This report represents a summary of the East Hartford, Connecticut, effort to establish an educational voucher system and the reasons for its defeat. Sections focus on the four basic issues that underlie any voucher plan: (1) nonpublic school involvement, (2) competition and the creation of an artificial market, (3) parent power and resultant decentralization, and (4) the creation and maintenance of alternative educational programs and services. The report also discusses the role of the state department of education and other agencies that will, or should be, involved with future voucher plans or similar innovations. (Author/IRT)
EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL!

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CONNECUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
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The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant (contract) with the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official National Institute of Education position or policy.
When the National Institute of Education approved the position of State Liaison to the Demonstration Scholarship (Voucher) Program in East Hartford, the Institute and the State Board of Education as well as the East Hartford Superintendent of Schools, Board of Education and local citizens felt that an important step in American education was about to be taken which would potentially involve some 10,000 elementary and secondary school students.

On January 26, 1976, the project was defeated.

There have been many studies to date concerning the limited experiment in Alum Rock (San Jose), California, and vouchers generally have been debated for years. The following effort represents a much needed critical appraisal of the voucher concept and the Connecticut experience. This report is submitted to the Connecticut State Board of Education in fulfillment of N.I.E. Grant No. G-76-0034 (Revised). In order to concentrate on pivotal issues, a detailed recapitulation of background materials has been omitted.

May, 1976.

The author wishes to encourage a continuing dialogue on the voucher concept and to receive feedback from readers concerning the content and usefulness of this report. Please submit all correspondence to:

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The late 1960's witnessed a confluence of dramatic events which startled school administrators across the nation, particularly those in urban areas. Unrest was prevalent. Violence, drugs, anti-war and civil rights protests contributed to making many schools battlefields in an already tense environment. The so-called baby-boom crested, swelling the school age population to levels of congestion which worried teachers, parents and school boards. The flight to the suburbs was skimming the white middle class from central cities; the gap filled with large numbers of the poor. The lessened tax base and the continued strain on public services in general, contributed to a further deterioration of an antiquated and insufficient public school system. Paralleling the crisis in the public schools was a parochial school system faced with a financial burden which threatened to close its doors and thereby force even more students into the public schools.

Under this pressure, educators were searching for a
financial respite from an intolerable situation which threatened to worsen. In 1970, President Nixon pledged to extend federal support to nonpublic schools. That same year the Center for the Study of Public Policy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, issued its voucher plan as a constitutional means of equalizing the financing of education, while allowing church-related schools to participate in a larger share of the tax dollar. In 1972, the President's Commission on School Finance and its Panel on Nonpublic Education concurred on recommendations to support private and parochial schools and to explore the potential benefits of a voucher plan which, they were convinced, promised to stimulate the creation of alternatives and program diversity in elementary and secondary education, as well as provide financial aid to nonpublic schools.

The late 1960's and early 1970's also witnessed widespread support of the alternative concept. This response to the call for educational diversity, and the recognition among many, of the need for financial equalization, coupled with demands for community control, or simply, less government, set the stage for high level agreement in the Office of Economic Opportunity, later the National Institute of Education, that vouchers might be a viable solution.

Six years and approximately ten million dollars later, education vouchers appear to be an innovation whose time may never come. As an answer to the inequality of school financing and the clamor for community (parental) control of education, the federally sponsored voucher idea has been
defeated in all but one of the eight communities where feasibility studies have been made.

Simply put, a voucher is a certificate, equal to the value of a child's education for one year, which is issued to the parents of each school-age child. Upon enrollment in an authorized educational program, the voucher is presented to the school officials, who then redeem it for its value in operating funds. The school is guaranteed only those funds equal to the amount of the vouchers it redeems.

Viewed in the politically turbulent context in which it was born, it is not surprising that the voucher idea was quite appealing to liberal and conservative alike. On the one hand it contributes to a political/governmental debureaucratization and, on the other hand, it gives some decision-making prerogatives to the individual parent. Ideally, a voucher plan gives each student access to the educational facilities he needs without regard to where he lives or his ability to pay. Because the voucher travels with the student, it is important for each school to attract students. Failure to do so would mean dissolution of the school or an overhaul of its program to broaden appeal. Competition for vouchers, proponents claim, contribute to creating a responsive system of schooling, and promote diversity, as each program attempts to secure voucher dollars.

Alum Rock, California, the only school district in the nation which has experimented with vouchers is currently near completion of its five-year partnership with the National
Institute of Education, the federal funding agency. As the only existing voucher demonstration, it has been the focus of an intensive debate, over the voucher concept generally and an exhaustive study to determine its functional impact. But Alum Rock has not adopted any of the eight widely discussed voucher models (Table 1) or even the one outlined by the Center for the Study of Public Policy (Table 2) which is the most popular plan and the one preferred by N.I.E. Rather, Alum Rock, by assuring teacher and administrator job security and by not including private/parochial schools, has merely offered the public a series of mini-schools and invited extensive community feedback about, and participation in, the school system. In effect, then, the only existing voucher program, referred to as a "transition" voucher, does not test two of the most important and controversial points of the entire voucher concept: (1) that free market competition, where responsiveness is a function of the financial resources following a student, results in a natural expansion or contraction of educational services as needed, and (2) the promotion of diversity so that all identifiable student/learner needs would be met - either through a "public" or a "private" source.

The demonstration in Alum Rock speaks quite well for both the need for, and the ability of, an educational system to provide alternative educational programs and client (parent) participation. While Alum Rock demonstrates the impact of several aspects of the voucher idea, N.I.E., and voucher proponents generally, appealed to several other potential cities to
TABLE 1
VOUCHER MODELS

1. Unregulated Market Model: The value of the voucher is the same for each child. Schools are permitted to charge whatever additional tuition the traffic will bear.

2. Unregulated Compensatory Model: The value of the voucher is higher for poor children. Schools are permitted to charge whatever additional tuition they wish.

3. Compulsory Private Scholarship Model: Schools may charge as much tuition as they like, provided they give scholarships to those children unable to pay full tuition. Eligibility and size of scholarships are determined by the EVA, which establishes a formula showing how much families with certain incomes can be charged.

4. The Effort Voucher: This model establishes several different possible levels of per pupil expenditure and allows a school to choose its own level. Parents who choose high expenditure schools are then charged more tuition (or tax) than parents who choose low-expenditure schools. Tuition (or tax) is also related to income. In theory the "effort" demanded of a low-income family attending a high-expenditure school is the same as the "effort" demanded of a high-income family in the same school.

5. "Egalitarian" Model: The value of the voucher is the same for each child. No school is permitted to charge any additional tuition.

6. Achievement Model: The value of the voucher is based on the progress made by the child during the year.
7. **Regulated Compensatory Model:** Schools may not charge tuition beyond the value of the voucher. They may "earn" extra funds by accepting children from poor families or educationally disadvantaged children. (A variant of this model permits privately managed voucher schools to charge affluent families according to their ability to pay.)

8. **Conditional Voucher:** State financing of educational programs through the issuance of vouchers based on one of many possible contingencies, provisions, and/or conditions which serve to distribute educational resources or affect the market in light of special needs or political demands. The formulas and priorities are potentially endless.

TABLE 2
PROPOSED VOUCHER GUIDELINES BY
THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY

Regulated Compensatory Model with the following provisions:

--- Demonstration is within one municipality.

--- Only inclusive of kindergarten through sixth grade.

--- All children of appropriate age in the demonstration area would be eligible for vouchers.

--- Compensatory funds should be available for those voucher schools enrolling the disadvantaged.

--- Parochial schools should be allowed to participate but only allowed to redeem vouchers for the cost of secular educational services.

--- Schools should not be allowed to select more than half of their students according to their own criteria. A lottery should be used to select half the students.

--- Information should be gathered and disseminated about each voucher program.

--- Private and parochial schools should already exist to insure genuine competition and "product differentiation".

--- Discrimination on the basis of race, wealth, I.Q., behavior and religion must be avoided.
expand the application of a voucher demonstration to include nonpublic schools. With the adoption of Sections 10-239a through 10-239h of the General Statutes of Connecticut (See Appendix I), enabling the participation of nonpublic schools in the use of general tax revenues for the purpose of a voucher demonstration, it appeared that the broader concept would finally be tested.

Hartford was the first city in Connecticut to study the feasibility of adopting the plan, but decided not to proceed, partly because of the uncertainties among the black and Hispanic communities concerning de facto segregation and among the white communities concerning the potentially disruptive impact on the neighborhood schools.

Shortly after Hartford rejected the idea, East Hartford, a homogeneous blue collar community, proceeded to study the concept and designed a proposal which appropriately expanded the voucher demonstration to include those elements absent from Alum Rock. This expansion would not significantly depart from the local open enrollment policy.

The following report represents a summary of the East Hartford effort and the reasons for its defeat. Later sections will focus on the four basic issues which underlie any voucher plan: (1) nonpublic school involvement, (2) competition and the creation of an artificial market, (3) parent power and resultant decentralization, and (4) the creation and maintenance of alternative educational programs and services. Finally, the report will discuss the role of the state department of
education and other agencies which will, or should be, involved with future voucher or similar innovations.
II  
EAST HARTFORD VOUCHER PLAN:  
PROPOSAL AND DEFEAT

BACKGROUND

Sections 10-239a through 10-239h were passed by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1972, enabling up to six town and/or regional boards of education to begin demonstration scholarship (voucher) programs. Enrollments had dropped in East Hartford and by 1975, twenty percent of the student spaces were vacant.

During this period, prior to the voucher feasibility study, the East Hartford Board of Education was one of only a few boards in Connecticut which had adopted an open enrollment policy. This enabled parents to send their children to any school within the town, provided there was space and that they would assume the transportation costs if the school was outside of the neighborhood attendance area.

The demonstration, known locally as the Parents' Choice Project, emphasized an invitation to the community to become informed and involved in the schools. The voucher plan was viewed as an extension of the current program and philosophy of the school system.
By the time the voucher plan became a real possibility in East Hartford, the financial appeal was substantial. The adoption of the voucher plan would have meant that transportation could be provided "free" for five years, since the federal government pledged to assume all project costs above and beyond the non-voucher budget. In addition, the funding for the feasibility study represented a source of "soft" money, which allows for the purchase of services and the exploration of concepts otherwise considered luxuries and therefore beyond the reach of an interested board constrained by a tight budget.

The adoption of the plan would have also provided an opportunity to test the viability of a competitive marketplace of educational services, though that was somewhat problematic, since there were only two nonpublic schools in East Hartford, both with limited space and an uncertain (though likely) desire to become voucher schools. Since they are church-related, their actual participation was threatened from the outset by groups promising to seek an immediate court injunction to prevent their inclusion in the voucher plan until the constitutional questions could be decided.

In summary, the motivation to seek the support for the feasibility study was quite understandable since the open enrollment policy provided a basis from which further experimentation, consistent with the idea of an educational marketplace, could, at first glance, be easily assimilated by East Hartford. The commitment to open enrollment and the intention of the system to decentralize and provide a greater role for parents
were seductive elements which convinced the Superintendent of Schools and the Parents' Choice Staff to advocate the five year voucher experiment.

**THE EAST HARTFORD PROPOSAL**

The proposal submitted by the coordinators of the Parents' Choice Project included five major elements:

1. **Transportation** - Each child would be given free transportation to and from the school he attended.

2. **Parents' Choice, Open Enrollment and Vouchers** - Each student would be guaranteed a space at his neighborhood school, but should another program be more appealing or better suited to his individual needs, his parents would have the right to transfer him to the school of his choice. Demand in excess of space available would be resolved by selecting students to fill half the vacancies by lottery and the other half through entrance requirements or simply according to the date of application.

   Each household would receive a voucher for each school age child. The voucher would be presented to school officials upon enrollment and then redeemed by the Board of Education (the Education Voucher Authority - EVA) for operating funds.

3. **Nonpublic School Participation** - All nonpublic schools within the demonstration area (in this case an area contiguous with the geographic limits of the town) would be invited and encouraged to participate in the voucher plan. The program autonomy of the nonpublic schools would be guaranteed.
4. Public School Autonomy - The public school system, in order to establish a competitive marketplace of educational services, would decentralize and allow school-level autonomy. The administration and faculty of each school would define their own goals and design the organization and curriculum necessary to deliver their program.

5. Information Gathering and Dissemination - Each school and its program would be described in a brochure to be delivered to parents in mid-spring. In addition, a Parent Advice Team would seek to answer questions and counsel parents who need more information about the programs offered.

THE BOARD'S DECISION

There was considerable speculation that the East Hartford Board would adopt the controversial proposal, but of the nine Board members, only two voted for the plan. According to the East Hartford Gazette, the 6-2 vote came as a surprise.

In support, Mrs. Barbara Atwood cited the experiment's potential importance to education nationally, and Mr. Robert Bannon urged adoption of the plan as a mechanism to encourage diversity within the town's total educational program.

Mr. Richard Daley said, in opposition to the voucher, that "the competition inherent in the voucher plan would hurt the educational process because the successful program should have an obligation to share its knowledge with others - not withhold it. If one method (teaching) is known to be better, it is encumbent on the Board to see it put forth in other schools.

Dr. Richard Veltri, also in opposition to vouchers,
cited costs as his main objection, "they are of too great a magnitude."

Mr. Lawrence DelPonte voted against the plan because he is "against competition when it relates to our youngsters."

The defeat seemed to reflect the convergence of three main concerns during the last weeks of public debate. First, the inclusion of parochial schools. East Hartford is predominantly Catholic and the two sectarian schools located there are both operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Hartford. The debate over inclusion of these schools centered on (a) whether or not the town could afford to support them financially, (b) the apparent though subtle, inference that perhaps the church-related schools were superior and would attract the best students away from the public schools, (c) the strength of the town's case to defend the constitutionality of the program. Though there appeared to be a general awareness of the underlying question regarding church-state relations, only two people testified publicly that they felt inclusion of the parochial schools was a direct violation of the principle of the separation of church and state.

Second, cost. Most of those who testified against the proposed voucher plan claimed that (a) too much money would be spent on an experiment that indirectly affects the students. The bulk of the funds was earmarked for additional transportation costs and to pay for the vouchers redeemed at nonpublic schools, (b) since the federal aid was only guaranteed for five years, the town was, in effect, asked to approve an experimental program
which would either be a failure and terminated, or if successful would demand financial support for continuation at a time when local resources might or might not be adequate, and (c) many people feared that financial pressures in Washington would result in partial funding or a cancellation of federal assistance, thereby aborting the program before it could be assessed.

Third, the professional staff of the public school system, both administrators and teachers, voted not to support the voucher proposal. Teachers opposed the plan because of (a) the emphasis on the competition for students. They claimed that the competitive system might not be sensitive to the needs of small minorities of students, (b) school autonomy and independent program direction could cause a discontinuity in vertical program coordination, which could result in serious skill discrepancies among entering high school students, (c) the availability of equal educational opportunity might be sacrificed if nonpublic schools were allowed to participate and maintain control over student selection procedures, (d) public money should not be spent on non-public schools, (e) the attraction of students to nonpublic schools would lessen overall enrollment and could, in an unpredictable fashion, jeopardize public school teaching positions, (f) implicit in the voucher plan is a form of evaluation based on program appeal rather than professional standards and judgment.

Administrators were generally opposed to the plan because (a) the budgeting process would be unstable due to the presence of unpredictable student transfers which involves the
fluctuation of the school's account, (b) the future uncertainty of the program, (c) the diminution of available financial resources due to private/parochial school access to general tax revenues, (d) the interference in the free interaction of staff and ideas, and the encouragement of hucksterism, due to the creation of a competitive system, and (e) they did not want East Hartford to have the burden of defending the inclusion of nonpublic schools in a program of questionable constitutionality.

There were also several political considerations which, though not stated publicly, seemed to have a bearing on the outcome. First, the proposal would have shifted much of the responsibility for educational policy and program, to each individual school. Second, the fractionalization of accountability would have lessened the responsiveness and control of the Board of Education. One must wonder if it is in fact legal or indeed possible, for the Board of Education to delegate its authority or to pass along its responsibility for public education to the individual schools without specific statutory authority to do so. Third, two surveys resulted in different conclusions about the public's position regarding the voucher plan. One survey found the parents in support of the two critical issues: inclusion of nonpublic schools and free public transportation for all students. Another survey showed parents overwhelmingly opposed to supplying free transportation and marginally opposed to the expansion of the open enrollment policy to include nonpublic schools. Apparently the Board felt that the necessary mandate for such an experiment was not forthcoming. Fourth, perhaps it was practical to study
a proposal to determine the town's capacity to implement a sweeping reform even though the eventual adoption of the voucher plan specifically, was doubtful. The supplemental advantages which accrued to East Hartford, attest to this. For example, a management information system, a transportation program, a school publicity program, in-service workshops to develop those skills necessary for school-building autonomy and public surveys all contributed to the general advancement of the East Hartford Public Schools.

In summary, the Board was aware that in the short-run, money would be available to experiment with vouchers, but the system would be subject to an enormous alteration; people's expectations would be raised; the avenues for personal expression increased; and power would be dispersed to individual schools. In addition, a court case was assured and discord among the professional staff who were opposed to the plan seemed inevitable. The long-run advantages were seen as nebulous and potentially costly to the community by the Board of Education. The immediate problems and future uncertainty were enough to dissuade the Board of Education.

EVALUATION AND COMMENT

In retrospect, the voucher proposal seems to have been mismatched to the realities in East Hartford. Of course, experimentation is necessary and valuable to promote educational improvement, but the conditions which were deemed important or desirable for the most favorable voucher demonstration were not present in East Hartford, and the program was not geared to results.
The circumstances at the time East Hartford studied the feasibility of a voucher plan did not warrant such a dramatic reorganization. The public schools were financially secure. In fact, there was a decline in enrollment which resulted in a considerable amount of excess space throughout the system. There was no particular dissatisfaction to inspire the creation of private schools. There were no visible signs that there were large numbers of isolated educationally disadvantaged students. The system was not suffering from conflicts associated with desegregation - only three percent of the population is black. And with twenty-two public schools, there was the appearance of an organizational capability to provide educational alternatives without vouchers.

The monetary aspect of vouchers was too unstable. For example, transportation alone was estimated to cost between fifty thousand and one million dollars. While this incredibly wide range is partly due to various estimation techniques, it also reflects the unpredictable fluctuations inherent in the variables of a competitive voucher model. By definition, the voucher system encourages volatility. With this in mind, it was interesting to note the apparent willingness among local and federal administrators to spend large varying sums of money on non-program items of indirect educational value.

Admittedly, the program could not have been demonstrated without paying for transportation and other costs, but the voucher conceptualization as applied to East Hartford did not illustrate a sufficiently strong link to specific educational
outcomes. The notion that a decentralized and competitive educational marketplace would contribute to greater student achievement or other viable outcomes seemed far removed from actual student performance and the individual programs within each school.

Furthermore, in light of the number of spaces available in the additional schools, a reasonable person might question the utility of the voucher plan which would have cost in excess of five million dollars, while making available only 65 new student spaces, all of which were located in the two private church-related schools.

The inclusion of nonpublic schools was necessary, but not in and of itself, adequate, to provide a competitive, diverse educational milieu. Instead, since the nonpublic schools were both church-related, they served as a blatant reminder that the entire program could be scuttled because of the challenge to the principle of the separation of church and state.

While under other circumstances the child benefit or the school benefit argument might be applicable, the immediate appearance here would have been to substantially support the parochial schools to an extent sufficiently great to suggest that the benefit was indeed only realized by those families sending their children to parochial school. One hundred percent of parochial school tuition costs would have been absorbed by the public, but only ten percent of the spaces in those schools would have been made available to new students.
Despite many ambiguities, the enabling legislation clearly states that the intent of a demonstration scholarship program is to "aid students and shall not be used to support or to benefit any particular schools." (Section 10-239a).

Because of the existing open enrollment policy, East Hartford has the potential to implement, independent of the federal and state governments, at least a feasible simulation of a competitive educational system composed of a variety of programs. Indeed 22 of 24 schools in the community would be available. In fact, the approval of the alternative school concept and the recognition of individual student needs can be effectively managed by the Superintendent of Schools in a modified form of the voucher plan which would remove the uncertainties, assuage the public reservations and accommodate the need for centralized direction.

Perhaps it was this realization which prompted many of the townspeople to reject a voucher plan which threatened (a) a court suit, (b) to divert already limited local funds to nonpublic schools (after the termination of federal support), and (c) to upset the social organization of the schools because of continued uncertainty.

With the defeat in East Hartford the prospects for an expanded voucher demonstration dimmed considerably and the federal interest is now being reexamined by the National Institute of Education.
INTRODUCTION

Without the inclusion of parochial and private schools, the proposed voucher plan would add little to the existing open enrollment policy in East Hartford or to the structure of education generally. The voucher concept is admittedly controversial, as are many social experiments, and the educational benefits and long-range implications are highly speculative at this time. The impact of the plan on the nature of public education as we know it, and its potential ramifications for nonpublic schools, in the State of Connecticut and elsewhere, is of dramatic importance.

At the fore in any discussion of education vouchers is the desirability and the constitutionality of providing nonpublic schools with direct access to tax sources for a large part, or all, of their financial support. Because many of the most ardent supporters of the voucher idea are representatives of the Catholic, church-related programs, which account for ninety percent of the six million students now enrolled in private schools, the decision usually focuses on whether or not
the principle of the separation of church and state is jeopardized and to what extent education would be removed from strictly public control and dominance.

Furthermore, since the preponderance of the non-sectarian private secondary schools charge a tuition larger than what they could hope to receive as voucher participants (See Appendix VI), many would not be able or would not desire to associate themselves with the plan. Accordingly, they have not demonstrated an organized interest in the voucher idea. Nor have elementary level schools that would appear to be potential beneficiaries of a voucher plan, chosen to organize support for the concept - either nationally or in localities that have studied the feasibility of a voucher plan. The essence of the debate, then, unquestionably focuses on the inclusion of church-related schools in the voucher demonstration.

The following topical divisions provide convenient departures for critical appraisal. The brief historical outlines are accompanied throughout with comment.

SECULARISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

The evolution of religious liberty in the United States followed both the arduous path of justice and the path of pragmatism. The burgeoning diversity of an essentially Protestant country eventually made support of any single church politically difficult. The separation of financial support of the church from state powers was the final step which recognized that religious and political harmony depended on a mutual disinterest in each other's affairs. Nevertheless there has been a
continuing tendency, most evident on the part of dominant religious interests, to influence state policy or the distribution of state resources. Many jurists believe that the constitutional guarantees of the separation of church and state have suffered under court interpretations which have subject the intent of the First Amendment to constant re-evaluation. This vacillation has resulted in the current uncertainty regarding the matter of financial aid and services provided by the state to individual church-related educational programs.

Despite the legal separation of the civil and ecclesiastical realms, the nation has not been totally free of religious strife. It is important to note that Catholic and Jewish persecution was, at various times, widespread and often most volatile over issues involving public education. For example in Philadelphia in 1844, Thayer reports, "Catholic schools were burned by an irate mob in answer to a Catholic Bishop's suggestion that public schools exempt Catholic children from the necessity of reading from the Protestant version of the Bible."

A. THE DUAL SYSTEM

Though many school-based religious ceremonies were practiced by a homogeneous Protestant population, religious instruction was outlawed almost everywhere by the twentieth century. This was no consolation, however, to a growing Catholic population offended by the pervasive Protestant tone of the public schools. In response, the American Catholic Church began an ambitious program to build church-related schools in each parish and to have "every Catholic child in a Catholic
school", a goal not quite successful, but a symbol of the religious purposes served by formal education and of the perceived differences between the public and parochial schools.

This dual system - the public schools becoming more secular, removing religious instruction, ceremony and prayer from its program, and the parochial schools, serving the needs of Catholic parents - remained unthreatened until the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the right of nonpublic schools to provide an equivalent program of instruction as fulfillment of the state's interest in education. This case, Pierce vs. The Society of Sisters (1925), guaranteed private and parochial schools their right to exist.

It has been decided by the court that the state has a right to demand that children receive certain training, but it must provide the means to attain that training and allow parents to avail themselves of an equivalent alternative. One's right to choose a nonpublic education is not accompanied by an attendant right to financial support from the state. In the case of church-related schools, state financial support would be tantamount to inviting sectarian interests into an educational process which has consistently removed such interests from its program, and to allow public resources to be used for essentially private ends. Whatever public benefits are thought to accrue from privately sponsored education, they would not be the result of the private schools' primary concern.

B. PURSUIT OF PUBLIC AID TO CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS

Since the decision in Pierce vs. The Society of Sisters,
nonpublic schools in many states have merely been thought of as altering the means to attaining basically public ends. The very strong religious tradition in the United States has contributed to the recognition by some authorities that religious schools should be eligible for some state support, since they are, according to these authorities, performing a state function. This thinking has led to the creation of many formulas which ultimately result in the contribution of tax revenues to nonpublic schools.

The first court case involving state support to church-related schools, Cochran vs. Louisiana State Board of Education (1930), laid the groundwork of the so-called "child benefit" theory. In this case, the State of Louisiana was allowed to continue a textbook loan program to nonpublic schools, since, according to the court, children benefited and not the religious schools. The desire, particularly by church-related schools, to share in tax revenues has consistently been based on their "undeniable" contribution to education. This desire for state financial support has been accompanied by political pressure from their patrons. Many parents of parochial school students claim they are subject to "double taxation" - having to pay taxes for the support of the public schools and tuition for their children's private schools. In addition, they charge that the right to send their children to private schools is an empty right if they do not have the financial resources and do not receive aid from the state.

If double taxation is an issue at all, it seems to
ignore the fact that tuition paid to a private school is, according to Thayer (p. 435), "an assessment which one assumes voluntarily by virtue of his identification with a cause he individually deems worthy and essential."

Handlin concurs, "The unexpressed but assumed promise of the Pierce decision was that the private school had no financial ties to the state. The rights of the Society of Sisters were a condition of the organization's willingness to assume the burden of maintaining its own institution."

Arons (1976, p. 99) supporting parochial school parents' claim to financial support, looks at the issue from a different perspective. He says that a First Amendment reading of the Pierce decision could establish a parent's right to public support for private education. According to Arons, there are three implications of a First Amendment reading, "First, a state's school financing system may not condition the provision of free education upon the sacrifice of First Amendment rights. Second, a state may not, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, permit educational choice for affluent parents while inhibiting it for poor parents. Third, state regulation of private schools may not substantially affect value inculcation within them unless there is a compelling state justification for doing so."

However, Arons' interpretation would effectively deny the state's powers over education guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In addition, one's religious freedom hardly seems infringed simply because
specific sects remain unsponsored during school hours.

The ultimate result of state support for nonpublic schools is the proliferation of a multitude of schools, each promoting religious, social, racial, political or economic interests. As desirable as it might seem to support all interests, limited resources and philosophical divisions preclude universal funding. Selected funding would immediately invoke the latent specter of state censorship and could interfere with individual freedom of expression in general and religious freedom in particular. No matter how noble, aid or support to one or a few private interests, would be divisive in its impact and threatening to the unaided and to those interests without a political power base watchful of the distribution of state resources.

Furthermore, the integrity of individual programs could be jeopardized after the invitation for state support had been accepted and the process of dependence initiated. According to Handlin, "Either each man would be left to find what services he himself could afford with the poor dependent upon some form of charity; or the state would assume or delegate complete control of any or all services."

In view of this nation's cultural diversity and pluralism, a state neutrality in regard to nonpublic schools would seem to be the wisest course of action.

C. TOWARD VOUCHERS

Until passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, federal statutes specifically prohibited aid to
any institution of sectarian or ecclesiastical control. Since this act, which permitted a limited financial relationship with nonpublic institutions, many programs and a growing number of individuals have become reliant on the mutually satisfying dependence between church sponsored programs (e.g., ghetto daycare centers) and state support.

The President's Commission on School Finance has recognized the utility of nonpublic agencies providing educational services and wants to extend the now limited relationship to establish an irrevocable partnership "on the grounds that educational appropriations are public welfare benefits which should not be restricted by religious conditions." Such an alliance could well result in the support of sectarian programs unable to survive by their ideological appeal or the commitment of their patrons.

Using the child benefit theory as the necessary justification, many programs and services routinely provided to public school children are now offered to children in sectarian schools at public expense. To what extent the services are just aids-in-kind or represent substantial and vital support is the subject of much debate.

Education vouchers represent the final step in the evolution of state aid to nonpublic schools, including, in some programs, payment to church-related schools of the total voucher dollars without a reduction in consideration of those activities of a purely sectarian nature.

D. THE CHILD BENEFIT THEORY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR VOUCHERS

The child benefit theory was cited most forcefully by
the Supreme Court when it handed down its decision in Everson
vs. School Board of Education (1947). Speaking for the Court,
Justice Black supported New Jersey's plan to provide public
transportation to parochial school children, "The establish-
ment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: neither the state nor the federal government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or to practice religion. Neither a state nor the federal
government can openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of separation
between church and state.'"

"This court has said that parents may, in the dis-
charge of their duty under state compulsory attendance laws,
send their children to a religious rather than a public school
if the school meets the secular educational requirements
which the state has the power to impose. It appears that these
parochial schools meet New Jersey's requirements. The state
contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."

In opposition, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter seemed more concerned with the implications for religious freedom than support per se, "(Religious freedom) was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religions' hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or the public purse."

At about the same time that the decision was delivered, the Catholic Bishops of America, appearing before the House Sub-Committee on Education and Labor, appealed for federal assistance and to replace the "Wall of Separation" between church and state with one of "Friendly Cooperation; one that assures to all young people, without discrimination, the right to benefit from those measures, grants or aids, which are manifestly designed for the health, safety, and welfare of American youth, irrespective of the school attended."

This was a landmark in the modern effort to increase federal aid to education and to secure a share for the parochial schools. Rather than suggest that private and parochial schools had a right to exist and an obligation to provide an adequate education at a cost to be paid by those who participated,
the schools began their campaign for funds on the basis of their service to the public and their right to exist, a right which they felt entitled them to public financial assistance - without public regulation.

The extension of state support to all nonpublic schools is justified, according to Whelan (pp. 16-18), on several grounds beyond the child benefit theory: Government has a basic interest in maintaining and improving the quality of education; it has a basic obligation to be neutral; it must recognize the rights of parents over their children; the nonpublic schools are the only viable alternative for parents, and; the only way to restore the vitality of the public schools is to force them to compete with nonpublic schools.

Viewing the relationship between education and religion in sectarian schools as an innocent, charitable tie, is to view the church itself as having less of an appeal, less of an interest in the affairs of state, less of an influence on society than is perhaps wise or justified. Justice Brennan in School District of Abington Township vs. Schempp (School Prayer), warned of the dangers of interdependence, "When we seek to apply the First Amendment to religious practices of today we should ask ourselves not how Madison and Jefferson would have viewed them under conditions peculiar to their day, but whether or not they threaten those consequences which the framers dearly feared, whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent."
The existence of religious harmony in America and the fact that serious and prolonged religious strife has been avoided, is as attributable to the devotion to the separation of church and state as to any characteristic of our way of life. Dissenting in Everson, Justice Rutledge reminded the Court that, "The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state, for when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting."

"Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or otherwise, brings the quest for more. It brings too, the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. . . That is precisely the history of societies which have had an established religion and dissident groups."

Further, the argument that free public transportation for parochial school students is merely a "child benefit" seems oversimplified and in violation of constitutional law. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson said, "The State cannot maintain a church and it can no more tax its citizens to furnish free carriage to those who attend a church. The prohibition against the establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a subsidy, bonus or reimbursement of expense to individuals for receiving religious instruction. . . ."

The child benefit theory is often used as a diversion from the fundamental issue of the separation of church and state.

Those who are attempting to develop influential
financial ties to the civil authority seem to veil the nature of parochial education, its inherent influence over its patrons and the divisiveness which could result from sectarian segregation. Advocates portray church-related schools as victims of a Godless, anti-religious and, for some, a vindictive state bureaucracy. While these efforts to subvert church and state separation have been unsuccessful to date, the future is uncertain.

THE SUPREME COURT SINCE EVERSON: NEW TESTS FOR VALIDITY

The Supreme Court has not handed down an interpretation which could be indisputably applied to each of a multitude of attempts to aid parochial schools; accordingly the legality of the Parents' Choice Project in East Hartford and other extended voucher plans has yet to be decided.

Perhaps the Supreme Court case most appropriate to the Connecticut experience is Committee for Public Education vs. Nyquist (1973) which declared that income tax relief (tuition grants) to parents of nonpublic school children were unconstitutional. According to the Court, "We do not agree... that tuition grants are an analogous endeavor to provide comparable benefits to all parents of school children whether enrolled in public or nonpublic schools. The grants to parents of private school children are given in addition to the right that they have to send their children to public schools totally at state expense and in any event, the argument proves too much for it would also provide a basis for approving through tuition grants the complete subsidization of all..."
religious schools on the ground that such action is necessary if the state is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such schools -- a result wholly at variance with the establishment clause."

Since vouchers in the hands of students in the public schools simply become registration cards, no matter how they are used, the only shift of tax money is from the public school account to an individual nonpublic school (in the case of East Hartford, two parochial schools) which assumes the unavoidable appearance of being a form of tuition relief, particularly since schools must accept the voucher as full payment naturally defraying all costs to parents.

A brief review of the Court's decisions since Everson reveals that several new tests have been developed to ascertain whether or not a law does represent a violation of the principle of separation of church and state.

First, does the plan (or statute) have (a) a secular purpose? (b) a secular effect? or (c) does it aid or inhibit religion? (Board of Education vs. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 1968)

Second, does the relationship between the civil and ecclesiastical agencies represent entanglement between them in regard to the affairs of either, or of both, by one or the other? (Walz vs. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 1970)

Third, is there a conflict of function whereby civil and/or ecclesiastical purposes are not clearly delineated and separate? (Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 398 U.S. 569, 570, 1971)

Fourth, are religious means used to serve government
ends where secular means would suffice? (School District vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 1963)

While it is always hazardous to anticipate the court's actions regarding any specific case before it, there seems to be some very convincing evidence to suggest that an extended voucher plan as defined for use by East Hartford and as applied under the conditions extant there, would indeed be unconstitutional. Some assistance to church-related programs has been allowed because the school is functioning in a manner responsive to a state interest, in accordance with welfare and police powers or because of the incidental nature of the program. Only small forms of aid have been held constitutional, McCann and Areen (p. 118), explain that, "Indirect aid is apparently acceptable if the direct impact is permissible. Otherwise, one faces the problem that any government service or tax reduction frees private funds which might or might not be devoted to religious activity."

When, however, as in East Hartford, large scale direct funding involves the very existence of the school, the matter clearly becomes a question of the separation of church and state. Justice Powell may have taken a step closer to deciding the eligibility of parochial schools when he attempted to clarify the principle of "primary effect". According to Powell, "Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when
it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting."

The voucher plan in East Hartford seems to demonstrate the "primary effect" of aid to parochial schools.

THE INSEPARABILITY OF RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS

Because parochial schools exist to further religious ends through religious instruction, ceremony, observances, modeling, and the tendency to self-select only those students who share a similar interest in a common religious orientation, it is evident that education in parochial schools serves religious purposes. According to a study conducted in Notre Dame University, 60.5 percent of Catholic parochial school students felt that the main purpose of their schools was to promote religion and morality. While parochial schools are a legitimate function of the Catholic Church and serve as a legal fulfillment of parents' obligation to provide an education to their children, support of those programs should remain the duty inherent in the personal choice made by like-minded and committed individuals who accept the financial obligation. To do otherwise would be to impose their will on a public which, over the years, has maintained a state neutrality concerning specific religious support and which values its secular education.

It is precisely the nature of the sectarian schools which prevents their constitutional participation in the voucher plan: first, being avowedly sectarian removes the school from the competitive marketplace; realistically, the appeal to those
families of other religious persuasions is negligible. Second, parochial schools are allowed to continue certain practices found unconstitutional in the public school setting, because they do not share in public funds and have obligations to a limited number of subscribers who voluntarily participate. Bible reading and prayer recitation for example, are allowed in parochial schools. With the initiation of substantial public financial support, the right to remain outside of public control and regulation might be jeopardized, requiring concessions on the part of parochial schools which would limit the strength of their appeal to those they have been designed to serve.

Third, entanglement between civil and ecclesiastical authorities would be unavoidable in the dispensation, supervision and accountability of voucher funds. No effort to guarantee the full autonomy of the sectarian schools, that is, to avoid entanglement, could be upheld since the public authority (the board of education) has the legal responsibility to account for all public funds.

One approach to accommodate church-related schools is to honor discount vouchers which recognizes the religious functions of church-related schools but also allows them support for their secular activities. However, the idea that partial funding can be arranged to satisfy the sectarian schools' assessment of their share of activities which represent discrete secular services is naive. Shuster (p. 154) has described the dilemma facing Catholic educators who want very much to maintain the integrity of their programs while
obtaining public funds to offset their nationwide financial crisis, "Many spokesmen for Catholic education were wont to argue that religion must 'permeate' every subject in the course of study. . . . If one was urging Catholic parents to send their children to a Catholic school, the 'permeation' argument was effective, but when there was a question of federal aid, the rules and perceptions were all on the side of a strict line of demarcation between the sacred and the secular."

To many people, the relief of the financial crisis among church-related schools was more important and certainly more pressing than determining the constitutionality of the resultant relationship between the church and the state. The President's Commission on School Finance felt that aid to parochial schools was necessary to avoid their closure and the subsequent transferral of large numbers of students to an already overcrowded public school system. Vouchers seemed to be one acceptable way to provide the necessary relief.

Political pressure was being applied, particularly from the cities where most church affiliated, and financially pressured, schools were concentrated. But, according to the Commission, "If government simply responds to predominating political pressures when it considers aid to nonpublic schools, it may provide assistance of whatever form or magnitude, that simply encourages the current diminishment of educational diversity", one of the very assets attributed to the inclusion of nonpublic schools. Furthermore, in reviewing the legal ramifications of providing the aid necessary, which the
Commission supported, McElroy, dissenting, said, "The fact is that the Commission, after considering the best legal advice it could recruit, could not find any proposal for a substantive form of assistance to nonpublic schools which appeared both practical and a probable winner of judicial challenge."

REGULATION

The proposed voucher plan in East Hartford reflected an awareness of the potential entanglement between civil and ecclesiastical authorities on two grounds: (1) the distribution and accounting of funds, and (2) certification and review of petitions to qualify as voucher participants. The proposal clearly discouraged any durable relationship between the Education Voucher Authority and the parochial schools. This policy of deliberate non-regulation to avoid a posture of entanglement raises questions of a moral and legal nature. Paradoxically, the interest of the federal and state bureaucracies in regard to both money and program, inevitably exacerbated by nonpublic school inclusion in the plan, would lead to entanglement.

Whereas both interest and non-interest seem inappropriate, regulation seems unavoidable. With reference to Wickard vs. Filburn, Justice Jackson dissenting in Everson pointed out the necessary and inevitable advent of regulation, "If the state may aid these religious schools it may therefore regulate them. . .It is hardly lack of due process for the government to regulate that which it subsidizes." The roots of regulation are in the enabling legislation itself, beginning
with a checklist of conditions enumerated in Section 10-239e and others (See Appendix I) which must be met before inclusion of nonpublic schools in the voucher demonstration. McCann and Areen (p. 125), scanning the relationship between the state and nonpublic schools, have found that, "Indeed, the legal precedent for state control of nonpublic schools is so clear that the real danger is not lack of regulation but over-zealous regulation. The end result could be to turn nonpublic schools into carbon copies of the most restricted public schools unless freedom for diversity and from unnecessary regulation is carefully protected."

The implications of regulation have not escaped the National Council of Christians and Jews, which issued a statement after the school prayer cases (1962) supporting the court decision and suggesting that while church-state involvement might seem quite appealing and provide immediate economic benefits to needy schools, the long-run potential for a continued and deepening relationship, possibly developing unwanted and unintended consequences detrimental to religious freedom, was an everpresent consideration. "The power of the state to coerce Bible reading and corporate prayer in public places is only a step removed from the state's power to prohibit Bible reading and corporate prayer in all areas of common life. The corollary is that we cannot shatter the power of the state to destroy religion without renouncing the power of the state to aid the propagation of religion. . . ."

"The decision challenges parents and leaders to
shape and strengthen spiritual commitment by reliance on voluntary means and to resist the temptation to rely on governmental institutions to create religious conviction. It reminds parents and religious leaders that the shaping of religious conviction is their responsibility, not the government's."

While it is conceivable that a financial relationship would not involve either government or religion interfering in the affairs of the other; and while it is conceivable that the relationship would be temporary; and while it is conceivable that sectarian rivalries and private purposes would not overwhelm the polity, there is no evidence to support these eventualities.

PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT: LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES

East Hartford's emphasis on encouraging "all" non-public schools to participate in the voucher plan seems hypocritical in view of the fact that the only other existing schools are two parochial schools. While this may have been plausible if private nonsectarian schools existed or were ready to open as voucher schools, under these circumstances it did not serve well to allay suspicions that only parochial schools would benefit.

Furthermore it seems unlikely that private nonsectarian school participation would ever become a reality. According to the Council for American Private Education, which studied the feasibility of establishing a private school in East Hartford, the costs would be prohibitive, greater than the voucher value,
if it were to be an attractive alternative. Perhaps the most
telling fact, according to CAPE is "the lack of a natural
interest" in creating a private school in East Hartford. This
point will be developed later in regard to the ostensible
good of a voucher system creating a competitive marketplace of
educational services. Suffice it to say that the hollow appeal
to nonpublic schools is in effect only an appeal to the
existing church-related schools to join the program. Should
conditions change and private schools be created in East
Hartford, additional unanswered questions will be raised as to
whether the voucher authority would eventually have to recognize
all applicants that meet statutory requirements and whether
additional requirements, if made, would apply equally to all
voucher schools. Non-regulation also presents difficulties.
First, as with parochial schools, the dual classification of
"public" and "private" would become inappropriate since both
systems would survive as recipients of aid from the same public
source. This would place the "public" schools at a disadvantage
because of more restrictions on their activities than in the
"private" schools. Second, public sponsorship of "private"
authority would condone discriminatory practices (e.g., entrance
requirements) and allow diversions from constitutional respon-
sibilities such as required of "public" schools (e.g., academic
freedom). La Noue (p. 138) points out that potential segregation
along racial and religious lines may be a perpetual problem
because, "The alternatives available to a private school that
wanted to restrict its enrollment are almost limitless, and
perhaps no voucher system can fully cope with them."

What is perhaps unknowable at this time is the latent interest that could be sparked among some profiteers (or the well meaning but over-anxious or the incompetent) to exploit the very loose statutory requirements for establishing a private school - a potential malady made worse by a pledge of non-involvement by the present "public" school administration and the school board.

**EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER AUTHORITY (EVA)**

The EVA, somewhat analogous to the present school board, would, under the voucher plan, act as a financial broker for the network of participating schools. Its role in determining school policy would be diminished as individual "public" schools increase their program autonomy. The EVA would, however, approve applications from nonpublic schools for participation in the plan.

According to the designers of the voucher plan in East Hartford, the EVA would have merely served as a conduit for education funds to parents, who would then take the initiative in selecting the appropriate public or private school for their children and therefore exercise a measure of control over the educational process.

Too often, it seems parent power (to be discussed in more detail later) is used as a rationale, for providing financial relief to the parents of nonpublic school children. The idea that parents deserve a larger role in educational
policy is justifiable but not an end-result of a voucher plan that simply puts money in the hands of parents who, as in the case in East Hartford, may either choose to spend their vouchers in the two parochial schools or return the money to the public treasury.

According to voucher proponents, parents are entitled to the vouchers on the same basis as other monies are distributed by the federal government to individuals for personal use. They point to the G.I. Bill, Social Security and Welfare payments as the precedents for paying parents an allowance for the education of their children. If church-related schools are chosen, it is done, the proponents say, as a consequence of the parents' free will and does not implicate government in the church-state morass. According to the Center for the Study of Public Policy (p. 225), the more options available to parents and, "The greater the intermediate individual discretion, the greater the likelihood of avoiding an unconstitutional connection between the government and the private institution."

But the CSPP reminds us (p. 229) that, "The argument that vouchers are acceptable because they do not in themselves aid churches, but only enable private individuals to do so if they wish, is nonetheless unlikely to persuade the courts unless freedom of choice exists in fact as well as in theory."

Yet, there are other fundamental differences between education vouchers and other forms of funds distributed by the government to individuals. La Noue (p. 136) demonstrates that,
"The analogy is not completely accurate, since, unlike most government programs, the beneficiaries in these programs have established their individual claim by prior service (G.I. Bill) or by prepayment of insurance premiums (Social Security). The money thus 'belongs' to them and they can spend it without constitutional restrictions."

Furthermore, the state's undeniable interest in the education of juveniles and the passage of compulsory attendance laws mandates participation in a definite program of studies. While alternative delivery systems may exist, they must, though serving other ends, minimally fulfill the state's education requirements. The G.I. Bill is awarded for prior service, is a form of recognition, optional to recipients, is available to adults for use by adults, cannot be identified as a primary source of any one school's or set of schools' financial requirements, and, in most cases, cannot practicably cover the entire cost of one's education.

The voucher, on the other hand, is given directly to schools, would represent the total contribution for all services, educational and otherwise, is geographically limited, does not expand individual accessibility to schools, does not expand individual prerogatives from that which existed prior to its issuance and places significant restrictions on its use by individuals and schools.

In some respects, the voucher seems to be a reward to some parents - an incentive for others - for using church-related schools as the vehicle for their children's education.
This reward would be realistically unavailable to other than Roman Catholic parents despite invitations from the parochial schools with the proviso that the applicants meet other entrance requirements which, as private schools, they are allowed to impose.

VOUCHERS: ROUTE TO DIVERSITY

As a justification for aiding parochial schools, the President's Commission on School Finance said that, "they (church-related schools) provide, diversity, choice and healthy competition to traditional public education." (Final Report p. 53). In another section of their report, the Commission said that, "Most of the (parochial) schools have made sweeping concessions to the public school modus operandi, partly in an effort (possibly misguided) to qualify for public support. It seems likely, then, that American education, public and nonpublic, is now characterized by less (emphasis theirs) diversity than at virtually any other point in its history."

In agreement, the Superintendent of Schools for the Archdiocese of Spokane laments that private schools have not, in this century, taken educational leadership in innovation (Saxe, p. 28). Contradicting the President's Commission on School Finance, private schools, being unregulated and autonomous, show a surprising lack of innovation and demonstrate few working alternative models of education.

If diversity is to be accomplished, organizational initiative would seem to be the most important element: the issuance of vouchers alone cannot guarantee diversity in fact
as well as in theory. Considering the costs involved and the apparent beneficiaries, vouchers do not seem to be the most efficient method of creating or maintaining a system of diverse educational services.

FURTHER LEGAL QUESTIONS

--- The issuance of vouchers may threaten a series of court established substantive and procedural principles which safeguard individuals and the public educational process. The requirements of non-discrimination, academic freedom, equality of opportunity and public accountability have not been extended to nonpublic schools. Their inclusion in a voucher plan often rests, as in Connecticut, on an agreement to meet established standards in some of these areas. To what extent would nonpublic schools be allowed to function outside of these procedures?

--- How would student suspension and expulsion practices be determined? Will the EVA establish uniform practices? Or will that be a function of the autonomous public and private schools?

--- Will the EVA be an extension of the state and/or the local board? Or an independent authority?

--- How will the state and local laws and procedures regarding teachers, school facilities, program, professional associations, accrediting boards and other facets of the public education program be changed by the inclusion of nonpublic schools? How will the private schools be affected? How much control will the state legislature have over these matters?
To what extent will they become altered through negotiation, custom, court interpretation or local agreement concerning their applicability, and/or their future status?

--- Will nonpublic participation change the legal status regarding the control of private schools? Would private schools participating in a voucher program become quasi-public and subject to a new set of requirements, procedures or expectations which are expressed, implied or otherwise a consequence of their relationship to the EVA?

--- Would a dual system reliant on a single funding agency be allowed to function with differing guidelines and regulations?

--- How will the state's interest in, and responsibility to supervise, the disbursement of voucher funds and the education of participating students be satisfied under a dual school system? How can the state's interest be adequately safeguarded if it must be responsible for avoiding the emergence of regulatory interference and entanglement with church-related voucher schools? Can the state or local boards limit or divest themselves of all, or a portion of, their supervisory responsibilities?

Furthermore, the fractionalization of education might lead to questions of one's right to the equal protection of the laws. The widespread availability of the best educational services the public can provide has been a valuable, durable expectation of each parent. Should limited public money be spent on private programs, this expectation would be sacrificed.
McCann and Areen state (p. 114), "Past case decisions firmly hold that government may not avoid providing citizens with the equal protection of the laws by conducting essentially public functions behind an artificial veil of 'private' sponsorship. Under this policy (known as the state action doctrine) various 'private' organizations have been held subject to the constitutional obligations usually imposed on the state by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."

If indeed this should be the case and constitutional guarantees follow the tax dollar, then would not all voucher schools become one and the same: hence, public? This occurrence would suggest that rather than creating alternatives diversity and parent choice through the dispensation of vouchers, an expanded public system would merely provide economic sustenance to formerly nonpublic and sectarian schools that would be forced by the state to conform with the secular, egalitarian practices of the public schools in order to insure continued financial support. This would, perhaps, be as undesirable to the nonpublic schools as it would be to voucher proponents.
IV
COMPETITION

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In an attempt to justify the creation of a competitive educational system, the original voucher proposal and many succeeding feasibility studies reach back to Adam Smith for historical roots and cite conservative economist Milton Friedman as an example of modern support. Adam Smith would have had the government give parents the money to pay for their children's teachers; Friedman would have an unregulated marketplace of educational services. The proposal by the Center for the Study of Public Policy, as it would have applied to East Hartford, was designed as a regulated model which can build-in safeguards or special conditions as required. Each voucher plan depends on creating a competitive environment where programs will succeed or fail, contract or change according to consumer demand.

The Superintendent of the East Hartford Public Schools, as quoted in the "Waterbury American" (April 28, 1976), advocated competition, "I say pull out the legal props now supporting public schools, tell them to survive in competition
with alternative schools and the children will be better served." This raises many questions: What are the legal props? Can the children be better served without developing competitive schools? What is it about competition that will improve the schools? Is management unable to initiate changes it considers necessary to better serve the children? Can the administrators, convinced that competition is the answer to a managerial impasse or a deficiency in the system, identify the specific mechanisms necessary to improve the schools, mechanisms which could be developed in a fashion not requiring competition per se? How will learning or other specific educational outcomes be affected? In what specific ways will the children be better served?

The underlying assumptions of the proposal suggest that, (1) there were severe problems the administration was unable to handle because of the "legal props" in the current non-competitive environment; (2) parents were dissatisfied with school performance, responsiveness, and/or program, or with their child's achievement; (3) the competitive model would behave in a fashion described by theory and serve as a remedy to a perceived need; (4) the voucher model was the most appropriate of several possible approaches to improving education and better serve the children; (5) private alternatives can provide better education and stimulate a competitive market; (6) parents were entitled to make the choice of program for their children, would keep informed, and would be active in school affairs.

Proponents claim that a competitive marketplace
insures responsiveness to the public's needs, that is shifts educational policy-making from a school board and central administrative bureaucracy - which is apparently out of touch with the public's educational needs - to the individual school which is influenced in a significant way by the public it serves. The rationale for this claim originates from several sources and has a variety of implications: First, it is a convenient way to relieve the pressure from assorted parental and interest groups' demands on the central administration. Second, it relieves any single office or administrator from making many evaluative decisions about programs or personnel. Third, it suggests the appearance of flexibility, responsiveness, diversity and the ability to satisfy any need identified by a parent, or, through a tyranny of the majority - so-called consumer power - demonstrate the lack of interest on the general public's part, which may then legitimately prevent the satisfaction of individual or minority needs. Fourth, it suggests that the organization will equalize opportunity and facilities by giving each parent the same claim to any program or facility regardless of residence or financial position. Fifth, many communities have witnessed the development of interest groups in education which claim that traditional local governance of the schools is elitist and unresponsive. They emphasize the importance of parent control, which, they claim, is mistakenly thought to be built into the functions of the school board. The ultimate symbol of parent control is the voucher; it can be used as a direct and immediate tool to indicate satisfaction
or dissatisfaction, and perhaps most importantly, it is a tool which could make each program responsive as it competes for vouchers. Sixth, the demand for accountability is effectively rendered a moot issue, becoming a parent responsibility, since parents are forced to judge and participate in the system.

The fear of administrator and teacher is that the process as an evaluative measure would be extremely unreliable, haphazard and therefore personally upsetting and professionally threatening.

Throughout the exploration of the voucher feasibility there was a general feeling among the planners that things would get better and that they certainly would not get any worse. According to the Center for the Study of Public Policy (1970, p. 5), "There is no evidence that 'experts' really know any more than parents about the likely effects of specific schools on specific children. There is no consensus about what causes what in education, much less any scientific evidence to back a consensus. This makes it hard to argue that the government should protect children from their parents' naivete by denying the parents' choice. . . ."

It would certainly be wrong to assume that a professional educator's assessment of educational needs and his matching them to appropriate resources or delivery systems would somehow be less reliable than an informed observer or parent. But even if the Center was correct, increasing the uncertainty of educational outcomes does not appear a wise solution to what amounts to a very serious situation. Much more than a voucher plan would
have to be considered, especially if vouchers mean that the choice of educational programs would be based on little more than a hunch or whim. The Center's conjecture seems a rather weak basis for a multi-million dollar voucher investment. Furthermore, the voucher idea does not seem supported by the history of laissez faire capitalism (competition) and the philosophy of caveat emptor, particularly in the realm of public service. In fact, a strong case could be made for just the opposite, that public monopolies are created because of the absence of private interest in a community service or because entrepreneurs cannot be attracted without governmental subsidy, particularly since they would be unable to select their markets and sufficiently manipulate those variables which contribute to increasing profits and decreasing costs.

When the feasibility study was completed in 1974, Wise, in an article in the "Hartford Times", agreed with Friedman that the public school system has the same problem as the post office, "It's a public monopoly which means it is inefficient and costly, and not responsive to the wishes of its customers. What it needs is the fresh air of competition." This sentiment has prevailed among proponents who unjustifiably credit the private sector with the interest in, and ability to provide, competing profit-making educational programs.

An examination of other privately managed public services suggests inevitable failure, resulting in government regulation at the very least and ownership at the most. Bus-lines, railroads, aircraft companies, utilities, etc., have
all required government intervention in one form or another. Which model of private enterprise would be used to create a profitable educational system that could efficiently and equitably accommodate every school-age child? There are no examples.

Recognizing the state's legitimate interest in education and the legal requirements that the school system guarantee constitutional rights and conform to political/social, secular, egalitarian values, voucher proponents in East Hartford and elsewhere concluded that the regulated model is really the only practical plan. It is the only one seriously considered by the National Institute of Education. Even Adam Smith recognized that "some attention of government is necessary in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of people."

Since competition will not necessarily expand the educational market, the concept may not, in a utilitarian sense, contribute to reforms in education but may, as Arons (p. 91) fears, "simply reinforce the only two options most families have at present - the established public monolith or the Catholic school system." In East Hartford, the choice was even more limited since the two parochial schools are both middle schools, leaving students and parents no choice at the elementary or secondary levels aside from the existing public schools. No private capability exists and any potential entrepreneur would be faced with the limited five-year duration of the experiment, after which voucher funds would be
subject to local approval - even more uncertain than current federal promises of support.

For the voucher to truly demonstrate its potential, it should be, according to CSPP, in a heterogeneous area with existing alternatives. This was not the case in East Hartford and, in fact, only a handful of locations in Connecticut would suffice. Upon further examination, no location seems particularly promising, since most private alternatives to the public schools (if there are any) charge tuitions which would be higher than the voucher value. This would leave only parochial schools as likely participants but even their eligibility is questionable. It should be noted that virtually every experiment in performance contracting has failed, suggesting that private enterprise would probably not be anxious to enter the marketplace of direct educational services or would not be able to provide any strong competitive alternative. La Noue (p. 139) points out that the hoped for results of better education is doubtful still. He says, "there is no research which shows that public schools are better in cities where the greatest competition with private schools exists."

Another purpose of the voucher plan is to equalize educational opportunity. Besides the apparent contradiction, since competition presupposes an appeal to advantage, equalizing educational opportunity, even in a regulated voucher demonstration, is tenuous if at all possible. Ginzberg (p. 106) warns that, "... economists have long recognized that effective competition presupposes some approximation to equality of
bargaining power. And that is missing in the case of the poor and the disadvantaged... It is fatuous to believe that the white community will permit a voucher system to operate so as to remove the barriers that they have laboriously erected to protect themselves and their children from what they consider to be the undesirable behavior patterns of the disadvantaged."

We shall see later that while this may not have posed a problem in East Hartford in relation to the minute black population there and the absence of great economic disparities, the implication is that mechanisms can be devised by any group or neighborhood to protect its own interests. Neighborhood children, for example, would have been guaranteed a seat in their school, thereby limiting the number of real vacancies available to the remainder of the town.

If the plan is not working as expected and, correspondingly, the need grows for increased regulation, the Education Voucher Authority may be forced to develop the same regulatory responsibilities and powers as the board of education. In this case the advantages of the voucher plan are diminished and become ultimately dependent on the EVA, as open enrollment was dependent on the board of education.

The voucher concept has evolved from the freewheeling laissez faire model with its reverence for the Smith and Friedman "fresh air of competition" to the realities of a highly regulated voucher model. Even this proposal seems inappropriate in light of the lack of interest in the demonstration nationally, and the small public turnout at the board of education's hearings.
A persistent and disturbing insecurity was evident among educators concerning the ability of the public schools to identify and meet the educational needs of the community. The ease with which educators blithely bandied about the faith in the competitive marketplace at the expense of their own training and abilities to manage the school system, while slighting the consequences of the experiment, was also disturbing. Creating the competitive system seemed likely to (1) weaken the public schools by inviting private and parochial participation, (2) make facilities planning more difficult because of enrollment uncertainties and the lack of coordinated and continuous needs assessment, (3) create waste through inefficient spending and duplication of effort, (4) disperse public interest and support in a unified public system, (5) disperse central accountability and responsibility, (6) cause a redistribution of state education funding, and perhaps most importantly, (7) have vast consequences on the organization of the schools and the surrounding social system. According to Weiner (p. 195), "Basic changes in the allocation of resources and authority such as those caused by the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, disturb and alter the basic social structure of an organization. Roles, internal interest groups, the status system, beliefs of members of the organization, patterns of participation and dependency, are all affected in such broad organizational changes. Long established procedures which embody past decisions, compromises and commitments, are altered or abolished. Such changes, in turn, alter the career prospects
of individuals, and bring new indices to the fore for the judging of individual and group performance. . . Thus, it seems that exclusive attention to financial incentives provides an inadequate guide to understanding how a school district . . . will adapt, mold and implement a voucher demonstration."

EDUCATION AND COMPETITION

The one aspect most often overlooked in voucher proposals is whether or not education is suited to the market model. For a competitive system to truly exist, both the consumer (parents/children) and the producers (school-level administrators/staff) must have a certain amount of control over supply and demand, and the product itself. In any voucher system, would educators have control over their facilities, personnel, goals, strategies and profit margins? Most important of all, will they have control over the design, quality, distribution, appeal and price of their product? Will the parents have the ability to reject all choices and not purchase educational services? Will they have functional alternatives to choose from and will they be able to exercise their choice at a reasonable cost to them - for example, measured in travel time for their children?

The answer to most of these questions is disappointingly, no. The marketplace would not, in fact, be diverse, flexible or dynamic - requirements of a genuine market are just not present - nor could they be in East Hartford or elsewhere. The situation is aggravated by compulsory education laws and other constraints.
While it is widely recognized that children are different and often require different treatment from their educational environments, few people would consider allowing low quality schools to exist. The differences among schools would, then, of necessity be limited to "educational climate" or identifiable needs which should, of course, be met in all school. Many of the East Hartford Board of Education members understood this and confirmed to the public that "differences do not always mean one program is better and one worse." Competition however, would possibly create an unjustified appearance of differences which would be interpreted as "better or worse".

In an expression of frustration with school performance, Hobson, 1974 Director of the Institute for Quality Education, said that "Education is the only industry in the history of the free enterprise system that holds the consumer - the child - responsible for the quality of the product". The "product" of education is a questionable entity, and is perhaps, a composite of many things, some of which may not be clearly defined. While schools must teach skills which are definable, it has not been clearly established whether the child is "raw-material", "the product", "the client", a "participant" or a combination of these. The situation is much more complex than in the business world, since the child shares the responsibility for what he learns, which depends on a host of variables from attitude and ability to willingness and motivation. Presumably, varying programs would apply varying assumptions about the learner and treat the school-related role of the child
accordingly. Under the circumstances, competition, as such, would be inappropriate.

The concept of product in a competitive arena has never been applied to children's learning per se. Rather, when educational services have competed, the appeal has been focused on peripheral matters - social life, philosophy, convenience, reputation, sports, and facilities. And under the voucher plan the demand for education, buoyed by state attendance requirements and public financial support, would eliminate necessary, vital elements from the competitive formula. According to Wiseman (In Blaugh, p. 360), there are "neighborhood effects" or benefits to the community improperly figured into the voucher model. In addition, "The demand for these services (education) does not reflect their value to the community in any direct way, since those who consume are not themselves called upon to make the sacrifice (of using resources in other ways) that makes that consumption possible." It is because "There are social benefits additional to the benefits obtained by the individual consumer of such services...The value of such services to individuals, even if they were required to pay the market price for them, would not reflect their full value to the community. Consequently, to leave such services simply to provision by the market would result in too little of them being provided." In effect, a free market could, if consumers were allowed not to choose, result in demand being insufficient to sustain a reliable, adequate and quality supply.
In another vein, the educational market is significantly different from other markets because the risk of experimenting with a new product - alternative school - is so much greater to the consumer and to the community that the required incentive for creating requisite demand (as in commerce) may not be present or of adequate strength to make nonpublic or newly created alternatives viable consumer choices.

In addition to the "risk" inherent in alternative programs providing required services or certain end results such as jobs or college admissions, newly created programs may suffer unduly because of a lack of accreditation. The new-product psychology, often exploited in the commercial realm, would not only be less effective in the marketplace of educational services, but may be a violation of the public trust and, irresponsible.

If competition is to become the vehicle for improving educational services, a tremendous duplication of effort would result (from similar competing appeals) and students might be misled or not adequately informed about potentially better services provided elsewhere. But is not the point of educational improvement to serve all who would benefit by creating alternatives to meet individual needs?

If competition would result in a system of less than full disclosure of its activities or methods to protect individual programs, it would be unfair to other students, all of whom are entitled to the best possible education available. Or might the appeal of individual programs be based on one or
a variety of the attributes or values of an educational program, leaving other valuable and perhaps essential elements unmet, and suggest their unimportance or, if required by law, their low priority?

In the final analysis, the idea of responsiveness in a fabricated competitive marketplace is, according to ABT Associates (p.14) unfounded. Says ABT, "The incentive structure in a public service enterprise is not geared to respond to competition" and "competition from the nonpublic sector under the voucher plan would be inconsequential". In East Hartford, competition from new sources would be absent altogether, leaving the marketplace, as it is, consisting of either the public, or, for grades 4-8, the parochial school choices. Is the public-parochial choice available to most parents sufficient to call the voucher environment a competitive free market - particularly since all students must attend one or the other and there is no choice not to buy - the ultimate power in the marketplace?

When the voucher concept approaches an actual application it seems apparent, judging from the East Hartford case, that the marketplace of educational services would be controlled by the public school interests, in at least several ways, by (1) the EVA approving or disapproving new schools (only public school board members would have been on the EVA in East Hartford); (2) establishing the voucher value; (3) virtually ignoring the market entry costs necessarily expended by hopeful competitors who would also be burdened by the five
year limit, making their investment financially unjustifiable to backers; and (4) the existence of public standards for facilities which alternatives might be expected to provide.

Ironically, the real advantage of a competitive system - consumer power - already exists in theory and, in some areas, in fact, without creating additional massive, cumbersome and highly speculative system-wide changes: the school board. East Hartford can, without a voucher plan, insure diversity in the schools to meet existing student needs, and insure accountability and responsiveness to parents.

THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION IN EDUCATION

Some public services simply do not lend themselves to competition. Many programs, such as those for the handicapped, disadvantaged, mentally retarded, gifted, or socially maladjusted would demand revenues in excess of the voucher value and would be provided in a single location to maximize economies of scale. By the same token, there are programs with a limited appeal which would not survive if more than one school were to compete; because of the splintered approach, programs may suffer due to decreased economies of scale. Their failure might falsely be attributed to the program itself instead of to financial inefficiency. If the program is of limited appeal, it may not be allowed to survive, unless it can convince an existing school of its merits and then be adopted. That is, the program would not be implemented despite its appeal to some students. The problem with competition generally is that it would require a school to surpass an
enrollment threshold which may be unrealistic for reasons beyond its control. Because a program may be uneconomical does not mean it has no value to those it serves, particularly if it is the only means of satisfying valid educational program and personal goals.

While schools generally would be required to compete, some could elect sponsorship with other governmental agencies or corporations, removing them from market constraints. Perhaps that would be recognition of their special or unique nature, and that competition would not be a proper or appropriate incentive for improvement. The implication is that there are not better incentives or special interests worth protecting among the bulk of the public schools and that competition would be effective there. This situation gives rise to the prospect that much time would be spent devising ways of not competing and/or attaining funds from other sources. And, according to the Alum Rock demonstration, teachers and administrators are likely to succeed in preventing competition. In this regard they would be the envy of many businessmen. Considering that market size and consumer dependence on available outlets for educational services, this does not seem unlikely, especially since most parents are satisfied locally in East Hartford (90%) and nationally.

Another restriction which effectively limits the marketplace is the requirement that the voucher be accepted as full value for educational services for one year. Since it would prevent the participation of most nonsectarian private schools, the wealthy would be encouraged to continue support
of their schools outside of the marketplace. And, as the voucher plan is virtually non-accessible to private nonsectarian schools (most charge a tuition higher than the market value) it is highly advantageous to parochial schools to join, because their source of funds is almost entirely supported by the church. This benefit to parochial schools is impossible to match in amount or intensity by any independent school without, at the very least, substantial backers, preferably the stature of large corporations.

**AUTONOMY**

According to voucher advocates, autonomy for each school would insure responsiveness. Apparently, the existing system governed by a school board and a professional, full-time central administration would not make the individual schools as responsive as would parents, unversed in the ways of education, the power structure, the distribution of resources and rewards.

Centralized administration often sacrifices flexibility, is slow to act, and is uninformed about particular school conditions, but it can develop valuable horizontal and vertical coordination throughout the system which, ultimately, is the basis for meaningful diversity created in response to need.

The philosophy espoused by the superintendent and voucher proponents suggested that individual schools must control their budget and program and must therefore be given real decision-making authority. The school principal and his staff would then have ultimate responsibility to the school's
Prior to the voucher study in East Hartford, individual schools possessed many of the characteristics of a decentralized system. They could (1) assign students for group and/or individual instruction according to their assessment of need and ability to respond, (2) organize and schedule instructional time within the school day, (3) select and orient new teachers; supervise, evaluate and assign all professional and nonprofessional staff, (4) select curriculum and methods suited to professional needs and abilities for classroom use, (5) assess pupils, communicate and respond to parents, and (6) study, initiate and evaluate new programs, parent-school relationships, educational services and new ways to distribute available resources.

Given these areas of responsibility, the need for further autonomy is questionable. The major difference appears to be financial, but the utility or an economic dimension may not, alone, be the contributing factor which makes autonomy a convincing argument for responsiveness. While program development is perhaps the essential element in autonomy, vouchers are not needed to institute school-based initiative. In fact, the voucher system might cause just the opposite - a standardization of program. If a coordinated effort does not direct the system to satisfy unique needs and prevent duplication, each school, left to its own devices, attempting first to satisfy personal professional objectives and perceived or real community needs, might take the politically safe majoritarian
view of providing what is most likely to succeed. With such an
event, diversity or unpopular programs might be discarded,
overruled or ignored. Unless an attempt is made to insure
diversity (without duplicity), responsiveness will be negligible
or limited to the same satisfied majority that currently exists.
It is conceivable, in fact, that if a central administration,
in the case of a small system such as East Hartford, does not
provide for meaningful minority demands or interests, no one
will. If each school meets prevailing demand only, there may
be insufficient diversity as minority positions are effectively
prevented from uniting across neighborhood lines.

While providing autonomy is a method of localizing
education, it is not dependent on the implementation of a
voucher program or an assurance that it would make the system
more responsive than it is now or make it more responsive to
those that might need it most.

RESPONSIVENESS

An elaborate system of vouchers in a competitive
environment where schools are autonomous is to ensure the
responsiveness of educational services to parental demands and
student needs. Schools that do not adapt to demands contract
to the point of closing, or change their programs. Schools
that are successful expand and prosper. The absolutely
essential element in this formula is the system's ability to
accurately perceive needed changes stemming from demands of
various intensity which are not always clarified in the political
arena in which they are generated. Furthermore, for the system
to be a meaningful representation of theory, the impact must be immediate and complete. Programs must be able to expand or contract in very short periods of time if they are to reflect and respond to the market.

Unfortunately, because schools will have most of their space committed to neighborhood children, their ability to meet demand is purely dependent on the excess space. In some schools in East Hartford, there is no space, in others it is substantial. The central issue is the usefulness of the "competitive" market which would probably be determined as much by the pure number of neighborhood children than any special program attraction. Because of this the demonstration will suffer. In some cases, enrollment is already at a level low enough to tempt officials to close the schools as an economy measure. There is no evidence to suggest that enrollment patterns would be significantly altered and no evidence that oversupply could be met or oversupply absorbed, thereby leaving the conditions of schooling in East Hartford absolutely the same as they were prior to a voucher plan.

According to the Center for Public Policy the worst threat is posed by the deterioration of the public school. "The fundamental political and pedagogic danger posed by most voucher plans is that a few publicly managed schools would become dumping grounds for the students whom over-applied schools, both public and private, did not want. The over-applied schools would become privileged sanctuaries for students whom educators enjoy teaching. In order to avoid this danger, a voucher
system must provide economic incentives for enrolling 'undesirable' children." (p. 58). Lottery systems for school selection, quotas, the prohibition of entrance requirements among the "public" schools and the guarantees to neighborhood children would reduce this danger considerably.

It appears that the worst would not occur, but with the necessary safeguards, regulations and conditions, together with natural limitations and inhibitions contribute to emasculating some of the essential elements of the voucher plan before it begins.

If, among other things, it is necessary to save the neighborhood school for local children, that becomes an obstacle or facilitator whose impact on the program should be seriously considered. The attractiveness of the neighborhood school should not be underestimated. For many reasons, it is the most popular plan, generating the most support. When school closings were discussed, the plan was defeated, illustrative of a desire by most citizens to support an inefficient program which serves their needs. The situation could probably resurface under a voucher plan if the competitive model seriously threatened to close "inefficient" schools. The central school authorities or the EVA would find the situation unavoidably uncomfortable and would be unable to plead local school autonomy since the neighborhood school would have no recourse in the matter. And, since it could be a vitally sensitive political matter and the school board or EVA would ultimately be responsible to the voters, the voucher system
and its competitive marketplace could be, after all, completely inoperable.

One basic cause of this, alluded to earlier, is the difficulty of the local school to convert demands from a variety of sources. Will demands always equate with need? Must all demands and all needs be met? Which ones will be rejected? These decisions will not only be difficult but could cripple the local schools placed in a political arena which will essentially encourage irrelevant, not necessarily educational, issues as well as meaningful community-school interaction. The situation becomes more problematic when the quality of involvement is considered. If it is any indication of what to expect, there was an inordinate amount of misinformation among the testimony from local citizens during the public hearings concerning the voucher plan. Furthermore, considering the two year duration of the study project, there was widespread apathy and ignorance about the voucher concept generally. This can either prevent serious school-community confrontations or serve to ignite unexpected, unpredictable and perhaps unnecessary confrontations later.

PARENT EVALUATION OF SCHOOL PROGRAMS

The voucher proposal would have an enormous impact on the educational system. It is hailed as a means of returning the schools to parents and making them responsive, but educational outcomes remain speculative at best, usually unidentifiable, and at worst, nonexistent. The results in terms of student behavior or performance would be hard to replicate
though perhaps attributable to a school-teacher-student mix which may not occur by accident, but which in every case would only last for one year.

If there is any probable advantage, it is rooted in the nature of choice itself and is explainable more in terms of one's feeling of being able to relate to the educational system than in the choice. Many educators would agree that this, by itself, may be to the program's credit - though not unique to vouchers.

The voucher system only promises choice and the potential for involvement in an effort to equalize educational opportunity. Discrete educational outcomes have not been articulated, though there has been an attempt to lure the public with promises of improvement. Apparently within the voucher plan there is some unidentifiable but worthwhile chemistry at work. Even the Center for the Study of Public Policy (p. 66) readily concedes that "the absolute level of achievement in a given school is largely determined by factors over which the school has no control." At this point, the function of extensive competition is weakened if not lost altogether. However, it would seem to be worth exploring the entire realm of educational environments which has only been mentioned peripherally.

It can be said that a strict environment and a permissive environment will have disparate effects on the children and staff in each school. Some will claim that even where the philosophies are similar, styles are not, and that the
possibilities may be quite large in number. This must be considered in any school-teacher-student mix.

If parents' main concerns rest in their children's performance and satisfaction with school - not inconveniently located - then competition can only contribute to the success of any school by appealing to the dissatisfied and by demonstrating that the school-teacher-child mix will at least be appropriate. The competitive marketplace would seem a cumbersome device for accomplishing this. Perhaps in-school counseling and program referral would be sufficient.

On the other hand, educational programs are often a reflection of individual teachers' goals, abilities and relationships with each student. To determine program quality at the individual classroom level may be too much to expect from marketplace activity alone. Quality may become a simple matter of taste, or become dependent on limited student performance measures or the folklore of each school. One must be as careful not to assign an undue emphasis to achievement scores and standard measures as they would not to accept spurious indicators. Yet, as each conventional measure is discounted as a strong indicator, there is less credibility to a competitive system which encourages various claims to superior quality. If the proper distinctions between schools or programs rests in their differences then they should not be encouraged to behave in a manner that would suggest "better" or "worse". Rather, they should match student with program according to need and mutual suitability.
Overemphasis on any aspect of school - even achievement or student performance - would be to miss important aspects of schooling that are difficult to measure. The burden is then placed on the parent and child to arrive at an assessment of the merits of particular schools. Sometimes it is easier to express negative feelings and explain why a program is insufficient. In this respect, individual schools, programs or teachers may share the responsibility and may respond to specific complaints. On the other hand, individual taste or personality conflicts may contribute to dissatisfaction which cannot be remedied without transferring to another program, an emotionally expensive solution, but one remedy. People's willingness to move away from the familiar, their neighborhood, their friends, is far from easy or desirable unless it is the lesser of possible evils or that another program is of such superior attraction that the promise of fulfillment is reward enough.

The decision to transfer is not uninfluenced by the school, but counseling or other official roles are not mentioned in the proposed plan. It may not be wise to leave the student transfer completely unattended. The absence of any professional role, even in an advising capacity, is indeed unusual. The creation of a Parents' Advisory Team, to be discussed later, does not seem to maximize available human resources, particularly since it would be created and would exist outside of the school organization and not include teachers or administrators. It is not clear how the mechanisms of the marketplace would contribute to a more efficient and effective change promoting the resolution of personal and program
needs for students transferring from an unsatisfactory situation.

The competitive marketplace would function best, if at all, at those points where separation is required, such as from an elementary to a middle school or from a middle school to a high school. Even here, convenience, friends and rumor are perhaps the real selling points, though professional guidance counselors would presumably be included in the transfer process at these junctures.

But, if the marketplace claims to respond to demand, how would individual teachers and administrators be affected? If a program fails, whose fault would it be - a teacher's or a group of teachers'? The program content? The way it was administered? While program changes might be easily made, how would tenured teachers be removed if there were no vacancies in other programs or replacements in a hold status or temporary assignment? How would poor supervision be identified as contributing to program failure? How would poor resource allocation be determined?

ON FINANCING

Each 'voucher would represent the total cost of educating a child in the public schools of East Hartford for one year. The cost would be adjusted to account for those aspects beyond the control of any one school, or disparities in facilities. Maintenance of facilities, size and salary of staff would be equalized. Each child in each participating school would be eligible for a voucher. Many educators decry this as
foreshadowing the end of "public" education. By inviting nonpublic schools to participate, two things would happen: (1) immediate redemption of the vouchers from those students already enrolled in private schools would be an added expense, and (2) the public school would lose the voucher value for each student transferring to a private school. The results according to critics, would be decreasing efficiency with increasing costs and taxes, and a dilution of the educational purchasing dollar within the public sector. At the same time public programs would always be forced to provide an education to anyone that wanted to attend school. The shifting student enrollments would cause an increase or decrease in the average program costs, which would often be beyond the control of school-building teachers and administrators who would be responsible for the success of their schools in the marketplace.

This situation is aggravated at the outset by the simple fact that those already enrolled in private schools would not return to the public schools because of the voucher plan, whereas some students in the public sector would be encouraged to transfer because of the voucher's financial incentive alone. As each public school student transfers, he would not only take his voucher but his absence would decrease state aid to the public schools. In the competitive market-place only the public schools would lose. As taxes would rise to account for public losses, the voucher value would increase, representing a greater margin for growth for the nonpublic schools. While the parochial schools, the only foreseeable
participants in East Hartford, are currently operating at a level substantially lower than the voucher value, is it not reasonable to assume that there would be a tendency to expand program offerings, increase costs and for them to arrive at a level of voucher parity, perhaps then lessening church support?

In East Hartford there was no intention of discounting private school vouchers at the outset, as originally suggested by the Center for Public Policy. Because of this the nonpublic schools would have been entitled to what would amount to a windfall of public financial support. If this is to be justified, the availability of new spaces and a truly functioning competitive model, in accordance with the intent of the proposed voucher plan, should be expected. Instead, the enrollment is as follows:

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<td>5-8</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>NA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>3420</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10633</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given declining public enrollment and the excess space, the additional costs to the public of at least five million dollars over the term of the project did not seem justifiable for the inclusion of 65 new spaces. Considering the space and resources available to public educators, one could expect the public schools to design an appropriate program and meet the needs of those students attracted to the nonpublic environment, unless their choice was of a purely religious

* Not Available
nature, in which case constitutional questions re-emerge. Certainly, under the circumstances, the public schools could never fully compete.

Referring to a general competitive model, Horobin and Smyth (Blaug, p. 375) accurately assess the apparent situation in East Hartford, "The proposition that, if competition prevails, resources will be allocated to their best uses is based on deductive reasoning from highly abstract and unrealistic assumptions; it is not a proposition based on empirical evidence." In short, as several members of the board of education have said, "It costs too much".
V
PARENT INVOLVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The assumption underlying a successful voucher plan is that parents will take the opportunity to choose their children's school and will participate in the educational system. It is this participation which insures educational needs assessment and system responsiveness. However, the history of American education seems to indicate that as professionals gained power and schools grew, parents' participation in the schools declined. A combination of events appear to be responsible for this: First, life styles changed and many family responsibilities such as education were institutionalized. Second, teachers and later, administrators, professionalized coincident with specialization of knowledge usually beyond the functional awareness of most parents. Third, the courts and teacher contracts legitimized professional independence, that is, it was recognized that teachers were not mere tools of the community and were not subject to close, demanding personal and professional control by the citizenry. Fourth,
the process of education and the problems associated with it
grew too complex for frequent and meaningful parent contact.
Fifth, school boards, mindful of their own role and interests,
assumed the responsibility of guarding parents' interests.

Perhaps the most evident reason for the absence of
parent participation in East Hartford is the lack of any sub-
stantial need which is not already met with building-level
PTA's or similar organizations. And by based on satisfaction
may not be inappropriate or in any way upsetting to the school
system or educational services.

The existence of a board of education, elected by
the people, and assorted parent teacher associations were not
widely thought to be inadequate participatory avenues in
East Hartford. The bureaucratic temptation always seems to be
to create a new agency to become the vehicle for what other
agencies have failed to do. In this case it seems that the
formal school organization was expecting parents to succeed on
their own where the central administration and the school board
failed: namely, to affectuate changes in educational services
which better correspond to their children's needs then are
prorently provided. Considering the organizational options
available to the school administrators for inviting productive
parent participation, it was inappropriate for the recommended
voucher plan to place the lauded goal of parent participation
on a level where parents would need to fend for themselves — a
situation more inclined to encourage parent-school chaos than
cooperation.
Currently, parents, because of the open enrollment policy, may choose to send their children to any school in East Hartford. While the administration may approve or reject the request to transfer from a neighborhood school, usually it is granted. If there are educational reasons why a student should not be moved, presumably the request would be denied. The policy appears to retain the ultimate educational decision among the school authorities. This may be a questionable practice, but it has not generated many problems or dissatisfaction among parents.

If the East Hartford system were not homogeneous, or the open enrollment policy was ineffectual because of the lack of space in "desirable" schools, or parents were not satisfied with the existence of, and their access to, other satisfying programs, the policy extension advocated as a part of the voucher plan might be necessary. Under the plan submitted to the board of education, the ultimate decision regarding student transfers would rest with individual parents: the reason for the transfer, in the eyes of the local educators, would become absolutely unimportant. The justification for this shift, as slight as it appears, was to insure philosophical consistency throughout the voucher plan and because of the psychological impact it would have as a symbol of real power - a vote of confidence in the people.

The idea of parents once again participating in the educational process has gained wide appeal lately, as an element of the voucher plan and in other ways. The voucher plan would
remedy the disaffection between parents and the schools.
Discussing the concept generally, Guthrie feels vouchers will return the control of public schools to parents. This control was lost, according to Guthrie, because of teacher unions, professional management removing contact with the public, consolidation of districts, growth in population, depoliticization of school board elections and a multi-level school bureaucracy.

Allowing parents to match educational services with their children's needs is one goal in the effort to give parents power. The assumptions made by the National Institute of Education underlying this provision of the voucher plan were, according to Weiner, (p. 203) that parents (1) have the proper aspirations for their children, (2) can provide an operational guide to suppliers of educational services, (3) can develop clear preferences for educational experiences, (4) can make appropriate choices, (5) can gather appropriate information, and (6) can articulate the needs of their children. In addition, there are standards for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of relevant information.

Concommitant to their right to choose, according to both the superintendent of schools and the coordinator of the Parents' Choice Project, "Parents have the right to make the wrong choice." The disturbing aspect of the emergent attitude guiding the sharing of authority with parents is the feeling of an organizational helplessness; experienced administrators seem to be saying that, "Your choice is as good as mine", "I guess you do not need my advice", and "The board of education,
central and building level professional administrators might not be the best people to make decisions concerning the educational experiences selected for your child." These kinds of sentiments suggest a strange reversal. The board of education and central administration have been created for the purpose of governing and administering an educational program which maximizes resource allocation and properly matches program to need. Part of their inherent responsibility has been to minimize mistakes and improper combinations of resources with students. The managerial imperative is to attempt to improve failing programs and systems before it is decided that they should be abandoned. Parent determination of educational policy and their choice of programs may exist within a framework which efficiently and effectively accounts for informed participation. Giving parents the ultimate decision (no matter how safe it might be) and encouraging them to arrive at their choices on their own, seems an improper response to a perceived interest by parents to share in educational policy-making.

Furthermore, while the illusion of power is created, the routes to expression are blocked, since the school board, changed to an Education Voucher Authority, would no longer be responsible to parents in many program areas. Rather, parents would in a sense, be cut adrift among the schools and their strength would be dispersed instead of aggregated.

While it is true that the right to make mistakes is not the same as being encouraged to choose unwisely, the lack of any formal role for local educators would increase the likelihood of parents exercising poor judgment. On the other
hand, those parents who in an attempt to become informed, and perhaps this is the real benefit, will seek out school teachers and administrators for advice and answers to questions vital to their choice. As desirable as this is, it is haphazard and burdensome since parents would need time, and school officials would of necessity not have the time to give. The inefficiency would contribute to more frustration, inconsistency, confusion and counter productivity. And all of this would occur if parents exercise their prerogatives, a goal highly regarded by voucher proponents—particularly if the plan were to be meaningful.

Non-decisions represent a danger not fully understood by voucher advocates. Not choosing a different program may represent satisfaction, ignorance or disregard for the children. If children's needs go unmet or they are unrecognized altogether, the program—not to mention the children—suffers by default! Teachers and administrators once again may enter the picture and either make the decision themselves or strongly recommend possibilities to parents—creating essentially the same pre-voucher structure. Many "non-decisions" appear likely. The feasibility study in East Hartford reported that, "...parent participation will be motivated primarily by a desire to remove a child from what the parent views as an uncomfortable setting. Transfers based on a positive interest in a particular type of a program, while likely to occur will not be frequent." Under these circumstances the benefits of a voucher program designed to increase choice, stimulate parental partici-
pation and shift power from the central office and teachers to parents would be limited at best, doubtful at worst, but most likely only of marginal utility not worth the expense.

The assessment may seem unduly harsh considering the widespread desire for debureaucratization, but it does accurately reflect the realities of parent interest in expanding their powers (in a manner proscribed by voucher) over educational services in East Hartford. Admittedly, they were concerned about having more and accurate information about the programs available to their children, and they strongly approved of the open enrollment policy, but if attendance at the public hearings is an indication of the kind and intensity of interest in vouchers generally, few people would actively pursue contact with local educators.

In Alum Rock the situation was similar. According to Weiner (p. 145), "Public and community debate over the expansion of the demonstration was virtually non-existent. It appears that the debate stimulated by the feasibility study in 1971 was far more vigorous than any public discussion accompanying the actual implementation of vouchers."

If the motivation to transfer in East Hartford is basically a response to a bad situation or a matter of convenience and few people demonstrate their ability or inclination to spend time on decisions vital to the voucher process, the utility of the concept is questioned and it becomes apparent that only special interest groups, as yet unidentified, would profitably use the new access routes to power in educational policy-making. It is likely that new groups would emerge to ease the
burden on the individual parent and exert an unpredictable impact on the system and the desired goals.

In the final analysis, an alteration in the distribution of power such as that called for by the voucher proposal, would result in a contest between the professional and the parent which can only end in victory for the side with more time, competence in educational affairs, legitimacy and perhaps most important, information - almost exclusively in the hands of the professionals.

This contest does not need to occur. Instead a partnership can be created which guarantees that children's needs will be met in an appropriate fashion. Because there are no visible rivalries or divisions in East Hartford, parent power as an equalizing mechanism does not promise to be a sound reorganization to insure responsiveness.

PARTICIPATION

The voucher plan assumes that consumer choice, information and power can be built-in and that the parents will exercise their right (almost a duty) to influence the supply and kinds of educational services. The existing desire and need for consumer power in East Hartford suggests that the real utility of the plan as a meaningful vehicle for additional parental input into the school decision-making process would be slight.

Though most appropriate in an urban environment (or a more heterogeneous community than East Hartford) in need of a plan to redistribute power, the Center for the Study of Public Policy
promoted vouchers because, "If parents are to take responsibility for their children's education, they cannot rely exclusively on political processes to let them do so. They must also be able to take individual action in behalf of their own children."

Unfortunately, giving parents the right to intervene in the system does not guarantee that they will when it is necessary or that they even will. For that matter their intervention is no guarantee that the system will respond properly to a perceived need or that the parent involvement stems from a legitimate grievance. The voucher idea as proposed by the CSPP might have given the appearance of redistributing power and being responsive to minority groups with existing grievances against the system, but it allowed for the introduction of wasteful, irrelevant inputs that would only cloud the real issues. The distribution of vouchers did not insure that the recipients would be able to use the power effectively and to their own advantage, but placed them in a position to be manipulated and exploited by the more informed or by special interests. In effect then, the issuance of vouchers would subject parents to the vagaries of ad-hocracy and uncertain institutional behavior which could be less able to safeguard the interests of individual parents or minority groups.

Whether the issuance of vouchers can truly transfer power or increase availability of educators and their access to parents depends on the organizational willingness to accept a low threshold of concern. A low threshold means that parents would easily become involved, perhaps to the point of being
nuisances. On the other hand, the organization should be willing and able to fill the void due to a high threshold of concern resulting in non-involvement. Organizational realities demonstrate that the opposite occurs: professional interest will tend to dominate in a power struggle with a lay public. The weakness of insurgent interests, coupled with the widespread satisfaction with the schools throughout the community, would not stimulate a shift in power.

In 1974, ninety percent of the parents in East Hartford felt that their children were doing as well at their school as they would at any other school in the demonstration area. There was no call for change and parents, sympathetic to educational diversity, were not sure if diversity would be best instituted between or within the schools.

At the time of the feasibility study, it was estimated by the study team that, at most, only ten to fifteen percent of the parents would exercise their option to choose. This demonstrated the discrepancy between voucher theory and reality in East Hartford.

What has happened elsewhere would have been likely in East Hartford had a voucher program been instituted. Bridges (p. 55) reports that, "All of this concern about matching children with programs that maximize educational outcomes may be misplaced, for we are talking as if parents (or schools) tried to maximize certain educational outcomes; but in fact their decisions probably are aimed more at satisficing than maximizing." This reflects the observation made earlier that
motivation will stem more from relieving a bad situation than the pursuit of a better situation.

CHOICE

Naturally once a set of expectations have been put in motion, and parental interest in the program is developed, parents should feel relatively hopeful that their needs would be met. Actually, ultimate satisfaction may depend more on the enrollment picture at each school than the influence parents have. In Alum Rock, Weiner (p. 32) points out that, "Location was the single most frequently mentioned reason for choosing a particular school, but about a third of the respondents mentioned features of the mini-school program as the reason they selected a particular school."

If little space is available, or only a few take advantage of the system, an enormous voucher dispensing machine would have been placed in motion for nothing.

In East Hartford, the Parents' Choice Project reported similar results with their open enrollment policy, and there is little reason to believe the situation would have been altered by vouchers. Of the 146 people (1.3 percent of the student body) who took advantage of the open enrollment policy, 29 percent transferred their children for what could be considered educational reasons; six percent preferred the different staff and 23 percent preferred the different program. 36 percent chose to transfer for convenience to daycare centers, babysitters, etc., and the balance was for an assortment of reasons.
Since parents would have the right to transfer their children for any reason the parents who seek convenience may be satisfied at the expense of the parents seeking needed programs, in which case the expanded Parents' Choice Project may be counter-productive.

If we assume that the proposed voucher plan would work as intended, parental control of the schools might tend to focus on the neighborhood unit since it is convenient, generally satisfactory and within a network of parents who share similar interests and are familiar with one another. The potential for a power base is present and easier to develop among neighbors who are already involved at least to the extent that their children are enrolled in neighborhood schools. Under these circumstances, the impulse toward maintaining the group norms and expectations seem inevitable while diversions and successful minority viewpoints would be at a decided disadvantage.

According to Blackman (p. 48), "It is not unreasonable to anticipate a decentralization of school programs, with different programs tending to different needs, creating classes more homogeneously grouped by social class, and thereby exacerbating social class differences."

Where neighborhoods are in transition and represent a variety of interests; each short of a plurality, the successful parental interests will be exemplified by their competence in using the system and verbal ability. Ginzberg (p. 379) reports that, "On the basis of recent experience which has involved the participation of parents in the education of their children, it is venturesome to postulate that many ghetto
parents will have the time, energy, interest and background necessary to make informed judgments, even if the available information were much better than now appears likely. Yet this is a critical dimension of the voucher plan."

Instead of an organizational inhibition to the redistribution of power and rewards, distinctions would arise which would leave some parents unprotected from the behavior of the larger group of parents responsible only to itself and individual members. The present system is directly accountable to parents via the ballot boxes and public opinion of which local board members are particularly mindful. Powerlessness in an amorphous public association would have few remedies. Blackman (p. 44) has found, "The higher the educational attainment, income and occupational status of the parents the more likely they were to report that they should have been and were involved in both school and political activities. . . . It seems all but certain that the general opportunity to participate will be used differentially by parents from different socio-economic strata."

Once again the poor and minorities continue at a disadvantage accentuated by the voucher plan; not reduced. Friedman (1973), using the same argument to show that vouchers would in fact contribute to a redistribution of power, noted, "Parents from higher socio-economic status groups typically have had greater input into the school system's functioning than parents from lower socio-economic status groups have had. Partly as a consequence of these unequal rates of involvement in activities intended to impact on the schools decision-making
processes, educational programs have been tailored to meet the demands of these self-selected parents."

Yet there is absolutely no reason to believe that if participation in East Hartford centered on community schools, the results would be any different. Friedman and others may find, in an area which has ignored minority parents, such as large cities, that vouchers would precipitate neighborhood control and therefore ghetto control of ghetto schools without any assurance that resources or programs would be redistributed according to demand. Either students transfer out of the ghetto to "better" schools and parents remain powerless (because their interest would be dispersed to varied remote programs) or students do not transfer and parents have control but no additional power. This situation was not symptomatic of problems or needs in East Hartford even though there is a variety of neighborhoods.

But as long as neighborhood patterns remain the same and economic de facto segregation continues, the result will be as Levin has pointed out that, "The working class child will be provided with schooling that will reinforce working class orientations while children from higher classes will attend schools that will orient them towards the upper echelon of the occupational hierarchy." 

Bridge (p. 47), in agreement, has reported after reviewing Alum Rock that, "Giving parents increased control over schools will merely make them more efficient shapers of what their children learn, and what their children learn will equip them to function in the same social
niche that their family now occupies in the social stratification system."

Unfortunately, as Coleman (1966), Bowles and Gintis (1972), and Jencks (1970) have found, "The capacity of the schools to overcome the limitations of the home is not great." This dire assessment is made worse when compounded with the unrealistic hope of redistributing power and because of the uncertain impact of inappropriate decisions or parent choices. Weiner (p. 196) reports that, "Decisions... often reflected an ignorance of the operational problems that would be encountered in their implementation."

The move toward large scale, uncontrolled parent participation could very well create an organizationally intolerable situation which would not be manageable without some form of intervention by professional educators.

PROGRAM DIVERSITY

The key to successful educational reform through vouchers is the existence and continued evolution of options. An organizational capability to respond to needs and demands and in so doing, create alternatives, is essential for the issuance of vouchers to have any meaning.

Fortunately, East Hartford subscribes to this thinking, and the intention to diversify is clear, particularly among the elementary schools. Interestingly, local schools have been separately self-described as either traditional, self-contained classroom, I.G.E. (Individually Guided Education), team taught, open space, child-centered, learning by doing, and
humanistic education.

Judging from a compilation of school descriptions, the difficulty in distinguishing between content and process, program and philosophy, intellectual and attitudinal goals, structure and method and many other variables is obvious to the trained professional and must be overwhelming to the uninformed. A close examination of the program descriptions does not impart a feel for the school. The extreme difficulty of transferring experiences, feelings, and school climate through written descriptions unfortunately leaves more to the imagination than is prudent in assessing individual programs. The fact that almost all schools share the same concern for the individual student, skill development, and a satisfying environment makes real distinctions a matter of interpreting nuances. Though there are several clear alternatives, described as having different organizational emphasis, it is still difficult, if not impossible to determine just how they are different. Since no single program has demonstrated a superior record of performance, the differences are perhaps geared to child rearing practices, general educational philosophy or a particular attitude among the professionals - certainly valid and worthwhile distinctions - and suggest that the programs are different but not necessarily better or worse than one another. Board of education members, recognizing this, do not want to introduce artificial competition and demand that if one teaching method or program is superior, that it must quickly be put forth in other schools. Since definable superiority has not been the case, diversity offers a way for parents to match their children's temperament to the available program
most compatible to his academic and emotional needs. Viewed in this manner, school officials might encourage specific transfers to arrange the proper school-child mix or institute a series of mini-schools in neighborhood schools to accommodate need. Vouchers would seem to complicate the matter.

Reviewing the programs from a different perspective, one member of the board of education expressed the frustration that he felt, "If the board doesn't get all the information, how can parents?" In an effort to find out what differences existed beneath the written distinctions he informally surveyed the sixteen elementary schools. Fourteen schools used the same math publisher, often, the same texts. Fifteen of the sixteen schools used the same English publisher. He wasn't convinced of the diversity - certainly not a reflection of resources - though he recognized some differences in method.

After two years of study, the development of individual school descriptions, and a commitment to diversity, the Parents' Choice Project Director in his Report on Parent Information (p. 1.) said that, "The most obvious problem is the apparent lack of significant differences among the schools."

One must take notice when the schools describe themselves using jargon appealing to all educational philosophies and practices, while a board member and the voucher project director fail to recognize significant differences. How could individual parents fare any better?

INFORMATION

Traditionally, members of the board of education and
the central office have been thought responsible for gathering and disseminating information to parents useful for their understanding of the system and their child's education. If board members find it difficult to keep informed of the system then, of course, parents would find it extremely difficult.

With implementation of the voucher plan, parents would be expected to become motivated to navigate their way through the system and to utilize the existing organization in an effort to secure the information necessary to make decisions. According to the Center for the Study of Public Policy (p. 68), "Parents will no doubt want information as to which school is 'best'. . .this is a field best left to private groups: Newspapers, counseling agencies, consumers' unions, the women's civic league, etc. Such groups will naturally be interested in school curricula."

The organizations in East Hartford which would demonstrate a natural interest in education and school curricula, if they exist, have not responded to voucher. Should a particularly controversial curricular addition be contemplated, it would be fair to assume that ad hoc committees might be formed. That is not enough. The nature of the information needed by parents wanting to make an informed choice and to participate in the system would require a considerable effort to obtain and digest. Bridge (p. 25), summarizing the determinants of a placement decision of parents in Alum Rock, says that, "In choosing a program for their child, parents must weigh a number of factors including: school characteristics (e.g., location, travel, safety, ethnic composition of the
student body), program characteristics (e.g., instructional arrangement, perceived quality of teaching, teacher-student ratio, subject matter emphasis), beliefs about the child (e.g., the child's interests, strengths and weaknesses), and the family's values of schooling objectives."

That is probably just the beginning of an enormous amount of time and effort needed to seek, collect, digest, understand, question and apply all the necessary information. In order to fulfill their needs, parents will require access to the schools, teachers, administrators, each other, central office personnel and board members. They will also need ways of verifying information, organizing themselves and developing, either as individuals or groups, their realms of involvement with the system.

PARENT ADVICE TEAM

The mechanism to simplify individual effort and to open the access routes to the system is the Parent Advice Team, a lay committee to serve as a clearinghouse for information and a full-time resource to parents. The establishment of this group would conceivably bring order to information gathering, processing and dissemination, but could find itself in an awkward situation between both parents and school system, removing parents one step further in a communications process which the voucher plan should simplify. However, considering the high rate of mobility generally, the Parent Advice Team may reduce the information problem facing both newcomers and residents changing districts or who do not have time to devote
to the process.

But the creation of the Parent Advice Team is a reminder of how the process can be manipulated by the system and that other organizations must and will be created if parents are to initiate involvement and define the role they want. The PAT suggests a passive role for parents particularly if parents depend on PAT. All that is created is a type of parent council composed of PAT members hired by the school system. This passive role is contrary to voucher theory, but difficult to overcome since the existence of PAT may determine a particular mode of behavior or standard procedures among involved parents.

The emergence of leaders would either be accidental, or perhaps issue oriented; the result of groups taking the initiative and competing for (or taking) a leadership position; or the result of community leaders, perhaps even former board of education members, taking the initiative. Though it was not designed as such, the PAT could evolve into a leadership role. It would certainly be tempting to the PAT and to those in the system if they could (through an extended relationship) develop a natural alliance.

The consequences to a school system that has accepted the inclusion of non-professional personnel in a potentially sensitive realm - data gathering and dissemination - could be considerable and, at any rate, well worth controlling. Depending on the powers that would evolve and the nature of the dependency between PAT and the system, the kind of relationship that could be created would be vital to the system and to the success of
the voucher plan.

Weiner (p. 121), reporting on the Alum Rock experience, indicates the problems PAT could most likely expect: (1) Not developing and using power or taking a leadership role, and (2) becoming well informed, but dealing with indifferent parents.

POWER STRUGGLE

The idea of parent involvement was to redistribute power so that parents would make decisions and develop a closer relationship to the school system. The development of the voucher plan would be inviting parents to take power and encourage educators to resist their efforts in part because few rewards would be involved and their lives would become more complicated. Parent power, despite efforts to the contrary, implies accountability and evaluation. If programs succeed or fail because of voucher, teachers and administrators may be inappropriately judged and become the victims of circumstance.

As a matter of survival and professional interest, teachers and administrators have a natural desire to maintain and expand their power. If one witnesses the evolution of the teaching profession, particularly since the 1960 New York teachers' strike, it becomes evident just how effective teachers have been in defending their interests. Useem (p. 8) explains, "The evidence indicates that direct day-to-day control of elementary and secondary schooling rests in the hands of an elite that is relatively impervious to public influence... (furthermore)... the school administration, not the local board and not the teachers, remains the primary focus of
control over educational policy."

The introduction of a voucher plan, if it could be adopted without teacher/administrator endorsement, would seem to give rise to new methods of manipulating parents and could create higher levels of frustration among those hopeful of attaining power. Since any major alteration of the school system ultimately depends on the response of the professional staff, it is doubtful that they would readily (if at all) give up anything, especially power, without consent.

Useem characterized the public's involvement in education as minimal. Under pre-voucher conditions (and this was during the most active period in the recent history of American education), Useem reported that, "Available research leads to the conclusion that the citizenry has little to do with the formulation of school policies. Voter turnout in school board elections is low and attendance at school board meetings is sparse (two-thirds of the nation's boards usually have fewer than five visitors at their meetings). When the public is mobilized, it is usually for a negative purpose, such as the rejection of a school bond issue at the polls or a fight against controversial curricula or racial desegregation." (p. 5)

Prior to the current plan, parents had two direct options in dealing with the schools: First, they could go to the school directly and confront the principal or teacher. Usually it was the reverse. The summoned parents would be upset about losing a day at work, and would be embarrassed because of an unpleasant disciplinary or academic matter. Second, they could go directly to the school board or the
superintendent's office. In this way they were contributing to their own satisfaction and were able (whether or not the matter was resolved) to approach those who could be held accountable.

The voucher plan passes the responsibility back to parents by ascribing powers and effectiveness to the illusory influence of the right to transfer. This "love it or leave it" attitude is hardly softened by eliminating the central office route of appeal or by insisting that much time and effort in organizing effective action must be spent by parents who, through the board of education, have hired a professional staff to avoid that very situation.

By creating dependence on the local school, parents may in fact be splintered into neighborhood groups rather than strengthened - given the homogeneous nature of the town. Less involvement and less effective participation would sometimes result, without substantially increasing the responsiveness of the neighborhood school usually sensitive to parent-school relationships. Where they were not responsible, parents could organize as with voucher, or appeal to a higher authority negated by autonomy.

Illustrative of the probable outcome in East Hartford was the assessment made by the National Institute of Education of the Alum Rock experience which, "Suggests that as decision-making has decentralized, it has reached teachers and principals, not parents. While parents exercise options, they do so within a framework of schools managed by professional
educators." (p. 26).

The situation created by vouchers may lead to discontinuity, since each school thriving in autonomy may not offer programs which appropriately succeed one another. Because of this, parents' efforts may be divided between participating in their children's current school programs and their future programs at those points of transition. This contributes to splintering parental involvement even further.

Ironically, some critics, such as East Hartford's town counselor, oppose decentralization for precisely the same reasons others support it: it is an encroachment on the powers of the board of education and would lessen the board's accountability - presumably not necessarily increasing accountability elsewhere.

The most often overlooked and obvious aspect of increasing parental involvement is defining just what is meant by involvement. The system opens up the potential for new problems, concerns, and conflicts, it may be unable to deal with. Yet, there are no remedies built in for intergroup conflict resolution.

The proposed program attempted to increase parental power through involvement, access and choice. Whether the system would have undergone serious alterations in East Hartford is doubtful, though, because of the weaknesses in organizational safeguards, and the potential for parental disappointment, system-wide confusion and unresponsiveness were likely.
INTRODUCTION

"Alternatives" in their most basic form simply offer students a choice, suggest optimal routes to essentially the same ends achieved through the traditional schooling process. Though it is not new to suggest that each student should be treated as an individual, the idea of creating administrative or formal instructional variants to appeal to some students who, because of their individual needs, are truly not benefiting from the educational system, is somewhat threatening and is often very controversial.

The institutional standardization of the schooling process has progressed to the point where a return to some school practices of fifty years ago is hailed as a great innovation. Older students teaching younger students and multi-age classrooms are proclaimed as breakthroughs, when in fact such arrangements (not always appropriate) were the rule in almost all schools. The search for and implementation of alternatives of whatever design is a response to the inflexibility
of schools which have adopted the industrial model of organization and the production ethic. In so doing, educators have been unable to fulfill their educational and managerial responsibility to provide the appropriate educational services to many of their students.

The call for alternatives would not be necessary if the system or school was fully responsive to its clients. At present, alternatives serve a political, as well as an educational function, by suggesting one way of overcoming perceived maladies inherent in the assumptions of teaching, learning and governing in the conventional school. In this case, conflict resolution may not be a simple matter of responding in an imaginative managerial manner. Rather, the system may also need to respond in a political manner.

The Center for the Study of Public Policy called for vouchers to remedy the inequality in school financing, and others have called for them as a political remedy for social and educational inequality. In this fashion the alternative concept based on a system of vouchers demands both educational and political action which has been shown, in the case of East Hartford, to be somewhat inappropriate.

Generally, however, alternatives serve three purposes:

1. To provide a variegated student body with the educational services it requires.

2. To provide legitimate institutional response to some social problems and demands.

3. To facilitate a managerial response within an organization not fully capable of experimentation or flexibility.
The assumption in each of these cases is that public education itself is legitimate and the state has the right (and the capability) to provide both the traditional and the alternative programs. Illich and others, known as the "deschooler" want to see a separation of school and state and believe the ultimate alternative is (at the very least) the right to choose no formal education. According to Illich, "the school has become the established church of secular times" and vouchers are the only way out of the school trap to attain total self-direction, self-satisfaction and control over one's learning experiences. The voucher as Illich sees it could be used in absolutely any way the individual chooses in a system where there is, ". . . legal protection from the obligatory, graded curriculum; laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of prior schooling; the formation of a skill center where useful skills can be learned, taught by those best equipped to teach them; and peer-matching by which the learned may share their knowledge with those seeking instruction. . . economic credit units allow the learner to choose what he will learn, from whom he will learn, and why he will learn."

Bereiter, noting the advantages of a "deschooled" society, agrees with Illich that convivial institutions might then have a chance to emerge. They are institutions that "satisfy a need without creating a dependency: they are there when you need them without generating increasing needs" (p. 70).

Though the voucher plan allows for alternatives
and reflects their endorsement by the President's Commission on School Finance and by many others, they were never recommended to recognize the full potential of an alternatives movement symbolized by the avant guard or the deschoolers.

Moving closer to the extremes of alternative possibilities, however, Jencks, one of the original voucher designers, apparently has become disappointed with the voucher as a means of equalizing opportunity, "...Indeed, we cannot imagine any noncoercive way to equalize consumption of educational services. We therefore conclude that what America needs is a system of finance which provides alternative services to those who get relatively few benefits from the educational system. If people do not want to attend school or college, an egalitarian society ought to accept this as a legitimate decision and give these people subsidized job training, subsidized housing, or perhaps simply a lower tax rate" (1972, p. 23).

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

Vouchers were never designed to reach into the realm of the deschoolers or those advocating truly institutional alternatives. Rather, they were viewed as a mechanism to broaden institutional choice by manipulating the variables comprising schooling: curriculum, location of instructional services, time of learner-teacher meeting, nature of competition, achievement, reward, cognitive-affective orientation, age-level and grade-level groupings, community-institutional orientation, student-teacher orientation, individual-group orientation,
orientation toward learning (experiential/vicarious), academic-vocational skill orientation, goal orientation, product-process orientation, training-child care orientation, financial, human resource allocation, time orientation (future-past), time structuring, student activity structuring, and evaluation.

There is virtually an endless number of combinations of these dimensions which can form the substance of an alternative program. Several are currently used in East Hartford: open classroom, traditional, teacher-centered, gifted, individualized instruction, activity centered, fine arts, multi-cultural, continuous progress, Individually Guided Education, team taught, open space, etc. There are others, such as the popular Summerhill and Montessori methods (known for their founders) and also the non-graded unit approach, free school, parent assisted learning, computer assisted instruction, modular, tracked and heterogeneously grouped.

Alternatives abound for each of a number of different educational needs, however, their central problem is operationally defining their programs in such a way that students and parents can fully understand what to expect from them. Little, if any, research shows one alternative better than another in terms of student outcomes, ability or achievement, though they have been shown appealing to different students, partly because of alternative climates.

The basic problem in describing a program is the inability to verbalize the exact method or sequence of experiences that is used or the ability, attitude, skills, and knowledge of the teacher. For example, what does it mean to be humanistic?
There have not been enough examples of the technique or the widespread understanding of the practice to readily convert the concept into a functional program in the eyes of parents or students who have not been exposed to that environment. There are too few meaningful descriptors to articulate or differentiate each program in such a way that it is meaningful to potential participants. The transference of the experience is so difficult even followers jeopardize acceptance of the concept by risking faulty implementation. Cunningham illustrates the problem: "Bettelheim reveals disappointment in the bunglings of his own disciples and predicts that Neill will experience the same fate. He sees Summerhill and Neill as inseparable. He believes that Summerhill's successes have never been recorded nor can they be. Neill's gifts are so subtle that they are not even known to himself, thus they cannot be shared. (The same could be said of Bettelheim)."

(Saxe, p. 344). Goodlad agrees, "...after visiting hundreds of classrooms, many of them reportedly experimental schools, (he) concluded sadly that the seeds of educational reform are truly being sown in the clouds above, but that little rain ever falls on the parched earth below." (p. 20).

Alternatives have become an acceptable way to infuse individuality and creativity into a system rapidly becoming moribund with uniformity, but the success of the alternatives is not a matter for institutional pride. Rather they are the manifestation of individual effort, which, unfortunately, is seldom harnessed by the system and destined to wither because
it is almost impossible to deliberately replicate. The beauty (and the failure) of the one-room schoolhouse was its freedom for the teaching talent to assert itself in diverse ways, some of which are considered today to be suitable and similar to those among the alternatives.

The success of an alternative program is directly related to the willingness of the larger system to tolerate and, often, defend it. Though individual style is so much a part of its success, it becomes less important to duplicate the techniques of one man or school of thought, but vitally important to allow the legitimate existence of an environment within the system which can nurture the competencies, energies and dedication so necessary to any program dependent on creative, enthusiastic service.

Alternatives, then, may be hard to define and sometimes impossible to duplicate, but are able to accomplish worthwhile ends in tolerant organizational settings which can accept unorthodox methods, diversity, an alteration of traditional goals and most importantly different assumptions concerning competition, achievement, and learning.

It is easy enough to restructure the organization to accommodate new instructional designs, new curricula, new programs, new schedules or any one of a multitude of system responses to perceived needs. Too often the impetus to create an alternative or an independent sub-system is merely a symptom of the unsatisfactory nature of the underlying assumptions of the organization. If they are not examined first, failure might be unavoidable. Needs must be identified through a
review of those areas of organizational life and the pervading human relationships most likely to be the root of the current need for change or the source for potential conflict later.

For example:

--- Where is the instructional emphasis? On the cognitive, affective domains? Academic, vocational goals?

--- How is punishment used? To maintain conformity? To humiliate? Is learning used as a punishment (study halls, extra homework)?

--- Are aversive control, fear, distrust, defeatism and negativism built into the system because of an inability to deal with individual needs?

--- Are students guilty until proven innocent? Can they freely exercise their rights and maintain their dignity as people?

--- Do anti-democratic rules permeate relationships with students? Are they denied choice? Are their activities and vehicles for self-expression censored or proscribed by the adults in the educational community?

--- Are only behavioral extremes recognized? Only "A" students rewarded and delinquents or vandals punished. faculty and administrators?

--- Is socialization artificial due to attempts at official social/political neutrality in the academic and social settings?

--- Is creativity and dissent repressed while conformity, and the status-quo rewarded? Is mediocrity accepted? Is there a tyranny of the majority?
--- Do teachers and students respect each other? Themselves?

--- Is school always a means to material ends and to the satisfaction of other people?

--- Are values in conflict with personal or family wishes? Is competition emphasized at the expense of cooperation or vice versa? Is insecurity, possessiveness, disregard for others and selfishness part of the hidden curriculum? Are students intimidated?

--- Are children/students thought of as products or clients of the system? Can they participate in the governance and operation of the school?

--- Is supervision of faculty and students performed with improvement or reprimand in mind? Are there opportunities for the staff to grow personally and professionally? Is feedback control-oriented or growth-oriented?

--- Do people in the organization seem more concerned with assigning blame than improving mistakes? Is failure punished? Is blame feared more than praise is sought?

--- Is the need for success and the avoidance of criticism greater than the need for change and personal satisfaction? Are teachers discouraged from taking risks? Trying new ideas?

--- Do stereotypes prevail, leading to categorization of students? Is the curricula oriented to age, grade, racial, economic segregation? Tracking? Are guidance counselors able to overcome and stifle stereotyping through scheduling or career advice?
These are a few questions that uncover the operating assumptions of the organization and the internal human relationships. What very often becomes a stagnating, mediocre institution is a school overburdened with various, simultaneous political and social demands which it fails to satisfy. It is ironic that a single system which cannot satisfy multiple demands can be divided by program, by goals if necessary, to insure satisfaction of diverse needs. Why it should be assumed that a single school could or should meet a variety of needs in a uniform manner has not been fully explained, though it is probably the logical extension of administrators who have adopted the industrial model of organization as appropriate for the schools.

Finally, if alternatives are to be established to satisfy a defined need, several additional questions must be answered:

--- Does the planned alternative have the endorsement of the system, or is it set up as a visible but not a real symbol of the organizational effort to respond to needs?

--- Will the alternative program be given a fair share of the materials, economic and human resources necessary to run a program on the same level as the traditional school?

--- Will the alternative be developed into a program as respectable as the finest in the traditional school or become (as many have) a euphemism for dropouts, miscreants or the gifted? Will there be new efforts at segregating desirables or undesirables from the system?

Unless these questions can be answered satisfactorily, voucher plans or alternative programs would suffer the same
fate: failure. The voucher idea in one sense was designed to create a program according to new assumptions by allowing parents extended input into the educational arena, but there is no reason to believe that their participation would be a more successful method of restructuring the schools to achieve specific ends than by allowing the central office to take the managerial initiative.

STRUCTURE

Once the assumptions are understood many organizational and physical plant designs may expedite goal achievement and the establishment of alternatives. A quick review of the structural possibilities includes:

--- Organizing around goals/purposes: political, psychological, social, moral.

--- The establishment of skills centers: trades and social skills.

Each of these categories requires the articulation (and differentiating and/or integration where necessary) of each skill, goal and specific level of competence. The allocation of resources should be made in accordance with the established goals. Ancillary services must be parcelled out according to need and in coordination with goals.

INSTRUCTIONAL LOCATION

Schools serve as a base for activity, but are not necessarily the best location for all educational services. The community has a variety of resources which could be tapped,
from found space and public parks to civic offices and businesses willing to accommodate small groups.

The location of some programs may be prohibitive to some students from beyond the neighborhood boundaries. Altering location according to program needs and distance from student homes may be one solution.

Students' homes may be used. Instead of sending children to school for some programs, teachers could travel to homes to provide instruction where parents may serve as volunteer aids and the community directly shares in education. On-site schooling for skills best demonstrated in the home or with materials readily available in the home could be part of the educational delivery system which enables teachers, parents and students to formulate unique programs for their special purposes.

Satellite centers geared to availability of students or teacher/professional talent could provide diversity, a change in atmosphere and a closer relationship between communities and their educational services.

Experiential education could enable students to design their learning objectives and programs without geographical restrictions. Multiple enrollment could allow students to participate in distant services or unique programs. Shared enrollment locally could expand options but also enable some parents to pursue formal religious training otherwise eliminated from the public school program because of the constitutional questions discussed earlier.
SCHEDULING

There are no boundaries here. Students and teachers could easily utilize a twenty-four hour day, a seven day week and a fifty-two week year when appropriate. This becomes more difficult with larger schools, but quite possible where mini-schools, house plans and individualized instruction are instituted. Computer assistance makes frequent scheduling much less of a problem than would first be thought.

Figure I depicts some of the points of departure from which any innovation or alternative program emanates. In their ideal form they serve particular needs in an overall educational setting. In their worst form they shift emphasis (such as introducing a new technique or curriculum revision) without focusing on needs. (See Figure I)

Any alternative design should consider (or reconsider) the impact on the entire system. The voucher plan in Alum Rock, according to Weiner (p. 71) resulted in an expected shift in the distribution of authority, role changes (especially among principals), ambiguity, uncertainty, tension and conflict. Even though professional capabilities were maximized due to program differentiation and the implementation of mini-schools, the increased number of interest groups and sub-groups compounded intergroup relations.

The structural organizational change must come to grips with the concomitant alterations in (a) roles, (b) expectations and demands, and (c) relationships among and between individuals and groups. The change will also have an impact on
INTERVENTION POINTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF ALTERNATIVES

FIGURE 1
the assumptions, rewards, penalties, goals and the informal organization. A thorough change strategy should accompany and be appropriate to the proposed alternative program. It seemed that aside from the arguments, much of the intensity of resistance in cities that rejected the voucher plan could be attributed to fear, ignorance and uncertainty among opponents. One particular weakness of the voucher plan has been, aside from Alum Rock, general insistence that it be immediately adopted throughout the entire city, not allowing for hesitation and not recognizing the valuable aspects of existing programs and student relationships that were successful and justified.

The implementation of alternatives allows for partial change - program diversity - with specific students or needs in mind. Alternatives recognize the inappropriateness of any one system. Because of this the organization must be able to act differentially in an organic fashion as the need or occasion demands. This can and should be developed by the system so that a variety of programs could be accommodated. The mini-school or sector-service (regional diversity instead of school-based diversity) are ideas which have prospered in many locations. Where there has been an organizational commitment to the alternative idea, they have formed and succeeded.

The voucher plan should not be utilized as a response to substantial problems within the school system or managerial ineffectiveness in developing autonomy, program initiative or effective building-level decision-making, or personnel decisions. Rather, the voucher or any alternative plan should stem from
success in these areas or develop as an independent response to need.

According to Weiner (p. 241) the success of the voucher plan (or any alternative, large-scale innovation) depends on:

--- Pre-existing reservoirs of trust and respect within the school organization.

--- Appropriateness of the innovation to identified need and to trends.

--- Availability of necessary financial support.

--- The proposal having persistent and influential advocates and the district is not (or would not become) highly mobilized politically.

--- Rewards being made for extra work and compensation and remedies available to overcome anxiety inherent during approval and implementation stages.

--- The existence of support systems (human/nonhuman) which can operate during the demonstration.

--- The availability of time and technical assistance during planning stages.

--- The support of an effective superintendent of schools.

--- Bringing all affected groups into the planning process.

--- Having available tangible rewards for those who must change their behavior (or expectations) as a consequence of the innovation.
--- A general sensitivity to people's needs and the accessibility of routes to satisfaction.

THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVES

The availability of alternatives may not matter to most students or faculty. Furthermore, Jencks reports that, "The character of a school's output depends largely on a single input, namely the characteristics of the entering children. Everything else - the school budget, its policies, the characteristics of the teachers - is either secondary or completely irrelevant" (p. 256). Yet, learner satisfaction, motivation and achievement all reflect his relative perceptions of his environment, his relationship to others and the impact of the organization on him.

Alternatives may provide a variety of responses to political demands and systems which will attempt to equalize resources but, if not for other reasons, their most valuable contribution may be the fact that they allow the organization to adapt to the individual and make the twelve year schooling process an acceptable if not an enjoyable and rewarding experience.
The East Hartford voucher proposal represented a local-federal partnership, the implications of which, for education generally and the State Board of Education in particular, would have been considerable. If a voucher plan were implemented according to design, and certainly if it were true to theory, the public schools could suffer irreparable damage.

The State Board of Education and local boards are established to insure the education of each child. Their authority, however, extends only to public schools. The inclusion of private educational programs under a voucher plan would indeed raise questions in regard to the role of the State Board of Education. Perhaps the greatest fears would be that (1) the "public" schools would become "dumping grounds" for all students unable to enter one of the "private" schools, and (2) as a consequence of private school involvement, financial support of the public schools would diminish considerably.
THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION

The enabling legislation provides broad powers and responsibilities to the demonstration board, which, according to the voucher proposal, would be the present board of education in East Hartford. The State Board of Education is only mentioned once in the statutes as a recipient, along with the General Assembly, of several periodic evaluations conducted by, and reported from, the demonstration board after a program is implemented. The legislation does not recognize the need for the State Board of Education to either plan, advise, supervise, administer, evaluate, direct, approve, fund or in any manner involve itself in the process of establishing a voucher plan. An explicitly defined role, outlined in the enabling legislation, may, however, be unnecessary in view of the general interests and duties of the State Board as expressed and implied in Sections 10-4 through 10-4b, et al, of the General Statutes. (See Appendices II, III and IV)

While precedent suggests that considerable local autonomy is not unusual, and sometimes not even in an experiment with the implications and potential ramifications of a voucher plan, the Board may be placed in an awkward position due to the legal and political forces which promise to involve the State of Connecticut in one fashion or another upon implementation.

Local boards of education are in an immediate position to approve proposed voucher plans; however, it may be the function of the State Board of Education to make the ultimate decision if the issues at hand are clearly interpreted
as detrimental to the education of local school children, or to the quality or functioning of the public school system. The State Board of Education may be forced to make the ultimate decision if approval by a local board would incur unwarranted, costly or prolonged responsibilities by the State of Connecticut, the State Board of Education or the local board of education.

It may have been the intent of the Legislature not to involve the State Board since, aside from the traditional autonomy granted local boards, non-involvement by the state could mean greater local flexibility, expeditious planning and ease in obtaining federal support. Yet, the issues are such that it seems imperative that the Board review its position and determine a role consistent with the law and most appropriate to the circumstances. According to Horobin, Smyth and Wiseman (in Blaug, p. 377), "If state provision were abolished (as a result of vouchers) then private provision would tend to be dominated by powerful organized sectors of the community."

In this way control of education could pass to interest groups alone or in concert, exerting pressure for financial aid and policy considerations from the state for essentially private purposes.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

--- What lobbies would emerge?

--- How would power be redistributed?

--- How would spending authorities establish educational policy?

--- What are the implications of allowing private
use of public funds along with changes in accountability?

--- Would "private" schools become "public" or quasi-public by virtue of their relationship to public financial sources?

--- To what extent does the state want to encourage education spending on private schools or their participation in the voucher plan? And to what extent is the state prepared to pay for that involvement?

--- Should it be the policy of the State Board to subsidize a network of nonpublic schools or any part of their programs or services?

--- Should the state become directly involved in voucher plans in terms of regulation, admissions criteria, suspension and expulsion practices, use and distribution of funds, supervision and certification of employees, curriculum standards, program evaluation or other areas?

SPECIFIC ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Should a local board approve a voucher plan, the following issues will be raised:

1. How will average daily membership be determined?

Section 10-239c of the General Statutes specifies that state aid shall be forthcoming to the voucher district "as would otherwise be provided by law". This may be interpreted in three ways: (a) Only those students in attendance in the public schools, previous to the experiment, will receive credit; (b) Because of the conditions which make the participating nonpublic schools quasi-public and, in part, an administrative function of the local board, all students may be eligible for inclusion
in average daily membership figures; (c) Only students participating in the demonstration, who were, in the previous year, or are currently, public school students, may be eligible.

Recommendation: Only those students enrolled in schools under the supervision of a local or regional board of education should be included in reports of average daily membership. The law does not provide for the inclusion of those students participating, but who are attending a nonpublic school, in the demonstration scholarship program, as part of the determination of ADM. To include those students in nonpublic schools (in this case, two parochial schools), in ADM reports, might be construed as direct and substantial aid to nonpublic (church-related) schools and cause the state and perhaps the State Board of Education to become defendants in any court challenge to a voucher plan.

2. Since all participating schools must meet all educational, fiscal, health and safety standards required by law, which agency will be required to determine compliance? And how will the relationship of the state in the affairs of nonpublic schools effect their autonomy? What, then, would be the operational and legal definitions of public and nonpublic school?

Recommendation: If the plan proceeds with nonpublic school participation where public funds are used to pay for services provided by those schools, all participating nonpublic schools should be subject to all rules, regulations, laws and requirements applicable to the public schools within the demonstration area. The General Statutes must, therefore, be
revised to mandate nonpublic school compliance with the laws governing and regulating public schools. This action would, however, effectively eliminate all distinctions between public and nonpublic schools and deserves further consideration.

3. How will the supervisory responsibility of the local board of education be affected? The East Hartford proposal, while allowing parochial schools to participate as voucher schools, did not require their accountability in order to avoid, according to East Hartford authorities, excessive entanglement between the civil and ecclesiastical administrators. This position, however, is not permitted by law. Quite to the contrary, eligibility requirements strongly suggest that a civil authority must be involved in the approval process and must perform in a similar manner with each school that seeks to participate or continue in such a program.

Recommendation: As implied in (1) and (2) above, no funds should be expended, or rules abridged, to allow the participation of nonpublic schools in the use of general tax revenues. To allow such participation is believed to be a violation of the public trust and an abrogation of the authority and responsibility placed in the hands of elected and appointed public servants, who, in all cases, must remain accountable to the taxpayers and to the parents for the distribution of tax funds, the quality of education, and compliance with the General Statutes. To perform in a manner contrary to the requirements of office by not strictly supervising and evaluating all programs supported through the disbursement of public funds
would be a negligent act.

At the very least, nonpublic schools must agree to be supervised by the local board of education in order to participate in the voucher plan. And, as in (2) above, when supervision and accountability are provided by the local board, whether through the office of the superintendent of schools or through the individual schools directly (under the direction of the board) separation between church and state is effectively removed.

4. Do Sections 10-239a through 10-239h of the General Statutes conflict with Section 10-76k (See Appendix V) because of the absence of defined responsibilities for the State Board of Education? Under Section 10-76k, the State Board of Education is thoroughly responsible for the approval of, and technical assistance to, significant experimental educational programs. Though the General Assembly was quite careful in outlining the relationship of the Board, and the extent of its involvement, and recognized its important role in determining educational policy, it appears dreadfully inconsistent that the General Assembly should completely ignore the State Board of Education on matters relating to the most far-reaching experiment in Connecticut education.

Recommendation: Several options are open to the State Board of Education which are outlined at the conclusion of this report. It is important that the Board review its position on the voucher plan in light of Sections 10-4a, 10-4b and 10-76k of the General Statutes.
5. What powers does the State Department of Education have in enforcing compliance with the laws applicable to the voucher plan? If the State Department of Education enforces the law, what are the ramifications of that involvement?

Recommendation: A ruling should be sought from the Attorney General and the resulting guidelines for appropriate Board involvement should reflect his decision.

6. How will students who are handicapped, disadvantaged and requiring special education be treated? While the public schools are required to maintain programs for these children, it is still unclear to what extent they will benefit or suffer from the voucher plan which, as proposed, does not account for their desire or ability to choose an educational program best suited to their needs. Because of practical administrative constraints, their participation has been limited by the current proposal. But, does their exclusion cause an avoidable and/or unnecessary hardship? Until implementation, this is impossible to determine. The Board must be reminded however, that the enabling legislation requires that disadvantaged children shall be given compensatory vouchers.

Recommendation: Because the state is already heavily involved with needs of the handicapped and special education programs, the Department should review all voucher plans and insure that each student will be guaranteed equal educational opportunity and equal access to facilities insofar as their educational and recreational needs require.

7. To what extent will the law and/or the State Board encourage the participation of nonpublic school interests
in the decision-making process of state and local spending authorities? To what extent does the Board or the Assembly wish to encourage higher levels of education spending for the same level of services that are now provided? To what extent shall the nonpublic schools be subsidized to compete with the public schools for public funds? Also, while the federal government will absorb many cost increases due to the voucher plan, what steps will be taken to assume the costs when federal involvement ends, without over-burdening the residents of the local district?

It seems that there are two implications for school finance: (1) Opening the tax revenues for private/parochial education will increase the cost of education for everyone except the parents who will send their children to nonpublic schools; and, (2) The cost of public education can only increase. Since the public schools are, must, and ought to be prepared to educate all children, they maintain maximum capacity and draw from a fixed tax base. The nonpublic schools can only gain since they will no longer need to charge their patrons who will be subsidized from the general revenue. While some costs are reduced, the loss to the public school system is considerable for each student that no longer enrolls in a public school (the voucher money to the nonpublic school, the loss of ADM and decreased economies of scale).

Recommendation: All efforts must be made to minimize the costs to the public so that termination of federal assistance will not cause a hardship or destroy whatever gains may have been realized. If it appears that the voucher plan would
be too costly or perhaps abandoned in five years, it should be submitted to re-examination at the outset, to determine its soundness. Elimination of nonpublic schools at the start, would, of course, avoid the problem later, but would jeopardize eventual federal assistance for the voucher project, which, according to NIE now rests on the inclusion of nonpublic schools.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The statutes should be amended to provide the State Board of Education a role, consistent with Section 10-76k, in all matters relating to a demonstration scholarship program.

2. The provision for nonpublic schools should be eliminated from Section 10-239e of the General Statutes in order to maintain the integrity of the public school system, its finances and constitutionality.

3. In light of the issues discussed in this report, it may now be appropriate for the State Board of Education to consider several available options in determining the role it will play in future voucher plans:
   a. Maintain a position of non-involvement.
   b. Decide to adopt or reject the policy of supporting nonpublic schools and confront the implications of such a policy.
   c. Intervene to modify any plan, establish conditions or otherwise influence the program before a local board acts.
   d. Wait until a local board of education has made a decision and thereby avoid unnecessary and perhaps premature
conflicts.

e. Establish policy and/or guidelines for the use of the Department of Education (and other) resources should a local board proceed with a voucher plan.

f. Communicate a non-binding "sense of the Board" position to local boards.

g. Establish procedures and guidelines for future development of voucher plans. Support a revision of the law to include a formal role for the State Board, or Board promulgated statutory restrictions and/or controls.

h. Seek prior rulings by the State Attorney General's Office regarding powers, duties and liabilities of the Board in regard to Sections 10-4 through 10-4b, 10-76k, and 10-239a through 10-239h of the General Statutes as they might apply to a voucher plan and establish the powers of and promote guidelines by the State Department of Education to insure compliance by local boards.

The following topic areas and specific questions may benefit from an interpretation/ruling by the Attorney General's Office:

I. Questions concerning the operationality of Sections 10-239a through 10-239h of the Connecticut General Statutes.

(1) (10-239a) "It is the intent of the legislature to enable up to six town or regional boards of education to participate in a demonstration. . . ." Does this mean individual boards of education and preclude more than one board designing a mutual program?
(2) (10-239a) "The demonstration scholarship program authorized by sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive, shall aid students and shall not be used to support or to benefit any particular schools." How will the issue of support be resolved? At what point does aiding a student's choice of program become aiding a particular school? What criteria will be used to determine the existence and extent of aid to students as a group and as individuals?

(3) (10-239b) "Demonstration area means the area designated by the participating town or regional board of education for the purposes of a demonstration scholarship program. . . ." May this area extend beyond the jurisdiction of the participating town or regional board of education?

(4) (10-239b) "...scholarship program. ...which area shall include a substantial number of needy or disadvantaged students. . . ." Must needy and/or disadvantaged students be included? What percentage of needy or disadvantaged constitutes substantial? Can a demonstration program be implemented where there are no needy/disadvantaged students?

(5) (10-239b) "...demonstration scholarship program means a program for all pupils eligible to attend public or private schools within the demonstration area. . . ." May any student or group of students be omitted from the scholarship program because of unique needs or the existence of fully adequate programs specially designed for them?

(6) (10-239c) "...such board to receive such state and local aid for any of its students as would otherwise be
provided by law regardless of whether or not such students participate in a demonstration scholarship program, which funds may be expended under the demonstration scholarship program as the demonstration contract shall provide and within the demonstration area." What does "otherwise" mean? Would state aid based on average daily membership be provided on the basis of all eligible students within the demonstration area? Would all students be counted in public and private and parochial schools? Would students be counted on the basis of prior attendance or current (during demonstration) attendance? Would students enrolled in private and parochial schools be eliminated from determining the basis of ADM if they were previously enrolled there?

Would other forms of state aid, such as categorical aid be provided to all participating private and parochial schools on an equal basis as the public schools?

Can the demonstration contract delegate authority and responsibility to other agencies or nonpublic agencies which would under non-demonstration conditions, be the responsibility of the local or regional school board? Can the demonstration board treat one or a group of schools in a manner different from other participating schools? Specifically, can different supervisory standards or requirements be established for different schools?

7. (10-239d) "The town or regional board of education may establish a demonstration board and staff and may authorize it to administer the demonstration project authorized by
sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive, provided the costs of such organization shall be borne by the contracting federal agency." Must the town or regional board of education establish a special demonstration board? If not, does the requirement that a federal agency pay the costs of administering a demonstration board apply to those activities of the local or regional board directly related to the demonstration project? Must federal funds be involved? Or can localities establish a demonstration scholarship plan entirely on their own?

8. (10-239d-2) "The scholarship funds shall be made available. . . in the form of a drawing right, certificate or other document. . . ." Must public school children be given this certificate or drawing right? May this drawing right take the form of a receipt from a nonpublic school which will then be redeemed by the public school authorities? If it may take the form of reimbursement, will that negate the scholarship feature of the law?

9. (10-239d-4) "... compensatory scholarships shall be given to disadvantaged children. . . ." Must compensatory scholarships be issued? Must special programs be designed for disadvantaged children in such a way that the scholarship must demonstrate "... the extent to which the quality and delivery of educational services are affected by economic incentives"?

10. (10-239d-6) "The contract shall provide sufficient money to pay all actual and necessary transportation costs. . . subject to distance limitations imposed by existing law." Are these limitations only applicable to providing maximal walking
limits? Is it possible that a maximum driving time on a bus would effectively limit the demonstration area? If not, must transportation be provided only to those points that can be accommodated in a daily round trip schedule? May boarding schools be selected and transportation paid on commercial carriers for weekend or vacation returns?

11. (10-239e) "...to use the demonstration scholarships at any public or private school in which the scholarship recipient is enrolled provided such public or private school: (1) Meets all educational, fiscal, health and safety standards required by law." There are two standards, one public and one private. Which educational, fiscal, health and safety standards would apply to participating demonstration schools? Would the public demonstration schools abide by the existing laws, etc., which apply only to them? Similarly, would participating private schools abide by the existing (and minimal) laws pertaining to private schools? Would participation in the demonstration project and in the use of substantial public funds, have the effect of making private schools quasi-public and subject to adherence to those laws governing the functioning of public schools?

12. (10-239e-3) "...in no case levies or requires any tuition fee or charge above the value of the education scholarship." Does this prevent private schools from admitting students from outside of the demonstration area at a cost which would exceed that allowed for participants? Would this in effect demand that all participating private schools be limited to enrolling students from the demonstration area at a cost
determined by a demonstration board on which, it is likely, they will not be represented?

13. (10-239e-b) "In compliance with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion, schools may be exempted from subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section (which forbids participation of those schools under sectarian control) if they meet all other requirements for eligibility." This raises many questions. See Chapter II.

II. Questions concerning the role of the State Department of Education and the State Board of Education.

1. The only mention of the State Board of Education in the enabling legislation for Demonstration Scholarship Programs is in Section 10-239g which states that, "All evaluations done shall be reported in detail to the state board of education and the joint standing committee of the general assembly.", and as a recipient of certificates from participating schools that they are in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

While the role of the State Board of Education is, according to Sections 10-239a through 10-239h, minimal, relative to the demonstration scholarship programs, other state laws suggest that the Legislature intended the State Board of Education to be more involved, and to share the responsibility of experimental programs. Specifically, Section 10-76k of the General Statutes titled, The Development of Experimental Educational Programs, outlines a definite role for the State Board of Education. Coupled with Sections 10-4 through 10-4b, the statutes appear to outline a clear area of general
responsibility for the State Board of Education. Therefore, it must be determined to what extent the State Board should be involved in future demonstration scholarship programs. Should the Board take the initiative, establish guidelines, supervise feasibility studies, channel federal funds, provide research services, approve local programs, establish criteria for private and/or parochial school involvement, etc.? Is the State Board liable for the actions of the local board in regard to the demonstration program? That is to say, will the State Board become a party in any suit regarding the expenditure of state funds for the education of children in private/parochial schools? Does the State Board have an obligation under Sections 10-4 through 10-4b of the General Statutes to become involved in the demonstration scholarship program to the extent necessary to protect the educational interests of the public school students? If the State Board does have that obligation, to what extent does it become involved? Does it approve or disapprove programs? Does it establish criteria for participation? Does it establish all guidelines for program operation through the State Department of Education?

2. If, according to the law, strictly construed, the State Board of Education does not have a role in demonstration scholarship programs, who interprets the ambiguities in the enabling legislation? In addition, should the State Department of Education be placed in the position of making administrative rulings regarding a voucher program (conceivably after hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent) which
could substantially alter or abolish it? If the State Department of Education must rule (at least preliminarily) on the use of calculation of state aid does it then not assume a role in the demonstration program? If it is forced into such a benign role it is also placed in the position of either administering the program through interpretation or establishing guidelines after the fact.

3. What duties, liabilities, and powers of the Board of Education are affected by the demonstration scholarship plan? What implications are there for the State Department of Education if in fact, the State Board must remain uninvolved? While it appears unlikely, a situation could develop where local initiative, not questioned by the state, might lead to erosion of state power and establish precedents that perhaps should be avoided. In a sense then the state, as senior partner in the cause of education, should take the initiative, determine its role and establish guidelines for the use of Sections 10-239a through 10-239h.

While it is important that the State Board of Education seek a ruling or an advisory opinion from the Attorney General's Office, the defeat of the proposed voucher plan in East Hartford has relieved the pressure for immediate action, and questions the desirability of the demonstration plan altogether. According to a spokesman at the National Institute of Education, it is likely that the federal interest in voucher experimentation will soon end. In addition, the questions raised by the program and the existing legislation are sufficient to demand a post-
ponement of any new voucher proposals.

The State Board of Education should be mindful of the recent initiative by several members of the Connecticut Legislature to mandate a demonstration program.

However, in light of the recent rejection of a voucher proposal in New Hampshire, it is doubtful that the federal interest in financing an extended demonstration will continue, and, after all is said and done, federal non-involvement may effectively call an end to the voucher movement.
Sec. 10-239a. Demonstration scholarship program. Short title. Legislative intent. This act shall be known and may be cited as the demonstration scholarship program authorization act of 1972. It is the intent of the legislature to enable up to six town or regional boards of education to participate in a demonstration program designed to develop and test the use of education scholarships for school children. The purpose of this demonstration scholarship program is to develop and test education scholarships as a way to improve the quality of education by making schools, both public and private, more responsive to the needs of children and parents, to provide greater parental choice, and to determine the extent to which the quality and delivery of educational services are affected by economic incentives. The demonstration scholarship program authorized by sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive, shall aid students and shall not be used to support or to benefit any particular schools.

Sec. 10-239b. Definitions. As used in sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive: (1) "Demonstration area" means the area designated by the participating town or regional board of education for the purposes of a demonstration scholarship program defined in subsection (2) of this section, which area shall include a substantial number of needy or disadvantaged students, (2) "demonstration scholarship program" means a program for developing and testing the use of educational scholarships for all pupils eligible to attend public or private schools within the demonstration area, which scholarships shall be made available to the parents or legal guardians of a scholarship recipient in the form of a drawing right, negotiable certificate or other document which may not be redeemed except for educational purposes at schools fulfilling the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10-239e, (3) "demonstration board" means a board established by the town or regional board of education to conduct the demonstration scholarship program, (4) "contract" means the agreement entered into by the town or regional board of education and a federal governmental agency for the purpose of conducting a demonstration scholarship program.

Sec. 10-239c. Contract with federal agency for funds. The town or regional board of education may contract with a federal governmental agency for funds to establish a demonstration scholarship program to exist for a period of up to five years, such board
to receive such state and local aid for any of its students as would otherwise be provided by law regardless of whether or not such students participate in a demonstration scholarship program, which funds may be expended under the demonstration scholarship program as the demonstration contract shall provide and within the demonstration area.

Sec. 10-239d. Demonstration board and staff. Scholarships. The town or regional board of education may establish a demonstration board and staff and may authorize it to administer the demonstration project as authorized by sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive, provided the costs of such organization shall be borne by the contracting federal agency. The members of the demonstration board, if it is not the town or regional board of education itself, shall serve for the terms established by the appointing board. (1) The demonstration board may:
(a) Employ a staff for the demonstration board, (b) receive and expend funds to support the demonstration board and scholarships for children in the demonstration area, (c) contract with other government agencies and private persons or organizations to provide or receive services, supplies, facilities and equipment, (d) determine rules and regulations for use of scholarships in the demonstration area, (e) adopt rules and regulations for its own government, (f) receive and expend funds from the federal governmental agency necessary to pay for the costs incurred in administering the program, (g) otherwise provide the specified programs, services and activities.

(2) The demonstration board shall award a scholarship to each school child residing in the demonstration area, subject only to such age and grade restrictions which it may establish. The scholarship funds shall be made available to the parents or legal guardian of a scholarship recipient in the form of a drawing right, certificate or other document which may not be redeemed except for educational purposes.

(3) The demonstration board shall establish the amount of the scholarship in a fair and impartial manner as follows: There shall be a basic scholarship equal in amount to every other basic scholarship for every eligible student in the demonstration area. In no case shall the amount of the basic scholarship fall below the level of average current expense per pupil for corresponding grade levels in the public schools in the demonstration area in the year immediately preceding the demonstration program.

(4) In addition to each base scholarship, compensatory scholarships shall be given to disadvantaged children. The amount of such compensatory scholarships and the manner by which children may qualify for them shall be established by the demonstration board.

(5) Adequate provision for the pro rata or incremental redemption of scholarships shall be made.
(6) The contract shall provide sufficient money to pay all actual and necessary transportation costs incurred by parents in sending their children to the school of their choice within the demonstration area, subject to distance limitations imposed by existing law.

(7) The contract shall specify that the contracting federal governmental agency shall hold harmless the participating local board from any possible decreased economies of scale or increased costs per pupil caused by transition to a demonstration program.

Sec. 10-239e. Use of scholarships. Eligibility of schools.
(a) The demonstration board shall authorize the parents or legal guardian of scholarship recipients to use the demonstration scholarships at any public or private school in which the scholarship recipient is enrolled provided such public or private school: (1) Meets all educational, fiscal, health and safety standards required by law, (2) does not discriminate against the admission of students and the hiring of teachers on the basis of race, color or economic status and has filed a certificate with the state board of education that the school is in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (3) in no case levies or requires any tuition, fee or charge above the value of the education scholarship, (4) is free from sectarian control or influence except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, (5) provides public access to all financial and administrative records and provides to the parent or guardian of each eligible child in the demonstration area comprehensive information, in written form, on the courses of study offered, curriculum, materials and textbooks, the qualifications of teachers, administrators and paraprofessionals, the minimum school day, the salary schedules, financial reports of money spent per pupil and such other information as may be required by the demonstration board, (6) provides periodic reports to the parents on the average progress of the pupils enrolled, (7) meets any additional requirements established for all participating schools by the demonstration board.

(b) In compliance with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion, schools may be exempted from subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section if they meet all other requirements for eligibility.

Sec. 10-239f. Collective bargaining by teachers. Nothing contained in sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive, shall be construed to interfere in any way with the rights of teachers in participating town or regional school districts to organize and to bargain collectively regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. Teachers employed in the demonstration area shall be bound by the terms of such bargaining in the same way and to the same extent as if there
were no demonstration area.

Sec. 10-239g. Evaluation of quality of education and satisfaction with schools under program. The demonstration board shall provide for a valid test for judging the quality of education and satisfaction with schools resulting from the demonstration scholarship program as compared to the present system of public and private schools. All evaluations done shall be reported in detail to the state board of education and the joint standing committee on education of the general assembly.

Sec. 10-239h. Liberal construction. The provisions of sections 10-239a to 10-239h, inclusive shall be liberally construed, the legislature's intent being to enable up to six Connecticut school districts to participate in this demonstration scholarship program.
Sec. 10-4. Duties of board. Reports. (a) Said board shall have general supervision and control of the educational interests of the state, which interests shall include pre-school, elementary and secondary education, special education, vocational education and adult education; shall provide leadership and otherwise promote the improvement of education in the state, including research, planning and evaluation; shall prepare such courses of study and publish such curriculum guides including recommendations for textbooks, materials and other teaching aids as it determines are necessary to assist school districts to carry out the duties prescribed by law; shall conduct workshops and related activities, including programs of inter-group relations training, to assist teachers in making effective use of such curriculum materials and in improving their proficiency in meeting the diverse needs and interests of pupils; and shall keep informed as to the conditions, progress and needs of the schools in the state.

(b) Said board shall submit to the governor, as provided in section 4-60, and to the general assembly, a detailed statement of the activities of the board and an account of the condition of the public schools and of the amount and quality of instruction therein and such other information as will assess the true condition, progress and needs of public education. Said board shall develop or cause to be developed an evaluation and assessment procedure designed to measure objectively the adequacy and efficiency of the educational programs offered by the public schools and shall report on these procedures to the joint standing committee on education of the general assembly by February 15, 1972.

(c) Said board shall also include recommendations for policies and programs designed to improve education and may publish such reports and information concerning the educational interests of the state within its jurisdiction as it deems advisable.
Sec. 10-4a. Educational interests of state identified. For purposes of sections 10-4, 10-4b and 10-220, the educational interests of the state shall include, but not be limited to, the concern of the state (1) that each child shall have for the period prescribed in the general statutes equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educational experiences; (2) that each school district shall finance at a reasonable level an educational program designed to achieve this end; and (3) that the mandates in the general statutes pertaining to education within the jurisdiction of the state board of education be implemented.
Sec. 10-4b. Failure of local board to implement educational interests. Whenever said state board finds that a board of education of any school district has failed to make reasonable provision to implement the educational interests of the state as defined in section 10-4a, said state board shall conduct an inquiry to identify the cause of such failure and shall determine what recommendations should be made as to the necessary remedies to be pursued by the responsible local or state agencies. In conducting such inquiries, the state board of education shall give the board of education involved the opportunity to be heard. Said state board may summon by subpoena any person whose testimony may be pertinent to the inquiry and any records or documents related to the provision of public education in the school district.
Sec. 10-76k. (Formerly Sec. 10-76i). Development of experimental educational programs. (a) The board of education of any school district, or any other public or private non-profit organization or agency, may prepare and develop experimental educational plans and submit them to the state board of education, provided all such proposals coming from organizations other than a board of education shall be approved by the board of education of the school district before submission to the state board. Each such plan shall specify, describe and support with reasons the following:

1. The objectives of such plan;
2. The methods of evaluation to be employed;
3. The area to be served by and from which pupils will be drawn for the experimental educational project;
4. The policies, standards and methods to be employed in the selection of pupils;
5. The policies, standards and methods with respect to the operation of the project, including administrative organization, grouping of pupils, educational and instructional practices, the use and functioning of teachers and other instructional and supervisory personnel, choice of educational materials and equipment, allocation of curricular time and use of extra-school cultural facilities;
6. The site, size, design, estimated capital cost and method of financing of any school or other building, or specific standards and criteria for determining the same;
7. The expected sources of financial support together with estimates of the required annual budgets for the first two years of operation, exclusive of capital costs of land and buildings;
8. The policies and standards with respect to professional staff, including qualifications, estimated salary scales and methods of selection of professional personnel; and
9. Provision for direct participation by members of the communities and students to be served by such experimental educational projects, in planning, policy-making and service function affecting such projects. The state board of education may accept, reject or modify any such experimental educational project, or it may request the revision and resubmission of such plan, if said board finds
such plan does not conform to the educational interests of the state, as defined in section 10-4a and other sections of the general statutes. Acceptance of an experimental educational project by the state board of education shall constitute compliance of the plan with this and other sections of this title.

(b) The state board of education shall furnish assistance to all applicants in the planning and developing of projects under this section.

(c) All experimental educational projects conducted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be evaluated at least annually. The state board of education shall, on or before March first annually, review with the joint standing committee on education of the general assembly all applications for projects, state board actions on such proposals, the current programs, evaluations of such programs, and such other information as said committee may require in order to inform itself about such programs.
APPENDIX VI
1970 PRIVATE SCHOOLS

1. AVON OLD FARMS SCHOOL - Avon, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1825; Avon Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1038.

2. LAURELCREST PREPARATORY SCHOOL - Bristol, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1600; Bristol Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $750.

3. CHERISHIRE ACADEMY - Cheshire, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1700; Cheshire Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $891.

4. SAINT THOMAS MORE SCHOOL - Colchester, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $2885; Colchester Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $833.

5. MARVELWOOD SCHOOL - Cornwall, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $2050; Cornwall Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $843.

6. WOOSTER SCHOOL - Danbury, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1700; Danbury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $957.

7. CHERRY LAWN SCHOOL - Darien, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1550; Darien Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1482.

8. FAIRFIELD COLLEGE PREPARATORY SCHOOL - Fairfield, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $550; Fairfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1027.

9. FAIRFIELD COUNTRY DAY SCHOOL - Fairfield, Conn.; Grades K-9; Tuition - $645 - $1725; Fairfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1027.

10. THE UNQUOWA SCHOOL - Fairfield, Conn.; Grades K-9; Tuition - $630 - $1370; Fairfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1027.
11. MISS PORTER'S SCHOOL - Farmington, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $3925; Farmington Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1014.

12. BRUNSWICK SCHOOL - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades N-12; Tuition - $800 - $1700; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

13. THE DAYCROFT SCHOOL - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades N-12; Tuition - $1650; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

14. GREENWICH ACADEMY - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades K-12; Tuition - $2500; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

15. GREENWICH COUNTRY DAY SCHOOL - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades 9-9; Tuition - $885 - $2185; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

16. ROSEMARY HALL SCHOOL - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $2350; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

17. WHITBY SCHOOL - Greenwich, Conn.; Grades N-9; Tuition - $1030 - $1680; Greenwich Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1211.

18. THE AUSTIN SCHOOL - Hartford, Conn.; Grades 8-12; Tuition - $1750; Hartford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1228.

19. KINGSWOOD SCHOOL - West Hartford, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1950; West Hartford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1153.

20. OXFORD SCHOOL - Hartford, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1920; Hartford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1228.

21. RENBROOK SCHOOL - West Hartford, Conn.; Grades N-9; Tuition - $625 - $1525; West Hartford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1153.

22. WATKINSON SCHOOL - Hartford, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1750; Hartford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1228.

23. KENT SCHOOL - Kent, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $3735; Kent Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $848.

24. THE HOTCHKISS SCHOOL - Salisbury, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1950; Salisbury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $809.

25. INDIAN MOUNTAIN SCHOOL - Salisbury, Conn.; Grades 5-9; Tuition - $1250; Salisbury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $809.
26. THE FORMAN SCHOOLS - Litchfield, Conn.; Grades 8-12; Tuition - $1750; Litchfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1008.

27. THE COUNTRY SCHOOL - Madison, Conn.; Grades K-9; Tuition - $775 - $1625; Madison Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $857.

28. WESTOVER SCHOOL - Middlebury, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $4400; Middlebury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $914.

29. THE MILFORD ACADEMY - Milford, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $2000; Milford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $846.

30. NEW CANAAN COUNTRY SCHOOL - New Canaan, Conn.; Grades N-9; Tuition - $907 - $1875; New Canaan Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1337.

31. SAINT LUKE'S SCHOOL - New Canaan, Conn.; Grades 4-12; Tuition - $1650 - $1950; New Canaan Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1337.

32. MORE HALL SCHOOL - Pomfret, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1100; Pomfret Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $724.

33. THE FOOTE SCHOOL - New Haven, Conn.; Grades K-8; Tuition - $670 - $1460; New Haven Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1141.

34. THE GATEWAY SCHOOL - New Haven, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1400; New Haven Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1141.

35. HAMDEN HALL COUNTRY DAY SCHOOL - Hamden, Conn.; Grades N-12; Tuition - $850 - $1750; Hamden Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1071.

36. HOPKINS GRAMMAR SCHOOL - New Haven, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $2000; New Haven Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1141.


38. CANTERBURY SCHOOL - New Milford, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1600; New Milford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $885.

39. PLUMFIELD SCHOOL - Darien, Conn.; Grades N-8; Tuition - $425 - $1600; Darien Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1482.
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56. RUMSEY HALL SCHOOL - Washington, Conn.; Grades 1-9; Tuition - $1450; Washington Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1158.

57. WYKEHAM RISE SCHOOL - Washington, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1750; Washington Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1158.

58. MCTERNAN SCHOOL - Waterbury, Conn.; Grades K-9; Tuition - $750 - $1450; Waterbury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $910.

59. SAINT MARGARET'S SCHOOL - Waterbury, Conn.; Grades 5-12; Tuition - $2050; Waterbury Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $910.

60. THE TAFT SCHOOL - Watertown, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1750; Watertown Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $790.

61. GREEN FARMS ACADEMY - Westport, Conn.; Grades K-12; Tuition - $940 - $1910; Westport Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1364.

62. THE LOOMIS SCHOOL - Windsor, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1850; Windsor Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $874.

63. THE CHAFFEE SCHOOL - Windsor, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1650; Windsor Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $874.

64. BECKET ACADEMY - East Haddam, Conn.; Grades 5-9; Tuition - $2700; East Haddam Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $889.

65. THE INDEPENDENT DAY SCHOOL - Middlefield, Conn.; Grades K-9; Tuition - $785 - $1585; Middlefield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $909.

66. THE ROOSEVELT SCHOOL - Stamford, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $3675; Stamford Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1081.

67. THE DAY PROSPECT HILL SCHOOL - New Haven, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1650 - $1725; New Haven Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1141.

68. KINGSLEY HALL SCHOOL - Westbrook, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1450; Westbrook Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $811.
69. LITCHFIELD PREPARATORY SCHOOL - Litchfield, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1000; Litchfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1008.

70. THE NOROTON SCHOOL - Darien, Conn.; Grades 9-12; Tuition - $1915; Darien Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $1482.

71. THE BEECHES SCHOOL - Plainfield, Conn.; Grades 4-12; Tuition - $1400; Plainfield Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $668.

72. DEVONSHIRE SCHOOL - Bristol, Conn.; Grades 7-12; Tuition - $1700; Bristol Public School Per Pupil Expenditure - $750.

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