The nature, causes, and values of the methods of governing higher educational institutions in Great Britain and the United States are discussed. Types of governing bodies are considered in terms of hierarchical rank and membership, along with the external institutions, groups, and individuals influencing the decisions made by academic governors. Historical traditions and precedents in each country are reviewed and related to current practices in educational administration. The complexities of the American system are described. It is emphasized that those who influence, no less than those who control, higher educational institutions must be reckoned with as participants in their management. (LBH)
Editors and publishers for a long time have been insisting upon terse if not high-voltage titles, a fact that has caused much discomfort for those who, in labeling their writings, struggle to yoke brevity and clarity. Having many times been deceived by the names of books and articles, I have often wished that it were possible to return to the practice of earlier times and to use such titles as that which Adam Smith gave his pivotal book of 1776, to wit, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, and that which John Cotton, New England's great colonial preacher, gave to one of his catechisms, namely, "Milk for the Nourishment of Young Babes Drawn from the Breasts of Both Testaments."

These and similar expansive declarations of intention lead me to observe that by the title of this paper I mean "An Inquiry into the Nature, Causes, and Values of the Methods of Governing Higher Educational Institutions Both in Britain and in America."

One further introductory remark. Many academics the world over believe that ideally they should be the ultimate if not the sole participants in the governing of colleges and universities, a point of view about which I shall be commenting upon later. Meanwhile three topics must be explored. First, types of governing bodies in terms of hierarchical rank. Second, their membership. Third, the external institutions, groups, and individuals influencing the decisions made by academic governors.

The structure which owns the property of an institution, which can sue and be sued, and which has the power to select and to direct administrative agents occupies the top hierarchical rank in all corporate government. Under the impact of quite different historical forces three types of such top-rung academic governing bodies (legal entities) have developed in Britain and in the nations it has sired. I proceed to describe them under the designations "Oxbridge," "Scottish-Mancunian," and "American."

The Oxbridge system of academic government need not, of course, be spelled out for Britons; but for reasons that will soon come into focus, it does for Americans. Its essential characteristics seem to me to be seven. First, that Oxford and Cambridge each constitutes a federation of autonomous corporations, namely, the University and its colleges. Second, that the University performs basic educational and research functions and in various relatively minor ways serves the colleges administratively.

1. A paper prepared for and read at a conference at the University of Lancaster, England, April 6 - 10, 1967.
Third, that everything relating to students other than degree requirements and examinations belongs within the bailiwicks of the colleges. Fourth, that each college manages its own affairs including its plant and other properties. Fifth, that the trustees of these college properties and the governors of all their other interests are, with few exceptions, the faculty members who have the status of fellows. Sixth, that neither Oxford nor Cambridge has a central governing body comparable to the courts of the Scottish universities, the councils of the other English universities, or the boards of trustees of American institutions. Seventh, that the central administration of the University has been kept weak by such devices as electing a new chief administrator (vice-chancellor) every two or every three years and traditionally selecting a head of one of the colleges.

In sum, the Oxbridge system operationally assigns the top-most hierarchical level to the colleges, the members of whose governing bodies (boards of fellows) are with few exceptions professors or dons. It can, therefore, be succinctly characterized as "faculty government," another variety of which (the Teutonic) powerfully influenced the universities of the world during the nineteenth century. For reasons too complex to be expanded upon here, however, neither the Oxbridge nor the Teutonic patterns of academic government took hold in the English speaking world outside England. Instead, the English and Commonwealth universities established after the founding of Durham in 1832 all bypassed the syndicalism inherent in the concept of faculty government. Rather, they adopted what seems to me most appropriately called "The Scottish-Mancunian Plan." The reasons for using this designation need a bit of elaboration.

The four Scottish universities had gradually become the fiefs of academics despite the Calvinistic dictum that in the affairs of both

---

1. The Franks Commission has recommended (S. 540-541) that the tenure of the Oxford vice-chancellor be increased to four years and that he be chosen two years before assuming office.

2. Currently a wave of enthusiasm for what has come to be called "the cluster college idea" has spread across the United States. In part it has grown from the success of the Harvard and Yale changes in student residence made forty years ago and in part from the direct experience of Americans -- Rhodes Scholars in particular -- with the Oxbridge college plan. These new units are typically not independent corporations; but it needs to be reported that at least four North American institutions have adopted the Oxbridge system of autonomous colleges, namely, the Claremont Colleges in California, the University of Atlanta, McGill University, and the University of Toronto. The two Canadian universities in the group, however, have central governing bodies and with hardly an exception the members of the college corporations in all four institutions are non-academic.
religious and secular organizations laymen and professional must participate as equals. This led Sir William Hamilton, professor of civil history and later of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, to examine and to criticize severely the concept of faculty government not only as it functioned in Scotland but also in England and on the Continent. His series of articles in the Edinburgh Review beginning a century and a quarter ago have no rivals for breadth and depth of scholarship concerned with academic government, and I've no doubt that they were pivotal and definitive in bringing about the far-reaching changes in English as well as in Scottish methods later enforced by parliamentary enactments. The following passage typifies his frequently expressed point of view about the undesirability of faculty domination in academic policy-making:

The history of Universities -- in truth, of all human institutions, lay or clerical, proves, by a melancholy experience, that seminaries founded for the common weal, in the furtherance of sound knowledge, are, if left to themselves ... regularly deflected from the great end for which they were created, and perverted to the private advantages of those through whom that end, it was confidently hoped, would be best accomplished. And this melancholy experience is, though in different forms, almost equally afforded in all our older British Universities; for all of these the State has founded and privileged, but over none has it ever organized adequate controlling power. And what is the consequence? What is their condition? What ought they to be, and what are they? Corrupt all; -- all clamant for reform. But unless reform come from without, we need not, in any University, have any expectation of a reform coming from within.¹

¹ No less emphatically Sir William deplored lay control of universities. About its comparable evils he knew a good deal since his own institution had long been ruled by the Town Council of Edinburgh. Believing that both exclusive systems should be scuttled, he advocated a plan which would coordinate professional and public interests by means of interrelated governing bodies on whose top-level unit would sit both academics and laymen.

---

¹ This statement appears toward the end of Hamilton's "Academical Patronage and Regulation in Reference to the University of Edinburgh" which apparently first came to the attention of the general public upon the publication in 1852 of his Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. In my copy (third edition, 1866) it appears on pp. 731-32. Beginning with an article on Oxford in the Edinburgh Review of June, 1831, the volume includes eleven "discussions" of educational issues including university reform. Nothing that I know of in Anglo-American educational literature compares with these writings in significance for the present, and I have long hoped that some enterprising publisher would reprint at least half of them.
The Universities (Scotland) Act of 1858, passed by Parliament two years after his death, embodied some of his ideas; but in operation it reduced the powers of academics only slightly. The situation would not be rectified until the Act of 1889. Meanwhile the Mancunian component of the still-functioning formula had matured.

Upon his death in 1846 a Manchester merchant named John Owens bequeathed something over ninety-six and a half thousand pounds for the establishment of a non-sectarian college in the city which had made him wealthy. Five years later the institution opened as Owens College under the absolute control of a board of trustees. That is to say, the members of the Faculty had no governmental or even administrative rights and were, in fact, "mere employees." "By an ingenious legal device," Sir John Stopford has written, "two Acts of Parliament in 1870 and 1871" gave the College a new constitution which, continued Sir John, "...merits close study since I believe it introduced some quite novel and important features in university government and certainly provided a pattern for all the other modern universities, a pattern which has stood the test of time.

...The main purpose of the new constitution was clearly to allocate powers between lay governors, professors, and alumni.

Because English and Scottish universities employ different -- and, to an American, unfamiliar and often confusing -- nomenclatures, I shall not attempt to explain why I agree with Sir John's statement that what I have just called the "Mancunian component" has indeed "stood the test of time." For present purposes it suffices to observe that its conjoining with the Scottish component has given both laymen and academics governing status in all British universities other than Oxford and Cambridge and, further, that laymen comprise the majority of members of the two upper-rung legal entities. More on both these points after a sketch of the American hierarchical situation.

In American colleges and universities -- except for about a score of institutions, the most prominent of which is Harvard -- only one legal entity exists. Most frequently called a board of trustees, it is theoretically, although as I shall show not actually, omnipotent. To explain these two legal systems and the preponderance of one of them, some history beginning with the American colonial period must be reviewed.

Two or three pages back I referred to the Calvinistic doctrine that


2. The ten or a dozen other designations include board of regents (many state universities), board of visitors, board of managers, board of curators.
laymen must participate on equal terms with professionals in managing the affairs of social institutions of all kinds. This concept threads through American academic government and accounts for both the unitary and the dual structuring of legal entities. Thus the first two colleges to be established -- Harvard and William and Mary -- each had two governing boards, laymen composing one and academics the other. For a number of reasons, however, the founders of six of the seven other colleges established before the Declaration of Independence ordained to operate under unitary lay boards. At least two considerations entered into this development: first, an academic class distinct from ministers of the gospel had not yet appeared in the frontier societies of colonial America; and second, educated Americans were aware of the bickerings between the members of the dual boards of Harvard and William and Mary.

Immediately after the end of the American Revolution colleges, some under public but most of them under private control, mushroomed especially in the new states west of the Allegheny Mountains; and with hardly an exception they followed the unitary-board plan. Moreover, in most of these institutions (the great majority of which, incidentally, did not survive) faculty members had little part in policy making and, like their opposite numbers in Owens College, were "mere employees." Mark well, however, the just-used phrase "in most of these institutions" for the reason that in the better colleges and universities, both private and public, democratically-minded presidents and trustees either initiated or encouraged the establishment of faculty governing bodies and gave them considerable power.

Some academics believe that the credit for this crucial development belongs to the American Association of University Professors organized in 1915. Long before that worthy society appeared upon the scene to whip laggard institutions into line, however, the nation's front-running colleges and universities had established faculty governing bodies called senates, academic councils, etc. To these, lay boards increasingly allocated authority over educational as distinguished from material matters. For example, during the administration of President Jeremiah Day (1817-1846), the Yale faculty acquired "the dominant share in management" which it has retained ever since. How this came about has been described as follows by the son of one of President Day's close professorial associates:

It was ... in accordance with the character of Dr. Day to consult other officers of the institution. It was his desire to have all questions with regard to the policy to be pursued discussed and decided in a meeting of the whole faculty of instructors. It seemed to him that such a course would be

1. When in 1908 the State of Virginia converted William and Mary into a state-financed institution, it scrapped the college's historic but moribund dual board arrangement.

attended with manifest advantages. Greater harmony would be thus secured among the different officers; and all would be more likely to feel an individual responsibility to assist in carrying out measures which had been adopted after they had themselves been personally consulted, and had an opportunity of expressing freely their opinion and casting their vote. Accordingly, from this time the responsibility for the government of the college rested with the faculty. Henceforth it was understood that no important action of any kind was ever to be taken, even by the corporation, without the recommendation or assent of the corps of instructors; in particular, that no professor or other officer was to be appointed without the consent of those who were devoting their lives to the daily instruction and government, and with whom any new officer would be associated.¹

Today faculty governing groups of various kinds and degrees of quality function in the very great majority -- if not, indeed, all -- of the more than 2,200 universities, colleges, junior colleges, technical institutes, etc. which constitute American higher education. About them only four comments are possible here. First, that except in small institutions representative assemblies have largely replaced the historic central bodies. Second, that the A.A.U.P. during its half century of existence has had a good deal to do with this democratic development as also with the promotion over the country of academic freedom and effective tenure practices. Third, that many of the faculty governing bodies that have taken form in the teachers' colleges which have been converted into state colleges if not into state universities (as well as newer institutions in the same category and also junior colleges) are as yet quite feeble, a fact which has created much discontent among their staffs. Fourth, that the American Federation of Teachers, a division of the American Federation of Labor, is vigorously capitalizing on this situation in the hope that it can supersede the A.A.U.P. as the representative of faculty members vis-a-vis legal entities and administrators. Concerning these external organizations more must be said further on. At this juncture alumni and student participation in academic government need attention.

Nothing comparable to British councils, courts, and convocations on which alumni have membership exist in the United States except at Harvard and at a few institutions which have developed extra-legal² but powerful bodies called visiting committees and alumni councils. Earlier I referred


2. That is, not dealt with in public, as distinguished from, institutional law (statutes, regulations).
to Harvard's dual governing boards, one of which (the Board of Overseers) for a century now has been made up of thirty alumni -- elected by the body of alumni by mail ballot -- plus the President and Treasurer of Harvard ex officio. It must ratify all fundamental acts of the owning board (the Corporation -- seven members), and in addition to that it regularly sends visiting committees into all Harvard faculties and departments. In my judgment it has had more to do with Harvard's eminence than any other single factor. Incidentally, a number of other universities are currently establishing extra-legal bodies made up of alumni and of other laymen to perform the visitation function more or less on the Harvard model. Meanwhile in some institutions, both public and private, alumni councils have become powerful if also extra-legal factors in the shaping of policy. In my judgment the great majority of them function perceptively and worthily.

Except at Harvard American alumni do not, like the British counterparts, constitute an hierarchical level of institutional government. Broadly speaking, it seems to me, this statement must be reversed for students. In any case, the legal entities of a very large number of American colleges and universities have franchised student legislatures and judiciaries with extensive powers in the management of student affairs. Currently some of their lenders in some institutions insist that these student groups should also be given legal status in making formal educational and research policies. Since the publicizing over the world of the tortured situation at Berkeley will undoubtedly come up for discussion at the forthcoming conference and since, further, the topic of student involvement in academic decision-making abounds in criss-crossed perplexities too convoluted to assess in this paper, I move on to the second topic I've listed for review, namely, the membership of British and American governing bodies.

Obviously to discuss here the electoral specifications of the several structural levels identified above would require more time than I or the potential readers of this essay have available. I limit myself therefore to the topmost bodies of Britain -- other than Oxbridge -- and to the comparable entities in the United States and Canada.

It seems to me, may I say at the outset, that the large bodies, which as I understand them are the "owning corporations" of British universities, function primarily as the electors and watchdogs of the smaller groups (councils in England, courts in Scotland) which actually govern. Next comes the Senate, made up almost entirely of professors. For the Americans of the conference group rather than for knowledgeable Britons, I reproduce the following description of these three units from the pseudonymous, informative, and charming book of several years ago entitled Letters to a Vice-Chancellor:

- 2 -
The usual pattern is that the university is governed in theory by a Court, which consists of representatives of every conceivable 'interest' in the locality -- from the Workers' Educational Association to the Girls' Friendly Society -- and which meets annually, like a General Meeting of shareholders, to receive reports on the university's progress. The business executive of this Court is the Council, usually thirty or so in all, representing especially the local authorities, with business, industry, and good works generally, and including a small contingent, perhaps five or six, elected by the Senate, with of course, as a permanent member, the Vice-Chancellor. The Senate consists of all the professors ex officio, plus some non-professorial members elected by their colleagues, and, sometimes, a warden or two if the university is predominantly residential -- making up, say, twenty-five in all, and meeting as Council does, monthly. The governmental distinction between the two bodies is that the Council is charged with all matters bearing on finance; and it is Council which employs the members of the university, of whatever grade. Senate is therefore the body primarily concerned with the day-to-day running of the university as a place of learning and teaching, Council holding the purse-strings (though it is often explicitly provided in the Charter that the Senate can initiate discussion on any matter of concern to the university).

Almost certainly it would be a traumatic experience for some American professors (happily a diminishing proportion) to read this description of British academic government as it operates except at Cambridge. Members of a school of thought which began to become vigorously vocal early this century, these gentlemen contend in effect that lay boards of trustees are American inventions foisted upon defrauded academics by the business community. To discover that British universities other than Oxbridge have long been managed by councils which closely resemble American boards of trustees would, I verily believe, provoke some of my colleagues -- of earlier years at least -- to react to the paragraph I've quoted above much like the yokel in an American folk tale. Upon seeing a giraffe in a circus, so the story goes, he exclaimed in disbelief, "There ain't no such animal."

Be that as it may, I wish it were possible to write a comparably compact statement describing the American situation. I'm certain it can't be done for the reason that, in contrast with British universities which governmentally closely resemble one another (Oxbridge excepted), American institutions of higher education fall into ten or a dozen slots. The federal government, the states, municipalities, counties, and taxing districts, for example, all finance colleges and/or universities and also stipulate the membership of their governing boards. Further, state universities -- to enlarge upon one of these types of structures -- fall into

several quite distinct categories, and some of them can hardly be distinguished governmentally from private institutions. The latter, in turn, are classifiable in various ways, the most common being (1) independent (meaning dependent financially upon neither state nor church), (2) and church-connected if not church-controlled. It would require a tedious number of pages to sort out these variations, and so instead I describe several general ways in which British councils and American boards of trustees differ.

In the first place, except for about a dozen institutions (the most prominent being Cornell University) faculty members do not serve as the trustees of the colleges or universities in which they teach; but I must add that increasingly faculty members are being chosen as trustees of other institutions, their alma maters in particular. Secondly, alumni, elected by alumni organizations, have achieved legal status on the boards of a growing number of private, and on those of a few public, institutions. Thirdly, in contrast with British arrangements, only a small proportion of the members of American boards represent political entities (state or local), a fact which may seem surprising to some who have been reading about the present furor at the University of California.

This list of differentia could, and properly should, be extended; but of necessity I move on to canvass the characteristics of the British and American governing entities under the aegis of faculties. To begin with, it needs to be observed that the faculty ranking systems in effect on the two sides of the Atlantic differ substantially. For example, the rank of professor has until very recently been reserved in Britain for heads of instructional departments, but in the United States a single department of a large university may have two dozen or more professors. Governmentally this is significant because in English and Scottish

1. Cornell adopted this plan almost half a century ago at the urging of a president who had been born in Canada and educated there, in Britain, and in Germany. Few institutions have followed Cornell's lead, and it seems most unlikely to me that many will. Canadian universities may, however, because a commission which has recently finished a study of them has recommended that step. Sir James Duff and Professor Robert O. Bordahl, an American associate, constituted the commission which had been appointed by the Canadian Association of University Teachers and the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. Their report, published last year by the University of Toronto Press, is entitled University Government in Canada.

2. Four of the twenty-four California Regents hold elective office: the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the lower branch of the state legislature, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Four others are also ex officio: the presidents of the California Board of Agriculture, the Alumni Association, the Mechanics Institute of San Francisco, and the University.
universities only professors belong to senates; although some departments
now have several professors, their total number in any university has not
increased enough to enforce -- as frequently in the United States -- the
emergence of representative assemblies. Thus British senates are
oligarchies whose members have seats therein because of their rank rather
than as elected representatives of their associates.

In the American institutions which have not yet substituted repre-
sentative bodies for large "town-meeting" assemblies professors, associate
professors, and assistant professors typically have suffrage rights. In
large universities this fact makes them resemble the unwieldy Ecclesia
whose inefficiency contributed to the devitalization of Hellenic democracy.
Happily smaller, democratically elected, university-wide structures called
boards, councils, etc. are replacing them; and concurrently "local govern-
ments" (schools, colleges, departments) are becoming increasingly important.
Usually all members of these latter units regardless of rank are voting
members. This system of suffrage brings into play the points of view of
younger academics and, further, provides those with appropriate interests
and talents governmental and administrative experience.

Faculty governing bodies, whatever their type, have unquestionably
acquired strategic power in the determination of the educational policy
of all well-established American colleges and universities. The scope of
their authority has been growing steadily for a long time, and it has
recently been formally "legislated" by an agreement between the A.A.U.P.,
the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards
of Universities and Colleges. The latter two organizations have already
adopted the agreement as has also the Council of the A.A.U.P. whose general
membership will vote on it at their annual meeting in Cleveland on April
28th and 29th. The opening paragraphs of the section relating to faculty
powers -- entitled "Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities" --
read as follows:

The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental
areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction,
research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which
relate to the educational process. On these matters the power
of review or final decision lodged in the governing board or
delegated by it to the president should be exercised adversely
only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communicated

1. The Franks Commission (S 308) has recommended that the number of
Oxford professorship be increased.

2. The meeting endorsed the "Statement." See A.A.U.P. Bulletin, June,
1967, p. 133.

to the faculty. It is desirable that the faculty should, following such communication, have opportunity for further consideration and further transmittal of its views to the president of the board. Budgets, manpower limitations, the time element and the policies of other groups, bodies and agencies having jurisdiction over the institution may set limits to realization of faculty advice.

The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered in course, determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved.

This document in which this statement appears makes no reference to alumni participation in academic government for the reason, I imagine, that alumni bodies have no status in public law except at Harvard where, be it recalled, the Board of Overseers has been an alumni body since 1866. It should also be recalled, however, that I have cited the legal right of a number of alumni organizations to elect a proportion of the membership of boards of trustees; and I must now report that on a few of these bodies an alumni association officer has ex officio status. Despite the absence of academic governing structures of their own (Harvard excepted) alumni do in fact powerfully influence American academic government -- and almost always desirably.

The same observation can be made about students who, on the other hand, are discussed in the document. It recommends that "ways... be found to permit significant participation within the limits of attainable effectiveness," but it endorses no such "ways." Rather it points out that "the obstacles to such participation are large and should not be minimized." The section of the statement entitled "On Student Status" is highly significant, however, because for the first time representative trustees, administrators, and professors have jointly agreed that students have various "rights" -- in fact, four:

The respect of students for their college or university can be enhanced if they are given at least these opportunities: (1) to be listened to in the classroom without fear of institutional reprisal for the substance of their views, (2) freedom to discuss questions of institutional policy and operation, (3) the right to academic due process when charged with serious violations of institutional regulations, and (4) the same right to hear speakers of their own choice as is enjoyed by other components of the institution.

Observe that these student "rights" do not include the right to organize self-governing bodies. These have become so characteristic of American colleges since the appearance of the first of them in the 1880's that everyone takes them for granted; and during recent years, as all readers of American newspapers and press services know, some of them have
been throwing their weight around to the discomfiture of public as well as of academic authorities. More on this subject cannot be included here lest I become entangled in its countless coils to the neglect of the last of the three topics listed at the outset, namely, "the external institutions, groups, and individuals influencing the decisions made by academic governors."

I suppose many others besides me have noticed that nobody refers any more to colleges and universities as ivory towers. Regardless of how valid that epithet may have been in the past, it no longer applies. In fact, instead of being elevated above society and hence far from the madding crowd, for both weal and for woe they have joined it. AS a consequence, every other important institution of modern life -- and many not so important -- plays upon higher education and in some measure affects its policy decisions.

To discuss this situation with even a shadow of adequacy would require a series of treatises from the pens of an ensemble of specialists. Here, therefore, I propose to suggest how influence differs from control and then to give some examples of involving civil government, philanthropy, and learned societies.

College and university legal entities have large powers of control over the institutions they govern; but, whether public or private, they function under the superior controls of civil government and, moreover, under its influences. By a control I mean a stipulation of established authority, by an influence a stimulation from any source which affects the behavior of a given entity. The stipulations of civil government in charters and legislative enactments, are known to be definitive; but philanthropic foundations also stipulate when they give grants for specific purposes, and so do learned societies when they in any of various ways endorse the work of the professors and the institutions in the areas over which they indirectly reign.

Concerning influences (stimulations) in contrast with controls (stipulations), it needs to be remarked that some are so faint as to have little operational significance but that -- on the other hand -- some have such high potency that they can hardly be differentiated from controls. The latter consist in such alluring inducements and of such potential impairments of good will that they cannot easily be rejected. Either of these types of influence may lead an institution to modify its program in ways which from its own point of view are desirable, questionable, or undesirable. To illustrate, the funds accepted by colleges and universities from governmental agencies and philanthropic organizations for the development of science and technology have clearly benefited these fields in important ways; but many believe that some of the consequences, if not actually harmful, have been of doubtful value to the health of higher education. Further, few doubt that the intensively accelerated financing
of those subjects has warped over-all institutional programs by disadvant-
aging the humanities and the social sciences.

Two other kinds of action-shaping stimulations must be cited: indirect as distinguished from direct influences, and influences which have unforeseen consequences. Efforts to "keep up with the Joneses" which result from the governmental support given the Joneses represent examples of indirect influence: witness the institutions which have established self-financed programs in new fields because competitors, financed by government grants, have endangered their status. Consider, too, the still reverberating impact on education and, indeed, on American life in general, of the G.I. Bill of Rights. Who in 1944 could have foretold that it would deluge higher education with veterans, their children, and, presumably in time, their children's children?

One of the best examples of philanthropic influence with unforeseen consequences relates to the first endowed professorship established at Harvard. In 1721 a London merchant named Thomas Hollis offered to endow a professorship of divinity there and expressed the hope that no one would be refused the chair "on account of his belief and practice of adult baptism." The orthodox members of the Harvard governing boards, however, rebelled against this suggestion, one overseer declaring that "Mr. Hollis could not bribe him to say that infant baptism didn't matter." The ensuing politicking led to the appointment to the professorship of a young ministerial alumnus who declared his adherence to all the doctrines held dear by the theological stalwarts but who during his forty-three years' tenure "proved the vanity of academic oaths and tests" by leading "the way out of the lush but fearsome jungles of Calvinism."1 Thus did a donor accelerate a salient change in Harvard's teaching and, booted, in the direction of American religious thought.

No less important than the impact of civil government and of philanthropy upon higher education has been that of the learned societies. They have become an increasingly powerful force in shaping the educational and research activities of the higher educational institutions of the United States and, I doubt not of Britain. In the sense that control has been defined above, they do not control these activities but because they shape the thinking of faculty members they mightily influence them. This fact led the vice president for academic affairs of a leading state university several years ago to write the following lament:

Sometimes it seems to me that we have several dozen deep and narrow departmental ruts and that the vast majority of our faculty members never get out of them. They keep their heads down and plough along, making them deeper every day. This means that they seldom see the university program as a whole and, worse, have little interest in anything about it not directly bearing upon their limited concerns. The effect upon

the younger faculty men is extremely bad. If one of them is unspoiled enough to try to develop new approaches on the high ground between the furrows, he is likely to be told to get back into the narrow track if he wants advancement in his profession.

A good many of our better people, particularly the younger ones, recognize their enslavement and would like to climb out and stand on high ground. But as individuals they are virtually helpless. They risk their futures of professional respectability and advancement every time they dare stick their heads over the edge of the ruts and try to act like university professors rather than like professors of chemistry, psychology, or political science.

Wide agreement with this statement exists among American administrators, but the point I seek to emphasize by means of this and the other examples given above is that those who influence, no less than those who control, higher educational institutions must be reckoned with as participants in their management. In short, academic government covers much, much more ground than dealt with in most discussions of the subject, a fact which suggests that it deserves more continuous and wide-ranging study than it has yet been accorded anywhere.

"Many academics the world over believe that ideally they should be the ultimate if not the sole participants in the governing of colleges and universities." So reads an early sentence of this paper. I have tried to show, however, that whatever the validity of such a point of view in past eras (actually it has always been chimerical), it has none today. Because all other social organizations look to them for high-level manpower, for advancing knowledge power, and increasingly for moral power, universities have become the focal institutions of the modern world. They are much too important -- to paraphrase Talleyrand's much-quoted remark about generals and wars -- to be left entirely in the hands of academics, a term which, it should be emphasized, includes not only faculty but also administrators and students.

Only a small handful of people, unfortunately, have been long-time students of academic government. Today, however, the popular media and academic journals abound with the writings of those who have recently become concerned with the subject. Many of their observations on specific current issues have high merit, but I have sought in these pages to do somewhat more, namely, to whet the appetite of those who hear and read them for more perspective on academic government both in time and space.

* * * *