This theoretical discussion explores pedagogical assumptions of political education in West Germany. Three major methodological orientations are discussed: the normative-ontological, empirical-analytical, and dialectical-historical. The author recounts the aims, methods, and basic presuppositions of each of these approaches. Topics discussed include what is and what is not learned in schools, how teachers might talk about political education, how to formulate political and educational ideas theoretically and how to conceptualize them, to what degree theoretical positions can be called political, how theories are discussed in political didactics, and literature on the discussion of political didactics within West Germany. Views of socialist Herbert Marcuse and liberal Karl Popper are compared in an attempt to show politics as the concrete expression of theories extracted from the humanities and the sciences. Remarks on the paper by Cleo Cherryholmes at Michigan State University and Klaus Hornung at Padagogische Hochschule, Reutlingen, West Germany, are included. German bibliographic sources are cited in the document. (Author/DB)
SOME REMARKS ON THE THEORY
OF POLITICAL EDUCATION

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Critical comment on Antonius Holtmann's paper is offered by Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Michigan State University, and Klaus Hornung, Pädagogische Hochschule Reutlingen.

German Studies Notes make available to interested persons and institutions a variety of research reports and working papers produced as part of this Comparative Project. Other topics include recent sociopolitical and socioeconomic questions, problems of fiscal policy, education and educational reform, the environment and public administration, and other social and broadly cultural themes. The focus of these papers is on the sixties and seventies, and their purpose is to facilitate the discussion and possible solution of similar problems in the two countries.

Inquiries should be addressed to the Institute of German Studies or to the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
Some Remarks on the Theory of Political Education: The Discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany

Antonius Holtmann

I. Taking a Stand in the Discussion

It would seem possible to assume the role of a critic who is kind to others or only to himself—expressing, as the case may be, acknowledgments or doubts. This approach tends to turn one's own high-minded point of view—which is recognizable, more or less diffusely, in the critical factions—into a platform for intolerant critical attacks or the customary scolding of one's colleagues. Such a stand usually produces self-encouragement or, not infrequently, self-exaltation.

One could also refrain from taking any position: by presenting the positions side by side and interpreting them for their own sake in a neutral and reserved manner. The reader will then be exposed to the same neutral and reserved academic discussion, as though the matter in hand were not really one's own concern.

It is, however, precisely one's own concern which is here under discussion, including one's own political and educational interests which were shaped under the general conditions of the individual process of socialization and which refer analytic terms and questions to a specific correlation of meaning. This has consequences.

The conception of this inventory is the expression of a specific theoretical concept: namely, that it is possible to put epistemology, the theory of the sciences and humanities (Wissenschaftstheorie), political theory, the state of awareness in everyday life, and the daily teaching and learning practice into a context of legitimation. Although this context would be multifaceted in the wake of individual specifics of general conditions of socialization and of a differing (conscious) elaboration of one's ('naive') "theory," it would still be traceable and imperative as far as the ideal type is concerned. And furthermore, it follows that a relativizing evaluation of the state of discussion must not be restricted to methodological problems, but should have its academically substantiated, regulative interest in the free development of personality (See: Constitution of the FRG, Article 212).

The position taken is thus to be stated as the dialectical-historical political theory. This is the background of the present attempt to represent the controversies between the positions as viewed from their own realms and to include relativizing evaluations in a substantiated way, which are then open to discussion. The weaknesses
of the two first-mentioned methods are no longer valid because their specific possibilities are being kept on a higher level.

The daily teaching and learning practice has two sides: that which takes place behind closed doors in the classroom as a result of the intended as well as the "secret" curriculum, especially in argumentation and theory, and that which is more or less controversially discussed in the staff room, i.e. theory on the elementary and on the intermediate level. The latter of these is intended to be our starting point. Then the reference to epistemology and the theory of the sciences and humanities as political theory will be established, and these abstract ideas will then be retransferred to the concrete practice in the classroom and to the daily acts of taking sides politically.

II. How Teachers might talk about Political Education:

Political and Social Learning: Objectives and Content

Some people say that social and political learning hardly have anything to do with each other. Social learning is seen as private, a matter of manners, of the development of the personality, of willingness to help and of consideration, of self-confidence and the will to reach one's own goals, of gentleness and humor and the ability to love, of the capacity to think and the readiness to act, etc.--political learning, that means: knowledge of democratic institutions and processes of deciding (critical criteria), identification with the existing system, participation in the shaping of political aims, restriction of political things to the public sphere and legitimation, and control of the institutions of the administration and the authorities for safeguarding the private sphere of freedom.

Social learning is oriented towards generally accepted ethical norms: institutions and decision-making are measured by these regulating factors, illustrated by examples in political education and made binding by the example of real-life situations in the past and in the present.

Others say: Social learning is the first step towards political learning. Here it is a type of behavior which the political framework must make possible. It is a behavior which politics will make easier. Thus it is a matter of questioning institutional and organizational facts, always with the purpose of finding out whether they still serve the self-realization of man, so that they can be altered step by step, even to the point of a complete reshaping. Therefore, the task consists of bringing the behavior acquired by social learning into political activity--as democratic behavior. Thus political and social learning belong together: Institutions and their organizational forms and legal regulations which have an influence on the social and private sphere determine the possibilities of individual and collective development. Consequently these institutions, forms of organization, and regulations must always be approached from the viewpoint...
of social behavior: they do not function for themselves, but for us. Continual questioning for the sake of self-realization is, of course, controversial, because the way to it and the extent of the possibilities are under dispute. And these controversies, these "partisan" arguments move the development forward. They must not be ended, and they cannot be ended because self-realization is not an absolute form, defined once and for all and the ultimate goal only then, but it must be redefined again and again during the historical development and in accordance with the circumstances.

And still others say: Social learning is always also political learning. The ways and means through which we produce, distribute, consume, and organize this working and economic planning effort (Arbeiten und Wirtschaften)--by voting, governing, and administering--shapes our attitudes, thoughts, and actions very strongly. But our working, economic planning, voting, governing, and administering is, at the same time and to a considerable extent, the result of our feeling, thinking, and acting. These interrelationships and their principles are difficult to recognize, because we tend to perceive single items in our environment in isolation and not so much in a fundamental context, and because we tend to consider our own perception of reality, as a matter-of-course, as objective and not so much dependent on our own interests, feelings, knowledge, and on the things themselves which are to be perceived.

It follows from this that the very development of our capability to perceive, of our basic attitudes, of our objectives, of our ways of argumentation and of our way of expressing abstract thought, of our stored knowledge and of our possibilities of taking action--that is, in short, of our particular "theory"--is a fact of political importance, because all this is formed by social reality and, in its turn, arranges reality for us and makes it understandable. Therefore, social learning at school is a consequence of political learning as an elaboration and qualification of the capability to perceive in the direction of "scientific method". Social learning is also the result of making conscious the dependence on social conditions and their contradictions which develop throughout the course of history in the processes of working and economic planning, with the latter having run into conflict time and again with the modes of governing and administration. These principles of development and of structure must be recognized in order to allow action, either to conserve or to change. Political learning and the acts that necessarily ensue from it have, as their yardstick, the self-realization of man. This is an absolute claim, thus also an objective interest of man that can be derived from the history of the human species--a claim which, in world history is formulated more and more expressively and more and more as a general truth derived from these contradictions. Indeed this has not only been formulated, but attempts have been and are being made to bring about its realization.

The strategy, form, and grade of this realization in the specific
historical situation are controversial, and so is the number of economic and political preconditions that are necessary in each case. Controversies here find their limitations and their legitimation.

This is how a discussion might develop in the staff room—a little too indefinite and too much bound to formulas to succeed at once in tracing concrete details and theoretical conceptions in or behind them. It is bound to contain abstractions of everyday talk. In the problem areas of social and political learning we now plan to make some details more concrete, so that scientific and political positions can be ascribed to them. Thus far one can only say that some people tend to place the norms given for instruction and its factual inherent laws in the foreground, others stress the modes of behavior and their institutional framework as well as controversial relativizing of norms and strategies. Still others place in the foreground the development of the capability to perceive the social conditions of community behavior and political behavior. The same holds true for the economic and political preconditions of a self-realization that is to be objectively named, but which can be reached only relatively in each case.

The Problem Area of Developmental Psychology and Psychology of Learning

Some say: Children develop in stages, where—above all—that which is latent in them develops. The environment can, as a rule, at most alter the capacity to learn—not, however, build it up. Essentially childlike feeling, thinking, and acting is forced into the background by the adult capacity of feeling, thinking and acting. Others say: It is true that children develop in stages, but these can only be very imprecisely fixed in regard to age because of greatly differing environmental influences and individual conditions. The children bring with them a formalized ability to think, but then in the concrete situation the development of their capability to feel, think, and act is a continuous reciprocal effect between personality factors and environmental factors (including adult reference persons) that can hardly be generally defined.

And still others say: It is certain that this development is both physical and psychical, but what is, in this, individually predisposed so that it proceeds in stages, remains superimposed by the influences of the environment, i.e. by the conditions of socialization. That which is predisposed is then of secondary importance—in fact, it must be that for the teacher for practical reasons. As a rule he is, in the school situation, unable to clearly differentiate between "heredity" and "environment"—a problem which overtaxes even specialized knowledge. Anyone who insists on "heredity" is relieved of educational methods of his own; whoever insists on environment is himself pedagogically challenged. And "environment" is not specifically individual, but can be determined in its individual shape, historically and according to the social background. Seen in this way, the stages
signify a biologically conditioned development in which each stage proves at the most to be a sudden effect of new possibilities of feeling, thinking, and acting—all of which merely gathered together so far.

The Problem Area of Socialization

Some say: The individual is not only strongly pre-modeled by heredity, he or she also lives in a fairly stable social environment—and must live in such a stability if self-confidence is not to be lost. That which is the expression of generally accepted norms gives man only very few possibilities and rights to exert influence. Social environment has influence on man via the compulsion exerted by the factual situation of the system of social institutions, beginning with the family and running via one's job to the state. Self-realization must be relativized according to the differing possibilities of the individual to reach them.

Others say: The individual and social environment are in a state of continual tension, full of conflicts, which—hardly predictable, much less solvable—drives on the development of man and his social environment. The single elements of this environment are in a constantly shifting relationship to one another—family, job, state, etc. "Compulsions exerted by the things and situations as such" (Sachzwänge) can be compensated by new findings or can be restricted to the necessary measure in each case. Each person lives under specific conditions of socialization.

And still others say: Social environment has a predominant influence on the development of man, but not resulting from a naturally occurring order and not as a reciprocal effect of single elements, but as living space which has been and has to be formed by man for the sake of his self-realization. This living space assigns the social individual elements and institutions to each other on principle, also in accordance with the predominant interests and the compulsions exerted by things and situations as such which belong to it. What is, essentially, the result of human desire and work gives man considerable possibilities and rights to exert influence. Those compulsions are reduced, but are then replaced by new ones. It is a matter of making them useful towards the self-realization of man. That activity takes place in a process of continual change in the historical development. Human forms of work, economic activities, and administrative change—and with them human feelings, thought, and actions. Self-realization as man's natural goal is claimed in the form that is possible in the actual historical situation.

The Problem Areas of the Subject Matter

Some say: The emphasis on the academic treatment of political education is not yet appropriate to the mental faculties of children and adolescents. Or they say: If an emphasis is to be placed on
academic treatment, then it should be placed on the substance of content which can be determined from its subject, and then also on subjects that mainly deal with events and substantive content and not with analytical differentiations and modes of behavior. Such subjects would be history, geography, and civic instruction, but not economics, sociology, and social psychology. Sexuality, health, and traffic safety training are spheres of information separated from that, because results of processes of cognition of other persons, and not so much the methods of acquiring knowledge, are in the foreground.

Others say: Political education must, of course, be treated like an academic subject in such a way that the findings of the relevant academic subjects and fundamental empirical methods of procedure must be used for the solution or controversial definition of the viewpoint of the learners, starting from topical problems which are of some concern for the learner, and which should be as controversial as possible. "Links between the subjects" and the structuring of their relationships determine the relationship between the subject matters and those academic subjects that have a supporting function; that means "studies" as the integrative framework for the special branches of learning, of history and politics, economics and sociology; this means geography, with a stress on social geography; and this means sexuality, health, and traffic safety training as problem areas of social behavior and of legal and institutional regulations.

And still others say: Academic treatment can mean but one thing; namely, to place the methods of gaining knowledge in the foreground, because reality is always only conveyed through the sense organs and through the naive theory that is shaped in each case in question. The social life of man, his work and spare-time activities, performing and administering, and the legal and institutional regulations—in other words: "society"—is the subject matter of perception. Not only the substantive content itself must be placed in relationship to a special branch of knowledge, but so must the interest behind the process of knowing and the problems which separate a segment of reality from the complicated overall complex. They thus place different emphases. One must only choose the theme "school" as an example and refer it to the above-mentioned academic subjects to understand this: history of the school and its social geography, economics of education and sociology, and social psychology of the school, school politics and school law, and last but not least school pedagogics. From which methodological area—from hermeneutics or empirics—the methods of gaining knowledge are taken and used, this all depends upon the guiding interest behind the question and on the segment of reality being treated. Thus neither a special subject matter nor special methods form one of the sociological disciplines. Even where it is a matter of different subjects, in the sphere of nature and technology (chemistry, physics, biology, handicrafts), esthetics (art, music), and communication (languages), these method areas are only altered according to the nature of the subject, and there is at least a functional connection.
with "society" (cf. esp. sexual education, health education, and traffic safety training).

Placing these aspects in relationship to each other is not arbitrary and not only determined by the segment of reality, but, above all, by the overall complex of society, the basic elements of which are perceived by the political-economic interest determining the process of knowledge. A special emphasis is thus put on sociology and social psychology as analytic disciplines, which investigate the reciprocal effect of the individual and social conditions of human perception and social life (the conditions of socialization, attitudes, feelings, thoughts, and actions), turning the condition of socialization, attitudes, feelings, thoughts, and actions into a problem of research both in teaching and learning—as a condition for self-awareness and self-realization. History and geography, the classical subjects for teachers-to-be which at school must represent "society" as being learnable and teachable, do not offer much: they comprise the dimension of time and space of social problems. By the growing differentiation of the methodology applied in the social studies, those disciplines—which are above all descriptive and narrative—have lost their monopoly. Is the analysis of a residential area in academic studies and practical teaching a study of sociological, politological, sociopsychological, economic, historical, or geographical nature? That depends on how one puts the questions, they are then always historical and geographical when they are put into a temporal or spatial framework.

The Problem Area of "Methods"

Some say: The essence of any instruction is, for the main part, to convey knowledge. Methodics offer the teacher an optimal way of conveying the subject. Others say: Methodics is not only the theory of the optimal way of conveying the subject. It is also the theory of the optimal forms of communication which enable the children to learn various procedures, in actual fact and specific to the subject, so that they can form their own reasoned opinion.

And still others say: Methodics are bound to the methodology of the sciences and humanities, because they concern themselves with those methods which are optimally suited to the correct recognition of reality. And so children must learn modes of procedure, that is, elementarized methods which can hold up to the principles of the academic sciences. If we were to elementarize content (i.e. the results of research), then we must also be in a position to elementarize methods. Methodics are, then, a methodological concept of pertinent truth-finding, found with the help of suitable forms of communication in the framework of the (formal) structural elements of teaching. Project-teaching in the form of "learning by discovery" is the ideally typical model.
The Problem Area of Theory of the Sciences and Humanities and Political Theory

Some say: The social sciences are bound by norms, to an order laid down by God, a natural order, or an order which follows the Law of Nature. Social institutions conform to this, and are measured over again by it and changed according to it. Academic learning offers help towards correct action and correct policies. This is why it is not arbitrary which position one takes. It must be able to stand up to natural order and morality. Revelation or enlightenment makes it recognizable to man. History gives proof of the limits which man puts upon himself again and again through his weaknesses in the process of his self-realization.

Others say: Academic study can set no norms in order to prescribe certain actions, using them as a basis. Norms are the expression of human interests, which must be carried out by the individual or groups in the controversy of opinions and in politics. Academic study can only guarantee that methodically correct research takes place; it alone can improve these methods and offer research results free of options to man. Academic study and politics demand an open controversy of opinions in the field of differing theories and positions, without which there would be no progress and no possibility for the individual to state his position and to live up to it. Only the ethics of the "open, pluralistic society" give the framework for this. They make self-realization possible. They try to keep the weaknesses and virtues of man in balance--through their institutions, regulations, and controlling authorities.

And still others say: Academic study is bound to norms which it gains from a definition of the essence of man within the scope of his historicity, and it has the task of giving directives to man by making him conscious of his present historical situation, laying claim to the highest possible self-realization of everyone for the sake of performing an action as correctly as possible. Academic study must guarantee that methodically correct research is carried out and that conditions which hinder man in his self-realization are eliminated as far as possible. And it makes evident that methods are not free from interests and evaluations either. Thus the question can always be posed as to whether academic study serves to further the highest possible self-realization of all men, and if it gets to the bottom of the conditions of society with its conceptuality and its problems. Only such a position can be held academically and politically.

III. How to Formulate Political and Educational Ideas Theoretically and how to Conceptualize them

These are theory elements formulated in everyday speech; they are conceivable points of reference of a concrete discussion of teaching problems which are under consideration or incidentally touched upon. Therefore, it is, in actual fact, possible to take sides on the basis of what "some people," what "others," and what
"still others" say, or to change sides according to the problem area in hand. The question of whether one or the other is stringent or not can only then be answered when these ideas are linked with the respective theories and are conceptualized, and, again, are directed at everyday educational and political practice.

In the discussion of the theory of social sciences in the Federal Republic of Germany there is, at present, a consensus of opinion over formulating "the foundations of the theory of the sciences and humanities in regard to political theories" in the following order: normative-ontological theories, empirical-analytical theories, dialectical-historical theories. Accordingly, "some people," the "others," and "still others" can be hypothetically subsumed in order to legitimize the theory and practice of political education in an academic and political way, as is here intended.

Fundamental theory-elements are contained in the synopsis.
Normative-Ontological Theory

Basic Convictions

There is objective truth in the form of ethical norms and natural orders (ontology).

That which has come into being in history reflects this truth; it has "stood the test."

Empirical-Analytical Theory

Not value judgments but factual judgments on materially given and conditioned substantive content are academically proven statements, even if academic study is based on values and influenced by evaluations. The belief in reason is a moral decision.

In assured criticism, objectivity lies in the sphere of academic controversies and conflicts of interests. The "open (pluralistic) society" guarantees this academic approach.

Man has no academic insight into possible regularities, complexes and forms of the essence of historical and social individual phenomena. He will recognize, however, continual conflicts of interests.

Dialectical-Historical Theory

Reason necessarily includes an emancipatory epistemological interest, gained from the history of man by the negation of inhumanity, recognizable in each particular case, and of the elimination of alienation which is, in fact, possible in each case. The conditions of society and human awareness are materially given and conditioned.

Values and value judgments are fundamental reference points of academic knowledge.

Academic knowledge means taking sides in the conflicts of interest in society. It is "objective" in its bias for the underprivileged. It refers to the objective possibility of a better, or rather a completed society ("concrete utopia").

History and social development have an essence recognizable to man and form a complex which structurizes the details. Both are the result of human action, in such a way that new contradictions and new dissolutions, etc., result from the dissolution of old contradictions, so that the progressive elements of that which has been overcome are reconciled in the new.
**Normative-Ontological Theory**

Contradictions exist between normative claim and social reality. They constitute the academic problem.

**Aims**

The "good society" corresponding to the ethical norms and natural orders within the bounds of that which has proved itself historically reliable and possible for man.

**Methods**

Hermeneutics, case-analysis (topical dialectics), history of ideas, historical analysis of problems and concepts, consideration of the results of empirical research. Interest in the workings of the institutions in regard to the problem areas: state, power, and functionally structural interest with regard to the problem area elite and political system. (von Beyme)

**Empirical-Analytical Theory**

Contradictions exist in the alleged knowledge and the alleged facts; they constitute the academic problem. In this sense, academic problems are frequently social problems which can be re-formulated.

**Aims**

Statements and predictions without any formal contradictions with the elimination of hidden normative contents; rational settlement of academic controversies; elimination of prejudices.

**Methods**


**Dialectical-Historical Theory**

The contradictions in social reality--those that can and cannot be cancelled--form, under the present conditions of property ownership and under the conditions of the present political system, both the academic and the political problem with emancipatory interest.

**Aims**

Outline and realization of the concrete utopia of a better society via criticism and alteration of the existing society and by using already realized emancipation.

**Methods**

The analytical categories correspond to the historical and social connections: In the dialectic of Being and consciousness, the emphasis is put on the material basis; the contradictions in the movements of Being and consciousness proceed in the triadic movement of thesis, antithesis and synthesis; its concrete definition lies in the endeavor to see the individual phenomena, which can be grasped empirically, in a complete network that cannot be grasped empirically, but which structuralizes it.
### Normative-Ontological Theory

Behavioristic interest with respect to political culture and group pluralism, and comparative interest with respect to the politics' system. (von Beyme)

### Empirical-Analytical Theory

Behavioristic interest with respect to political culture and group pluralism, and comparative interest with respect to the politics' system. (von Beyme)

### Dialectical-Historical Theory

(Dialectics, individual things, totality, appearance, essence). The epistemological process, which itself is integrated into social conditions and in its "method" is bound to the object under examination, proceeds via the provisional definition of the details (idea) from this abstract (the categories of "familiar thought") to the concrete, to the essence as the structuralizing network of the individual phenomena, analyzed and evaluated with the interest in highest-possible emancipation; the action itself concerned with emancipation accelerates and differentiates the recognition: Practice as corrective of theory (dialectic theory-practice). Historical-genetic and comparative interest with regard to problems of the class-struggle and the political system. (von Beyme)

### Areas of Knowledge

- **Political history of ideas; ontology; for instance, striving towards "pure politics."**

- **There is no academic subject as "a thing-in-itself." Disciplines are only "constructed conglomerates of problems" (Popper); thus consideration of all the disciplines of the social sciences, which are relevant to the problem, within the framework of reciprocal complementing.**

- **Integration of the "disciplines" via the homogeneous subject-matter "society" and via the uniform dialectical-historical theory. "Disciplines" articulate problems which are specific in each case, corresponding to the historical aspects of the whole of society within the framework of political economy. The social sciences are always a historical science.**
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<th>Normative-Ontological Theory</th>
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<td>Demands of Action</td>
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<td>As &quot;practical academic study&quot; (Hennis) political doctrine of action for the sake of a &quot;good society.&quot;</td>
<td>Directives of action for a &quot;social technology&quot; that can be based morally, but not academically. (Popper)</td>
<td>In the dialectic of theory and practice action for the sake of emancipation is epistemologically and politically necessary.</td>
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IV. To what Degree Theoretical Positions can be Called Political

"The position in the theory of the sciences and humanities has a certain connection with the political viewpoint of a scholar. There is, however, no absolute parallelism" (von Beyme). This is formulated so vaguely, because one still knows very little about these connections. The hypotheses which attempt to approach the problem from the other side are not any less vague; Richard M. Merelman also suspects "a certain connection," but no "absolute parallelism" between everyday attitudes and cognitive structures, that is between "naive theory" and a politically biased view. Combining "naive theory" with the theory of the sciences and humanities and combining this with the political bias and political theory represents the here formulated attempt to structuralize the political-didactic discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany by pointing out these problems.

This is why the following is formulated as a hypothesis: Sociopolitical theories are, in their essence, systematizations which are clearly differentiated and beyond the scope of the everyday complex of life. They are systematizations a political, definitely diffuse and contradictory everyday consciousness. Everyday cognitive structures and the corresponding clearly differentiated theories of the sciences and humanities are, on the other hand, an everyday consciousness which is reduced to a particular disposition of knowledge, or rather reduced to sociopolitical theory; or to put it in other words: these political theories are, for the time being, perceptive and reflective concepts transferred into historically reality-oriented politics, and so they can be formulated best in a generalizing way. Consciousness and perception—whether clearly differentiated or not—come into being, according to the dialectical-historical theory, under socially mediated conditions of socialization, in the framework of opposing interests which are politically and economically conditioned. In the course of history, the dominance of the positions shifts according to the shifts in the opposing sociopolitical interests in a particular political system.

Thus the first attempt at establishing a relationship between theories and political attitudes is clear: between normative-ontological theory and conservatism, between empirical-analytical theory and liberalism, between dialectical-historical theory and socialism. The clarity is relativized as soon as it is no longer seen as a model that refers to the historical origin, but, in its present function in society, represents party-political practice in a concrete historical situation with problems caused by a particular system.

In the course of the historical process of forming a system of political parties since the bourgeois revolution, conservative, liberal, and socialist parties have formed themselves into wings, in disputes over the problems in hand, but have also split into variants of the original legitimizing model of theory, and in so doing have partially overlapped, so that there are definitely conservative liberals and social democrats, social democratic liberals and Christian democrats,
and liberal Christian democrats and social democrats. This is particularly true of those who only vote (as opposed to actual party members) with their multifaceted voting motivations. Parliamentary democracy is the political system of political liberalism. It provides the formal elements of the sociopolitical minimal consensus as an instrument of the relative stability of the political system. It necessarily makes the other political interests more liberal, namely those which have become an integral part of a theory or party. Theory elements become purely decorative pieces to be set before short-term political strategy. Especially socialist party wings disagree with this, because they have political-emancipatory concepts that aim at changing, or rather totally overcoming, the system. The everyday conservative attitude of respect for tradition, the interest in continuity and the affirmation of the tried and tested as new normative quality offer no alternative to that. Empirical experience and theory of political systems become the new scientific and academic legitimation of liberalized conservatism. Fascism that has developed into a party, and authoritarian-bureaucratic socialism have, as their background the theory of the sciences and humanities, normative-ontological and dialectical-historic theories, but also the always possible fascist and authoritarian-socialist instrumentalization of empirical research. Just as these sociopolitical positions lack rational legitimation, so the others are in want of humanitarian ones.

However, much sociopolitical theories mix with each other in the historical process of the formation of a party, in the political debate which is concerned with fundamental principles political structure elements shine through. This is proof for the possibility to question biased and everyday talk according to the theory of the sciences and humanities; and it is proof for the necessity to connect it to the political-didactic discussion, because the former does this anyway --de facto, as it were--either intentionally or unintentionally, and because it tries to qualify the sociopolitical engagement, the capacity for thinking, and the corresponding capability to act.

Parliamentary speeches (from the Bundestag) can demonstrate to what extent theory is contained in parliamentary controversy (1). Political questions addressed to theorists of the sciences and humanities can show how political the positions are that deal with the theory of the sciences and humanities (2). A recording of unreflected talk can show which potential offers itself for the qualification of interests and engagement, of reflection and action (Richard M. Merelman, cf. under "Further Reference" in V.).

(1) In the following synopsis, central sentences from a debate have been put together which were spoken in connection with the proposal of the CDU/CSU ("Concerning the Constitutional Order of the Federal Republic of Germany") and the SPD and FDP ("Concerning the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 until 1974") in the German Bundestag on February 14-15, 1974 (79th/80th session). It manifests the
common liberal basis, but also the conservative or rather left-liberal /social democratic interpretation of the minimum consensus.

Normative theory elements are contained in the statements of the CDU speakers, political premises of empirical-analytical theory in the statements of the FDP. The speakers of the SPD do not behave any differently, with their recognizable dialectic theory elements and socialist sociopolitical demands in points 3, 7, 8, 10.
1. Democracy based on the principle of freedom requires a fundamental consensus of the parties and groups in society. (Dregger)

2. Principles of a democracy based on the principle of freedom (among other things): organic opposition, independence of the jurisdiction, autonomy of the trade unions, protection of minorities, freedom of opinion and of the press, free elections. (Dregger)

3. The constitution must be rooted in the hearts and minds of the people. Adhering to the constitution does not mean adhering to the present social and political situation, because the conditions of human existence and public community alter. There is no alternative to the Basic Law, there is also no convergence, no mixing of the systems. (Dregger)

1. The Basic Law reflects social democratic ideas well. (Schäfer)

2. Socialism is only realized through democracy, democracy is fulfilled through socialism. (Godesberg Program; Schäfer)

3. The constitution is an expression of the really existing balance of power in a country. (Lasalle)

It is the true content of all social order, to grant to all individuals the genuine possibility to help and develop themselves by means of all the institutions of the state, in a way corresponding to the particular needs of a specific time. (Lasalle; Schäfer)

1. The Basic Law is pervaded by the spirit of liberalism and constitutionalism. (Hirsch)

2. To the unchangeable principles of our state belong: the sovereignty of the people, legality of the administration, multi-party system, right to oppose, parliamentary responsibility, independence of the courts of justice, exclusion of all kinds of despotism. (Hirsch)

3. The content of the constitution must correspond to the social reality and to the ideals of the citizens. We all seek to change the system of our public life, and therefore also the constitution, in such a way that it grants optimal living conditions and corresponds to the demands of the people on society. The chance of survival of a society lies in its accepted change through overcoming conflicts of interests and opinions. (Hirsch)
CDU
We react sensitively to everything that looks like a change of the system. Whoever touches parts of the constitution or even surrenders them, surrenders everything, gives a signal to the leftists who want to distract the SPD from its path, which leads away from the Basic Law. (Filbinger)

4. The Basic Law is, on principle, open to alternative political programs. (Vogel)

5. Extremism of the right or left (right or left fascism) are likewise incompatible with a democracy based on liberty and law. They deny constitutionalism, pluralism, the basic rights. Their language sounds harmonizing. (Dregger)

SPD
4. The constitution leaves room for differing models of a welfare state (democratic socialism, socialist ideas outside the SPD, liberalism of the Freiburg Ideas of the FDP, catholic social doctrine, socially oriented free market economy of the CDU from Blüm to Dregger). (Dürr)

5. The young socialists are seekers of solutions, which are meant to be better solutions for man. (Schäfer)

FDP
4. Adherents of different political conceptions are not in the wrong within the framework of the Basic Law and do not act against the constitution. (Hirsch)

5. Democratic parties have the task to bind or rather to integrate their extreme wings. (Groß)
CDU

The NPD has been mentally and politically overcome today. We have mastered the anti-constitutional left-wing radicalism, because the solidarity of the socialists superimposes itself upon the solidarity of the democrats and so collaborates with the enemies of the constitution. (Vogel)

6. Tolerance only for the tolerant: Whoever works against the democratic state cannot work for that state; whoever wants to destroy the constitution must be prevented from doing so. (Dregger)

SPD

6. We do not want public enemies working for the state. They must be repelled with constitutional means and a policy of reform. (Schäfer)

FDP

6. Whoever works against the democratic state cannot be in its service. (Hirsch)

For constitutional reasons we must put up with the danger that someone gets into the Civil Service who clearly does not work in accordance with the Basic Law. A policy of reform is the best means of defense. (Groß)
7. The impetus on constitutionalism and the welfare state are equal principles, the latter is a matter of good services in the welfare state and of social politics as a basis for freedom and dignity of man. (Dregger)

8. The socially oriented free market economy is the basis for the protection of freedom within the state. It is appropriate politically and partly even according to law, if the constitution is to be realized. (Dregger)

The social market economy is part of the claim of the Basic Law to bring about freedom. (Vogel)

7. The basic rights do not only secure the freedom of the individual towards the state, they also take part in establishing the state, being rights that establish the community. Preventative care in the welfare state serves self-determination and the development of a free society. (Schäfer)

The principle of the welfare state as expressed in the Basic Law is a dynamic element of the constitution. The basic rights are a yardstick for shaping society in the direction of the welfare state. Democracy is not only a form of government but also a form of life. The political democracy requires support by democratic structures in the social sphere. (Dürr)

The basic rights grant freedom from the state, but also rights and services. The rights of participation in state and society result from one's own sense of responsibility, self-determination, the dynamic and the fact that man is prepared to take risks (servant of industry, citizen of industry; Naumann). (Hirsch)

Constitutional retaining of the status quo and activity towards the welfare state to improve social justice threaten the freedom of the individual which must be secured by constitutional means. The substance of the right of the individual in our constitution is always in danger. (Hirsch)

8. The Basic Law has not made a choice in favor of any particular economic system; this is a matter of political controversy. (Dürr)

The free market economy must be gauged in its workings in relations to the claims raised by the welfare state and to the chance that servants of the economy might turn into citizens of the economy (Radbruch). (Schäfer)

8. Socially oriented free market economy is no constitutional category but a problem of political controversies based upon the constitution. (Hirsch)
We do not want the structure of the socially oriented free market economy to be broken up, because otherwise the constitution is on a losing course. (Filbinger)

The demand for nationalization of the banks and the basic industries, similar to disappropriation, for central control of the investments, for community possession of building land, is not in accordance with the fundamental values of our constitution. (Filbinger)

9. The freedom of man is protected by a carefully worked out system of balance of power (separation of powers, opposition, federalism, self-government, competition, trade unions). (Dregger)

9. The balance of power in the sphere of state and society is the condition for the functioning of the state. (Schäfer)

9. The absolute majority of a single party leads to misuse of power. (Groß)

10. The imperative mandate is anti-constitutional. (Dregger)

10. The debate about the imperative mandate is old. It is, however, a question of how I can exert some influence in such a way that the delegate acts in the way he has promised. (Schäfer)

10. The imperative mandate leads to responsibility becoming anonymous. (Hirsch)
(2) Herbert Marcuse (dialectical-historical theory: "critical theory") and Karl Popper (empirical-analytical theory: "critical rationalism") were, in 1970, questioned in a television interview, both in exactly the same way. The following synopsis has been compiled from their answers. The field of politics appears as the concrete expression of an abstraction from the theory of the sciences and humanities: a socialist and a liberal in comparison (Stark).

### Marcuse

#### The New Society

**a) Situation**

- The fundamental contradiction of the capitalist system:
  - the wealth of society contrasts with repressive and destructive use.
- Integration of the majority of the working class into the existing system (partly in its support) by raising the standard of living.
- Control mechanisms through steering and manipulation of the consciousness.
- Fetishism of the world of goods leads to the reproduction of the capitalist system with the help of the satisfaction of needs which have been aroused.
- The struggle for existence becomes harder.
- Poverty and misery are continually produced.
- Exploitation of the Third World in favor of the production interests of the industrial countries.
- Restriction of democracy and pluralism; discrimination of the left.
- Institutionalized violence.

### Popper

#### The Open Society

**a) Situation**

- The open society is both reality and ideal, for example in England and the U.S.A.:
  - free discussion and its influence on politics;
  - institutions for the protection of freedom and the weak.
- The form of the political system is important: it is permanently in need of improvement and it is a possible system;
  - for example, the withdrawal from Vietnam took place through public pressure in the U.S.A.
- Institutions are determined sometimes by one group, sometimes by another.
- There is no class society.
- Democracies are always open to ideas, especially to oppositional ones.
- Open democracies are always prepared to have doubts about themselves.
- Dictatorships either from left or right are essentially the same thing.
- Characteristic of democracy is: the institutions allow a change of government without use of violence.
- The state is a necessary evil.
Marcuse

b) **Alternatives**

A society

without war, exploitation, repression, poverty, waste,

in which people determine their own existence,

which as a socialist society is open to new ideas. The economic conditions are given for this society.

c) **The Way**

--It is different according to the specific socio-economic conditions.

--Students are those who prepare the revolutionary movement; the working class remains the revolutionary subject.

--Revolution arises from dehumanization, from being disgusted over waste because of brutality and ignorance. The cause lies in the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist system.

Reforms are necessary, but:

Exploitation and repression are characteristics of capitalist production. Some day reforms will find their limits, they will then have to cut through the roots of capitalist production: the interest in profit;

revolutionary violence then meets with institutionalized violence.

Fighting for a cause is the natural expression of human existence; radical opposition today is anti-capitalist opposition.

The Theoretical Background

d) **Anthropology**

Because of the achievements of the industrial society, man, for the first time in history, can act well and with solidarity, i.e. for the first time he has the chance to live emancipatedly.

Popper

The Way

Conflicts must be carried out rationally. One can always only aspire to a society better than the present one.

Revolutionary ideals and their supporters almost always become victims of the revolution. Nonviolent changes allow unwanted and undesired consequences of our measures to be changed in time: they facilitate reforms.

The Theoretical Background

d) **Anthropology**

Human beings are only very rarely reasonable; they must choose between reason and violence; avoidable use of violence is criminal.
Marcuse

Values are not only based upon subjective decisions. Emancipation is necessary to thought. The sciences and humanities are based on critical analysis of facts, tendencies, possibilities.

From the dialectical analysis of the social process arises the human (natural) necessity to change society.

The conception of freedom includes struggle against lack of freedom, otherwise the theoretical concept is wrong.

The objectivity and universality (of dialectical-historical theory) is the one that also applies to history.

Popper

Violence always leads even deeper into violence.

There is no such thing as a reasonable society, but only one that is always relatively more reasonable than the present one.

"Our lack of knowledge is unbounded."

We have no absolutely certain knowledge, but only hypothetical knowledge, which is permanently criticized in order to eliminate errors without condemning the bearer of knowledge. The same applies to the social sphere.

"The revolutionary change in our ideas, theories or hypotheses can take the place of violent revolutions which have caused the loss of so many human lives."

Social values are a matter of decision. The decision towards rationalism is based on the belief in reason; it is moral. At the same time it is the "belief in the rational unity of man," "equality in the eyes of the law" in spite of the manifold inequalities of all human individuals. That means: partisanship which transcends party politics; tolerance; refusal of any claim to authority.
What is and is not Learned in our Schools

Everyday conversation in the staff room has its counterpart in the everyday practice in the classroom. It does not necessarily compare with what one would expect according to the intention expressed.

With regard to the classroom one here expects that the following is, above all, to be learned or confirmed:

1. Cognition, feeling, and action are areas of perception and action which are to be kept separate from one another; they each represent individual acts which are hardly socially mediated; theory does not, therefore, need practice in the process of cognition. **It is not learned** that individual cognition, feeling, and action are areas of perception and action dependent upon one another and socially mediated; that theory and practice, therefore, condition each other in the process of knowing in such a way that practice receives an epistemological function.

2. **It is learned or confirmed** that social factual circumstances are given independent of specific interests and can be perceived free of options just as independently of one's own interests; **and not** that social factual circumstances are dependent on specific interests and that they can only be perceived dependent on one's own interest, i.e. by taking options; that they are, therefore, always also human practice.

3. **It is learned or confirmed** that one's own perception of social factual circumstances is, naturally, objective and adequate to those factual circumstances, if the process of knowing is seen as taking place one-sidedly as viewed by the perceiving subject to the object; **and not** that one's own perception of social factual circumstances is only then adequate to the factual circumstances, if it is understood as a dialectical reciprocal process between subject and object.

4. **It is learned or confirmed** that social factual circumstances show their essence in the shape of phenomena, and—additively structured—must be perceived adequately to their character as individual phenomena; **and not** that social phenomena can only indirectly express their essence and can only be perceived in their context, which places the individual phenomena into a totality that structures them adequately to their character.

5. **It is learned or confirmed** that in the sphere of society it is mainly a question of compulsions exerted by the things and situations as such. It is necessary to recognize them and, above all, to adapt to them; **and not** that in the sphere of society compulsions exerted by the things and situations as such and the adaptations resulting from
them must be restricted to an extent which is, in each case, historically (still) necessary.

6. **It is learned or confirmed** that social conditions can only be altered in small areas; **and not** that social conditions can also be altered radically.

What is mostly learned and confirmed is the result of a type of teacher training that is content-oriented and of a similar teaching practice with the help of curricula and schoolbooks to date, and it is the result of the manifold influences of the "hidden curriculum." It is an objectivism that is oriented to the subjects only with appeals to social behavior. It corresponds to the empirical-analytical forms of perception and reflection in bourgeois society. The principle can be noticed everywhere: student teachers hardly ever deal with the theory of knowledge or the theory of the sciences and humanities and also scarcely with methodological problems. Textbooks contain factual circumstances and opinions, but not materials and aids for (systematic) "learning by discovery"; they suggest that things or problems can only be what they appear to be. The evidence of the given facts becomes a normative power.

What is learned and confirmed has little of Karl Popper's skepticism and little of the exactness of inductive empirical experience. Factual circumstances which are relatively unproblematized, and behavioral appeals, join together to form the conservative-liberal concept of a society as free of conflicts as possible.

Teaching aids which attempt to break through this objectivism have only been on the market for a few years. They present factual circumstances in a controversial way, containing primarily sources and data; they provoke the forming of one's own opinion and the development of discussion techniques as well as new ways of gaining information. This is a left-liberal theory of conflict which remains pedagogically unproductive, mainly because of its pre-determined social-ethical postulates in the tradition of the enlightenment. There is enough skepticism there, but still very little methodological meticulousness as would be necessary against the background of critical rationalism.

In school practice the dialectical-historical theories of socialism—which may be counted (with reference to the Critical Theory or an "open" Marxism) to the democratic order of the Basic Law based on the principle of liberty—have only very little effect. They have been under increasing public and administrative pressure since the economic crisis of the West and the defeat of the Social Democrats in the last elections. In Hesse and North-Rhine Westphalia, general directives which found their legitimation in this theory have been made "innocuous" under the pressure of the public and of the CDU opposition. Dialectical thought and action has then, for this reason, no great chance in our
schools. In addition to this the socialism of the Critical Theory makes matters difficult for itself when it comes to introducing dialectical-historical thought: it presents itself with statements of fact and opinions, not infrequently by harmonizing empty formulas of a "concrete utopia" of an emancipated society, all leading in the direction of consciously solving conflicts by way of reforms, by altering the system, and finally, through the extent of the reforms, even by overcoming the system.

All three concepts show a methodological deficit. They furnish conservatism, pluralistic arbitrariness of opinion-making, and dogmatic-doctrinaire socialism with opportunities as well as with very controversial and polemic discussions: ones does not use arguments, but polemicizes with the results of one's own ideas or those of others. Presenting the opposing position in a distorted way increases the pleasure.

How Theories are Discussed in Political Didactics

The weight is distributed differently in the discussion of the political-didactical theory at the colleges. There the socialism of the Critical Theory and of an "open" Marxism probably prevails over the left-liberal theory of conflict; conservative-liberal concepts rank far behind. The pressure exerted by practice (Praxisdruck) in the classroom forces any weak theory aside--weak, because this theoretical approach has not become habit by having resulted from the process of knowing. It is probably already in the staff room that normative ontology asserts itself, especially if emotions break through the safety limits of acquired rationality. Colleges and universities are generally still sanctuaries in this regard, far removed from the pressures of everyday reality.

The business of political education is dealing with sociopolitical interests; perception and thought, the theory of cognition, and the theory of the sciences and humanities are just as political. In this context, sociopolitical basic directions and the basic directions of the theory of the sciences and humanities have been accentuated in different ways, with each accent placed according to the particular emphasis and evaluation of individual theory elements and factual circumstances, so that general verdicts can very rarely be allowed--at least not if based on one's own opinion.

Those who agree to dealing with each other in this manner draw the lines where dogmatism and/or inhumanity become decisive factors, and they manage the whole spectrum of intermediary possibilities with the help of a generous constitution in order not to reduce to a degree of ineffectiveness controversies that are provocative vis-a-vis proven knowledge.

Thus, when looking at things reasonably, only a pluralism that is greatly reduced offers itself, the consensus of which keeps changing in
the historical course of events. In the west world it is a pluralism
on a bourgeois-liberal basis; dialectical-historical theory would like
to realize this on a democratic-socialist basis. In the Godesberg
Program of the SPD this is clearly expressed. Dialectical-historical
theory considers this to be a historical necessity which can be slowed
down, but not stopped.

If both positions are still historically legitimized, they must be
included into the discussion and competition of the practice of research
and teaching and of sociopolitical action. In teaching, for example,
there are problems under discussion which must be discussed in a
politically controversial way; they demand a political statement of
opinion. Emancipation is the yardstick with which sociopolitical
positions are to be measured. One could in each particular case
attempt to clarify which position provides a better analysis of
reality and thus provokes action, and which gives broader opportunities
to the partial and fundamental expansion of emancipation—under consid-
eration of strategic arguments. Such a position includes the impending
dangers into its considerations. Theoretical and sociopolitical plural-
ism already operates under its criterion of selection, but it works
only very rarely in a definite way.

Analysis and strategy remain controversial to a limited extent,
because the factors which are relevant for the solution can only be
defined in a relatively narrow way. Methodologically speaking, dogma-
tic and doctrinaire fixations are deadly sins.

If one wants to work together competitively, one must use arguments;
that means one has got to apply one's own methodological concept and
that of others to one's own theory and that of others. This has so far
happened only rarely in the political-didactic discussion, which is
also an expression of the already mentioned methodological deficit,
but this time in the ranks of the theoreticians.

V. Literature on the Discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany

As an introduction into the political didactic discussion which is
taking place in the Federal Republic of Germany, a detailed study of
the theoretical controversies is not appropriate. One all too easily
loses oneself in isolated details, making the comparison with the
discussion in the U.S.A. more difficult for oneself. This discussion,
in fact, also took place in the Federal Republic via the reception of
the basic elements (Holtmann, Wulf). So here the "background" is in
the foreground: the structural elements, to which positions can be
traced back in a different way. Special problems are included in them
or can be easily derived from them; they can be discussed on this
basis: for instance, the role of history, legitimations of learning
objectives and contents, the question about structures of perception
and structures of things as they are, the relationship of the methodics
of instruction and the methodology of the sciences and humanities, the
problems of openness and indoctrination, etc. One can, moreover, make
the discussion more concrete, if it is gradually included, to a greater extent, into the occupation with projects in the field of curricula and practical teaching for the Primary (Elementary) Stage, Secondary Stage I, Secondary Stage II, and into the discussion of the foundations of educational politics and of problems of cooperation.

In the following list, only summarizing titles of books or single issues from series are given. Among journals, the following must be mentioned:

Demokratische Erziehung (Köln: Pahl Rugenstein Verlag)
Gegenwartskunde (Opladen: Leske-Verlag)
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht (Stuttgart: Klett Verlag)
Materialien zur politischen Bildung (Neuwied: Luchterhand-Verlag)
Politische Bildung (Stuttgart: Klett Verlag)
Politisiche Didaktik (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung)

Publications in the German Democratic Republic:
Geschichtsunterricht und Staatsbürgerkunde (East Berlin: VEB Verlag Volk und Wissen)

Within the framework of normative-ontological and conservative-liberal theory, the following attempts to legitimize their position with the help of the system theory should be noted:

Hugo Andreae, Zur Didaktik der Gemeinschaftskunde (Weinheim: Beltz-Verlag, 1968)
Hans Günther Assel, Ideologie und Ordnung als Probleme politischer Bildung (München: Ehrenwirth-Verlag, 1970)
Bernhard Sutor, Didaktik des politischen Unterrichts (Paderborn: Schöningh-Verlag, 1971).

The following books are to be found in the framework of empirical-analytical and liberal theory:

(on the basis of the system theory:)
Günther C. Behrmann, Soziales System und politische Sozialisation. Eine Kritik der politischen Pädagogik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1972)

(on the basis of the left-liberal sociopolitical theory:)
Kurt Gerhard Fischer, Einführung in die politische Bildung (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1973)

(and, on the very same basis, but with the legitimization of the objectives by means of the critical theory:)
Hermann Giesecke, Didaktik der politischen Bildung, New Edition (München: Juventa Verlag, 1972)
The following books are to be found in the context of dialectical-historical and (democratic) socialist theory:


A Marxist position with greater emphasis on the "objective economic factor" is found in:


Concerning the author's attempt to lay the foundations of political education through the process of socialization and knowledge via methodology and theory of the social sciences, see:


A survey on the discussion of the theory of political education is given by:


Concerning the relationship of the teaching of history and political instruction, we have:


An introduction into the discussion of the theory of the sciences and humanities in the FRG is given by:


Further reference was made in this text to:


The following two books inform the German reader about "Social Studies" in the U.S.A.:


Original translation by W. & I. Winter, Tübingen.

Edited by Louis F. Helbig, Indiana University, March 1976.
Professor Holtmann has discussed in a rather systematic fashion three major methodological orientations that may be adopted when one is concerned with political education: the normative-ontological, empirical-analytical, and dialectical-historical. He recounts that these approaches have different aims, methods, and basic convictions or presuppositions. This part of his discussion, in an important sense is useful for Americans concerned with social and political education to consider. It seems that many Americans have remained naively aloof from the methodological and ideological issues that are raised in this paper. This may be due, in part, to the overwhelming dominance of the empirical-analytical position, at least for the recent past. American attitudes concerning the improvement of social and political education suppose that we have in hand the necessary information and knowledge required to bring about a better world in the classroom. It is further assumed that this information and knowledge is for the most part factual and technological. It is further never, or rarely, thought to question how these answers were arrived at nor what the questions are that we think we have answered. When one proceeds in this fashion there is little sense of the limits of the situation. The self-consciousness needed for critical reflection is missing.

It is not the case that methodology is entirely absent in the United States concerning political and social education. A very brief account of some of the methodological influence in political education should be instructive, however. During the last decade the so-called "new social studies" replaced the "old social studies." This was for the most part a methodological and political issue, although these aspects of the controversy were not always in the forefront. The methodological battle was between the traditional normative-ontological positions and rational empiricism or empirical-analytical approaches. The political fight was between conservative and liberal. Professor Holtmann's characterization of some exchanges in West Germany also seem apt for our case:

"...one does not use arguments, but polemizes with the results of one's own ideas or those of others. Presenting the opposing position in a distorted way increases the pleasure." (p. 27)

The debate in the United States was polemical but also enlightened and insightful at times. The "new social studies" eventually won a political victory within our professional schools and associations. The debate has subsided.

It seems to me that the methodological debate has terminated prematurely. Rational empiricism, our dominant methodological and
ideological stance, was advocated rather than analyzed. The epistemological assumptions and nature of this orientation were never identified, illuminated, or critiqued. It is true that the gross misinterpretations that accompanied the "new social studies" (such as "concepts are the structure of the social sciences," and "induction is the process of social science") occur now with less frequency. This might mean that we are simply more adept at working within this new framework. It does not mean that we understand the foundations of that framework any better. Professor Holtmann's paper provides a much broader context within which Americans can reflect on developments in their country.

Professor Holtmann rather carefully outlines a number of different positions dealing with political education. Additionally he argues that many of these can be subsumed under the three more general positions mentioned above: normative-ontological, empirical-analytical, and historical-dialectical. He shows methodological aspects of political discourse and the political ideological overtones in philosophical discourse. Practice cannot be separated from methodology and ideology, but practice in the classroom remains apart from serious discussions of these issues. The participants to these potential debates are in separate camps that can barely understand each other. The differences in presuppositions make communication a rare and chancy thing. One is left with a rather pessimistic outlook on the future. It is difficult to envision thoughtful, serious, reflective change.

Holtmann provides an explanation of sorts for this state of affairs. It is the result of the complex of methodology and ideology of which we are victims rather than masters. Another view on this issue may be obtained from some ideas put forth by Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault studies discourse as an archaeologist.

What are being analyzed here are certainly not the terminal states of discourse...behind the completed system...is an immense density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations. (p. 76)

If discourse is viewed in archaeological terms and we look for the sedimentation of statements instead of the logical and grammatical structure of sentences, then one gets a rather different perspective on institutional change and stability. One can think of the density of statements, how they are grouped, what are the distances between frequent terms and phrases. By looking at the dispersion and distribution of statements it becomes easier to understand why classroom practice and serious methodological discussions are so far removed. It also becomes easier to understand the distance between methodological and ideological orientations. The content of frequently stated sayings in the staff room bear little in common with philosophical discourse. Until such time substructures are built in the staff room discourse that will support methodological discussion, the fragmented world described by Holtmann will continue. I have few ideas about how this
may be brought about. Given our lack of success with less involved interventions, such as technologically dominated curriculum packages, raising our collective self-consciousness with respect to our methodology and ideology may be very difficult, if at all possible.

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Some Remarks on the Paper by Antonius Holtmann

Klaus Hornung

Preliminary Remarks

The West German Federal Agency for Political Education requested a paper of limited length as a contribution to the discussion at the conference in Bloomington. A complementary, or rather alternative point of view to the paper of Mr. Holtmann would, of course—were it to be sufficiently substantiated—necessitate writing a longer paper than the one already submitted, which therefore needs oral comments and elucidation during the conference.

In my theses 1 to 4, I confine myself to commenting on several passages of Holtmann's presentation which seem to me to be important—here I follow the order of the author's paper. In thesis 5, I am giving a short summary of my own premises.

1. The Problem Area of Political Socialization

In teacher training in the FRG, in the problem area of socialization, the third approach (see Holtmann) at present enjoys a priority position which is almost dogmatically immune to criticism. The other academic approaches, in particular the so-called "conservative" theory of mental ability, are often discussed polemically, but only deprecatively—to the detriment of carefully considered academic information and discussion. Precisely in this area the "lag in modernity" is evident of which, for instance, Behrmann also quite rightfully speaks (quoted by Holtmann). This lag is characteristic of many areas in current discussions of educational science and also of political didactics in the FRG. In other words, a state of research is taken up which has already been abandoned some time previously in Anglo-Saxon research. In this context I would like to mention the publications of Bloom, Stabilität und Veränderung menschlicher Merkmale (Weinheim, 1971); Hans Eysenck, London; Arthur Jensen, Berkeley; Wilhelm Shockley, Stanford University; and others. This is shown among other things by the fact that, for instance, the thorough empirical analyses of J. Hitpass, Zwischenbilanz der Bildungsreform (Bottrop, 1973), are being almost completely ignored in the relevant discussion.

2. The Problem Areas of Subject Matter and Methods

It is regrettable that Holtmann does not include into his considerations the debate which is presently being conducted in the FRG—the debate consisting of these two positions: the "academically founded school subject" and the "integrated subject-determined learning area in the field of social sciences," which had to lead to a narrowing of
the spectrum in the discussion. The latter has developed particularly in the debate about the official general directives for political education in Hesse and North-Rhine Westphalia. Various differentiations made by Holtmann--such as, for instance, between "events and factual contents" in the traditional school subjects and "analytical differentiations and modes of behavior" in the new "learning areas"--are quite obviously untenable in the light of serious didactic discussion (although the fact is not to be ignored that precisely the latter is so often absent these days).

Without contradicting in principle the claim to academic soundness, specifically in the very area of political education, one must point, self-critically, to the fact that the high demands of stress on the "academic treatment" of teaching in the schools means excessive pressure on most of the students who want to be teachers. In the daily practice of the seminars and, of course, in actual class presentations, often only abstract general concepts remain which are to a great extent as much without content as they are colorless; those concepts can scarcely, or only with great difficulty, be connected with the contents and wide range of social reality. Especially concepts from general theoretical sociology (such as structure, function, role, stratification, mobility, international relations, etc.) rather hide a widespread lack of social experience in our students than serving their proper purpose of analysis and "construction" of social reality.

Neither should the statement be fundamentally disputed that it should be just as basically possible to elementarize academic methods, and that they, therefore, like the contents, should be helpful to the teaching of the social sciences at school. But: this claim has so far not yet been fulfilled in a satisfactory way or with models that can be implemented. In the same way, the abstract concepts of the social sciences nowadays often cover the student teachers' lack of social experience only deductively instead of serving the structuralization of experience, thus also the mentioning of preferred methods favors and encourages all types of ideologization.¹ Contents are being less and less conveyed, learned, and taken into consideration, usually with the explanation--which pretends to be better than reality and is therefore know-it-all--that such an approach would be fundamentally "affirmative," "bourgeois-positivistic," and "system-stabilizing." Methods ("learning how to learn and to do research ..."), on the other hand, frequently become a pretext for avoiding any learning activities involving contents: "methods" and "contents" are opposed antinomically. Social reality is defined as being a priori worthy of criticism because of the way the methods are being understood. At the same time, this critique considers itself absolute, although it is really over-simplified. The connection between knowledge of and insight into "factual contents" on the one hand and methodological "criticism" on the other hand is being destroyed in favor of an "imaginary world," a world without any content and no more than a construct of this "criticism." Moreover, behind the controversy over the
academic methods the political/ideological actionistic aim is clearly visible; the "conveyance of factual contents" is "affirmatively system-stabilizing," and it is only the conveyance of a "critical awareness of methods" which supposedly serves the social and political change with "emancipatory aims." That this approach must necessarily encourage most students to form an "alliance between the radicals and the lazy and the less-talented" (Thomas Nipperdey) at our universities and colleges, an alliance characteristic for the "great refusal" and the "formation of revolutionary awareness" and as such very probably wanted--all this is thoroughly taken into account and intended from the side of the actionist revolutionary aims.

The priority demanded by Holtmann, for example, in sociology and social psychology for a recognition of "segments of reality" as parts of a complex overall social structure (usually at the expense of history, geography, or other allegedly "narrative and descriptive disciplines") does more than interpret their methodological framework; it also runs the risk of replacing a traditional, abstract civic instruction by a new subject: a type of "social studies" which, in practice, is often as pseudo-academic as that which it replaces. Among young teachers who are insufficiently informed and, for this very reason, susceptible to dogmatic ideologization this leads to a set of typical attitudes, to a global formula with an actionistic ideology, and to so-called "ideologically critical" explanations of "structures" and "processes" in society. Those attitudes then serve as an absolute authority in their judgments.

3. On the Problem of Teacher Training

When Holtmann speaks of the supposedly "only slight effect" of the Critical Theory and of neo-Marxist positions, this may, in fact, still be relevant for the reality at school up to now. (According to my knowledge, however, there are no substantiated empirical results which prove this, probably for obvious reasons.) This, however, by no means applies to the colleges and universities which produce our teachers. The above-mentioned positions--although often stated in quite a narrow-minded and simplified form (only a small minority of our students are really intelligent representatives of Marxist positions)--are here clearly in the majority. And this is not only in the subjects which deal with social sciences in the more narrow sense: nowadays, the social sciences, however insufficiently practiced, exert a strong influence on educational science, on religious instruction, history, foreign languages, etc., and this, of course, must sooner or later have an impact on the daily teaching practice in our schools. One can hardly speak any more of a chiefly "content-oriented teacher training" and an imaginary "objectivism that is oriented toward the subjects with appeals to social behavior" (disregarding certain "conservative" remnants at some universities and in some subjects). Finally, one can no longer speak at all of the "normative power of the evidence of the given facts" at our universities: too much of what
had been passed on as matter-of-fact, and too many integrative structures and norms have been broken—especially in Germany—since 1945. The formal idea of "learning how to learn," which flows from educational science and general didactics as well as from the theory of learning, has long since overcome that imaginary "subject-oriented objectivism," especially in the subsidiary subjects, and has drawn their form into question, or rather, has already solved it to a great extent. Political didactics of supposedly "critical" and "emancipatory" social sciences is establishing itself in many places as a new meta-academic subject. This type of didactics lays claim to those criteria which are obligatory and relevant. In the face of the expressed need for an ideology among those students who are "radical" and lazy" one only has to look at the topics and products of our university lectures and seminars, the daily disillusionments suffered by many professors, and the academic standards themselves in order to see this: a steady erosion of the overall standard in so far as it is related to academic quality and differentiated discourse.

The "hidden curriculum" is, moreover, also to be found—for many of our lectures and seminars—in the paperback literature of "critical," neo-Marxist, and "revolutionary" origins. This is an important factor in official university life which can hardly be underestimated: Rowohlt Aktuell, Edition Suhrkamp, and the neo-leftist publishers such as Trikont, Oberbaum, Wagenbach, Pahl-Rugenstein are omnipresent with their publications. They are pushing a concept of society, especially among students in social studies, which is supposed to be "critical" but is, in reality, ideologically and dogmatically narrow-minded. Every lecturer in the FRG could tell a long tale about this, unless most of them prefer to remain silent. The students' choice of literature is, at any rate, determined to a great extent by these offers. Attempts to work with a wide and balanced selection of literature and sources is widely regarded as "bourgeois objectivism," which is to be replaced by "partiality": the widespread polemics against so-called scientific positivism—often found among students who master neither orthography nor the rudiments of the theory of the sciences and humanities—is only the ideological veiling of both massive political actionism and a lack of motivation and capability to carry on differentiated discourse. (I am gladly willing to relate fresh pieces of experience from recent lectures and seminars in the oral discussion.)

When Holtmann talks repeatedly about a "lack of scepticism and inductive empirical experience" among the older teachers in service, then this also applies, mutatis mutandis, to a considerable number of the newly trained teachers with their tendencies toward a dogmatic immunization of their own positions. Since teacher training in the FRG runs in a vicious circle—school/university/back-to-school—and since hardly any exposure to social, professional, or political experiences is being demanded from our high school graduates in the course of their adolescence and education, an "imaginary world" comes into
being which is encouraged by those "facts"—a world which is void of experience, a-prioristic and dogmatized. At present, our universities are producing, in a pronounced form, intellectuals (according to Schumpeter) in the deficient mode—especially in the sphere of the social sciences. Here, one learns to "criticize" before even a minimum of information, recognition, and insight into "given material" has been established. "Factual content" is a priori "problematized" and criticized, often without the most elementary information being known. One immunizes oneself right from the beginning against the recognition of such information by the moralizing, defamatory, and actionistic derogation of the existing facts and institutions as "forms of government" which must be abolished, and which, supposedly, are an "antagonistic" impediment toward individual emancipation.

4. How Positions in the Theory of the Methods of Academic Study Relativize Each Other

The remarks Holtmann is making about those controversies which were purely academic originally, but which have changed since 1968 into "sociopolitical rivalries and power struggles over professorships and institutes," are indeed quite relevant. In such an understatement, however, the partly hidden, partly very overt and direct invasion of academic life by political arguments in the FRG is not expressed clearly enough. Indeed, Holtmann does say that academic theory-directed polemics is on the verge of degenerating into "mutual accusations." This correct statement characterizes a situation which is bad enough in itself. The massive ideological encroachment of political criteria upon our policies for offering a chair and our policies within the institutes has indeed been detrimental to the pluralistic university. This encroachment—even where it produced only partial results initially—seems to lead to more and more politically "mono-colored" faculties and universities. It may be true that positions of the critical theory and of neo-Marxist origin had a "special need to compensate" and that some universities have so far been too mono-coloredly "conservative." The establishment and institutionalization of neo-Marxist centers of power at universities such as Bremen, Oldenburg, Marburg, Kassel, and others is, however, a reaction the strength of which must be noted with great concern from the viewpoint of a pluralistic-liberal democracy and also from that of the university itself.

Those "normative-ontological" theories and approaches provide a certain counterweight—also in the field of university politics—of which I would not say, as does Holtmann, that they would fall outside the present controversy over academic theory in the Federal Republic. It cannot be said of them either that they are "only represented at a few universities in the Federal Republic," neither does it seem admissible to me to attribute only at best a marginal effect, as Holtmann suggests, to the writings of the Freiburg (Wilhelm Hennis, Dieter Oberndorfer) and Munich (Hans Maier, Nikolaus Lobkowitz, Manfred
schools of political science. They both exert considerable influence. A series of experts in historical studies, such as Thomas Nipperdey (Munich), Kurt Kluxen (Erlangen), Hans Buchheim (Mainz), or Theodor Schieder (Cologne) must be included here. Younger professors such as Ulrich Matz or Peter Graf Kielmannsegg could indeed be called the 'third generation' of this approach. Quite a few of the important representatives of constitutional studies, particularly the group around the periodical Der Staat, including Roman Schnur, Werner Weber, Helmut Quaritsch, Roman Herzog, et al. must be mentioned here, as well as the sociologists Helmut Schelsky and Arnold Gehlen, also the philosophers Hermann Lübbe und Günter Rohrmoser. The effect of the academic publications of the afore-mentioned is of new relevance with regard to a growing trend in the Federal Republic to look more critically at the one-sided "emancipatory" conception of academic inquiry, though admittedly this cannot yet be finally assessed.

5. The Limits of Emancipatory Pedagogics

The past decade of political education in the Federal Republic was characterized chiefly by dialectic-historical theoretical approaches and emancipatory aims. Thus, for instance, Jürgen Habermas, writing as early as 1961, could not see democracy as a system like any other; in his opinion the essence of democracy lies in the fact that "...it effects far-reaching social changes which increase the freedom of the individual and which can in the end perhaps perfect it. Democracy works towards self-determination of humanity, and only when the latter is realized is the former true. Political participation will then be synonymous with self-determination." What must be taken into account in the current discussion of this with regard to the theory of academic inquiry and social philosophy? The representatives of the emancipatory school see a phase of a "counter-reformation" since the end of the sixties, following certain encouraging beginnings. A growing number of their critics see a "reverse trend" underway since the destruction began of the "essentialism of Hegel's legacy of the emancipation philosophy" (Karl Popper), the myth of the 'total reason' which ostensibly reveals itself in history (Hans Albert), i.e. Habermas's doctrine of "society as a historically effected totality for the purposes of critical maieutics of political practice." From the aim of the 'emancipated citizen,' namely to overcome National Socialist totalitarianism and the authoritarian political culture of German tradition in general, came forth in the course of the sixties already an increasing ideological overloading of the idea of emancipation. This became clear, for instance, in the change from an initially liberal-pluralistic concept of conflict to 'antagonistic' ideas of society and neo-Marxist theories of class conflict.

Thus, in the Federal Republic, it is this ideologically overburdened emancipation ideology which has not been able to avoid the 'dialectic of enlightenment.' It has perverted from a theory of enlightenment to new 'monolithism,' to new normative didactics of
of persuasion and conviction, to a social science which takes its
legitimation from the supposed knowledge of the "historically effected
totality." It is precisely through this that it deteriorates further
into a new "aggressive counter enlightenment" with a firm belief in its
own political salvation, unrealistic know-all manner, penetrating
morality and zealous intolerance (Hermann Lübbe).\textsuperscript{10} From this stage
it can be changed at any time into an "approved doctrine of society"
and ultimately a 'state religion'--something which Theodor Adorno was
well aware of.\textsuperscript{11} Here then the term 'emancipation' has been sub-
jected to that process of which Robert Spaemann has recently said that
it has seldom been beneficial for any word, namely, to be pushed into
the slot which is reserved for the word 'good.' No word has benefitted
from this: "...neither the words 'healthy,' 'patriotic,' 'altruistic,'
'German,' nor 'scientific,' nor any other word. Through being moved
up to the place of the word 'good' words are made taboo and can evade
further questioning... In the face of the emancipation ideology we
must defend the right of self-determination of the citizen. The term
emancipation, ideologically overcharged, has become ambiguous. Once
meant as liberation from authoritarian power, it now serves as a
legitimation of a new kind of authority, namely that which manages to
declare itself emancipatory."\textsuperscript{12}

In any case, the present emancipation ideology in West Germany has
simplified the actual complementary nature of freedom, self-determi-
ation, and emancipation of the citizen on the one hand and authority,
identification, and the sociopolitical consensus on the other hand.
It has been simplified into an Either-Or dichotomy instead of bringing
it to bear positively on the analysis and evaluation of all educational
and social processes. This ideology is also supported by the mistaken
notion that the 'nature' of man must only be allowed to develop freely
and without restraints for him, so that he might find himself on that
road at the end of which man's freedom will 'perhaps be perfected,'
although human 'nature' is anything but a simple factor, is not of a
single cast but many-sided, contradictory in itself.

The criticism of such a one-dimensional emancipation ideology
states: "A man cannot become a true man if left to his own devices,
i.e. the essence of man's 'nature' lies in the fact that it is dependent
on regulation, ordering, disciplining of its contradictory factors, on
the orientation of its individual development on authority, models,
consensus of values, and in becoming a person through the choice of
For and Against with regard to these."\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, in the past few
years the practical manifestation of emancipation in the Federal
Republic and in many other Western countries has itself confirmed this
dependency: all too easily the experiment of radically autonomous
self-regulation shifts suddenly into self-enslavement or self-destruc-
tion; 'critical awareness' becomes an uncritical gullibility with
regard to dogma and only a slight capacity for self-criticism. The uni-
versal enthronement of the principle of pleasure, for instance, would
never reach the goal of "the greatest possible good," but would in fact rather quickly express itself in self-destructive economism and a low cultural niveau.

Political education today must therefore keep in mind not only the dangers of incapacitation and 'consumption' of the individual in the social and power structures of the 'advanced industrial society' (which should certainly not be argued away), but also the other side of the coin: the weakening, if not to say the destruction of the "bloc des idées incontestables" in the pluralistic industrial societies, that is, the crisis and weakness of that minimum of common basic beliefs, without which neither personal identity nor solidarity and co-operation, i.e. the historically-politically relevant and durable existence of a society are possible. The contemporary free pluralistic social state has made possible for the individual citizen a measure of free self-development unimagin ed before. (It hardly seems possible to extend this measure of freedom without tearing the social fabric.) This pluralistic state has, however, also led to 'exposing forces', which threaten man's very existence, to a separation of individual and group interests which leads to absolute political abstention and which therefore works against representative democracy.

From the beginning the free constitutional democracy associated --as can be fascinatingly studied from its sources, for instance from the Federalist-- man's will to gain emancipation with a mistrust of his nature, which was why it balanced power with power. Of this mistrust--not only, by the way, of the temptations of the power of the mighty rulers, but also of the impotence of the ruled--there is usually little to be seen in the Messianic ideas of democracy and emancipation of today, which tend to identify the 'palaces' always with vice and the 'huts' always with virtue. In contrast, political education for a free constitutional democracy is always concerned at the same time with the function of the sociopolitical institutions in the service of guaranteeing freedom and with its task of safeguarding "the capacity of the whole to function", in other words at the same time with the insurance of freedom in the face of self-abuse, i.e. with the necessary and absolutely real dialectic of personal freedom and integrating institutions, authority and self-determination, progress and conservation, personal development through the For and Against with regard to society.

It is a matter, then, of the realization that 'emancipation' can never consist of the abolition of all kinds of restrictions and ties, but that the substance of 'reasonable freedom' in the reality of human history is rather to be sought in the equilibrium of 'freedom under the law.' Edmund Burke summarized this dialectic in the fabric of all history and society in a splendid "Letter to a Member of the National Assembly in Paris" (1791) in which, among other things, he says:

"Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion
as their love of justice is above their rapacity; in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumption; in proportion as they are more disposed to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters."19)
1) See H. Freyer, *Theorie des gegenwartigen Zeitalters* (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 117ff. "(Die gut verpaßte Ideologie): The psychological point of departure is that emptiness left in a person as soon as he is defined as an element in a secondary system... In this void, this lack of experience, ideologies flourish... The great thought forms, with which ideology fills the void or spans it deductively, betray at first glance where they originate: not from scientific inquiry but from religion, admittedly not the religion of the believing heart, but from the religion of the zealous prophet... To this are added the most varied psychological mechanisms, which encourage the susceptibility to ideologies: disappointments, which have spoiled the capacity to judge what may be hoped for, the urge to feel oneself a member of the rank and file, but on the other hand, the urge to belong to the few 'initiated'...."


3) Thus Nipperdey in his letter of farewell to the Berlin 'Senator für Wissenschaft,' Professor Stein.


5) Fritz Wilmar in a lecture at The Reutlingen Teachers' Training College.


10) Thomas Molnar's term.


13) Compare in this context: Gerhard Szcesny, *Die Disziplinierung der Demokratie oder die vierte Stufe der Freiheit* (Reinbek, 1974).


19) Quoted in H. Barth, Der konservative Gedanke (Stuttgart, 1958) p. 17 (The Works of Edmund Burke, Boston, 1839, vol. 3, p. 326.)

This paper also includes ideas which I have gone into in more depth in various recent publications: "Zwischen offener Gesellschaft und ideologischem Dogmatismus - 30 Jahre politische Bildung in der Bundesrepublik," in: Peter Gutjahr-Löser and H.H. Kutter (ed.), Der Streit um die politische Bildung (Munich, 1975); "Die politische Didaktik 'kritisch-normativer' Richtung," in: Kurt Gerhard Fischer (ed.), Reader zur politischen Bildung (Stuttgart, 1975); "Überleben in Freiheit - Entscheidungsfragen politischer Ordnung 'an den Grenzen des Wachstums'," in: Herder-Bücherei, INITIATIVE Nr. 13 (Freiburg, 1976).