The purpose of this conference of news executives from Japan and the United States was to exchange views on the relationship of the two nations and to identify areas of common concern. In general, it was agreed that the two nations are getting along very well despite their cultural differences. The first session dealt with the U.S. role in Asia. The consensus was that Japan has taken the U.S. pullout from Southeast Asia in stride and is exerting its own influence as best possible diplomatically and economically. The U.S. commitment to South Korea is a touchy area for both countries, and Japan urged the United States to recognize North Korea so it can be brought into the world community. Fear of both Koreas was expressed. A consensus exists for the current American-Japanese security treaty. Speakers warned about underrating trouble spots such as China and Russia, Europe, money exchange, access to resource materials, and direct investment policies. A light discussion ensued of cultural and sociological contrasts, followed by a probe into the victor-vanquished relationship after World War II. The final session concerned media coverage of one country by the other and the relationship between the newsmen in crisis times and under ordinary conditions. (ND)
When thirty news executives from the United States and Japan meet to consider what the readers of each country are learning about the other, the results are of absorbing interest to someone like me, who for many years has been involved with both sides of this information process.

Given the powerful influence that the press exerts on public attitudes in the two countries, the convening of the meeting sponsored by the United States and Japan Committees of the International Press Institute and hosted by The Johnson Foundation at Wingspread, already the fifth in a series of bilateral sessions, is, I consider, a response to a very urgent need to maintain a strong channel of communication between the peoples of the two countries.

It is nonetheless encouraging and inspiring to find that the news executives agreed that the two nations are getting on very well together in the areas that matter most, despite so many cultural differences. While agreeing that overall relations have never been better, the panelists noted that there remained certain areas which could conceivably become causes of friction. It seems to me that such areas of possible communications difficulties are far more likely to occur in the cultural and psychological sphere than in the political and economic realm. In the political and economic relationship, communications between the two countries are generally based on practical considerations of national interests, and hence are apt to result in less confusion since a common international language is used. Such is not the case in the cultural field where the widely disparate backgrounds of Americans and Japanese may often cause serious difficulties in communication between the two peoples. Owing to the extent of these cultural differences, the obstacles of communication are more formidable between the United States and Japan than between the United States and Europe. Those common cultural ties between the United States and Europe are regularly reflected in the media. It is, for example, quite usual to see the American press report on European personalities and daily life; similar coverage of Japanese figures and society is seldom seen. In the absence of common cultural bonds between the United States and Japan, when relations deteriorate, it takes much more to bring them back to normalcy.

Constant vigilance is required on both sides if communication leading to mutual understanding is to be sustained. We must continue to work together to prevent existing communication gaps from widening, and in this important work, the role of the press is crucial.

It is forums such as the present one which, by exchanging views and identifying areas of common concern, are so essential in sustaining mutual understanding across the Pacific. I commend this report to the reader as yet another important link in the fascinating and complex relationship between the United States and Japan.

Genichi Akatani
Assistant Secretary-General
Office of Public Information
United Nations
INTRODUCTION

There is a strong reason for a new Wingspread report on relations between Japan and the United States, namely constant change. I believe that the landscape is never seen in the same way, no matter how many times individuals travel the old road. The reason is simply that fresh combinations of ideas are created by individuals, thus affecting human events.

An exchange of views on the relationship of two nations should not wait until some dark crisis develops. It is better to have exchange take place in the sunlight, a more favorable climate for building the trust essential for mutual enlightenment.

Sessions like those held at Wingspread are bound to be a mix of past events and present attitudes. In fact, current views can become past tense very quickly in this era of whirlwind change. It is that rapid pace of human affairs which makes it important for us to put on the brakes at regular intervals, to quiet the clatter and try to find out what motivates us in our thinking and acting. That was the goal of the Wingspread meeting, as it will be during future Wingspread discussions between representatives of differing cultures.

Journalists are exceptionally well prepared to explain matters to each other. Their profession is communication, and it puts them at the crossroads (news centers) of human affairs. When this is combined with the freedom to report, the result is vitality and a good chance of expressing truth in terms of influencing citizen opinion and also official relationships, the role of the journalist can be the difference between amity or enmity. When nations slip into a position of enmity, the avenues to accurate perception and mutual progress are blocked, including trade, sharing of technology and cultural interchange. Risks of conflict may then be created, followed by the violation of human rights, including at times the right to life itself. Meetings like the Wingspread Conference are in the class of conflict prevention, brought about by thoughtful dialogue which influences opinion and policies.

Are there differences in the ways in which Japanese and American colleagues approach discussions? Yes, there are differences, based on heritage. I believe we should not try to impose change on each other, but accept the cultural differences and construct bridges of mutual trust. The Wingspread meeting accomplished this.

These are among the reasons for publishing highlights of the "Japan-United States Editors' Conference," and why we appreciate the conscientious work of our Japanese colleagues and those of the International Press Institute. The Johnson Foundation will continue to support similar exchanges in the future. The changing tide of human affairs requires this so that our future is not manipulated by the wheel of chance but directed by intelligence for the benefit of human development and dignity.

Leslie Paffrath
President
The Johnson Foundation
Korea — where the U.S. is committed to stand firm. The Japanese hope that this commitment will not be weakened — or tested — any time soon.

Some Japanese said they would appreciate a U.S. move to recognize North Korea, or any other action to bring the isolated Pyongyang regime into contact with the world community.

Spokesmen for both sides seemed convinced that, at present, it is in the interest of both Koreas and all four major powers concerned — China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. — to avoid renewal of the Korean War. The Japanese indicated (as Professor Tora Yano of Kyoto University put it) that they were as much afraid of a provocation coming from the South Koreans as from North Korea.

All speakers on this subject indicated that any major renewal of warfare would be very hard to contain within Korea or to fight with conventional troops or weapons. If this meant seriously considering resort to tactical nuclear weapons, one American speaker warned — with most of the Japanese nodding solemn agreement — the U.S.-Japanese alliance probably could not survive, and the U.S. very probably would be denied use of Japanese bases.

Barring such provocation, the consensus was that there is no great push from either side to rewrite the American-Japanese security treaty. Some American spokesmen indicated there is talk within the U.S. diplomatic and military establishments about pushing Japan to enlarge its contributions toward the joint defense, but several Japanese speakers were emphatic that Japan has no desire to do so. They said that even if the U.S. flirted with drawing back to a mid-Pacific defense line of Guam, Tinian and Saipan (which Asian Studies Professor Nathaniel B. Thayer of Johns Hopkins and Harvard said might be in the cards), there would be little interest in Japan in increasing its defense budget beyond the present 1 percent of gross national product.

On the political and economic fronts, speakers on both sides warned against underestimating such potential trouble spots as:

**China and Russia** — Japan is more interested in China than the U.S. in opening up contacts with China and least interested in detente with Russia.

**Europe** — While the U.S. maintains close and intimate ties, Japan's relations with most European trading rivals reflect what one U.S. spokesman called a “healthy mutual disrespect.”

**Money** — Japan, as a trading nation, likes fixed exchange rates; the U.S. prefers to keep them floating.

**Access to materials** — Japan is far more urgently dependent on the United States upon imports of basic resources, especially oil and food, and the Japanese pessimistically foresee an almost certain decline in living standards with inflated resource costs a permanent feature of the economy.

**Direct investment policies** — Both countries, badly hurt by recession, keep flinging with restrictions on investments in each other's economies and with investment rivalries elsewhere.

The liveliest give-and-take session was devoted to a light-hearted discussion of cultural and sociological contrasts between the two countries. This was followed by a bit more self-conscious probing of the victor-vanquished relationship after World War II.

The final sessions — inevitable when editors get together — consisted of mainly shop talk, on media coverage of each country by the other and the relationship between them in both crisis times and under more ordinary conditions.

As one heard all these concerns aired in two languages, with earphones carrying simultaneous translation, the process itself took on an added credibility. However any speaker appraised his own of the other-country's policy or viewpoint, there was a kind of internal assent, dissent, comment or criticism — from a dozen or more well-
informed citizens of the country referred to. So, for each participant, the impression carried away was not just a mixture of varied viewpoints, but something subtler: a rough "sense of the meeting" on each topic discussed.

THE U.S. ROLE IN ASIA — A STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW

The conference opened Sunday evening with welcoming remarks by Leslie Patfraft for the host Johnson Foundation; by William Block, Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the International Press Institute, as conference chairman; and by George Chaplin and Yasuo Takeyama, respective chairman of the U.S. and Japanese delegations. An off-the-record and informal discussion of the United States role in Asia by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll followed. It was the first comprehensive updating of official American policy that most of the conferenees had heard since the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. It amounted to a preview of the "new Pacific doctrine" that President Ford enunciated in his December 8 speech in Honolulu, on the way home from China, Indonesia and the Philippines.

The United States had every intention, Mr. Ingersoll indicated, of remaining a Pacific power with an important role to play in Asia. But the lesson it had learned above all in Southeast Asia was that American support could only supplement and never supplant local initiatives in meeting threats to the peace or independence of small nations. Many American officials now recognize that primarily military responses to problems of social upheaval are inadequate and even potentially counter-productive. They also recognize that U.S. interests in East Asia are enduring and that there is little chance of creating a stable equilibrium in that area without effective U.S. participation.

In its reassessment of Asian realities after Vietnam, the State Department had concluded that the basic structure of major power equilibrium is essentially unchanged, with three key stabilizing factors: (1) the persistent
Sino-Soviet rivalry, (2) the continuing firm U.S.-Japanese friendship, and (3) the continuing prosperity of the Pacific region economy.

In Southeast Asia itself, however, the American position has been transformed, with influence throughout the Indo-China peninsula eradicated, with Hanoi dominant and its ambitions uncertain. The non-Communist nations of the region have not overreacted, as some domino-theorists had feared, but have moved toward greater self-reliance and a more diversified diplomatic strategy. Thailand and the Philippines in particular have questioned the value of U.S. military help, and at their insistence, SEATO is being phased out. But they still want a continuing American presence, and they want the U.S. generally involved, militarily and economically, in the affairs of the region. So the U.S. government, while waiting for the dust to settle in Indochina, is adjusting its profile in gradual response to the attitudes of the other nations in the region. Meanwhile, it is devoting new attention — as the President's subsequent post-Peking visit to Indonesia and the Philippines underscored — to both bilateral and multilateral relations with the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states.

In Korea, the State Department posture was likewise described in terms similar to those later set forth in the "New Pacific Doctrine" — with assurances to South Korea of America's continuing military presence, but with a parallel effort to ease North-South tensions on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. veto of applications for U.N. membership by both Vietnams, cast because the admission of South Korea was excluded, was described as typical of current U.S. policy — a readiness to take constructive steps to relieve tensions, but not to countenance any undercutting of basic U.S. interests or those of its allies. The U.S. effort in South Korea's behalf was described as one of the strongest diplomatic campaigns ever waged at the U.N. — an effort motivated in part by a fear that the Algerian resolution excluding South Korea might be destabilizing enough to prod Seoul into a rash action.

U.S. relations with China were described as firm and durable. The great Chinese emphasis on
America's "error" in pursuing détente with the Soviet Union was described as not particularly new.

The U.S. relationship with Japan was described as the real cornerstone of American policy in East Asia.

FROM HIGH POLICY ... TO DOMESTIC POLITICS

The conference turned on Monday, morning to a journalistic look at some lower-level domestic politics, American- and Japanese-style.

A veteran Washington bureau chief for Asahi Shimbun of Tokyo, Yukio Matsuyama, skillfully dissected "Post-Watergate American Politics," while a former Northeast Asia bureau chief for the Washington Post, Don Ober dorfer, countered with a candid portrait of "Post-Tanaka Japanese Politics."

Post-Watergate American Politics — A Japanese View

Mr. Matsuyama, a Japanese veteran Washington bureau chief, established his analyst's credentials with a smiling admission that his first appraisal of Gerald Ford, in late 1973, described him as an honest but mediocre Republican congressman whose highest political goal was to be House speaker of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. In fact, he did. Tanaka, Fukuda, Ohira, Shinoda and Nakasone: "today, all of them still remain as the strongmen of the party."

In America, when he returned in 1971 after an absence of only five years, he found few familiar faces. Of Mansfield, Fulbright, Mills, Hoover, Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Walter Jenkins and Bobby Baker — only M ansfield remained unchanged as Senate majority leader.

Another of Mr. Matsuyama's vivid impressions: "Being a Washington correspondent is tantamount to covering a perpetual crisis" — Berlin, Cuba, race riots. Mideast eruptions, Vietnam war and the testing of a 50-megaton bomb. After covering all that, he rather appreciates, he said, the comparative tranquility of the post-Watergate Ford era. But one aspect of this era makes him "sadly disappointed and dissatisfied" with both Mr. Ford and the Americans. After being greatly impressed with the way the country grappled with the problem of immorality in the long nightmare of Watergate, "the aftermath is a different story. Americans appear to regard Watergate as simply a spectacular scandal caused by an abnormally immoral." But he asked, wasn't Mr. Nixon's political character widely known before he became President, and who gave him his 1972 landslide victory?

"I would think the American attention needs to be directed more to the political process which produced the Nixon Presidency," said Mr. Matsuyama. "A dozen to any analysis of the Nixon psychosis.

He noted the vivid contrast between the seriousness, sincerity, intelligence and sophistication of the Nixon impeachment hearings, and the "atmosphere of the rabid, raucous primaries, conventions and campaigns" that produced the McGovern-Nixon candidacy and liberty — which in turn produced the Nixon landslide. "The House Judiciary Committee kept talking about political morality and decency," he mused, "but where could we find morality, decency or intelligence in the primary or the convention? It was easier to find Machiavellism, money, propaganda and demagoguery."

Mr. Matsuyama raised the bicentennial-year question: Where are today's counterparts to the first-personages who produced the American Revolution? Are they today preoccupied with something other than politics?

Noting his own country's tradition of copying every sort of trend or fad from the U.S., Mr. Matsuyama said he hoped American politics after Watergate would produce some reforms that Japan might also copy. He closed with some energetic preaching on American politics that was actually directed at Japanese ears.

What he missed in post-Watergate Washington, he said, was any compelling drive for reform. President Ford "seems to be acting as if Watergate never was." In Congress, 98 Watergate-related bills have been proposed; none has passed. The Nixon pardon, he said, had a remarkable effect in putting Watergate into the past tense. But when one remembers the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials, "where the leaders were condemned even when they had no direct responsibility for the crimes of their subordinates ... you will understand how foreigners feel about the pardon."

If foreigners seem to worry unduly about American politics, it is with no wish for reform, said Mr. Matsuyama. It is only because the system of the leader of the western democracies, "has such untoward influence over our own nation's course, we just can't help worrying." What worried him most, he said, was too much power concentrated in the White House "which needs to be dispersed as soon as possible if the United States is not again to be driven to the brink of totalitarianism."

He agreed, he said, with the Chicago professor who said that if King John had his Magna Charta, King Charles his Bill of Rights and King George III his American Constitution, "The Nixon Administration should have no less glorious a monument to political reform and liberty ... a historic document should be produced with the express intent to hold in check the power of the
American presidency, no matter how ambitious or greedy for infallible power the presidential occupant may prove to be."

Post-Tanaka Japanese Politics — An American View

In giving his American-eye view of "Post-Tanaka Japanese Politics," Mr. Oberdorfer said the first thing he learned about covering Japanese politics is that it isn't very helpful to try to translate the intricate maneuvering within Japan's dominant Liberal Democratic Party into American political terms. The two systems, despite superficial similarities, are extremely different beneath the surface, and one of the key differences is that political leaders in Japan tend to have lifetime employment. The maneuverings for position within the system tend to have no more direct impact on the public than do the similar maneuvers and personnel changes within the great corporations of Japan.

Parliamentary politics, in Mr. Oberdorfer's view, is not a primary moving force within Japanese life—despite the enormous media coverage given to it. There is a lack of man-in-the-street involvement that keeps much of the maneuvering private and not intended for public view. It is a system which, in America, would outrage the press concept of a "public right to know," yet is accepted in Japanese journalism by the practice among newsmen of attaching themselves to the great figures of Japanese politics in order to "wheedle" information out of them.

These and other "baffles" in the Japanese system, said Mr. Oberdorfer, help cushion abrupt changes and have contributed to giving the conservative LDP party the longest period of rule—an almost uninterrupted 30 years since World War II—of any single party in any parliamentary democracy in the world (unless one counts the Congress Party of India, the democracy of which may now be in question).

But time, he said, may be running out for the LDP. The LDP had begun a long, slow, steady decline before it turned from the Sato leadership to the "feudalized bulldozer," Tanaka, as a fresh face to try to reverse the trend. Tanaka came in like a whirlwind in mid-1972, quickly seemed to gain popularity with his recognition visit to Peking and other international and domestic moves, and sought to capitalize on this with a December 1972 election. But the LDP continued to lose ground in that election, and came into the Diet with 276 of the 491 seats, only 30 over the absolute majority needed to operate the parliamentary system successfully.

Thus Tanaka fell. While this was technically triggered by a magazine expose of a relatively minor scandal that was magnified in some eyes to resemble the downfall of Richard Nixon over Watergate, the Tanaka regime was about to fall anyway, Mr. Oberdorfer said.

In naming Premier Miki as Tanaka's successor, other leaders of the LDP were griping, in Mr. Oberdorfer's view, for either a transitional figure or—as he now appears to have turned out—a figure to put off a transition in Japanese politics for another year or so. Premier Miki's government, he said, has proved unable to make any major adjustments, and his popularity has dropped dramatically from about 47 percent in one poll when he took office to about 23 percent most recently. The Miki era, he predicted, is already drawing to a close.

On the future of the LDP, Mr. Oberdorfer took a more iffy view. If its decline is not arrested, the Japanese political system will soon be facing a greater change than any since the end of the war; and there are no more Mikis in the wings to execute a holding operation while the party sorts itself out." Mr. Oberdorfer's "guess" was that the Japanese ability to adapt and adjust, as shown repeatedly in economic and international affairs, will come into play in domestic politics and produce either a viable conservative-democratic socialist coalition, or some changes in the parliamentary rules to moderate the need for an absolute majority, or make otheradjustments that will keep the main elements of the present conservative leadership in power.

The Oberdorfer and Matsuyama talks triggered lively discussion. Mr. Matsuyama's concern about the "morality" of the example set by "the exemplar of democracy, the United States," touched off a spirited argument among U.S. participants, who differed sharply on the role that "morality" should play in politics.

Emmett D. DNA of the Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News noted that he is always suspicious when politicians or lawyers speak of morality. The U.S. tradition, he said; due to the pluralism of its institutions, makes morality an individual matter. Perhaps unlike Japan, he said, "We have no consensus on morality, and our system assumes the public arena is not where morality will be determined but is based rather on an assertion of rival self-interests, checks and balances to keep them in line." A politics thus based on self-interest, he added, is "not necessarily bad."

James L. Greenfield of the New York Times agreed. Watergate, he said, "was not a question of morality but legality. Nixon broke the law! We don't rely on the goodness of people; one man's morality can be another man's crime. But we insist that they obey the law."

Crocker Snow, Jr., Vice Chairman of the United States delegation and assistant to the publisher of the Boston Globe, said he was "not as embarrassed" as his colleagues to judge some American acts immoral. The American image in the world is not a legalistic one, he insisted. "Vietnam was not only a mistake but a black mark on our image. It was immoral, and I'm not embarrassed to say so. Our actions in Chile were not illegal, in domestic law, but were certainly immoral."

On the downfall of President Nixon, Akira Ogata of Nippon Hoso Kyokai thought Nixon should, despite the sins of Watergate, get credited for what he tried to do in restoring a free economy and opening the way to detente with Soviet Russia and China. Mr. Matsuyama replied that he had received credit for these things but that what he did was cancelled out by the matters that brought his resignation.
Shigeomi of Asahi Shimbun was struck by the clumsiness of the impeachment procedure and the Watergate investigations and thought a parliamentary type of no-confidence vote was a much easier way to get rid of an unwanted leader.

On Mr. Matsuyama's call for a constitutional reform to curb the power of the American presidency, some Americans replied that, in the wake of Watergate, they feared as much a pendulum movement in the opposite direction—a swing toward too much Congressional probing and undercutting to the point where the executive powers might be emasculated.

Japanese participants raised questions about the role of the American press in presidential elections. One wondered why most American papers took sides by making editorial endorsements. Mr. Dedmon felt newspapers had an obligation, just as voters do, to indicate a choice, and that it would be "a cop-out" not to do so. Mr. Greenfield and Millard Browne of the Buffalo Evening News agreed that they regarded not endorsing as a cop-out, but Mr. Browne noted that it was a much-debated question among editorial page editors and that a number of leading papers, including the Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, and Newsday, had made a virtue of declining to endorse in presidential races. Robert W. Gibson of the Los Angeles Times said his paper felt that, far from coping-out, it gained credibility for its editorials on campaign issues by declining to take sides on presidential candidates. Mr. Block of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette didn't think editorial endorsements were nearly as important in most voters' minds as all the other influences at work on them during a campaign, but he agreed with the view that newspapers should take positions.

In commenting on Mr. Oberdorfer's survey of Japanese politics, Shiro Mikumo of the Sankei Shimbun noted that the LDP was not the only party having difficulties. The minority parties were facing the same problems. "The closer they come to the possibility of sharing power, the more difficulties they seem to have."

The Japanese delegation chairman, Mr. Takeyama, added that
Premier Miki is anxious to dissolve the lower house but that the regime would be in a poor position to face the electorate just now. He added, as a footnote to Mr. Oberdorfer’s comments about the LDP’s transitional difficulties and continuing decline, that Japan has an efficient and competent bureaucracy, but many of its members are losing confidence in themselves.

To which Mr. Oberdorfer replied that Japan is a “Look, Ma, no hands” sort of country. “You can’t find out who’s steering it. Somebody is, obviously, but the process—which operates much the same way in business and journalism as in government—is often baffling to outsiders.”

AS JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES SEE THEIR FUTURE IN ASIA

The conference turned on Monday afternoon to international politics. Professor Nathaniel B. Thayer of Johns Hopkins and Harvard started with “The United States and Japan—Political Problems for the Future.” Professor Toru Yano of Kyoto University followed with “The Role of Japan in Asia.”

Professor Thayer said that the United States has been the dominant power in Asia for at least the past quarter century. In the future, however, the United States will have to share power with Japan. Both nations have similar goals in Asia; they speak of trying to create conditions to achieve peace, democracy and prosperity. But the two nations also have differences; they differ over tactics to achieve goals in Asia; they differ over the degree of importance to attach to the nations of Asia. Asia has grown greatly in world importance. For 200 years world politics centered on Europe; now that center is drifting towards Asia, which will soon embrace half the world’s people. How Japan and the United States work out their differences in Asia will have major implications for the world order.

The Asian superpowers, as Thayer saw it, are Japan and the U.S. Other Asian nations depend on them for investment, markets and technology; they are each other’s best overseas customer. But they see Asia, China, Russia and each other very differently. “Japan accords China first priority. America accords Russia...”
first priority. Japan believes China must be brought into Asia. America recognizes that Russia will be part of Asia.*

China, according to Professor Thayer, is trying to build an autarkic economy; the rest of Asia is building an integrated economy. China may be doing well, but the rest of Asia is doing better. Japan has realized that its great task is not to confront China, but to draw China into full participation. In current negotiations, the Chinese are insisting that Japan cooperate with China to limit the power of the Russians, and many Japanese appear willing to do so. "There is little room in Japan's concept of Asia for Russia." For Americans, by contrast, Russia is still the principal concern, with China seen as a rival to Russia, and normalization of U.S. relations with China seen as a way to influence Russian behavior.

In overall U.S.-Japanese relations, Professor Thayer saw no serious problems on the immediate horizon, but many potential differences and difficulties in the middle distance. "Currently both economies are depressed and pressures are mounting. Within a year or two, when both rebound, Thayer foresee five probable developments:

1. Japan's economy will grow faster than America's.

2. Japanese businessmen will continue to canvass the U.S. market searching for inefficiencies and weaknesses they can exploit. Although American economists may applaud Japanese exploitation as ultimately strengthening the American economy and benefiting the American consumer, American bureaucrats and politicians will see Japanese actions as imminently threatening to American Industry and workers.

3. The Japanese will be investing heavily overseas. Their Asian investment will probably outpace U.S. Asian investment with the result that the Japanese may reap greater economic benefit than the Americans.

These developments will reawaken American dissatisfaction with the Japanese relationship. Pressure will build in the United States to take unilateral actions, which would slow down the Japanese economy. American actions would provoke counterac-

Professor Thayer discounted the likelihood of competition between the United States and Japan over access to raw materials and search for markets in other parts of the world. If such competition were anticipated, it would have appeared by now. However, Japan is far more dependent on other countries for raw materials and markets than is the United States. In this respect, Japan is closer in her interests to Europe. At present, he said, Europe and Japan have little in common except a "healthy mutual disrespect," but that can change as economic interests converge. Thus, Professor Thayer saw a growing identification between Europe and Japan.

Another major potential problem, said Professor Thayer, concerns respective roles in the military defense of Asia. Some Americans have seen the Japanese as enjoying a free ride with the United States bearing the burden for the defense of Asia, including Japan. They argue that Japan should be made to bear a greater share of the burden. Professor Thayer pointed out that a rearmament of Japan with an overseas military role would more worry than protect the other Asian nations. Furthermore, the greatest security threat in the various Asian nations is internal insurgency. Japan can best help foster political stability through trade, aid, and investment.

But Japan should be expected to strengthen her own defense. Ideally, Professor Thayer argued, a new security treaty should be written. The present treaty is obsolete. It gives to the United States a power that it no longer needs. This power makes it difficult for the Japanese government to increase its defense effort.

Specifically, the present treaty gives to the United States the power to use bases in Japan to maintain peace and security in the Far East. Japanese opposition parties have argued that this power may drag them into a war rather than protect them from war. Their argument has been telling. The treaty has never been able to muster a majority in the public opinion polls.

The Japanese popular fear of involvement in an American war has prevented the Japanese government from cooperating with the American government in planning a joint defense of Japan.

During the early seventies, the United States has redefined its Asian defense responsibilities. It will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens an ally. In other types of aggression, it will furnish military and economic assistance but will expect the threatened nation to provide the manpower for its defense. The United States is precluded from maintaining nuclear weapons on its Japanese bases. Thus, the Japanese bases have only marginal value for Asian defense.

Since 1967, Japan's investment in trade, with, and aid for most Asian nations has equalled or topped that of the United States. If the Asian policy of the U.S. is to build prosperous nations in an open economic system, Japanese cooperation is essential. Japan's cooperation is best elicited by underwriting its security. American interest in the security of Japan is of a different magnitude than in the security of other Asian nations. The United States should be willing to write a new treaty uncoupling the security of Japan from that of the other Asian nations.

A new treaty whose venue was limited to Japan would probably be accepted in Japan by both the ruling and opposition parties and the public. Such acceptance would permit the Japanese government to cooperate with the
American government in planning the defense of Japan. A joint plan could lead to the precise apportionment of defense responsibilities between the two nations. A better and probably cheaper defense would result. The United States could reduce its defense commitments without heightening Japanese anxieties or encouraging Soviet adventurism.

Professor Thayer saw only a "minimal" likelihood of renewed Korean hostilities, with no major power seeing any benefit from such an outbreak, and all probably seeking to avoid it. He voiced serious concern about the recent situation when U.S. authorities spoke openly about using nuclear weapons if South Korea were placed under attack. If the Americans even contemplated resort to tactical nuclear weapons, Thayer warned, the U.S. alliance with Japan would immediately be in jeopardy. Several Japanese promptly agreed.

So did Professor Yano of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto University, who said that Japan views the South Korean issue basically as a diplomatic and not a military one, and hopes for the present to see relations frozen as they are—with North-South tensions eased but without any unification of Korea.

The Japanese, he said, would appreciate a continuing U.S. military presence in Korea "for five more years"—and even after that, they would not appreciate an "unconditional U.S. retreat," but would hope that the U.S. might use any pullback as diplomatic leverage to draw the North Koreans into international society. Both Koreas and all the major powers—Russia and China as well as the U.S. and Japan—share a desire for no-war in Korea. But there is cause for concern in the internal situation in South Korea, and in the "lack of sensitivity and doctrinaire character" of the North Koreans.

The basic interest of Japan is to promote an easing of tensions within Korea and to develop deepening economic ties with North Korea. Asked if it would be helpful to Japan for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, Professor Yano said emphatically: "Yes, uch." He cited four points of concern that Japan has in preserving the basic security treaty: (1) it is not merely a set of security arrangements but an "everlasting friendship" treaty; (2) it facilitates Japan's adjustment of its basic defense philosophy to meet the needs of the years just ahead; (3) it preserves Japan against embarking on very hazardous armament adventures; and (4) the crucial reason—it is functioning effectively, so that Japan can contribute much to the regional security of Asia.

Professor Yano also noted that a greater, rather than less, dependence on the U.S. treaty is central to the thinking of the Japanese Defense Agency in planning Japan's basic defense posture for the years ahead. He indicated Japan has no expectation of increasing the approximate 1 percent of gross national product it now allocates for total defense expenditures. It is planning a military capability, therefore, for only a very-limited surprise attack, or for aggression on its soil of small dimensions. It will be a defense aimed mainly at coping with natural disasters and keeping domestic order.

Underlying this Japanese approach to defense, said Professor Yano, is a somewhat nervous expectation that Asia will see less, and less international tension and more and more emphasis on great-power detente. The greater concern of the next few years, in Japanese eyes, will be for economic issues. But in pressing a whole range of negotiations with China, the Japanese are "very worried" about the success problem and possible collapse of the Foner "on a very high level." So the Japanese feel no need to hasten the pace of negotiations to reach a final friendship treaty with the People's Republic. In its relations with the Soviet Union, too, he described Japan as taking a "very cool attitude" and "very much worried about Soviet diplomatic aggressions in our vicinity."

Professor Yano noted that one of the most significant developments since the Vietnam War has been the international influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Japan, he said, has welcomed the opportunity to develop increasingly close relations with the ASEAN bloc, at the same time that it has hurried in normalizing relations with Hanoi as potential and responsible leader of the socialist camp in Indochina.

Given the policy options of being pro-ASEAN, or working to keep the ASEAN and Indochina blocs in power, or of developing closer relations with Hanoi, he said, Japan has apparently chosen the second, balance-of-power option. It is working hard both to renew relations with Hanoi and to help the ASEAN nations. In Professor Yano's view, Hanoi is not necessarily willing to be beholden to either the People's Republic of China or the USSR, and therefore not only welcomes Japanese aid but "would also welcome" a normalization of relations, and especially financial aid, from the U.S.

Professor Yano described "five strikingly peculiar features" of the Japanese foreign policymaking process.
First, all policies are formulated by a ring of section chiefs who work problems out together. They must get further sanctions from higher levels, but usually not much further input. This is a "traditional habit in our bureaucracy, and it is hardly possible to change it."

A second feature is that before any decision is made, "you must consult with all persons concerned with the matter." This takes great time and involves ringing up many people—sometimes as many as 100 in 16 or 18 ministries. This usually means, said Mr. Yano, that "the best option can never be adopted," that "the second or third best" is more likely to win all the required approvals.

Third, Japan has good “country desks” and a good “global desk,” so its country and global policies are usually OK, but it most often blunders in its regional policy formulations—for, say, the Middle East, or Asia.

A fourth “peculiarity” of Japanese foreign policy-making, he said, is its tendency to discriminate by region, giving U.S. and European relations the highest priority, with Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America neglected in study, diplomatic skill and effort expanded.

The final “peculiarity” cited—although some Americans weren’t so sure it was peculiar to Japan—was that foreign-policy ideas come from two different sources: one reflecting an analysis of trends outside Japan, the other reflecting the domestic political climate.

A TROUBLED WORLD ECONOMY—HOW SERIOUS FOR THE U.S., JAPAN?

How much are the American and Japanese economies hurting from the world economic recession—and how much will their relationship with each other be strained as various economies rebound at different speeds? Is the miracle of Japan’s swift rise to economic superpower status ending, or is it only waiting to catch its second wind? Are such pressures as those of the OPEC cartel for higher raw materials prices, and from Third World countries for a redistribution of the world’s wealth, merely creating manageable adjustment problems for the American and Jap-
Japanese economies — or are they creating a "whole new ball game" and a fundamental worsening of prospects, or of relations with each other?

These were some of the hard questions faced Tuesday morning. The speakers were Junichi Kada, chief of the editorial board of Yomiuri Shimbun, of Tokyo, and Hugh Patrick, a Yale University professor of Far Eastern Economics. They diverged chiefly on the resiliency and strength of the Japanese economy — with Mr. Kada taking a distinctly more pessimistic view than Professor Patrick.

Mr. Kada opened the discussion by noting that, since the period of Japan's "super-rapid economic growth" in the 1960's, there has been a "great qualitative change in the conditions prevailing." Japan, he said, "could not possibly find itself in the 1970's and the 1980's on a simple line projected from the 1960's."

He cited four "basic conditions," internal and external, which enabled his small Insular country to achieve "a growth unparalleled in history" and to become a major power. Three of the four conditions, he said, "have been shaken to the roots and are undergoing changes."

The four conditions:

1. Japan started out with a strong national consensus on the need to achieve the goal of making Japan a great manufacturing and trading nation, and the entire political, economic, educational, and social systems of Japan functioned with this single goal in mind.

That condition has drastically changed. For 10 years doubts about national goals have been rising among the people. Instead of giving top priority to production and trade, many now feel Japan should spend more effort in protecting the environment and improving the welfare of the people. Due to concern about the environment, for example, the availability of land for new factories has become extremely limited. And the "self-evident logic" that there can be no improvement in welfare without a certain degree of economic growth is "no longer being accepted in Japan."

2. It was possible for Japan to obtain cheaply, in large quanti-
ties and in a stable manner, the raw materials its factories need — thanks to a favorable demand-supply situation for raw materials and the ease of ocean transportation in large ships.

That condition, too, has now drastically changed — and not only because of the success of OPEC’s oil strategy, but because of the new “resource nationalism” of the developing countries, which is putting limitations on supplies of other raw materials. Mr. Kada views the future prospects here rather darkly. He saw it likely that the age when prices were determined by the balance between demand and supply will be replaced by “an age when prices will be maintained at artificial levels by various measures.” When that happens, he said, “it is evident that Japan, as the world’s largest importer of raw materials, will bear the heaviest burden.”

3. The market for the exports of Japan’s industrial production kept constantly expanding.

This condition is likewise nearing a dead end. For the last dozen years, Mr. Kada said, Japanese exports have “created problems all over the world.” The “too rapid increase in volume” has brought political, economic and social resentment. During the last 23 years, Japan’s exports of capital have also encountered growing resistance. Until recently, Japan has solved each frictional problem and has continued to expand its exports — in a market generally based on free-trade principles and a worldwide pattern of economic growth. This year’s Japanese exports, Mr. Kada said, are about to fall more than $10 billion short of the year’s target — proof, he said, of the growing barriers to trade expansion.

4. The fourth condition underlying Japan’s super-rapid growth of the 1960’s — and the only one still prevailing unchanged — is that the long-range safety of world shipping lanes was guaranteed, thanks to the maintenance of international peace.

In looking to the future, Mr. Kada foresaw growing pressures from the Third World nations for a redistribution of the world’s wealth, with an insistent dialogue between “North and South.” This, he thought, would be likely to lead toward the reorganization of such international systems as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, orienting them more toward redistribution of wealth.

In the light of such prospects, he saw Japan facing the necessity of reconciling itself to prices “stabilized at a high level,” and he saw this as particularly disadvantageous to a country as dependent on raw materials imports as Japan. He also predicted that the new emphasis on the welfare of developing countries would cause the whole tempo of world economic growth to slow down, with this inevitably slowing the expansion of Japan’s exports.

When Japan was first hit by the oil crisis, Mr. Kada recalled, there was a wave of extreme pessimism about the very foundation of its economic existence. But Japan quickly recovered its “equanimity” and discovered some realistic ways of coping with the situation. Even so, he said, the majority of the Japanese people still “harbor a vague sense of insecurity regarding the ability of Japan to continue its existence within the world economy.” At the least, he said, the Japanese people fear that restrictions on resources will make inflation a permanent feature of their national economy; and they are becoming painfully aware that their continuance as a major trading nation will not be “under conditions as fortuitous” as in the recent past.

This less-than-optimistic conclusion drew the comment from Mr. Takeyama that 1970 was “quite a crucial” turning-point year for Japan: that its phenomenal growth rate cooled down, and that its GNP (gross national product) growth rate since then had been disappointing. He estimated that there would be no growth this year, and that the forecast was for a 5.5 percent annual growth average for the next few years — noting that any annual rate under 6 percent would bring rising unemployment and other difficult problems.

Professor Patrick’s view of Japan’s economic prospects in the period ahead was considerably more optimistic. He thought Mr. Takeyama’s prediction of 5.5 percent was too low — both for Japan’s economic good and in relation to its ability to grow faster. Not only does Japan have a potential capacity to resume economic growth at a somewhat faster rate, said Mr. Patrick, but once it starts to do so, he doubted if any domestic forces would move to slow it down. "Japan needs a larger growth for a lot of purposes," he said — particularly to keep employment high; to clean up pollution and to do some effective urban renewal. He also thought the Japanese government has a tendency to make very cautious projections — partly in order not to scare the American government.

Mr. Takeyama replied that, in terms of predictions, "Hugh may be right," and agreed that, from the viewpoint of employment opportunity, "Japan surely needs a growth rate over 6 percent." But he listed various difficulties in the way of achieving it during the coming decade — including the problem of how to finance it without taking on excessive bonded indebtedness. He noted that in the next phase of growth Japan will have some of the same problems of working out balanced trade relations with emerging nations that the U.S. has had with Japan.

This discussion followed general remarks by Professor Patrick on the responses both countries had made to the world recession. Their main focus, he said, has been on domestic policy — primarily (1) how to get inflation down to tolerable levels and (2) how to solve the problem of declining profits and employment. Both countries have discovered that these aren’t purely domestic concerns because their econo-
On Obiedorler, veteran
orthopedic Asia bureau
chief, The Washington
post, gave the conference
a broad view of post-
war Japanese politics.

mies are related to world trade,
and what the Big Three—U.S.,
Japan and Europe—do will de-
termin whether the world econo-
my is prosperous or not. So
each is saying to the others:
"You please get your economy
growing again so it will stimulate
world trade, but we have to solve
our inflation problems first." Ja-
pan, said Professor Patrick, has
been the most laggard in that re-
spect; letting an economy that
has grown at a 10 percent rate
be throttled down to a 1 or 0
percent growth, he said, is
"ridiculous."

Professor Patrick saw fairly bright
prospects for a continuing world
economic recovery (although at
the time he spoke he thought
the prospect of a New York City
default might seriously cloud the
recovery). During the recovery
phase, he thought Japan had the
capability of being a leader, in
"shaping the rules of the game"
but that it was very reluctant to
do so. This reluctance, he said,
was partly due to its sense of real
vulnerability, in the ways de-
scribed by Mr. Kada; and partly
because "the bureaucracy makes
policy for Japan and is inherently
very cautious."

Mr. Patrick thought that the im-
portant news of the future in
U.S.-Japanese relations would be
more and more in the economic
area, and less in the areas of
politics, military and security is-
ues or ordinary intergovernment-
al relations. On the security is-
ue, he said, "we'd like to have
the Japanese say that Korea is
vital to their defense, and we
want the Japanese to love us and
our bases, to welcome a U.S.
military presence like the Ger-
mans do. But they don't really,
and the Japanese also don't in-
tend to spend any more relatively
on defense than the 1 percent
of GNP that they are now spend-
ing." Mr. Patrick doubted that
any political changes in Japan
in the near future would have any
major effect on economic or for-
ign policy developments;
"Prime Ministers come and go,
but policy goes on as before."

With economic issues moving to
the fore, he warned the editors
that most newsmen, especially in
America, are poorly trained to
cover economic news. He foreseen
a trend toward settling more and
more economic matters through
negotiation rather than in the
marketplace, with "all kinds of
government Intrusions, national and international." He cited the politicalization of access to oil as only the most vivid example of many trends in this direction, and he saw the old dichotomy between free-trade and protectionist policies giving way to a much more complicated future of case-by-case negotiations on major issues, with all sorts of ad hoc arrangements set up (especially with developing nations), in what may be an "evolving common law" of world economic relationships.

Professor Patrick said he differed somewhat with Mr. Kada, however, in appraising the effect of all this on Japan's economy in the next few years. He thought it unlikely, for example, that an effective price cartel could be maintained on anything except oil and he 'question how long it will last, either." He suggested that when major new supplies of oil come into the market from the North Sea, Alaska, China, etc. — the world price may break, and the United States and Europe may try then to have agreed to a long-term price floor, and thereby find themselves on the higher end of a two-price system, with Japan getting the advantage of a price cut and lower priced oil.

Professor Patrick said there are no major bilateral tensions at present, but he warned that this condition is not likely to last long, and we should not forget some "nasty periods" in 1971-73. Underlying any tensions, he said, is the fact that the major oil-producing countries now perceive a very solid need for each other. Japan's direct trade with the United States may become relatively less important in Japan's economy, but it will still be a vital ingredient. Japan, in turn, "already important to the United States, can only become more so." Its economic size relative to both the U.S. and to individual European nations will probably increase. Japan, in short, will be "a very big economy" probably looming more important in American interests ten years from now than the OPEC nations.

Professor Patrick tended to agree with Mr. Kada's thesis about Japan's relatively greater dependence on access to raw materials. "Japan does not have the options of independence, in contrast to interdependence, that the United States will continue to have," he said. Apart from its military strength, which Japan totally lacks, he noted that the U.S. also has a "very strong natural resource base," so "self-sufficiency will mean something very different to Japanese than Americans." Japanese foreign policy "inevitably," therefore, will have to continue to give high priority to economics — preferably through a multilateral, liberal world of trade and capital flows among all nations; but if that is not possible, then Japan will have to make other arrangements to import what it needs for a high GNP, and to export sufficiently to pay the import bill.

Professor Patrick took a dimmer view of U.S.-Japanese-European trilateral relations. The basic European attitude is to regard Japan as a threat and otherwise to have as little to do with it as necessary. "The Europeans are incredible in their lack of academic and governmental expertise on Japan," he said. They are basically "anti-global; the 'global nations' are Russia, the United States and Japan."

Two participants added footnotes to this theme. Mr. Dedmon, as an American member of a trilateral commission on U.S.-European-Japanese affairs, said it was in danger of collapse due to a lack of financial support and to disinterest primarily by European business interests. It was like a three-legged stool in danger of collapsing, he said, because of its weak European leg. Professor Yano described a trilateral conference in Kyoto last spring, during which "the atmosphere was cordial but there was no real consensus." Americans, he said, were interested in global economics, the Europeans were pushing for stimulative measures to counter depression and unemployment, while the Japanese were more concerned about domestic inflation.

A question by Mr. Takeyama then touched off a lively discussion of another confusion in U.S.-Japanese relations. This is the concept of a close relationship among the "Pacific Rim" of Pacific nations. Professor Thayer said that this idea — which generally embraced the nations bordering on the Pacific, except for China — had been discussed by economists for about six years, and that only within the past year had much thought been given to the political ramifications. Chile and several other South American nations were interested, he said. Australia was especially interested — Mexico was strongly opposed. Professor Paton added that the idea of a grouping of major Pacific nations (to include Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and U.S.) had been first discussed in terms of a possible Pacific free-trade area, but this had been shot down "mostly by the Americans," who were pushing global free trade and saw the Pacific-area idea as useful only as leverage to try to keep the Europeans from going too exclusive.

Alfred Balk, editor and publisher of Atlas World Press Review, asked what impact the Third World drive for a new economic world order would have on U.S.-Japanese relations. Professor Patrick thought the basic impact would be to pull us closer together. He agreed that this will be a growing issue, and that by and large the U.S. and Japanese interest would be similar. He doubted that "Japan, any more than the United States, is prepared to redistribute its wealth to the developing countries."

TWO INTERDEPENDENT SOCIETIES — AS DIFFERENT AS THEY CAN BE

The Japanese and the Americans — two people as different as people can be? Or two nations more alike than any other major nations in the world?

On those divergent questions, too, the view depended on the viewpoint — or at least the speaker's conclusion depended on his premises — as the discussion turned Tuesday afternoon to the lively subject of U.S. and Japanese sociological and cultural contrasts.
The different-as-can-be view was generally that of Crocker Snow, Jr., vice chairman of the United States delegation and assistant to the publisher of the Boston Globe. His talk prompted an opposite expression from Alfred Balk.

To Mr. Snow, the differences were many and started with the physical environment: Japan, an old, small, closely contained society with a highly homogenous population; the U.S., its chief characteristic being its geographic, ethnic, racial and religious diversity. Mr. Balk, granting the contrasts, saw similarities predominating. In fact, he said, in their dominant characteristics, they are the two most alike nations in the world. "The similarities are just fascinating. Both are world leaders in high technology societies, highly geared to economic growth. They are also the two most plastic societies in the world—relatively new as modern societies with no residual titled aristocracies. They are both seafaring, bound by the same gods—science, technology, material success, comfort."

Throughout his anecdoté-filled prepared talk, Mr. Snow drew on a seven-year background as a Japanese-based naval officer and later as a Tokyo-based foreign correspondent to point up cultural and sociological contrasts between the two countries and some of the subtle difficulties each has in understanding the other. He stressed three kinds of contrasts:

1. Japan as a tribal society vs. America as a society of individuals. "This," said Mr. Snow, "is one of the first things an American feels in Japan, and every western writer on Japan is full of tales about it. He told of a meeting of librarians where the Japanese participants wanted no individual name tags but wanted to be treated collectively as librarians. The first word an American usually hears in Japan is a mumbled "gaijin," meaning foreigner or non-Japanese, and this tag lingers as long as he remains. For the Japanese, he said, "there is great security of place in the tribe." Self-will is thus an undesirable trait; improvisation is bad. Jay-walking in Tokyo, for instance, is taboo for the Japanese. Mr. Snow said he played semi-pro hockey with a Japanese team and found the same contrast prevailing. The coaches expected that the Americans' style would emphasize individual improvisation and the Japanese would play totally by predetermined patterns. What the "tribalism" comes down to, he suggested, is that all Japanese know where they are in society and have a sense of belonging. For the same reasons, the Japanese have great stresses and strains, though most of those in today's America, he suggested, are because of a lack of social confinement and constraints, while those in Japan are largely the stresses and strains of group living in a closely-confined society.

2. Japan as a consensus society vs. America as a society of adversarial relations. This is particularly apparent throughout the two political systems. Mr. Snow noted, in Japan, adversary situations are mainly just ritualistic; the real decision-making process is one of consensus with decisions arrived at by committee. The U.S. is a contentious society where decisions are arrived at by "chaotic and force of personality." This difference causes decisions in Japan to be somewhat slow in arriving at, while the American taste, it makes for faceless decision-making and a very bland political discourse. He cited the example of a five-hour dinner for eight reporters by retiring former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in which "not one noteworthy thing was said": it was "all ritual and party line."

Mr. Snow also cited, as a disconcerting example of rule-by-consensus, the time his wife was scheduled to have an operation but the various consulting doctors could not reach a consensus and so the operation was cancelled.

3. Japan as a non-verbal society vs. America as a let-it-hang-out kind of society. This contrast takes subtler forms, Mr. Snow said, and perhaps begins with the two types of written language—Japanese being built of isolated "ideographs, pictographs, and English being a "linear" language. He gave the train of thought. He cited the way mixed Japanese and American teams would play at charades at parties; the Americans would act out a word at a time, the Japanese would act out the concept. He cited another example of the American tendency to verbalize and the Japanese to fix on a concept, the earlier discussion on the Watergate scandal, where the Japanese tended to be shocked by the immorality and insincerity of the principals while the Americans tended to focus on specific illegal acts and incidents. "In Japan," said Mr. Snow, "there is a place for aberrational behavior if it seems to be sincere." He cited another example, the way mixed American visitors was asked by Japanese hosts, "Do you want to go to Place A or Place B?" In America, one might reply, "Tell me why you want to go to each. Since no coordination was possible, it was finally decided to take them all to both places."

Professor Patrick said there was no lack of individualism or competitiveness in Japan. On the contrary, he said, much of the social constraint there is an effort to contain the competitiveness within acceptable channels. There are twin pressures, he said—the contention of struggling through the organization and getting to the top, along with attempts to constrain ambition and protect against unbridled competitiveness. America has its rituals, too, for resolving such
conflicts. "We do it with winners and losers, legal suits and games," he said, "but the Japanese do not like to label losers; there is too much embarrassment and shame. They like to spread blame, to have a kind of 'no fault insurance' for all behavior. But the Japanese have their conflicts too; it's just that their process of resolving them is different."

Mr. Takeyama noted that many of the characteristics cited about the Japanese culture must have originated from a very long tradition of living together in a small country. Professor Yano added a point of contrast about Japanese and American professors. In 1967, he said, he met Henry Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard, and he carried away the impression that Dr. Kissinger probably couldn't have become a professor in any university in Japan because he was "so self-willed, so arrogant." In Japan, he said, a professor is assessed mostly for his personal character and behavior. "The key secret in Japan," he said, "is to keep silent. We are trained to sensitivity and to feelings, using very few words." To Mr. Snow's point about the tribal society, Professor Yano added a touch of irony. "We are taught to be very careful with one aspect of our society. We must be neat and tidy, careful and full of rules inside our own society. But there are no rules for behavior outside."

On the supposed contrast between the two countries' approaches to decision-making, one speaker commented that it's often hard to tell when either society has made a decision. In the United States, as soon as a decision is announced, "someone is working to change it." In the Japanese system, "they sit down and talk about what they're not going to talk about, narrowing the differences." The side issues will get spun off and may be talked about later. But with the important issues, "in Japan, you never go to a Yes-or-No vote but to a consensus which, when finally reached, usually sticks." In a typical U.S.-Japanese conference, he added, "the Japanese will usually talk about politics in
economic terms, and the U.S. will talk about economics in political terms." On the recognition of China, for example, the Japanese would use economic reasons for doing political things, and the U.S. rationale would be just the opposite, denying there was any economic motive.

To a question from Mr. Chaplin on "the role of apology": in Japanese society, Professor Yano said that apology is primarily a face-saver. "The rules about it are strictly formulated. The way you apologize, use terminology, is so strict. The loudness of voice, facial gesture, everything is important.

Michael J. McGuire of the Chicago Tribune asked whether a "victorious/vanquished mentality" doesn't still prevail in U.S.-Japanese relations, with Americans still "patronizing" the Japanese instead of consulting with them as equals. Mr. Snow felt that, yes, a "victorious/vanquished mentality" does unfortunately still exist.

Given the growth and development of Japan today, as well as its cultural history, he added, "If there's any patronizing, it is purely and simply—unethically—racial." To a comment about the presumed reluctance in U.S.-Japanese meetings to discuss the war experience, Mr. Takeyama replied that although the war experience "was very bitter," he had no objection to discussing any aspect of it, but "no, not backward, not forward." Sam B. Williams of the Geneva (N. Y.) Times, said he thought the American treatment of Japan after World War II had been much "harsher" than that of Germany or Italy. and he noted that Japan was the only country not allowed to have an army. Stanley M. Swinton of the Associated Press thought, however, that strategic and geographical considerations explain that difference. "There was a war in Europe, so we had to avoid having any German army whatever," he said, "but Japan had a different background and particularly a different experience with the atomic bomb," Mr. Swinton added that he hadn't noticed any reluctance among the Japanese to talk of the war experiences and disagreed with the suggestion that our attitude toward Japan was "patronizing."

Mr. Balk agreed with Mr. Swinton, saying that if anything the American attitude was one of admiration and envy of the Japanese.

Mr. Oberdorfer sounded the closing note in the cultural discussion by admitting he was pessimistic about achieving real mutual understanding "across the great divide of such cultural differences." But he said he could think of no better way to try than to communicate "the way this whole thing went today."

A MORNING OF SHOP-TALK

THE BETTER TO COVER EACH OTHER

Wednesday's shop-talk session of U.S.-Japanese press coverage took up, not surprisingly, where Tuesday's discussion of cultural differences left off. The discussion of "crisis coverage" was led by Rodney Armstrong, director of the Joint Research Program on the Media being conducted by Keio University in Japan and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where he is a senior fellow in the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. He noted at the outset that, "since everything about the two countries is different, comparing press coverage is comparing apples and oranges." The very roles of the media in the lives of the two countries, he said, differ greatly. The Japanese media are "actors in the forming of a national consensus." He noted that Mr. Takeyama, leader of the Japanese press delegation, had "let slip that we had no role in every major policy-making body in Japan." Ranking members of the media in Japan, he said, regularly design articles to achieve an action or some mood within the subtle process by which a Japanese consensus is structured. In the U.S., he went on, we have a "totally different, adversarial relationship" with the government. The American media reflect far greater diversity, with few papers having a circulation comparable to the larger Japanese papers. The English press, he suggested, is more nearly comparable to the Japanese press.

The media in both countries, Mr. Armstrong said, have played a considerable role, positively and negatively, in crises of U.S.-Japanese relations. There has been a deplorable lack of coverage of Japan in the American press, he said, but this coverage has greatly increased in recent years, both in volume and in quality. That change is mostly the result, not of new or better correspondents in Tokyo, but of a greater willingness by editors back home to give greater space. He noted particularly that there had been a great interest and considerable coverage of the Emperor's and Empress' recent visit.

Turning to Japanese press performance in covering America, Mr. Armstrong said that the Japanese people in the past had not been given much real comprehension of the role of Congress in American foreign policy. He suggested that this would be a good year for Japanese media in Washington to broaden that coverage of America—to "let Dr. Kissinger alone for a while and go on the American style of living and thinking." As an example of one story waiting to be told, he said that if the Japanese press explained the role of foundations in America's national life, it might be helpful in leading to the development of similar institutions in Japan.

Mr. Swinton, drawing on his AP experience, said he thought that Japanese coverage of New York and Washington is "very substantially the way it was eight or nine years ago. They, he said, seniority often determined which Japanese journalists went to New York "just before they retired." Most of them came with a language problem. Now, the Japanese journalists tend to be younger and more specifically trained for their American assignment, and some are very good at getting around the country. Mr. Swinton also thought American coverage of "Japan is much better than it was 25 years ago. Even the leftist correspondents who didn't really know anything about Asian culture or history." The problem on both sides, he added, is "humanizing the news; we still don't get much on how people in each country live, on the quality of life."

Robert W. Gibson, foreign news editor of the Los Angeles Times, picked up that theme with the point that "we editors are too concerned with the spot-news syndrome." Before covering each crisis, he said, "the press in each country has a responsibility to lay a groundwork for reader understanding of the other country. This is a matter primarily of educating telegraph editors, who are on the firing line and under great
space pressure, that background stories are as important as what's happened in the last 24 hours."

The conference ended with an

luncheon after a discussion of the U.S.-Japan journalist exchange program. Plans for future joint meetings were projected with the hope of continuing the process of expanding mutual understanding and awareness through the free, independent and inquiring press of Japan and the United States.

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The building Frank Lloyd Wright called Wingspread, situated on a rolling prairie site just north of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed in 1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In 1960, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Johnson, it became the headquarters of The Johnson Foundation and began its career as an educational conference center.

In the years since, it has been the setting for many conferences and meetings dealing with subjects of regional, national, and international interest. It is the hope of the Foundation's trustees that Wingspread will take its place increasingly as a national institution devoted to the free exchange of ideas among people.

The rolling expanse of the Midwestern prairies was considered a natural setting for Wingspread. In the limitless earth the architect envisioned a freedom and movement. The name Wingspread was an expression of the nature of the house, reflecting aspiration through spread wings—a symbol of soaring inspiration.

The Johnson Foundation encourages the examination of a variety of problems facing the Midwest, the Nation, and mankind. In the belief that responsible analyses and proposals should reach a substantial audience, The Johnson Foundation assists in the publication of various papers and reports. Publication, of course, does not imply approval.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained from The Johnson Foundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401.
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