Puerto Ricans as a group are more disadvantaged economically, politically, and socially than any other ethnic minority. This marginalization is partly due to the educational system's discriminatory practices which deprive the vast majority of Puerto Rican children of equal educational opportunities. The educational problems of Puerto Ricans stem both from substandard educational facilities in low income areas and from the neglect of special language problems in the group. The problems involved in education and language are not simple, and the picture that emerges from a discussion on equal educational opportunities for Puerto Ricans is that both bilingual education and teacher training programs are needed to break the vicious circle of illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment which is associated with this ethnic group. Topics discussed are: (1) educational opportunity for Puerto Ricans in New York City, Chicago, Newark, and Boston; (2) policy implications in educational programs for the ethnic group; (3) Puerto Ricans and internal colonialism; (4) the island colony; (5) ethnic, geographic, and demographic dimensions; (6) patterns, processes, and indicators of marginality; (7) mechanisms of colonialism; and, (8) adaptive responses in Puerto Ricans. (Author/AM)
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
FOR PUERTO RICANS

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Introduction

Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland are in most ways the most marginalized minority group in the nation. By almost any indicator, Puerto Ricans as a group are more disadvantaged economically, politically and socially than any other ethnic minority, including Blacks. To a large extent, this marginalization is brought about by the educational system, in which institutionalized and personal discrimination combine to deprive the vast majority of Puerto Rican children of equal educational opportunities. This deprivation has two forms: the segregation of Puerto Rican and Black children in substandard schools, and the lack of adequate programs to deal with the fact that a great number of Puerto Ricans do not speak English.

Puerto Ricans have always had low levels of education in comparison to other ethnic groups in the U.S. Although there is some indication that the second-generation group is better off educationally (see Table 6), the drop-out rate is still very high. In 1970, 55 percent between the ages of 16 and 21 were out of school; of these, 36 percent were also unemployed (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 20). In Boston, the dropout rate was 90% among Puerto Ricans, many of whom were children of migrant farm workers and some of whom had never registered for school (Senate hearings, 1970; Civil Rights Commission, 1972). This situation resulted in a 62% illiteracy rate among adults. Those who stay in school tend to be placed in vocational high schools rather than academic high schools: only 15 percent of the students in New York City's academic high schools were Puerto Rican in 1970, while 28 percent of the enrollment of vocational schools was Puerto Rican (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 21). The fact that the kinds of jobs for which
vocational schools train people are not only low-status but also are
disappearing rapidly in the U.S. may be some indication of the cause of
high unemployment rates among Puerto Ricans. College enrollment is even
lower than either Black or White enrollment: only 1% in New York in 1970
(Wagenheim, 1975).

More important than mere dropout rates, and also more difficult to
ascertain objectively, is the quality of education received by Puerto
Ricans compared with that given to Anglos. It has often been noted that
schools with a majority of ethnic minority students show deteriorating
rates of achievement. The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity in 1970 found that in New York schools with Puerto Rican
majorities the majority of students had below grade level reading scores.
In the case of Puerto Ricans, this problem cannot be discussed without
taking into consideration the question of language. The fact that Puerto
Rican children have a built-in handicap in that many do not know English
upon entering school has been given as a reason for poor attendance and
poor achievement. It is indeed true that English is a second language for
most children: 83.1 percent of all Puerto Ricans in 1969 showed Spanish
as their mother tongue, and 72.1 percent usually spoke Spanish at home
(Wagenheim, 1975, p. 56). It is a truism that children cannot learn to
read a language they do not speak, or speak only slightly.

The educational problems of Puerto Ricans, then, stem both from
substandard educational facilities in low-income areas and from the
neglect of special language problems in the group. Both of these diffi-
culties have been dealt with in recent public policy decisions. The
well-known Brown decision of 1954 made separate facilities for minorities
illegal; however, the 1974 Milliken case restricted active desegregation to school districts, thus making cross-district busing illegal without proof of institutional discrimination at the State level. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires equality of educational opportunity, and the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 provides for funding bilingual programs and the teaching of English as a Second Language (ESL). The Supreme Court recently strengthened the cause of non-English speaking students in the Lau case, by deciding that equal educational opportunity included educating linguistically distinct groups. Finally, in the Rodriguez case, the court decided that inequality of educational facilities resulting from unequal income levels from district to district is unconstitutional.

The implementation of these decisions and programs has met with only limited success. The programs which have resulted have been of two kinds: desegregation plans, either voluntary or court-ordered, and bilingual education programs. Unfortunately, there has not been a concerted effort to coordinate these two programs or to consider which of the two types of programs is most useful in a given situation. All too often, priority has been given to desegregation and only afterwards, and to a lesser degree, to bilingual education. In addition, the nature of the two programs differs in that one favors maximum cultural and racial diversity while the other emphasizes instruction in two languages to a class comprised of approximately 50% of each language group. The result of this conflict of goals, even in the best cases, is that desegregation occurs and is followed by ESL programs designed to assimilate culturally distinct groups rather than to maintain cultural pluralism (Waugh and Koon, 1974;
Civil Rights Commission, 1976). In the worst cases, desegregation results in segregated classrooms where Puerto Ricans are in the lowest-level ability groups, and remain educationally marginalized (Civil Rights Commission, 1976). Finally, in cases such as New York City, where most Puerto Ricans live, the district structure is such that desegregation is impossible and Black and Puerto Rican children leave school with few or no skills and inadequate education to enter college.

Despite the large percentage of non-English speakers, there are very few bilingual education programs to accommodate them. In New York City, there were 131 schools with a majority of Puerto Rican students in 1970. Although there are a few attempts at bilingual education, these are understaffed and underfunded (see table 9). The Puerto Rican Forum found that 75 percent of non-English speaking students in New York received no help at all with their language problem (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3732). The lack of programs to help non-English speaking students is in part due to the fact that there are few teachers equipped to teach in Spanish or to teach English as a second language.

The problem of education and language is anything but simple. On one hand, educators see that people who cannot read and write English are permanently handicapped in this country. On the other hand, the high rate of return migration to Puerto Rico makes necessary the retention of Spanish. The ideal situation would be one in which both languages were taught by people competent in both. As Cafferty (1975, p. 61) has said:

"The acquisition of a second language for American children whose native tongue is English is considered a cultural asset;...whereas retention of a foreign language and native tongue is seen as a cultural detriment."
The ideal of truly bilingual education can never be fulfilled in the absence of teacher training programs, however. The problems encountered in the relationship between middle-class Anglo teachers and classes with both Puerto Rican and Anglo students is illustrated by Bucchioni in his account of a morning in school (in Cordasco & Bucchioni, 1972). The teacher was ill-equipped to teach students who could not understand what she was saying along with those who were bored by her repetitions for the benefit of the Spanish speakers. At the same time, Spanish was not acceptable as a means of communication, even if what was said was the correct answer. The situation resulted in frustration for all the participants; even though there was little blatant discrimination on the part of the teacher, the institutional situation was such that the Puerto Ricans were made to seem inferior and stupid because they did not speak English. The teacher felt exasperated and ineffectual because she could not get the students to learn what she was teaching.

This situation cannot be alleviated if the shortage of Puerto Rican teachers continues. In New York City there were 500 Puerto Rican teachers in 1970, compared with 250,000 Puerto Rican students. In Chicago, .2% of the teachers were Puerto Rican, with 4.5% Puerto Rican students (Senate hearings, 1970). In Newark, there were 8 Puerto Rican teachers out of a total of 2,577 teachers in 1970. This is a percentage of less than 1%, although about 7.6 percent of the city's students were Puerto Rican (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 51). Ironically, the lack of teachers is directly related to the educational system, which, as noted earlier, produces drop-outs and technical school students rather than people who might be trained to teach in Spanish and thus break the vicious circle of illiteracy, poverty
and unemployment. Unless this situation is changed by institutional means, the dominant segment can have no answer to the accusations made by Nathan Quinones of the Puerto Rican Educators' Association:

"We need not wait for the genetic manipulation prophesied for us in A Brave New World to produce the Epsilons needed by society. We have a system operating now that has assured us of an ample supply of menial laborers for at least the next generation. An integral cog in the production of these mis-casts is our schools and the human raw material is the Puerto Rican" (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3742).

Educational Opportunity in Four Cities

1. New York City

Although Puerto Ricans are less segregated residentially and educationally than are Blacks in New York City (see Map 1, Table 8), the Puerto Rican community tends to overlap with and flank Black residential areas (Map 2). Thus the problem of segregation in New York is common to both Puerto Ricans and Blacks together, rather than a purely Puerto Rican concern. In fact, taking only Puerto Ricans, there are few school districts, even in New York, where desegregation would be recommended. It is only when Puerto Rican and Black enrollments are considered together that a majority of ethnic minority students becomes obvious in some schools. The fact that minorities are segregated by district constitutes unequal educational opportunity as defined by the Supreme Court. However, as a result of the Milliken decision in 1974, cross-district desegregation is unfeasible at this time without extensive litigation to prove discrimination on the part of state education officials. The practically even proportion of students within district schools makes desegregation within districts unnecessary. Furthermore, the decentralization of New York's system in 1969 makes massive inter-district busing unlikely, since community control has been opted for in favor of integration.
The problem of language among Puerto Ricans aggravates the educational marginalization brought about by segregation. The fact that 47% of the Puerto Rican students in New York in 1970 could not speak English demonstrates the extent of the problem. This percentage represents 118,000 students (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3726). The spectacular drop-out rate, estimated at over 65%, is the result of the school system's failure to deal with the language barrier. Although many programs have been funded under the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, these programs do not begin to reach the majority of students with language problems (see Table 3). Furthermore, the number of students serviced sometimes decreased as the amount of funding has increased. While it is difficult to explain this occurrence from mere figures, it seems at least possible that increased salaries and evaluations of programs have siphoned off much of the funding. Teacher training programs have also been implemented, but the discriminatory examination and licensing practices of the New York City Board of Education prevent many qualified Puerto Ricans from being hired. In addition, the problem of overall budget cutbacks in New York has diminished the number of new openings which might otherwise be used to hire Puerto Rican teachers to staff bilingual classrooms. Finally, the widespread ignorance on the part of educators and school boards of what bilingual education entails and of the cultural background of Puerto Ricans makes implementation difficult at best (Civil Rights Commission, 1972a).

In New York, the segregation and inadequate bilingual education programs combine to marginalize Puerto Ricans. While desegregation is unfeasible at this time, it seems clear that bilingual programs can be
more completely and systematically implemented to help alleviate this aspect of Puerto Ricans’ restricted access to equal educational opportunity.

2. Chicago

Chicago's Puerto Ricans, although the second largest Puerto Rican community on the mainland, are a minority within the larger Hispanic community comprised for the most part by Mexican-Americans; it is thus difficult to get specific information on them. However, Aspire, a Puerto Rican self-help organization, estimated a population of 130,000 in 1970. This figure is larger than the 1970 census figure of 87,160 (Hagenheim, 1975). In the public schools, Aspira estimated an enrollment of 26,176 Puerto Ricans (Senate hearings, 1970). Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking groups comprised an enrollment of 44,631 in 1970 who spoke only Spanish; only 20% were in ESL programs (Hagenheim, 1975, pp. 61-62). Five bilingual schools serviced 541 students (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3723). This lack of response to the needs of Spanish speakers resulted in a dropout rate of 70%. In 1970, the median number of school years completed by first-generation Chicago Puerto Ricans over 25 was 8.1; for second-generation it was 8.6, not significantly higher. Given the great need for dealing with non-English speakers, it seems clear that the most feasible way of giving equal educational opportunity to Chicago's Puerto Ricans is by well-designed bilingual education programs. In addition, these are what Puerto Rican leaders in Chicago have most expressly requested (Senate hearings, 1970).
3. Newark

Newark holds the third largest concentration of Puerto Ricans on the mainland, approximately 30,000 (Wagenheim, 1975). This group is 7.1% of the city's population, which is 54.2% Black. The needs of Newark's Puerto Rican population have been almost totally ignored, except for some press coverage after the 1974 Labor Day riots (Wagenheim, 1975). In one Newark school, an official found ten Puerto Rican students who had been consistently passed from grade to grade although they spoke no English at all. This kind of education is to a large extent responsible for the estimated 42% dropout rate. One Puerto Rican professional woman said, "I honestly believe that if the Newark school system burned down tomorrow, it wouldn't really have much of an impact on our children" (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 52).

As is the case with New York City and Chicago, desegregation is unlikely to help the cause of Puerto Ricans in Newark. The school-age population is overwhelmingly made up of minority students, and only inter-district busing, currently not acceptable, would alleviate the problem of racial and ethnic segregation. It is only by the implementation of bilingual/bicultural education programs either in addition to or in the absence of desegregation that Newark's Puerto Rican students might be reached before another generation is turned into the Epsilons of Mr. Quinones' statement.

4. Boston

Desegregation in Boston is a good example of the relationship between mere desegregation and equal opportunity for Puerto Ricans. Although
Puerto Rican leaders in Boston and Springfield have tried hard to bring forward the plight of the students (Senate hearings, 1970; Civil Rights Commission, 1972b), the massive busing program implemented in 1974 in Boston has not included a program to deal with Puerto Rican problems. The major problem in the Boston area is non-enrollment: at least 2,000 school-age children are not in school; this, compared with the fact that only 1,791 Puerto Ricans are enrolled, illustrates the scope of the problem. Of those in school, 45.1 percent are one or more years behind their expected grade level (Civil Rights Commission, 1972b, 7-8). The dropout rate of those enrolled was 90 percent in 1970 (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3708). In that year, three Puerto Ricans graduated from public high school in Boston.

Clearly, Boston's school have ignored the needs of Puerto Ricans to an extent that approaches the criminal. However, in the 1976 Civil Rights Commission report no mention is made of bilingual education programs being implemented in the wake of desegregation. Official blindness to the needs of Puerto Ricans has not been overcome by the program of desegregation. In 1970-71 only 486 Puerto Ricans were involved in bilingual education programs; at that time the programs depended entirely on federal funds which would expire in two years. No plans were made to continue the program with state or municipal funds--the Boston school officials clearly are unconcerned about Puerto Ricans. Thus, although desegregation in Boston has been almost completely implemented and is being accepted in the community (Civil Rights Commission, 1976), the Puerto Rican students continue to be ignored. The case of Boston illustrates the problems inherent in the idea that desegregation is the best means of providing
equal educational opportunity to children. Boston's Puerto Rican children continue to be marginal educationally despite busing. It cannot be said too strongly that truly equal opportunity for them can be attained only through well-designed bilingual education programs, by concerted efforts to keep students in school, and by programs designed to provide opportunities beyond the technical and trade level of occupations after high school.

Policy Implications

The lack of equal educational opportunities for Puerto Ricans is two-fold, and consists of segregation into substandard schools as well as neglect of the Puerto Rican linguistic and cultural heritage. Under existing law and court decisions, both of these areas should be given attention. The ideal solution is desegregation accompanied by effective bilingual education programs staffed by well-trained teachers and directed by Puerto Rican administrators. It is a testament to official neglect that, eight years after the passage of the Bilingual Education Act and twelve years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the vast majority of Puerto Ricans have had no benefits at all from either piece of legislation.

It appears that public policy as implemented in the educational programs at present has dealt with desegregation and bilingual education as separate kinds of programs. While they are logically different and require different kinds of activity, they cannot be separated without detriment to Puerto Rican education. It is important, then, to consider a greater degree of coordination of desegregation and bilingual education.
programs. Both are necessary if Puerto Ricans are to become active participants in the benefits of American society.

In examining the current situation of Puerto Ricans on the mainland, it becomes evident that the bulk of the student population is unlikely to be desegregated in the near future, the best and most feasible way to provide greater educational opportunities is by bilingual education at least in elementary school, by increased attention to training Puerto Rican teachers and administrators, and by disarming discriminatory examination and hiring practices such as those in New York (Civil Rights Commission, 1972a). These programs will not be easy to implement, but it is well to remember that since the Lau decision of 1974 bilingual education is required by law, and can be mandated just as busing has been.

At the same time, desegregation of areas not restricted by the Milliken decision is certainly feasible. An example of this kind of program is that of Denver, Colorado, whose school population is 20% Hispanic. Court-ordered desegregation was followed by an effort to implement bilingual/bicultural education programs. While many parents, teachers and students reported positive results both in attitudes and achievement scores following integration, the Hispanic community remained dissatisfied with the amount of attention paid to bilingual programs, calling them "ineffective, floundering, weak and inadequate." An expanded program is now being developed under Colorado's Bicultural Education Act of 1975 (Civil Rights Commission, 1976, p. 49).

While Denver's road to desegregation is far from smooth, for its Hispanic students the possibility of effective bilingual education is much more realistic than for Boston's Puerto Ricans or for the vast majority of
Puerto Ricans now vegetating in the schools of New York City. This kind of desegregation program accompanied with bilingual education is possible in school districts whose minority populations have been segregated and are thus eligible for intra-district desegregation. The alternative is classroom segregation within desegregated schools, and a continuation of marginal education for Puerto Ricans. In addition, communities with small minorities of English-speaking Puerto Ricans could easily be integrated. In fact, communities whose Puerto Rican populations are small tend also to have a greater proportion of English speakers in those populations (Wagenheim, 1975).

Perhaps the most important policy to be implemented in attempting to provide educational opportunities to Puerto Ricans is evaluations of each case separately, in terms of the linguistic needs of the community, the resources available for busing and/or bilingual education, and the desires of the Puerto Ricans within the community. The most frequent complaint of Puerto Rican leaders is that the lack of Puerto Rican teachers and administrators prevents this minority from controlling its children's education and evaluating the needs of its school children in a way that will benefit them. Finally, it is important to remember that desegregation does not solve the major problems of Puerto Ricans. The emphasis of desegregation over bilingual education has made for a continuation of educational deprivation for Puerto Ricans in areas like Boston. The Civil Rights Commission report of 1976, while stating that desegregation was being carried out successfully in this country, warned that desegregation alone does not necessarily improve education and that classroom integration as well as extensive curriculum overhauls are necessary (Civil Rights Commission, 1976, p. 208). It is important to keep this in mind in formulating future policy.
Puerto Ricans and Internal Colonialism

Puerto Ricans are systematically neglected in the educational institutions of this country. They are marginalized both by being forced to attend substandard schools and by being taught in a language they do not understand. This educational crippling, it is true, puts the Puerto Rican at a permanent disadvantage with regard to employment opportunities in.

However, in addition to the education factor there is widespread institutional and personal discrimination throughout American society, which deprives Puerto Ricans of equality in every sphere of life. Table 9 demonstrates, for example, that the return for education in earnings is lower for Puerto Ricans than either Blacks or Whites. It seems clear that education and its role in the lives of Puerto Ricans cannot be fully evaluated without taking into consideration the totality of exploitation which is their lot. This exploitation, which serves the interests of the dominant ethnic group, I be called internal colonialism.

Origins and Recent History

Puerto Rico has been a colony, both political and economic, of the United States since 1898. The Internal colony of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland consists of persons of Puerto Rican birth or parentage—that is, immigrants from Puerto Rico and their children. Of these, the majority are still of the first generation, although the second generation is growing faster than the immigrant population at present (see Table 3). Puerto Ricans are distinct from other Spanish origin ethnic groups in that they are American citizens and therefore cannot be "illegal aliens,"
nor can they be prevented from coming to the mainland by immigration quotas. However, Puerto Ricans are often included in census and other data as 'Spanish speaking' or Spanish surnamed, and are thus difficult to separate in terms of how they actually differ from these other groups.

Despite the fact that they are lumped together with other Spanish-speaking groups, Puerto Ricans see themselves as Puerto Ricans, not as Spanish-speaking. Oscar Lewis' study of a Puerto Rican family shows that they maintain their allegiance to Puerto Rico as their cultural homeland even after living on the mainland for many years (Lewis, 1965, p. 135). In another study (Rodriguez, 1975), an overwhelming majority of New York respondents characterized themselves as Puerto Ricans, not Americans, even though they realized that Puerto Ricans are discriminated against in schools and the job market. Puerto Rican identity is reinforced by constant return migration to Puerto Rico. Lewis' study illustrates what census figures tell us: Puerto Ricans move back and forth between the island and the mainland throughout their lives, sometimes for the sake of employment, sometimes because of family problems or successes. Speaking Spanish, an important source of identity for Puerto Ricans, is also reinforced by return migration. Although Puerto Rico is officially bilingual, school is taught exclusively in Spanish and Spanish is in use as the dominant language (Cafferty, 1975, p. 63).

Puerto Ricans are distinct from other immigrant groups in the U.S. for three important reasons. In the first place, they are not really immigrants but migrants. Having been included in the U.S. territory by events outside their control, they are now U.S. citizens of a distinct cultural background. As such, their identity is more ambivalent than that
of Italian or Irish immigrants who came to this country with the intention of becoming citizens. The assumption is that those who did not wish to become part of the U.S. did not immigrate; this choice was not given to the Puerto Ricans.

A second reason why Puerto Ricans are different from other immigrant groups is the ease of migration and return migration. Groups migrating from Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century faced a long and dangerous sea voyage, therefore the decision to emigrate was of a more or less permanent nature. Puerto Rico, on the other hand, is a short plane ride from New York City. The trip costs from $35 to $50 and often can be paid for on the installment plan after the migrant arrives in New York. The return trip is equally easy, and return migration is much more prevalent among Puerto Ricans than among earlier European immigrants (Cafferty, 1975).

A third difference between Puerto Ricans and earlier immigrants is that economic conditions are less favorable for Puerto Ricans than for the other groups. The U.S. economy is much more mechanized today than it was fifty or seventy-five years ago, and the need for unskilled labor is much smaller now than when the great waves of European immigrants arrived. Therefore, the low-level occupations filled by earlier groups on their way up, and to which Puerto Ricans are limited by lack of education, language barriers and discriminatory hiring practices, are much less abundant than earlier; this situation has resulted in extremely high unemployment rates among Puerto Ricans.

The stereotype of the Puerto Rican is that of someone who lives in New York City and works in a factory. Actually, many Puerto Ricans came
originally as migrant farm laborers on contract with U.S. growers (Fitzpatrick, 1971, pp. 15-17). While two-thirds of the Puerto Rican population lives in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Puerto Ricans are found in every state in the Union. In most states, they are such a small minority that they are not considered separately from other Spanish-speaking groups (Hagenheim, 1975, p. 37).

Within the area of the largest population concentration, Puerto Ricans are found in terms of occupations, income and educational achievement from one area to another. By far the most depressed area in all respects is also the area where the largest number of Puerto Ricans live: New York City. Although they make up 7.3 percent of the population of New York (a total of 845,775 in the New York City Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area), they have only 2.2 percent of the college students, 1.4 percent of the professional workers and more than 13 percent of the factory workers in the city. The ratio of Puerto Rican teachers to students is 228 to 1 in New York, where the overall ratio is 20 to 1. Their median income is $100 a week lower than that for the general population of the area (Hagenheim, 1975, pp. 39-41).

By contrast, Puerto Rican populations in areas surrounding New York City are relatively better off economically if not politically. For example, on Long Island, with a Puerto Rican population of 24,403 in 1970, only 10 percent of these were below the poverty level, compared with 28% in New York City. The median family income is over $10,000 per year, and higher levels of employment and education prevail. On the other hand, there seem to be less emphasis on Puerto Rican identity and more efforts to assimilate into white middle-class society among Long Island's
Puerto Ricans (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 45). This phenomenon is reported for other middle-class Puerto Ricans in the areas surrounding New York City (Rodriguez, 1975, p. 77), thus illustrating a major theme found in mobility of Puerto Ricans and other oppressed groups: in order to be accepted in white middle-class society, the Puerto Ricans must drop their cultural and linguistic background.

The state with the second highest Puerto Rican population is New Jersey. In 1970, there were 135,676 Puerto Ricans in that state, 95.9% of whom were urban residents. The three major cities for Puerto Ricans are Newark, Jersey City and Hoboken. As in New York State, Puerto Ricans in New Jersey fall behind both Whites and Blacks in educational achievement, employment and income. 27.4% percent are below the poverty level. Within New Jersey, the differences of income and educational achievement from one area to another are great, and the relationship between these and other factors is important. For example, the top cities in terms of median income and education are also those with the least number of families on welfare (Wagenheim, 1975).

Pennsylvania, the state with the third largest Puerto Rican population, follows many of the patterns described for New York and New Jersey. Puerto Ricans are predominantly urban, with 95.8 percent of the population in 1970 living in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. As in other areas, income levels fall below both Whites and Blacks, as do educational levels (Wagenheim, 1975, pp. 55-56).

These figures point out some general patterns among Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland. Predominantly urban in residence, Puerto Ricans are concentrated in the Middle Atlantic states. Their income and educational
levels are consistently below those of any other group, and large numbers are on some kind of public assistance. However, there are significant numbers of middle-class Puerto Ricans in all three states with large Puerto Rican populations. These middle-class groups tend to live in areas with few poor Puerto Ricans and are generally found in predominantly white suburbs. Lacking the culturally supportive ambience of the urban ghetto, they feel a greater pressure to conform to white cultural and social patterns, and deny their own background. Thus the emergence of a viable middle-class Puerto Rican culture on the U.S. mainland is nearly impossible, since those few Puerto Ricans who attain middle-class status tend to drop their Puerto Rican identity. As long as this pattern continues, to be Puerto Rican will be synonymous with poverty and ghettoization, a situation which is self-perpetuating given the larger socio-economic and political patterns of U.S. society.

An additional element of variation in the Puerto Rican population is that of race—Puerto Ricans are a racially mixed group. Among themselves, the kind of racial strife found in the U.S. is virtually unheard of, although there do exist terms expressing varying racial mixtures (Marden, 1973). The difference between the meaning of race in Puerto Rico and on the mainland is one of the first problems that Puerto Ricans who appear Negroid have to face on reaching the U.S. One man of mixed blood reports that he had to insist on being identified as Puerto Rican instead of Negro during one of his first attempts to get a job on the mainland (Lewis, 1965). Race is also a factor in any attempt at assimilation in the U.S., for any 'white-looking' Puerto Rican has a better chance of passing into middle class society than does a 'negro-looking'
individual, and sometimes downplay relationships with darker-skinned relatives (Rodrigue, 1978).

The Island Colony

Puerto Rico was acquired by the U.S. as compensation for the costs of the Spanish American War in 1898. It is typical of American foreign policy at that time that the opinion of Puerto Rico concerning this event was neither consulted nor heeded. Puerto Rico at the time was well on the way to attaining independence from Spain; however, its semi-independent status was not taken into consideration by the American colonizers. The island was perceived as an economically backward paradise, ripe for American development. This could take place only after political control was established and the semi-autonomous government was replaced by a colonial government of which the majority of the members were American. The reasons given for this political takeover were Puerto Rico's poverty and illiteracy; however, as Puerto Ricans pointed out at the time, these were lower in Puerto Rico than in many states of the Union at the time of their gaining statehood (Hagenheim, 1973, p. 118). It seems clear from the public policy statements at that time that racist and cultural factors were at the bottom of the differential treatment of Puerto Rico (Hagenheim, 1973).

In 1917 the U.S. granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans. This action, far from giving more freedom and participation to Puerto Ricans, severely limited their political power. By including them formally in the U.S. polity (again, without any attempt to ascertain the will of the majority in the matter), it made independence impossible. By imposing severe restrictions on which Puerto Ricans could vote, even within Puerto Rico
and on Puerto Rican affairs, it extended the political control of the mainland over Puerto Rico. Indeed, by limiting the right to vote to literates and those who accepted U.S. citizenship, this policy reduced the number of voters from 250,000 to 85,000 (Wagenheim, 1973, p. 133).

During this same period, American businessmen were reaping enormous profits from sugar, tobacco and coffee production on the island. The majority of these profits were taken out of Puerto Rico. As writers of the time pointed out, the economic and social progress made by Puerto Rico was the result not of American investments but of Puerto Rican investments in such projects as road-building and school construction. These were paid for after Puerto Rico's major profits were taken by American private interests (Wagenheim, 1973, pp. 162-165).

The 1917 Jones Act granted U.S. citizenship and provided for a bicameral legislature. The governor of the island was appointed by the President of the U.S., as were other major officials in the government. Puerto Ricans had no formal voting rights in the U.S. Congress, which maintained veto power over the island's legislature.

It was not until 1947 that Puerto Rico attained a small measure of independence. Its status was changed to that of a Free Associated State, in which Puerto Ricans could elect their own governor, who in turn appointed all officials except auditor and members of the Supreme Court. It is significant that the first Puerto Rican governor elected under this new status was also the one who instituted the first program of economic development to make a significant difference to the status of Puerto Ricans. Operation Bootstrap, begun in 1948, included the building of industrial plants, providing tax relief and training the labor force. Under this plan, over 1,066 new factories have opened, directly or indirectly
creating at least 128,000 new jobs. Family income increased from $660 in 1940 to $3,818 in 1966 (Fitzpatrick, 1971, pp. 45-48). Despite this rise in the island's standard of living, economic hegemony is still maintained by mainland businessmen who control most of the state's agricultural production.

The history of Puerto Ricans on the mainland is largely the story of migration from the island. Although Puerto Ricans migrated before 1940, significant numbers did not begin migrating until after World War II. Migration patterns have always coincided with employment opportunities on the mainland. The first kind of employment found by migrants was temporary farm labor, as early as 1940. Since peak labor periods in Puerto Rico are at different times than in the U.S., Puerto Ricans could work part time in the U.S. and part time in Puerto Rico. Some of these early migrants stayed on and formed nuclei which then attracted the great waves of migrations seeking employment in the post-war economic boom of the mainland (Fitzpatrick, 1971; Wagenheim, 1975).

This early migration pattern, in conjunction with the established subordinate position of Puerto Rico with respect to the mainland, helped to create a pattern of stereotyping based on occupation, race and culture which continues to the present. Puerto Ricans were perceived by the dominant society as farm laborers incapable of adjusting to urban life:

"During the last ten years and growing every year, there has descended on Manhattan island like a locust plague an influx of Puerto Ricans... They are mostly crude farmers, subject to congenital tropical diseases, physically unfitted for the northern climate...unable physically, mentally, or financially to compete, they turn to guile and wile and the steel blade...mark of their blood and heritage" (Lait and Mortimer, quoted in Wagenheim, 1975, p. 4).

This stereotyped perception, while no longer that of the crude farmer, continues to place Puerto Ricans in the lowest strata of occupations. They
are still considered foreigners, even by other immigrant groups (Lewis, 1965, pp. 497-98).

From 1950 to 1968, migration from Puerto Rico to the mainland outstripped return migration by a large margin (Cafferty, 1975). However, the rate of return migration has increased since 1965, and by 1970 almost 200,000 residents of Puerto Rico had spent time in the U.S. These figures, along with the sharp drop in migration from the island registered in the 1970 census, may indicate a significant change in migration patterns. In 1970 for the first time those born in Puerto Rico and those born in the U.S. of Puerto Rican parentage was almost equal (see Table 3). The significance of these figures is hard to establish at this point. They may reflect a response to the deteriorating economic conditions on the mainland, especially for Puerto Ricans. Despite the drop in migration, the emerging second generation of Puerto Ricans on the mainland is a phenomenon which will establish patterns of its own, albeit within the confines of the colonial structure established before the major migrations began.

Governing the Colony

The pattern of migration of Puerto Ricans tells much about their establishment as an internal colony on the U.S. mainland. Migration began as a reaction to unemployment on the island (Fitzpatrick, 1971, pp. 13-14). This unemployment was directly related to U.S. colonization of the island. The artificial economic conditions favoring U.S. businessmen were maintained by political domination of the island (Wagenheim, 1973). Because of the low level of education and the absence of industries requiring skilled labor (both conditions fostered by U.S. economic exploitation of Puerto
Puerto Rican migrants to the mainland were forced to take the lowest paying jobs. Their lack of skills, combined with the language barrier and blatant hiring discrimination, created the job stereotyping from which they still have not escaped. Once established, this pattern of low-status occupational stereotyping reinforces their economic marginality. More than that, Puerto Rican migrants have contributed to the growth of two important industries in New York City without obtaining concomitant benefits for their contribution. As Rosenberg (1974, p. 43) points out:

"It is often stated that the Puerto Rican migration to New York and the concomitant availability of cheap manual labor saved two industries in the City. First, the garment industry needed cheap operatives to compete with foreign producers. Second, the restaurant, hotel and theater industry needed unskilled and semi-skilled laborers to handle the growing demand for services. Puerto Ricans, to a great extent, filled the demand for workers in both these industries—they were willing, more than any other group, to accept the low wages and limited potential for mobility attached to such jobs."

Having thus been established as an economic and political colony not only on the island but also on the mainland, Puerto Ricans are now suffering from the disappearance of these same low-paying jobs. New York City, where the majority of Puerto Ricans live, lost 41,000 jobs between June 1973 and June 1974; 15,700 of these jobs were in manufacturing, where most Puerto Ricans are employed. Manufacturing is becoming increasingly automated, and factories are moving away from the cities to accommodate the managers who live in the suburbs. The combination of automation, making unskilled and semi-skilled labor obsolete, and the move away from the city, has resulted in extremely high unemployment rates for Puerto Ricans, the highest for any ethnic group in the U.S. (Rosenberg, 1974; see Table 4).
Thus, migration, initially a response to economic conditions arising from the colonial status of Puerto Rico, has resulted in the continuation of those conditions and the maintenance of internal colonial status for Puerto Ricans on the mainland. For these migrants, the dream of economic success has turned into a nightmare of poverty, oppression and political marginality, with no end in sight.

**Ethnic, Geographic and Demographic Dimensions**

**Establishment of ethnic boundaries**

Puerto Ricans were from the very beginnings of their relationship with the United States treated differently from groups included within its boundaries voluntarily. As Muñoz Rivera, father of the first Puerto Rican governor after the American takeover, said in 1916:

"...in the Treaty of Paris the people of Porto Rico were disposed of as were the serfs of ancient times, fixtures of the land, who were transferred by force to the service of new masters and subject to new servitudes" (Vagenheim, 1973, p. 132).

Another eloquent spokesman for Puerto Rico during this period was Tulio Larrinaga, the Resident Commissioner in Washington at the time. In 1911 he wrote:

"Would the new States which were admitted to the Union several years ago have made the rapid strides which have marked their progress if they had been kept down, under the arbitrary rule of a limited number of men sent there from outside, with the sole authority to make their laws and administer their material wealth and resources? Many of the territories did not have at the time of their admission to the Union anything like the favorable conditions which Porto Rico presents, in simply asking for the right of home jurisdiction.

Porto Rico has a civilization centuries old; has a larger population than eighteen States of the Union; has a greater commerce and wealth than several of them; has a larger trade with the continental United States than many of the nations with which they interchange commerce" (Vagenheim, 1973, p. 110).
This process of economic and political marginalization, based unequivocally on the assumption that somehow Puerto Ricans, despite their resources, were culturally inferior to mainlanders, created and continued those very conditions which the colonizers had deplored. How can an area whose wealth is systematically stripped away hope to develop economically? How can a people who have no power over their destinies develop viable political institutions? And how can an island whose economic and political life is controlled by self-seeking exploiters hope to establish educational and other social institutions to meet the need of its population? Beyond the economic and political conditions of the island, which established its inhabitants as inferior to mainlanders, the chauvinism of the latter continued to express itself, viewing Puerto Rican culture and institutions as inferior. The ethnic boundary thus established by the mainlanders in economic, political and cultural terms remains today in virtually unchanged form, not only on the island, but between the dominant society and migrants on the mainland as well.

The ethnic boundary between Puerto Ricans and the dominant Anglo group is thus based in large part on the subordinate status of Puerto Ricans. To the colonizers, they are lazy, dirty, culturally and racially incapable of skilled labor. They speak a different language and have different cultural traits and are therefore inferior. They are poor because they are lazy or culturally inferior, not because they are exploited and oppressed. Their poverty and their distinct language and culture are the major signals of their ethnicity to members of the dominant society.

The Puerto Rican migrants themselves see Puerto Rican birth or parentage, as well as speaking Spanish, as essential indicators of
Puerto Rican identity (Rodriguez, 1975; Lewis, 1965). Although they perceive racial distinctions among themselves (Harden, 1973, p. 339), these fall within the more inclusive category of Puerto Rican. This identity is valued and continued despite the fact that Puerto Ricans perceive that they are discriminated against in their daily lives. This fact, as well as the continuation of ethnic identity, points to the importance of ethnicity as a source of group and personal identity for them.

Although the self-identity of Puerto Ricans does not include feelings of inferiority, the way in which they are treated by dominant sector individuals and institutions can sometimes lead to psychological effects such as fatalism, inferiority complexes, and other forms of mental illness. Rosenberg (1974) has discussed the motivational problems of people living in segregated ghettos where a high rate of unemployment prevails: People become discouraged from looking for work because their neighbors and relatives are unemployed. Rosenberg also finds a positive correlation between ghettoization and lack of occupational mobility among Puerto Ricans. He theorizes that living far from suburban sources of employment adds to the weight of discouragement already existing in the ghetto. This visible proof of their inability to find work can in turn lead to such patterns of behavior as crime, alcoholism and severe mental illness (Fitzpatrick, 1973).

Lewis' description of the Rios family in La Vida (1965) also illustrates the kind of behavior resulting from an inability to find stable employment. Those families with a stable income were in general more stable than those whose adult members changed jobs frequently and were often unemployed. Rodriguez comments on the relationship between ghetto
residence, employment and psychology of the colonized in the following passage.

"The ghetto in perpetuating the group's existence as a distinct group keeps the group in a low position on the ethnic ladder... while the ghetto sacrifices rapid mobility, it makes mobility feasible, by sustaining the idea that the grass is greener outside the ghetto; this dream provides incentive to work at the low-status jobs offered. By performing these functions, the ghetto improves or maintains the group's fitness for its low position and aids in the 'naturalization' of assimilated ethnic groups." (Rodriguez, 1975, p. 77).

Demographics

Since the original migrations following World War II, the Puerto Rican population has spread out from New York City and environs. This trend has continued to the present. For example, between 1960 and 1970 the Puerto Rican population of New York grew by 42 percent and in Massachusetts by 360 percent. Furthermore, in 1960 only 10 cities had more than 5,000 Puerto Ricans, while in 1970 there were 29. Finally, there is some slight movement away from inner city slums to outlying suburbs (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 11; Kantrowitz, 1969; see also maps 2 and 3).

The 1970 census shows 1,429,396 Puerto Ricans on the mainland; however, this number has been called far too low, and charges of undercounting have been made. The 1973 Current Population Survey (CPS) shows 1,548,000 Puerto Ricans, an increase of 8.3%--very low when compared with other Spanish origin groups. This fact again has led to charges of undercounting of Puerto Ricans. The problem is a controversial one; however, the fact remains that somewhere over 1.5 million people of Puerto Rican birth or parentage now live on the U.S. mainland. Contrary to popular images of Puerto Ricans, the vast majority of them live in husband-wife families, not in female-headed families which are considered more unstable.
In 1972 the median age for Puerto Ricans on the mainland was 17.5, compared with 28 for the U.S. as a whole and 21.5 for Puerto Rico. This younger population probably results from the fact that migrants tend to be young and have young children, while older Puerto Ricans sometimes return to the island to retire (Wagenheim, 1975, p.11).

It is certain not because Puerto Ricans have many children. Of all Puerto Rican families counted in the 1970 census, 56% had two or less children, while 12% had more than four. This compares with 54% and 8% for the entire U.S. population. These families were listed as 85% nuclear families and 15% extended, as compared with 88% nuclear and 12% extended for the entire U.S. population (HEW report, 1974, 38,42).

Patterns, Processes and Indicators of Marginality

A comparison of socio-economic indicators for Puerto Ricans and Americans in general illustrates the subordinate status of the former. The fact that the U.S. total includes Puerto Ricans and other minorities means that the dominant Anglo sector is actually much better off than the colonized segment and that the dominant sector benefits at the expense of oppressed groups. Economically, the vast majority of Puerto Ricans hold low-status jobs (see Table 5), predominantly those requiring no skills and having a high turnover rate (Rosenberg, 1974, p. 43). The median income for Puerto Ricans is the lowest in the nation (see Table 7) and unemployment rates are the highest (see Table 4). Furthermore, mobility rates for second generation Puerto Ricans are lower than might be expected, compared with previous immigrant groups (Wagenheim, 1975; Rosenberg, 1974).
It has often been said that the reason Puerto Ricans remain in low-paying jobs is that they have low levels of education. (Rosenberg, 1974; Wagenheim, 1975; Fitzpatrick, 1971). It is indeed the case that Puerto Ricans average fewer years in school than any other group, including Blacks (Wagenheim, 1975, pp. 18-19; see Table 6). Furthermore, higher levels of education are correlated with higher income (Rosenberg, 1974; see Table 7). However, the median income at any given level of education is higher by far for Anglos than for Puerto Ricans, and more important, the return to education is much lower for Puerto Ricans than for Anglos (see Table 7). That is, the percent increase in income is higher for Anglos than for Puerto Ricans from one educational level to another.

Given the economic and social difficulties involved in staying in school, these statistics translate to an everyday reality in which the advantages to dropping out far outweigh the rewards for staying in school.

Political participation is much lower for Puerto Ricans than for the dominant sector of American society. Voter registration is lower for Puerto Ricans, who still must show proof of six years education in order to register. In 1969, only 131,000 out of a voting-age population of 435,000 in New York City were registered. More telling are the figures on political representation: There are few voting districts in which Puerto Ricans are a majority, a situation brought about at least in part by gerrymandering (Fitzpatrick, 1971, p. 57; Wagenheim, 1975, p. 43). As of 1970, Puerto Ricans had no political representatives in New York City and only four representatives in the state government (Fitzpatrick, 1971, p. 58). One political breakthrough has been that of Herman Badillo Rivera, a native of Puerto Rico. He became the first Puerto Rican member of Congress in 1970.
In-depth socio-economic factors

Social conditions among Puerto Ricans on the mainland illustrate some of the patterns of marginality which prevail in this group. As has been indicated, educational marginality is an important factor in the colonization of Puerto Ricans. Mental illness figures are another indicator of this process. Two separate studies, one in 1949-51 and one in 1968, showed a high rate of schizophrenia for Puerto Ricans.

There is even a condition known as "Puerto Rican Syndrome" or adaque, a hyperkinetic seizure at times of severe stress or anxiety (Fitzpatrick, 1971). However, as Fitzpatrick points out, the reasons for this high mental illness rate are not clear. While some investigators point to the higher incidence of mental illness among the poor, others attribute Puerto Rican schizophrenia to the stress of migration or to the cultural stress due to a dual sexual standard and other cultural traits. Still others, and an increasing number of experts, point to the differential treatment of poor people by professionals who assume that certain kinds of behavior are by definition deviant, without considering this behavior in its social and cultural context:

"Those in control of the mental health facilities determine the definitions, the methods, and conditions of treatment. They can confine those who are weak and segregate them for treatment. They can apply the system favorably to those they understand, and unfavorably to those they do not understand. What is crucial is that the poor have no access to strategic control. They cannot exert political power for the protection of forms of behavior which they consider legitimate; their coping behavior may bring them into conflict with the system; and they are helpless either to compel the system to operate in their favor, or to resist when it operates to their disadvantage" (Fitzpatrick, 1971, p. 166).

Finally, the ever-present problem of the language barrier makes the basic problem more complicated. As with teachers, the number of Puerto
Rican personnel in mental facilities is tiny, and people trained especially to deal with Puerto Rican problems virtually non-existent. Combined with the overcrowded and underfunded conditions prevailing at public facilities in poor areas, the situation is not likely to result in more than cursory and even experimental treatment. Thus, mental stress brought about at least in part by colonial conditions is misunderstood and at times exacerbated because of the institutionalized colonialism involved in its treatment.

We have already discussed some of the economic indicators of Puerto Rican colonialism: among these are the figures on unemployment, occupations and median income. Although the overall pattern of oppression is an accurate version of the lives of most Puerto Ricans in the U.S., there are variations on both sides of the mean. As discussed above, there are several thousand Puerto Ricans living in suburban environments around New York City (see Map 3); these have higher average incomes than their inner-city counterparts. However, there are significant numbers of extremely depressed people from migrant worker backgrounds in Massachusetts who offset the relative affluence of the better-off suburban dwellers. According to one spokesman, 30 percent of the Puerto Rican population of Massachusetts is comprised of people who are at least part-time migrant workers. These people come to the Boston area to work in the fields, but the short growing season forces them into industry or non-employment during the winter. This group, which grew from 5,217 in 1960 to 23,332 or more in 1970, has a median income of $4,998, compared with $11,449 for all residents of the area. Those few agencies keeping track of Puerto Ricans in the area showed consistently low levels of employment even in
areas where one would expect better representation: Less than 8 percent of the 3,000 people employed in community agencies devoted to the Spanish-speaking actually were Spanish-speaking. In Springfield, an agency for developing skills among the poor placed 150 persons in jobs; only two were Spanish-speaking (Wassenberg, 1975, p. 59).

Another economic indicator of Puerto Rican colonialism is that of business ownership. In 1972, Puerto Ricans owned consistently fewer businesses than any other Spanish-origin group; this group as a whole fell behind Anglos ownership. For example, in construction, Puerto Ricans owned 475 out of 16,603 Spanish-origin owned firms, of which only 57 had paid employees (Minority Owned Businesses, 1972).

However, these figures tell little about the realities of ownership for Puerto Ricans. As Aldrich and Reiss (1976) point out, the difficulties involved in getting credit are so widespread that a majority of Blacks and Puerto Ricans depend on family loans to get started. In addition, the kinds of businesses involved are also important. Aldrich and Reiss show that as the racial composition of neighborhoods changes, the type of businesses taken over by minorities are the less lucrative retail and service operations. More profitable construction, manufacturing and wholesale trade remain in the hands of Anglos. Furthermore, the failure rate of minority businesses is higher due to the lower income levels of their clientele, shifting commercial demand, and the perennial problem of credit (Aldrich and Reiss, 1976, pp. 851, 855, 859).

Finally, Wiley's discussion of the "ethnic mobility trap" (1967) suggests that ownership of an ethnically-oriented business may be a dead end in terms of economic mobility. By investing in a small business
catering to the already economically depressed ethnic group, the ethnic entrepreneur closes any other avenues of mobility which may be open to him. However, Wi!ley does not point out an important fact: In the vast majority of cases the limited mobility provided by the ethnic business is often the only avenue to success; Wi!ley's assumption that other avenues exist in terms of large-scale, non-ethnic businesses is somewhat overly optimistic, given the statistics cited in the above discussion.

Socio-economic mobility from one generation to the next is another important indicator of economic success or marginality. In the case of Puerto Ricans, the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, although indications are that the U.S.-born are in general better off than their Puerto Rican born parents. For example, the median number of school years completed by the second generation is 11.2 as compared to 8.9 for the first generation. A greater percentage of second generation Puerto Ricans also occupy managerial and white collar jobs and have higher incomes (see Table 6).

However, the median income for males of Puerto Rican parentage ($5129 in 1970) is not significantly higher than that of males of Puerto Rican birth ($5105). This may result from the fact that 36 percent of the second generation over the age of 16 is also under 25; this age group has the highest rate of unemployment (Puerto Ricans in the U.S., 1973). However, given the employment outlook for the future, especially in urban areas where Puerto Ricans live, it would be optimistic to predict that this young second generation will fare significantly better in the future.

A final factor to consider in any discussion of mobility is that of the third generation. Herber, (1965), Glazer and Moynihan (1964) and others have assumed that the third generation can aspire to be structurally
assimilated into American society even if it remains culturally and ethnically distinct to some extent. However, statistics on Blacks, Chicanos and American Indians indicate that this has not been the case for groups forcefully included in the U.S. polity. One study found that while second generation Mexican Americans fare better than those of the first generation, third generation members are trapped in semi-skilled jobs and do not improve over their parents (Moore, 1971, pp. 58-59; Camarillo, 1971, p. 98). Thus, while we may expect those Puerto Ricans born in the U.S. to be able to adjust more effectively to their oppressed position and to the language and educational barriers they must face than do migrants, the crucial question is, how will the children of the second generation fare? This cannot be answered at present, since the second generation is only now beginning to enter the labor force and adult life. However, the fact that they are slightly better off than their parents is not necessarily an indication that the group as a whole is being assimilated into American society; indeed, the education and unemployment figures point to the opposite conclusion.

Political patterns

Political indicators of the marginalization of Puerto Ricans have already been touched on for New York City, where the large number of this minority makes their under-representation more glaring. One reason for this lack of political participation is the residential pattern of Puerto Ricans in the city. Unlike former immigrant groups, Puerto Ricans are not situated all in one area of the city. They are spread out in different neighborhoods where they intermingle with Blacks and other minorities.
Thus they are unable to vote in a bloc for a Puerto Rican candidate. In addition, the ghetto districts are often astutely gerrymandered to prevent bloc voting.

The lack of Puerto Rican representation goes beyond that of elected officers, however. In educational policy-making bodies they are also under-represented. The board of education in New York City had one member of Puerto Rican background, but no Puerto Ricans in policy-implementation positions. Within the school system itself, less than 1 percent of the professional employees are Puerto Rican. In Chicago, there are no Puerto Rican principals or administrators of any kind (Senate hearings, 1970). In the Boston school system there is not one guidance counselor, secretary, administrator, clerical worker, or librarian from the Spanish-speaking community (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 60).

This lack of representation in government agencies, even those designed specifically to interact with Puerto Ricans as a group, makes for difficulties in communication between Puerto Ricans and the agencies. As one student of the problem in Boston points out, this situation puts "the Puerto Rican in the fringe area of a man who knows his needs but who can find no one to listen" (Wagenheim, 1975, p. 59). Berle, in her study of Puerto Rican health patterns in New York City, discusses the problems involved in obtaining information door-to-door: people who have been consistently mistreated by official representatives of government agencies are likely to greet the caller with silence or with a large dog, teeth bared (Berle, 1958, p. 14). This problem is also discussed by Kimball with respect to voter registration drives. Well-meaning people trying to register Puerto Ricans are greeted with suspicion because they are
strangers and because any attempt at registration of names is perceived as an intrusion from a hostile government, and a tool for further oppression (Kimball, 1972). This attitude stems from experiences such as those quoted above with respect to mental health agencies, educational facilities, and even community action agencies whose personnel is made up of members of the dominant segment. These agencies, rather than helping Puerto Ricans attain a measure of representation, end up as symbols of political and economic marginalization.

**Mechanisms of Colonialism**

**Economic mechanisms**

The occupational, employment, and income patterns discussed earlier are not the product of fortuitous forces in American life, nor are they caused by inferior cultural institutions among the Puerto Ricans. Rather, they are the result of systematic exclusion of this group from economic opportunities available to the members of the dominant sector of U.S. society. This exclusion takes place in the institutional framework as well as on the personal level. Lack of skills and education are often given as reasons for low-status occupations among Puerto Ricans; however, we have already seen how even when Puerto Ricans find a way to remain in school, their incomes do not match those of Anglos with similar educations (Table 7). Furthermore, the institutional neglect built into the educational system makes low skills inevitable. A third cause of low-status employment is the location of jobs: they are increasingly distant from the ghettos where Puerto Ricans are forced to live because of low incomes and housing discrimination (Rosenberg, 1974). Finally, an aversion
to dealing with agencies in general leads most job-seekers to use informal means to find employment. Rosenberg points out the built-in handicap of this procedure for ghetto dwellers:

"Given their distance from ghetto neighborhoods, it is probable that information about job opportunities in these suburban concerns does not circulate through informal channels of communication, but rather, through formal channels. To the extent that a ghetto jobseeker, consequently, is dependent upon local networks to inform him of appropriate job opportunities, he is handicapped by the exclusion of better-paying, more rewarding suburban jobs from the local grapevine. The men in our sample who succeeded in obtaining skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar jobs and/or jobs in manufacturing deviated from the norm of informal job search methods..." (1974, pp. 141-142).

It must be stressed that this handicap stems from two institutions of internal colonialism: the segregated ghetto and the discriminatory treatment regularly received by Puerto Ricans in their dealings with formal agencies, thus discouraging them from seeking jobs through government employment agencies.

Beyond the institutional constraints on types of employment available is the widespread phenomenon of personal discrimination against Puerto Ricans on the job market. In one study of Puerto Ricans in New York City, the great majority stated that they had felt discriminated against in the employment arena. One respondent was accepted for a job over the phone, then after arriving in person was told the employer did not want a dark Puerto Rican (Rodriguez, 1975, p. 71). In another study, done by a New York City agency, 14.3 percent of White Puerto Rican males and 18.8 percent of nonwhite Puerto Rican males responded "yes" when asked if they had ever been given a hard time on the job (Rosenberg, 1974, 127).

Exclusion from middle and upper-income jobs and in many cases from any jobs at all is thus the reality for Puerto Ricans; it matters little
to them in terms of income whether this exclusion takes an impersonal or personal form. Public manpower and job training programs and recruitment drives have had only marginal effects, as unemployment and occupation statistics reveal. Widely advertised recruitment drives in New York State resulted in some improvement in the ratio of Puerto Ricans in the state government, but 81 percent of these earned less than $9,000, a larger percentage than either Blacks or Whites in the government. In the Boston area, already discussed, the Concentrated Employment Program formed to train the economically deprived, placed 150 people in three years. Only two were Spanish-speaking. At the same time, agencies proliferate in the depressed Roxbury district, but community development stagnates because the funding for the agencies goes to support the Anglo staff rather than into the community itself (Wagenheim, 1975, pp. 59-60).

Social mechanisms

We have already seen that Puerto Ricans receive inferior education as a result of language difficulties and the lack of trained teachers to deal with this situation. Like the statistics on employment, these educational figures are not accidental. For example, the use of IQ tests designed for White, English-speaking middle class students results in the misplacing of Puerto Ricans in classes for the mentally retarded. The executive director of Aspira of Illinois, a Puerto Rican self-help group, reported having been assigned an IQ of 20 in one test. She went on to point another problem in Chicago schools: exclusion from special programs encouraging gifted children. "At present the Puerto Rican is systematically being excluded from these programs. This constitutes a
perfect example of institutional discrimination, as distinct from any personal racist pathology" (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 3722). Aside from this kind of institutional discrimination, personal discrimination against Puerto Ricans in school is a powerful mechanism preventing advancement. In one study, a majority of respondents reported discrimination in school (Rodriguez, 1975, p.7). Cases of mistreatment abounded in the literature.

It is impossible to speak of public policy regarding Puerto Ricans without discussing welfare. "The cause of the most widespread and hostile criticism against the Puerto Ricans" (Fitzpatrick, 1971, p. 155). In 1970, 24 percent of all Puerto Rican families relied on some form of assistance. In New York City, where the bulk of poor Puerto Ricans live, welfare recipients grew from 332,000 in 1959 to 1,2 million in January 1972. These figures are less startling in perspective: New York was tenth among selected major urban centers between 1964 and 1971. Contrary to the popular image of the welfare chisler, the New York welfare recipients are with few exceptions truly poverty-stricken. The U.S. Labor department found in 1971 that only 2.6 percent of welfare recipients were employable. By contrast, 56.8 percent were children. An investigation of welfare mothers by New York City in 1973 revealed that 65% of the women examined were disabled; thus, even if child care centers were available they would be unable to work and support their families (Wagenheim, 1975, pp. 33-34). What the statistics on welfare reveal is not cheating by Puerto Ricans but rather consistent levels of poverty.

More important than the reasons why Puerto Ricans are on welfare are the effects of the welfare system on its beneficiaries. Fitzpatrick
"Since Puerto Ricans are the poorest of New York's families, the pressures to find adequate income are severe. Although supplementary welfare payments can be arranged if a father's income is below a calculated minimum level, this supplement is small compared to the amount available if the mother can claim no support from a father in or out of the home. Thus the pressure for the father to vacate the home is very strong....The situation may prompt the father to leave the home so that both he and the family can live better, or it may put pressure on the mother to force the father out. The consequence may be continued separation and the breakup of the family. Either situation is unfortunate, and obviously contributes to family weakness."

Thus, rather than a solution to the problem of Puerto Rican social and economic marginalization, welfare in many ways exacerbates the problem by inefficiently treating the symptoms rather than the root causes of poverty.

**Political mechanisms**

An important aspect of differential public policy toward Puerto Ricans is that of public expenditures. While poverty areas should be the ones to receive the most assistance from government agencies, it is too often the case that disproportionately small segments of the public budget go toward helping the poor. This differential public expenditure is thus a mechanism for enforcing the existing colonial relationship between the Puerto Rican sector and the dominant Anglo sector of society. Since Puerto Ricans and Blacks live for the most part in segregated ghettos, they are easy to identify and their residential areas are those receiving the least public money. As we have seen, what money does go for community development ends up in the pockets of predominantly White middle-class experts staffing the agencies rather than to those for whom it was originally destined.
A classic example of public expenditure well-meant but badly used is the much spoken of Puerto Rican Study, which studied New York City schools during the years 1953-1957. With a budget of $1 million, it carried out a very thorough study and made several excellent recommendations. Among them: the use of four standard tests to determine English proficiency; special reception classes for new migrant children; and the training of teachers in how to teach English as a second language. In 1970, these recommendations were still not implemented in any systematic way in New York City (Senate hearings, 1970, pp. 3732-3733). The $1 million went to the investigators, but the Puerto Ricans remain in their original colonized situation.

This kind of public expenditure can only exist where the group in question has no access to public policy formation and implementation. Thus, the lack of trained Puerto Ricans in such institutions as boards of education, public welfare agencies, and employment training programs makes it possible for these agencies to ignore Puerto Ricans. Thus the vicious circle continues: mechanisms of institutional and personal discrimination create patterns of marginalization which in turn prevent the emergence of effective representatives in public policy formation agencies.

One effective mechanism continuing this vicious circle is that of restrictions on voting. As Kimball (1972, pp. 2-5) points out, voter registration was initially a response to immigrants in the late 19th century. Before 1876, any American citizen wishing to vote simply went to the polls. The institution of voter registration since that time has resulted in a sharp drop in voter participation; this drop has occurred predominantly among the poor. Voter registration is thus at root a tool
for political control. This is especially true for Puerto Ricans, who must have proof of literacy in English or six years' education in Puerto Rico in order to be able to register. In a study of a voter registration drive in New York City, Kimball found that "by almost any standard of measure the...drive was a failure, and most of all in failing to recruit large numbers of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Total registration...was smaller than for any mayoralty election since 1957, when permanent personal registration was instituted" (1972, pp. 167-168). In New York, the days for registration were severely limited; however, even massive attempts to register voters during the restricted time given failed. One reason for this is the key to how voter registration works as a tool for political marginalization:

"In low-income districts, particularly, the voting lists are seen as a roster for jury duty, bill collectors, and visits from the law... Door-to-door canvassing with the official lists in densely populated housing projects, for example, is a frustrating experience of misinformation, language barriers, hostility, and fright" (Kimball, 1972, pp. 163-164).

Kimball's word for the non-voting poor is the disconnected; it is an apt word for those cut off from every aspect of prosperity in American society. Among these, and at the lowest levels in every index, are the Puerto Ricans.

**Adaptive Responses**

Despite the many problems faced by Puerto Ricans on the mainland, they have developed several self-help organizations in major cities; these have accomplished much, given the systematic marginalization of the group by the dominant sector. One of these organizations, the Puerto Rican Forum, was begun in the 1950's in New York City. Its major goal was to help Puerto Rican youth. The Forum founded Aspira, to develop
education, and the Puerto Rican Community Development Project, a multipurpose organization aimed mainly at New York City's youth.

Aspira has been one of the most effective grass-roots organizations to develop in the Puerto Rican community. The activities of this group include establishing clubs to promote college attendance, and the convocation of conferences and workshops to provide encouragement to young Puerto Ricans seeking higher education (Fitzpatrick, 1971, pp. 65-66). Aspira has also been active in exposing the gross injustices built into the public school system in New York and Chicago (Senate hearings, 1970). In 1970, the Chicago branch of Aspira reported that after one year of operation it had increased the number of Puerto Ricans in college from the Chicago area from 30 to 170 (Senate hearings, 1970, p. 379).

The Puerto Rican Development Project, founded shortly after Aspira, was a response to the need for a more comprehensive self-help organization. More activist than Aspira, it has also been more controversial in that it has been more outspoken in its demands for short-term justice for the minority it represents. It is active throughout New York City, and is involved in job training programs and other activist concerns. Equally important, Fitzpatrick points out, is "the Project's role as a visible representative of Puerto Ricans in New York" (1971, p. 68).

A third self-help organization is the Puerto Rican Family Institute. Begun in 1963, its role is to facilitate the adjustment of newly arrived migrant families to life on the mainland. Fitzpatrick notes that the Family Institute is the only thorough-going Puerto Rican family agency in New York City, and provides an alternative to the strange and often hostile environment of public agencies.
The need for this kind of uniquely Puerto Rican agency to deal with specific needs of the community is discussed by Rogler (1972) in his description of the formation of a self-help group in a middle-sized eastern city. He chronicles the difficulties of forming a group made up of people who not only must work full-time but often are trying to learn English at night, and have no experience in forming organizations. In spite of these handicaps, the group was aggressive in continuing its efforts to meet Puerto Rican needs in the community. These efforts were blocked not only by politicians but by the very poverty agencies who were funded to help them. Despite this, the group persevered, was still in existence at the end of Rogler's study, and was increasing its membership and the formality of its organization.

Self-help groups such as those described above serve to dramatize the predicament of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland, and to a certain extent improve their conditions. However, the dreary facts of unemployment, poverty and low educational achievement point up the realities of life for the vast majority of this group. These realities stem not from inherent weaknesses in the group itself but from systematic and institutionalized marginalization of the group by the dominant segment of the society. This marginalization takes the form of political, economic and social institutions and practices whose effect is to deny comprehensively to Puerto Ricans access to goods, services and policy-making power. An increase in the attention paid to the educational needs of Puerto Ricans is only one of the many areas for improvement. Until the predicament of the Puerto Ricans is altered by widespread lifting of internal colonial constraints, the work of valiant organizations like Aspira can be little more than minor alleviation of a major injustice.
TABLE 1

Nativity of Puerto Ricans, by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group (Years)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 and above</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2

Migratory Flow From and to Puerto Rico

(Annual Averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>55,400</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>79,600</td>
<td>76,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>49,600</td>
<td>42,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE 3

**Persons of Puerto Rican Birth and Parentage in the United States: 1910-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nativity Year</th>
<th>Year of Census</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Puerto Rico:</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>11,811</td>
<td>680.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>52,774</td>
<td>346.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>69,967</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>226,110</td>
<td>223.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>617,356</td>
<td>172.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>810,087</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Puerto Rican Parentage: | 1950   | 75,265 | --         |
|                        | 1960   | 275,457| 266.0%    |
|                        | 1970   | 581,375| 111.1     |

TABLE 4
Official and Adjusted Unemployment for Total U.S. Population and Puerto Ricans in the United States, March 1972
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and Sex</th>
<th>U.S. Total</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans in United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Participation Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males, ages 16 to 64</td>
<td>52,900,000</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, 16 to 64</td>
<td>31,877,000</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males and Females, 16 to 64</td>
<td>84,777,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adjusted figures for Puerto Ricans are based upon labor force participation rates for the total U.S. population.

TABLE 5

Family Structure Among Puerto Ricans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of all Families</th>
<th>Husband/wife families</th>
<th>Female-head families</th>
<th>Wifeless male head families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 6

Comparison of Selected Characteristics of First And Second Generation Puerto Ricans in the U.S., 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Puerto Rican birth</th>
<th>Puerto Rican parentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1960</td>
<td>617,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>810,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of Households</td>
<td>331,833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education, 16 and over:
- less than 5 years: 121,569, 8,045
- 8 years: 88,248, 10,218
- 9-11 years: 177,070, 55,511
- some college: 35,846, 14,627
- median years completed: 8.9, 11.2

### Income, 16 and over:
- without income:
  - Total: 189,253, 48,456
  - male: 34,746, 18,191
  - female: 154,507, 30,265
- income under $1,000:
  - Total: 54,580, 16,467
  - male: 20,812, 7,790
  - female: 33,768, 8,677
- income $1000-6000:
  - Total: 311,926, 45,812
  - male: 161,644, 21,658
  - female: 150,282, 24,154
- income over $6000:
  - Total: 121,967, 24,450
  - male: 104,966, 19,148
  - female: 17,001, 5,302

### Employment, over 16:
- types of occupations (male and female):
  - clerical & kindred: 46,053, 17,999
  - craftsmen, foremen: 37,883, 6,317
  - operatives: 125,896, 10,821
  - service, excep. household: 52,292, 8,273
  - professional & manag.: 25,370, 8,646
  - all others: 36,429, 7,829

TABLE 7

Median earnings in 1973 of persons 25 years and over,
By years of school completed and ethnic origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total U.S.</th>
<th>Puerto Rican</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total, 25 years and over</td>
<td>$6,703</td>
<td>$5,432</td>
<td>$9,022</td>
<td>$5,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 years school</td>
<td>5,230</td>
<td>4,432</td>
<td>5,644</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>6,505</td>
<td>4,975</td>
<td>6,711</td>
<td>4,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>6,974</td>
<td>5,160</td>
<td>7,316</td>
<td>5,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>8,205</td>
<td>7,172</td>
<td>8,357</td>
<td>6,512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## TABLE 3

Distribution of Puerto Rican Population, New York City, 1930-1960  
(by percent of total Puerto Rican Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manhattan</th>
<th>Bronx</th>
<th>Richmond</th>
<th>Brooklyn</th>
<th>Queens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## TABLE 4

Bilingual Education Programs in New York City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of programs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of students</td>
<td>20,989*</td>
<td>7,031</td>
<td>9,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>$456,499*</td>
<td>$2,506,506</td>
<td>$4,020,016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include $29,900 budgeted to serve grades 1-6 and 7-9 in District 2; the number of students participating in these programs is not given.

MAP 1
Puerto Rican Student Enrollment in New York City, by Boroughs

Negroes constituted 10.0% or more of the total population
Puerto Ricans constituted 10.0% or more of the total population
Nonwhite Puerto Ricans constituted 10.0% or more of the Puerto Rican population

MAP 2

Distribution of Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Nonwhite Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1969

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<th>Author(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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