Administration can be defined as getting the work of an enterprise done; good administration constitutes a disciplined effort to keep the enterprise operating effectively, at top form. Four concepts characterize the structure of American higher education: diversity, equalitarianism, local control, and mixed state and private enterprise; some of these qualities are uniquely American, and some may be used as models for higher education in other nations. Policy-making in American higher education has three central tendencies: (1) participation of several distinct groups (lay trustees, professoriate, students, and alumni) in governance; (2) the diversified membership of boards of trustees, as compared with the historical clergy board; and (3) the influence of teachers in defining teaching and research policy. There are six central concepts in the operational control of American higher education: (1) administration as an ordered plan for performing the organization's work; (2) a stable organization is required; (3) authority and lines of authority must be established; (4) authority involves willing cooperation; (5) an administrator must be an able and persuasive communicator of ideas and sentiments; and (6) able and persuasive communication is the primary factor in good administration. What American educators have learned from these tendencies and concepts may be useful to educators in other countries, specifically in Japan. (Author/MSE)
Seventeen years ago the eminent Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset gave a series of lectures at the University of Madrid about the destiny of Spanish universities. He described their retarded state and suggested that little could be done to improve them until the Spanish people ceased being what he called slovenly. Spanish universities, he asserted, reflected the slovenliness of Spanish society as a whole:

"... it permeates everything in Spain, from the state of its official acts, to the life of the family and the very grimace of the individual. In our university faculty meetings, the atmosphere is heavy with this slovenliness; and to walk through these halls, even on ordinary days, and hear the hullabaloo and see the gesticulations of you students, is to breathe an atmosphere so thick with slovenliness that it choked."

Ortega observed that above all else Spanish universities needed to counteract slovenliness, and this required the cultivation of "the opposite of slovenliness," namely, self-discipline toward the end of being "in form." Let me read another passage from his first lecture which describes what he meant by such discipline:

"The opposite of slovenliness is to be in form. You people well know the tremendous difference there is between an athlete when he is in form, and the same man when he is out of form. The difference in what he is able to do is every bit as striking as if he were two entirely different people. But this form is a thing that has to be acquired. In order to achieve it, the individual must first go off by himself and concentrate upon his own development: he has to go into training, and give up many things, in the determination to surpass himself, to be more alert, tense, supple. There is nothing that is indifferent to him, for every little thing either is favorable to his form, or else pulls him down, and with this in mind he goes out for one thing and avoids the other."

I have quoted from Ortega because good administration constitutes a disciplined effort to keep the enterprise being administered operating effectively.

2. Ibid., p. 43.
that is, at top form. Observe that I have said "good administration." Like most other people I've been associated with poorly administered institutions; and though it be desirable to know the nature of good administration, one ought to begin a paper such as this with a definition of administration in general -- of administration whether it be good or bad. Here's the succinct definition that I use in my courses here at Stanford: administration is getting the work of an enterprise done. I shall develop this definition later, but first I want briefly to return to Ortega and to report another of the chief concepts of his lectures. He expressed it in these words: "Let us look abroad for information -- but not for a model."

I have been asked by Professor Neilson to describe the administration of American colleges and universities for whatever value such a description may have to the Japanese educators attending this conference. I want at the outset to make it clear that I shall do this in no chauvinistic spirit. I shall, in fact, proceed in an exactly opposite mood for the reason that I am greatly disturbed by the efforts made by some of the American educational consultants in Japan to rebuild Japanese higher education according to American blueprints. In my judgment these efforts demonstrate deplorable historical and cultural ignorance. In any case they have led to distortions and confusions that will afflict Japan, I fear, for a long while to come. In this paper I describe the administration of American colleges and universities, but I hope that these remarks will make it clear that I am not proposing that American methods be exported to Japan. To paraphrase Ortega, I seek to give you information and not to hold up American practices as a model for you to copy.

The Three Topics to be Discussed

Everything about a social institution can be discussed under the term administration -- the various functions it performs, the purposes behind these functions, the personnel who do the work of the institution, the clienteles served, and, indeed, every facet of the institution. In this paper, however, I shall discuss only three of these numerous matters: the structuring of American higher education as a whole, central tendencies in the policy-making function, and central tendencies in operational control. I've defined administration as getting the work of an enterprise done; and thus I first describe the machinery (institutional structuring) in which and through which the work is done, the determination of what the work shall be, and the over-all management of that work.

The Structure of American Higher Education

To comprehend the structuring of American higher education four concepts must be understood: first, diversity; second, equalitarianism; third, local control; and fourth, our mixed state and private enterprise.

3. Ibid., p. 50.
First, diversity: American higher education consists of about 1900 institutions predominantly called colleges and universities. About 1300 of these grant degrees ranging from the baccalaureate to the doctorate. The other approximately 600 are junior colleges which offer two-year courses leading to the title of associate in arts. These 1900 structures differ conspicuously in size, procedures, purposes, and quality of products. To most foreigners -- and, indeed, to many Americans -- this diversity seems to make our higher education so chaotic as to be beyond understanding and much of it of such low grade as to be worthy only of contempt. I shall not stop to discuss the validity of these judgments, but instead move on to try to explain them.

American higher educational diversity has resulted in part from American equalitarianism. When Americans say that they are democratic, they most frequently mean that they are equalitarians and hence believe the individuals should be able to move up the social scale in terms of their abilities and not in terms of their hereditary class status. This deeply ingrained equalitarianism of Americans accounts in part for the diversity of our higher educational structuring: it has led to the establishment of colleges and universities to serve many levels of intellectual ability.

Here our practices differ markedly from those of European countries and from Asiatic countries which, like Japan during the nineteenth century and several decades later, followed European models. European universities differ from one another in many ways, but in one particular they do not differ, namely, by and large they admit only students of high intellectual ability. This is not so in the United States. A student of average intelligence -- or even below average intelligence -- can get admitted to some American university, college, or junior college. Our better institutions, of course, maintain high admission requirements which indeed grow constantly more difficult; but large numbers of young men and women who could not possibly be admitted to the higher educational institutions of most other countries do attend American colleges and universities.

Is this bad? Some Americans and most foreigners seem to think so, but our educational arrangements are inevitable because of the third concept which I've cited, namely, local control of education. Most countries supervise their educational systems from the capital, but the United States Constitution prohibits such over-all control. Thus each of the 48 states and each of the several territories has organized and operates its own educational system under standards of its own choosing. Structural diversity inevitably results from this principle of local control, and so also do diversity of admission requirements, of teaching standards, of products.

Our situation is further complicated by the fact that in contrast to most other nations both civil government and groups of private individuals operate colleges and universities. In round numbers civil government units -- chiefly states but also counties, municipalities, and even the national government -- support about half of our 1900 higher educational structures. No national bureaucracy controls these civil institutions, and the private institutions have practically no checks upon them from government. This too makes for diversity and, I might add, to a very desirable cross fertilization between public and private institutions.
In my opening remarks I observed that the educational practices of one country cannot be adopted by another, and I should like to illustrate the generalization by reviewing briefly the successful effort made in the nineteenth century to break away from European leading strings and the unsuccessful counter-efforts made to force our higher educational structuring into the German pattern.

Until the passage of the Land Grant College Act in 1862, the United States followed the European philosophy that the traditional institutions should educate only those destined for the literary professions of law, medicine, and theology. Protests against this limitation had been voiced by many laymen and some educators before our Civil War, and the Land Grant College Act -- enacted during the first year of the war -- led to the institutional implementation of the protest by the establishing of state colleges and universities required to offer instruction in agriculture and engineering as well as in the traditional subjects. This act -- in my judgment the most important piece of higher educational legislation in our history -- completely changed the face of our colleges and universities in the direction of egalitarianism. A number of leading educators, however, have sought to make us adopt the German organizational system and thus to force the so-called utilitarian subjects into non-university and inferior structures and at the same time to push general education back into the secondary schools.

Some of the advocates of this change had been presidents of leading state universities and leading private universities, but their campaigns have failed completely. They have failed because a nation will not ignore its own history and culture to copy the structures of another nation no matter how great the prestige of those who propose that they be ignored.

I stress this point because the American plan of higher educational structuring, I repeat, is not exportable. It has many flaws but also many virtues, and both come from our American backgrounds. Some of our methods may have utility for you in Japan; but if any do, they will need to be blended into your own scheme of things and not imposed from above arbitrarily. Thus I repeat Ortega's epigram: "Look abroad for information -- not for a model." If the Germanophile American educators of the past had followed this advice, many of the problems we have had and continue to have would have been avoided.

Central Tendencies in the Policy-Making Function

The policy-making function of colleges and universities I shall for convenience call academic government. I do this in order to distinguish between the separate enterprises of making policy and of executing policy.

To describe the government of American colleges and universities I must review some European and also some American academic history. European universities have followed two historical patterns of government, the French and the Italian. American colleges see-sawed between the two until the beginning of the nineteenth century and then chose the Italian.
Consider first the French plan. It developed at the University of Paris during its early centuries and spread from there to England and Germany. Its central principle was that academic government belongs in the hands of professors and only of professors. It made no provisions for lay participation except in England which early established the office of Visitor, the holder of which may be called upon to adjudicate quarrels or, if he is bold enough and strong enough, can visit the institution and propose changes in its procedures. Since the seventeenth century few Visitors have exercised this right which means that the professors of Oxford and Cambridge govern themselves entirely. No, not quite. On three occasions during the past hundred years the National Government has investigated and reorganized both universities, but more about that in a few moments. These investigations and reorganizations have not impaired the principle of the historic French plan which, incidentally, Napoleon destroyed in France. The principle is, to repeat, that faculties are autonomous bodies and that laymen -- and the general public -- shall have no continuing part in their government. The principle, further, leads to the operational plan of keeping the office of vice chancellor, the chief administrative post, weak. Thus at Oxford the vice chancellor remains in office only three years and at Cambridge only two.

In German universities the chief administrator, the Rector Magnificus, has an even shorter tenure -- only one year -- and neither lay governing boards nor Visitors exist. The faculties have all the power -- or so they believed until Hitler took over. Hitler, incidentally, found it necessary, I understand, to change not a single statute to accomplish his domination of German universities, a fact which meant that German professors had much less real power than they thought. That point too, however, must be briefly tabled while I describe the Italian pattern of academic government.

I call it the historic Italian plan, but Americans got it from the Scottish universities which had copied it from the University of Leyden which in turn had adopted it from the Italian universities. For several centuries after the emergence of the Italian universities in the late Middle Ages students held all their administrative posts, and student legislative bodies established regulations governing the fees to be paid professors, the length of their lectures, and the fines to be levied against teachers who came to their lecture halls late and who taught less well than the students thought desirable. Eventually for a complex of reasons student control waned, and the civil authorities took over by appointing what we would today call boards of trustees, that is, lay bodies of non-academic people. They became the governors of both professors and students. As observed, the University of Leyden, which opened in 1575, adopted this revised Italian plan; and the University of Edinburgh, organized seven years later, followed Leyden in employing the same pattern.

It would be wearisome to review the American experiments with these two plans. Thus I report only that the efforts of Harvard, and William and Mary to follow the French system, as Oxford and Cambridge had adapted it to their situations, failed. In the United States, therefore, we have come to follow essentially the Italian plan in the form that Yale and Princeton in particular copied it from the University of Edinburgh.

This scheme originally gave all the governing power to boards of trustees, professors being in very fact hired men. But during the nineteenth century
professors found the situation untenable, and slowly their agitations and the foresight of such great presidents as Charles Eliot of Harvard, Andrew Dickson White of Cornell, and William Rainey Harper of Chicago brought them very considerable participation in academic government. The first specific date I can cite is 1825, the year that Harvard established four faculties, that is, bodies of professors to govern their immediate areas. These were the faculties of Harvard College, of the Divinity School, the Law School, and the Medical School. Then in 1872 Harvard established an Academic Council on which sat members of all faculties, a plan which has since lapsed at Harvard but which has been in effect at the University of Chicago, for example, since its opening in 1892 and at scores of other institutions. Meanwhile all universities have unit faculties such as the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, the Faculty of Engineering, the Faculty of Law, each governing its own domain.

Boards of trustees retain the right to veto the legislation of these bodies, but they seldom employ it. When they do, hell usually breaks loose, and trustees long ago learned that even worse than a woman scorned is a faculty on the rampage. Thus professors have acquired a wide area of authority in the government of most American colleges and universities. They control curriculums, research policy, appointments, promotions, and -- except in highly controversial cases -- tenure. This means that the label of "hired men" no longer justifiably describes American professors.

It should be said that in some institutions, however professors have not yet achieved the governing rights of their fellows in other institutions; and beyond question they have considerable grounds for complaint. Autocratic presidents, dictatorial deans and department heads, and unenlightened boards of trustees still flourish; but the history of the past century makes it clear that professors can extend their participation in academic government if they have the will to use the instruments and agencies immediately at hand.

Observe that I say 'participation in academic government' and not control of it. Some professors continue to advocate the adoption of the historic French system of academic government, but the possibility of American colleges and universities abandoning the Italian plan seems slim indeed. Our whole legal structure stands in the way, and flaws have appeared in the English and German systems which make them both undesirable and impossible for us.

Consider the English situation briefly. Beginning in 1831 Sir William Hamilton, professor of Moral Philosophy and History at the University of Edinburgh, published a series of articles in the Edinburgh Review deploring the state of learning at Oxford and Cambridge and demanding their reform. Parliament discussed the situation on several occasions thereafter; but nothing happened until Benjamin Jowett, a fellow of Balliol College and later its famous master, together with a group of other Oxford tutors, petitioned the Prime Minister in 1850 to appoint an investigating committee. "We are incapable," they wrote, "of reforming ourselves." By this they meant that the systems of academic government of both universities prevented them from changing to meet the needs of the rapidly changing times. The Prime Minister responded by appointing a royal commission whose findings led to the Parliamentary reorganization of both universities but did not change the ancient system of control. Nor have later royal commissions changed it. It seems to me, however, to be of very great significance that the new English universities that began to come upon the scene during the nineteenth century all follow not the system of Oxford and Cambridge but, instead, that of the Scottish universities.
In other words, their policy-making and policy execution procedures are more akin to the American plan than to those in effect at Oxford and Cambridge. For example, all of them have councils somewhat like our boards of trustees, and all their chief administrators have unlimited tenure.

As for the German universities, James Bryant Conant made a study of them soon after he became President of Harvard and reported that German professors had a good deal less power than they thought. He found, for example, that the most-touted power of filling professorships did not really lie with the professoriate but, in all controversial situations, with ministries of education. Ministries also largely controlled budgets which put the universities not in the power of boards of trustees but, worse, in the hands of governmental bureaucrats.

In sum, not even in the two ancient English universities or in the German universities do professors have complete control. Nor are they likely in the foreseeable future to acquire it there or here in the United States. Universities are so intricately integrated into modern society that, to paraphrase a statement of Clemenceau's about war and generals, academic government has everywhere become too important to be left entirely in the hands of professors or entirely in the hands of boards of trustees. The enterprise increasingly requires the participation of both and, further, that of alumni and students who in many institutions have become increasingly important governing groups.

This section of the paper is captioned 'Central Tendencies in the Policy-Making Function,' and the historical review that I have given makes it possible to state them briefly. They seem to me to be three: first, the participation in American academic government of several groups -- lay trustees, the professoriate, alumni, and students -- the amounts and forms of this participation differing greatly from institution to institution; second, the membership of more kinds of people on boards of trustees -- not chiefly clergymen as until about a century ago and not chiefly businessmen and lawyers as more recently but many kinds of people including civil servants, scientists, labor leaders, and sometimes professors from other institutions; and third, the great and, indeed, definitive influence of professors in determining teaching and research policy through their own governing bodies which send up recommendations to boards of trustees. I understand that some of these practices are now being followed in Japan. If Ortega spoke truth, then it follows that their success depends upon how well they integrate with Japanese conceptions of government in general and of academic government in particular.

Central Tendencies in Operational Control

I come now to the topic which, I imagine, interests you most, central tendencies in operational control, that is, in what almost invariably in academic circles goes by the name of administration. Thus throughout what follows I shall be using the term administration rather than the more cumbersome term of operational control.

One can approach the discussion of administration from as many directions as there are degrees on a compass, but I shall discuss it from the vantage point
of the concept of order, the concept which stands in opposition to the slovenliness which Ortega deplored. So that my line of reasoning will be clear, I begin by listing the six sub-concepts that I shall discuss. Each is valued differently from one American college and university to another, but nonetheless each seems to me to constitute a central tendency of American higher education in general. These six spreading convictions among American academic administrators are:

1. **Administration is an ordered plan for performing the work of an institution.**

2. **An ordered plan requires an organization.**

3. **An organization must establish authority and a line of authority.**

4. **Authority involves not only giving orders but also willingness upon the part of those to whom they are addressed to follow them.**

5. **To stimulate cooperation an administrator must be an able and persuasive communicator of the ideas and sentiments which arise not only in him and his immediate associates but also in all members of the organization.**

6. **Able and persuasive communication constitutes the primary factor in good administration.**

1. **Administration is an ordered plan for performing the work of an institution:** "Order is heaven's first law" wrote Alexander Pope, and Edmund Burke observed that "Good order is the foundation of all things." So important is order that a case can be made for the proposition that man's chief energies in life go into keeping order, into attacking systems of order that he doesn't like, and into seeking to establish kinds of order that he considers more desirable.

The importance of order need not be labored. The point under discussion is that administration is an ordered plan for performing the work of an institution. To establish and to keep order a mechanism must be developed. **Administration is getting work done**, and the work cannot be done without a mechanism and a plan for operating it. The more efficient the plan, that is, the better ordered the plan, the better the performance.

I might at this juncture move on to point number two; but if I should, someone would be certain to think that I believe order to be the ultimate criterion of living. I should like to make it clear that I do not believe that. On the contrary I believe that order is in constant conflict with freedom and that, to develop, every institution and every society must permit freedom for disagreements with the existing order in attempts to work out a better order. These attempts often make for considerable disorder; but they must be permitted else we will become as perfectly ordered as the ants and the bees but no more intelligent. The communists, a recent writer has observed, are dangerous for no reason more than because of their 'deep anti-human craving for absolute order.'
2. An ordered plan requires an organization: In a book of sixty years ago, John Dewey wrote one of the best definitions of organization that I have ever seen: 'Organization is nothing but getting things into connection with one another so that they work easily, flexibly, and fully.' Otherwise expressed, organization is putting and keeping things in their proper relationships. The word 'keeping' is crucial here because ordered plans may be temporary, may be devised for only a single use. If plans are to have continuity, an organization must be built to keep them in operation.

In passing I might point out that some of the most difficult and emotionally arousing administrative problems of present-day American colleges and universities relate to the kinds of organization they shall have. The professors who declare administration to be unnecessary really mean that they do not like the complex organizations that the growth in size and the increase in functions of twentieth century higher education have made inevitable.

To many American professors, the present administrative structure seems too heavy; but during the past several decades a sound theory of organization has been developing in government, in the military establishment, in industry, and also in academic institutions. It goes by the name of functional administration and means the organization of functional specialists into a number of coordinate groups. In academic institutions four such functions besides general direction or general administration are coming to be recognized and established: (1) instruction and research, (2) student affairs, (3) public relations, and (4) business affairs. Thirty years ago hardly a university in the country operated under the principle of functional administration, but today scores if not hundreds do. The adoption of the principle is leading to the slow sloughing off of what Robert Maynard Hutchins of the University of Chicago in 1943 called the 'involved, bewildering, indefensible, narrow and antiquated' administrative structure so characteristic of American colleges and universities until relatively recently.

3. An organization must establish authority and a line of authority: A good deal of the authority in the world is spontaneous and automatic. Such is the authority of parents over their children at least during their younger years and also the authority of religious, political, and other social leaders over many of their adherents. When an organization is originally established, however, the question immediately arises as to who shall have authority. Watch a group of children organize a club or a team to see this process in operation -- and often with considerable clamor and sometimes with hard feeling.

Problems of the continuity of authority engage a sizeable fraction of past and current history. One of the most revolutionary ideas of all times bears upon this question: the philosophy of democracy which eliminates hereditary rights to authority and puts in the hands of all the people the power to choose, to criticize, to change those in authority.

But whatever the philosophy permeating an organization, it must establish a line of authority, a chain of command. Academic people do not like the terms authority and chain of command, but nonetheless they exist and must exist if colleges and universities are to function. When American colleges were small, business got done by direct personal relations; and this fact often concealed
the existence of the line of command or, in any case, blurred and softened it. When crises arose in those simpler days, however, the line of authority exerted itself. It must ever be so if organizations are to have order, if they are to function -- if they are to survive.

4. Authority involves not only giving orders but also willingness upon the part of those to whom they are addressed to cooperate in following them. Chester I. Barnard, who some years ago became president of the Rockefeller Foundation after 21 years in the presidency of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, has written what seems to me one of the most important books on administration ever published. It is entitled The Functions of the Executive. One of the most significant of its ideas is that authority is double-edged and not single-edged as commonly supposed.

Mr. Barnard points out that authority, to change the metaphor, has two sides -- the objective and the subjective -- and that the former has little avail without the latter. Thus if a person in authority commands that something be done which the individual commanded doesn't want to do, he may do it, but he will do it poorly and thus circumvent the wishes of the giver of the command. Everyone has seen this happen in his own children, among his friends, among his associates. And everyone with any spirit has done his own share of circumventing. Professors, as every administrator knows, do a good deal of it. Being individualists par excellence, they are masters of short-circuiting all procedures which they don't like; and if to boot, they don't like the administrator, they find ways to thwart him.

An incident at Ohio State University comes to mind in this connection. Someone in the President's office decided that a study should be made of how professors spend their time, and so a questionnaire went out to all members of the faculty. I remember hearing the head of the Classical Languages Department fuming about it at lunch at the Faculty Club. At first he decided not to answer it; but he changed his mind, and he gloated over the clever answer he thought up. Ignoring the itemized questions printed for detailed response, he wrote across the face of the questionnaire "I spend 24 hours a day in the service of Ohio State University." That was that, and it illustrates the Barnard principle that authority has two sides and that he who uses it will do so in vain unless he employs coercion or has the cooperation of the individual or individuals upon whom the authority is exercised.

5. To stimulate cooperation an administrator must be an able and persuasive communicator of ideas and sentiments: The word cooperation too infrequently gets broken down into its parts to make its meaning stand out more clearly: operation plus co -- acting together. To promote cooperation one must somehow get people to act together.

Barnard has a good deal to say in his book about what induces people to cooperate. He points out that monetary rewards are less potent here than most people think and that people make most of the basic decisions of their lives on other counts. A friend of Mr. Barnard's, the late Elton Mayo of Harvard, demonstrated this thesis experimentally in industrial studies; and I strongly recommend that you read not only Mr. Barnard's book but also Professor Mayo's Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization.
Cooperation, say both Barnard and Mayo, results from common purposes, and common purposes result from "the social conditioning of all who participate." In turn, social conditioning results from skill in communication upon the part of those in authority, skill in communicating the ideas and the sentiments that transform workers from solitary individuals into a social group with common purposes and hence a high morale.

Ability to communicate, writes Mayo, is the very essence of the social skill necessary to establish cooperation; and relating this principle to the educational situation, he writes:

"In these days, education has gone over -- often extravagantly -- to the development of technical skills and the appropriate scientific bases for such skills. This would be excellent were it not for the fact that the universities have failed to develop an equivalent study of, and instruction in, social skill. Students are taught logical and lucid expression; they are not taught that social skill begins in the art of provoking, and receiving, communications from others. The attitudes and ideas thus communicated, by no means wholly logical, will serve to form the basis of a wider and more effective understanding."

The implications of the Barnard and Mayo books are so tremendous that I could considerably lengthen this paper discussing them. I can cite and develop only one of these implications, namely, that college and university administrators need training -- and are coming in the United States to see the need of training -- in persuasive communication. Increasing numbers of them are learning the arts of getting people to express themselves freely and to work together toward common purposes commonly determined.

6. **Able and persuasive communication constitutes the primary factor in good administration:** Barnard declares "the establishment and maintenance of the system of communication," to be "the primary task" and "the central problem of executive functions." No other functions, he holds "can be accomplished without it, and none well done unless it is well done."

Administration is an ordered plan of getting the work of an institution done; an ordered plan requires an organization; an organization must establish authority, and a line of authority; authority involves not only giving orders but also willingness upon the part of those to whom they are addressed to cooperate in following them; to stimulate cooperation an administrator must be an able and persuasive communicator of ideas and sentiments; and to be an able and persuasive communicator constitutes the primary factor in good administration. The elements in this line of reasoning seem to me to mesh; and Barnard and Mayo would say that the place to begin is with the last element and to work backward. That to me is a most interesting point. I did not know it during my seventeen years as an administrator including six in a college presidency. I wish I had. Indeed, I had never heard of it which suggests that much needed -- and still needs -- to be done about informing academic administrators of the fundamentals of good administration.
Although "much still needs to be done" to inform American college and university administrators of the six central tendencies that I have described, great strides forward have been made in recent years. Greater strides seem certain in the future. American government and industry have in particular learned much about the nature of administration, and their knowledge finds its way into the academic world. Although I am wary of Japanese educators following American higher education structural diversity and methods of policy control, I believe that in operational control we are in the process of developing conceptions and practices that may perhaps be worthy of adaptation if not adoption in Japan. You will, of course, be the judges of that. Certainly the slovenliness that Ortega so vigorously criticized in the universities of his own country will never afflict you. Your inherent devotion to orderliness happily protects you from that abhorrent fate and, may I venture to suggest, makes Japanese and Americans -- who also honor order -- close academic kin.

Prepared in May 1957
for a meeting of administrators
from institutions of higher education in Japan.