Sixty college students were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a study of the effects of inadmissible evidence on a jury's verdict. The first group was exposed to the inadmissible evidence and a ruling that it was inadmissible; the second group, to the inadmissible testimony without objection; the third group, to the inadmissible evidence and a ruling that it was admissible; and the fourth group, to no inadmissible evidence. After reading transcripts of the trial, subjects completed measures of understanding the judge's instructions, of credibility of the defendant, of verdict, and of sentencing. Analysis of results indicated that jurors did not disregard inadmissible testimony when instructed to do so and that jurors' verdicts seem to be influenced by inadmissible evidence only when objection is raised. Both theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.
THE EFFECTS OF INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY ON VERDICTS IN SIMULATED JURIES

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While jurors are instructed by judges to disregard such instances of inadmissible material, they may well not do so; or perhaps they cannot do so [Konopka, et al., 1974, p. 40].

Research on the impact of inadmissible testimony has produced much speculation but limited confirmation of many hypothesized suspicions. Although jurors often are instructed "to decide the case upon the law and the evidence" [1954 Judicial Conference, in Erlanger, 1970, p. 346], inadmissible testimony commonly is believed to have an impact on jury verdicts. Oddly enough, research has not produced very convincing findings which would support the conclusion that inadmissible testimony has a direct effect on jury decisions.

Some study infers that inadmissible testimony may influence jury decisions. Wanamaker (1937) interviewed jurors and determined that much deliberation had taken place on matters which, according to law and judgment, ought not to have been considered. Although not addressing the effects of inadmissible testimony directly, the authors of the Chicago Jury Project suggested that the jury may consider items not properly a part of the trial proceedings (Kalveh & Zeisel, 1966, esp. p. 165). Notwithstanding studies which imply that jurors may consider inadmissible testimony, research which confirms such an expectation has been strangely elusive.

Typical of the studies which failed to demonstrate jury influence via inadmissible testimony is the research in the Michigan State University video tape research program (Konopka, et al., 1974; Poole, Lefebvre, Miller, & Pontes, 1975) and the study by Reynolds (1975). Although these researchers exposed subjects to a recorded trial transcript, and although some credibility effects were noted,
no significant effects on jury verdicts was revealed. These researchers were uniform in their criticisms of the manipulations they employed. The Knopka, et al. and the Poole, et al. studies featured no manipulation checks, rendering it difficult to assess the appropriateness of their operationalizations of inadmissible testimony. Yet, few would deny the conclusion that the Michigan State studies employed only "extremely mundane bits of information [Poole, et al., 1975, p. 12]" as examples of inadmissible testimony. The Reynolds study included manipulation checks on several receiver perceptions and found that the manipulation used in his study was not seriously believed nor comprehended by the research subjects. Hence, direct support for the view that inadmissible testimony affects verdicts has not been forthcoming in research which used recreations of trial transcripts.

Other researchers (Simon, 1966; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973) exposed subjects to news accounts of trials in which some sensational inadmissible testimony was introduced. These studies found that jurors did not seem to disregard inadmissible testimony when rendering verdicts. The research which used trial summaries has been criticized (Reynolds, 1975) for its failure to analog jury reception of courtroom advocacy, given that inadmissible testimony is treated differently by judges and news reporters and that dynamics of the courtroom transaction may affect the processing of inadmissible testimony.

If one were to conclude much from past research on the impact of inadmissible testimony it might well include the following:

1. Subjects appear to be influenced by sensational reports of inadmissible testimony when that information is conveyed in a news story format.
2. Simulated jurors who are exposed to a transcript of a trial which contains either mundane, unbelievable, or incomprehensible inadmissible testimony do not seem to be influenced significantly by the inadmissible material.

Since the first statement indicates that significant effects are manifested when news stories are substituted for trial communication, and since the second statement indicates that manipulation problems may have confounded much past research, additional research seems invited. This research project was undertaken to help answer the question, "Does inadmissible testimony affect jurors' verdicts?"

This research was guided by two now obvious imperatives. First, the research should deal with simulated jurors exposed to courtroom transcripts, not simply subjects who read a news story. Second, the type of inadmissible testimony should not be mundane, unbelievable, or incomprehensible. Major case appeals rarely base the preponderance of argument on mundane examples of inadmissible testimony. Instead, testimony which attracts special attention because of its unusual or sensational nature may be partial basis for believing that justice was not served.

RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES

Although past research findings have been equivocal at best, a strong case can be made for the position that juries never really disregard inadmissible testimony. Jurors are known to consider factors other than the arguments and evidence in a trial. Jurors may hold sex biases (Zeisel, 1968), have different views on the standards necessary to prove a case (Simon & Mahan, 1971), or be influenced by the attractiveness of the trial participants (Landy & Aronson, 1969; Walster, 1966). Since extraneous elements may be considered by jurors, it might not be unexpected that inadmissible
testimony may influence jury verdicts. In addition, few are willing to deny the commonly accepted dictum that it is impossible for an individual to 'forget' something which has been comprehended. Hence, it would be difficult to believe that jurors could disregard testimony once heard. Another viewpoint holds that since research has indicated that jurors may not understand judges' instructions (Mitchell & Byrne, 1972; O'Mara, 1972; Forston, 1970, Forston, 1972 a,b; Hunter, 1935), it might also be expected that the instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony might not be followed carefully by most jurors. In sum, there may be some reason to suspect that inadmissible testimony is not ignored by the typical jury.

In a trial setting some of the most sensational testimony might deal with information damaging to the defendant. Thus, with the above reasoning in mind, the following hypothesis was generated:

\[ H_1: \text{Simulated jurors instructed by the judge to disregard inadmissible testimony damaging to the defendant will render significantly more guilty verdicts than simulated juries not exposed to the inadmissible testimony.} \]

Of course, when inadmissible testimony is introduced several options are open to the participants in the trial: (1) the testimony may be the focus of an objection with the objection sustained (and the jury instructed to disregard the inadmissible testimony); (2) the testimony may be the focus of an objection with the objection overruled; (3) the testimony may not be the focus of an objection. Additionally, under ideal circumstances no inadmissible testimony would be presented. Based upon the general view that inadmissible testimony has some affect, \textit{per se}, on jury behavior, the following hypothesis was advanced:

\[ H_2: \text{Simulated jurors not instructed by the judge to disregard inadmissible testimony damaging to the defendant will render significantly more guilty verdicts than simulated juries not exposed to the inadmissible testimony.} \]
In essence, this hypothesis predicts that subjects who are exposed to the inadmissible testimony with either no objection or with the objection overruled, will render more guilty verdicts than subjects in a control condition.

**METHOD**

The methods for this study included selecting materials, simulated jurors, a design, a set of procedures, and statistical manipulations to be employed.

**Materials**

**Independent Manipulation**

The first step in selecting materials was the selection of a stimulus message. After an investigation of potential manuscripts, the particular message employed was selected. A case transcript, rather than a news story, was used so that information from this study might reflect a concern for realism in the operationalizations. The case dealt with a man and woman charged with armed robbery of a jewelry store. At different points in the testimony from the "star witness" for the prosecution inadmissible testimony was introduced or deleted, depending on the particular experimental condition.

Due to practical limitations, the researchers were unable to video tape a trial for presentation to subjects. Fortunately, past research has indicated that essentially the same types of results are produced when subjects are exposed to a trial transcript by reading, listening to an audio tape, or viewing a video tape (Forston, 1968). The transcript conditions were taped by a group of oral interpreters and the tapes spliced to meet the needs of the experimental conditions.

Four independent conditions were created. The first group
was exposed to inadmissible testimony, an objection by the defense, the judge's sustaining the objection and instructions for the jury to disregard the inadmissible material. Specifically, jurors heard the chief prosecution witness (the jewelry store clerk) make three sensational statements which were judged inadmissible: reference was made to a statement made by the defendant's former attorney that the defendant had been "using" the clerk when she began to date him prior to the crime's commission; reference was made to the defendant's prior arrest for shoplifting; reference was made to a statement the defendant made to the witness at another trial at which time she implied that the witness should have taken more seriously her alleged plans to rob the jewelry store.

The second group was exposed to the same transcript with the defense's objections and the judge's rulings deleted. Thus, the trial proceeded without delay.

The third group was exposed to all of the inadmissible testimony, the defense objections, brief counterarguments after each objection, and the judge's overruling the objections.

The fourth group served as a control condition. This group was exposed to no inadmissible testimony in the transcript.

**Dependent Measures**

Since the principal variable of interest was the verdict of guilt or innocence of the female defendant for her part in the alleged crime, the operationalization took primary importance. Based upon previous research (Reynolds, 1975) subjects were asked to respond to the statement, "The Defendant, Ruth Gibson, Is Guilty," on a set of four seven-interval semantic differential-type scales (Yes/No; Probable/Improbable; Likely/Unlikely; True/False). These
scales had been factor analyzed for the student population sampled and found to load on one belief (Fishbein & Raven, 1962) dimension.  

Indication of a recommended length of sentence was determined by asking subjects to answer the following question: "If you thought the defendant is guilty, what sentence would you recommend (the penalty is 1 to 20 years in prison)?" Of course, such sentencing would not properly be a part of the jury's duty in a typical criminal trial, but such data was desired since it helped provide additional information on the extent of juror responses.

Credibility of the defendant was assessed in order to provide additional information on the nature of juror evaluations and to provide useful information if the experimental manipulation had not operated as expected. A set of seven-interval, semantic differential-type scales designed for the measurement of credibility of public figures (McCroskey, Jensen, & Todd, 1972) was subjected to factor analysis featuring a principal components solution with varimax orthogonal rotation. Three credibility factors were produced. These factors were tentatively labeled character, competence, and extroversion.

Subjects

Subjects consisted of sixty-three students enrolled in the Basic Communication course. Given the desirability of maintaining equal cell sizes, fifteen subjects were assigned to each experimental condition. In order to equalize cell sizes, subjects were assigned numbers and fifteen subjects per cell were randomly selected (Glass & Stanley, 1970, pp. 510-511).

Although college students rarely comprise the bulk of jurors at a trial, the use of student jurors was deemed acceptable since
past research indicates that adult and student juries reach nearly identical verdicts (Anapol, 1973; Anapol, 1974).

**Design**

This study employed a factorial design with the control condition included in the 1x4 matrix. The subjects' assessment of verdicts, length of sentence, character, competence, and extroversion served as dependent measures.

As previously described, the first group was exposed to the inadmissible testimony ruled inadmissible. The second group was exposed to the inadmissible testimony without objection. The third group was exposed to the inadmissible testimony ruled as admissible. The fourth group was exposed to no inadmissible testimony.

Two additional controls were deemed necessary. The first check was to insure that subjects understood the judge's instructions. The rationale for measuring subjects' understanding of the judge's instructions stems from research by Sigworth (1973) and Forston (1974) which suggested that comprehension of judges' instructions may be marginal at best. Since this study was concerned with jurors' ability to follow instructions to disregard inadmissible testimony, it was felt that a major misunderstanding of the judge's instructions could confound this research. Thus, measures of subjects' comprehension of judge's instructions were obtained by administering a five item true-false test to subjects. The reliability of the test was determined by reference to the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (Kuder & Richardson, 1937) which yielded a coefficient of .521. Although a low coefficient, given the number of items on the test the measure appeared to be minimally acceptable for this initial study. Nonetheless, such low reliability places a meaningful
A second check was placed on subjects' agreement with the judge's ruling. Since judge and jury may disagree approximately twenty percent of the time (Kalven, 1964), it was feared that the results of the study might be affected by a simple disagreement with a judge's ruling. The measure of judge-juror agreement was obtained by asking subjects to react to the statement "In My Opinion, the Judge Was Ruling Accurately In the Trial," on a set of seven-interval semantic differential-type scales identical to those used to measure subjects' verdicts. Judge-juror agreement for the two groups which were exposed to the judge's ruling on the inadmissible testimony (group one which heard the testimony ruled inadmissible; group three which was exposed to the testimony ruled admissible) was compared by use of a t test.

Throughout the questionnaire polarity of scales was reflected and the order of scales was varied.

Procedures

Subjects were tested in their classrooms by the experimenters who introduced the study as a survey of reactions to courtroom communication. Subjects were asked to pretend that they were members of a jury which was evaluating the testimony in a case to be presented to them.

A brief description to the charges in the trial was provided along with an identification of the participants in the dispute. A brief summary of the circumstances in the case was provided before subjects were exposed to one of the experimental conditions.

Subjects completed a page of scales and questions including the measure of verdicts, recommended sentences, defendant credibility,
judge's instructions comprehension, and agreement with judge's ruling. After subjects completed the questionnaires, they were thanked and the hypotheses were explained to them. During this phase the experimenters interviewed individuals and found that they had taken the task quite seriously, a fact which was also reflected on the questionnaires which were—without exception—filled out completely.

Statistical Analysis

All data was tabulated and entered into the appropriate cells of a 1x4 analysis of variance and tested for significance. All seven-point scales were scored by assigning a seven to the most extreme positive pole and a one to the most extreme negative pole. To test hypothesized differences between control and experimental groups, Dunnett's (Kirk, 1968) multiple comparison technique was referenced. Other a posteriori tests were completed by use of Tukey’s HSD method. Bartlett’s test was referenced to determine if homogeneity of variance requirements had been satisfied.

Alpha was set at .05 for all statistical tests.

RESULTS

This section reports the results of statistical analyses related to manipulation checks, hypotheses, and additional variables.

Manipulation Checks

Two manipulation checks were utilized in this study. One manipulation check tested subjects' comprehension of the judge's instructions while the other check provided information on agreement with the judge's rulings.

To determine if the judge's instructions were understood, subjects' scores on the comprehension test were analyzed. The
mean score of the subjects was 4.35 (possible range: 0 to 5) indicating that they probably understood the instructions rendered by the judge. The extent of their understanding, however, is open to question given the low reliability of the comprehension test. To determine if any differences in comprehension existed in the specific research conditions, a 1x4 analysis of variance was computed. No significant differences were found (F<1) indicating the uniformity of the subjects' comprehension of judge instructions across conditions. The Bartlett-Box test was not significant (F=1.57, p=.19) indicating that the assumption of homogeneous variances was not violated.

To test subjects' agreement with the judge's rulings, respondents completed the previously described set of 'belief' scales. Results, reported on Table 1 suggest that there was no significant disagreement with judge instruction (X=21.53). The t test revealed that subjects who reacted to the testimony ruled admissible did not tend to disagree with the ruling more than those who had been exposed to the testimony ruled inadmissible.

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis predicted that subjects instructed to disregard inadmissible testimony nonetheless would render significantly more guilty verdicts than subjects not exposed to the inadmissible testimony. Table 2 reports the results of the 1x4 analysis of variance of verdict scores. A significant difference was found among the research conditions. The Bartlett-Box F test revealed no significant violation of homogeneous variances. Dunnett's test of these data revealed support for the first hypothesis (see Table 3).
The second hypothesis predicted that those jurors not instructed to disregard the inadmissible testimony would render more guilty verdicts than those not exposed to the inadmissible testimony. The data did not fully support this hypothesis. Although the "objection overruled" condition was significantly different from the control condition, the "no objection" condition was not significantly different from the control condition. Only when objection was made to the inadmissible testimony did it seem to have any impact on jury verdicts. At best, partial support for this hypothesis could be claimed. Nevertheless, the researchers urge that caution be exercised in interpreting the implications of such partial confirmation.

Follow-up a posteriori tests revealed no additional significant differences.

**Additional Variables**

Subjects were asked to recommend a length of sentence, ranging from one to twenty years in prison. Analysis of variance of these data revealed a significant F ratio. Nonetheless, since the Bartlett-Box test was significant there is reason to believe that the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated. Since the sample sizes were equal, true Type I error rate was slightly above the P level reported (Glass & Stanley, 1970, p. 371). Since the probability level for the F test was .02, however, one might still believe that a true significant difference exists between the groups. Given the significant Bartlett-Box F, however, one might wonder if the sample contained other contaminating trends. Dunnett's test revealed that subjects who were instructed to disregard the inadmis-
sible testimony recommended longer sentences than those who were exposed to the control condition (see Table 5). No other comparisons with the control condition were significant. No additional significant differences were found by the \textit{a posteriori} tests.

Insert Tables 4 and 5 approximately here.

Subjects rated credibility of the defendant on three dimensions of source credibility: character, competence, and extraversion. Only on the character dimension was a significant difference found (see Table 6). None of the Bartlett-Box tests for the credibility analyses was significant. Dunnett's test indicated that subjects who were instructed to disregard the inadmissible testimony rated the defendant lower on the character dimension of credibility than did subjects who served in the control condition (see Table 7). No other Dunnett's or \textit{a posteriori} tests were found significant.

Insert Tables 6 and 7 approximately here.

The F ratios for the competence and extraversion ratings were not significant (F<1). Interestingly enough, inspection of the means indicated that subjects perceived the defendant (who was also perceived as a criminal) to be of "moderate" intelligence or competence ($\bar{X}=10.62$; possible range: 3-21). Subjects also viewed the criminal defendant to be only slightly extroverted ($\bar{X}=14.58$; possible range: 3-21).

\textbf{DISCUSSION}

Since the manipulation checks indicated that the experimental conditions had produced fairly unqiue results, one might be led to a discussion of the potential interpretation of the hypothesized findings.
Support for the first hypothesis lends credence to the often heard view that jurors do not, in fact, disregard inadmissible testimony when they are instructed to do so. One might infer—with some cognizance of this study's limitations—that individuals who are convicted after disclosure of sensational inadmissible testimony may not have received a just verdict. Support for the first hypothesis also may indicate that jurors have some major difficulty in following judges' instructions, although they may understand them in certain instances. Moreover, the inability of jurors to ignore material even though so instructed may argue for increased study of the pragmatics of video taped trials. With video taping, inadmissible testimony might be edited from the record before a jury were exposed to the trial. At any rate, this study suggests that jurors do not—or cannot—disregard inadmissible testimony.

The second hypothesis predicted that subjects who were exposed to the inadmissible testimony without instructions to disregard it, would produce more guilty verdicts than those not exposed to any inadmissible testimony. Only partial support for this hypothesis could be claimed since the "no objection" condition did not differ significantly from the control condition. Rather than arguing for partial support of this hypothesis, however, the researchers are much more interested in underscoring the clearcut pattern which the data evinced. Only when objection was raised to the inadmissible testimony, did the inadmissible testimony have a significant impact on jury verdicts. It seemed that jurors were obliged to devote their energies toward processing the objectionable information only when the attorneys indicated that they though the material was worthy of argument. Instead of claiming limited support for the second
hypothesis, the researchers advance what they believe to be a much more important relationship.

On both the length of sentence recommendations and the character dimension of source credibility, significant differences were found. The pattern for both variables was similar. The subjects were instructed to disregard the inadmissible testimony tended to recommend longer sentences and to rate the defendant lower in character than did subjects in the control condition. Although previously mentioned homogeneity of variance problems may have jeopardized clear interpretation of sentence length results, no such problem seems to have plagued the character measure. In general, it seems that the entire evaluation of the defendant—not just the verdict rendered—was affected by the inclusion of the inadmissible testimony. Nevertheless, the results indicated no significant difference between the ratings of those who were exposed to the inadmissible testimony ruled admissible and those who were exposed to no inadmissible testimony. Such a finding may be difficult to explain except that one may note that recommendations of sentence length and ratings of character were obtained after subjects had committed themselves to a verdict (most of which were guilty verdicts). One might argue that subjects, having declared themselves to believe the defendant guilty, may have felt that the defense attorney's successful attempt to "cover-up" inadmissible testimony damaging to the defendant was an action worth punishing by increasing sentence length and by evaluating the defendant as a less trustworthy person. Such an explanation, though not exhaustive of alternative explanations, seems quite reasonable to the researchers.

The failure to find significant differences on the competence
and extroversion dimensions of credibility should not have been wholly unexpected. Evaluating someone a guilty of a crime may have compelled subjects to impute that person's character, but not necessarily that person's intelligence (criminals may be perceived as sly by many people), nor that person's extroversion (criminals may be perceived as quite outgoing).

The major findings from this study were that jurors did not seem to disregard inadmissible testimony when instructed to do so, and that juror's verdicts seem to be influenced by inadmissible testimony only when objection is raised. It would seem that such findings auger poorly for the trial lawyer who introduces objections freely. The introduction of objections seems only to focus attention more clearly on the questionable material.

The research findings seem to be explicable rather well by reference to Broadbent's filter conception of attention (Broadbent, 1953, 1958). According to Broadbent's early formulation, the organism cannot process all information with which it is confronted at a given point in time. In its attempt to fine tune or filter stimuli for processing, the organism focuses attention on certain stimuli which possess special characteristics perceived by the individual. Broadbent explains:

Evidence both from mathematical considerations and from experiment favors the view that only certain aspects of the total stimulus situation can initiate complex responses at one time. The stimuli possessing intensity, biological importance, and novelty are most likely to be selected at any time (1953, p. 339).

Although Broadbent's filter approach has been criticized for its failure to explain attention in many specialized situations (including attention lapses among schizophrenics), the approach seems to have some usefulness in assisting in an explanation of juror responses
to inadmissible testimony.

It well may be that the introduction of an objection in an otherwise dry or even ponderous trial attracts special attention to the material because it represents a change perceived as comparatively novel. It should not be surprising then, that the novel message has some influence on individual jurors. By calling attention to inadmissible testimony the lawyers may be insuring that such information will be processed by jurors. Albeit other theories such as the signal detection approach (Swets, 1964) or the amplification model of Sokolov (1960), may offer explanations for the effects discovered in this study, Broadbent's filter conceptualization may offer a viable starting point for future theoretic explanations. At any rate, the findings which indicated that objecting to inadmissible testimony enhances the likelihood that such testimony will influence verdicts seem irresistible.

Some major limitations other than those already mentioned should be imposed upon this study's findings, lest too much be concluded from this single effort. First, since students, not actual members of a jury pool, were used as research subjects there is some reason to question the rules of correspondence for the conclusions advanced in this study. Further research needs to be completed with different types of samples before one can conclude that the results reported here can be applied to actual jurors.

Second, the results may reflect an unusually powerful manipulation of sensational inadmissible testimony. Although past research seems to indicate that mundane inadmissible testimony has little effect on jury evaluations, it is possible the the particular
examples of inadmissible testimony designed for this study were so extreme that they introduce an artificiality which may seriously limit the generalizability of these research findings. Of course, any experimental research project in the social sciences may be criticized for employing manipulations which were artificially powerful, but in legal communication research, such questions should not be taken lightly.

Third, the simulated jurors were not given the chance to interact with each other in any formal deliberations. Granted that research indicates that most jury verdicts are decided before deliberation actually begins (as indicated by the fact that the majority on the first ballot eventually wins out in 60% of the cases [Wend & Danzig, 1940; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, p. 486; Simon, 1967, p. 63]), other research indicates that collective understanding and recall may be improved by group deliberation (Dashiel, 1935). Before these results are generalized too far, this research should be replicated using actively interacting juries, rather than simulated jurors deliberating individually.

Fourth, since different messages were used, it was always possible that some contaminating variables in addition to those intentionally manipulated might have confounded the results. Such variables as message length, references to sex of the defendant, or any of a host of language variables come to mind. As some control on language emotiveness, Lynch's Human Interest Quotient was computed for each of the manipulated portions of the transcript, and the manipulations were found to be of similar language emotiveness (S.D.=1.2; possible range: 0 to 77; see Lynch, 1968). It is always possible, however, that some other contaminating factors
may have operated uncontrolled in this study, but the possible impact of such variables is a matter of only broad conjecture. Future research which builds into the design additional controls of other related variables may be needed before a policy maker should take this study's results as the basis for a decision. Given that this research is part of a larger program of research, however, one should not be surprised to find future research completed which addresses itself to the hypotheses and limitations of this particular study.

Future research is planned, not only to overcome limitations inherent in this study, but to answer other questions related to the impact of inadmissible testimony on jury decision-making. Research on the impact of different sources of information (lay observer, physicians, or police) in different sorts of trials (criminal or civil) detailing different sorts of inadmissible material (past arrest records or amount of insurance owned, etc.) currently is planned. The authors believe that the impact of inadmissible testimony is a valuable area which is ripe for research.

**SUMMARY**

Subject to some major limitations, this study produced evidence indicating that (1) simulated jurors instructed by a judge to disregard inadmissible testimony do not appear to do so when rendering their verdicts; (2) only when inadmissible testimony is the focus of an objection do simulated juror's verdicts seem to be influenced by such information.

Research findings were interpreted in terms of Broadbent's filter theory of attention, limitations on the research were outlined and directions for future research were suggested.
FOOTNOTES

1 The sensational quality of the manipulation had been verified by a five-person expert jury using a seven-interval "sensational-mundane" scale (Hirsch, Reinard, & Reynolds, 1976).

2 The scales loaded on one 'belief' factor: Yes/No (.90); True/False (.92); Probable/Improbable (.89); Likely/Unlikely (.89).

3 The scales loaded on three factors. The first factor, accounting for 44.2% of the variance was extroversion: Verbal/Quick (.80); Talkative/Silent (.87); Extroverted/Introverted (.72). Character accounted for 34.1% of the variance: Friendly/Unfriendly (.96); Pleasant/Unpleasant (.72); Good/Bad (.47). The competence dimension accounted by 21.8% of the variance: Qualified/Unqualified (.97); Expert/Inexpert (.43); Intelligent/Unintelligent (.53).
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CJD process analysis. Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, Ill.: December 1972. (a)

Does the jury understand? Usually not. Des Moines Sunday Register, May 21, 1972, 15C. (b)


Zeisel, H. Some data on juror attitudes toward capital punishment.
Chicago: Center for the Study of Criminal Justice, University of Chicago, 1968.
### TABLE 1

$t$ Test of Reactions to Judge's Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence

<table>
<thead>
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<th>$P$</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(two tailed)

### MEANS

*Possible range: 4-28*

**Group 1:**
- Objection Sustained: 22.93

**Group 2:**
- Objection Overruled: 20.13

### TABLE 2

Analysis of Variance of Verdicts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
<th>M.S.</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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Bartlett-Box $F = .81; P = .49$

### Means

*Possible range: 4-28*

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<th>Group</th>
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<tr>
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<td>17.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objection overruled</td>
<td>23.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>No inadmissible testimony</td>
<td>17.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3

**Dunnett's Comparison of Control to Experimental Groups on Verdict Scores**

Objection sustained - no inadmissible testimony = 4.46 *
No objection - no inadmissible testimony = .66
Objection overruled - no inadmissible testimony = 5.80 *

* Significant at the .05 level; critical d' = 4.37

### TABLE 4

**Analysis of Variance of Sentence Recommendations**

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<th>Source</th>
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<th>P</th>
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<td>Within Groups</td>
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<td>Bartlett-Box F = 14.91, P = .001</td>
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Means (possible range: 0 to 20)

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<td>No inadmissible testimony</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.84</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5

**Dunnett's Comparison of Control to Experimental Groups on Sentence Recommendations**

Objection sustained - no inadmissible testimony = 8.13 *
No objection - no inadmissible testimony = .13
Objection overruled - no inadmissible testimony = 5.67 *

* Significant at the .05 level; critical d' = 6.32
### TABLE 6

**Analysis of Variance of Defendant Character**

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<th>Source</th>
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<th>P</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.35</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bartlett-Box F = 1.63, P = .18

Means

*(possible range: 3-21)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objection sustained</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No objection</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objection overruled</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No inadmissible testimony</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7

**Dunnett's Comparison of Control to Experimental Groups on Defendant Character**

- Objection sustained - no inadmissible testimony = 3.73 *
- No objection - no inadmissible testimony = 2.33
- Objection overruled - no inadmissible testimony = 1.33

*Significant at the .05 level, critical d = 2.56