Limitations of the traditional epistemological orientation toward an "objective paradigm" are discussed, and an alternative "subjective paradigm" is proposed which holds that knowledge is synthesized by the knower, pursuant to his or her own motives. Implications of this view are drawn for the study of language, including problems of early language acquisition. The psychology of reading and response is conceptualized in a way similar to the psychology of language acquisition and is related to various developmental stages. Because language use, literary response, and interpretation are seen as always motivated rather than motiveless, studies which screen out "irrelevant" motives and other emotional factors are seen to create new motives for language use and literary response, replacing the ones of primary interest: those attached to normal speech and reading contexts. The rationale for subjective criticism and its pedagogical implications are also discussed.

(AA)
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY
IN THE
STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

DAVID BLEICH
INDIANA UNIVERSITY

DAVID BLEICH
Dept. of English
Ballantine Hall
Indiana University
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47401

DAVID BLEICH
515 South Woodlawn
Bloomington, Indiana 47401
Language and literature are now two different disciplines. Linguistic research is governed by the belief in the explanatory adequacy of mathematics, while criticism is resigned to the epistemological inadequacy of interpretation. Neither of these attitudes has produced the desired results, which are knowledge and confidence in the means to develop new knowledge. Those committed to formulating grammatical rules allow that they have yet to explain the actual human use of language, and those who think literary interpretation is important are embarrassed that it seems ultimately to boil down to mere subjective opinion. In school, it has become increasingly difficult to justify teaching either discipline because those studying the subjects at the most complex level have either forgotten or never knew which occasions in human experience regularly demand knowledge of language and literature. Younger people do know these occasions, and they can only turn to other subjects whose concerns are more certainly related to their own. I think that the separate paths of language and literature as well as their epistemological struggles are the results of an outworn cultural allegiance to objectivity. In the following remarks, I will explore the epistemological issue, suggest a possible means of ameliorating it, and then indicate implications of these means for pedagogy.

In a previous essay, I described the traditional epistemological orientation as the "objective paradigm," where the idea of a paradigm follows T. S. Kuhn's original use of it. To think in this framework is to assume that the object of knowledge is now and will continue to be independent of the act of observation. The explanation of that object (or process) is thought of as belonging to the object, and is considered as independent of the observer as the object is. Thus, both objects and knowledge about objects are "objective."

This assumption dictates certain criteria of explanatory adequacy: universality—the explanation has to obtain in every case of the object; repeatability—every time the object or process is deliberately repeated, the explanation ob-
TAINS; AND PREDICTABILITY--THE BEHAVIOR OF THE OBJECT (OR PROCESS) MAY
PREDICTED BY OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXPLANATION. THESE STANDARDS OF EX-
PLANATION ARE ALL MET WHEN IT IS REPRESENTED IN LOGICAL OR MATHEMATICAL TERMS.
BECAUSE THIS FORM OF EXPLANATION HAS HAD THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN THE LAST FEW
CENTURIES, HUME'S UNCONTRADICTED ARGUMENT AGAINST A NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN
CAUSE AND EFFECT HAS NOT BEEN ASSIMILATED TO OUR CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE. MATHE-
MATICAL EXPLANATION SEEMS TO DEMONSTRATE JUST SUCH A NECESSARY CONNECTION IN
THE OBJECT OF INQUIRY BECAUSE THE EXPLANATION IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT.
IT IS A CONTRADICTION IN OUR THOUGHT THAT BOTH HUME'S ARGUMENT AND MATHEMATICAL
EXPLANATION ARE CONSIDERED TRUE.

THIS CONTRADICTION MAY BE ELIMINATED BY ASSUMING THE SUBJECTIVE PARADIGM,
WHICH PROPOSES THAT KNOWLEDGE IS SYNTHESIZED BY THE KNOWER PURSUANT TO HIS OWN
MOTIVES AND THE MOTIVES OF HIS COMMUNITY; THE OBJECT OF EXPLANATION IS A SET OF
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES, AND THE PURPOSE OF EXPLANATION IS TO FACILITATE MENTAL
HANDLING OF THOSE EXPERIENCES. BOTH THE OBJECT OF INQUIRY AND ITS EXPLANATION
ARE THEREFORE SUBJECTIVE. IN INSTANCES WHERE MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION IS AP-
PLICABLE, IT IS UNDERSTOOD AS A SUBCATEGORY OF A MORE GENERAL EXPLANATORY ACT,
RESYMBOLOGIZATION. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AN EXPLANATION IS MATHEMATICAL OR VERBAL,
IT IS CONCEIVED OF AS HAVING RESYMBOLIZED AN EXPERIENCE RATHER THAN AS HAVING
GOTTEN CLOSER TO THE TRUTH ABOUT AN OBJECTIVE PHENOMENON. A CAUSAL EXPLANATION
IS MORE USEFULLY UNDERSTOOD AS HAVING ANSWERED A SUBJECTIVE DEMAND AND MAKES
NO CLAIMS ABOUT OBJECTIVELY NECESSARY CONNECTIONS.

SYMBOLIZATION IS THE CHARACTERISTIC HUMAN MEANS OF IDENTIFYING EXPERIENCE;
RESYMBOLOGIZATION IS THE RESULT OF THE SUBJECTIVE DIALECTIC THAT TRIES TO ASSIMILATE
THAT EXPERIENCE, CONSCIOUSLY, TO OUR PREVIOUS VIEW OF THINGS. AN EXPLANATION RE-
SOLVES THE NEW DISHARMONY THROUGH AN ALTERATION OF SELF-AWARENESS. THE ACT OF
EXPLANATION IS THUS UNDERSTOOD AS A PIECE OF LOCAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION.
THIS VIEW IS CONSISTENT WITH KUHN'S ACCOUNT OF THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE, WHICH ARGUES THAT IT IS MORE DEMONSTRABLY DETERMINED BY COMMUNAL
SYNTHESIS THAN BY AN APPROACH EVER NEARER TO A BODY OF ABSOLUTE TRUTH. KNOW-
LEDGE ARTICULATED BY ONE CIVILIZATION IS MORE EASILY UNDERSTOOD AS ANSWERING
THE DEMANDS OF THAT CULTURE THAN AS HAVING DISCOVERED THE ERRORS OF THE PREV-
IOUS CULTURE. FOR EXAMPLE KNOWLEDGE CREATED IN OUR TIME HAS FACILITATED A
DANGEROUS POPULATION GROWTH AND HAS POSED THE THREAT OF HUMAN ANNIHILATION;
A FUTURE CIVILIZATION COULD CONCEIVABLY VIEW THIS KNOWLEDGE AS A MALADAPTIVE
MUTATION. BUT UNDERSTOOD MORE LOCALLY, THE SAME KNOWLEDGE HELPS PEOPLE TO LIVE
LONGER AND DID HELP PRESERVE THIS CIVILIZATION.

THE CONCEPT OF RESYMBOLIZATION CONFERS A MORE GENERAL AUTHORITY ONTO VERBAL
EXPLANATION THAN ON MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION, BUT BOTH ARE SEEN AS GOVERNED BY
SUBJECTIVE AND INTERSUBJECTIVE FACTORS ONLY. RATHER THAN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
DICTATING THE CRITERIA OF EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY, THE COMMUNITY OF THINKERS CRE-
ATE THE CRITERIA AND DETERMINES THE RANGE AND APPLICABILITY OF ANY GIVEN EXPLAN-
ATION; PERSUASION RATHER THAN PROOF IS THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE. THEREFORE, AN
ADEQUATE EXPLANATION NEED NOT BE PREDICTABLE OR REPEATABLE, AND CERTAINLY NOT
UNIVERSAL; IT NEED ONLY SATISFY A LOCAL DEMAND FOR EXPLANATION. IT IS A MOOT
QUESTION WHETHER SUPERSTITIONS DISAPPEAR BECAUSE THEY WERE DISCOVERED TO BE
ERRONEOUS BELIEFS, OR WHETHER THE BELIEFS CAME INTO CONFLICT WITH MORE URGENT
ADAPTIVE DEMANDS IN THE COMMUNITY. THERE ARE STILL MANY TALL URBAN BUILDINGS
WHICH DO NOT HAVE THIRTEENTH FLOORS. FOR SOME PURPOSES, THE CONCEPT OF THE THIR-
TEENTH FLOOR OBTAINS; FOR OTHERS THERE IS ONLY THE TWELFTH AND FOURTEENTH. THE
SUBJECTIVE PARADIGM IS VIABLE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE FOR EVER FEWER PURPOSES,
MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

THIS DECREASING ADEQUACY IS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASING AWARENESS OF THE
ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE, AND BY THE RISING AND PERHAPS
FEARFUL SUSPICION THAT KNOWLEDGE IS AFTER ALL QUITE A SUBJECTIVE MATTER. IN
ANY CASE, LANGUAGE IS NOW AN ITEM OF ORGANIZED INQUIRY ON AN UNPRECEDENTED
SCALE, BUT IT HAS PROVED PARTICULARLY UNYIELDING TO MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE ENACTS OUR CONDITION OF SUBJECTIVITY. BECAUSE WE THINK IN LANGUAGE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE ON WHICH ASPECT OF LANGUAGE TO ISOLATE FOR OBJECTIVE STUDY, BEING SO DECISIVELY TIED TO OVERALL MENTAL FUNCTIONING, THE CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AS A SYSTEM OF FORMAL RULES DOES NOT ACCORD WITH ITS USE. MANY HAVE RECOGNIZED THIS AND HAVE ENLARGED THE PURVIEW OF STUDY TO INCLUDE SEMANTICS AND SPEECH BEHAVIORS; YET THE NEED TO SPELL OUT FORMAL RULES STILL GOVERNS THESE EFFORTS. SUBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF USING RULES AS PART OF AN EXPLANATION, BUT THEY DO SUGGEST PLACING THE FIRST RESEARCH PRIORITIES ON THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF LANGUAGE AND PARTICULARLY ON THE COMMON FEELING OF CONSCIOUS DOMINION OVER THE LANGUAGE WE USE.

THIS ORIENTATION TRANSLATES THE PROBLEM OF THE "NATURE OF LANGUAGE" INTO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO UNDERSTAND OUR OWN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT; FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS, PIAGET AND CHOMSKY HAVE ALREADY DEFINED THE ISSUE IN THESE TERMS: TO UNDERSTAND LANGUAGE IS TO UNDERSTAND THE MIND. CHOMSKY IS IN AGREEMENT WITH PIAGET THAT LANGUAGE OR INTELLIGENCE OR BOTH ARE TO BE CONCEIVED SIMILARLY TO ORGANS OF THE BODY. THEY ARE IN DISPUTE OVER WHETHER PIAGET’S FORMULATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF INTELLIGENCE CONSTITUTE AN EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT. CHOMSKY’S REASONING IS THAT BECAUSE LANGUAGE HAS BEEN LARGELY DESCRIBABLE AS A SYSTEM OF FORMAL SYNTAXIC RULES, WE ARE JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING RULES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFANTILE INTELLIGENCE, AND FOR SEEKING THE SOURCE OF THOSE RULES IN A MATHEMATICALLY DESCRIBABLE STRUCTURE PRESENT, PRESUMABLY, IN HUMAN GENES. SUCH A SYSTEM OF GENETICALLY BASED RULES WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF THE STAGES OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING THE MEANS OF TRANSITION BETWEEN STAGES, FROM BIRTH THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADULT LANGUAGE. CHOMSKY CLAIMS THAT PIAGET’S FORMULATIONS GIVE ONLY A DESCRIPTION OF THE SHIFTS FROM STAGE TO STAGE, AND NOT AN EXPLANATION. AGAIN PRE-
SUMMARY, IF THE GENETIC INFORMATION THAT STAGE SIX FOLLOWS STAGE FIVE COULD BE ISOLATED, THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EXPLANATION, SINCE THE FULL PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE MATHEMATICALLY AVAILABLE BY INSPECTION OF THE GENES IN ADVANCE.

LET US ASSUME THAT WHAT CHOMSKY'S THINKING IMPLIES CAN BE DONE, NAMELY, THAT WE CAN EXTRACT FROM GENES MATHEMATICAL INFORMATION THAT FORMULATES HOW INFANTILE DEVELOPMENTAL SCHEMATA GROW STAGEWISE INTO LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE. RATHER THAN EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE, THIS INFORMATION EXPLAINS THE ORIGIN OF LINGUISTIC RULES. THE PROBLEM ARISES IF WE CONSIDER THAT THE PURPOSE OF SEEKING NEW GENETIC KNOWLEDGE WAS TO ALLAY THE SERIOUS DOUBT THAT A FORMAL SYSTEM OF RULES EXPLAINED LANGUAGE. THIS DOUBT HAD TO DO WITH THE DEPENDENCY BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND MENTAL FUNCTIONING IN GENERAL. UNLESS A CLAIM IS MADE THAT THE GENETIC KNOWLEDGE WILL ALSO EXPLAIN MENTAL FUNCTIONING THROUGH A SYSTEM OF RULES, WE ARE LEFT WITH ONLY A SLIGHTLY IMPROVED VERSION OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSFORMATIONAL RULES WITH REGARD TO EXPLANATORY POWER. SEEKING A MATHEMATICAL EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE OR MIND OR BOTH ASSUMES THAT, ULTIMATELY, BOTH ARE OBJECTIVE ENTITIES. BUT THE DIFFICULTIES ARISING IN PURSUIT OF SUCH AN EXPLANATION SUGGEST THAT IT WILL BE MORE FORTHCOMING BY LIMITING THE DEGREE TO WHICH BOTH ARE OBJECTIFIED AND THEN REFORMULATING THE ORIGINAL QUESTION, WHAT IS LANGUAGE, IN THE DIRECTION PROPOSED BY HEISENBERG ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF OUR INVESTIGATION OF LANGUAGE?

IS PURELY SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE HAVING TO DO WITH THE MOTIVES AND ACTION OF
THE DRIVERS—IN THEIR HISTORY AS DRIVERS, AND IN THEIR PERFORMANCE ON THAT
PARTICULAR OCCASION. GIVEN ALL OF THESE FORMS OF POSSIBLE KNOWLEDGE, THE
QUESTION IS HOW TO COMBINE THEM TO CONSTITUTE AN EXPLANATION. TO ANSWER THIS
QUESTION WE ASK, WHO Wants TO KNOW? WHAT DOES THE ASKER MEAN BY EXPLANATION?
IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO POSTULATE THAT THE INQUIRER COMES FROM MARS; IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW THE EXACT OCCASION AND MOTIVE FOR THE REQUEST IN ORDER TO SYN-
THESIZE THE ADEQUATE MIX OF KNOWLEDGE FOR AN EXPLANATION. ITS CORRECTNESS
WILL FURTHER BE DETERMINED BY NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE ASKER AND THE EXPLAINER.
WHAT A PERSON WANTS TO KNOW DETERMINES EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY. THIS IS EXACTLY
THE CASE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF LANGUAGE.

AUTOMATICALLY, UNDER THE OBJECTIVE PARADIGM, THE FIRST QUESTION IS "WHAT
IS IT?" UNDER THE SUBJECTIVE PARADIGM, THE FIRST QUESTION IS, "WHAT DO I WANT
TO KNOW?" I THINK IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS LATTER QUESTION ACTUALLY PRECEDES THE
FORMER; THE FORMER QUESTION ASSUMES THAT I WANT TO KNOW WHAT LANGUAGE IS,
AND THAT THE MORE FORMALLY AND PRECISELY I CAN SPECIFY "LANGUAGE," THE BETTER
THE EXPLANATION. THE LATTER QUESTION USES AS ITS CRITERION OF EXPLANATORY ADE-
QUACY THE SATISFACTION OF THE COMMUNITY OF ASKERS. IT IS THE CASE THAT THIS
CRITERION, IN PRINCIPLE, WILL ALLOW A SUPERSTITIOUS ANSWER TO PREVAIL; YET IF
THAT IS WHAT THE HUMAN COMMUNITY CHOOSES, IT CAN'T BE HELPED.

THE IDEA OF RESYMBOLIZATION IS ESPECIALLY USEFUL IN DEALING WITH THIS NEW
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCE. IT IS CAPABLE OF ENCOMPASSING, IN A SINGLE FRAME-
WORK OF THOUGHT, BOTH THE TRADITIONAL TYPES OF MATHEMATICALLY REPRESENTED KNOW-
LEDGE AS WELL AS MORE RECENT TYPES OF INTERPRETIVE KNOWLEDGE THAT ARE INCREAS-
INGLY DETERMINING THE COURSE OF CIVILIZATION. THE IDEA SUGGESTS WAYS TO UNDER-
STAND LANGUAGE THAT CAN ACCOMODATE ITS DESCRIPTION IN TERMS OF FORMAL RULES
AS WELL AS THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF LANGUAGE AS THE INSTRUMENT OF DELIBER-
ATE HUMAN INITIATIVE. IN THIS WAY RESYMBOLIZATION DEALS WITH THE DIFFICULTY IN
OUR CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AS BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND A
MEDIUM OF KNOWLEDGE.

MODERN ATTENTION TO SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY BEGAN WITH ERNST CASSIRER'S PHILOSOPHY
OF SYMBOLIC FORMS, WHICH PROPOSED THAT ALL KNOWLEDGE, QUANTITATIVE AND HERMENEUTIC,
AND ALL ART, MAY BE CONCEIVED AS DIFFERENT VARIETIES OF SYMBOLIC FORMS. HUMAN
BEINGS ARE ALWAYS PERFORMING A BASIC ACT OF MENTAL FUNCTIONING--THE FORMATION OF
SYMBOLS. ALL CULTURAL ARTIFACTS ARE ASCRIBABLE TO ACTS OF SYMBOL FORMATION; THE
SYNTHESIZING OF SYMBOLS IS A PRIMARY MENTAL ACT FROM WHICH QUANTITATIVE, VERBAL,
AND SENSORY ACTS DERIVE. CASSIRER BELIEVED THAT THIS ACTIVITY WAS PHYLOGENETIC
IN SCOPE AND ORIGIN, AND HIS WORK PRESENT ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS
BELIEF.

SUSANNE LANGER PURSUES CASSIRER'S THOUGHT IN THE STUDY OF ART AND AESTHETIC
EXPERIENCE, AND INTRODUCES PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION.

I BELIEVE THERE IS A PRIMARY NEED IN MAN, WHICH OTHER CREATURES PROBABLY
DO NOT HAVE, AND WHICH ACTUATES ALL HIS APPARENTLY UNZOOLOGICAL AIMS, HIS
WISTFUL FANCIES, HIS CONSCIOUSNESS OF VALUE, HIS UTTERLY IMPRACTICAL EN-
THUSIASMS, AND HIS AWARENESS OF A "BEYOND" FILLED WITH HOLINESS. DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THIS NEED GIVES RISE TO ALMOST EVERYTHING THAT WE COMMONLY
ASSIGN TO THE "HIGHER" LIFE, IT IS NOT ITSELF A "HIGHER" FORM OF SOME "LOW-
ER" NEED; IT IS QUITE ESSENTIAL, IMPERIOUS, AND GENERAL, AND MAY BE CALLED
"HIGH" ONLY IN THE SENSE THAT IS BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY (I THINK) TO A VERY
COMPLEX AND PERHAPS RECENT GENUS. . . . THIS BASIC NEED, WHICH CERTAINLY
IS OBVIOUS ONLY IN MAN, IS THE NEED OF SYMBOLIZATION. . . . Symbolization
IS THE ESSENTIAL ACT OF THE MIND.

THE MATERIAL FURNISHED BY THE SENSES IS CONSTANTLY WROUGHT INTO SYMBOLS,
WHICH ARE OUR ELEMENTARY IDEAS. SOME OF THESE IDEAS CAN BE COMBINED AND
MANIPULATED IN THE MANNER WE CALL "REASONING." OTHERS DO NOT LEND THEM-
SELVES TO THIS USE, BUT ARE NATURALLY TELESCOPED INTO DREAMS, OR VAPOR
OFF IN CONSCIOUS FANTASY; AND A VAST NUMBER OF THEM BUILD THE MOST TYP-
ICAL AND FUNDAMENTAL EDIFICE OF THE HUMAN MIND--RELIGION.

LANGER BRINGS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCERNS BY CHARACTERIZING SYMBOL FORMATION
As a "basic need," Cassirer's work was oriented almost exclusively around issues of cognition and epistemology; Langer's thinking is oriented about issues of affectivity, and she proposes that all art forms have the generic function of expressing human feeling. The need for artistic symbolization results in the public expression in sensory and sometimes verbal terms of personal affective states.

An important result of Cassirer's and Langer's assumptions is their view of language as having a special status in the array of symbolic forms. Langer writes that "speech is, in fact, the readiest active termination of that basic process in the human brain which may be called the symbolic transformation of experiences." Language, unlike other forms of symbolic expression, occupies approximately the same status in every human society. While it is true that all cultures paint, dance, and sing, they don't all do each to the same degree, and the parts of society that practice these arts vary in size from culture to culture. For language this sort of variation does not obtain. All people speak, and all learn to speak at about the same infantile age. Speech grows and develops in each person regardless of whether it becomes an art form, an instrument of science, or a medium of soothsaying. The status of speech being the "readiest active termination" of the symbol-making capacity grows from its intimate connection with the natural biological developments of sight, hearing, and vocalization and their history of intercoordination with the infant's bodily development. Thus if a child grows under normal ecological and social conditions, he will learn to speak. The level of linguistic complexity at which all members of a society may mutually interact is extremely high, and such interaction involves no unique talent or special allocation of psychological energy. Language is, in these senses, the basic and universal behavior that argues most strongly for exploring further what may be meant by a "need of symbolization."
To a large extent, the idea of a need is self-evident for Langer; the need of symbolization is analogous to the needs for food, air, or exercise. Her thinking of it in these terms is itself an important contribution to understanding it. In general among psychologists, there is no clear consensus of what a need is, however. When applied to symbolization and language, the idea is further complicated because the linguistic function seems so heavily dependent on intrapsychic factors. Furthermore, the general function of language seems so exactly opposite to other organismically grounded needs; that is, it is more often than not a substitute for sensorimotor behavior, and a systematic inhibition of bodily action. Language permits a whole series of ordinary animal behaviors to come under the dominion of conscious control and initiative. In fact, language is the means and agency of the characteristic human self-awareness. Therefore, in order to discuss and understand it, the traditional thought-structure of causality has to be enlarged.

In psychological discourse, a need is adduced as the cause of certain behaviors; the "cause" of eating is hunger, which is the need to eat. In thinking so automatically of a need as a cause, we also automatically think of the necessary connection between the need and the behavior. Yet we also know that, especially in psychological matters, there is no such necessary connection; sometimes the same need results in different behaviors. So instead of thinking of either a need or a cause, we can better use the idea of a motive. Consider the following example.

We would normally think that the swing of a bat causes the ball to fly to center field, if the action of the bat and ball are isolated. However, we do not usually think of batting in this way; rather, the batter "causes" the ball to move. But except perhaps in legal contracts, a cause is not ascribed to a person's initiative. We do think of the batter as being motivated to hit the ball, so that a motive is a consciously regulated cause, and it is the
NAME FOR CAUSES ORIGINATING IN DELIBERATE HUMAN ACTION. ONCE THE BATTER IS INCLUDING IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF BATTING, HIS DECISIONS TO BECOME A PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE, HIS OBSERVATION OF THE PITCHER, HIS CALCULATIONS OF WHICH PITCH IS TO FOLLOW ALL ENTER INTO THE EXPLANATION OF HIS BEHAVIOR, AND CAUSALITY IS INADEQUATE FOR THIS EXPLANATION. A DETERMINING PART OF ANY SITUATION IN WHICH BATTING IS OBSERVED IS OUR OWN ASSUMPTION THAT THE BATTER WANTS TO HIT THE BALL; AND THEN, OUR OWN WISH FOR THE BATTER TO HIT THE BALL BROUGHT US TO OBSERVE HIM TO BEGIN WITH.

IN SOME CONTEXTS, A NEED OR A CAUSE MAY BE USED TO EXPLAIN BEHAVIOR JUST AS EASILY AS A MOTIVE. IF A CAUSE IS USED, IT IS LESS DISPUTABLE THAN A NEED; IF A NEED IS USED, IT IS LESS DISPUTABLE THAN A MOTIVE. IN GENERAL, NEEDS AND CAUSES ARE USED TO EXPLAIN BEHAVIORS THAT ARE CONSIDERABLY LESS DISPUTABLE THAN THOSE WE WOULD EXPLAIN WITH MOTIVES, WHICH WE APPLY IN DISCUSSING THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS OF INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE. IN PARTICULAR, MOTIVATION IS NECESSARY AS AN EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLE WHEN WE AIM TO UNDERSTAND DELIBERATE BEHAVIOR, OR OTHER HUMAN ACTION IN WHICH AN ACT OF CHOICE ENTERS PROMINENTLY. MOST FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION TRY TO CONCEPTUALIZE BEHAVIOR BY MAKING ACTS OF CHOICE SEEM INEVITABLE, AS BEING CAUSALLY DETERMINED BY A PRINCIPLE. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE BECAUSE CAUSAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN THE ABSOLUTELY PREVAILING MEANS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION. AT THE SAME TIME PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION IS WITHOUT POINT IF IT DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE EVER-PRESENT SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF CONSCIOUS DELIBERATION AND SELF-AWARENESS. HOWEVER, SINCE ALL BEHAVIOR IS NOT ASCRIBABLE TO CONSCIOUS PLANNING, THE EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES HAVE TO BE APPLICABLE TO OTHER CONDITIONS AS WELL. UNDERSTOOD IN VARIOUS WAYS, MOTIVATION CAN FRUITFULLY EXPLAIN HABITUAL BEHAVIORS, UNCONSCIOUS BEHAVIORS (THOSE OF WHICH WE ARE NOT AWARE UNTIL TOLD OF THEM BY OTHERS), AND DELIBERATE BEHAVIORS. EACH OF THESE BEHAVIORS ARE MANIFESTED IN THE WAYS WE USE LANGUAGE. IN FACT, LANGUAGE BEHAVIORS DETERMINE MOTIVATION AS MUCH AS MOTIVATION DETERMINES LANGUAGE.
Without fully documenting my argument for the motivational character of language, which was recently published, I will outline my central claim for the present purpose of showing a conceptual connection between language behaviors and interpretive practices.

Thus far, the main obstacle in the search for explanations of human language has been the problem of infantile language acquisition. Even those who are sympathetic to mathematical explanation agree that further empirical knowledge of infantile language development is necessary. For example, Fodor, Bever, and Garrett have recently concluded that "Many of the deepest problems about the psychology of language converge, ultimately, on the problem of how languages are learned. Thus far we have no theory of ontogenesis which does convincingly any of the things that such a theory ought to do."

The main item of interest for a motivational explanation of linguistic ontogenesis is the relationship of the infant with his first language teacher, usually the mother, who speaks to the infant far more than anyone else. The main action of infantile development at the age of language acquisition is the process of the infant's adjustment to the condition of separation from the mother. The growing awareness of the fact of separation is accompanied by frustration which is marked by crying at first, and subsequently the characteristic temper tantrum. My claim is that syntactical language is the child's solution to the disharmonious sense of his own separateness. Until this point, mother had been the central locus of experience in general; the child's own sensorimotor behaviors are simultaneously experience dependent and mother dependent. Since the child learns words much before he learns language, part of the separation experience is the accidental use of words without the fulfilling experience; this separation of words from experience accompanies the child's separation of himself from the locus of experience, mother. This is the case because mother is the word-giver. The typical tantrum occurs when the child says, say, "cookie," and no cookie is forthcoming; thus both
WORDS AND CHILD ARE ISOLATED.

A predication is the juxtaposition of two previously independent thoughts in dependent relation to one another, and each predication has the general form of topic and comment. It is difficult to detect in the infant just when two consecutive topics are presented instead as topic and comment, i.e., as the child's first acts of syntactic language. The "sentences" of the presyntactic period consist of a topic and an experience; these are the so-called one-word sentences that Lois Bloom has recently described. When the child learns to make two of his words dependent on one another, he has acquired language. He has transferred a partly-mental partly-sensorimotor function into the wholly mental realm. By characterizing this transfer as having been motivated by the cognitive and affective frustration of separation of experience and its main locus, I am explaining language acquisition as a piece of local psychological adaptation in the Darwinian sense. Language may now command sensorimotor experience thereby creating the subjective sense of psychological autonomy, even though many physical dependencies remain.

A syntactic formulation, rather than the indicative use of single words or phrases, is the child's first act of naming— that is, of perceptual identification and of symbol-formation. Even though most early sentences seem to have an objective semantic, such as "mommy gone," they are actually naming the subjective experience of "mommy gone." The formulation of this mental correlative of the adverse experience substitutes the interverbal dependency for the child's actual dependency, whose problematical dimension is thereby significantly reduced. At the same time, the illusion of correspondence between the conceptual and the perceptual is created which accounts for what I earlier called cognitive stereoscopy, and for the feeling that one's own self is objective. Language appears in consciousness when the latter is no longer able to remain harmonious in respect of the rest of the child's developmental progress. Language creates self-conscious-
NESS BY TRANSFERRING EXPERIENCE DEPENDENCY INTO INTERVERBAL DEPENDENCY. THE
CHILD'S CONDITION OF FRUSTRATING SEPARATION IS THE MOTIVE FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT.
THIS, ALONG WITH MANY SIMILAR MOTIVES, PRODUCE THE MANY NEW LEVELS OF LINGUISTIC
COMPLEXITY: EACH NEW ACHIEVEMENT IS AN ADVANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, OR, IN TERMS WE
ARE NOW USING IN A SOMewhat DIFFERENT CONTEXT, AN ADVANCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

FROM THIS STANDPOINT, THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION, THOUGH CONCEIVABLY
A POSSIBLE FUNCTION OF ADULT LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR, IS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT COM-
PARED TO THE PRIVATE PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF SELF-REGULATION, AND TO THE INTER-
SUBJECTIVE FUNCTION OF REGULATING ONE'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE TRIVIAL QUESTION "WHAT TIME IS IT?" IS MORE PERSUASIVELY EXPLAINED AS THE
ASKER'S MOTIVATED USE OF THE INTERROGATIVE FORMULA IN RESPONSE TO HIS OWN ANXIETY
ABOUT CATCHING THE TRAIN, THAN AS THE LOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE FORM, "THE
TIME IS . . .". IF DIFFERENT SENTENCE FORMS ARE NOT ACQUIRED THROUGH A LOGICAL
PROCESS, THE POSTULATION OF A LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DECLARATIVE AND
THE INTERROGATIVE IS NOT AN EXPLANATION OF THEIR ACTUAL USE. IT IS LIKELY, RATHER,
THE EACH MAJOR SENTENCE FORM HAS ITS OWN MOTIVATIONAL HISTORY IN EVERY ADULT SPEAK-
ER, EVEN THOUGH LOGICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THESE FORMS ARE INVOKED ONCE THEY ARE
ALL ESTABLISHED. IN ANY ACT OF SYNTHESIZING A NEW NAME--A NEW SYMBOL--FROM THE
CHILD'S FIRST SENTENCE TO THE MATURE WORK OF THE POET, THE LOGICAL FORMALISM OF
THE NAME CAN ONLY BE AN AUXILIARY FEATURE OF IT, WHILE ITS SUBJECTIVE HISTORY
IS ITS EXPLANATION. THE USE OF NEEDS, CAUSES, OR LOGIC TO EXPLAIN LANGUAGE BYPASSES
ITS USE AS THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF DELIBERATE CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READING AND RESPONSE MAY BE CONCEPTUALIZED ANALOGOUSLY TO
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION. CONVERSATIONAL FLUENCY BETWEEN MOTHER
AND CHILD INVOLVES THE LATTER'S OVERTAKING OF WHAT HAS BECOME THE MOTHER'S MOST
IMPORTANT FEATURE--HER LANGUAGE, THE MOTHER TONGUE. TELLING AND LISTENING PRO-
CEEDS ON BOTH SIDES IN THAT LOCAL FORM OF THE CULTURAL LANGUAGE, AND THE CON-
VERSATIONAL RITUALS EXERT RAPIDLY INCREASING INFLUENCE ON BEHAVIORS AFFECTING
all other of the child's interpersonal relationships. Depending on the value
placed on literary and book activity in the home, storytelling and booklooking
become a special variety of conversation. While these rituals may have gone
on when the child was as young as a year, the capability of following an ex-
tended story, the attention span, and finally the psychological motivation does
not appear until about the middle of the third year. In this instance, as in
the case of the acquisition of language, the motivation is the last and most
important item to produce the capacity for a literary experience. The new
motive is associated with the next major developmental step after the achieve-
ment of separation from the mother and from sensorimotor experience. The child
at this age now translates his sense of the parents' greater physical strength
into a knowledge of their authority, which amounts to a psychological justi-
fication by the child of the parents' power over him. The oedipal idea is a
metaphor for the child's psychological task of negotiating his love and his know-
ledge of authority with his perception of the different relationships he has
with each parent. The child's own needs and understanding of authority motivate
him to listen to a parentally authorized story. The storytelling experience per-
mits the child both to affirm the parents' authority and assimilate it to his
own sense of self in the form of knowledge of the story. This knowledge, man-
ifested in the child's simple repetition of the story to someone else, is a
new predication of the form, "the story I heard is this . . ." It is new because
the verbatim story cannot be repeated; only the child's personal version of it
is. The explanatory motive of this special version grows out of the child's
stake in the parental storytelling relationship. The topic of the predication
was given by the parent; the child's perceptual response is his comment; the
subjective form of topic and comment then emerge as the new "name" or symbol
or predication—which is the retelling of the story. The motivation for hearing
and repeating a story is the same as for acquiring syntactical language; each
ACHIEVEMENT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN ACT OF SYMBOL FORMATION.

INsofar as the child's authority relationship with his parents results in knowledge, the relationship is pedagogical. The key factor is the child's motivated appropriation of authority. This means that a pedagogical situation does not need to have an authority figure in it; it only means that each constituent of that situation be willing to overtake the authority of the other. Therefore the concept of pedagogy can apply to the meeting of any two or more people who gather for the common purpose of developing new knowledge. In adult life, if one reader agrees on the interpretation proposed by another, that reader was "taught" a piece of knowledge. If a classroom is authoritarian rather than authoritative, the coerced agreement is illusory pedagogy; only knowledge resulting from motivated initiative can become a part of an individual's self awareness. At this time, pedagogical traditions have no systematic means of securing the motivated development of knowledge.

As Kuhn has discussed the pedagogy of scientific knowledge has been the most important social practice in maintaining the belief in its objectivity. Scientific textbooks present the accumulation of mathematical formalisms without detailing the choices that were made in arriving at these formalisms. This pedagogy thereby reified the absolute authority of the world of "real" objects. It now appears that this world is only an abstraction of a relatively small part of human experience, and that scientific work now proceeds on the basis of assumed symbolizations of data supplied by mechanical instruments. Yet the idea of real objects is a psychological fact that depends on the need to assume that dinner tables, automobile traffic, and payroll deductions are real. Therefore a real object is an experiential item that is not subject to dispute or interpretation. Knowledge of real objects is also only trivially consequential. Once any of these objects, such as income tax, becomes an item of dispute, it is symbolized in alternative ways, and the final prevalence of one of these ways leads to a change in payroll deductions.
In a pedagogical situation all the items of interest are symbolic; the main aim in any such situation is to resymbolize existing knowledge to the advantage of the interested parties. This aim departs from the familiar view of pedagogy as the occasion for passing on existing knowledge, a view which depends on the belief in the objectivity of knowledge. Real knowledge, even of humanistic concerns such as literary response, has been sought in contrived laboratory and "experimental" circumstances for the purpose of only reporting in the classroom and other forums for the simple dissemination of information. Yet in the areas of language, literary response, and interpretation especially, any artificial contrivance to create knowledge is meaningless. Many of those studying language acquisition have begun to realize this, and have developed procedures for studying infants as they normally behave in familiar surroundings. However, most of those studying literary response and interpretation have not accepted the pedagogical circumstance for synthesizing knowledge of these subjects. A contrived knowledge-getting situation is used to screen out "irrelevant" motives and other emotional factors. But since language is never motiveless, the new situation actually creates new motives for language use and literary response, and they replace the ones of primary interest, those attached to normal speech and reading contexts.

Through the distinction between competence and performance and the resulting elaborate attention to competence, the discipline of linguistics has essentially ruled out the pedagogical circumstance as a source of knowledge. Yet to most young people, of just about any age after five, learning about language means learning about their own language—that is, how they speak, hear, and read. In any phase of psychological development, there is always a motive to know about oneself. In the study of language and literature, this motive has to be appropriated for the development of knowledge or the means to knowledge. To take one example, the teaching of writing at this time is thought of as a
LANGUAGE SKILL THAT CAN BE DEVELOPED WITH ADEQUATE TRAINING. OF COURSE, EVERY-ONE ALSO KNOWS THAT THIS IS FALSE, AS TESTIFIED TO BY THE VARIOUS WAYS INVENTED OF TRICKING STUDENTS INTO WRITING WELL. BUT AS LONG AS WRITING IS CONCEIVED AS A SKILL, THERE CAN BE NO PEDAGOGY THAT WILL LEAD TO SUCCESS. IT CAN ONLY BE THE CASE THAT WRITING IS A PART OF A PERSON'S OVERALL ORIENTATION TOWARD LANGUAGE, AND THIS ORIENTATION IS TO BE EXPLAINED BY THE MOTIVATIONAL HISTORY OF LANGUAGE USE. IF THIS IS TRUE, IT IS JUST NOT POSSIBLE FOR A UNIVERSITY COURSE TO PRESCRIBE HOW A PERSON'S WRITING IS TO "IMPROVE." IN ORDER TO ENGAGE A STUDENT'S MOTIVES, THE NOTION OF IMPROVEMENT HAS TO BE ABANDONED IN FAVOR OF ELICITING CERTAIN RUDIMENTARY FORMS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE. THE CONFIDENCE IN SUCH KNOWLEDGE MAY THEN MOTIVATE A STUDENT TO WRITE ABOUT IT, PROVIDING HE HAS GOOD REASON TO TRUST THE TEACHER.

THE SITUATION IS SIMILAR IN THE PEDAGOGY OF LITERARY INTERPRETATION. SUPPOSE A TEACHER ANNOUNCES IN CLASS--AS HE CUSTOMARILY ANNOUNCES IN PUBLISHED CRITICISM--THAT THE GIANT IN "JACK AND THE BEANSTALK" SYMBOLIZES A FATHER. UNLESS A STUDENT IS HIGHLY VERSED AND ALREADY INTERESTED IN PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITICISM, HE WILL HAVE ESSENTIALLY NO MOTIVE TO EVEN THINK ABOUT THIS FORMULATION, LET ALONE DECIDE ON ITS VALUE TO HIM. HOWEVER, HE WILL HAVE THE MOTIVE TO RECORD IT AND REMEMBER IT, UNTIL IT IS TIME TO PROVE THAT HE ATTENDED CLASS. IN PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY, THE TEACHER HAS OMITTED HIS OWN INTEREST IN DEFINING THE SYMBOLISM; HIS INTELLECTUAL AUTHORITY FOR MAKING SUCH A CLAIM IS UNAVAILABLE TO THE STUDENT AND NOT VISIBLE IN THE TEACHER IN CLASS. THE EMULATIVE GROUNDS ON WHICH EARLY LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE EXPERIENCES ARE BUILT, DO NOT OBTAIN IN THIS CLASSROOM; A NEGOTIATION CANNOT TAKE PLACE BECAUSE THE TERMS ARE SO DISPARATE. THE STUDENT'S ONLY CHOICE IS TO ACCEPT THE FORMULATION AS OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OR FAIL. HOWEVER, A MOTIVATIONAL VOCABULARY IS COMMON TO PEOPLE OF GREATLY DIFFERING AGES AND EXPERIENCES. THE TERMS OF EMOTIONAL AND PERCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF A LITERARY WORK ARE AT LEAST COMPARABLE.
In different readers due to each's ability to bring his motivational history to bear on the present task of mutual concern. Unfortunately, those who have made genuine efforts to abandon objectivist attitudes in literary pedagogy, such as Alan Purves in *How Porcupines Make Love* and Barrett Mandel in *Literature and the English Department*, found they were left only with nonverbal symbolisms, open-endedness as an abiding pedagogical condition, or complete reliance on student initiatives and the hope that they will succeed without active leadership.

To engage each person's subjectivity respectfully and systematically in the study of language and literature is a difficult, time-consuming enterprise; a productive attitude and a suitable method are not easily articulated even to those sympathetic to the general purpose. It has taken several years to integrate into my department's curricular offerings a series of courses growing from this purpose. However, in this time certain priorities have become clear to me.

Subjective criticism now understands that the same interpretive problems recur in each new age and culture because hermeneutic activity is anchored in language behaviors. Put another way, since language has, historically, served more or less the same organismic function for the human race, our sense of permanent interpretive knowledge lies in the questions we ask rather than in the answers we get; mathematical systems create the feeling of permanent answers. I therefore take traditional hermeneutic concerns as reflections of enduring human motives. Our intellectual task is to make these concerns serve present purposes.

The relatively recent acceptance of the value of subjective thinking suggests that this task can be pursued through deliberate recovery and engagement of our motives. Any interpretive project can accommodate this interest. In other work, I have discussed in some detail what, regardless of which interpretive projects are undertaken, is involved in the collection of statements of associative responses to the literature.
of interest. These statements are analogous to the young child's spontaneous retelling of a story; they define the reader's evaluative perception of that particular reading experience; they identify to the reader his initial assimilation of the work. They include citations of the work, affective reactions to these parts, and associative elaborations of the affects; these elaborations are spontaneously remembered interpersonal events and relationships that define the affective and perceptual elements of the statement. \(^{10}\)

A response statement is understood to be given in the context of an agreed-upon pedagogical purpose, which is the attempt to reach a judgment of how either one person's or the group's reading experience has produced sharable knowledge. I will outline four categories of knowledge that I have sought in this way; it will be clear in each instance how the category reflects a traditional issue of criticism and response; moreover, the redefinition of any category is easily accomplished without changing the main pedagogical activity, which is the public negotiation of the response statement as a motivational explanation of the reader's judgment of his experience. The result of the negotiation is a collective resymbolization of the reading experience or, a new but highly localized and subjectively authorized interpretation. The four possible pedagogical purposes are: (1) judgments of taste and changes of taste; (2) judgments of significance; (3) judgments of real and symbolized authors; (4) judgments of collective interest and the classification of authors and works. Issues of right or wrong in these judgments or good or better are arbitrated only by the subjective interests of the participating readers.

1. **Judgments of taste and changes of taste.** I. A. Richards thought that evaluation was the main task of criticism, and that critics ought to be able to persuade other readers what is best for them to read. The subjective aspect of this traditional critical purpose is that each person would like to know his own tastes, how he acquired them, and whether or how he can change them. When
TEN DIFFERENT JUDGMENTS OF TASTE FOR THE SAME WORK ARE PRESENTED COORDINATELY WITH RESPONSE STATEMENTS, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE OBJECTIVE QUALITY OF THE WORK IS BOTH INDETERMINATE AND IRRELEVANT. ONCE THE BURDEN OF COPING WITH RECEIVED JUDGMENTS OF GREATNESS OR FAILURE IS LIFTED EVALUATION PROCEEDS ON THE BASIS OF PRESENTLY HELD PERSPECTIVES AND CONCERNS. IF ALL THE MEMBERS OF A COMMUNITY ARE LITERATE, EACH HAS THE SAME EVALUATIVE AUTHORITY. MORE IMPORTANTLY, EACH HAS A FAIRLY OBVIOUS PERSONAL MOTIVE FOR DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE OF HIS OWN TASTE. THE OPPORTUNITY IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO PARLAY SUCH KNOWLEDGE INTO A WIDER SELF-KNOWLEDGE OR INTO A WIDER KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN COMMUNITY. AT THE SAME TIME READING ONE WORK WILL NOT BRING RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE, BUT A SUBJECTIVELY ORIENTED FIRST READING WILL HELP ESTABLISH JUST HOW INTERESTED A READER IS IN FINDING OUT ABOUT HIS TASTE. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO YOUNGER READERS IS THAT THE RESPONSE STATEMENT CAN REVEAL THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR TASTES HAVE BEEN PEREMPTORILY DETERMINED BY PEDAGOGICAL AUTHORITY.

CHANGES IN TASTE ARE FUNCTIONS OF PERSONAL GROWTH, WHICH TAKES PLACE EVEN IN A RELATIVELY SHORT-LIVED UNIVERSITY COURSE. A PART OF EACH PERSON'S SELF-IMAGE IS HIS SENSE OF WHICH PERIODS IN HIS LIFE MARK THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TIMES OF GROWTH. REGARDLESS OF THE ANNOUNCED PEDAGOGICAL PURPOSE, THE SUBJECTIVE INQUIRY INTO TASTE BRINGS OUT A COMPARISON OF THE RESPONSE NOW WITH WHAT IT WAS IN A READING MANY YEARS BEFORE. IT IS THEREFORE OF CONSEQUENCE TO DELIBERATELY INVESTIGATE ONE'S CHILDHOOD TASTES, READING HABITS, AND LITERARY ORIENTATION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHICH PARTS OF OUR EARLIER DEVELOPMENT ARE OF CONTINUING INFLUENCE IN THE PRESENT.

IN PRINCIPLE, ANY PERIOD OF TIME MAY BE SET ASIDE AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING CHANGES OF TASTE, DEPENDING ON THE KIND OF KNOWLEDGE THAT IS SOUGHT. IT IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO LEARN HOW AND WHY ONE'S TASTE CHANGES, AS IT IS TO KNOW THE RANGE OF TASTE AT ANY MOMENT. BUT UNLESS SUCH KNOWLEDGE IS PURSUED DELIBERATELY THROUGH RESPONSE STATEMENTS AND COLLECTIVELY NEGOTIATED JUDGMENTS, THE KNOWLEDGE
CLAIMED WILL HAVE NEITHER AUTHORITY NOR EXPLANATORY POWER.

(2) JUDGMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE. To judge significance is to conceive a reading experience in terms of an independent system of values or thought. This is the most familiar path of interpretive work in contemporary criticism. When no distinct thought system is invoked, the terms of judgment are usually moral. To propose such judgments without reference to response statements results in the formulaic applications of stylish dogmas or traditional homilies. It is more authoritative in a pedagogical relationship to tell why this work is the fulfillment of an oral wish to me than it is to prove, with evidence, that it is objectively such a fulfillment. If a reader authentically perceives literature with Marxian principles, it is of interest to learn the self-interest of such principles to the reader in addition to why he finds them in this work. A response statement particularizes known systems of thought and gives a motivational ground to an individual reader’s understanding and use of that system. Because literature is a symbolic object, its normal function is to create interpretive occasions: there is no such thing as an "autonomous" literary work. Any discussion of literature will assume a standard for translating the work into "meaning." From the standpoint of subjective criticism, no existing standard is necessarily right or wrong. Established knowledge, in this context, is communicated in conjunction with its paradigmatic framework, and is itself implicitly available for renegotiation. This may mean that interpretive knowledge is less stable than knowledge in general was heretofore conceived. Yet unless the stabilizing machinery rests unambiguously and self-consciously in the community of students, the knowledge is idle and of no consequence.

(3) JUDGMENTS OF THE REAL AND SYMBOLIZED AUTHOR. Because childhood language and reading experiences develop in relation to an authoritative person, most subsequent readings are marked at some points in some degrees at least by the feeling of communicative involvement with the author. Many are originally mo-
TIVATED TO READ BY THE DESIRE TO IMMERSE THEMSELVES IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER IM-
PORTANT LITERARY AND EMOTIONAL AUTHORITY; MANY READING EXPERIENCES ARE SPONTAN-
Eously PERCEPTUALLY ORIENTED AROUND "WHAT THE AUTHOR IS SAYING." WHEN KNOWLEDGE
IS PROPOSED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH PERCEPTIONS, THE GROUND ON WHICH THE READER
SYMBOLIZED THE AUTHOR ARE SUSCEPTIBLE OF EASY DISPUTE. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW
MUCH DOCUMENTED INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR THE READER IS USING AND HOW MUCH
HE IS ONLY ATTRIBUTING AUTHORITY TO AN INFERRED IMAGINARY FIGURE. TWO PATHS
MAY BE TAKEN TOWARD GREATER CERTAINTY IN THIS CONNECTION, THOUGH EACH IS ULTIM-
ATELY DEPENDENT ON THE OTHER.

THE RESPONSE STATEMENT CAN IMMEDIATELY HELP ESTABLISH THE SUBJECTIVE BASIS
OF THE IMAGINED AUTHOR BY SUGGESTING HOW AN INTEREST IN A WORK IS PART OF AN
INTEREST IN A CERTAIN KIND OF REMEMBERED OR PREFERRED PERSON. OR, IT CAN DIS-
CLOSE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF ONE'S TASTE FOR THAT AUTHOR AS THE RESULT
OF HAVING PREVIOUSLY READ OTHER WORKS OF HIS. BUT REGARDLESS OF HOW SUBJECTIVE
ONE'S IMAGE OF AN AUTHOR IS, A READER KNOWS THAT FOR MOST WORKS THERE WAS A
REAL CREATOR, AND THERE IS ALWAYS A GENUINE CURIOSITY ABOUT HIM, AND ESPECIALLY
AFTER SOME NEW, SMALL, BUT REAL INFORMATION BECOMES KNOWN. A CHILD UNDERSTANDS
IN THE STORYTELLING SITUATION THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINATOR AND A PERFORMER; HIS
OWN DEVELOPMENT DETERMINES HOW MUCH INTEREST HE HAS IN EACH; WHEN THERE IS NO
PERFORMER, THE REAL AUTHOR IS THE MAIN OBJECT OF INTEREST, AND NOTHING LESS THAN
THE MOST AUTHENTIC FACTS WILL SERVE TO SATISFY THE INTEREST.

THE USE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THESE FACTS, HOWEVER, ARE FUNCTIONS OF THE
ORIGINAL SUBJECTIVE CONCERN WITH THE AUTHOR OF THE WORK ONE READS, UNLESS ONE
BECOMES WHOLLY MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO DISCOVER THE LOST LIFE, THOUGH EVEN
THEN THE CONCERN WOULD NOT BE OTHER THAN SUBJECTIVE. A FULLY DOCUMENTED BIO-
GRAPHICAL STUDY IS A REFLECTION OF A LOCAL CULTURAL PREFERENCE. THERE IS NO
OBJECTIVE REASON WHY PSYCHOLOGICAL PORTRAITURE IS PREFERABLE TO A DETAILED
CHRONOLOGICAL CHART; YET THE FORMER IS FAR PREFERRED TODAY TO THE LATTER. THE
Motive for any sort of biographical interest, even for inferring the author from only the work, is created by the pattern of authority relationships in our histories, whose specific shape was once real, but, like the author, is recoverable only through symbolization and interpretation. Although such knowledge is never guaranteed truth, the act of formulating it is the source of enlightenment.

(4) Judgments of collective interest and the classification of authors and works. Those interested in making criticism scientific have sought permanent categories for different types of literature. Although classification proved to be explanatory for living things, it is not so for literature because it is comprised only of symbolic objects; nontrivial similarities among such objects depend on collective values and perceptual habits. Symbolic objects are perceived as similar on the basis of what the community of perceivers have in common.

It is a common academic exercise to decide if Oedipus Rex, Hamlet, and Death of a Salesman all belong to the same genre, "tragedy." Using Aristotle's list of tragic features, some readers will decide that there is enough correspondence among the works to say that yes they are tragedies, while others will dissent from this view. At the same time all may agree the each play feels tragic. The latter judgment is not objective and depends instead on a shared emotional sense of tragedy in this community. Long established generic concepts such as this retain their semantic value because of their imprecise denotation and their consequent availability for renegotiation. The category is interpretive to begin with, so that to narrow or specify its meaning is either to convert it into a descriptive label or to propose a new subjective interpretation. A similar logic applies to the classification of authors, stylistic schools, and historical periods.

The subjective priority is to discover what each interpretive community
HOLDS IN COMMON; RESPONSE STATEMENTS MAKE SHARED VALUES VISIBLE AS MUCH AS THEY DISCLOSE IDIOSYNCRATIC ONES. AWARENESS OF COMMON INTERESTS BEGINS IN CHILDHOOD ONCE THE CHILD'S AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN STABILIZED. FROM SCHOOL AGE ONWARD, PEER GROUP POLITICS IS A KEY ELEMENT IN PEDAGOGICAL MOTIVATION. IT IS OF INTEREST TO EACH PERSON TO KNOW HOW AND WHY HE ASSIMILATES OTHER PEOPLE'S LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT. THE PEDAGOGICAL COMMUNITY IS WHERE ASSIMILATION BEGINS ON A REGULAR BASIS. YET THE HABIT OF OBJECTIVITY KEEPS THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY LATENT. EVERY PERSON IN CLASS USES THE GROUP AS ONE OF THE MEANS TOWARD SELF-DEFINITION BUT THE DELIBERATE INVOCATION OF COMMON INTERESTS IS EITHER SURREPTITIOUS OR SUPERFICIAL. THE UNIVERSAL CONCERN WITH HOW ONE'S PEERS THINK AND FEEL IS A PEDAGOGICAL MOTIVE THAT IS ALWAYS READY TO BE ENGAGED. RESPONSE STATEMENTS MAKE THESE MOTIVES AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATION INTO COMMON KNOWLEDGE.

PART OF THE PURPOSE OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY HAS BEEN TO SHOW HOW LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE ARE MOST PRODUCTIVELY STUDIED WITHIN THE SAME FRAMEWORK OF THOUGHT. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THIS REMAINS AN ABSTRACT OR ACADEMIC QUESTION, I WILL NOT HAVE MADE MY POINT. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP REMAINS WITH US PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS FAR MORE THAN WITH STUDENTS. THIS MEANS THAT EXPLORATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, OF MOTIVATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO KNOWLEDGE HAS TO BE GROUNDED IN EACH TEACHER'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS OWN MOTIVES. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCE OF SUBJECTIVE THINKING.
NOTES


3. SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (1942; RPT. NEW YORK, 1964), PP. 45, 46.

4. Ibid., p. 48.


INTERACTING WITH HIS ENVIRONMENT, THEN THE IDEA THAT SINGLE-WORD UTTERANCES REFLECT PRIOR LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE OF SENTENCES BECOMES EVEN LESS TENABLE."

(pp. 130-131). Bloom's skepticism about linguistic competence derives from the limits she perceived in what one can know about the child's mind. While many inferences may be proposed, she holds to the view that only observations of the child's actual usages is an adequate authorization for knowledge about infantile language development. She therefore rejects, in principle, the view that mathematical formulations will constitute an explanation of language, since such formulations apply only to linguistic competence, which, in turn, is based on the objectification of language as independent of behavior.

7. Ibid.
10. The rationale and major concerns in the collection of response statements are introduced in my monograph, Readings and Feelings: An Introduction to Subjective Criticism (National Council of Teachers of English, 1975). There is further discussion of the aims and uses of these statements in work now in preparation. I am presenting the following proposed categories for inquiry on the assumption that at least the principle of recording response is acceptable.