on the preparation of an...
Arms control must be a continuing and expanding process. Measures which limit or restrain competition in one area must not exacerbate it elsewhere. For example, despite the obvious importance of efforts to limit strategic arms, these weapons are only a small part of the armaments of the superpowers, consuming only a fraction of their military budgets. They by no means even include all nuclear weapons. As the strategic balance stabilizes, the tactical or regional balances, both nuclear and conventional, increase in importance. Also, limitations on nuclear weapons must be supplemented by limitations on conventional weapons and on arms transfers. Nor can arms control be limited to the superpowers alone. The interests of all the nations of the world are intimately involved in arms control.

Editor's Note: The initiatives concept as introduced in this essay differs significantly from the Peace Initiatives Strategy introduced in the next two essays. Among the differences are the sense of goals, the difference between isolated acts and an initiatives strategy, and the attempt in the following two essays to link initiatives in other fields to the problem of gaining reciprocation when "nations disagree."
VII. C. A PEACE INITIATIVES STRATEGY FOR ENDING WAR: Assumptions, Goals and a Nonviolent Method, by Robert Pickus

Editor's Note: The essay which follows is a concise statement of an approach to international conflict which takes seriously the goal of ending war. The essay states the assumptions underlying that approach, identifies the basic goals which must be achieved to end war as a legitimate means of resolving international conflict and introduces the peace initiatives strategy for achieving those goals.

Every context sustaining an approach to international conflict involves a number of assumptions. We have made some of the most important of ours explicit here.

ASSUMPTIONS

1) Something is wrong in a world in which war is accepted as a right and reasonable instrument of national policy. A world in which nations train men for mass violence is a world that should be changed.

2) Conflict among men is in the nature of things; organized mass violence is not. We will not rid the world of hatred or of individual and small group violence, but we can end war.

3) Ending war is not contingent on achieving a world of perfect justice and harmony, nor does it require a fundamental alteration in human souls or psyches. Ending war does not require resolving all the tensions that lead to conflict.

4) A perspective on foreign policy adequate to present international reality will recognize and meet the threat to our nation's security and to democratic values posed by power organized in other national and ideological camps. It will therefore seek changes of understanding and policy in those power centers as well as in America.

5) But such a perspective must emphasize initiative action by our country. For in a time when the agreements essential to controlling the threat of war seem beyond reach, only action not dependent on prior agreement can change the situation and make agreement possible. There are initiatives our government could take which are more likely to lead the world toward a stable peace than our present, dominantly military policy, or the current most visible alternative—an attempted withdrawal from world affairs.

6) Work for a world without war which takes intelligent account of threats to democratic values and institutions posed by other power centers is in the best interest of our country and expresses the best in our traditions. It is not a threat to them.

7) Responsibility for such work rests with individual citizens as well as political leaders. Laymen as well as experts have a critical role to play in making our country a leader in work for a world without war.

8) But government provides the process by which a world without war may be both achieved and sustained. Our commitment is to represent, democratic government by which majorities rule and to conceptions of individual and minority rights, which set limits to and legitimize governmental authority.

9) Man can reason and should. With all its shortcomings, a commitment to rationality is an essential requisite in the process by which we will end war.

10) Whatever the odds, we are required to try.

We make no formal argument for the validity of all the assumptions stated. To do so would involve a long and difficult analysis of alternative assumptions and an attempt to establish the superiority of those we have accepted. Some evidence for the validity of some of these assumptions has been provided in other sections, but a full argument cannot be made within the confines of this book. We have, therefore, simply stated the ideas believed to be true which undergird the political statement that follows.

ESTABLISHING THE GOAL

Working to bring an end to war requires establishing alternative means through which nations can resolve their conflicts and defend their values as they act on their presently divergent views of what constitutes justice and security. The obstacles to ending war are not simply in the domain of geography and power—that is, of geopolitics—but also in the domain of psychopolitics, the current crisis of mind and will.

In the shadow of Hiroshima the will to work for an end to war was manifest. It is no longer. Instead, new and old justifications for war urge mankind to disaster. At the heart of the context presented here is a reaffirmation of the right goal: ending war.

Elements in our American heritage turn us to this goal. Our religious traditions teach man's innate dignity and worth. From them has emerged a gradually developing concept of law that protects us from the arbitrary use of power and insists that the state is the servant and not the master of men.
Our own recognition of contemporary threats to these values dictates acceptance of the goal of ending war, for the power of other states is not the only threat to this tradition. It is also threatened by the inexorable requirements of organization for modern war and by the tragic parallel rejection of a non-violent democratic process by many of our own young people, caught in the moral and political contradictions of an America that is waging war.

The root values of our political tradition, the flexible pluralism of our nation, its immense power—all make possible a significant contribution to attempts to end war. One can recognize the limitations of what the United States can do, while still rejecting many voices now calling for a lowering of goals. The perspective here presented here rejects a withdrawal from international responsibility, as it rejects the belief that a dominantly military policy can fulfill that responsibility or secure our own future.

THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES

What are the essential objectives of those committed to achieving a world without war?

A world without war is a world in which agreement on universal, complete and enforceable disarmament has been achieved and put into effect. But disarmament alone is not a sufficient objective, for it cannot be maintained without alternative procedures for resolving conflict and establishing justice in world affairs. It cannot be maintained without law. Achieving disarmament and establishing law are, therefore, the first two objectives. But there can be no law without a sense of world community. If a disarmed world under law is to be based on consent, instead of imposed by violence, there must be a developed sense of unity and mutual responsibility among men. The third objective is, therefore, a strengthened sense of world community.

Most men, however, do not want law and stability if that entails keeping things as they are. They live under conditions of deprivation or exploitation, and they want change. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, economic, political and social change can come with or without mass violence, but it will come. A fourth objective, then, for those committed to work for a world without war is to provide peaceful channels and well-conceived programs for needed change and development.

Those seeking to commit this nation to leadership in achieving a just and stable peace must also find ways to change those attitudes and policies of other nations that black the road to peace. The single-minded focus on the Communist enemy that for so long gave cohesion, whether sensible or not, to U.S. policy has given way to a new realization of a rapidly changing world, one in which sixty-six of the 141 nations on our State Department's list are new nations which have achieved independence in this generation. The primary concern of these new nations is to establish national unity and a national character. Their desire to project their new identity adds new problems to the obstacles posed by the older nationalism. In this explosive scene it is more important than ever to assess realistically the power and purpose of key elements in the Communist world. Such an assessment rejects both the view of Communism as a demonic, unchanging, monolithic force, and also the unwarranted optimism which ignores the threat to democratic values and world peace posed by some current attitudes and policies of Communist nations and political forces. A fifth objective, then, is to move other nations to join us in pursuit of a disarmed world under law—one in which change can come without chaos, and hopeful trends toward material well-being, education and freedom for all men can be encouraged.

Since values must be defended and needed change is often rejected, those who turn away from mass violence must propose other means by which conflict can be resolved and change achieved in the Communist world in the developing nations and in the West. Thus peace research, particularly the application of the theory of nonviolence to international conflict, and experimentation with nonviolent techniques for conflict resolution, is another essential requisite of progress on the road to a world without war.

Finally, progress in the achievement of the other six objectives is unlikely unless men and nations are impelled to work for them. That recognition of obligation comes when men touch those root values which assert the brotherhood of all men or encounter that knowledge or authority which sustains the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." Whether based on a humanistic ethic or a religious dictum, widespread understanding of why men should turn from war, and action consonant with that understanding, is a seventh essential requirement if governments are to lead in ending war.

Seven objectives, then, together make up a world without war approach to foreign policy discussion:

1. General, complete and enforceable disarmament
2. Growth toward world law
3. World community
4. World economic and political development
   Bringing other nations into agreement on the pursuit of these goals
5. Enabling change without violence
6. Affirming fundamental values

A DYNAMIC

How can the perspective outlined above provide standards for judgment when a specific war/peace
issue is encountered? Before deriving those standards from the discussion thus far, we must first note a limitation of the approach outlined. It is a weakness that is widely recognized and that explains in part why so many thoughtful people are no longer interested in universal disarmament or world law statements to be meaningful each of the objectives requires agreement. And the primary lesson from twenty-four years of international negotiations is that we cannot reach agreement. The fifth objective thus encompasses and is the prerequisite to most of the others.

Is there a policy which begins with today's reality, which can act in situations where agreement has not been achieved, and act to produce new incentives and pressures that make agreement more likely? There is such a policy perspective. It is a policy of American Initiatives.

AMERICAN INITIATIVES

A policy of American initiatives is based on the belief that a dominantly military U.S. foreign policy cannot produce growth toward a world without war or develop successful opposition to the spread of totalitarian political systems. A favorable judgment of the feasibility of an initiative policy does not require an optimistic assessment of the realities of power and policy in the Soviet Union or China. One can, for example, be profoundly pessimistic about present policy in Peking and yet come to the conclusion that initiative proposals for U.S.-China policy involve less risk and greater promise for improvement than does continued isolation and potential military confrontation. The heart of the initiative approach lies in the very different question it seeks to answer: instead of,

"How can our military power best influence their political and military policy," a peace initiative approach asks, "What non-military acts can we take that give promise of producing the change in their attitude and policies that must come if we are to reach agreement on disarmament and world law?"

The initiative approach works with the processes of change. It reflects acquiescence to an opponent's will as it refuses to seek his destruction. It seeks instead to change him. A policy of peace initiatives is distinguished by its goals—world disarmament and world law—from the more familiar military initiatives that constitute an arms race. But its method is a very similar one. It does not wait for agreement. It pursues its purpose by unilateral actions. A peace initiatives policy recognizes that any final settlement must be based on common consent, but asserts that there are situations (Vietnam is clearly one) in which only independent action taken without prior agreement can create a situation in which agreement becomes possible. A peace initiatives policy seeks to form vectors of influence on and within an opposing political system that could move that system toward agreement on world disarmament and world law.²

CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVES POLICY

How can initiative acts create the conditions that change behavior?

a. By changing the environment within which the leaders of opposing political systems act.

The principle here is the same one that urges a redefinition of the arms race: men respond to their environment. An initiative policy seeks to create an environment, which increases internal pressure on Russia and on these leaders to respond to peace initiatives. Similarly, an initiative policy focuses external forces and world opinion on the need for change in these leaders' military policies, as well as in our own.

b. By changing the balance of political forces within the opposing systems' leadership.

Proponents and opponents of ABM deployment, of "thick" and "thin" systems and all the other elements in our ABM or MIRV controversies, surely exist in the Soviet Union. "Dove" and "hawk" camps exist in every nation. U.S. initiatives could vitally affect the outcome of internal arguments over the feasibility of negotiating a general and complete disarmament agreement.

c. By bringing pressure for reciprocal action to bear on and within the opposing system.

The American failure to bring significant pressure to bear on Hanoi and the NLF to end the war in Vietnam is a case in point. Could genuine peace initiatives do what military pressure has failed to do? What would be the impact, for example, of a unilateral American cease-fire (save under attack) combined with political initiatives that opened the way for the NLF to pursue their political objectives by means other than violence?

Most of the people of Vietnam are fighting neither Communist aggression nor American imperialism. They are fighting for their lives. Hanoi and the NLF have felt no pressure from them to end the killing because the U.S. has been successfully identified in the minds of many (in Vietnam and around the world) as the force that makes the killing go on. American initiatives to end the killing and to identify the forces that prefer victory to peace could change the situation. This approach is very different from current discussions of "Vietnamizing" the war, whether presented in the Nixon administration's context or in that of a peace movement that concentrates solely on withdrawing American power instead of on ending the killing. An initiative approach aims at ending the killing in a way that moves us toward control of the threat of war. It defines negative and positive incentives that could move the Vietnamese combatants toward a negotiated settlement (± 301).

Similarly, the arms race is an obstacle to most of the world's population participation in the fruits of industrialization. A strategy of American initiative acts, even if unsuccessful, would bring pressure to bear on the powers which prefer the risks of an arms race to the risks of disarmament; for such powers
obstacles to the new nations' desire for rapid economic development. Turning to internal pressures, today's students are one example of an important group in most of the major powers that would work internally for a positive response to genuine peace initiatives.

d. By opening alternative nonviolent courses of action through which an opponent may pursue his goals.

An initiative policy offers hope of regaining a perspective on security and the pursuit of justice that can turn men from present reliance on mass violence or national military power. For many, despite thermonuclear weapons, there now appears to be no alternative. A peace initiative policy would reject and seek to control violence, even as it accepted and opened channels for political conflict and its nonviolent resolution.

Initiative acts may not be immediately reciprocated in a given situation but may still be useful and important steps. Properly undertaken they can aid in establishing the understandings and precedents necessary to contain new stages in the arms race or new threats of war. Since confusion over who is initiating a new stage, and who is merely responding to the other side, is the usual justification for each new stage, there is enormous value in acts which help identify and isolate those political forces committed to continuing the arms race.

BUILDING AN INITIATIVES POLICY

There is nothing new in the idea of unilateral initiatives. The Soviet Union has for years jammed or stopped jamming the Voice of America as a way of signaling a change in Soviet attitude. As simple an act as inviting a foreign head of state to visit this country, as potentially significant an act as President Nixon's announcement regarding American cessation of research and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons, and even the very limited steps taken recently to change U.S.-China trade relations are unilateral initiatives. President Kennedy's announcement, in his 1963 American University speech, of a unilateral American cessation of nuclear testing in the atmosphere was an important peace initiative that clearly aided in the successful achievement of agreement on the nuclear test ban treaty.

What would be new would be a policy of initiative action to end war. There was a period early in the sixties when attention for a time focused on the initiative idea. Premier Khrushchev called for a policy of "mutual example," the Carnegie Endowment's fiftieth anniversary project in 1961 sought suggestions of unilateral steps the United States could take to improve the prospects of peace. Other research agencies worked on lists of American initiative acts they deemed desirable and feasible.

But no policy was ever enunciated.

Doing so would involve a clear and comprehensive statement of goals essential to achieving a world without war. It would require a planned series of initiative acts—not isolated gestures, but a deliberate, graduated set of initiatives designed to move us toward each goal. Such a policy would include careful thought as to what must be done to create or exploit the conditions (outlined above) that would make reciprocation most likely.

With regard to disarmament, for example, agreement on complete banning of arms in Antarctica and outer space has been achieved. What could be done to extend zonal disarmament to other areas? Could the United States designate a segment of this country—say New England—as a disarmed zone open to international inspection? How could that initiative engage the U.N. and other international agencies? What other acts by our government and private agencies could maximize internal and external pressure on the Soviet Union to reciprocate by naming a single disarmed area within the Soviet Union? How could these zones be extended? What would be the most likely countries in Africa willing to designate a disarmed zone? What approaches should be made to governments there?

Since inspection is a key to the disarmament problem, at what point should the United States authorize "inspection by the people" of all U.S. disarmament initiatives? That is, specifically state the U.S. citizen's moral obligation to report any violation of disarmament initiatives (or any subsequent international agreements) to an international agency. What appeals to specific elites and age groups within the Soviet Union; what Russian traditions, what realities of domestic Soviet politics and what possibilities of pressure from world opinion give promise, if properly exploited, of a favorable response to this initiative? How can the facts of extensive governmental controls within Soviet society and the ideological barriers to a sense of world community be overcome?

It is this kind of detailed thinking extended to each of the major goals considered above that would be necessary to construct an initiatives policy.

Any initiative approach requires a carefully thought out policy involving prior public announcement of the act and its intention and suggested possible reciprocal moves. The degree of risk involved in each step would have to be carefully calculated. What, for example, would we risk if we took seriously the proposal to make the DEW line (Distant Early Warning line) an international guarantor of warning against nuclear attack, a warrant that America seeks security from such an attack, not only for our nation, but for others, or, what would we risk if we tied reduction in our arms budget to problems of capital needs in the developing nations?
An initiatives policy would relate disarmament moves to acts strengthening growth toward world law. There have been, for example, proposals for American initiatives to internationalize control of the Panama Canal. Such an agreement could provide a model for international control of international waterways and thus a step toward eliminating situations that have in the past led to war. Repealing the Connally Reservation (thus ending a situation in which the United States and not the International Court of Justice determines when the Court has jurisdiction in cases involving what the U.S. might regard as a domestic issue) is another example of a unilateral act in the world law area that properly undertaken could encourage reciprocation by other nations committed to growth toward world law. An unarmed World Peace Brigade for service on war-threatened borders; opening selected American editorial columns to Communist Chinese editors (and requesting reciprocation); U.N. chartering of international corporations—there is no shortage of specific ideas of how initiatives by our country could have a beneficial impact on economic and political relations, international law and international organization and problems ranging from population and space research to economic development. We do not attempt here to list these, or to sort the sound from the unsound. Our purpose is to introduce the idea, not to spell out a full policy of American initiatives.

There have been two widely different approaches to a policy of American initiatives. One emphasizes the reduction of international tension and sees as the central problem creating an atmosphere of mutual trust in which agreements, previously thought impossible to achieve, may be reached. Just as an arms race is a form of unilateral but reciprocal tension-increasing activity, this approach recommends unilateral but reciprocated tension-decreasing activity. Another initiative approach views more soberly the reality of the conflict that produces the tension, and focuses on the problem of producing sufficient pressure to move recalcitrant national leaders to make the desired reciprocal response. A combination of reduction of threat and coercive pressures, both internal and external, to force reciprocation, is the approach recommended here.

We face a situation in which every plan for peace comes up against the fact that it requires agreement and we do not agree. In that situation many say we either surrender to other nations' will, or continue to rely on our military power to prevent them from imposing that will. There is a third choice. It requires that we act in situations where agreement cannot be reached in ways most likely to create a changed situation in which agreement becomes possible. A policy of American initiatives for peace provides the needed dynamics. A policy of American initiatives engages us in the right endeavor: progress on our part toward the right goals and the attempt to define what must change in Soviet, Chinese, and others' attitudes to make possible the achievement of those goals.

Needed change will not come easily. It will not come in response to calls for trust in international affairs (as if nations were men). It will not come at all except in response to pressure for such changes. Some of these pressures are now apparent in our society and in others. A world without war approach calls for an American policy primarily focused on defining and taking the steps we can take to maximize the chances for hopeful change.

Such an American initiatives policy could immediately provide the dynamics for at least the minimal goals: no further expansion of the arms race; a serious attempt to begin closing the gap between the very rich and very poor nations of the world; and temporary political settlements to defuse the three key explosive areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Germany. Such a policy, however, goes far beyond initial steps and temporary settlements. It recognizes that the awesome threats to man in the remainder of this century—nuclear war, hunger, population, the poisoning of our environment, the fragmenting new separatists and the developmental agonies of the new nations—are of such a magnitude that only international cooperation by presently opposed great powers and new world organization can resolve them.

Can we form the will which is the essential requisite for the pursuit of such a policy? Have we a President capable of such an initiative? Are we now a nation capable of responding to such leadership?

One need only examine the character of our present peace movement to see that we do not yet have even a citizens' peace effort with such a perspective, let alone a government committed to it.
The preceding essay was written in the 1960's, when the balance of strategic armaments began shifting from clear U.S. superiority to equivalence with the Soviet Union. This shift plus other factors—the failure to conclude a SALT II agreement, the likely impact of new technological innovations such as the guidance systems of the Cruise missiles and the new Missile X, and nuclear proliferation—necessitates a rethinking of the initiatives strategy.

These changes suggest the following questions:

-- Given strategic equivalence at significantly higher levels of forces, does a 10% reduction of such forces become a less significant peace initiative act? Or would such an act endanger allies?

-- Given that the Cruise missile may eliminate the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (a distinction critical to the success of SALT I), does the impending deployment of Cruise missiles hinder further arms control negotiations?

-- Given nuclear proliferation and the evolution of highly sophisticated conventional armies such as Iran's, how would a peace initiatives strategy be carried out with many power centers instead of just two?

In addition to such new questions, there remain many old ones:

-- Given the effects of the Vietnam war and Watergate plus the domestic conflicts of the 1960's, is the U.S. capable of carrying out an initiatives strategy?

-- Given the preeminence of dictatorships in international organizations, can such organizations be reformed to fulfill the role outlined for them in a peace initiatives strategy?

A complete answer to each of these questions is beyond the scope of this essay. The basic question which is answered is this: Are there in 1977, non-military peace initiative acts which this country should take which could gain the reciprocation of other powers?

This essay is a reworking of a policy statement adopted by the World Without War Issues Center—Midwest Board of Directors, March 30, 1976. I have benefited from comments by William Epstein, Jim Green, Tom Halstad, Gene LoRoque, and many others. Lowell Livezey and Karen Minnice provided editorial comments and Laura Akgulian substantially edited and revised the manuscript. Each of the above would no doubt disagree with parts of the essay for which I am alone responsible.
During 1977 negotiations are expected in an effort to complete SALT II and to achieve mutual, balanced force reductions in Europe. At the U.N. and elsewhere, proposals will be put forward concerning nearly every facet of the arms race. Informal and formal discussions will be held. But over 30 years of such discussions have produced only minor agreements (see page 67). These agreements have diverted the arms race into different areas without altering the basic thrust to higher and higher levels of armaments by more and more states. When negotiations fail, peace initiatives remain the only realistic choice between yielding to an opponent's will and increased belligerency.

Many, of course, argue that no one really wants arms control much less disarmament. A peace initiatives strategy is designed for those who do.

A peace initiatives strategy could break negotiating deadlocks. It could do so by altering the international political climate and by bringing into greater influence, those seeking arms reductions. The peace initiatives strategy does not depend upon the existence of a peacekeeping/peace-making system to replace the balance of terror at the outset—it is designed to aid in the creation of such a system. The goals essential to a world without war are stated in the preceding essay; here many specific peace initiatives toward the goal of general and complete disarmament are offered.

Examples of initiative acts toward the other goals concludes this essay. The prospects for reciprocation to disarmament initiatives is enhanced by initiative acts toward the other goals. The development of a comprehensive set of interrelated, mutually reinforcing peace initiatives acts remains an unfulfilled, urgent research task. Accomplishing that task is needed if we are to test whether it is possible to achieve a world without war.

Toward Arms Control and Disarmament

Today the basic steps needed to halt and reverse the arms race are:

1. Intention-clarifying peace initiatives.
2. Force-reducing initiatives reducing one side's armaments.
3. Reciprocal force reduction by all other equivalently armed powers.
4. Proposals leading from an arms race to arms reduction and finally to disarmament. These proposals could become the basis of negotiations; however, if such negotiations fail, the proposals would be replaced by force reductions peace initiatives, or even nonviolent, coercive initiatives (designed to elicit reciprocation).
5. Strengthening of peacemaking/peace-keeping institutions as the arms race abates.
6. Verification of arms reduction measures after disarmament is well advanced. Although national technical means are adequate at the outset, and throughout most of its process, achievement of disarmament requires international, on-site inspection; thus, for example, the existing consultative framework in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. question each other about compliance with SALT must be broadened.

7. Enforcement of negotiated agreements by the international community, using non-military incentives to achieve this end. Like verification (step 6), enforcement is not essential at first, but becomes indispensable as disarmament proceeds.

Peace Initiative Acts

The phrase "peace initiatives" has acquired many connotations. As used here peace initiative acts are: (a) tangible; (b) goal-oriented; (c) designed to lessen military threat and gain reciprocation.

Speeches announcing new policy or statements of intent are sometimes called peace initiatives. However, frequently a verbal commitment by one side is contingent upon action by the other side and thus is consistent with preparation for or continuation of war. A sincere peace initiative act should therefore involve tangible change: for example, a unilaterally-initiated cease-fire, a percentage force reduction, or even the actual governmental reorganization necessary to pursue disarmament goals.

Since every peace initiative act is a small step towards a goal, keeping sight of that final objective is crucial: otherwise, tempting short-term decisions might steer reciprocation and further initiative efforts in the wrong direction.

Finally, peace initiatives are either a form of sacrifice or a lessening of military threat to others seeking the same goal; for example, a percentage force reduction, a 1% GNP contribution to world development programs, or a transfer of revenues derived from a national canal to an international waterways authority all constitute valid initiatives which one nation might undertake. Such moves by one country will hopefully set an example for others and when combined with other initiatives increase the pressure on an adversary state for a positive response.

Peace initiative acts in the disarmament field can be divided into at least three categories: intention-clarifying, force reduction, and nonviolent coercive initiatives. Each is briefly introduced, then specific initiative proposals designed for the 1970's are offered.

I. Intention-Clarifying Peace Initiatives

Intention-clarifying peace initiatives indicate an active desire to pursue disarmament goals, but are not themselves reductions in armaments.
Goal: The U.S. should announce its willingness to seek general and complete disarmament under effective international controls, as agreed to in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and should demonstrate its commitment to that goal by the following acts:

Peace Initiative #1: The U.S. should publish statistics on its own forces, etc., as well as estimates of all other counties' forces; it should then turn this information over to the U.N., emphasizing that corrections and explanations by other powers are essential for more accurate, useful statistics the following year. The U.N. should be invited to discuss these reports and to suggest appropriate international institutions and procedures for verifying such data.

Peace Initiative #2: The U.S. should continue to require every U.S. conventional arms or military technology manufacturer and exporter (including government agencies) to obtain an export license specifying the contents and destination of each shipment; it should now require that such information be made available to the U.N.

Peace Initiative #3: If other countries have not begun supplying similar information on their armaments and arms transfers after six months, the U.S. should volunteer its satellite surveillance system plus intelligence information on world military armaments to the U.N.; in addition, it should offer to pay one-half the costs of maintaining the satellite system for the international agency handling disarmament (whether it is the U.N., International Atomic Energy Agency, etc.). Non-governmental institutions which now make such estimates, e.g., the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, would then check the completeness and accuracy of such information, thereby stimulating voluntary participation of other states in this process.

By verifying current force levels, the above initiatives would help define levels of parity in reciprocal, percentage armaments reductions. Moreover, they would signal a change in attitude and priorities to the international community. By including all countries in its statistics, yet leading itself, the U.S. by these initiatives would recognize the existence of many centers of military power today.

Changes in governmental organizations and programs also indicate a commitment to disarmament goals. The U.S. should undertake the following:

Peace Initiative #4: The U.S. should significantly increase the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency budget and broaden its mandate, enabling it to:

--research peace initiatives, non-violent international conflict, civilian (non-violent) defense, and peaceful methods of effecting needed change. Developed in this century by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., non-violent techniques can build a sense of community between adversaries in a conflict; further investigation of their use in international conflicts is urgently needed;

--explore the factors which encourage or discourage reciprocation, this to be done in conjunction with similar governmental agencies and non-governmental peace research centers;
update plans for converting U.S. armaments manufacture from military to peacetime production; also, the agency could develop appropriate legislation limiting the impact of military contract losses on workers, industry and communities;
--make the currently required Arms Control Impact statements concerning new weapons systems public; publish disarmament impact statements as well, indicating the problems and feasibility of particular force reductions, disarmament initiatives, etc.

Peace Initiative #5: The President of the U.S. should support creation of a United Nations University, a National Peace Academy, and a U.N. Research and Analysis Center for Arms Control and Disarmament; he should ensure that among these institutions' main tasks are the refinement of the goal of general and complete disarmament and the development of peace initiatives or negotiable plans for achieving it.

Peace Initiative #6: The President should include the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the National Security Council; he should also expand the ACDA's consultative framework to include knowledgeable peace researchers from private schools and organizations.

Peace Initiative #7: The Executive Branch should publish annual reports delineating the purpose and present status of disarmament initiatives.

Peace Initiative #8: The U.S. Congress should insist on representation in all international arms control and disarmament negotiations; it should study the arms control impact statements now provided and should use its authority to limit or stop armaments programs and transfers which damage arms control negotiations or counter force reduction peace initiatives.

Peace Initiative #9: The U.S. President should issue an executive order authorizing U.S. citizens who learn of or suspect U.S. violations of international disarmaments agreements to report such infractions to the appropriate international authority; Congress should pass a companion resolution. The Presidential order should be automatically renewed every two years if other countries establish corresponding authorizations for their citizens; however, failure to reciprocate here may not be crucial if electronic and other espionage devices adequately assure compliance with an agreement or response to initiatives.

Peace Initiative #10: U.S. scientific organizations should require members to report breaches of international disarmament agreements. Once done, these organizations should persuade other national and international scientific groups to adopt similar rules. The U.S. government should make such a commitment a prerequisite to researching military contracts or technology with military implications. In addition, scientific organizations should insist that all research be open and published, and that national and international bodies of scientists study and evaluate the military impact of scientific investigation and discoveries.

Peace Initiative #11: Non-governmental U.S. organizations--religious, labor, business, professional, educational and civic--should intensify
their interest in arms control and disarmament issues, inform their members of pending decisions, and insist that government lead in initiating force reductions. Through either their branches or analogous groups in other countries, they should rouse an international constituency pressing for initiative action by their respective governments. Each of these non-governmental groups could contribute a different area of expertise: religious groups could clarify the values underlying efforts to achieve a world without war; labor and business could discuss positive and negative consequences of disarmament on their income and how to minimize the negative effects; educational institutions could study how traditional subjects relate to the arms race, etc.

II. Mutual Force Reduction Peace Initiatives

Once a nation declares that it shall seek general and complete disarmament, it can actually reduce forces in four distinct ways while negotiations continue. These are:

a. A Freeze: halting production of new weapons systems—a significant step towards breaking the momentum of an arms race since weapons production is a lengthy process.

b. Percentage Reduction: if unilaterally initiated, fixed percentage force reduction which is repeated if the first reduction is reciprocated by an adversary.

c. Zonal Disarming: declaring a particular area of the earth a disarmed zone (e.g., Antarctica, the sea-bed, and outer space); or the banning of a particular weapons system within a zone (e.g., Latin America is a nuclear-free zone).

d. Conventional Armaments Reduction: applying techniques (a), (b), and (c) to stem the tide of conventional as well as nuclear arms races.

IIIa. A Freeze

Goal: To prevent nuclear proliferation, we advocate: (1) a comprehensive test-ban treaty beginning with a moratorium on underground testing by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; (2) universal monitoring of nuclear power plants by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and (3) the conducting of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes only when authorized by some competent international authority under the U.N. If these goals are not achieved through negotiation we recommend the following:

Peace Initiative #12: The U.S. should unilaterally stop testing all nuclear devices for two years and agree to make this test ban permanent if the Soviet Union reciprocates. If they do not, the U.S. should resume testing, but only on a one-to-one basis.
Peace Initiative #13: The U.S. should unilaterally place all of its nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards and urge all other nations possessing nuclear facilities to do likewise.

Peace Initiative #14: The U.S. should either require that all spent nuclear fuel be returned to the U.S. for reprocessing, or build regional reprocessing plants and ban all nuclear assistance to countries that acquire national uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology.

Peace Initiative #15: The U.S. should make information on peaceful nuclear explosions readily available; it should coordinate detonation efforts with other nuclear and non-nuclear powers if the anticipated benefits of such an explosion outweigh environmental damages.

Peace Initiative #16: The U.S. should implement improved security measures when transporting nuclear materials. In addition, the U.S. should step up research on reducing the weapons potential of nuclear wastes and on alternative energy sources, thus sparking international efforts to meet energy needs through a less dangerous means.

Peace Initiative #17: Pending acceptance of an international convention, the U.S. should pledge cooperation in preventing theft and pursuing stolen nuclear materials, as well as refusing asylum to nuclear thieves and terrorists.

Coal: To prevent qualitative refinement of existing armaments or creation of new nuclear or non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, we recommend ending production of all nuclear weapons systems and a halt in the manufacture of other weaponry. If negotiations to achieve this are unsuccessful, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #18: The U.S. should unilaterally freeze its development and production of all nuclear weapons delivery systems for one year. Specifically, we advocate a freeze on at least these systems: (1) the B-1 Bomber; (2) the Trident submarine; (3) MARVs; (4) Cruise missiles; (5) the mobile MX missile; and (6) other systems not publicly known. The U.S. should ask the Soviet Union to reciprocate by freezing development of their Backfire Bomber, their new generation of ICBMs, and others not disclosed publicly.

Peace Initiative #19: The U.S. should sign the draft treaty abolishing use of lethal chemical weapons. Then it should begin a phased destruction of existing weapons stock, verified by international inspectors, and should complete such destruction when the Soviet Union and other nations are conducting equivalent programs.

IIb. Mutual Force Reduction Initiatives

The intention-clarifying initiatives described above demonstrate the U.S.'s willingness to pursue disarmament. As reciprocation to such initiatives occurs, mutual force reduction initiatives begin (although force reduction is not contingent upon prior initiatives and could therefore start any time). Mutual force reduction initiatives are unilateral cuts in existing forces which are repeated if an adversary reciprocates.
Goal: The numbers of strategic delivery systems possessed by the super-powers should be mutually reduced. Since negotiations have consistently failed to achieve this end, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #20: The U. S. should unilaterally reduce each of the triad of forces currently operational - 5% for SLBMs, and 10% for ICBMs and bombers. (If the preceding initiatives have been reciprocated, these percentages could be increased.) Based on 1975 figures, this would entail removing 176 land-based missiles, 33 submarine-launched missiles and 42 long-range bombers from operational readiness. The initial reductions should include MIRV'd delivery systems in the same proportion as they exist in current forces; MIRV'd warheads should not be transferred to the remaining strategic delivery systems.

If the Soviet Union reciprocates, reducing its respective forces by a similar 5 and 10%, the U. S. should cut away an additional 5 and 10%. This process could then be set up on an automatic, six-month basis which, after four years, would continue only if other countries owning strategic delivery systems participate.

One reason for the previously advocated freeze on new systems is that Cruise and Missile MX weapons are not as easily detectable by national verification, plus an enlarged Consultative Committee (part of the SALT I agreement) could monitor and check reciprocation to the above initiatives.

In addition to strategic delivery systems, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. possess numerous tactical nuclear weapons, many of them stationed in Western and Eastern Europe.

Goal: The U. S. and the U. S. S. R. should continue discussing mutual, balanced force reductions in Europe. Since lengthy negotiations on this subject have made little progress, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #21: The U. S. should reduce its tactical nuclear warheads in Europe by 25%, and should agree to remove another 20% when the Soviet Union reciprocates the first 25%.

During this process, European regional organizations should aid in inspecting and verifying compliance with negotiated agreements or reciprocation to peace initiatives. This assistance could include permitting access to national technical means of verification and admittance to the SALT I - established consultative committee. Other regional arms races should be approached in like manner, with their regional organizations playing a similar role.

IIc. Zonal Disarmament

A disarmed zone is a geographical area in which weapons of war are prohibited. The purposes of a disarmed or "nuclear-free" zone are: a) to prevent the arms race from spreading to new areas; b) to psychologically prepare people in specific locations for security without weapons; c) to break an impasse in percentage reductions (e. g., when a force reduction initiative is not reciprocated, but one of the powers wants to keep the disarmament process going); and d) to increase the number of people living in nuclear-free - and hopefully, weapons-free - areas.
Goal: Through negotiations, the U. S. should seek establishment of nuclear-free zones in Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, the Micronesian Trust Territories, and the Indian Ocean. If these goals cannot be reached, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #22: The U. S. should sign Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and should also encourage France to do so. Protocol I would then be ratified when the Soviet Union ratifies Protocol II, which commits nuclear powers not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against signatories.

Peace Initiative #23: The U. S. should pledge not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, as encouragement in the creation of other nuclear-free zones.

Peace Initiative #24: The U. S. should declare the Micronesian Trust Territory in the South Pacific a disarmed zone; it should then begin phased withdrawal of its forces, continuing down to local police levels if other naval powers promise to respect the zone.

II. Conventional Armaments

The techniques of freeze, percentage reduction and zonal disarmament apply to conventional as well as nuclear arms races. The suppliers of conventional arms are now many, although the U. S. remains the largest manufacturer and exporter. We believe that as the above initiatives are taken, reciprocated, and new international verification and inspection agencies are created, new approaches to conventional arms control will be feasible.

Goal: Through mutual, balanced reductions, the U. S. should seek ultimate elimination of arms transferral and export abroad. If agreement on these goals is not reached, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #25: The U. S. should halt shipment of all conventional arms for three months; it should extend this halt if other arms suppliers agree first to ceilings on shipments, then to a timetable for eventual elimination of such shipments. Conferences securing regional arms reductions and providing international peace-keeping forces plus peace-building programs should accompany this initiative.

Peace Initiative #26: The U. S. should require that domestic weapons manufacturers report arms production and exports to the U. N.; it should request all other manufacturers in the world to make similar reports. The U. S. would continue this procedure if other countries reciprocate after two years.

Peace Initiative #27: The U. S. should place the same controls on exporters of arms technology as those imposed on arms exporters.

Ending conventional arms races would occur more rapidly if there existed a permanent, standby, U. N. peace-keeping force armed only with light weapons for use in self-defense. Such a force would act as an intermediary, policing cease-fire lines, monitoring the fulfillment of negotiated agreements, and perhaps supervising elections to resolve conflicts. If negotiations fail to achieve this end, we recommend:

Peace Initiative #28: The U. S. should designate and train communications and other appropriate units to aid U. N. peace-keeping missions.
III. Nonviolent Coercive Peace Initiatives

If after intention clarifying and force-reduction initiatives are tried and if they fail to gain appropriate reciprocation, or if a violation of an agreement takes place, there is still a third choice other than that between surrender and reentering the arms race. Nonviolent coercive peace initiatives are actions designed to put economic, social or political pressure on a country to reciprocate. Nonviolent coercive initiatives would probably only be feasible if a high degree of consensus in the world community was achieved by the preceding types of initiatives. If there were widespread agreement that only one participant in an arms race refused to reverse that race, the following nonviolent but coercive measures might be initiated by those committed to disarm: an economic boycott of a country's products, a refusal of the country's currency in international exchange, a refusal to accept the country's passports, nonviolent demonstrations before the country's Embassy and Consulates, informational leafletting in the country's capital or broadcasts to the public, exposure of internal human rights violations and a refusal to trade commodities such as grain. Such actions would be of limited duration and would end if the country reciprocated a peace initiative.

Policy & commendation. We believe the study of such measures should be undertaken at once to determine their feasibility and appropriateness as a means of gaining compliance with negotiated agreements or reciprocation to peace initiatives.

IV. Related World Without War Goals

The chances of gaining reciprocation by others to the above recommended initiative acts is increased as progress is made toward the related goals listed below. The examples illustrate how initiatives toward each goal could be made now.

Goal: Strengthening international authority into institution capable of providing a limited world law.

Peace Initiative #29: The U. S. should seek establishment in Geneva of a World Oceans Authority and send a delegation there to help develop the institution needed. Until other representatives arrive, the U. S. delegates would begin to license and collect royalties from any U. S. firm mining sea-bed minerals. These royalties would be paid into world development banks, making clear that those countries not acting similarly were benefiting privately from resources which belong to all humanity.

Goal: Building a sense of world community.

Peace Initiative #30: The U. S. should match the Japanese government's grant to establish the United Nations University. It should also establish a National Peace Academy and ask that both educational institutions' charters focus part of the curriculum on nonviolent ways of preventing international conflict.

Goal: Strengthening the world's capacity for preventing international war...
Peace Initiative #31: The U. S. should invite journalists from other countries to investigate any U. S. human rights problem. Newspapers should be asked to cooperate by providing space for such assessments and for governmental and non-governmental responses. The other countries involved should then reciprocate by permitting similar access by U. S. journalists and space in their newspapers.

Goal: A sustained attack on world hunger and a long-term economic development program.

Peace Initiative #32: The U. S. should pledge six million metric tons of grain per year to alleviate hunger or to help create a World Food Reserve and call on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to provide an equivalent share of the needed fertilizers.

Goal: An increased capacity for nonviolent conflict.

Peace Initiative #33: The U. S. should support the development of a nonviolent international peace force trained to act as intermediaries and as conflict resolution specialists. These intermediaries should be assigned to U. N. agencies working in crisis areas, thus developing on site contacts useful in crisis situations.

Problems and Opportunities

Once a process of descalating the arms race and progress toward the above goals begins, there will be new opportunities and new problems. How far, for example, can the Soviet Union disarm without changing the balance of forces between it and China? When should conventional force reductions be phased into the process? How much progress must be made toward each of the related goals to make continued disarmament initiatives feasible? Although the answers to each of these questions is important, not having the answers should not prevent a country from beginning a strategy of peace initiatives.

These questions suggest difficulties which must be solved to achieve general and complete disarmament. We believe that if the super-powers would begin a process such as that outlined above, the obstacles would be significantly easier to overcome. There would be created a new climate, with different assessments of intention, a new willingness to express in behavior the commitment to world without war goals, and different assessments by world public opinion about who or what is blocking the path to peace.
VIII. ISSUES

Decisions concerning each of the specific proposals listed in Part IV will be made this year. Such decisions will be made by national and international leaders, by non-governmental organization leaders and by concerned citizens.

Such decisions become issues when you must choose "yes" or "no".

Below are listed the major areas of the arms control and disarmament field: following by questions which will probably be answered, at least temporarily, yes or no in the next few years.

1. Strategic Armaments
   a. Will a SALT II Agreement be reached? Will it limit the strategic arms race?
   b. Will the U.S. build the B-1 Bomber?
   c. Will the U.S.S.R. build the "Backfire" bomber?
   d. Will the U.S. refine the Cruise missile? Other new systems?
   e. Should new Trident submarines be built? Should the communications system be improved?
   f. Will new MIRV's be added to existing strategic armaments?
   g. Should the Mobile X missile be developed?
   h. Will the Soviet Union build a new generation of ICBM's?
   i. Can the naval arms build-up be reversed?

2. Nuclear Proliferation
   a. Will new countries go nuclear?
   b. Should the International Atomic Energy Agency be strengthened to enable it to prevent diversion of spent fuel to military weapons construction?
   c. Can a comprehensive nuclear test ban be achieved?
   d. Is there a need for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions?

3. Regional Arms Races
   a. Will mutual balanced force reduction in Europe take place?
   b. Can nuclear weapons in Europe be reduced?
   c. Can the flow of arms to the Middle East be reduced? reversed? ended?
   d. Can the build-up of armaments in Africa, Latin America, and Asia be ended or reversed?
   e. Will new disarmed zones be created?

4. Military Spending
   a. How much should the U.S. appropriate for military spending this year?
   b. What percent of a country's GNP goes for military spending?
   c. What are the human costs of the arms race?

5. Conventional Arms
   a. Can a suppliers' agreement be reached to halt the arms trade?
   b. Can conventional arms control, reduction and disarmament be achieved?
   c. Will conventional and environmental weapons be banned?

6. Domestic
   a. Will the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be adequately funded?
   b. Is this country prepared for conversion to peace-time production?
   c. Is peace research adequately funded? conceived? relevant?

7. International
   a. Will international organizations be able to play an effective role in the disarmament area? Will they have the authority? the will? the values?
IX. RESOURCES FOR ACTION

A. TABLE OF DISARMAMENT RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONS

For information and follow-up development in the arms race field, it is important to learn what organizations and sources of information there are, and which resources or organizations, newsletters and periodical publications can help.

1. Bimonthly Newsletter

For General Armament Information, 1100 East 4th Street, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20009. Publishes monthly Arms Control Policy: Current Trends in Arms Control and Disarmament, focusing on proposals for controlling the arms race, reducing military expenditures and for a limited but effective deterrent capacity.

2. Disarmament News and Disarmament News and Disarmament Affairs, Department of State Building, 1201 19th Street, Washington, D. C. 20511. Publishes an annual report plus publications on arms control agreements, the effects of nuclear weapons use and efforts to develop adequate safeguards for international arms control agreements.


4. Friends Committee on National Legislation, 2021 Second Avenue, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20002. Publishes the FCNL Newsletter which regularly reports social and military expenditures, provides information on legislation related to the arms race and summertime meetings and conferences developing proposals to reverse the arms race.

5. Interdependent Monthly which covers the range of arms control and disarmament issues, including conventional arms races and terrorism.

Periodicals

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Bernard Feld, Editor in Chief, Samuel Day, Jr., Editor, published monthly. Focuses on disarmament issues, their technological as well as social implications.

Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Marek Thee, Editor, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, quarterly. Covers a wide range of peace-related problems including the arms race and disarmament issues.

Fellowship, Jim Forest, Editor, Box 271, Nyack, New York 19960. Published by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, it brings a pacifist perspective to bear on disarmament issues.

Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N. Y. 10021. Regularly publishes articles on arms control issues. It usually focuses on arms control measures or shifts in strategic doctrine concerning superiority versus parity.

Foreign Policy Quarterly, Samuel Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel, Editors, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017. Often challenges the assumptions of Foreign Affairs by introducing minimum deterrence arguments into the national debate.


Scientific American, Gerard Piel, Editor, 415 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017. Regularly presents articles on arms control issues and on the dangers of the continuing arms race.

Other publications, like Saturday Review, and newspapers like the New York Times and Christian Science Monitor, regularly include articles on the arms race and on disarmament issues.
B. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Overviews


2. A Self Survey Where Do You Stand?

3. A Summary of What Is at Stake in this Field

4. Facts about world military, and social expenditures

5. A summary of bilateral and multilateral treaties that codify the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence

6. Contending Perspectives on the Arms Race

7. Proposals to Reverse the Arms Race

8. International Organizations and Disarmament

9. A Peace Initiatives Strategy designed to move us toward general and complete disarmament

The B. BIBLIOGRAPHY is a supplement to the previous yearbooks this fall rate. More copies, 40% off.

Military Strategy


11. World Armaments and Disarmament, 1974 Yearbook. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (hereafter called SIPRI). Frank Berman, and staff, 1975. M.I.T. Press, $25.00 Published annually since 1970; each yearbook assesses the new developments in both nuclear and conventional arms races. In addition, each yearbook offers background information on arms control treaties, a summary of what countries have ratified them, their terms, plus valuable statistics on current trends. More than a reference tool, this is an indispensable guide to the arms race, to efforts to end it, and to eventually achieve disarmament

12. World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook for 1970. $25.00 This new edition of the above publication has been announced for late 1976. It will follow the same format as previous yearbooks.

History and Negotiated Arms Control Agreements

13. Arms Control: Moving Toward World Security. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1975. U.S. Government Printing Office. $7.50 Provides brief, answers to questions such as "Who is the Enemy?" "What is the Enemy?" "Who is the Enemy?" "What are the Enemy's aims?" "What are the Enemy's arms?" "What are the Enemy's threats?" "What are the Enemy's defenses?" "What are the Enemy's capabilities?" "What are the Enemy's intentions?" "What are the Enemy's actions?"

14. Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1975. U.S. Government Printing Office. $35 Surveys the forms of verification national technical means (satellites, electronic espionage), technical data sharing and international inspection and concludes that verification of compliance with arms control agreements is essential to any agreement. This government publication maintains that national technical means, by themselves, are not always adequate.

15. The Superpowers and Arms Control, From Cold War to Interdependence. Walter C. Clements Jr., 1975. Lexington Books, $13.25 A technical, historical overview of arms control in political and historical perspective and applies social science approaches such as rational actor and organizational process models to clarify decision-making within both super powers.

16. SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. Mason Wilth and John Rivenolde. eds. 1974. Free Press, $9.95 Ten arms control experts here explore the many diverse considerations involved in negotiating the First Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. In addition, a number of issues in SALT II are clarified.

17. Nuclear Arms Control Agreements: Process and Impact. Charles Babson, and J. P. Krebs. 1975. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, $1.00 This work argues that partial arms control agreements can be an impetus to new weapons programs which are not covered by the agreement, a section on verification and compliance with arms agreements is also valuable.

Arms Control and Disarmament Issues

Overview

18. The Last Chance. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. William Epstein. 1975. Macmillan, $14.95 From a background of over twenty years experience on disarmament issues at the U.N., Epstein analyzes the new dangers of nuclear proliferation, and offers specific proposals for ending proliferation and for total disarmament and arms reduction. The overview of the arms race since 1945 places current events in perspective and justifies the title: things will get worse, unless.

Issues: Nuclear Proliferation


20. NPT, Paradoxes and Problems. Anne Marks (ed.). 1975. Arms Control Association and Carnegie-Endowment for International Peace, $1.50 Participant in the conference here conclude that nuclear weapons proliferation and the non-Proliferation Treaty should "begin to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, including a treaty on general and complete disarmament."


Issues: China

23. The United States, China and Arms Control. Ralph Opjordsbakken, Morton Halperin, and Jerome Cohen. 1975. Brookings Institution, $2.00 A study of nuclear strategy as developed in China and the implications of China's nuclear program for Japan, the Soviet Union and the U.S.


Issues: Conventional Arms


This study by a U.N.A. policy panel concerns the rapidly expanding flow of conventional arms.

26. The Arms Trade with the Third World. SIPRI. 1974. Humanities Press, $15.00 Presents the basic facts on the export and import of arms and their major suppliers (the U.S.S.R., France, and West Germany) to eleven different regions of the world and details where the arms came from for the major conventional wars in the 1960's, esp. the Nigerian Civil War and the India-Pakistani war. An in-depth study of the arms flow to the Middle East is also provided.


Issues: Chemical and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

28. Chemical Disarmament: Some Problems of Verification. A SIPRI Monograph. 1974. Humanities Press, $11.50 A study of the types of data to be reported internationally by a national verification organization to make effective a chemical weapons ban.

29. NAPOL and other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of their Possible Use. 1975. United Nations, $3.50 A report on the work of the United Nations General Assembly resolution. This work was prepared to study the effects of such weapons; the report concludes with a call for their prohibition.

Issues: Force Reductions in Europe

30. Force Reductions in Europe. A SIPRI Monograph. 1974. Humanities Press, $11.50 Summarizes recent proposals for force reductions, introduces the strategic military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and provides an analysis of possible reductions through asymmetrical reductions, conventional and nuclear force mixes; areas to be considered and associated measures.

The United Nations and Disarmament

Toward Multilateral disarmament: Peace Initiatives


Unilateral Disarmament and Civilian Defense


International Terrorism


Other Studies


Policy

- To order the box next to the items desired. If you want more than one copy, write the quantity desired and the title. Readers are invited to suggest new books or pamphlets for consideration in the conflict without war.
- Additional copies of this newsletter are available for $2.95.
- An Overview of the War/Peace field.

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Additional copies of this newsletter are available for $2.95. Also available is newsletter #1: An Overview of the War/Peace field.
C. DECISION-MAKERS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES

I. The United States

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20505

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

General Advisory Committee on
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State Building
2201 C Street
Washington, D. C. 20451

The Honorable
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Committees - Senate
Appropriations
Foreign Operations
Armed Services
Subcommittee on Arms Control
Subcommittee on Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty Safeguards
Foreign Relations
Democratic Policy Committee
Republican Policy Committee

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street
Washington, D. C. 20506

The Honorable
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Committees - House
Appropriations
Armed Services
International Relations
Subcommittee on International Security
and Scientific Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements

Joint Committee on Defense Production

II. International Organizations

Secretary General
United Nations
New York City, New York 10017

Disarmament Affairs Division
Department of Political and Security
Council Affairs
United Nations
New York City, New York 10017
European Office of the U. N.
Palais des Nations
Geneva, Switzerland

International Atomic Energy Agency
Kaerntnerring
Vienna 1, Austria

Organizations of American States
Pan American Union
17th Street & Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20006

III. Other Countries

France
Office of the Embassy
2535 Belmont Road
Washington, D. C. 20008

Israel
Office of the Embassy
1621 22nd Street
Washington, D. C. 20008

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Office of the Embassy
1125 Sixteenth Street
Washington, D. C. 20036

Great Britain
Office of the Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Ave.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Germany
Office of the Embassy
Reservoir Road
Washington, D. C. 20007

India
Office of the Embassy
2107 Massachusetts Ave.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Peoples Republic of China
Mission to the U. N.
United Nations
New York City, N. Y. 10017

Others available on request.

IV. Organizations (a select list of organizations with programs in the disarmament field)

American Friends Service Committee
1561 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Arms Control Association
11 Dupont Circle, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Center for Defense Information
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Council for a Livable World
100 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Fellowship of Reconciliation
Box 271
Nyack, New York 10960

SANE
318 Massachusetts Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

United Nations Association of the USA
345 East 46th Street
New York City, New York 10017

War Resisters League
339 Lafayette Street
New York City, New York 10012

World Without War Council
175 Fifth Avenue
New York City, New York 10010

Friends Comm. on National Legislation
245 Second Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Write: Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church, 100 Maryland Avenue, N. E., Washington, D. C. 20002, for "Register Citizen Opinion" which lists religious organizational offices and additional non-governmental organizations, publications and U. S. House of Representatives and Senate Committee Assignments, plus how to write to various governmental officials.
THE WORLD WITHOUT WAR COUNCIL

The principle purposes and functions of the Council are...

- to establish the goal of ending war as a guiding force in American life;
- to clarify the elements of understanding and belief and to define the strategies and tasks essential to achieving the goal;
- to engage mainstream organizations and institutions in appropriate work through their own constituencies to translate these ideas into national policy;
- to offer, through national and regional centers of thought and activity, the catalytic, training, model-building, programming and coordinating services and resources needed;
- to provide a continuing overview of peace efforts by voluntary organizations with the purpose of aiding in the development of common standards and priorities for more effective work;
- to articulate the basic moral and political values which provide the motivation needed for a sustained engagement in that work.

Write the office nearest you for a complete introduction to the Council's programs, publications, ideas, people and work opportunities.

National Office: 175 Fifth Avenue, New York City, N. Y. 10010

Northern California Regional Office:
1730 Grove Street, Berkeley, California 94709

Midwest Regional Office: 110 South Dearborn, Chicago, Ill. 60603

Northwest Regional Office: 1514 N. E. 45th Street, Seattle, Wash. 98105

Other Offices: 1838 S. W. Jefferson, Portland, Oregon 97201
LEGEND

ABM defence system

Approximate location of Chinese ICBM and IRBM site

NATO NADGE early warning system

Approximate location of French and Soviet IRBM site

ICBM site

Tallin line air defence system

Soviet radar and other military facility

US radar and other military facility

Missile plant

Missile range

Satellite launch facility

Weapon laboratory

Weapon production facility

Strategic bomber base

Home port of nuclear carrier

Nuclear submarine base

US nuclear submarine base, in Spain and UK

Nuclear test site