A study was made at the College of DuPage (Illinois) of the attitudes toward and expectations concerning collective bargaining held by college faculty and administrators. Data for the study were obtained by surveying 228 faculty and 44 administrators, of whom 105 and 37 responded, respectively. Results of analysis indicated statistically significant differences in the responses of the two groups, with faculty indicating a slight tendency toward agreement with or support of collective bargaining and administrators indicating a very slight disagreement with the concept of collective bargaining. No decided preference, either for or against the concept of collective bargaining, was expressed by either group. The survey findings were compared to the empirical findings of other major studies concerning collective bargaining. Areas examined were governance, quality of educational services, academic freedom, institutional climate, institutional autonomy, nature of administration, and economic benefits. Results of the comparison revealed that both College of DuPage groups held erroneous views in some of these areas. (JDS)
FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD AND EXPECTATIONS
CONCERNING RECOGNIZED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AT COLLEGE
OF DuPage AS COMPARED WITH EMPirical FINDINGS

by

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College of DuPage

A PRACTICUM PRESENTED TO NOVA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

NOVA UNIVERSITY
December 30, 1976
ABSTRACT

Authors: Hansen, Barbara J. and D. Richard Petrizzo
Title: Faculty and Administrative Attitudes Toward and Expectations Concerning Recognized Collective Bargaining at College of DuPage as Compared with Empirical Findings
Institution: Nova University
Date: December 30, 1976

This study described survey data obtained from faculty and administrators relative to attitudes toward and expectations concerning collective bargaining as compared with empirical findings in the field. The purpose was to determine local sentiment for or against bargaining, as well as to ascertain the depth of knowledge in the area characteristic of the two groups. Significant attitudinal differences were observed, with faculty more favorable and administration more opposed to collective bargaining. Expectation items revealed erroneous views were held by both groups in most areas commonly thought to be affected by bargaining. Dissemination of the study's findings to administration and faculty was undertaken.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCEDURES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative and Faculty Responses by Survey Item, Showing Number of Responses, Mean Response and Standard Deviation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Attitude Scale: Mean Scale Response of Administrative and Faculty Groups Compared on the Basis of a t-Test for Significance at the 0.05 Level</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expectation Scale: Ranking of Administrative and Faculty Responses by Group Mean</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expectation Scale: Rank Order Correlation of Faculty and Administrative Responses</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

College of DuPage opened its doors in the fall of 1967, established by the Illinois Public Community College Act, and incorporating what had been Lyons Township Junior College. The college was transformed, almost overnight, from what was a junior college committed to serving the needs of students interested in transferring to a four-year baccalaureate program, to a dynamic community college committed to serving the broad, diverse needs of its community. Inherent in this transition was the re-orientation of the faculty absorbed from Lyons Township to a totally different and inclusive concept of serving educational needs. Furthermore, a vigorous, nationwide hiring program was instituted to bring in additional and often younger faculty to meet the growing demands of College of DuPage's community and swelling student body. The college's rapid growth, signified by new faculty "classes" of up to 70 individuals for each of the years 1967-1970, tapered off and stabilized, despite continued enrollment increases, as the college settled in to accomplish its mission. Currently, 1-11 new faculty are hired each year -- some to establish new programs, others to replace faculty who have left the college.

The community college district served by College of DuPage consists of a rapidly growing, highly mobile and very affluent
population of primarily white collar employees who are both well educated and well compensated. Therefore, the standard of living in the district is extremely high. Also, DuPage County is contiguous to Cook County and the city of Chicago, where a very strong American Federation of Teachers chapter exists for the Chicago City College faculty. These two factors have led the college board of trustees to maintain a highly competitive salary schedule which is economically attractive to existing as well as potential faculty members and a leader among comparative institutions in the state.

Within this context, and given the current board definition of "faculty" as inclusive of all professional staff members excluding only the president (and the collegial model that may be inferred), one would not anticipate union activity on the DuPage campus. While a small and highly vocal AFT chapter does exist, widespread agitation for collective bargaining is not evident. In 1973, out of frustration with a negotiated salary package not commensurate with the rate of inflation and during a highly charged faculty meeting, the Faculty Association requested collective bargaining from the board of trustees. The request was denied. During the academic year 1975-76, the Faculty Senate sponsored a number of workshops and panels dealing with formal bargaining, hoping to educate the faculty prior to a potentially increased movement in that direction. Interesting to note is the fact that the most well-attended session was conducted by the chairman of the board, himself a professor of labor-management relations and a professional arbitrator.
While the college faculty, administration and board of trustees continue their waltzing with each other on the question of whether or not to move to formal recognition, the federal Congress is addressing itself to the pressures of labor for legislation enabling collective bargaining in the public sector. Concurrently, James Thompson, the newly elected governor of this industrial state, indicated during his campaign that he would support federal collective bargaining legislation and further seek to have such legislation introduced in the Illinois legislature.

Numerous sources document the increasing pressures toward collective bargaining throughout the country (see, e.g., Carr and Van Eyck, 1973; Ernst, 1975; Semas, 1974). Sumner (1975:9) indicates that if enabling legislation is passed at either the state or federal level, repetition "...of the almost wholesale statewide opting for bargaining that occurred in New York, for example, soon after bargaining became legal [is] to be expected... The level of unionization in community colleges will rise considerably under stepped up union membership drives, even without bargaining legislation." Further impetus for unionization arises from an economic situation which has reduced faculty resistance to the concept of unionization.

The purpose of the investigation undertaken by the authors was, then, to assess currently held faculty and administrative

1"Faculty" is defined, for the purpose of this paper, as those whose primary responsibility is teaching, counseling, and librarian. "Administration" includes those who administer board policy or supervise people or programs.
attitudes toward and expectations concerning collective bargaining and to compare these with the realities as defined by available research in the field, with the hope that a more informed conclusion could be reached relative to the implications of collective bargaining on the College of DuPage campus. Data for the study was obtained through a survey distributed to all faculty and administrators. A descriptive as well as a comparative analysis between the two groups was done.

Collective bargaining has potentially profound implications for the governance of College of DuPage, as well as for a multitude of other areas of operation (see, e.g., Bylsma and Blackburr, 1971; Carr and Van Eyck, 1973; Ernst, 1975; and Richardson, 1974). In addressing the significance of a decision regarding the adoption of collective bargaining, Ernst (1975:91) maintains that "an increasing number of faculty and staff find themselves trying to decide whether collective bargaining should be accepted or rejected at their institutions. Often, this important decision is made without due consideration of the basic factors involved.... Clearly, all factors should be weighed carefully."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

A great deal has been and continues to be written on the subject of collective bargaining in higher education. While a wide range of opinion has been encountered, both favorable and unfavorable, certain concerns and considerations are reiterated throughout the literature.

First, the movement toward collective bargaining in institutions of higher education is well documented. Twenty-four states now have enabling legislation and, according to Semas (1976), the trend toward adoption of collective bargaining by colleges and universities picked up during the 1975-76 academic year. One source (Kemerer, 1976:50) indicates that in 10 years the union movement has increased to include one-seventh of U.S. colleges and universities, representing 12 per cent of professional staff and 20 per cent of full-time teaching faculty.

Commonly mentioned causal factors include: legislation allowing collective bargaining in the public sector; the "boom-then-bust" experience of the '60's and '70's, leading to concern over job security and economic benefits; inadequate participation and lack of status in college governance; more ambitious union membership drives; the "domino effect," or the perception that bargaining has produced benefits elsewhere; a perceived loss of power to external agencies such as state legislatures; and a widespread lack of
authority in society in general, and on campus specifically, leading to a challenge to the old seats of power and traditional methods of handling conflict (see, e.g., Boyd, 1971; Garbarino, 1975; Howe, 1973; Schultz, 1975; and Sumner, 1975). Summarizing these contributing factors, Garbarino maintains (1975:251) that when the majority of the faculty feel "...that the existing machinery for representing faculty interests is inadequate, the institution in question is ripe for organization."

The community college has proven to be the most fertile ground for collective bargaining. According to Rushing (1976:30), one in five now has formal bargaining. This phenomenon is perhaps attributable to closer ties to the public school system and its unionization experience, out of which many community colleges and their faculties derived (Garbarino, 1975:183). Additionally, the vocational orientation of many community college faculty, having backgrounds which include union membership, contributes to a more ready acceptance of the union concept (Sumner, 1975:183). Hodgkinson (1971:111) refers to the tradition of insignificant faculty participation and administrative dominance characteristic of many community colleges. Other sources cite the lower status of community college faculties, trying to compete with their favored university colleagues for economic benefits. For whatever specific reason, more and more institutions, and particularly, community colleges, are moving toward adoption of collective bargaining. Rushing (1976:27) calls this trend "...the most significant issue in community college management today." Sumner (1975:1) says,
"Collective bargaining is the most incendiary issue in postsecondary education today."

A pertinent issue requiring examination is, then, the nature of the process itself. Carr and Van Eyck (1973:3) define collective bargaining as follows:

Collective bargaining designates a definite process shaped by history and defined by law. It is a specific means by which persons identified with a particular enterprise, separated into management and labor components, are enabled, in a highly formalistic way, to discuss certain issues (or "relations") that lie between them, to reach binding agreement on how to handle these issues, and then to be governed by that agreement in the work relationship for a fixed period.

The industrial model of labor versus management implied in this definition is of concern to many students of the bargaining movement in higher education. There is a question as to whether or not the model fits. Donald Walker (1976:6) emphatically states that this industrial approach does not work or belong in academia. It is "...conflict oriented and grows out of a pessimistic view of man and an almost Darwinian view of conflict resolution, which depends on survival of the strongest." He goes on to state that attitudes and motivations under this model are directed toward wages, hours, and working conditions, to the implied exclusion of the education of students. Rushing (1976:32-33) expands on this argument:

Members of the higher education community...are inexperienced in this arena, [as compared to the considerable expertise now prevalent among management and labor in industry] and this inexperience has been apparent in most early efforts. The traditional concept of collegiality wherein the president, deans, and other administrators are a part of the faculty, has made role definitions difficult in collective bargaining. The limited nature of their sources and levels of revenue puts community colleges in a different position than that of manufacturing enterprises. The price of their product,
education, cannot be adjusted as easily as the pri
ter shoes. Appropriations by state legislatures...and tax sources that require a vote of the people, do no
give educational institutions the freedom to negotiate in the same manner as industry.

Early laws were often modeled after those of industry, and for the reasons above, have frequently been less than satisfactory. College faculties and boards have tried to pattern their negotiation procedures after those of business and met with disappointing results. But this is changing.

Mortimer and Johnson (1976:44) also highlight the danger of "... the imposition of industrial labor relations case law on higher education, and the introduction of a new set of actors and a number of potential changes in the relationships among the traditional actors in the arena of higher education governance."

Richardson approaches organized collective bargaining with reference to the pure form of the political model of governance theory. Indicating that "...the failure to deal effectively with conflict has been a major criticism of college governance..." (1974:350), he states that the political model "...addresses itself primarily to substantive issues which evade the solutions of bureaucratic authority or collegial consensus. The three models are in no way mutually exclusive" (1974:351). Richardson hastens to add that we must better understand "...what aspects of collective bargaining satisfied whom with regard to which problems..." before we go the "...additional step [of] declaring it the ultimate answer or even permitting it to achieve that status through collective inaction" (1974:352). A political model of governance, may, then, be appropriate and of great utility in dealing with certain, but perhaps not all, issues.
Addressing this applicability question, and the consequences of collective bargaining for academic governance, Lombardi asserts (1974a:11):

Collective bargaining upsets a long held theory of governance as a cooperative endeavor among the professional staff involving the faculty and administrators, sometimes also including students and other workers. Under collective bargaining the adversary employer-employee relationship carried over from the industrial world replaces shared authority or cooperative relationships including all elements within the community.

Similarly, in the epilogue to their book, Duryea and Fisk contribute these thoughts (1973:198):

Whatever the causes of unionism, the consequences of a commitment to this form of organization poses a significant change in the academic milieu. Recognizing as it does a dichotomy of interests between those who manage and those who implement, collective bargaining accentuates the organizational role of faculty members as employees in contrast to the ideal of professionals who participate as partners in the academic enterprise...professional personnel find their work far more regimented and conditioned by organizational arrangements than it is now.

In contrast, other observers view collective bargaining as a more formalized or legislated variety of shared authority, beneficial to the institution as it encourages the development of leadership in all constituent groups (Anderson, 1975:12; Hankin, 1972:1). The line of thought indicated by the majority of these sources is crystallized by Boyd (1971:314): When relationships are replaced by adversarial encounters, the employee professor may be "...better paid in a spiritually poorer environment."

A clear delineation of the impact which collective bargaining is likely to have on an institution can, at this point in its history, only be tentative. Almost every major source is very
cautious to point out the tenuous nature of drawing early conclusions (see, e.g., Semas, 1974; Carr and Van Eyck, 1973: 240; Ladd and Lipset, 1973:69). Yet some discernible trends appear over and over again as one searches the literature. Common to all discussions of impact are the following areas: governance; the role and fate of the faculty senate; the role of students; salaries; faculty workload and productivity; professional status and values of faculty members; faculty quality (tenure, merit pay); academic freedom; institutional autonomy; administrative composition; public attitudes; innovation and experimentation; administrative/faculty relationships; and cost, in terms of both time and financial resources.

The decision to move to collective bargaining is, therefore, a critical one, one which the evidence strongly suggests is irreversible (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:240; Ernst, 1975:91). Roger Heyns, President of the American Council on Education, signifies its importance in this way (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:vii):

Its effects on the academic profession and its potentials for strengthening or weakening the institutions and for helping or hindering teaching, research, and service are still not fully known. What is known is that the ramifications extend far beyond "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of work" as they are understood in industrial bargaining.

What appears to be needed is a thorough consideration of the probable consequences of collective bargaining, garnered as best one can from the available material accumulated to date, prior to a decision to hold a representation election. Faculty must identify and examine their most cherished values and attitudes toward the academic community in light of the evidence.
Collective bargaining is not so clearly the ideal or best way of managing labor relations, or of structuring the governance system, at every college or university in the land that it deserves to be adopted and implemented everywhere at the earliest possible moment. We believe that it, ...along with other promising means,...should be the subject of substantial experimentation (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:156).

If reasoned analysis leads to adoption of collective bargaining, faculty will understand, be prepared for, and perhaps welcome the outcome. Such analysis could, on the contrary, lead to a rejection of the industrial model implied in the bargaining process. A third alternative may be the creation of a hybrid model capable of dealing with conflict without abandonment of a collegial milieu.

The examination which follows describes and analyzes currently held faculty and administrative attitudes toward and expectations concerning collective bargaining at one community college, comparing these with the available data on real implications. Given the potentially profound impact of bargaining, especially as it affects governance, and the irreversibility of the decision to adopt it, institutions should evaluate their own perceptions of the process and determine whether they are founded in fact or fantasy. The search for knowledge could not, in the authors' judgment, be more aptly directed than toward a phenomenon which may well change the nature of institutions dedicated to such a search.

Kemerer and Baldrige conclude (1975/76:62) that "...collective bargaining itself is only a neutral decision making process. It has no inherent capacity for either harm or good. Its impact will be determined largely by the extent to which faculty and administrators actively engage in working through problems and determining the union
role in campus affairs." In the same vein, Boyd's comments (1971: 318) yield this overview as a framework for the discussion to follow: "It poses grave dangers to academic values and procedures, but it has demonstrated utility in solving some of the stickiest problems that confront...faculties and administrators. We should enjoy the challenge of salvaging its advantages while avoiding its perils."
PROCEDURES

As indicated previously, the authors have undertaken to ascertain faculty and administrative attitudes toward and expectations concerning recognized collective bargaining at College of DuPage as compared with empirical findings. To meet this objective, the authors determined that (a) because of the size of the populations to be studied (i.e., faculty, 228; administrators, 44) and because these populations are located on the same campus, a survey instrument would be employed to elicit responses from the totals, and (b) that a comprehensive review of the literature would be conducted in order that conclusions could be drawn from the findings.

Accordingly, the authors spent considerable time reviewing numerous books and articles on the topic. Much of the reading provided background information in the field of collective negotiations, allowing the authors to determine the most pertinent literature available in the field while, in addition, attempting to find previously validated data and instrumentation which would provide an instrument with sufficient validity and reliability to elicit the needed information for the study.

2Pursuant to this study, the authors have defined an "attitude" as a mental position with regard to a fact or state, and an "expectation" as a prospect of the future, or anticipation.
Once the reading was completed, the appropriate items were selected from the Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) report and the Ladd-Lipset (1973) national study on faculty collective bargaining. Due to the broad national recognition and reliability which was associated with the Ladd-Lipset survey, it was selected as the primary source and proved to be comparable in nature to the issues that the authors of this project were seeking to determine. Survey items were then selected for their relevance to the study. An instrument (a copy of which is included in the appendix) was designed which was used for both populations and color coded by group to protect the anonymity of the respondent. A cover letter was also prepared explaining the reasons for the survey, the need for cooperation, a requested return date and a detailed explanation of the intended use of the data.

In attempting to delineate the limitations of this study, the authors felt there were two, namely: (a) the fact that any mail survey has a potential response bias; and (b) the implications of this study are only germane to the population and environment of College of DuPage at this time and not applicable to any other institution.

In using the survey method, the authors' intention was to discover the nature and distribution of certain attitudes and expectations concerning collective bargaining characteristic of the two populations. A null hypothesis for the attitudinal scale was adopted: there are no differences expressed between the populations other than that due to chance. The authors also assumed
no strongly held attitudes favorable to collective bargaining would be indicated by either group. In addition, the authors made an assumption that both faculty and administrators have limited knowledge about the field of collective bargaining, especially as it might relate to the College of DuPage campus. Therefore, one of the most significant aspects of this study was to determine the nature of the attitudes expressed about collective bargaining and the degree of sophistication indicated by the expectations listed by each group. In addition, for purposes of this study, the authors did not attempt to compare attitudes or expectations within groups, nor did they attempt to ascertain why the observed distribution exists but rather, described what the distribution is. The following, then, specifically explains the way in which the data was handled.
RESULTS

Responses to the survey instrument were obtained from 37 of a potential 44 administrators and from 105 of a potential 228 faculty members. These responses were analyzed primarily by means of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, or SPSS. Certain questions (i.e., 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 21, 24, 25, 30 and 31) were recoded so that a response of "1" implied the most favorable and "5" the most unfavorable attitude toward or expectation concerning collective bargaining. The survey instrument used in this study is contained in the appendix.

Administrative responses on each item were analyzed to yield: number of responses, mean response, and the standard deviation. Comparable analysis was made of faculty responses. These results are summarized in Table 1.

Survey items were then broken down into two scales as follows: (a) the attitude scale, including items 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 32 and 34; and (b) the expectation scale, including items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31 and 33.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Collective bargaining improves quality of educational services</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 4.05, SD = 0.88</td>
<td>N = 102, M = 3.05, SD = 1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collective bargaining helps safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom</td>
<td>N = 36, M = 3.14, SD = 1.13</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 2.29, SD = 1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Presence of unions would increase influence of faculty senate</td>
<td>N = 36, M = 3.81, SD = 1.28</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 2.85, SD = 1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4. Presence of unions would increase power of administrators</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 2.14, SD = 1.13</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 2.22, SD = 0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5. Collective bargaining would increase influence of outside agencies</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 4.08, SD = 0.68</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 3.63, SD = 0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*6. Collective bargaining would cause specialists to replace generalists in the administration</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.08, SD = 1.04</td>
<td>N = 102, M = 3.03, SD = 0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Collective bargaining would increase effectiveness of campus governance</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.78, SD = 0.98</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 2.93, SD = 1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*8. Collective bargaining would decrease influence of students in decision making</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.49, SD = 1.28</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 2.86, SD = 1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*9. Collective bargaining has no place in a college or university</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 2.78, SD = 1.40</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 2.20, SD = 1.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>*10. Unions increase dissent among faculty</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.41</td>
<td>M = 2.94</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.09</td>
<td>SD = 1.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>*11. Strikes by faculty are non-professional</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.14</td>
<td>M = 2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.27</td>
<td>SD = 1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*12. Faculty strikes are not apt to produce results</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 2.73</td>
<td>M = 2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.17</td>
<td>SD = 1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Collective bargaining would increase voice of faculty in academic policy matters</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.59</td>
<td>M = 2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.17</td>
<td>SD = 1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*14. Collective bargaining would formalize relationships between faculty &amp; administration</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 4.14</td>
<td>M = 3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 0.86</td>
<td>SD = 0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*15. If faculties bargain collectively, students should have the right as well</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 2.65</td>
<td>M = 2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.38</td>
<td>SD = 1.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Collective bargaining improves accountability and responsiveness of institution to the community</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.92</td>
<td>M = 3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 0.95</td>
<td>SD = 1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*17. Collective bargaining reduces collegiality</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 4.30</td>
<td>M = 3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 0.94</td>
<td>SD = 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Strong environmental pressures promoting union growth</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 2.27</td>
<td>M = 2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.10</td>
<td>SD = 0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Unions have made impressive progress in affecting personnel policies</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 2.81</td>
<td>M = 2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.27</td>
<td>SD = 1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Faculty senates and unions should have different responsibilities</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 2.38</td>
<td>M = 2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.30</td>
<td>SD = 1.16</td>
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<td>Faculty</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*21. The burdens of negotiating and administering complex contracts will compound difficulties of administration</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.65, SD = 1.34</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 3.14, SD = 1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Collective bargaining helps safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom</td>
<td>N = 36, M = 3.06, SD = 1.28</td>
<td>N = 101, M = 2.50, Su = 1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Collective bargaining brings higher salaries and improved benefits</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.0, SD = 1.25</td>
<td>N = 105, M = 2.28, SD = 0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*24. Collective bargaining contributes to reduction in productivity</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.62, SD = 1.09</td>
<td>N = 106, M = 2.63, SD = 1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*25. Collective bargaining increases adversary relationships</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 4.24, SD = 6.93</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 3.50, SD = 1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Individual salary bargaining for merit increases is bad for faculty as a group</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 2.73, SD = 1.31</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 2.66, SD = 1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The only basis for salary differentiation among faculty in the same position should be age or seniority</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 4.19, SD = 1.05</td>
<td>N = 103, M = 3.78, SD = 1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Unions make it more difficult to deny tenure</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 2.76, SD = 1.14</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 2.85, SD = 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Only unions can assure fair treatment for non-tenured faculty</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.97, SD = 0.99</td>
<td>N = 102, M = 3.20, SD = 1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*30. Collective bargaining substitutes seniority for merit and lowers standards for tenure</td>
<td>N = 37, M = 3.05, SD = 1.10</td>
<td>N = 104, M = 2.58, SD = 1.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (concluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*31. Collective bargaining causes overemphasis on rules and regulations</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.86</td>
<td>M = 3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 0.98</td>
<td>SD = 1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Faculties have little real power to influence college policies as senates are typically ineffective</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.49</td>
<td>M = 2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.22</td>
<td>SD = 1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Union grievance procedures protect faculty against arbitrary administrative action</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.0</td>
<td>M = 2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.20</td>
<td>SD = 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Growth of faculty collective bargaining is beneficial and should be encouraged</td>
<td>N = 37</td>
<td>N = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M = 3.46</td>
<td>M = 2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.15</td>
<td>SD = 1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3For questions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 24, 29 and 30, a response of "1" = strongly disagree; "2" = disagree; "3" = neutral; "4" = agree; and "5" = strongly agree. These items will be indicated by an asterisk.
The attitude scale was analyzed in the following manner. A scale score for each respondent was calculated by summing scores on each item within the scale. Individual scale scores could vary from a value of 12 (a response of "1" to each of 12 items within the scale), indicating the most positive attitude toward collective bargaining, through 60 (a response of "5" to each of 12 items within the scale), indicating the most negative attitude toward collective bargaining. A mean score for each population was then computed, in order to achieve a more reliable indication of the nature of the attitudes toward collective bargaining held by the two groups surveyed. The mean score obtained for administrators was 36.6, while the mean score for faculty was 32.0. The two population means were compared by use of a t-test for significance at the 0.05 level, to ascertain whether faculty and administrators hold similar or different beliefs relative to collective bargaining. The t-test value was 3.18, as shown in Table 2. From a table of t for 61.98 degrees of freedom and a two-tailed test, the 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels are 2.000 and 2.600 respectively. The calculated value of t is greater than either of these values and therefore there appears to be a significant difference between the two populations.
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative M</th>
<th>Faculty M</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3.18(^5)</td>
<td>61.98</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\)Includes survey items 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34.

\(^5\) Significant beyond the 0.01 level.

The expectation scale was analyzed as follows. Within each population, items within the scale were ranked on the mean response, from high to low. These findings are depicted in Table 3. It must be noted that a high mean response indicates negative expectations concerning collective bargaining. For example, the administrative group mean for item 17 ("Collective bargaining will reduce collegiality between administrators and faculty.") is 4.30, the highest mean obtained for this group. Because this item is a recoded item (see page 16 in Results section), a high mean reflects agreement with the statement, as well as a negative perception of the bargaining process. Following the initial step, a Spearman rho rank order correlation was employed to compare the expectations indicated by faculty and administrators respectively. The ranked expectations of administrators and faculty correlated at .862 (P < .01). This correlation, which accounts for about three-fourths of the total
Table 3

Expectation Scale: Ranking of Administrative and Faculty Responses by Group Mean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrators</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item Number</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*6Includes survey items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31 and 33.*
common variances between the ranking of the two groups, indicates that they hold similar but not identical perceptions of collective bargaining. Table 4 depicts the results.
Table 4

Expectation Scale: Rank Order Correlation of Faculty and Administrative Responses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrators Ranking</th>
<th>Item* Number</th>
<th>Faculty Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Spearman rho rank order correlation = .862 (P <= .01)
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The heart of the authors' analysis of their findings consists of the attitude and expectation scales. The attitude scale reflects local sentiment for or against collective bargaining and can be compared with findings obtained by other researchers. The expectation scale can be said to reflect administrators' and faculty members' depth of knowledge relative to collective bargaining. Currently held expectations reflected in data obtained on this scale can be compared with demonstrated implications described by others in the field. The remainder of this paper addresses itself to the two-fold task of comparing local findings to the available literature in the area of collective bargaining and evaluating the potential impact which the results of such a comparison might have for College of DuPage.

As indicated in the chapter dealing with results, the attitudinal scale is comprised of several items which were included to elicit the overall mean scale score of each population's sentiment toward collective bargaining. With a range of possible scale means from 12, indicating strong agreement, to a scale mean of 60, indicating strong disagreement, the mean faculty response was 32.01 and the mean administrative response was 36.59. A t-test was computed to validate these means with a significance beyond the 0.01 level.

As a result of the analysis, it appears that the faculty perceptions indicate a slight tendency toward agreement with or support of collective bargaining, while the mean score of the
administrators indicate an extremely slight disagreement with the concept of bargaining. These scores do not indicate a decided preference either for or against the process.

An analysis of the attitudes expressed by those surveyed and those expressed in the literature suggests that two trends are converging in higher education today: (a) traditional patterns which have been rooted in educational institutions and (b) the more recently emerging patterns of faculty collective bargaining. As these trends continue to converge, educators are faced with a classic dilemma -- that of meshing two differing and often contradictory patterns of action (Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975). Surveys of faculty members indicate that American faculty are more disposed to accept collective bargaining than the number of institutions now covered by union contracts would indicate, and that the per cent of faculty members favorable to bargaining has been growing steadily. The growth of faculty unionism in an era of increasing austerity promises to be the source of the most important intramural conflict in academe in the next decade.

In today's environment, faculty members need no external stimuli (although they exist) to organize themselves to relate to administration, save that provided by the temper of the times. Faculty may desire an alternative to their current course, but if such an alternative is to have any hope of acceptance, it must possess two basic characteristics: strong organization and direct group action (Howe, 1974). "Therefore, unless administrators and faculty make an honest assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of collective bargaining for each party in the marriage at a given institution, each may find themselves in the unwelcome position of a groom at a shotgun wedding; they may be there as a consequence of their activities, but not by their own choice" (Howe, 1974:27).

For purposes of discussion, the expectation scale was grouped into subheadings consisting of the following survey items and topics:

1. quality of educational services, including items 1, 16, 24, 28 and 30;
2. faculty rights and academic freedom, items 2 and 33;
3. governance, items 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 21 and 31;
4. climate, items 10, 14, 17 and 25;
5. economic benefits, item 23;
6. nature of administration, item 6; and
7. institutional autonomy, item 5.

In the examination which follows, the authors will relate survey responses within each subgrouping to the literature in the field. This discussion of the consequences of collective bargaining is not intended to provide either endorsement for or an indictment against collective bargaining. Rather, the purpose is to highlight potential benefits and dangers which are likely, should formal bargaining be adopted at College of DuPage.

Quality of Educational Services

Based on group means, the data collected from items in this category indicates that in response to item 1 ("Collective bargaining would help improve the quality of educational services on campus.") the administrative group rather strongly disagreed, while the
facultyt was neutral. On item 16 ("Collective bargaining would improve the accountability and responsiveness of the institution to the community it serves."), administrators and faculty alike indicated disagreement. Responding to item 24 ("Collective bargaining will contribute to a reduction in productivity."), administrators agreed, while faculty disagreed. On item 28 ("Faculty unions will make it more difficult for institutions to deny tenure."), both groups agreed with the statement. Finally, faculty disagreed and administrators were neutral as to item 30 ("Collective bargaining will substitute seniority for merit and lower the standards for tenure appointments.").

In light of the expectations expressed by the survey data, an examination of pertinent research in the field yields the following observations.

The basic question inherent in this grouping of statements is what, if any, impact does collective bargaining have on the educational process -- does it affect faculty productivity, faculty quality, institutional accountability, or the nature of the educational program itself?

Hedgepeth (1974:697-8), studying the effects of collective bargaining on one university campus, found that the increased structure which resulted lowered standards of performance to a minimum level required by the contract, stifled creativity and effective job performance, and revealed fears that the elimination of merit pay would perpetuate mediocrity and discourage talent and innovation. Lombardi (1974a:9) found that "...only a few contracts contain provisions for the introduction of new teaching
technologies and fewer resulted in workload formulas that increase productivity." In a similar vein (1974b:14), he predicts that collective bargaining will inhibit educational innovation and increase the cost of instruction.

Other sources reflect concern over the fate of academic excellence given the advent of collective bargaining. According to Carr and Van Eyck (1973:266), "...collective bargaining has long been recognized as exerting a leveling influence." They go on to assert that the rigidity of the contract has the potential to "...inhibit faculties from undertaking bold and courageous educational experiments," although this result is by no means inevitable.

The question centers, at least partially, on standards for the awarding of tenure. Garbarino (1973:97) found that "...what the unions undoubtedly have done is to slow down a sharp increase in promotion standards that many unionized institutions would have liked to introduce in the current slack faculty labor market." Ladd and Lipset state that at CUNY, unionism "...has made it more difficult to refuse tenure" (1973:97). According to Kemerer and Baldridge (1975/76:50), unions may, due to "...their thrust toward overly specific, objective criteria, tend to encourage 'promotion and tenure by default,' rather than by merit, and this in turn may reduce the quality of the profession." The fear is, then, that faculty quality may decline under collective bargaining because it makes no provision to reward the outstanding teacher, and may in fact curb attempts at innovation and experimentation because of the rigid structure imposed by the contract.
Another potential danger with direct implications for the educational program is indicated by Ernst (1975:94). Trade-offs for financial benefits are expected, and a productivity emphasis is likely. Low enrollment, high cost programs cannot be defended on economic grounds, even though they may be instructionally sound and even desirable. This emphasis again reduces the faculty voice in academic decision making, and may "bargain" some people right out of a job.

The scope of negotiable items must also be understood in terms of its impact on educational services, faculty productivity, etc. Boyd (1971:314-15) intimates some of the potential fallout in this area: salaries become linked to workload; workload is related to class size; class size to curricular offerings and perhaps admissions policies; and offerings to curricular policy. The range of negotiable items, therefore, extends far beyond a narrow definition of wages, hours, and working conditions, and tends to become broader as institutional "ability to pay" decreases, and unions must then show consequences in order to retain the support of their members.

Another danger is that contracts negotiated under threat of strike may pay professors at the expense of students. The temptation will be great to deteriorate the faculty-student ratio in order to produce funds for a contract settlement.... If there is any positive correlation between faculty-student ratio and the quality of the educational experience, then the result of this practice will be to give students a poorer educational experience. (Boyd, 1971:315)

The potential of a strike, furthermore, may arouse community distrust and antipathy over the possible interruption of services, services supported, of course, by local and state taxes, and local student
tuition. As Sumner observes (1975:5), "Public demands for accountability generate efforts to monitor faculty workloads and performance."

A final concern in the area of educational services can be inferred from the following comments by Duryea and Fisk (1973:215). Observing that unions tend to reorder faculty priorities, placing welfare above academic issues, they point out:

First a union is an organization, a bureaucracy. As such it has the will to survive associated with all organizations. One cannot expect from it a dedication which would place commitment to the higher principles of education ahead of its existence.... One can expect all the petty foibles and failures which seem eternally a part of human associations.

The preceding analysis would suggest, in summary, that collective bargaining has the potential to impact negatively on faculty quality, productivity, educational innovation, and concern over community educational needs.

Faculty Rights and Academic Freedom

Survey responses to item 2 ("Collective bargaining would help safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom.") reflect moderate administrative disagreement and faculty agreement. Faculty agreed with item 33 ("Union grievance procedures will protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administration officials."), while administrators were neutral.

The question here is, of course, whether collective bargaining will adversely affect "...certain principles and values that the academic profession prizes, particularly those concerned with academic freedom and tenure and so-called academic due process.... Academic freedom and tenure are clearly 'conditions of employment' and are thus negotiable at the bargaining table." (Carr and Van Eyck,
Academic freedom has traditionally meant the right of the faculty member to decide how and what he will teach. As the scope of bargainable items broadens, issues such as these may come to the bargaining table, endangering "...the freedom of the professor to teach how and what he pleases. The danger is not merely a hypothetical one; course content has already been bargained at one Michigan table." (Boyd, 1971:315).

In regard to protection against arbitrary administrative action, or the assurance of due process, several sources see unions as effective in promoting fair and reasonable personnel practices (see, e.g., Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975/76:50; Angell, in Duryea and Fisk, 1973:100; and Garbarino, 1975:256), reducing favoritism and bias. These comments must, however, be considered in light of charges cited in the previous section that this end is accomplished at the expense of lowered standards of faculty quality.

One further comment must be made in relation to faculty rights under collective bargaining. Because bargaining agents can be chosen by a simple majority of faculty members, many individuals may be philosophically unrepresented, thus losing to some extent their rights as members of the academic community. Furthermore, inherent in collective action is the necessary loss of personal independence, a subordination of individual to group interests. For faculty members raised on independent initiative and thought, the required transition may be uncomfortable or even painful.
Governance

In regard to the impact of collective bargaining on governance, faculty and administrators indicated the following expectations. Faculty agree and administrators disagree that unions would increase the influence of the faculty senate (item 3). Both groups disagree with the statement, "Unions would increase the power of administrators." (item 4). Administrators do not feel that collective bargaining would increase the effectiveness of campus governance (item 7). Faculty were neutral on this issue. Administrators agree, and faculty disagree that collective bargaining would decrease the influence of students in decision making (item 8). Administrators disagree and faculty agree with the statement, "Collective bargaining would increase the voice of the faculty in academic policy matters." (item 13). Both groups agree that complex contracts compound the difficulties of administration (item 21). And finally, both groups agree that bargaining results in overemphasis on rules and regulations (item 31). The overwhelming consensus of opinion in the literature is that profound changes are likely in the governance area, given the adoption of collective bargaining.

Numerous sources predict the eventual demise of the faculty senate, as more and more issues are sent to the bargaining table for resolution, leaving the senate with no appreciable role (see, e.g., Ladd and Lipset, 1973:82; Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975/76; 51; Boyd, 1971:315). Ernst (1975:92) states that:
In order for traditional faculty government organizations to coexist with collective bargaining, both parties must share a common philosophical commitment to their perpetuation. Thus far the unions have shown little evidence of such commitment.... This finding is consistent with the industrial model, where unions have exhibited no disposition to either limit or share their authority.

Boyd (1973:315) indicates that while collective bargaining may be applicable to the negotiation of salaries and fringe benefits, its usurpation of senate prerogatives in academic decision making cannot yet be deemed appropriate. Whatever the fate of the academic senate, the evidence indicates that in some low-tier colleges where faculty influence has been limited by strong administrations, an increase in faculty power has resulted from collective bargaining (Ladd and Lipset, 1976). Faculty power may be lost, however, due to the increased influence of external agencies. This will be discussed in a later section.

One must once again keep in mind here, as Ladd and Lipset caution (1973:82), that the senate is constituted of elected representatives of all faculty, whereas the bargaining agent will represent only those who have voted for representation and joined the union. In other words, the voting membership of the union is not the same as the whole faculty. Most bargaining agents do not allow non-members to vote on a proposed contract. A union "clique," potentially responsible to only a limited membership, could unseat a senate "clique" which must answer to the entire faculty. Further, this union "clique" may be of a different breed.
In terms of bargaining's effects on the power of administrators, the outcome is the clarification of administrative authority through management rights clauses (Duryea and Fisk, 1973: 205). Ernst (1975:91) indicates that the end result of management rights clauses, found in two-thirds of all current contracts, might actually be to increase administrative influence in policy decisions, to the detriment of faculty participation in this area. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975/76:51) have also observed a potential shift toward greater administrative power.

Conversely, however, most sources concur that administration becomes hamstrung by the great expenditures of time required by the bargaining process and administration of the contract. As Boyd comments (1971:313): "When the new function of collective bargaining is added on top of the existing administrative responsibilities, it absorbs an enormous portion of the available manpower. Since most of the old functions remain, the result will almost inevitably be a growth in the bureaucracy." These views are echoed by Duryea and Fisk (1973:205) and Ladd and Lipset (1976). The following quotation does justice to the seriousness of this point:

The accretion begins with the addition of an individual responsible for coordinating the collective bargaining effort. Universities which deal with several different unions are apt to find that the unique nature of bargaining with the faculty requires a separate administrator. To perform his tasks, this administrator will require extensive support from many of his colleagues in both the fiscal and academic areas. The business manager, the budget director and the controller will spend much of their time preparing for the bargaining effort. Even a middle-sized institution is apt to require the equivalent of half a year's service from an attorney. The director of data processing and the director of institutional research
will each find that they have gained a new customer with insatiable demands. Information services will have to work overtime to interpret the novel situation to the interested public on and off campus and to provide the communication which is vital if the adversarial nature of collective bargaining is not to introduce an abrasive quality to campus life. Ecologists must join presidents in bemoaning the costs of this operation. At least one Canadian forest must be denuded for each contract, to provide the enormous paper flow, not merely of memoranda but of the accordion-like piles turned out by the computer's printer. (Boyd, 1971:313)

What does all of this mean for the effectiveness of campus governance? Kemerer and Baldridge see it this way (1975/76:51-2):
"Campuses are increasingly balkanized into veto groups, and administrative discretion to respond to campus problems is increasingly circumscribed by contractual provisions, particularly in personnel areas.... If successful, faculty unionization will add one more interest group to campus politics, thus complicating the decision process even further and constituting a potential veto to organization change." For Boyd, the total cost in money and time will be borne by diverting finances and manpower "...from other tasks that should have been performed. One can only assume that the university is poorer because of [it]" (1971:313).

Additionally, collective bargaining might well bolster the role of the local board of trustees, perhaps even encouraging it to intrude into day-to-day campus affairs. This is due to the fact that negotiated contracts have typically placed greater responsibility on the board itself (Ernst, 1975:93), forcing it to confront issues and problems typically left to faculty and administrative resolution. "There is a distinct danger that the coming of faculty bargaining will play into the hands of those
trustees, of which every institution seems to have one or more, who have an irresistible desire to help run things on campus" (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:252).

A final consideration in this discussion of governance concerns the role of students. Students, as consumers, realize that increased faculty salaries and reduced workloads would result in increased student tuition and a possible restriction of curricular offerings or development. Conflict between the two groups has occurred at many institutions across the country to date (Ladd-Lipset, 1973:89-93), with some student groups examining and questioning such things as tenure, workload, and instructor effectiveness. One example of this conflict occurred in the Chicago City Colleges during an AFT strike in 1968. Students were told, by the union, that grades and credit given by someone other than the instructor would be invalid, and that a diploma so awarded would not be official. In another instance, at two community colleges in Pennsylvania, students "...sought injunctions against faculty strikes" (Ladd-Lipset, 1973:91). Is it unreasonable to predict, then, that student unions might be formed to protect their interests as faculty unionism grows?

In summary, the picture is one of changing roles, under bargaining, of the faculty senate, the administration, the board, and the students. It is a picture of increasing bureaucracy, demanding financial and manpower resources which must be diverted from other tasks. Finally, it is a picture nailed down by rules, regulations, schedules and dates. One must conclude that the end
product will not be that of an improved governance structure, at least at this point in our understanding of and experience with collective bargaining.

Climate

There was not much dissent on survey responses in relation to the consequences of collective bargaining for intra-institutional relationships. Faculty and administrators decidedly agreed that bargaining increases adversary relationships (item 25), formalizes relationships between faculty and administrators (item 14), and reduces collegiality (item 17). With respect to the item, "Representation by a union increases the amount of dissent within the faculty," item 10, administrators registered mild agreement, while faculty indicated a rather neutral position. Of all mean responses obtained, 3 out of 4 of those in this category indicated the most strongly held views (for both groups) toward collective bargaining.

With few exceptions, the literature confirms these perceptions rather resoundingly. The great majority of respondents in Hedgepeth's study felt that:

...though there might have been a basis for adversary relationships in pre-existing conditions, collective bargaining has extended and intensified those conditions. It has led to the development of adversary relations within the faculty and staff. There is a conflict between those who support collective bargaining and those who oppose it.... The result has been an erosion of mutual trust and an increase in the difficulty of leadership.... (1974:698)

Carr and Van Eyck similarly emphasize the risks of a loss of trust and cooperation under collective bargaining (1973:255). These
losses would of necessity change the climate of the academic setting.

Hedgepeth also found "...widespread concern that formalization had resulted in more impersonal, more structured relationships" (1974:697). Administrators felt isolated as "...communication with subordinates was inhibited." These findings are echoed by Duryea and Fisk (1973:199). Lombardi (1974b:9) describes a profound change in relationships among the board, president, deans and other administrators, many of whom were not party to the contract negotiations but must administer its provisions. A reduction in the efficiency of management may, he says, be the end result.

As to the issue of collegiality, Donald Walker notes George Angell, Director, Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, when he defines "collegiality" as having four components: "...friendly relationships, shared governance, common goals and aspirations, and mutual aid in time of need" (1976:5). Walker feels adversary relationships result from collective bargaining, that these relationships destroy the collegium. Ernst approaches the question in this way (1975:96):

It has been argued that the establishment of an adversarial relationship is consistent with and will not have an impact upon "collegiality." An example commonly given is that of the courtroom, where the presentation of arguments assumes an adversary relationship yet may be followed by a strong sense of camaraderie between the advocates once the case is settled. The fallacy in this analogy is that disputing attorneys are not bound together in a close and continuing relationship, nor do they usually have ideological involvement in most cases. Further, one attorney does not depend upon another for the allocation of scarce resources.
There is not much debate about the advent of adversary relationships given collective bargaining. The Ladd-Lipset survey (1976) found that both observers of the process and unionized faculty agreed that increased adversarial relations occurred among the many constituent groups within the institution: administrators, faculty and students.

One dissenting view concerning the ultimate impact such relationships will have should, however, be mentioned. Garbarino (1975:256) suggests that "...the adoption of a new, frankly adversarial form of faculty-administration interaction may permit more rapid change to occur than the former consensus systems could have produced. This may result from the need to win the support of only a majority of those voting in a contract ratification. Governance by consensus implies a veto power by minorities on specific issues." Ray Howe (1974:224) points out that while bargaining sessions are "...likely to be adversary in nature, there is no need for them to be hostile." The styles, perceptions and understanding of the opponents will set the tenor.

Many students of the field fear that the aspirations of the adversaries will take precedence over the health of the institution (see, e.g., Richardson, 1972:57). On this point, Howe states (1974:226):

Intimate and extensive knowledge of the enterprise serves any negotiator well, but equally imperative is a sense of commitment to the institution and its purposes. The "hired gun" employed by either party solely because of proficiencies in negotiations represents a signal possibility of danger. The fortunes of individuals and of the institution they collectively comprise are inextricably entwined in any long run situation.
Anderson (1975:16) reinforces this sentiment:

The short-term gains achieved by either party to the contract at the expense of institutional health and well-being are "pound foolishness" at its ultimate.... The only real test of "goodness" will be the extent to which the [contract is] conducive to greater institutional wealth.

One final extension of this discussion of "climate" under collective bargaining will be made. Boyd (1971:316), in discussing the illegal strikes which may be engaged in by faculty (illegal because law ordinarily forbids public employee strikes), says "Illegal strikes represent a special danger to university communities because of what they will teach our students about contempt for law, about coercion as a means of influencing relationships, and about a resort to hypocrisy which is particularly repugnant...."

Economic Benefits

In response to the survey item, "Collective bargaining is likely to bring higher salaries and improved benefits," (Item 23), faculty agreed and administrators were neutral.

Ladd and Lipset stated in the February 23, 1976, issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education that both scholars and surveyed faculty members agreed, "...unionsized faculties have gained higher salary increases." Carr and Van Eyck (1973:242) note: "Among the community colleges, the evidence suggests that significant gains have been won through bargaining that might not otherwise have been forthcoming." These assertions need to be further examined in light of other perspectives and more recent research.
First, Ladd and Lipset (1973:69) indicate that there is disagreement over whether the gains made by unions would have occurred even without unionization. According to Hedgepeth (1974:697), "It is difficult to determine what salary increments would have been received without bargaining, especially in light of the changing economic situation." His case study revealed, in addition, a loss of traditional yearly salary increments without compensating wage increases.

Referring to the impact on salaries unions have had, Garbarino (1975:258) explains that:

...faculty unions' effect on salaries has in general been inversely proportional to the level of salaries prior to unionization. To that extent, faculty unions have had an equalizing effect in speeding up a change that might have occurred in any event.... It is not clear whether these trends are entirely the results of unionization or the consequence of a general trend toward equalization that is characteristic of higher education generally.

In relation to gains in fringe benefits, scholars point out the difficulty of putting dollar values on such packages (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:244). Often, it appears that fringe benefit provisions to some degree reinforce pre-existing policies.

Means and Semas report in the December 6, 1976, issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education that two recent studies on the effect of unions on pay increases indicate "...faculty members who have adopted collective bargaining have not been receiving significantly larger salary increases than professors who are not unionized.... Public two-year colleges showed the greatest decline in the difference in salaries between unionized and non-unionized
faculties." They go on to comment that levels of compensation probably reflect such factors as the local situation, regional location, economic conditions and legislative attitudes, rather than whether or not the institution has adopted collective bargaining.

The push for improved salaries is likely to have definite ramifications in the form of management demands for increased productivity (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:249) or, as Hedgepeth sees it (1974:701), reduced participation in decision making. Faculties must also consider that economic gains must be "...balanced against the additional cost of local, state and national union dues" (Ernst, 1975:95).

Carr and Van Eyck, in the final chapter of their book (1973:290), ask whether bargaining might bankrupt an institution. Their conclusion, based on case evidence, is that such a possibility does exist, unless both parties look realistically at the financial picture.

The literature would indicate, then, that bargaining does not necessarily increase salaries and fringe benefits -- local conditions must be taken into account -- and that trade-offs will likely be expected if economic concessions are made.

Nature of Administration

Both the faculty and administrative groups indicated a neutral response to the statement, "Collective bargaining would cause specialists (e.g., lawyers, management experts) to replace generalists in the administration," (item 6).
The changing role of administration has been discussed previously under the "Governance" and "Climate" categories. The point here is to illustrate a potentially changed "management type" in institutions of higher education. This possibility is mentioned by Garbarino (1975:256) and also by Kemerer and Baldridge (1976:51), who state:

The nature of the administration will gradually change in response to collective bargaining. In order to negotiate and administer contracts successfully, specialists such as lawyers, labor relations experts and institutional researchers will tend to replace the traditional faculty-related generalist.

Ramifications of such a trend for the "collegium" should be self-evident.

Institutional Autonomy

Both groups agreed that collective bargaining increases the influence of outside agencies, such as arbitrators, courts or state agencies. These perceptions are confirmed by the literature, which speaks to the resulting loss of institutional autonomy. "With collective bargaining comes the probability that educational decisions will be influenced and, in some cases, made by external offices and agencies" (Ernst, 1975:96).

Carr and Van Eyck (1973:283-4), for example, point out that the large degree of autonomy allowed to American colleges and universities has greatly contributed to their diversity and their strength. We have witnessed, however, in the last decade, a growing tendency for all levels of government to attempt to control higher education in return for increasing tax support. Unionization may
accelerate this trend. "Faculty bargaining must be recognized as subjecting colleges and universities to the threat if not the reality of substantial external intrusion into internal affairs that have hitherto been viewed as theirs to control and settle." This intrusion begins with state enabling legislation, which provides the framework for the bargaining process. It continues with the labor board’s determination of the composition of the bargaining unit, and supervision of a representation election; the increasing tendency to appeal to an arbitrator in deciding a grievance case, which ultimately may go to the courts; and a ruling by the labor board of an unfair labor practice by either party. Observers caution that rulings on issues with academic ramifications do not always reflect an understanding of the issues or sympathy for faculty involvement in curricula and program matters (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:288).

Another aspect of this concern for institutional autonomy relates to the legislature’s "control over the funds needed to finance collective bargaining agreements" in public institutions (Mortimer and Johnson, 1976:36). Boyd (1971:314) states the problem this way: "One danger in many states is that legislatures may shelter appropriated money within line-item budgets in order to prevent its being bargained away for salaries.... Legislatures may increasingly call the tune, where once they merely paid the piper. One cannot blame this trend on unions, because it has been visible for several years, but a speed-up is certainly to be feared." Garbarino (1975:187) points out that in the community college
experience, legislative hostility seems to have followed, not preceded, unionization. Thus, the trend toward tighter control of monies available for salaries might be expected to increase. "It is clear that collective bargaining brings the controversial matter of faculty salaries and fringe benefits to the attention of the legislature" (Mortimer and Johnson, 1976:39).

Scholars in the field extend this logic by observing that there is a discernible movement toward statewide bargaining involving the legislature and the governor (Ernst, 1975:93; Hudson and Wattenbarger, 1972:3). Ironically,

...collective bargaining appears to be reducing the extent to which decisions are made at the campus or even university-wide level. Since the ultimate power to decide on a wage and working conditions package is in the hands of the state government in public institutions, the university administrators and trustees are increasingly bypassed by the unions in favor of direct negotiations with the state officials. Conversely, as noted, the traditional role of ... administrators as lobbyists for more funds and higher salaries for the faculty is curtailed, for with collective bargaining they become agents of the employers' side of the negotiations. This change in role necessarily widens the gap between administration and faculty. (Ladd and Lipset, 1973:98)

The question of who acts as "employer" when public-college professors negotiate is uncertain in many states. In some cases, the governor acts as the employer, in others it is a statewide board, in still others, it is the local board. In any but the latter case, local boards will obviously be superseded, removing decision making authority from the campus and leaving behind a consideration of local issues, needs and circumstances.

External influences are also felt when legislatures push toward the "standardization of public employee personnel policies.
and procedures" (Mortimer and Johnson, 1976:35). As mentioned earlier, some feel that automatic promotion and tenure and the availability of appeal to outside arbitrators and the courts undermine the autonomy of institutions of higher education in promoting excellence, and is imitative of public school certification, whereby each teacher is basically interchangeable with each other teacher. In other words, nonprofessionalism. The union argument, of course, is that capricious administrative judgments must be controlled and that objective criteria must be met (Ladd and Lipset, 1973:72). It seems to the authors that the threat here again is the growing influence that arbitrators, labor boards, and courts are achieving in the academic community. More and more, then, hiring practices must be carefully scrutinized to assure quality staff, given the increasingly difficult road to removal of personnel.

Finally, external interests are also brought into the institution by the values and attitudes of national organizations like the NEA and AFT, which "may have regional or national goals that will claim priority over campus needs" (Boyd, 1971:314).

Mortimer and Johnson conclude (1976:44):

It would appear that the future of campus autonomy [under collective bargaining] is dependent upon the ability of campus administrators and local union leaders to develop cooperative relationships and to work at solving local problems in an informal manner.... Collective bargaining appears to be part of a larger social, political trend toward centralized decision making and homogenization of policies and procedures affecting faculty with those affecting other public employees.
Conclusions must now be drawn in relation to the three assumptions put forward by the authors in the section on "Procedures." First, as anticipated, no particularly strong attitudes either for or against collective bargaining were discerned by the analysis of faculty and administrative group data on attitudes toward collective bargaining. This counters the local AFT's claim that there is a strong and widespread desire for collective bargaining. Secondly, there was, however, a significant difference between the two groups on the attitude scale, with faculty indicating a more positive sentiment and administrators indicating a more negative view. The final issue refers to the authors' assumption that the depth of knowledge concerning bargaining, demonstrated by the expectation scale, would be rather minimal. Here, the results appear to be mixed when survey responses are compared with the literature. Given the limitations imposed by using group means, in that averages are affected by extreme scores, it appears that both surveyed groups are particularly sensitive to the implications bargaining may have for intra-institutional relationships and institutional autonomy. In the areas of educational services, faculty rights and academic freedom, governance, economic benefits and the nature of administration, both groups apparently hold some fallacious views.

The authors' intent was to shed light on local attitudes toward and expectations concerning collective bargaining in comparison with demonstrated implications. Having accomplished this, their recommendation is that the results of this study be disseminated to administration and faculty by the president and
the faculty senate. As reiterated throughout the preceding
discussion, the ramifications of collective bargaining are
potentially profound and should be given great consideration
before a decision in favor of or against bargaining is made.
The purpose here is to provide background for such deliberation.

It may be, as Hardson (1974) and Duryea and Fisk (1973)
maintain, that a mixed model of governance, more suitable to the
academic scene than traditional trade unionism, must emerge,
whereby both sides balance short-range economic issues against
long-range dedication to professional responsibilities and
philosophies. "The alternative for both professionals and
administrators poses an employee-management relationship which
can hardly serve an enterprise so intimately concerned with
humanity's intellectual welfare and possible survival" (Duryea

After evaluating the ramifications of collective bargaining
for academe, Benjamin Aaron notes (1971:14-15):

What is missing from this vision of the future, or at
least dimly perceived, is a quality of life in our colleges
and universities in which eccentricity and nonconformity
can still flourish; in which distinguished scholarship is
honored despite its lack of "relevance" -- that mean little
word; in which the main ties between colleagues are their
intellectual interests; in which cost-benefit analysis is
not the sole basis on which the value of every course or
degree program is judged; and in which these institutions,
in addition to administering to the contemporary needs of
their students and helping to solve some of the problems
faced by the broader community, remain the guardians and
transmitters of the world's cultural heritage.
Perhaps the most fitting conclusion the authors can provide is offered by Ray Howe (1973:48):

This is a time of crisis. But one must remember the classic definition of what a crisis really is. It is not a moment of tragedy or disaster. It is rather the point in the drama at which the fortunes of the protagonists begin to turn, for the worse or for the better, and which of these it will prove to be the author determines with a steady pen.

Boards and faculty together have it upon them, either as a monstrous burden or as a gigantic opportunity, that they are the co-authors of the drama.
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ATTITUDES TOWARD AND EXPECTATIONS OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AT COLLEGE OF DUBUQUE

DIRECTIONS: Please indicate your response to each item using the following key to select the appropriate answer.
A = strongly agree; B = agree; C = neutral; D = disagree; E = strongly disagree.

1. Collective bargaining would help improve the quality of educational services on campus.
2. Collective bargaining would help safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom.
3. The presence of unions would increase the influence of the faculty senate on my campus.
4. The presence of unions would increase the power of the administrators on my campus.
5. Collective bargaining would increase the influence of outside agencies (arbitrators, courts, or state agencies).
6. Collective bargaining would cause specialists (e.g., lawyers, management experts) to replace generalists in the administration.
7. Collective bargaining would increase the effectiveness of campus governance.
8. Collective bargaining would decrease the influence of students in decision making.
9. Collective bargaining by faculty members has no place in a college or university.
10. Representation by a union increases the amount of dissent within the faculty.
11. Because it is non-professional conduct, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing.
12. Because it is not apt to produce results, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing.
13. Collective bargaining would increase the voice of the average faculty member in academic policy matters.
14. Collective bargaining would formalize relationships between faculty and administration.
15. If faculty bargain collectively, then students should have the right as well.
16. Collective bargaining would improve the accountability and responsiveness of the institution to the community it serves.
17. Collective bargaining will reduce collegiality between administrators and faculty.
18. There are strong environmental forces that are promoting the growth of unions.
19. Unions have made impressive progress in affecting personnel policies in the short time they have been representing faculty.
20. Faculty senates and unions should have different responsibilities, with unions addressing economic issues and working conditions and senates dealing with curriculum, degree requirements and admissions.
21. The burdens of negotiating and administering the complex provisions of contracts will compound the difficulties of administration.
22. Collective bargaining would help safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom.
23. Collective bargaining is likely to bring higher salaries and improved benefits.
24. Collective bargaining will contribute to a reduction in productivity.
25. Collective bargaining will increase the sense of an adversary relationship between administrators and faculty.
26. Individual salary bargaining for merit increases is bad for college faculty as a group.
27. The only basis for salary differentiation among faculty in the same position should be age or seniority.
28. Faculty unions will make it more difficult for institutions to deny tenure.
29. Non-tenured faculty need the assurance of fair treatment at the point where the tenure decision is made, and only an employee organization can provide this.
30. Collective bargaining will substitute seniority for merit and lower the standards for tenure appointments.
31. Collective bargaining will result in overemphasis on rules and regulations.
32. Faculties have little or no power to influence college policies since the traditional "self government" institutions, such as faculty senates or councils, are typically ineffective.
33. Union grievance procedures will protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administration officials.
34. The recent growth of faculty collective bargaining is beneficial and should be encouraged.