This paper is an annotated list of fifty documents on the reconceptualist philosophy of curriculum theory delivered and/or published since 1973 and many of those published prior to 1973 which had a formative influence on the movement. Each source is identified by author, title, editor, and publishing date, and each is summarized and evaluated in a short essay. (MB)
CURRICULUM THEORY IN THE 1970's: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIST MOVEMENT, 
50 ANNOTATED SOURCES

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Introduction to the Bibliography

I undertook this research into the reconceptualist movement in curriculum theory during the summer of 1976 at the suggestion of Dr. O. P. Esteves of the Texas Tech University College of Education. With her help and the help of my research advisor, Dr. Billy Askins, I was able to design a project consisting of two components: literature review and in-person interviews. The project was funded by a Summer Research Assistantship from the Texas Tech Graduate School.

This bibliography is the product of the first component of the research--the literature review. It is quite comprehensive and, I feel, fairly complete in its coverage of the major works which have shaped the reconceptualist philosophy as well as of the major papers delivered and/or published by members of the reconceptualist movement since 1972.

One of the characteristics of the reconceptualist position is its organic growth and change; it incorporates new syntheses and thus never remains the same for very long. This bibliography, therefore, provides a glimpse of the movement as it was in the summer of 1976. Researchers who look at this material in years to come would do well to supplement this reading with the more recent works of authors represented here: the growth and development of thinkers such as William Pinar, Madeleine Grumet, Michael Apple, Alex Molnar, Janet Miller, Tim Riordan, Seven Mann, and others will reveal the growth and development of the movement.

Finally, though this educational position is being called the "reconceptualist movement," it should not be thought of in the usual sense of a "movement," since it lacks the highly organized structure generally associated with that term. Instead, it is a fluid coalition of individuals who share a similar conceptual framework and value system, and who object to the mechanistic production metaphor that predominates in American schooling at this time.

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Apple reminds us that school controversies usually focus on choices that fall within the rules of the game; almost never are the rules themselves challenged. Having said this, he goes on to clearly challenge the traditional basic assumptions that underlie the teaching of most science and social studies, and to offer alternatives.

He shows how competition and conflict within the community of scientists are omitted from the science curriculum, and outlines a curriculum that would include the exploration of how conflict makes a valuable contribution to creativity in science.

Apple then traces the focus of the American social studies curriculum to the acceptance of society as basically a cooperative system, in which conflict is seen as dysfunctional. He calls for a social studies curriculum that will focus on change, rather than the maintenance of equilibrium, as the true social "order," and on conflict and flux as the true social reality.

Interestingly, Apple has a gentle word of warning for educators: that theorizing can lead to "quietism or a perspective that...necessitates a continuing monologue on the complexity of it all, while the world tumbles down around us." In other words, we must act. As Apple points out, the educator's paradox is that one criticizes public education but continues to try and improve it: "...an ambiguous position, but, after all, so is one's total situation."

It requires much deliberate and difficult consciousness-raising for educators to confront the basic assumptions upon which they operate and which have become "second nature." These basic assumptions are usually grounded in the technological-scientific ethic (behaviorism, control, etc.) According to Apple, "These habitual ways of perceiving educational problems set the boundaries of curriculists' imaginations...." (p. 121)

Using Jurgen Habermas' three categories of science, Apple argues that educators must work to move education away from "strict" (that is, research-oriented) science and towards "critical" science that focuses on reflection, self-awareness, and dialectical exchange. He sees the two major problems historically in education as being (1) our inability to deal with ambiguity; and (2) our "continual pursuit of...simplistic answers to complex human dilemmas" (p. 127).

Finally, he points out that there is an inescapable connection between social and education thought, on one hand; and economic and political institutions, on the other; and that "to raise radical questions about one may mean raising equally radical questions about the other." (p. 129) In this, Apple aligns himself with all those social and educational critics who insist that one cannot consider the educational system apart from the society in which it exists, and that there cannot be a healthy institution in a society which is unhealthy at its core.

No brief summary could begin to do justice to this extensive and intricate paper. While Dr. Apple repeatedly points out questions which require deeper analysis than he can give, the paper does manage to go to the root of several critical issues.

Apple's basic theme is the need to question— in fact, to subject to rigorous critical analysis— our most basic, and usually taken-for-granted, assumptions. Our pose of neutrality, he maintains, is false— and our attempt to avoid confronting the ethical implications of our educational decisions must be challenged.

In the course of his discussion of critical viewpoints, Apple makes some interesting observations about why Marxist critical analysis has found so little support in the United States.

Apple discusses the implications of categorization at great length and supports the work of other educators in showing how it de-personalizes education and allows educators, once again, to avoid ethical considerations. Also, how, by focusing on students problems, the schools avoid facing their own role in creating those problems.

Finally, "Can we, as educators, honestly cope with the probability that certainty will not be forthcoming, that all our answers will be situational and filled with ambiguity? With this in mind, how do we commit ourselves to action?... Even our "neutral" activity may not be so. One has no choice but to be committed."

Apple and King start from the premise that schools are not failing, but succeeding--that schools are doing exactly what they were meant to do. If one accepts this premise, the task then becomes to study the larger social context, with the intention of discovering the "deep structure" of meanings and assumptions--the ideology--within which schools operate.

The second part of this paper is a brief review of the historical roots of the curriculum field. This review supports the authors' premise and leaves the reader with a depressing awareness that latent intent, or "deep structure," is by now so firmly embedded in our cultural subconscious that it may be impossible to change it in any significant way.

The third part of the paper takes the same idea and looks at it from another angle, by describing an average kindergarten classroom and "discovering the meanings: of the activities that go on in it. This section is devastating to read. Perhaps the core of any teacher-training program should consist of exercises involving extrapolation from papers such as this. One could have student-teachers read this paper, for example, and then talk and write about their own educational histories in such a way as to become aware of what was done to them, and how; and in what ways the acquiesced--and how that acquiescence shaped the assumptions which they now bring to their own training as teachers. How, from being the oppressed (as students) they learned how to be the oppressors (as teachers).

A wry, dry irony permeates this overview of educational reforms within the social context of the past twenty years, making this paper fun to read—a somewhat rare quality in educational writing. In addition, the overview itself makes clear and, it seems, accurate connections between social conditions or events and the responses of the educational institution. Three points seem particularly important:

1. That the innovations of the 60's and 70's were/are designed and directed by colleges and teacher-training institutions that do not recognize their own contribution to "the destructive nature of the whole educational enterprise, from kindergarten through graduate school." (p. 55)

2. That in a dominance-oriented culture such as ours, the purpose of the curriculum has been to ensure that "each child must internalize the cultural values—" This is not a new idea, but is one that bears repeating periodically.

3. That "tinkering with the surface of things or treating the symptoms of deep underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, decentralization, performance contracting, compensatory education, bidialectalism, experimental schools, sensitivity training, remedial reading, humanistic education--none of these liberal answers will contribute much to a pedagogy of liberation." (p. 65) Also, that "reform is part of the mythology of the pedagogy of domination...." (p. 66)
This paper answers the questions: What is the reconceptualist movement? What is the background of the movement and its current relationship to mainstream curriculum theory? What is its underlying philosophy? And, most importantly, what impact is it likely to have on the institution of schooling in America?

The author describes two divergent philosophical positions that are found within the Reconceptualist movement and outlines both their differences and their areas of common ground.

It is the conclusion of this author that the Reconceptualist position constitutes a viable and energetic new force within the field of curriculum theory and that the internal tensions in fact provide the dynamics for the formation of new syntheses in curriculum thinking.

A beautifully-constructed paper that leads the reader step by step through some very useful concepts: the levels, continuum, and intentionality of consciousness as it develops; the role of "limit situations" in consciousness-raising; the similarity of the individual consciousness to the collective, cultural consciousness; the function of myth in the collective consciousness; and the increasing polarization that occurs when individual and collective consciousness find themselves "out of sync" or in actual opposition.

Finally, Bullough ties all this together by situating the curriculum Reconceptualists with a larger movement which is attempting to uncover and re-create myths especially as they relate to schooling" and adds that the group must necessarily find itself "part of a vanguard of so-called radicals" because it does look critically, not only at school life, but at life in general.

The resulting struggle for understanding is, Bullough feels, a hopeful think, part of the consciousness-expanding process of "reaching out... moving through... recreation."

This paper is immensely satisfying to read: Bullough covers in 12 lucid pages more than most educational writers could cover in many more.
This paper is a brief historical overview of the origin and development of the modern curriculum movement since the 1870's. It mentions the impact of Frederick Taylor's management model (1920's) and Jerrold Zacharias' physics paradigm (1956-66)—which, Cremin points out, has much in common with the model suggested by W. T. Harris 80 years earlier.

The presentation of Zacharias' subject matter/grade levels graph brings two thoughts to mind. First, if this is similar to the model proposed by W. T. Harris in the 1870's why on earth is "articulation" of curriculum proclaimed as an innovative idea in the 1970's? Secondly, if the idea of an articulated curriculum is so old, so embedded in educational theorizing, then why is it not practiced in schools more than it is? Three answers, or possible part-answers, come to mind. First, field workers know little history of education, as the result of too-little emphasis on the value of a solid grounding in the foundations courses as a part of their professional preparation. Second, translating theory-conceptualizing into practice usually does not involve the practitioner—that is, the actual teachers—in developing the conceptualization. Third, teachers are not encouraged to talk to each other across grade levels. High school teachers, over the years, have come to feel that they can learn little from grade school teachers, for example; similarly, college teachers feel they can learn little from high school teachers; and so on. It occurs to me that this "divide and rule" separation of teachers at the various levels may be a control mechanism useful to administrators.

Finally, Cremin plays with the idea of returning to Harris' original model to see what relevance it may have in modern times, and hints that perhaps even "deschooling" isn't, after all, such a new idea.
It may be worth considering the view that curriculum makers keep inventing the wheel is reflective of an historian's perspective. Cremin's paper is, however, persuasive, and suggests among other things that university courses in curriculum should include far more study of the history of the curriculum field than they now seem to do.

When cummings delivered the Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard during the winter 1952-53, he surprised his audience by giving them, not literary criticism, but autobiography. The result--these "nonlectures"--forms an excellent example of the kind of autobiographical exploration suggested by some of the Reconceptualists: it includes not merely recollection of events, but the examination of the meanings of those events for the person who experienced them.

cummings stood on that stage and revealed himself to his listeners not only so that they would know him, but also that he should further know himself. He was not merely being exhibitionistic or egotistical; rather, he was making a gift of himself and also of the method he was using, saying (without saying so): "here is a way that you, too, may use to learn yourself."

An excellent recent source on this topic. The book consists of an introductory essay by the editor, which is followed by nine essays on four different aspects of the theme. Of particular interest are "John Dewey and the Existential Phenomenologist" by Leroy Troutner; "Literature, Existentialism, and Education" by Maxine Greene; "That Mode of Being Called Teaching," by David Denton; and "The Multiple Realities of Schooling," by Clinton Collins.

"Remember what it was to be me: that is always the point," Says Didion in this useful essay. It is included in a bibliography on the Reconceptualists because of the Reconceptualist emphasis on knowing who you are: on self-study which reveals you to yourself as a being-in-the-world, with (if you choose to take it) control over your own life. Consequently, some Reconceptualists turn to autobiography, the keeping of journals, and other techniques of self-exploration: Didion's essay, thus, is pertinent.
Dr. Greene makes an articulate plea for teachers to be authentically self-aware, and to teach in such a way that students will become engaged in learning, and will re-discover the power of history (enabling them to make their own), of professionalism, and of active "policy-orientation" (The existential project) in spite of the Con-III characteristics of ahistoricism, self-righteousness, and anti-intellectualism.

In spite of the naivete of Reich's conception, teachers can learn from it, and from the youth culture that it attempts to describe. We can try to understand their sense of powerlessness, disrespect for history, and scorn of professionalism: understanding these, and their causes, may help us find ways to teach so as to combat them.

Dr. Greene points out that educators don't have to try and be "Con-III" types, but that if we can love those who are, then maybe we can "succeed in engaging some of them in what ought to be a distinctly human endeavor: releasing people (in defiance of the monolith) to learn." She feels that we should teach history as "an interpretation of a set of interpretations"—not as objective truth, and in such a way that students can genuinely relate to it and feel power to act, maybe even to change it. We should help students to "define the possibilities of significant action."

"Deeply troubled about powerlessness, aware of the irrational and often brutal ends for which power is used in our society, I still believe persons are free to choose themselves as powerless—or not. They are free to perceive social opportunities as "slots" which they are being "processed" to fill—or not. The obvious way to cope with these modes of seeing is to enable young people to conceptualize in the technological society, to understand the ways in which it works, to recognize the interstices through which restless people can move....."
This book should be read, slowly and thoughtfully, by every educator and every teacher-trainee. It would also be appropriate for the layman who is concerned about the state of public education in our culture. Too rich to summarize in its entirety, selected thoughts from several chapters are included here in order to give a general idea of the book’s viewpoint:

Chapter 1 - DOING PHILOSOPHY

"There is a loss of anchorage in our society. Even in the academic world, there are few enduring norms. The teacher can only try to find out how to think about what is happening around him and, after that, how to think what he is doing in the crisis-ridden world." (p. 20)

The teacher should be acquainted with the movies of his day and "try to help his students understand that they are not instances of photographed reality...like novels, poems, paintings, they tap realms of imaginative possibility ...." (p. 16)

Chapter 2 - CHOOSING A PAST

It is necessary to understand the paradigms of the past, even though they are "no longer viable or sensible." (p. 37)

Greene uses this chapter to do a quick overview of the changing shape of philosophical thinking, from antiquity to the present.

Chapter 3 - MAN: THE CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUE

"There are bound to be implications for education when so many individuals find their lives so inconsequential, if only because people who feel anonymous and unimportant are unable to assume responsibility for effecting change." (p. 46)
Greene, Maxine. Teacher as Stranger. Page 2

Preoccupied with identity, dignity, etc. as reflected in the events of the 1960's.

Skinnerian view vs. Rogerian, pp. 54-55.

"The issue for the teacher IN the school is not so much whether the critics are right or wrong in their more sweeping condemnations but whether the teacher's view of himself and the individuals in his class permits him to work authentically towards the realization of possibilities." (p. 62)

Chapter 4 - BEING AND LEARNING

"Teaching...must be carried on deliberately in situations never twice the same..."

This chapter is about how people arrive at certain assumptions about human nature; it reviews the myths on which our culture bases its general approach to education. It traces the thinking of Socrates, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, and Dewey in defining man. It discusses the problem of definitions: the way they can exclude possibilities, contributing to an attitude of determinism. Categorization also shuts out the possibility of the unexpected act, and limits a teacher's view of her students--she cuts off the chance that the student may surprise her, by abstracting and categorizing the student.

P. 88 - predictive vs. explanatory determinism

"Desperate for an explanation of slow learning, the teacher too frequently gives way to the temptation of a determinist answer...(and assumes) that what a person is determines what he should be..." pp. 90-91.

Determinist answer leads to self-fulfilling prophecy

The teacher must balance, existing in tension between allowing students to create themselves, and guiding them to skills that will help them to do so--
Dr. Greene is optimistic. Despite modern conditions of oppression and malaise, she says, "...our obligation as educators is to enable students to take action against such powerlessness... I happen to believe that this kind of awakening can still occur in schools..." Towards the end of the paper, she gives an example of how a good teacher might move both him/herself and the students towards "gradual disclosure of inner and outer horizons" using a dialogic method.

In addition to sharing this guideline for application, Dr. Greene makes several other useful points in this paper, one of which is as clear a definition of the term "cognitive action" as one is likely to find:

...knowing what one is doing and doing things in a way that effects connections within experience, with a full awareness of the suitability of certain means to certain ends. (p. 78)

Another useful facet of this paper is Dr. Greene's discussion of Dewey, Sartre, and Freire. She begins with Dewey because, as she points out, we have all been "reared in a Deweyan tradition"—all thoroughly immersed in the pragmatic approach which links thought to action. But Dr. Greene shows that a crucial difference between a Deweyan viewpoint and a Sartean one is that thinking, for Dewey, leads to a resolution of a conflict or condition of disequilibrium: until the conflict is resolved, forward movement is not possible. While for Sartre, praxis (purposeful human activity) "signifies a refusal of some given reality in the name of a reality to be produced." One moves toward the unknown.

To simplify still further, one might say that in Dewey's terms, thinking takes place in a moment of pause between problem and solution, In Sartre's view, the thinking itself is not a moment of pause but a moment of motion. And for Freire, it may even, if it is motion to a higher level of consciousness, become a moment leading to liberation.

This is a difficult paper, which moves the reader's understanding of curriculum into a new dimension, that of consciousness; that is, curriculum conceived as the intentional making of new totalities, by the learner, taking into account both his personal existential predicament or situation and his primordial consciousness or "background awareness." This view sees students as the makers of their own curriculums, with help and guidance from teachers "...willing to engage in dialogue...to help him pose his problems."

The paper takes off from an interesting point: a comparison of the difference in approach of Americans and Europeans to literary criticism. While British and Americans tend to see the work as separate from the life of the author, the Europeans ("critics of consciousness" Greene calls them) see the work and the life as inextricable—"a conscious effort on the part of an individual artist to understand his own experience by framing it in language." In addition, Greene points out that the reader re-creates, and goes beyond the work itself, "lending his own life" to the work as he reads. Seen in this way, no art object can be autonomous.

Greene makes this point about literary criticism because she views the making of a personal curriculum to be akin to the making of a work of art; each an integral part—and product—of the total life of the student, or the artist.
Dr. Greene uses a small section from Moby Dick to illustrate what she means by "mystification", and then sets about to convince the reader that one, at least, of the important functions of the Foundations areas--philosophy, sociology, history, and so forth--is to contribute to "de-mystification."

"The obligation of the foundations professor is...many-pronged. Teachers-to-be must be introduced to the concepts and principles that compose the relevant interpretive disciplines. They must be enabled to look through the perspectives opened by history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and philosophy; they must learn how to consciously order the materials of their experience with the aid of such perspectives...to understand the role of the disciplines, the role of organized subject matter in selecting out aspects of reality. This means a capacity (too seldom attended to) to engage in new kinds of questioning and problemposing, appropriate to an overly dominated human world." (p. 15)

The need for de-mystification is even more crucial in an ever more technological society, she argues, and is not "subversive:" on the contrary, is thoroughly in line with the traditional understanding of democratic citizenship.

"...teacher educators ought to work to combat the sense of ineffectuality and powerlessness that comes when persons feel themselves to be the victims of forces wholly beyond their control.... They would by acting on behalf of a tradition of free institutions, acting on their freedom in the light of principle. For all the present pressures and aberrations within contemporary society, I cannot see this as anything but the enactment of what is thought of as democracy."

She warns those who would work in this way against the trap of arrogance or certainty:
"Working in this fashion with students, liberating them to understand that the social reality they..."
inhabit is a constructed one, educators ought to avoid, if possible, the high-sounding voice of expertise. They and their students might well enter a conversation with one another...a being together in a world susceptible to questioning... formal inquiry, scientific thinking, and the rest are significant to the degree they nourish the human conversation." (p. 25)

Grumet defines "education" as a person's dialogue with his own experience, and maintains that this definition is incompatible with behaviorism.

She identifies the following concepts common to existentialism, phenomenology, and Currere: dialogue/dialectic; paradox-ambiguity; context and self-report; one's own voice versus the empirical paradigm. Then illustrates how the roots of Currere can be traced to the works of Husserl and Sartre.

Phenomenology repudiated psychologism and empiricism.

Existentialism repudiated idealism.

Currere repudiates behaviorism & technocracy.

This is a long and complex paper, elegantly written by a person who seems to have a thorough grasp of modern philosophies as well as of research in this area.

This paper will please readers who move back and forth between the first and third categories of curriculum work outlined by James Macdonald in "Curriculum Theory" (1971)—that is, between theorizing as a playful/creative philosphizing or sense-making, and as a tool for actual classroom application.

Grumet shows how the use of autobiographical and theatre exercises can help us to "transfer our attention from (schools, methodologies, academic disciplines) these forms themselves to the ways in which a student uses them and moves through them."

Using Grotowski's "poor theatre" concept (theatre which deliberately strips itself of stylistic conventions) she coins the term "poor curriculum" as curriculum in which "we turn our focus from the artifacts themselves, the Bunsen burner, Silas Marner, Greenwich Time, nongrading... to the ways in which the individual student confronts them."

The body of her paper consists of a two-part section on the Theory and Projects of Autobiography and a similar two-part section on the Theory and Projects of Theatre, as used in student teacher seminars, high school classes, and undergraduate courses. The projects, in particular, suggest the kinds of things that may be tried in classrooms.

Grumet mentions several interesting areas for future exploration: work with experienced teachers; work within different kinds of school settings; and work which will prove that application of Currere need not be elitist.

The reader may find him/herself curious to know whether there is a place one might go, to see these classroom application in action. This impulse
to see it happening should probably be resisted. Not only do such classrooms need privacy and autonomy, but would-be visitors should probably instead get busy exploring these approaches in their own classrooms, in ways authentic to themselves and their own situations. Watching someone else do it is too likely to create "That-is-how-it-should-be-done" mind-sets.
"Learning" is not something that is done to a person (when he or she is "taught"); rather, it is a never-ending process of being-in-the-world, "always emergent as past and future-become horizons of a present." This being true, the task of the curriculum worker is to design environments that "encourage the moment of vision, when the past and future are the horizons of the individual's present so that his own potentiality for being is grasped. Education is a manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography of the individual with the unfolding history of his society."

The point that the society, too, is temporal, enfolding past, present, and future in shifting rhythms of continuity and change, is an important one; in making this point, Huebner reminds us that the individual lives in a social context and must take it into account: "...the man who tries to shape society beyond its limits of tolerance is out of tune with his society and must be held in check...educational institutions must concern themselves with the individuals's temporality within the historical rhythm of the society."

Finally, Huebner makes the point that "educational purpose," because it shapes the educational environment and the dialectic between individuals and society and the rhythms of continuity and change, "...is part of the political ideological struggle existing in any evolving society."

More than any other curriculum reconceptualist, Huebner has been concerned with the ways in which language limits the teacher's understandings of classroom existence. In this essay, he discusses the way in which acceptance of language systems from the social sciences and psychology keep the teacher from recognizing the mystery involved in the acts of teaching: "...the curricular worker seems unwilling to deal with mystery or doubt or unknowables." Huebner goes on to suggest that new questions must be asked if teachers are to be enabled to break out of this kind of language trap. He discussed five value systems--technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical--stressing that the first three are dominant now, but the last two must be encouraged and emphasized if teachers are to become genuine teachers rather than conceiving of themselves as technicians.

The very ways in which we talk to and about children are a function of the cultural assumptions we have assimilated and unconsciously pass on—not just what we say, but how we say it.

Educators must be aware of this, and bring intentionality to their work. Huebner discusses three "facets of man's temporality" which, he feels, must be given equal consideration in educational thinking: memory and tradition; the activity of interpretation; and "the phenomenon of community as a caring collectivity in which individuals share memories and intentions." With these in mind, he suggests we consider the individual, the past, and the community and interrelate them through hermeneutical, political, and work activity.

Huebner goes on to give an illustration of how this might be done, using the teaching of reading as an example, and shows that the educational process should be a genuine two-way exchange, not a one-way process. This, he feels, would help children to more effectively feel themselves in the world and, in fact, to feel as if they can shape the world instead of learning—as they are now taught—to passively be shaped.

"The question of value that should be asked in education, then, is not what is valuable and hence should be learned by the young, but what is valuable enough to be conserved as part of the past and made present to the young? By that question I wish to draw attention to the way the educator too frequently talks about learning as a form of normative control rather than as a possibility for the future." (p. 49)

"(The child) is left with the awareness that the public world is made and that he is a misfit, rather than with the awareness that the public world is always in the process of being reworked and that he has a right to rework it. He does not perceive himself as engaged in work activity or political activity." (p. 50)

An interesting paper that traces the development of management theory and its impact on education. Efficiency, standardization, and diversification are discussed in relation to the ways in which they have become elements in school management and in curriculum theory and development.

Recent programs such as IPI (Individually Prescribed Instruction) and others are found to be efficiency and standardization-related, rather than genuinely individualized approaches to teaching and learning. Kliebard warns that the great threat of the application of the "production" metaphor (the term used to denote management theory as applied to education) is that "The bureaucratic model...threatens to destroy...the satisfaction that one may find in intellectual activity." He further warns that separation of ends and means in education is a travesty of the genuine education experience, and represents a deterministic outlook on human behavior--in a word, that it is manipulative and, consequently, in fundamental opposition to the true meaning of education.

This essay, which first appeared in Educational Comment in 1970, provides further evidence that what one may have thought of as "innovative" curriculum developments of the 1960's and 70's are often, in reality, simply reworkings of much earlier ideas.

Dr. Kliebard discusses the "impulse to reject the past" that seems characteristic of the curriculum field in terms of two consequences. First, the simple ignorance of the history of the field itself, which aids in (a) the perpetuation of myths, and in (b) the tendency to re-invent the wheel. Second, the urge to do good, or to improve the world, which seems to lie at the base of curriculum work. A third issue is raised by the lack of agreement, within the field itself, on definitions; this leads to further confusion and helps to keep the field fragmented and chaotic.

Toward the end of this paper, Dr. Kliebard presents the "persistent issues" of curricular objectives and differentiated curriculum, and again uses historical perspectives to illuminate current attitudes on these two issues. In his view, the emphasis on curricular objectives is closely related to the widespread acceptance of the technological/production model and should be replaced by creative alternatives which go beyond, but do not ignore, the limiting framework of the past 50 years. Kliebard's criticism of the concepts underlying the use of behavioral objectives makes good sense and provides much food for thought.

Kliebard puts the Tyler "rationale"--first stated in 1950--into perspective in his typically lucid manner. Kliebard's rejection of the concept of behavioral objectives (at least as used within the production model) is supported by his detailed analysis of Tyler's "three sources" of objectives. "One wonders," Kliebard remarks, "whether the long-standing insistence by curriculum theorists that the first step in making a curriculum be the specification of objectives has any merit whatsoever..." and "...the simplistic notion that evaluation is a process of matching objectives with outcomes leaves much to be desired. It ignores what may be the more significant latent outcomes in favor of the manifest and anticipated ones, and it minimizes the vital relationship between ends and means."
This article provides a clear theory model that combines systems theory and aesthetic rationality in a dynamic process. It clearly outlines the dangers of relying too heavily on scientific/technological rationality, and argues that education must guard against this, by conscious and deliberate inclusion of aesthetic-intuitive-open-dynamic rationality. The following quotes will give a more specific idea of Macdonald's arguments, and the illustration on the next page will provide a general idea of the model itself.

First, Macdonald defines theorizing as "the development of frameworks from which designs can be generated, rather than as the testing of designs." He sees two basic problems facing the curriculum theorizer: first, the conflict between scientific-technological-systems rationality (which he calls closed rationality) and aesthetic rationality (which he calls open rationality). The second problem is the conflict between those who would be neutral and those who would be committed. This is really the same conflict as the first--only it is put in terms of values.

"...at this point in scientific knowledge and theory, the basic scientific understandings of the nature of reality no longer resemble a systems metaphor. Therefore, the systems metaphor applied to human behavior in curriculum settings is already predictably inadequate for any long-range theorizing...The danger of our present systems approach to human behavior is that...(it) will become so USEFUL in solving our problems of efficiency and effectiveness that we shall be in grave danger of losing contact with reality through aesthetic rationality."

Macdonald observes the inadequacy of philosophy as the framework for theory: "...philosophies...are explications of abstract systems--grids placed rather rigidly over life asking for a consistency and completeness that simply do not exist in the situation..."
"...a general action system theory (that) provides a spatial grid within which the maximization of freedom may dynamically operate."

From this general framework, certain propositions can be generated:

1. Curriculum is not one thing—it is an interactional hypothetical construct which can be "known" only after the fact.

2. Concrete embodiment of the curriculum is the artificially constructed environments in which schooling takes place.

3. The curriculum is CONTINUALLY IN CREATION.

4. The construction of the contrived environment should be based in technological rationality.

5. The contrived environment of the instructional setting should be based in aesthetic rationality (i.e., teacher-student relationships).

Points 3, 4, and 5 seem particularly worth remembering: point 3, because we all tend to make something and then say: "it is made; leave it--don't tamper with it." Points 4 and 5 because, taken together they form a balance between the conflicting viewpoints of scientific/closed and aesthetic/open rationality identified earlier by Macdonald. We can use the products of technological-scientific rationality; we must use the interpersonal techniques of aesthetic rationality and so achieve a healthy, harmonious balance.
Definitions of "curriculum" vary: some consider it to be subject matter only, while others view it as all school experiences.

Conceptions of "theorizing" vary: for some, theory is a guide for applied curriculum development; for a second group, it means scientific, conceptual, research-oriented theory; for yet others, theorizing is a playful, creative intellectual task. **ONE PERSON MAY OPERATE AT ALL THREE LEVELS AT DIFFERENT TIMES, depending on the demands of the situation.**

As Huebner has shown, the intent of theorizing can be characterized by its language. It can be either descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimizing, prescriptive, or affiliative. (Huebner, "The Task of the Curriculum Theorist" mimeo/author, Columbia Teachers College, 1968)

The production model (Tyler Rationale) assumes "acceptance of contemporary social values (thus eliminating the value question of what to teach)."

Macdonald groups curriculum theorizing into three categories:

1. knowledge-oriented (subject matter)
2. reality-oriented (political, social realities)
3. value-oriented (as soon as theory takes form in a curriculum design it becomes a value statement)

"Curriculum theory...might be said to be the essence of educational theory because it is the study of how to have a learning environment."
This short pamphlet is packed with ideas, information, and concepts about a humanistic-existential approach to schooling. Little of it is new or startling, yet one too seldom sees such ideas in practice in real school settings.

The model presented is useful especially for the two components included in it which are left out of many models: genuine exploration, and transcending (in the existential sense of the term).

Putting such a model into practice would require creatively different approaches to teacher inservice, and also implies an altered role for administrators.

The notes that follow will summarize several of the most important points made in the pamphlet, and an illustration of the model itself will follow on the next page.

A model of schooling must include: goals and purposes; a pattern of organization; some idea of desired relationships; and an idea of how to assess itself.

The Tyler Rationale has served as the basis of curriculum development for 25 years. Macdonald, Wolfson, and Zaret, who oppose the behavioral objective/technological/efficiency model which resulted discovered that they could not use Tyler's questions and apply their own value base: "...we soon discovered that we had really raised a different set of highly inter-related questions encompassing broader socio-cultural issues."

"...education is not only NOT value-free, it is (along with politics) the most value-laden of human activities. The important questions, therefore, are in what directions are we headed, and in what directions should we be headed...."
the HUMANISTIC-EXISTENTIAL PERSONAL MODEL OF LEARNING

EXPLORING/trying out, feeling
fantasizing, probing, sensing. Internal--
takes time, is not readily apparent to an
observer (most schools ignore this)

TRANSCENDING/resolve conflicts,
clarify purposes, make commit-
ments, risk failure, acknowledge
desires. Insightful knowing,
creation of personal meanings.
acting on understandings (most
schools oppose this)

INTEGRATING/attitudes, values
perceptions, skills, infor-
mation, performance. Tentative
patterning, no closure yet.
(most schools exploit this)

This model is
dynamic, interactive
simultaneous or cyclical
transaction-oriented

There are 3 fundamental concepts necessary today for
intelligent social decision-making: Liberation (vs. control);
pluralism (vs. standardization); and participation (vs. decision-

CURRICULUM IS the environment which has been selected as
a set of possibilities for learning transactions. It includes:
the learning environment (genuine choices, enough time to explore,
real support, suspension of judgment); student-and-teacher re-
lationships (teacher self-aware, authentic, flexible, a continuing
learner); and content (holistic approach, avoid fragmentation).

Decisions about curriculum must take into account: organ-
ization (graded vs. areas of investigation); structure (decided
by adults vs. organic); and syntax (structured vs. playful
experiencing).

EVALUATION--two kinds proposed by Macdonald et al: educational
evaluation, within the school, of the total educational environ-
ment, including self-evaluation by students and teachers; and
social accountability, between school and community, including
the opportunity for community members to participate in school
decision-making, unrestricted observation, and access to data
gathered in the educational evaluation.

If curriculum thinking is inevitably gounded in values, and if this is not clearly understood, curriculum people will continue to have trouble talking to each other. We are not, as Macdonald says, "...working out of the same basic...metaphors..."

Macdonald offers the following conceptual framework, in an effort to clarify the relationships between curriculum thinking and value systems:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Design:</th>
<th>Subject Problems of Living Needs Emerging Designs Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Axiology:</td>
<td>Cultural (knowledge, cultural heritage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Basic Cognitive Human Interests:</td>
<td>Empirical- Analytical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That Are the Ground for Knowledge:</td>
<td>Control (technical interest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Development Models:</td>
<td>Linear Expert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Macdonald's two basic premises are (1) that human interest lies at the root of all curriculum thinking; and (2) that basic differences of opinion in curriculum thinking arise from differing views about CONTROL, CONSENSUS, and LIBERATION.

Using the conceptual framework provided by Jurgen Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests (that is, that there are three major human interests: control, understanding, and liberation), Macdonald reviews the curriculum theory field and comes to the conclusion that it is "in much better shape" than he had thought. "There is indeed a definite and definable intellectual thrust and potency when viewed in terms of intentionality. What previously had appeared to me to be bits and pieces of interesting intellectual activity forms a dynamic mosaic pattern from this viewpoint." There is, in Macdonald's opinion, a movement, and whether it is called "Reconceptualist" or by some other name not yet formulated, it is a real and growing force in curriculum theorizing.

This paper and its bibliography could serve as a sort of course-of-study, or project, for the student of curriculum theory; by reading Habermas and, in turn, all the other sources cited by Macdonald, the student could begin to get a feel for the "state of the art," at least in terms of the conceptual framework chosen by Macdonald, which does seem to help in clarifying the various approaches to curriculum theorizing.

The critic, according to Mann, is not a practitioner, but one who stands back and observes the practitioner with the intention of discovering meaning in the patterns of choices made by the practitioner. Further, "The meanings the curriculum critic discloses are...meanings about which he believes ethical judgments are to be made. An appropriate final problem to be considered...is whether or not his critique should include these judgments...my tentative conviction is that the critic would do well to write his critique in dimensions that to him are of ethical import, thereby giving tools to the practitioner, and allow the latter the freedom to employ the critique, or the many critiques, as he and his colleagues who design curricula sees fit."

The above gives an extremely sketchy idea of Mann's premises and really fails to do justice to the complexity of his conceptions and the detail with which he develops them. Readers interested in this line of thought are urged to read Mann's paper for themselves.

In the final section of the paper, Mann spells out the "two unorthodox propositions underlying all the arguments in this paper." The first is that "New understanding of what is involved in curriculum will come from those scholars who can MAKE THE HEURISTIC LEAP from the data they must know well to the ethical roots of their concern." In other words, there must be a creative fusion of the objective ("data they must know well") with the ethical, and that this fusion is, or makes possible, a leap of imagination to a new insight or understanding.

The second "unorthodox proposition" suggests that educators measure the success of their ventures by the products they turn out, and are "unwilling to judge or even note the qualities of the situation itself...Is it possible that the educator's pre-occupation with products involves an escape, by removal in time, from the responsibility to see and value education in ethical terms altogether?" It seems to me that this intriguing question deserves open discussion in all colleges of education, perhaps particularly in curriculum courses.

In this paper, Mann begins by noting that there "is not yet a discipline of curriculum theory, but that most of the ingredients for one are present in solution," adding towards the end that "Most of what bears the name of "curriculum theory" is not theoretical at all but is more properly considered praxeological"—that is, directed towards application in classrooms. Outlining the three kinds of structure said by Schwab* to exist in all disciplines (that is, organizational, substantive, and syntactical) Mann proposes that a study of the correlation of these structures, as they occur in the field of education, could provide the field of curriculum theory with the discipline that it has been lacking.

He further suggests a way to "proceed with curriculum theory construction." First, assumptions about the three structures should be made as explicit as possible. Second, problems should be identified in relation to these structures rather than in relation to practical problems of schooling. Third, speculation should lead to the generation of theoretical models; and fourth, systematic data gathering should be conducted, with the intention of furthering the development of the theoretical models.

This paper helps somewhat to define the boundaries and clarify the differences between the practical and theoretical approaches to curriculum theorizing and makes a persuasive case for the theoretical approach being of more importance in the long run.


Mann and Molnar here present a definition of student rights and responsibilities that would surely, if implemented, threaten the status quo and frighten the average school principal right out of his wits. And they go even further, by suggesting some concrete steps that might be taken by teachers to realize this new definition. In the course of this short paper they expose the intent-to-oppress which controls students in schools almost absolutely, and which shows itself in such culturally entrenched policies as maintaining the myth of the value-free curriculum; distracting students with controlled in-school activities (usually connected with student government); and the tactic of refusing to allow student action for one social cause on the argument that all other causes must then be allowed "equal time."

Implementation of the belief that students have both the right and the responsibility to study and engage in progressive social action may begin, as Mann and Molnar suggest, with the teacher; but it will succeed only to the extent that it has the full support of the school administration. This, then is where the most difficult task lies—in the reform of the kind of training experienced by all of our future school principals and superintendents.

This remarkable article, written 20 years ago, is still so pertinent that it should be the first assignment made in every Introduction to Research course. Clearly, however, it has not been so utilized. If it had, the shape of educational research might have changed in the past 20 years, and more people would be engaged in research as a personal, creative process rather than as a hurdle to be jumped for a degree or a necessary activity engaged in for the purpose of securing career promotion. In fact, the prevailing product-oriented attitude has been reinforced and strengthened in the last 20 years by the rapid growth of computer technology; this has, it seems, led us still further from the hopeful viewpoint proposed by Dr. Mooney in 1957.

In addition, the tightening job market and the emphasis at most universities on research for its own sake, with no particular judgments made by anyone as to the value of the chosen problems, has ensured that (1) doctoral candidates are even less inclined than before to deviate from the traditionally acceptable research format, and (2) thousands of more or less trivial doctoral theses pile up in university libraries and microfilm storage tanks and are of no particular use to anyone—not even to the students who invested time and energy in producing them.

It might seem that the chances of altering this situation now are very small, but perhaps for this very reason Mooney's article continues to be important. Mooney proposes a shift from what he calls the "consumer's" point of view (concerned with product) to the "producer's" point of view (concerned with process). After carefully explaining these, he adds to the end of his paper a list of 50 research questions which are surely of vital importance and among which, it seems, any educator would find several which have personal meaning and appeal for him or her and on which the researcher would willingly spend time and energy, with enthusiasm rising out of personal involvement with the problems.

This short essay is the first of the "reactions" to the papers that formed the substance of the 1973 Rochester Conference and which form the body of this book. Osborn describes the role of the small discussion group of which he was a member during the conference; its reactions to the focus on heightened consciousness and the function of the group for its members as a place where they could "come down" from the "conference high."

Interestingly, it seems the group wanted the theorists to be more practical, and that they were not practical became a "formidable ideological gulf."

Osborn closes by challenging the Reconceptualists to "realistically propose a curriculum of higher consciousness for American schools" in such a way that it might have a recognizable hope of being successfully implemented—in such a way that the practitioners could see that it could work and presumably could thus risk trying it. Osborn implies that unless this can be done, it will never become a movement of any lasting significance.

Pinar's ability to move from particular to universal is remarkable. He begins this paper by sharing some highly personal self-exploration, and then moves from that into a more general discussion of the Currere philosophy and the importance of reconceptualization. He concludes by giving a brief history of the movement, an idea of where it might lead in the next twenty years, and some suggestions for those who may choose this path. A few notes on this paper are included below.

I.

Effects of schooling: warped fantasy life; many forms of self-estrangement; focus on "the individual" has always been from the teacher's point of view....

Currere: "...it is not the course to be run, or the artifacts employed in the running of the course; it is the running of the course...our experience of our lives."

Some steps of "the method of Currere:"
--biography of one's life in schools
--keep a journal
--analyze present personal reading
--write a "novel" of one's present life
--study relationships revealed in the above 4 steps

II.

History of the reconceptualist movement.

Where it all may--hopefully--lead: "to a synthesis of the two cultures--the scientific with the humanistic and artistic." (p. 36)

Suggestions: deliberate correspondency; a journal or newsletter; involve more students; annual meetings; include the conceptual-empiricists (implies that polarization is to be avoided if possible.)

Pinar's informal style makes this paper fun to read, and the steps of the "the method" are clearly described. However, both the method itself and the literary style used to explain it are intensely personal; educators who prefer conventional research format may find this disconcerting.

According to Pinar, examination of one's past, present, and future using the "method" yields "...a coherence. Not necessarily a logical one, but a lived one, a felt one." The "method" takes the self as its data source, and utilized free association in following four steps: Regressive (past-present); Progressive (present-future); Analytical (present); and Synthetic (past-present-future). "Critical consciousness" or the "transcendental ego" may be the result—one may be able to escape one's biography (another way to say it would be the ability to break out of one's life scripts by recognizing what they are) through the process of examining it. In this process, one learns to recognize one's own voice....

Some critics may assert that this highly personal self-examination will yield a different result for every individual, and that therefore there is no common result to build upon in terms of providing learning experiences in schools. Pinar seems to agree, but only up to a point: There will be individual variations in biographies, he acknowledges, but also one may discern a common structure underlying them. Possibly this is because, generally speaking, American children grow up within a powerfully structured social-cultural environment and are influenced by more or less similar formative forces.

This paper sets itself a twofold task: first, to reply to those critics who object to what they view as an absence of an activist-political dimension in Currere; second, to comment upon the complaints of those critics who seem uncomfortable with the method of Currere for more psychological, perhaps personal reasons.

Pinar's answer to the first ("political") group of critics is that Currere is not incompatible with political activism—that, in fact, since it is a method of raising the ontological level, of oneself, one's students, and one's colleagues—it can of itself be seen as a political strategy.

Pinar also makes an interesting observation about what constitutes genuine education: it occurs when one passes beyond merely comprehending an idea, and begins to make use of it to shed light on problems of one's own choosing.

These two points were, for this reader, the most useful part of this paper.

Pinar's reply to the second ("psychological") group of critics is less satisfactory, mainly because the nature of their criticism is not clear. This may not be Pinar's fault he observes that they appear to have both latent and manifest criticisms—this may be the source of the lack of clarity. The manifest criticism seems to be an objection to Pinar's highly personal literary style. Pinar identifies the latent criticism as an objection to his use of his own personal biography or perhaps even to himself and his background. Neither of these objections seem very important and Pinar is quite correct in spending most of his paper responding to the political critics who, at least, seem more honest and forthright.

A third interesting concept that is explored in this paper is the idea of the transmission of energy between people of differing ontological levels.

Pinar rejects the "we-they" political dichotomy and observes that "the most fundamental expression of social justice (is) the comradeship of the entire species...specific political strategies are less important than the ontological status of the...strategists. Ontologically high people create and effectively use high (or humanized) strategies."

Using the "madness" charge made by David Cooper and R. D. Laing, Pinar discusses twelve effects of schooling and demonstrates how "...the cumulative effect of the schooling experience is devastating," and creates "credentialed but crazed" human beings. The twelve effects of schooling discussed are:

- distortion of fantasy life
- loss of self through modeling
- loss of autonomy
- loss of self-love
- thwarting of affiliative needs
- estrangement from self
- other-direction
- self-as-role: objectification
- false-self systems
- loss of ability to be alone
- disconfirmation
- loss of aesthetic capacities

Laing and Cooper, Pinar notes, "are less explicit about the outlines of reformations." Pinar, too, saves these questions for another time.

In this essay, Roszak challenges the subject-object dualism of Western culture that has led to excessive stress on "objectivity" at the expense of fundamental human symbolisms.

Two of these symbolisms which he discusses (calling them "root meanings"—experience and symbol together) are the notions of vision-flight and of gravity-fallenness as basic elements within the subconscious of the human species:

"The shamanic vision-flight, one of those supreme symbols of human culture which has been elaborated into thousands of religious and artistic expressions, embedded in the foundations of language, driven like a taproot into the bottommost stratum of our consciousness..."

The notion of gravity as a transcendent symbol (fallenness, etc.) was warped, according to Roszak, by Newton's attempt to objectify it; this was the beginning of "scientific objectivity" and of a deep cultural alienation that is the inevitable result of separating a fundamental concept from its root meanings:

"...objectivity demanded that Newton strip his scientific vocabulary of its symbolic resonance..."

Protestant Christianity, maintains Roszak, is impoverished by the resulting single vision; that is, refusal to regard the world in animistic and symbolic ways. To encounter the world on both levels, he suggests, (both objective and symbolic) "...is to abolish the alienative dichotomy" of subject/object.

The thoughts expressed by Roszak in this essay are clearly pertinent to reconceptualization in education, for "root meanings" are precisely what are missing in school curriculums. Whether this was deliberate, as many social critics are now suggesting; or accidental—a byproduct of the way the education institution grew in this country—it is nonetheless true of all school work/planning/teaching that approaches its task from the scientific-technological-empirical point of view. Any method of raising the ontological level through self-exploration, any educational strategy that has "critical consciousness" as its goal, would surely attempt to "encounter the world on both levels" as Roszak suggests.

*Search For a Method* is a difficult book for the beginning student of philosophy. Sartre assumes much prior knowledge in his readers, and much goes unexplained as a result. Persistence, however, is rewarding, for slowly the ideas reveal themselves, and much of the material used to illustrate is both helpful as well as fascinating in its own right. In particular, Sartre's use of the lives of Flaubert and deSade (to show how the regressive-progressive method can lead to understanding) is most interesting, and does help to clarify the method to some extent. A brief summary of the three chapters is given below.

I - Marxism and Existentialism

Marxism as a philosophy is a synthesis of Hegel (objective reality) and Kierkegaard (specificity of human existence) but, as applied by totalitarian governments, it has become static. Sartre says this need not be so, that it will remain "the philosophy of our time" as long as technical progress fails to lift "the yoke of scarcity."

II - The Problem of Mediations

It is necessary to consider the particular; political Marxism often fails to do this. Sartre offers an existential/psychoanalytic model that can form a dynamic mediation between universal and particular. This model is explained in chapter III:

III - The Progressive-Regressive Method

This is a dialectical movement that leads to understanding and awareness ("critical consciousness"?) It consists of two steps:

Regressive Phase--the life (autobiography) illuminates the work and the work clarifies the life--both must be cross-referenced with (a) each other; (b) the social realities of the period, and (c) the pertinent social realities of the past.

Progressive Phase--study the work as a "project" intended by the individual to help him surpass and thereby to make himself, make history, etc. (choosing from the "field of possibles").

According to Schumacher, ideas formed in one generation have their greatest impact, not in their own time but one or two generations later. Thus, certain ideas that were startling in the 19th century are now firmly embedded in our culture. Six such ideas that dominate 20th-century thinking are: evolution; competition; history as class struggle; relativism; positivism; and the Freudian conception of the subconscious mind. The clear implication here is that every generation is necessarily out of step with its own deepest values, which it inherits from previous generations and which may not be appropriate for its present circumstances.

"The great ideas of the 19th century may fill our minds in one way or another, but our hearts do not believe in them all the same. Mind and heart are at war with one another, not, as is commonly asserted, reason and faith." (p. 93)

Schumacher is so eloquent that paraphrasing or summarizing seem inappropriate. Several pertinent excerpts will be allowed to speak for themselves:

"Education cannot help us as long as it accords no place to metaphysics. Whether the subjects taught are subjects of science or of the humanities, if the teaching does not lead to a clarification of...our fundamental convictions, it cannot educate a man and, consequently, cannot be of real value to society." (p. 93)

"The "centre"...is the place where he has to create for himself an orderly system of ideas about himself and the world...if he has never given any thought to this...the centre will not by any means be empty: it will be filled with all those...ideas which have seeped into his mind during his Dark Ages (youth)." (p. 95)

It is necessary, Schumacher says, to combat the 19th-century ideas which we have inherited with some opposing metaphysical ideas; he suggests the following as examples:

--acceptance of the notion of hierarchical order
--focus on divergent, rather than convergent, thinking
--a return to a conception of ethics and morality
"The task of our generation...is one of metaphysical reconstruction. It is not as if we had to invent anything new; at the same time, it is not good enough merely to revert to the old formulations. Our task—and the task of all education—is to understand the present world, the world in which we live and make our choices."

"The problems of education are...reflections of the deepest problems of our age. They cannot be solved by organization, administration, or the expenditure of money...Education which fails to clarify our central convictions is mere training or indulgence. For it is our central convictions that are in disorder and, as long as the present anti-metaphysical temper persists, the disorder will grow worse." (p. 101)

These notes have been made from only one chapter of Small is Beautiful, the chapter which addresses itself specifically to education as a cultural institution. However, the other chapters also contain many implications for the way thoughtful educators may choose to behave in the remainder of the present century.
This paper has three parts. First, Shaker describes the Reconceptualists as (1) occupying a middle ground between the conservative-technocratic empiricists and the romantic critics; and (2) espousing a "melange of traditional, progressive, and radical values and programs."

Second, Shaker develops a theory of emotions and a hierarchy of sensitivity, and maintains that "reconstruction of our emotional life as a culture is needed..." a point that would hardly be challenged by thoughtful people.

The third part is a section on "ethics" which actually is primarily a rebuttal to those critics of the Reconceptualists who claim that it is elitist and can be applied "neither to the disadvantaged nor the trade-oriented: "To criticize the Reconceptualists on such grounds belies their true message. Social and economic involvement are at the center of this new curricular reform."

A more complete development of either section one or section two would perhaps have been interesting and helpful. As it is, the connection between them, that justifies their being linked in this way, is unclear.
This is a succinct discussion of the predicament of the creative artist who also functions as a teacher. Congruence is an authentic and harmonious balance between one's life and one's chosen work, in which the life is the work, and the work is the life.

"Try as we will to find a balance between maintaining our own authentic relationships and educating others toward establishing their own, we are often dealt a situation of incongruences that makes the fulfillment of our highest good a network of risk-taking experiences." (p. 447)

The first risk Shaw discusses is the risk that the teacher will move further and further toward a concern for teaching strategies and spend less and less time actively engaged in her own creation. To be specific, this is the risk that the art teacher won't be a practicing artist, or will be inclined to find less and less time available "for his own work." "...creative participation with the medium one teaches," points out Shaw (who is a film-maker) "is certainly the key to one's authenticity." (p. 447)

The second risk takes the distancing an added step; this occurs when one "has chosen not to teach the medium itself, but rather to instruct others how to teach the medium..." (p. 448) "In both cases of risk, a balance of energies expended in various directions is implied and desirable. However, such a balance is often threatened by the very nature of the teaching institution...In the face of this, we are hard put to maintain a sense of our centers and genuine bond with our medium...we must encourage the principle of congruence in all of its forms as a standard for teachers in the humanities." (p. 449)

Starratt begins by asking whether it might be possible to find a healthy balance between behaviorism and humanism, personal freedom and social adaptation, and the moralists and the academicians.

In the effort to answer his own question, Starratt suggests a "vigorous revival of philosophical inquiry" and challenges those who argue that theorists should turn their attention to practical applications of theory. He identifies global survival as one major area that has thus far been neglected in theory-making (and in practical application--actual classroom teaching--as well).

"Curriculum theorists have a huge task ahead of them: to describe the varieties of human knowledge and experience that will promote the development of personal, socio-political, and academic skills necessary to cope with the global challenge...development of heightened consciousness must be one of the critical components..." (p. 31)
This elegantly written paper traces the ebb and flow of humanist "general" education at Columbia University from 1880-1960, then identifies six characteristics of the 1960's and 1970's that contribute to making its future "uncertain"--

1. a rebirth of interest in the Humanities.

2. pressure of those previously excluded from higher education--their ambivalence about "getting cultured" seen as a result of being deprived of a sense of identity or community that was once provided by their social class.

3. the concepts of ORDEAL and INITIATION are fundamental to the humanistic educational traditions of the past:
   "Very likely this feeling on the part of many Americans that being taught or required to learn is an arbitrary denial of autonomy goes far toward explaining the state of primary and secondary education in our country..."

4. the tendency of many university-level people to assume that the only hope lies in higher education--that elementary and secondary are lost causes and unworthy of serious effort by bright people.

5. the tendency of many to mistake the awareness of youth for being educated.

6. impatience in our culture with the traditional humanistic idea of MAKING A LIFE, because making choices that will create a "shaped self", like a work of art--and having to choose; that is, choosing one thing and forfeiting the other, is seen as repugnant in our culture today: we want it all, seemingly, and would rather make no choices at all--just be swept along--than have to miss something.

This paper outlines the author's experience during about 4-5 years of exploring Zen, tracing his thoughts and feelings and also giving a brief overview of Zen concepts.

Its value lies in its demonstration of how Zen teaching and discipline may be used as a tool for examining one's experience and arriving at a truer, more accurate understanding of oneself and one's life.

It is also interesting to note that Vana experienced a crystallization and clarification of his understandings as a result of his effort to write about them. This would seem to support Pinar's assertion that it is valuable for the individual to write his own autobiography as part of his self-discovery (the "regressive" phase of the Method of Currere).

Interesting to read, this informal, diary-like paper includes some useful concepts and to some extent exemplifies the autobiographical writing exercises that form part of the method of Currere.

First, Wallenstein reminds the reader that the development of critical consciousness leaves no room for laziness and habit--always a timely reminder for people who try to stay genuinely in tune with themselves. Her images make this section particularly effective.

Next, she describes different kinds of teachers, in an effort to show the reader a picture of desirable teaching behavior, from a Reconceptualist point of view.

Finally, she takes a look at herself and her own experience in terms of a number of chosen dualisms--Individual vs. Group; Passivity vs. Action. Then she suggests others as useful frameworks for future "self-work:" Form vs. Content; Optimism vs. Pessimism; and Time.

"In my own search, I see myself moving towards an environment in which all my thoughts and perceptions during the day comprise my curriculum...it is our task as educators to find ways to make school hours a dynamic part of each individual's curriculum." (p. 17)

This paper gives a clear explanation of three stages of awareness, here called "searches", but does not explain reconceptualization in much detail.

Weingarten begins by identifying three schools of curriculum theory: (1) those critics of Tyler who call for a return to the affective domain; (2) those who continue with the scientific empirical model; and (3) the Re-conceptualists, with their call for expanding awareness.

Next, he identifies a process of three "searches" that lead to reconceptualizing:

- search 1 - a subjective reaction to our condition
  (consciousness raising)

- search 2 - objective assessment of our condition
  (revisionist critics)

- search 3 - search, through ourselves, to transcend our condition using personal biography to discover oneself; use expanding awareness to establish one's "project" and choose among alternative "possibles"

"As the stages of search unfold, one develops an increasingly complex sense of "the problem"...and the complexity of the present challenge is that part of its solution demands the conversion of persons at the level of their mode of...knowing reality."

Weingarten calls this paper a "rough and drafty" rough draft--and in fact it does leave the reader somewhat confused. Still, several interesting ideas do emerge:

1. The possible relationship of the work of men like Paolo Soleri and curriculum theorists; though what this might be is only hinted at;

2. The failure of Pinar to "study students from their point of view". It is unclear why Weingarten feels that this is a failure "to be surmounted;"

3. Identification of communication as the "nub of the issue"--a communication that will give the audience something to use for themselves: "...I suggest we take a page from our own book and extend ourselves far enough to at least give our audience a chance to grab some threads, and maybe go home, or whatever, and weave their own dress." (p. 8)

It is this third point that seems to be the clearest and most useful message of this paper. Clearly, Weingarten is responding to the demands of conference participants ever since the 1973 Rochester Conference, that all this reconceptualizing come down to earth and present itself in a recognizable applicable form.

Part One is a summary of Huebner's writing from 1962 to 1974. Three basic themes are revealed—curricular language; educational environment; and the tasks of the curriculum person.

Part Two is a general analysis of the works to discern progressions, development of ideas, and/or inconsistencies.

Part Three is a personal response and criticism. White accuses Huebner of not really departing from the Tyler Rationale. He also expresses impatience with the ambiguity of some of Huebner's language and with the vagueness of the relationship of the ideas to actual classroom application. White agrees that a common language would be of great help, but feels that this work is progressing too slowly to be of much use.
CURRICULUM THEORY IN THE 1970's: 
THE RECONCEPTUALIST MOVEMENT, 
50 ANNOTATED SOURCES

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Introduction to the Bibliography

I undertook this research into the reconceptualist movement in curriculum theory during the summer of 1976 at the suggestion of Dr. O. P. Esteves of the Texas Tech University College of Education. With her help and the help of my research advisor, Dr. Billy Askins, I was able to design a project consisting of two components: literature review and in-person interviews. The project was funded by a Summer Research Assistantship from the Texas Tech Graduate School.

This bibliography is the product of the first component of the research—the literature review. It is quite comprehensive and, I feel, fairly complete in its coverage of the major works which have shaped the reconceptualist philosophy as well as of the major papers delivered and/or published by members of the reconceptualist movement since 1972.

One of the characteristics of the reconceptualist position is its organic growth and change; it incorporates new syntheses and thus never remains the same for very long. This bibliography, therefore, provides a glimpse of the movement as it was in the summer of 1976. Researchers who look at this material in years to come would do well to supplement this reading with the more recent works of authors represented here: the growth and development of thinkers such as William Pinar, Madeleine Grumet, Michael Apple, Alex Molnar, Janet Miller, Tim Riordan, Seven Mann, and others will reveal the growth and development of the movement.

Finally, though this educational position is being called the "reconceptualist movement," it should not be thought of in the usual sense of a "movement," since it lacks the highly organized structure generally associated with that term. Instead, it is a fluid coalition of individuals who share a similar conceptual framework and value system, and who object to the mechanistic production metaphor that predominates in American schooling at this time.

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Apple reminds us that school controversies usually focus on choices that fall within the rules of the game; almost never are the rules themselves challenged. Having said this, he goes on to clearly challenge the traditional basic assumptions that underlie the teaching of most science and social studies, and to offer alternatives.

He shows how competition and conflict within the community of scientists are omitted from the science curriculum, and outlines a curriculum that would include the exploration of how conflict makes a valuable contribution to creativity in science.

Apple then traces the focus of the American social studies curriculum to the acceptance of society as basically a cooperative system, in which conflict is seen as dysfunctional. He calls for a social studies curriculum that will focus on change, rather than the maintenance of equilibrium, as the true social "order," and on conflict and flux as the true social reality.

Interestingly, Apple has a gentle word of warning for educators: that theorizing can lead to "quietism or a perspective that...necessitates a continuing monologue on the complexity of it all, while the world tumbles down around us." In other words, we must act. As Apple points out, the educator's paradox is that one criticizes public education but continues to try and improve it: "...an ambiguous position, but, after all, so is one's total situation."
It requires much deliberate and difficult consciousness-raising for educators to confront the basic assumptions upon which they operate and which have become "second nature." These basic assumptions are usually grounded in the technological-scientific ethic (behaviorism, control, etc.) According to Apple, "These habitual ways of perceiving educational problems set the boundaries of curriculists' imaginations...." (p. 121)

Using Jurgen Habermas' three categories of science, Apple argues that educators must work to move education away from "strict" (that is, research-oriented) science and towards "critical" science that focuses on reflection, self-awareness, and dialectical exchange. He sees the two major problems historically in education as being (1) our inability to deal with ambiguity; and (2) our "continual pursuit of...simplistic answers to complex human dilemmas" (p. 127).

Finally, he points out that there is an inescapable, connection between social and education thought, on one hand; and economic and political institutions, on the other; and that "to raise radical questions about one may mean raising equally radical questions about the other." (p. 129) In this, Apple aligns himself with all those social and educational critics who insist that one cannot consider the educational system apart from the society in which it exists, and that there cannot be a healthy institution in a society which is unhealthy at its core.
No brief summary could begin to do justice to this extensive and intricate paper. While Dr. Apple repeatedly points out questions which require deeper analysis than he can give, the paper does manage to go to the root of several critical issues.

Apple's basic theme is the need to question—in fact, to subject to rigorous critical analysis—our most basic, and usually taken-for-granted, assumptions. Our pose of neutrality, he maintains, is false—and our attempt to avoid confronting the ethical implications of our educational decisions must be challenged.

In the course of his discussion of critical viewpoints, Apple makes some interesting observations about why Marxist critical analysis has found so little support in the United States.

Apple discusses the implications of categorization at great length and supports the work of other educators in showing how it de-personalizes education and allows educators, once again, to avoid ethical considerations. Also, how, by focusing on students problems, the schools avoid facing their own role in creating those problems.

Finally, "Can we, as educators, honestly cope with the probability that certainty will not be forthcoming, that all our answers will be situational and filled with ambiguity? With this in mind, how do we commit ourselves to action?... Even our "neutral" activity may not be so. One has no choice but to be committed."

Apple and King start from the premise that schools are not failing, but succeeding—that schools are doing exactly what they were meant to do. If one accepts this premise, the task then becomes to study the larger social context, with the intention of discovering the "deep structure" of meanings and assumptions—the ideology—within which schools operate.

The second part of this paper is a brief review of the historical roots of the curriculum field. This review supports the authors' premise and leaves the reader with a depressing awareness that latent intent, or "deep structure," is by now so firmly embedded in our cultural subconscious that it may be impossible to change it in any significant way.

The third part of the paper takes the same idea and looks at it from another angle, by describing an average kindergarten classroom and "discovering the meanings of the activities that go on in it. This section is devastating to read. Perhaps the core of any teacher-training program should consist of exercises involving extrapolation from papers such as this. One could have student-teachers read this paper, for example, and then talk and write about their own educational histories in such a way as to become aware of what was done to them, and how; and in what ways the acquiesced—and how that acquiescence shaped the assumptions which they now bring to their own training as teachers. How, from being the oppressed (as students) they learned how to be the oppressors (as teachers).

A wry, dry irony permeates this overview of educational reforms within the social context of the past twenty years, making this paper fun to read—a somewhat rare quality in educational writing. In addition, the overview itself makes clear and, it seems, accurate connections between social conditions or events and the responses of the educational institution. Three points seem particularly important:

1. That the innovations of the 60's and 70's were/are designed and directed by colleges and teacher-training institutions that do not recognize their own contribution to "the destructive nature of the whole educational enterprise, from kindergarten through graduate school." (p. 55)

2. That in a dominance-oriented culture such as ours, the purpose of the curriculum has been to ensure that "each child must internalize the cultural values—" This is not a new idea, but is one that bears repeating periodically.

3. That "tinkering with the surface of things or treating the symptoms of deep underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, decentralization, performance contracting, compensatory education, bidialectalism, experimental schools, sensitivity training, remedial reading, humanistic education—none of these liberal answers will contribute much to a pedagogy of liberation." (p. 65)

Also, that "reform is part of the mythology of the pedagogy of domination...." (p. 66)

This paper answers the questions: What is the reconceptualist movement? What is the background of the movement and its current relationship to mainstream curriculum theory? What is its underlying philosophy? And, most importantly, what impact is it likely to have on the institution of schooling in America?

The author describes two divergent philosophical positions that are found within the Reconceptualist movement and outlines both their differences and their areas of common ground.

It is the conclusion of this author that the Reconceptualist position constitutes a viable and energetic new force within the field of curriculum theory and that the internal tensions in fact provide the dynamics for the formation of new syntheses in curriculum thinking.

A beautifully-constructed paper that leads the reader step by step through some very useful concepts: the levels, continuum, and intentionality of consciousness as it develops; the role of "limit situations" in consciousness-raising; the similarity of the individual consciousness to the collective, cultural consciousness; the function of myth in the collective consciousness; and the increasing polarization that occurs when individual and collective consciousness find themselves "out of sync" or in actual opposition.

Finally, Bullough ties all this together by situating the curriculum Reconceptualists with "a larger movement which is attempting to uncover and re-create myths especially as they relate to schooling" and adds that the group must necessarily find itself "part of a vanguard of so-called radicals" because it does look critically, not only at school life, but at life in general.

The resulting struggle for understanding is, Bullough feels, a hopeful think, part of the consciousness-expanding process of "reaching out... moving through... recreation."

This paper is immensely satisfying to read: Bullough covers in 12 lucid pages more than most educational writers could cover in many more.

This paper is a brief historical overview of the origin and development of the modern curriculum movement since the 1870's. It mentions the impact of Frederick Taylor's management model (1920's) and Jerrold Zacharias' physics paradigm (1956-66)--which, Cremin points out, has much in common with the model suggested by W. T. Harris 80 years earlier.

The presentation of Zacharias' subject matter/grade levels graph brings two thoughts to mind. First, if this is similar to the model proposed by W. T. Harris in the 1870's why on earth is "articulation" of curriculum proclaimed as an innovative idea in the 1970's? Secondly, if the idea of an articulated curriculum is so old, so embedded in educational theorizing, then why is it not practiced in schools more than it is? Three answers, or possible part-answers, come to mind. First, field workers know little history of education, as the result of too-little emphasis on the value of a solid grounding in the foundations courses as a part of their professional preparation. Second, translating theory-conceptualizing into practice usually does not involve the practitioner—that is, the actual teachers—in developing the conceptualization. Third, teachers are not encouraged to talk to each other across grade levels. High school teachers, over the years, have come to feel that they can learn little from grade school teachers, for example; similarly, college teachers feel they can learn little from high school teachers; and so on. It occurs to me that this "divide and rule" separation of teachers at the various levels may be a control mechanism useful to administrators.

Finally, Cremin plays with the idea of returning to Harris' original model to see what relevance it may have in modern times, and hints that perhaps even "deschooling" isn't, after all, such a new idea.
It may be worth considering the view that curriculum makers keep inventing the wheel is reflective of an historian's perspective. Cremin's paper is, however, persuasive, and suggests among other things that university courses in curriculum should include far more study of the history of the curriculum field than they now seem to do.
When cummings delivered the Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard during the winter 1952-53, he surprised his audience by giving them, not literary criticism, but autobiography. The result--these "non-lectures"--forms an excellent example of the kind of autobiographical exploration suggested by some of the conceptualists: it includes not merely recollection of events, but the examination of the meanings of those events for the person who experienced them.

cummings stood on that stage and revealed himself to his listeners not only so that they would know him, but also that he should further know himself. He was not merely being exhibitionistic or egotistical; rather, he was making a gift of himself and also of the method he was using, saying (without saying so): "here is a way that you, too, may use to learn yourself."

An excellent recent source on this topic. The book consists of an introductory essay by the editor, which is followed by nine essays on four different aspects of the theme. Of particular interest are "John Dewey and the Existential Phenomenologist" by Leroy Troutner; "Literature, Existentialism, and Education" by Maxine Greene; "That Mode of Being Called Teaching," by David Denton; and "The Multiple Realities of Schooling," by Clinton Collins.

"Remember what it was to be me: that is always the point," says Didion in this useful essay. It is included in a bibliography on the Reconceptualists because of the Reconceptualist emphasis on knowing who you are: on self-study which reveals you to yourself as a being-in-the-world, with (if you choose to take it) control over your own life. Consequently, some Reconceptualists turn to autobiography, the keeping of journals, and other techniques of self-exploration: Didion's essay, thus, is pertinent.

Dr. Greene makes an articulate plea for teachers to be authentically self-aware, and to teach in such a way that students will become engaged in learning, and will re-discover the power of history (enabling them to make their own), of professionalism, and of active "policy-orientation" (The existential project) in spite of the Con-III characteristics of ahistoricism, self-righteousness, and anti-intellectualism.

In spite of the naivete of Reich's conception, teachers can learn from it, and from the youth culture that it attempts to describe. We can try to understand their sense of powerlessness, disrespect for history, and scorn of professionalism: understanding these, and their causes, may help us find ways to teach so as to combat them.

Dr. Greene points out that educators don't have to try and be "Con-III" types, but that if we can love those who are, then maybe we can "succeed in engaging some of them in what ought to be a distinctly human endeavor: releasing people (in defiance of the monolith) to learn." She feels that we should teach history as "an interpretation of a set of interpretations"--not as objective truth, and in such a way that students can genuinely relate to it and feel power to act, maybe even to change it. We should help students to "define the possibilities of significant action."

"Deeply troubled about powerlessness, aware of the irrational and often brutal ends for which power is used in our society, I still believe persons are free to choose themselves as powerless--or not. They are free to perceive social opportunities as "slots" which they are being "processed" to fill--or not. The obvious way to cope with these modes of seeing is to enable young people to conceptualize in the technological society, to understand the ways in which it works, to recognize the interstices through which restless people can move...."
This book should be read, slowly and thoughtfully, by every educator and every teacher-trainee. It would also be appropriate for the layman who is concerned about the state of public education in our culture. Too rich to summarize in its entirety, selected thoughts from several chapters are included here in order to give a general idea of the book's viewpoint:

Chapter 1 - DOING PHILOSOPHY

"There is a loss of anchorage in our society. Even in the academic world, there are few enduring norms. The teacher can only try to find out how to think about what is happening around him and, after that, how to think what he is doing in the crisis-ridden world." (p. 20)

The teacher should be acquainted with the movies of his day and "try to help his students understand that they are not instances of photographed reality...like novels, poems, paintings, they tap realms of imaginative possibility ....." (p. 16)

Chapter 2 - CHOOSING A PAST

It is necessary to understand the paradigms of the past, even though they are "no longer viable or sensible." (p. 37)

Greene uses this chapter to do a quick overview of the changing shape of philosophical thinking, from antiquity to the present.

Chapter 3 - MAN: THE CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUE

"There are bound to be implications for education when so many individuals find their lives so inconsequential, if only because people who feel anonymous and unimportant are unable to assume responsibility for effecting change." (p. 46)
Preoccupation with identity, dignity, etc. as reflected in the events of the 1960's.

Skinnerian view vs. Rogerian, pp. 54-55.

"The issue for the teacher IN the school is not so much whether the critics are right or wrong in their more sweeping condemnations but whether the teacher's view of himself and the individuals in his class permits him to work authentically towards the realization of possibilities." (p. 62)

Chapter 4 - BEING AND LEARNING

"Teaching...must be carried on deliberately in situations never twice the same..."

This chapter is about how people arrive at certain assumptions about human nature; it reviews the myths on which our culture bases its general approach to education. It traces the thinking of Socrates, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, and Dewey in defining man. It discusses the problem of definitions: the way they can exclude possibilities, contributing to an attitude of determinism. Categorization also shuts out the possibility of the unexpected act, and limits a teacher's view of her students--she cuts off the chance that the student may surprise her, by abstracting and categorizing the student.

P. 88 - predictive vs. explanatory determinism

"Desperate for an explanation of slow learning, the teacher too frequently gives way to the temptation of a determinist answer...(and assumes) that what a person is determines what he should be..." pp. 90-91.

Determinist answer leads to Self-fulfilling prophecy

The teacher must balance, existing in tension between allowing students to create themselves, and guiding them to skills that will help them to do so---
Dr. Greene is optimistic. Despite modern conditions of oppression and malaise, she says, "...our obligation as educators is to enable students to take action against such powerlessness... I happen to believe that this kind of awakening can still occur in schools..." Towards the end of the paper, she gives an example of how a good teacher might move both him/herself and the students towards "gradual disclosure of inner and outer horizons" using a dialogic method.

In addition to sharing this guideline for application, Dr. Greene makes several other useful points in this paper, one of which is as clear a definition of the term "cognitive action" as one is likely to find:

...knowing what one is doing and doing things in a way that effects connections within experience, with a full awareness of the suitability of certain means to certain ends. (p. 78)

Another useful facet of this paper is Dr. Greene's discussion of Dewey, Sartre, and Freire. She begins with Dewey because, as she points out, we have all been "reared in a Deweyan tradition"—all thoroughly immersed in the pragmatic approach which links thought to action. But Dr. Greene shows that a crucial difference between a Deweyan viewpoint and a Sartean one is that thinking, for Dewey, leads to a resolution of a conflict or condition of disequilibrium: until the conflict is resolved, forward movement is not possible. While for Sartre, praxis (purposeful human activity) "signifies a refusal of some given reality in the name of a reality to be produced." One moves toward the unknown.

To simplify still further, one might say that in Dewey's terms, thinking takes place in a moment of pause between problem and solution. In Sartre's view, the thinking itself is not a moment of pause but a moment of motion. And for Freire, it may even, if it is motion to a higher level of consciousness, become a moment leading to liberation.

This is a difficult paper, which moves the reader's understanding of curriculum into a new dimension, that of consciousness; that is, curriculum conceived as the intentional making of new totalities, by the learner, taking into account both his personal existential predicament or situation and his primordial consciousness or "background awareness." This view sees students as the makers of their own curriculums, with help and guidance from teachers "...willing to engage in dialogue...to help him pose his problems."

The paper takes off from an interesting point: a comparison of the difference in approach of Americans and Europeans to literary criticism. While British and Americans tend to see the work as separate from the life of the author, the Europeans ("critics of consciousness" Greene calls them) see the work and the life as inextricable--"a conscious effort on the part of an individual artist to understand his own experience by framing it in language." In addition, Greene points out that the reader re-creates, and goes beyond the work itself, "lending his own life" to the work as he reads. Seen in this way, no art object can be autonomous.

Greene makes this point about literary criticism because she views the making of a personal curriculum to be akin to the making of a work of art; each an integral part--and product--of the total life of the student, or the artist.
Dr. Greene uses a small section from Moby Dick to illustrate what she means by "mystification", and then sets about to convince the reader that one, at least, of the important functions of the Foundations areas--philosophy, sociology, history, and so forth--is to contribute to "de-mystification."

"The obligation of the foundations professor is...many-pronged. Teachers-to-be must be introduced to the concepts and principles that compose the relevant interpretive disciplines. They must be enabled to look through the perspectives opened by history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and philosophy; they must learn how to consciously order the materials of their experience with the aid of such perspectives...to understand the role of the disciplines, the role of organized subject matter in selecting out aspects of reality. This means a capacity (too seldom attended to) to engage in new kinds of questioning and problem-posing, appropriate to an overly dominated human world." (p. 15)

The need for de-mystification is even more crucial in an ever more technological society, she argues, and is not "subversive;" on the contrary, is thoroughly in line with the traditional understanding of democratic citizenship.

"...teacher educators ought to work to combat the sense of ineffectuality and powerlessness that comes when persons feel themselves to be the victims of forces wholly beyond their control.... They would by acting on behalf of a tradition of free institutions, acting on their freedom in the light of principle. For all the present pressures and aberrations within contemporary society, I cannot see this as anything but the enactment of what is thought of as democracy."

She warns those who would work in this way against the trap of arrogance or certainty: "Working in this fashion with students, liberating them to understand that the social reality they..."
inhabit is a constructed one, educators ought to avoid, if possible, the high-sounding voice of expertise. They and their students might well enter a conversation with one another...a being together in a world susceptible to questioning... formal inquiry, scientific thinking, and the rest are significant to the degree they nourish the human conversation." (p. 25)

Grumet defines "education" as a person's dialogue with his own experience, and maintains that this definition is incompatible with behaviorism.

She identifies the following concepts common to existentialism, phenomenology, and Currere: dialogue/dialectic; paradox-ambiguity; context and self-report; ones own voice versus the empirical paradigm. Then illustrates how the roots of Currere can be traced to the works of Husserl and Sartre.

Phenomenology repudiated psychologism and empiricism.

Existentialism repudiated idealism.

Currere repudiates behaviorism & technocracy.

This is a long and complex paper, elegantly written by a person who seems to have a thorough grasp of modern philosophies as well as of research in this area.
This paper will please readers who move back and forth between the first and third categories of curriculum work outlined by James Macdonald in "Curriculum Theory" (1971)—that is, between theorizing as a playful/creative philosophizing or sense-making, and as a tool for actual classroom application.

Grumet shows how the use of autobiographical theater exercises can help us to "transfer our attention from (schools, methodologies, academic disciplines) these forms themselves to the ways in which a student uses them and moves through them."

Using Grotowski's "poor theatre" concept (theater which deliberately strips itself of stylistic conventions) she coins the term "poor curriculum" as curriculum in which "we turn our focus from the artifacts themselves, the Bunsen burner, Silas Marner, Greenwich Time, nongraded... to the ways in which the individual student confronts them."

The body of her paper consists of a two-part section on the Theory and Projects of Autobiography and a similar two-part section on the Theory and Projects of Theatre, as used in student teacher seminars, high school classes, and undergraduate courses. The projects, in particular, suggest the kinds of things that may be tried in classrooms.

Grumet mentions several interesting areas for future exploration: work with experienced teachers; work within different kinds of school settings; and work which will prove that application of currere need not be elitist.

The reader may find him/herself curious to know whether there is a place one might go, to see these classroom application in action. This impulse
Grumet, Madeleine R. "Toward a Poor Curriculum: The Use of Autobiography and Theatre in the Practice of Currere."

...to see it happen should probably be resisted. Not only do classrooms need privacy and autonomy, but visitors should probably instead get busy exploring these approaches in their own classrooms, in ways authentic to themselves and their own situations. Watching someone else do it is too likely to create "That-is-how-it-should-be-done" mind-sets."

"Learning" is not something that is done to a person (when he or she is "taught"); rather, it is a never-ending process of being-in-the-world, "always emergent as past and future become horizons of a present." This being true, the task of the curriculum worker is to design environments that "encourage the moment of vision, when the past and future are the horizons of the individual's present so that his own potentiality for being is grasped. Education is a manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography of the individual with the unfolding history of his society."

The point that the society, too, is temporal, enfolding past, present, and future in shifting rhythms of continuity and change, is an important one; in making this point, Huebner reminds us that the individual lives in a social context and must take it into account: "...the man who tries to shape society beyond its limits of tolerance is out of tune with his society and must be held in check...educational institutions must concern themselves with the individual's temporality within the historical rhythm of the society."

Finally, Huebner makes the point that "educational purpose," because it shapes the educational environment and the dialectic between individuals and society and the rhythms of continuity and change, "...is part of the political ideological struggle existing in any evolving society."
More than any other curriculum reconceptualist, Huebner has been concerned with the ways in which language limits the teacher's understandings of classroom existence. In this essay, he discusses the way in which acceptance of language systems from the social sciences and psychology keep the teacher from recognizing the mystery involved in the acts of teaching: "...the curricular worker seems unwilling to deal with mystery or doubt or unknowables." Huebner goes on to suggest that new questions must be asked if teachers are to be enabled to break out of this kind of language trap. He discussed five value systems--technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical--stressing that the first three are dominant now, but the last two must be encouraged and emphasized if teachers are to become genuine teachers rather than conceiving of themselves as technicians.

The very ways in which we talk to and about children are a function of the cultural assumptions we have assimilated and unconsciously pass on—not just what we say, but how we say it.

Educators must be aware of this, and bring intentionality to their work. Huebner discusses three "facets of man's temporality" which, he feels, must be given equal consideration in educational thinking: memory and tradition; the activity of interpretation; and "the phenomenon of community as a caring collectivity in which individuals share memories and intentions." With these in mind, he suggests we consider the individual, the past, and the community and interrelate them through hermeneutical, political, and work activity.

Huebner goes on to give an illustration of how this might be done, using the teaching of reading as an example, and shows that the educational process should be a genuine two-way exchange, not a one-way process. This, he feels, would help children to more effectively feel themselves in the world, and, in fact, to feel as if they can shape the world instead of learning—as they are now taught—to passively be shaped.

"The question of value that should be asked in education, then, is not what is valuable and hence should be learned by the young, but what is valuable enough to be conserved as part of the past and made present to the young? By that question I wish to draw attention to the way the educator too frequently talks about learning as a form of normative control rather than as a possibility for the future." (p. 49)

"(The child) is left with the awareness that the public world is made and that he is a misfit, rather than with the awareness that the public world is always in the process of being reworked and that he has a right to rework it. He does not perceive himself as engaged in work activity or political activity." (p. 50)

An interesting paper that traces the development of management theory and its impact on education. Efficiency, standardization, and diversification are discussed in relation to the ways in which they have become elements in school management and in curriculum theory and development.

Recent programs such as IPI (Individually Prescribed Instruction) and others are found to be efficiency and standardization-related, rather than genuinely individualized approaches to teaching and learning. Kliebard warns that the great threat of the application of the "production" metaphor (the term used to denote management theory as applied to education) is that "The bureaucratic model...threatens to destroy...the satisfaction that one may find in intellectual activity." He further warns that separation of ends and means in education is a travesty of the genuine education experience, and represents a deterministic outlook on human behavior--in a word, that it is manipulative and, consequently, in fundamental opposition to the true meaning of education.

This essay, which first appeared in Educational Comment in 1970, provides further evidence that what one may have thought of as "innovative" curriculum developments of the 1960's and 70's are often, in reality, simply re-workings of much earlier ideas.

Dr. Kliebard discusses the "impulse to reject the past" that seems characteristic of the curriculum field in terms of two consequences. First, the simple ignorance of the history of the field itself, which aids in (a) the perpetuation of myths, and in (b) the tendency to re-invent the wheel. Second, the urge to do good, or to improve the world, which seems to lie at the base of curriculum work. A third issue is raised by the lack of agreement, within the field itself, on definitions; this leads to further confusion and helps to keep the field fragmented and chaotic.

Toward the end of this paper, Dr. Kliebard presents the "persistent issues" of curricular objectives and differentiated curriculum, and again uses historical perspectives to illuminate current attitudes on these two issues. In his view, the emphasis on curricular objectives is closely related to the widespread acceptance of the technological/production model and should be replaced by creative alternatives which go beyond, but do not ignore, the limiting framework of the past 50 years. Kliebard's criticism of the concepts underlying the use of behavioral objectives makes good sense and provides much food for thought.

Kliebard puts the Tyler "rationale"--first stated in 1950--into perspective in his typically lucid manner. Kliebard's rejection of the concept of behavioral objectives (at least as used within the production model) is supported by his detailed analysis of Tyler's "three sources" of objectives. "One wonders," Kliebard remarks, "whether the long-standing insistence by curriculum theorists that the first step in making a curriculum be the specification of objectives has any merit whatsoever..." and"...the simplistic notion evaluation is a process of matching objectives with outcomes leaves much to be desired. It ignores what may be the more significant latent outcomes in favor of the manifest and anticipated ones, and it minimizes the vital relationship between ends and means."
This article provides a clear theory model that combines systems theory and aesthetic rationality in a dynamic process. It clearly outlines the dangers of relying too heavily on scientific/technological rationality, and argues that education must guard against this, by conscious and deliberate inclusion of aesthetic-intuitive-open-dynamic rationality. The following quotes will give a more specific idea of Macdonald's arguments, and the illustration on the next page will provide a general idea of the model itself.

First, Macdonald defines theorizing as "the development of frameworks from which designs can be generated, rather than as the testing of designs." He sees two basic problems facing the curriculum theorizer: first, the conflict between scientific-technological-systems rationality (which he calls closed rationality) and aesthetic rationality (which he calls open rationality). The second problem is the conflict between those who would be neutral and those who would be committed. This is really the same conflict as the first--only it is put in terms of values.

"...at this point in scientific knowledge and theory, the basic scientific understandings of the nature of reality no longer resemble a systems metaphor. Therefore, the systems metaphor applied to human behavior in curriculum settings is already predictably inadequate for any long-range theorizing...The danger of our present systems approach to human behavior is that...(it) will become so USEFUL in solving our problems of efficiency and effectiveness that we shall be in grave danger of losing contact with reality through aesthetic rationality."

Macdonald observes the inadequacy of philosophy as the framework for theory: "...philosophies...are explications of abstract systems--grids placed rather rigidly over life asking for a consistency and completeness that simply do not exist in the situation."
"...a general action system theory (that) provides a spatial grid within which the maximization of freedom may dynamically operate."

From this general framework, certain propositions can be generated:

1. Curriculum is not one thing—-it is an interactional hypothetical construct which can be "known" only after the fact.

2. Concrete embodiment of the curriculum is the artificially constructed environments in which schooling takes place.

3. The curriculum is CONTINUALLY IN CREATION.

4. The construction of the contrived environment should be based in technological rationality.

5. The contrived environment of the instructional setting should be based in aesthetic rationality (i.e., teacher-student relationships).

Points 3, 4, and 5 seem particularly worth remembering: point 3, because we all tend to make something and then say: "it is made; leave it—don't tamper with it." Points 4 and 5 because, taken together they form a balance between the conflicting viewpoints of scientific/closed and aesthetic/open rationality identified earlier by Macdonald. We can use the products of technological-scientific rationality; we must use the interpersonal techniques of aesthetic rationality and so achieve a healthy, harmonious balance.
Definitions of "curriculum" vary: some consider it to be subject matter only, while others view it as all school experiences.

Conceptions of "theorizing" vary: for some, theory is a guide for applied curriculum development; for a second group, it means scientific, conceptual, research-oriented theory; for yet others, theorizing is a playful, creative intellectual task. ONE PERSON MAY OPERATE AT ALL THREE LEVELS AT DIFFERENT TIMES, depending on the demands of the situation.

As Huebner has shown, the intent of theorizing can be characterized by its language. It can be either descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimizing, prescriptive, or affiliative. (Huebner, "The Task of the Curriculum Theorist" mimeo/author, Columbia Teachers College, 1968)

The production model (Tyler Rationale) assumes "acceptance of contemporary social values (thus eliminating the value question of what to teach)."

Macdonald groups curriculum theorizing into three categories:

1. knowledge-oriented (subject matter)
2. reality-oriented (political, social realities)
3. value-oriented (as soon as theory takes form in a curriculum design it becomes a value statement)

"Curriculum theory...might be said to be the essence of educational theory because it is the study of how to have a learning environment."
Macdonald, James.; Wolfson, Bernice; and Zaret, Esther. 
Reschooling Society: A Conceptual Model. 

This short pamphlet is packed with ideas, information, and concepts about a humanistic-existential approach to schooling. Little of it is new or startling, yet one too seldom sees such ideas in practice in real school settings.

The model presented is useful especially for the two components included in it which are left out of many models: genuine exploration, and transcending (in the existential sense of the term).

Putting such a model into practice would require creatively different approaches to teacher inservice, and also implies an altered role for administrators.

The notes that follow will summarize several of the most important points made in the pamphlet, and an illustration of the model itself will follow on the next page.

A model of schooling must include: goals and purposes; a pattern of organization; some idea of desired relationships; and an idea of how to assess itself.

The Tyler Rationale has served as the basis of curriculum development for 25 years. Macdonald, Wolfson, and Zaret, who oppose the behavioral objective/technological/efficiency model which resulted discovered that they could not use Tyler's questions and apply their own value base: "...we soon discovered that we had really raised a different set of highly inter-related questions encompassing broader socio-cultural issues."

"...education is not only NOT value-free, it is (along with politics) the most value-laden of human activities. The important questions, therefore, are in what directions are we headed, and in what directions should we be headed...."
the HUMANISTIC-EXISTENTIAL PERSONAL MODEL OF LEARNING

EXPLORING/trying out, feeling
fantasizing, probing, sensing. Internal--
takes time, is not readily apparent to an
observer (most schools ignore this)

TRANSCENDING/resolve conflicts,
clarify purposes, make commit-
ments, risk failure, acknowledge
desires. Insightful knowing,
creation of personal meanings.
acting on understandings (most
schools oppose this)

INTEGRATING/attitudes, values
perceptions, skills, informa-
tion, performance. Tentative
patterning, no closure yet.
(most schools exploit this)

This model is
dynamic, interactive
simultaneous or cyclical
transaction-oriented

There are 3 fundamental concepts necessary today for
intelligent social decision-making: Liberation (vs. control);
pluralism (vs. standardization); and participation (vs. decision-
making by authorities). (G. Winter, Being Free. N. Y.:

CURRICULUM IS the environment which has been selected as
a set of possibilities for learning transactions. It includes:
the learning environment (genuine choices, enough time to explore,
real support, suspension of judgment); student-and-teacher re-
lationships (teacher self-aware, authentic, flexible, a continuing
learner); and content (holistic approach, avoid fragmentation).

Decisions about curriculum must take into account: organ-
ization (graded vs. areas of investigation); structure (decided
by adults vs. organic); and syntax (structured vs. playful
experiencing).

EVALUATION--two kinds proposed by Macdonald et al: educational
evaluation, within the school, of the total educational environ-
ment, including self-evaluation by students and teachers; and
social accountability, between school and community, including
the opportunity for community members to participate in school
decision-making, unrestricted observation, and access to data
gathered in the educational evaluation.

If curriculum thinking is inevitably grounded in values, and if this is not clearly understood, curriculum people will continue to have trouble talking to each other. We are not, as Macdonald says, "...working out of the same basic...metaphors..."

Macdonald offers the following conceptual framework, in an effort to clarify the relationships between curriculum thinking and value systems:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Design</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PROBLEMS OF LIVING</th>
<th>EMERGING NEEDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MATTER</td>
<td>CURRICULA</td>
<td>DESIGNS</td>
<td>PROPOSALS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- (knowledge, cultural heritage)
- (social interests)
- (individual welfare)

3 basic empirical-hermeneutic cognitive-analytical-historical human interests
that are the ground for knowledge:
for technical interest
for practical interest
for critical interest

curriculum development models:
- LINEAR EXPERT MODEL
- CIRCULAR CONSENSUS MODEL
- DIALOGICAL DYNAMIC MODEL

Macdonald's two basic premises are
(1) that human interest lies at the root of all curriculum thinking; and (2) that basic differences of opinion in curriculum thinking arise from differing views about CONTROL, CONSENSUS, and LIBERATION.
Using the conceptual framework provided by Jurgen Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests (that is, that there are three major human interests: control, understanding, and liberation), Macdonald reviews the curriculum theory field and comes to the conclusion that it is "in much better shape" than he had thought. "There is indeed a definite and definable intellectual thrust and potency when viewed in terms of intentionality. What previously had appeared to me to be bits and pieces of interesting intellectual activity forms a dynamic mosaic pattern from this viewpoint." There is, in Macdonald's opinion, a movement, and whether it is called "Reconceptualist" or by some other name not yet formulated, it is a real and growing force in curriculum theorizing.

This paper and its bibliography could serve as a sort of course-of-study, or project, for the student of curriculum theory; by reading Habermas and, in turn, all the other sources cited by Macdonald, the student could begin to get a feel for the "state of the art," at least in terms of the conceptual framework chosen by Macdonald, which does seem to help in clarifying the various approaches to curriculum theorizing.

The critic, according to Mann, is not a practitioner, but one who stands back and observes the practitioner with the intention of discovering meaning in the patterns of choices made by the practitioner. Further, "The meanings the curriculum critic discloses are...meanings about which he believes ethical judgments are to be made. An appropriate final problem to be considered...is whether or not his critique should include these judgments...my tentative conviction is that the critic would do well to write his critique in dimensions that to him are of ethical import, thereby giving tools to the practitioner, and allow the latter the freedom to employ the critique, or the many critiques, as he and his colleagues who design curricula see fit."

The above gives an extremely sketchy idea of Mann's premises and really fails to do justice to the complexity of his conceptions and the detail with which he develops them. Readers interested in this line of thought are urged to read Mann's paper for themselves.

In the final section of the paper, Mann spells out the "two unorthodox propositions underlying all the arguments in this paper." The first is that "New understanding of what is involved in curriculum will come from those scholars who can MAKE THE HEURISTIC LEAP from the data they must know well to the ethical roots of their concern." In other words, there must be a creative fusion of the objective ("data they must know well") with the ethical, and that this fusion is, or makes possible, a leap of imagination to a new insight or understanding.

The second "unorthodox proposition" suggests that educators measure the success of their ventures by the products they turn out, and are "unwilling to judge or even note the qualities of the situation itself...Is it possible that the educator's preoccupation with products involves an escape, by removal in time, from the responsibility to see and value education in ethical terms altogether?" It seems to me that this intriguing question deserves open discussion in all colleges of education, perhaps particularly in curriculum courses.

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In this paper, Mann begins by noting that there "is not yet a discipline of curriculum theory, but that most of the ingredients for one are present in solution," adding towards the end that "Most of what bears the name of "curriculum theory" is not theoretical at all but is more properly considered praxeological"--that is, directed towards application in classrooms. Outlining the three kinds of structure said by Schwab* to exist in all disciplines (that is, organizational, substantive, and syntactical) Mann proposes that a study of the correlation of these structures, as they occur in the field of education, could provide the field of curriculum theory with the discipline that it has been lacking.

He further suggests a way to "proceed with curriculum theory construction." First, assumptions about the three structures should be made as explicit as possible. Second, problems should be identified in relation to these structures rather than in relation to practical problems of schooling. Third, speculation should lead to the generation of theoretical models; and fourth, systematic data gathering should be conducted, with the intention of furthering the development of the theoretical models.

This paper helps somewhat to define the boundaries and clarify the differences between the practical and theoretical approaches to curriculum theorizing and makes a persuasive case for the theoretical approach being of more importance in the long run.


Mann and Molnar here present a definition of student rights and responsibilities that would surely, if implemented, threaten the status quo and frighten the average school principal right out of his wits. And they go even further, by suggesting some concrete steps that might be taken by teachers to realize this new definition. In the course of this short paper they expose the intent-to-oppress which controls students in schools almost absolutely, and which shows itself in such culturally entrenched policies as maintaining the myth of the value-free curriculum; distracting students with controlled in-school activities (usually connected with student government); and the tactic of refusing to allow student action for one social cause on the argument that all other causes must then be allowed "equal time."

Implementation of the belief that students have both the right and the responsibility to study and engage in progressive social action may begin, as Mann and Molnar suggest, with the teacher; but it will succeed only to the extent that it has the full support of the school administration. This, then is where the most difficult task lies—in the reform of the kind of training experienced by all of our future school principals and superintendents.

This remarkable article, written 20 years ago, is still so pertinent that it should be the first assignment made in every Introduction to Research course. Clearly, however, it has not been so utilized. If it had, the shape of educational research might have changed in the past 20 years, and more people would be engaged in research as a personal, creative process rather than as a hurdle to be jumped for a degree or a necessary activity engaged in for the purpose of securing career promotion. In fact, the prevailing product-oriented attitude has been reinforced and strengthened in the last 20 years by the rapid growth of computer technology; this has, it seems, led us still further from the hopeful viewpoint proposed by Dr. Mooney in 1957.

In addition, the tightening job market and the emphasis at most universities on research for its own sake, with no particular judgments made by anyone as to the value of the chosen problems, has ensured that (1) doctoral candidates are even less inclined than before to deviate from the traditionally acceptable research format, and (2) thousands of more or less trivial doctoral theses pile up in university libraries and microfilm storage tanks and are of no particular use to anyone—not even to the students who invested time and energy in producing them.

It might seem that the chances of altering this situation now are very small, but perhaps for this very reason Mooney's article continues to be important. Mooney proposes a shift from what he calls the "consumer's" point of view (concerned with product) to the "producer's" point of view (concerned with process). After carefully explaining these, he adds to the end of his paper a list of 50 research questions which are surely of vital importance and among which, it seems, any educator would find several which have personal meaning and appeal for him or her and on which the researcher would willingly spend time and energy, with enthusiasm rising out of personal involvement with the problems.

This short essay is the first of the "reactions" to the papers that formed the substance of the 1973 Rochester Conference and which form the body of this book. Osborn describes the role of the small discussion group of which he was a member during the conference; its reactions to the focus on heightened consciousness and the function of the group for its members as a place where they could "come down" from the "conference high."

Interestingly, it seems the group wanted the theorists to be more practical, and that they were not practical became a "formidable ideological gulf."

Osborn closes by challenging the Reconceptualists to "realistically propose a curriculum of higher consciousness for American schools" in such a way that it might have a recognizable hope of being successfully implemented—in such a way that the practitioners could see that it could work and presumably could thus risk trying it. Osborn implies that unless this can be done, it will never become a movement of any lasting significance.

Pinar's ability to move from particular to universal is remarkable. He begins this paper by sharing some highly personal self-exploration, and then moves from that into a more general discussion of the Currere philosophy and the importance of reconceptualization. He concludes by giving a brief history of the movement, an idea of where it might lead in the next twenty years, and some suggestions for those who may choose this path. A few notes on this paper are included below.

I.

Effects of schooling: warped fantasy life; many forms of self-estrangement; focus on "the individual" has always been from the teacher's point of view....

Currere: "...it is not the course to be run, or the artifacts employed in the running of the course; it is the running of the course...our experience of our lives."

Some steps of "the method of Currere:"
--biography of one's life in schools
--keep a journal
--analyze present personal reading
--write a "novel" of one's present life
--study relationships revealed in the above 4 steps

II.

History of the reconceptualist movement.

Where it all may--hopefully--lead: "to a synthesis of the two cultures--the scientific with the humanistic and artistic." (p. 36)

Suggestions: deliberate correspondence; a journal or newsletter; involve more students; annual meetings; include the conceptual-empiricists (implies that polarization is to be avoided if possible.)
Pinar's informal style makes this paper fun to read, and the steps of the "the method" are clearly described. However, both the method itself and the literary style used to explain it are intensely personal; educators who prefer conventional research format may find this disconcerting.

According to Pinar, examination of one's past, present, and future using the "method" yields "...a coherence. Not necessarily a logical one, but a lived one, a felt one." The "method" takes the self as its data source, and utilized free association in following four steps: Regressive (past-present); Progressive (present-future); Analytical (present); and Synthetic (past-present-future). "Critical consciousness" or the "transcendental ego" may be the result--one may be able to escape one's biography (another way to say it would be the ability to break out of one's life scripts by recognizing what they are) through the process of examining it. In this process, one learns to recognize one's own voice....

Some critics may assert that this highly personal self-examination will yield a different result for every individual, and that therefore there is no common result to build upon in terms of providing learning experiences in schools. Pinar seems to agree, but only up to a point: There will be individual variations in biographies, he acknowledges, but also one may discern a common structure underlying them. Possibly this is because, generally speaking, American children grow up within a powerfully structured social-cultural environment and are influenced by more or less similar formative forces.

This paper sets itself a twofold task: first, to reply to those critics who object to what they view as an absence of an activist-political dimension in Currere; second, to comment upon the complaints of those critics who seem uncomfortable with the method of Currere for more psychological, perhaps personal reasons.

Pinar's answer to the first ("political") group of critics is that Currere is not incompatible with political activism--that, in fact, since it is a method of raising the ontological level, of oneself, one's students, and one's colleagues--it can of itself be seen as a political strategy.

Pinar also makes an interesting observation about what constitutes genuine education: it occurs when one passes beyond merely comprehending an idea, and begins to MAKE USE OF IT to shed light on problems of one's own choosing.

These two points were, for this reader, the most useful part of this paper.

Pinar's reply to the second ("psychological") group of critics is less satisfactory, mainly because the nature of their criticism is not clear. This may not be Pinar's fault" he observes that they appear to have both latent and manifest criticisms--this may be the source of the lack of clarity. The manifest criticism seems to be an objection to Pinar's highly personal literary style. Pinar identifies the latent criticism as an objection to his use of his own personal biography or perhaps even to himself and his background. Neither of these objections seem very important and Pinar is quite correct in spending most of his paper responding to the political critics who, at least, seem more honest and forthright.

A third interesting concept that is explored in this paper is the idea of the transmission of energy between people of differing ontological levels.

Pinar rejects the "we-they" political dichotomy and observes that "the most fundamental expression of social justice (is) the comradeship of the entire species...specific political strategies are less important than the ontological status of the...strategists. Ontologically high people create and effectively use high (or humanized) strategies."
Using the "madness" charge made by David Cooper and R. D. Laing, Pinar discusses twelve effects of schooling and demonstrates how "...the cumulative effect of the schooling experience is devastating," and creates "credentialed but crazed" human beings. The twelve effects of schooling discussed are:

- distortion of fantasy life
- loss of self through modeling
- loss of autonomy
- loss of self-love
- thwarting of affiliative needs
- estrangement from self
- other-direction
- self-as-role: objectification
- false-self systems
- loss of ability to be alone
- disconfirmation
- loss of aesthetic capacities

Laing and Cooper, Pinar notes, "are less explicit about the outlines of reformations." Pinar, too, saves these questions for another time.
In this essay, Roszak challenges the subject-object dualism of Western culture that has led to excessive stress on "objectivity" at the expense of fundamental human symbolisms.

Two of these symbolisms which he discusses (calling them "root meanings"—experience and symbol together) are the notions of vision-flight and of gravity-fallenness as basic elements within the subconscious of the human species:

"The shamanic vision-flight, one of those supreme symbols of human culture which has been elaborated into thousands of religious and artistic expressions, embedded in the foundations of language, driven like a taproot into the bottommost stratum of our consciousness..."

The notion of gravity as a transcendent symbol (fallenness, etc.) was warped, according to Roszak, by Newton's attempt to objectify it; this was the beginning of "scientific objectivity" and of a deep cultural alienation that is the inevitable result of separating a fundamental concept from its root meanings:

"...objectivity demanded that Newton strip his scientific vocabulary of its symbolic resonance..."

Protestant Christianity, maintains Roszak, is impoverished by the resulting single vision; that is, refusal to regard the world in animistic and symbolic ways. To encounter the world on both levels, he suggests, (both objective and symbolic) "...is to abolish the alienative dichotomy" of subject/object.

The thoughts expressed by Roszak in this essay are clearly pertinent to reconceptualization in education, for "root meanings" are precisely what are missing in school curriculums. Whether this was deliberate, as many social critics are now suggesting; or accidental—a byproduct of the way the education institution grew in this country—it is nonetheless true of all school work/planning/teaching that approaches its task from the scientific-technological-empirical point of view. Any method of raising the ontological level through self-exploration, any educational strategy that has "critical consciousness" as its goal, would surely attempt to "encounter the world on both levels" as Roszak suggests.
Search For a Method is a difficult book for the beginning student of philosophy. Sartre assumes much prior knowledge in his readers, and much goes unexplained as a result. Persistence, however, is rewarding, for slowly the ideas reveal themselves, and much of the material used to illustrate is both helpful as well as fascinating in its own right. In particular, Sartre's use of the lives of Flaubert and deSade (to show how the regressive-progressive method can lead to understanding) is most interesting, and does help to clarify the method to some extent. A brief summary of the three chapters is given below.

I - Marxism and Existentialism

Marxism as a philosophy is a synthesis of Hegel (objective reality) and Kierkegaard (specificity of human existence) but, as applied by totalitarian governments, it has become static. Sartre says this need not be so, that it will remain "the philosophy of our time" as long as technical progress fails to lift "the yoke of scarcity."

II - The Problem of Mediations

It is necessary to consider the particular; political Marxism often fails to do this. Sartre offers an existential/psychoanalytic model that can form a dynamic mediation between universal and particular. This model is explained in chapter III:

III - The Progressive-Regressive Method

This is a dialectical movement that leads to understanding and awareness ("critical consciousness"?) It consists of two steps:

Regressive Phase--the life (autobiography) illuminates the work and the work clarifies the life--both must be cross-referenced with (a) each other; (b) the social realities of the period, and (c) the pertinent social realities of the past.

Progressive Phase--study the work as a "project" intended by the individual to help him surpass and thereby to make himself, make history, etc. (choosing from the "field of possibles").

According to Schumacher, ideas formed in one generation have their greatest impact, not in their own time but one or two generations later. Thus, certain ideas that were startling in the 19th century are now firmly embedded in our culture. Six such ideas that dominate 20th-century thinking are: evolution; competition; history as class struggle; relativism; positivism; and the Freudian conception of the subconscious mind. The clear implication here is that every generation is necessarily out of step with its own deepest values, which it inherits from previous generations and which may not be appropriate for its present circumstances.

"The great ideas of the 19th century may fill our minds in one way or another, but our hearts do not believe in them all the same. Mind and heart are at war with one another, not, as is commonly asserted, reason and faith." (p. 93)

Schumacher is so eloquent that paraphrasing or summarizing seem inappropriate. Several pertinent excerpts will be allowed to speak for themselves:

"Education cannot help us as long as it accords no place to metaphysics. Whether the subjects taught are subjects of science or of the humanities, if the teaching does not lead to a clarification of...our fundamental convictions, it cannot educate a man and, consequently, cannot be of real value to society." (p. 93)

"The "centre"...is the place where he has to create for himself an orderly system of ideas about himself and the world...if he has never given any thought to this...the centre will not by any means be empty: it will be filled with all those...ideas which have seeped into his mind during his Dark Ages (youth)." (p. 95)

It is necessary, Schumacher says, to combat the 19th-century ideas which we have inherited with some opposing metaphysical ideas; he suggests the following as examples:

--acceptance of the notion of hierarchical order
--focus on divergent, rather than convergent, thinking
--a return to a conception of ethics and morality

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"The task of our generation...is one of metaphysical reconstruction. It is not as if we had to invent anything new; at the same time, it is not good enough merely to revert to the old formulations. Our task--and the task of all education--is to understand the present world, the world in which we live and make our choices."

"The problems of education are...reflections of the deepest problems of our age. They cannot be solved by organization, administration, or the expenditure of money...Education which fails to clarify our central convictions is mere training or indulgence. For it is our central convictions that are in disorder and, as long as the present anti-metaphysical temper persists, the disorder will grow worse." (p. 101)

These notes have been made from only one chapter of Small is Beautiful, the chapter which addresses itself specifically to education as a cultural institution. However, the other chapters also contain many implications for the way thoughtful educators may choose to behave in the remainder of the present century.
This paper has three parts. First, Shaker describes the Reconceptualists as (1) occupying a middle ground between the conservative-technocratic empiricists and the romantic critics; and (2) espousing a "melange of traditional, progressive, and radical values and programs."

Second, Shaker develops a theory of emotions and a hierarchy of sensitivity, and maintains that "reconstruction of our emotional life as a culture is needed..." a point that would hardly be challenged by thoughtful people.

The third part is a section on "ethics" which actually is primarily a rebuttal to those critics of the Reconceptualists who claim that it is elitist and can be applied "neither to the disadvantaged nor the trade-oriented: "To criticize the Reconceptualists on such grounds belies their true message. Social and economic involvement are at the center of this new curricular reform."

A more complete development of either section one or section two would perhaps have been interesting and helpful. As it is, the connection between them, that justifies their being linked in this way, is unclear.
This is a succinct discussion of the predicament of the creative artist who also functions as a teacher. **Congruence** is an authentic and harmonious balance between one's life and one's chosen work, in which the life is the work, and the work is the life.

"Try as we will to find a balance between maintaining our own authentic relationships and educating others toward establishing their own, we are often dealt a situation of incongruences that makes the fulfillment of our highest good a network of risk-taking experiences."

(p. 447)

The first risk Shaw discusses is the risk that the teacher will move further and further toward a concern for teaching strategies and spend less and less time actively engaged in her own creation. To be specific, this is the risk that the art teacher won't be a practicing artist, or will be inclined to find less and less time available "for his own work."

"...creative participation with the medium one teaches," points out Shaw (who is a filmmaker) "is certainly the key to one's authenticity." (p. 447)

The second risk takes the distancing an added step; this occurs when one "has chosen not to teach the medium itself, but rather to instruct others how to teach the medium..." (p. 448) "In both cases of risk, a balance of energies expended in various directions is implied and desirable. However, such a balance is often threatened by the very nature of the teaching institution...In the face of this, we are hard put to maintain a sense of our centers and genuine bond with our medium...we must encourage the principle of congruence in all of its forms as a standard for teachers in the humanities." (p. 449)

Starratt begins by asking whether it might be possible to find a healthy balance between behaviorism and humanism, personal freedom and social adaptation, and the moralists and the academicians.

In the effort to answer his own question, Starratt suggests a "vigorous revival of philosophical inquiry" and challenges those who argue that theorists should turn their attention to practical applications of theory. He identifies global survival as one major area that has thus far been neglected in theory-making (and in practical application--actual classroom teaching--as well).

"Curriculum theorists have a huge task ahead of them: to describe the varieties of human knowledge and experience that will promote the development of personal, socio-political, and academic skills necessary to cope with the global challenge...development of heightened consciousness must be one of the critical components..." (p. 31)
This elegantly written paper traces the ebb and flow of humanist "general" education at Columbia University from 1880-1960, then identifies six characteristics of the 1960's and 1970's that contribute to making its future "uncertain"--

1. a rebirth of interest in the Humanities.

2. pressure of those previously excluded from higher education--their ambivalence about "getting cultured" seen as a result of being deprived of a sense of identity or community that was once provided by their social class.

3. the concepts of ORDEAL and INITIATION are fundamental to the humanistic educational traditions of the past:

   "Very likely this feeling on the part of many Americans that being taught or required to learn is an arbitrary denial of autonomy goes far toward explaining the state of primary and secondary education in our country..."

4. the tendency of many university-level people to assume that the only hope lies in higher education--that elementary and secondary are lost causes and unworthy of serious effort by bright people.

5. the tendency of many to mistake the awareness of youth for being educated.

6. impatience in our culture with the traditional humanistic idea of MAKING A LIFE, because making choices that will create a "shaped self", like a work of art--and having to choose; that is, choosing one thing and forfeiting the other, is seen as repugnant in our culture today: we want it all, seemingly, and would rather make no choices at all--just be swept along--than have to miss something.

This paper outlines the author's experience during about 4-5 years of exploring Zen, tracing his thoughts and feelings and also giving a brief overview of Zen concepts.

Its value lies in its demonstration of how Zen teaching and discipline may be used as a tool for examining one's experience and arriving at a truer, more accurate understanding of oneself and one's life.

It is also interesting to note that Vana experienced a crystallization and clarification of his understandings as a result of his effort to write about them. This would seem to support Pinar's assertion that it is valuable for the individual to write his own autobiography as part of his self-discovery (the "regressive" phase of the Method of Currere).

Interesting to read, this informal, diary-like paper includes some useful concepts and to some extent exemplifies the autobiographical writing exercises that form part of the method of Currere.

First, Wallenstein reminds the reader that the development of critical consciousness leaves no room for laziness and habit—always a timely reminder for people who try to stay genuinely in tune with themselves. Her images make this section particularly effective.

Next, she describes different kinds of teachers, in an effort to show the reader a picture of desirable teaching behavior, from a Reconceptualist point of view.

Finally, she takes a look at herself and her own experience in terms of a number of chosen dualisms—Individual vs. Group; Passivity vs. Action. Then she suggests others as useful frameworks for future "self-work:" Form vs. Content; Optimism vs. Pessimism; and Time.

"In my own search, I see myself moving towards an environment in which all my thoughts and perceptions during the day comprise my curriculum...it is our task as educators to find ways to make school hours a dynamic part of each individual's curriculum." (p. 17)
This paper gives a clear explanation of three stages of awareness, here called "searches", but does not explain reconceptualization in much detail.

Weingarten begins by identifying three schools of curriculum theory: (1) those critics of Tyler who call for a return to the affective domain; (2) those who continue with the scientific empirical model; and (3) the Re-conceptualists, with their call for expanding awareness.

Next, he identifies a process of three "searches" that lead to reconceptualizing:

search 1 - a subjective reaction to our condition
   (consciousness raising)

search 2 - objective assessment of our condition
   (revisionist critics)

search 3 - search, through ourselves, to transcend our condition using personal biography to discover oneself; use expanding awareness to establish one's "project" and choose among alternative "possibles"

"As the stages of search unfold, one develops an increasingly complex sense of "the problem"...(and) the complexity of the present challenge is that part of its solution demands the conversion of persons at the level of their mode of...knowing reality."
Weingarten calls this paper a "rough and drafty" rough draft--and in fact it does leave the reader somewhat confused. Still, several interesting ideas do emerge:

1. The possible relationship of the work of men like Paolo Soleri and curriculum theorists; though what this might be is only hinted at;

2. The failure of Pinar to "study students from their point of view". It is unclear why Weingarten feels that this is a failure "to be surmounted;"

3. Identification of communication as the "nub of the issue"--a communication that will give the audience something to use for themselves: "...I suggest we take a page from our own book and extend ourselves far enough to at least give our audience a chance to grab some threads, and maybe go home, or whatever, and weave their own dress." (p. 8)

It is this third point that seems to be the clearest and most useful message of this paper. Clearly, Weingarten is responding to the demands of conference participants ever since the 1973 Rochester Conference, that all this reconceptualizing come down to earth and present itself in a recognizable applicable form.

Part One is a summary of Huebner's writing from 1962 to 1974. Three basic themes are revealed--curricular language; educational environment; and the tasks of the curriculum person.

Part Two is a general analysis of the works to discern progressions, development of ideas, and/or inconsistencies.

Part Three is a personal response and criticism. White accuses Huebner of not really departing from the Tyler Rationale. He also expresses impatience with the ambiguity of some of Huebner's language and with the vagueness of the relationship of the ideas to actual classroom application. White agrees that a common language would be of great help, but feels that this work is progressing too slowly to be of much use.