The role of ideology in mass media practices is explored in an analysis of the relation between the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Shanghai Commune of 1967, two attempts to translate the philosophical concept of dictatorship of the proletariat into some political form. A review of the use of Paris Commune imagery by the Chinese to mobilize the population for political development highlights the critical role of ideology in understanding the operation of the mass media and the difficulties the Chinese have in continuing their revolution in the political and bureaucratic superstructure. (Author/AA)
PARIS COMMUNE IMAGERY IN CHINA'S MASS MEDIA

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In their quarter-century of nation building, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China have mobilized the Chinese people, nearly 800 million strong, and politicized an essentially apolitical population. While this transformation has its roots in the Republican period and builds on the momentum of social change that has marked the last hundred years of Chinese history, there can be no doubt that it has been radically accelerated by the adroit manipulation of their communications system.

That system developed out of Lenin’s theory of the press, enunciated in *What Is to Be Done* and *State and Revolution*, and communications practices of the Soviet Union. Based on the philosophical concept that human consciousness is politically manipulable, Lenin posited an intimate relationship between the political process and the communication process in which the press functions as an adjunct to the Communist Party and State in transmitting programs and instructions to the people and guiding the development of the new socialist man.

It has been suggested that:

The Bolsheviks invented virtually every device that Mao has used, and intensified. The Soviets used wall newspapers, developed a wired radio system, made almost everyone attend agitation meetings at which, among other things, public newspaper reading took place. The Bolsheviks trained a large corps of oral agitators; they invented worker correspondents. They set up the apparatus of censorship, party factions, central news agency, subscription promotion through post office, all of which the Chinese followed. However, orthodox mimicking of the Bolsheviks was represented by what the
Chinese Communists did during their more bureaucratic periods of consolidation and internal construction. The crescendo of agitation that China has reached in the periods of mass campaigns was something that the Soviets never attained. It represents a step well beyond Lenin in belief in the power of mass persuasion to mold men.

While this Chinese distinctiveness, as described, is basically a matter of degree, clearly the Cultural Revolution marked a departure from Leninist practice, if not theory. Maoist-controlled elements of the communications system were turned against the authority of both the Communist Party and the State and were even used in the "destruction of the mass media." The Cultural Revolution differed from previous Chinese mass campaigns in the use of violence: (1) it gave the participants "actual experience in class struggle;" (2) the power and authority of individuals and institutions, including the mass media, were seized and redistributed; and (3) it attempted to create spontaneously new political forms to replace those destroyed.

Information about Chinese Communist political and communications theory and practice primarily comes from the mass media themselves—normally not as systematic sets of ideas, but more as evolutionary disclosures of bits and pieces of ideas which must be carefully sifted from the substantial daily flood of media products.

The situation is greatly exacerbated when one attempts to understand periods of internal stress such as the Cultural Revolution. First, the regular flow of mass media products out of China (e.g., newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and New China News
Agency copy) was severely curtailed. Routine processes of surveillance had to be altered. International news agencies set up and manned radio units in their Hong Kong offices to monitor provincial broadcasts and Radio Peking. There were also more frequent interpersonal communications between members of the China-watching community than usual. Second, the use of wall posters denied a pertinent body of information except for the limited number which were smuggled into the Colony.

One China scholar has maintained that:

Practice in Mao's view, is not so much a question of the application of theory on a passive and malleable world as it is a question of the dialectical interaction between the theory and an active and malleating world. He sees theory and practice as thesis and antithesis, and the synthesis which emerges from this interaction involves not only a changed world, but a changed theory as well.

If he is correct, it should be possible to discern the ideological interaction in the mass media, particularly during a period of political mobilization.

This study explores the role of political ideology—not in the Marxist sense of false consciousness or the pejorative, cold-war sense of intransigency, but simply as the body of ideas on which a particular political, economic, or social system is based—in actual mass communications policies and practices. It examines the relationship between the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Shanghai Commune of 1967, two attempts to translate the philosophical concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an actual political form. Specifically, how did the Chinese use a set of images derived from the Paris Commune for political
development during the Cultural Revolution?

Background

"...On February 5, 1967, the whole of Shanghai, close to ten million people, was declared one single commune, and a Temporary Committee of Shanghai People's Commune took the place of the Shanghai municipal authorities." This proclamation came from Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao. A member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group in Peking with a long history of service in Shanghai's journalistic circles, Chang enjoyed the support of Mao Tse-tung.

The structure and function of the Shanghai Commune, the news announcement implied, was to be identical with the 1871 Paris Commune, which had been described by Chairman Mao and other leaders of the Cultural Revolution as the model to emulate. Since the issuance of the Famous "Sixteen Points" in August 1966, references to the Paris Commune had filled the mass media as the ultimate form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Among other things, it guaranteed the people's right to select their own leaders, supervise their performance, and invoke an immediate recall of those who proved unsatisfactory--after the people had successfully seized power from the "capitalist roaders," i.e., the conservative, bureaucratic Party and government cadres. Therefore, the announcement in the Shanghai Liberation Daily continued, general elections would be held in the near future. The chosen representatives would assume the duties of the provisional ruling
committee, the interim administrative body.

In describing its 19th Century predecessor Marx had observed: "On the dawn of the 18th of March, Paris arose to the thunderburst of 'Vive la Commune!'" The Shanghai People's Commune also had a dramatic birth. In Chinese Communist fashion a mass rally was held to herald "a 'new Paris Commune' in the '60s of the twentieth century, conforming to the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship...an outstanding contribution made by Chairman Mao to International communism." But the shouts of "long live the revolutionary heritage of the great Paris Commune" had scarcely died when the Shanghai People's Commune itself passed quietly out of existence. A single resolution on municipal sanitation was the only recorded legacy of its eighteen days in power.

Until the Cultural Revolution, the People's Daily was the combined Party and State news organ, unlike the Soviet situation with each having its own voice, Pravda and Izvestia. Normally it promulgated official positions in its editorials, which were frequently then quoted verbatim by the New China News Agency, in lower level organs, and by the broadcast medium. While the People's Daily lost that pre-eminence during this period, provincial media continued to search for official word in the media voices emanating from Peking.

Official Peking had greet the news of the Shanghai People's Commune with a deafening silence. Perhaps this failure to gain recognition accounts for the Commune's apparent inactivity. In any event, the leadership must have realized that it was then
treading on dangerous ground as the Peking media increasingly extolled an alternate form—the three-in-one alliance inaugurated on January 31st in the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee. Still the Paris Commune image had not been officially withdrawn.

Representing three elements (the new mass organizations, old Party cadres loyal to Mao, and the army), the Revolutionary Committee was identified as the appropriate form of political alliance to be developed during the current historical situation. The full impact of those newspaper and radio declarations became clear during the week 12-18 February when Chang and his Deputy Head, Yao Wen-yuan, were summoned to Peking. In a series of three meetings with Chairman Mao they learned that the Shanghai government by any other name (e.g., Commune) would still be a Revolutionary Committee. Dutifully Chang returned to Shanghai and in a personal tour de force delivered a lengthy televised speech articulating the new Maoist line. On February 22, the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee unceremoniously replaced the Shanghai People's Commune. Whether it could have succeeded with Mao's blessing must remain a moot issue.

The fact remains that the Shanghai Commune did exist. It represented an attempt by radical Maoist elements to consolidate the power and political control they had seized from Shanghai Mayor Ts'ao Ti'ch'iu and other moderates in the municipal government. After the public humiliation of the moderates in early January, various revolutionary groups attempted to coalesce. A
fifth attempt, under the formula of the Paris Commune, brought thirty-eight such organizations together. It reflected an attempt to realize their Marxist-Maoist image of a dictatorship of the proletariat recently forged in the extended mass media system. Unlike most other areas of China, Shanghai experienced the mobilizing power of such images interpreted and reinforced in the communications process.

But, the Shanghai People's Commune remains an enigma for all who try to answer the basic historical questions surrounding its short-lived existence. On the one hand, evidence of that very existence is sparse. Interrupted media coverage during the Cultural Revolution, particularly fragmentary for the 1967 "January Storm" and "February Adverse Current" in Shanghai, impedes an historical reconstruction of the phenomenon by non-Chinese Communist scholars. And, since official Chinese accounts of the two-month period, which have been constructed in retrospect, all but deny that existence, the Shanghai Commune itself must remain, at least for the present, little more than a puzzling footnote to the broader discussion of revolutionary political activities in the Cultural Revolution.

On the other hand, a number of substantive questions about the political and communications implications of the Shanghai People's Commune also remain unanswered, for example: Why did Mao Tse-tung promote the Paris Commune in the media during the Cultural Revolution? Why did he subsequently withhold official endorsement of the Shanghai People's Commune and introduce a more
repressive image into the communications process? Why did the images of the Paris Commune fade into the reality of the Revolutionary Committee? How did this interactive process affect Mao's philosophy of the press? A review of the role of the Paris Commune imagery serving Maoists in their media-mobilization of the masses may help to put those questions into perspective, if not provide definitive answers.

Commune-Images Enter The Communications Process

More than simply a century separated working men's Paris of 1871 from working men's Shanghai of 1967. A detailed social, economic, and political comparison lies beyond the scope of this paper; but, suffice it to say, the historical realities bore little resemblance one to another. Yet, images of the Paris experience served the Chinese a hundred years later.

Marx was the first to celebrate the Paris Commune. The analysis of those 72 days, recorded in his "Civil War in France," created a powerful, multiple-imagery. Ever since, Marxists have drawn on that analysis and emphasized one or more of the themes to suit their own historical purposes. Lenin, for example, dwelt on "smashing the old state machinery" in his State and Revolution. Others have stressed the image of "creative workers reforming society" in discussing the Russian development of "Soviets" as organs of government in 1905 and 1917.

Capitalists have also drawn images from the Paris experience. In spite of its heavy petty bourgeoisie rather than proletarian leadership, they have used images of anarchy and violence. It became
the object of vilification in the American media. In fact:

During the hard times of the seventies, the hysteria over the Paris Commune and International Workingmen's Association took on new life. Meetings of unemployed and peaceful demonstrations to present demands to municipal officials were, in the opinion of the WORLD, for example, 'The Commune in City Hall' and 'The Red Flag in New York.' The hand of the International was seen in every strike and every petition. They were the doings of foreign subversives, the Times charged, of a 'dangerous class' that looked for an opportunity 'to spread abroad the anarchy and ruin of the French.'

At the time of the railroad strike of 1877, captions like these were carried by newspapers and placards: 'Commune in Pittsburgh,' 'Commune in Reading,' 'Commune in St. Louis,' 'Commune in Chicago,' 'Commune in Philadelphia,' 'Commune in New York,' and the 'Reign of the Commune.'

Until 1956 Mao saw little relevance in the concept of the Paris Commune for contemporary China. Above all, as "the glorious harbinger of a new society," it was the supreme model of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Engels had said in his 1891 "Introduction to the Civil War in France." And, according to Mao, China's socialist society was to be constructed by the people's democratic dictatorship--an alliance of four democratic classes of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie--not by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, as China moved toward political order and economic development in the post-revolutionary period (1950-1956), Mao became increasingly concerned:

...that existing state and party organs were no longer effective to achieve Marxian socialist ends--and that the works of the revolution were threatened by an increasing institutional state apparatus which stood above society and by the entrenchment of new bureaucratic elites (governmental administrators and a technological intelligentsia)
separated from the masses and potentially alien to Marxist goals and Maoist values.

Those concerns manifested themselves politically in direct appeals to the masses to circumvent the bureaucracies. Both the accelerated agricultural collectivization (1955-56) and the communization program during the Great Leap Forward are prominent examples. In the realm of ideology, Mao adopted the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and "proclaimed both its universal validity and its particular Chinese historical necessity." It seems likely that Maoist theoretical literature on the nature of agricultural communes during the Great Leap was influenced by Commune-images. The composite media-image of the commune was:

1. relatively autonomous, local, socio-economic units, which were capable of conducting agricultural, industrial, cultural, and military affairs, and
2. organs of revolutionary political power, which would effectively reduce the size and control of the central state bureaucracy.

Indeed, the Maoist vision of 1958 saw the people's commune as the agency to perform all the social and political tasks which Marxists traditionally have identified with the 'transition period' of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'—everything from the abolition of the distinctions between town and countryside, between mental and manual labor, between industry and agriculture and between workers and peasants to the very 'withering away' of the state itself. The commune was to be 'the organizer of living' as well as the organizer of production; it was conceived as the means to realize ultimate communist ends as well as the embryonic social unit of the future communist utopia.

While Western scholars apparently disagree about the extent to which Mao's original concept of the communes would have undermined centralized state power had it been realized, one Chinese
A scholar in September 1958 asserted that "the integration of the 
hsiang with the commune will make the commune not very different 
from the Paris Commune, integrating the economic organization with 
the organization of state power." 32

The history of the Great Leap Forward is still enmeshed in 
arguments of Mao's success or failure. What seems clear is that 
1959-60 was marked by economic and organizational chaos. The 
communes did not develop as originally conceived and bureaucratic 
forces reasserted themselves in the ensuing confusion. Political 
control reverted to the Party and State apparatus, while the 
Maoists retained power in ideological affairs. They continued to 
attempt to shape mass consciousness through their hold on important 
channels of the mass media.

The worsening domestic situation in China coincided with 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet international relations during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The death of Stalin was accompanied 
by an increasingly critical evaluation of the Soviet experience 
as a model for Chinese socio-economic development. Apprehensive 
over Khrushchev's growing détente—peaceful coexistence—with 
United States "imperialism" seemed to intensify Mao's rejection of 
the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It appeared 
as a new bureaucratic elite, a new class exploiting the Soviet masses. 
And what was even worse, it was becoming the prototype which pro-
Soviet Chinese leaders were emulating. For Maoists, this was noth-
ing short of a real degeneration of the socialist revolution. It 
required a response.
In 1961 the Maoists seized an opportunity. In an unprecedented celebration of the Paris Commune, public meetings were held in Peking, Shanghai, and other major cities. Academicians gathered to commemorate the "revolutionary spirit of the Commune" on its 90th Anniversary and extol the "revolutionary enthusiasm, will, and spirit of the founders." 34

Focusing on their major concern (i.e., the erosion of proletarian control of the revolution at the hands of a new bourgeois of governmental administrators and technological intellectuals), Maoist publications stressed that the fundamental revolutionary tradition of the Paris Commune experience was replacing the bourgeois dictatorship with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Reflecting Mao's abiding faith in the revolutionary capacity of the masses, one Marxist theoretician explained:

Proletarian dictatorship, Lenin pointed out, is the suppression exercised by the majority, the exploited, against the minority, the exploiters, and this suppression is integrated with the spread of democracy among the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants. (Italics added) 35

The increasingly explicit media-denunciation of Soviet "abuses" of the dictatorship was matched by much more subtle, implicit rebukes of contemporary Chinese practices. The same basic image of the Paris Commune was reflected in a major essay by Wu Chiang, which was widely publicized:

The basic experience of the Chinese people in the victory of revolution is that not for a single moment have they forgotten to concentrate their target on the smashing of the state machinery of the reactionary rule and that they have creatively solved this problem strictly according to their own conditions.
The image stressed creativity in the masses, which means an innate capacity to generate new organizational forms such as the early Russian "Soviets." Even the official People's Daily was involved in projecting the Commune-imagery. There seems to be a distinctively Maoist "creativity" emphasis in their order:

1. the heroic revolutionary spirit of the Commune;
2. the valuable experience of the workers' revolutionary practices;
3. the proletariat's creative spirit of reforming society and making history;
4. the seizure of political power and the smashing of the old state machinery;
5. the abolition of mercenary troops and reactionary police, replaced by a people's armed force;
6. the abolition of the bureaucratic system, replaced with popular vote election of all government servants with an option to remove them at any time;
7. the establishment of government servants' salaries equal to workers' wages;
8. the inclusion of both legislative and executive functions in the governing body of the Commune;
9. the separation of Church and State; and,
10. the handing over of abandoned capitalist factories to workers' association for organized production, and, in the meantime, the exercise of State supervision and supervision by workers over
other factories.

These images essentially served domestic and international ideological roles. However, the decision to incorporate the Paris Commune as an important foundation-stone in China's Marxist historical tradition also played a psychological role. In much the same way some Christian denominations boost their own legitimacy by adhering to a doctrine of apostolic succession, the Maoists identified their own dictatorship of the proletariat with that first celebrated model, looking over the current Soviet model to Paris.

Keeping in mind that a more strident tone and increasing violence-content (i.e., suppressing and smashing the "newly emerging bourgeoisie") began to characterize Paris Commune imagery in the media around 1961, it may be instructive to consider briefly the conceptual foundations of Mao Tse-tung's theory of continuous revolution, as analyzed by a Berkeley Political Science Professor, John Starr.

He maintains that Mao's theory had been developing since 1959 and the foundation was largely laid by the fall of 1962. He also contends that Mao introduced three important innovations from the earlier enunciations of Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky. In fact, Mao uses a different term chi-hsü ko-ming, "continuous revolution," instead of pu-tuan ko-ming, "uninterrupted or permanent revolution," used to translate Trotsky's theory.

What distinguishes contemporary Chinese references to the theory of permanent revolution from earlier instances is the shift of emphasis away from the question of transition between
stages [e.g., the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution
gives rise to that of socialist revolution] and toward the
idea of the revolutionary nature of a single stage becoming,
in effect, permanent. 40

The three innovations are:

(1) Contradictions will continue even into the communist
stage with the possibility of their deteriorating into antagonistic
contradictions, particularly between "'remnants' of the old society
and foreign elements, neither of whom have experienced revolutionary
transformation" but in theory also between "any non-antagonistic
contradiction in the society, including, presumably, the 'contra-
dictions between the government and the people' which Mao listed
in 1957:

contradictions among the interests of the state, the interests
of the collective and the interests of the individual; between
democracy and centralism; between the leadership and the led;
and the contradiction arising from the bureaucratic style of
work of certain government workers in their relations with
the masses." 41

This is, of course, totally at variance with both Marx's and
Lenin's analysis that development must inevitably move forward.
In fact, Lenin criticized Bukharin in this area and maintained that
under socialism antagonism would disappear.

(2) Social classes are re-introduced as salient categories
in the analysis of these permanent contradictions throughout the
socialist stage. He talks about "the possibility of an individual's
moving from one category to another [e.g., bourgeoisie to proletariat
or the reverse] as a result of attitudinal change." That alters
the determination of class status from Party membership to a com-
bination of ideological, political, and economic factors.
Mao contends that "development need not necessarily be unidirectional, that history may witness examples of deterioration as well as progress." It is really the most fundamental aspect because it provides for "the appearance of new bourgeois elements in a socialist society long after the eventual demise of those who can properly be called 'remnants' of the old society: it thus provides, pari passu, a justification for the necessity of making revolution 'continuously.'"

The time period and substance of innovations which Starr suggests seem to parallel the shift in Paris Commune imagery described earlier.

By 1964 the Sino-Soviet fissure had already greatly widened. The Socialist Education Movement was underway. Mao again turned to Paris Commune themes to awaken political consciousness to the dangers of capitalist restoration--that is, the kind of developmental reversal Starr suggested. In interviews and public statements he praised the seizure of political power by the Communards and again placed China firmly in the line of their successors, while recognizing the possibility of China's backsliding into a bourgeois dictatorship by following the Soviet Union's "peaceful evolution" policies.

Two years later, Mao was still operating almost exclusively in the realm of ideology, which limited his access to the media and certainly identified the mass media institution as being in contradiction with the interests of the masses. Divorced from policy making, he had watched "capitalist tendencies" re-emerge in China's
social, economic, and political programs. With mounting apprehension he had seen the "bureaucratic disease" spread from State apparatus to Party cadres. The ideological campaign against capitalist restoration mentioned earlier seemed to have fallen on deaf ears among the leadership. (It is interesting to note that Stalin, long before Mao, had used the same terminology to suppress dissidents to his policies, especially in the 30's.) However, still confident of the revolutionary spirit of the masses, Mao seemed to believe that those seeds carefully planted in what media organs he still controlled would bear fruit at the appropriate time.

That time came in March 1966. He shifted his attack to contemporary Chinese politics. Appropriately, images of the Paris Commune once again provided the mobilizing force in his communications battle. This time perhaps beyond even Mao's expectations. An article in Red Flag, the leading theoretical journal of the Party, signaled Mao's intentions. Ostensibly honoring the 95th Anniversary of the Paris Commune, Cheng Chih-ssu's "The Great Lessons of the Paris Commune" set the stage for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution's attack on Party and State.

In addition to reaffirming those Commune images previously stressed--namely, the revolutionary spirit of the masses, the proletariat's creative spirit, seizure of political power and the smashing of the old state machinery--Cheng introduced a new emphasis which impinged directly on Chinese domestic politics. Focusing on Engels' discussion of preventing the transformation of the proletarian state organs from the servants of society into the masters
of society, Cheng advanced three Commune-derived preventative images: (1) the system of direct elections and immediate recall for cause; (2) the egalitarian practice of paying officials (the servants of society) the same wages as workers; and, (3) the revolutionary enthusiasm and initiative of the masses to become actively involved in the operational life of the Commune.

Cheng went beyond Engels' 'two infallible means' and discussed a third one of his own--this apparently the product of research in sources other than the accounts of Marx, Engels and Lenin--of particular significance to domestic events in China at the time of his writing. 'The masses were the real masters in the Paris Commune,' he began, and then described in some detail the wide scale organization of the populace and the breadth of participation and discussion evoked through these basic-level organizations. 20,000 activists attended daily meetings, he claimed, 'where they made proposals or advanced critical opinions on social and political matters great and small. They also made their wishes and demands known through articles and letters to the revolutionary newspapers and journals. This revolutionary enthusiasm and initiative of the masses was the source of the Commune's strength....The Commune...seriously studied and adopted proposals from the masses....The masses also carefully checked up on the work of the Commune and its members.'

Cheng's detailed, authoritative article was the chief source of information about the Paris Commune for most young Chinese who were soon to be mobilized to travel the length and breadth of China "sharing revolutionary experiences." The consciousness of older members of society has already been formed to respond to such re-activated imagery. The Commune-image of participating masses making revolution evidently served the Maoists well in getting the Chinese stirred into action.

An appeal to the "powerful revolutionary masses" to participate in the emerging political struggle was not long in coming.
The Circular of 16 May 1966, which described the establishment of a Central Cultural Revolution Group under the Standing Committee of the Politburo, made it clear that "bourgeois representatives" were "preparing public opinion for the restoration of capitalism" so that "(O)nce conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." Then, a short time later, Mao perpetuated the popular image in describing the first wall poster (ta-tzu-pao) of the Cultural Revolution posted at Peking University as "the manifesto of the Peking People's Commune of the sixties in the twentieth century."

The first official Party document on the Cultural Revolution, known as "The Sixteen Points," was adopted on August 8, 1966, by the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee. Characteristically it was immediately published throughout the country and repeatedly broadcast on local radio. Point nine reiterated the recently expanded imagery of the Paris Commune, especially the active participation of the masses in the new revolution. The news release stressed:

1. new organizational forms of great historic importance were being created by the masses;
2. these groups, committees and congresses were organs of power to keep the Party in close contact with the masses;
3. it would be necessary to institute a system of general elections, like the Paris Commune with the list of the candidates proposed by the revolutionary masses after full discussion, and the
elections held only after the masses had repeatedly discussed the lists;

(4) the masses are entitled to criticize the leadership at any time and even recall them for incompetence or replace them by new elections.

Clearly the new Paris Commune themes introduced in Cheng's influential article were quickly absorbed into the system of images and used extensively.

In a December 12th Red Flag article again honoring the 95th Anniversary, Wang Li, a left-wing member of the Central Group, described the revolution as "a new experience of extensive democracy," Wang Li, Ch'en Po-ta, and other spokesmen continued to espouse Mao's faith in the masses under images of the Commune. By the end of 1966, the momentum of those mobilized masses had carried the Cultural Revolution, and with it the image of the Paris-Commune-type dictatorship of the proletariat, into most phases of Chinese life.

**Ideological Struggle and Media-Image Reversal**

The seizure of Shanghai's municipal power and subsequent attempts by the revolutionary mass organizations to consolidate their success are difficult to reconstruct in proper perspective. In this case, twentieth-century Western reporting tends to be fragmentary and to select the sensational, the disruptive, and the violent.

An interesting historical parallel to this distorted coverage lies in the treatment of the Paris Commune itself by nineteenth-century American press:
No political or economic issue in the United States, save governmental corruption, received more headlines in the American press of the 1870's than did the Paris Commune and the International Workingmen's Association. Every big newspaper gave readers the impression that the foundations of organized society had crumbled. Anarchy, assassination, slaughter, incendiarism, streets covered with human gore—such blood curdling scenes were monotonously reported in the news.

From their lead articles and editorials on the Commune, several theses emerged which can be stated as follows: The people in France, and by implication the people in the United States, were unfit to have a hand in government; given the socialist character of the Commune, violence was inevitable; the Communards were communists, commanded by the International, awaiting the order to overrun other countries; finally, the commune might also come to America.

In fact, the images of violence and anarchy which prevailed seem to have been either completely inaccurate or grossly distorted in the light of historical analysis.

However, discounting the usual rhetorical excesses of Chinese sources during the Cultural Revolution, their own publications suggest a certain amount of disorder by virtue of their repeated appeals to unity and a return to industrial production. Recent official accounts seem to suggest that in most cases disruption and chaotic conditions were localized phenomena, i.e., even mass demonstrations, which reportedly reached nearly a million citizens on occasion, did not paralyze the world's most populous city. Without unduely minimizing the revolutionary fervor, it seems likely that Shanghai's January storm was not "even more tumultuous and reverberant' than the Paris Commune (1871) and the October Revolution (1917)," as has been suggested.

Indeed it seems likely that the nature of Western reporting in this case meshed more with the images of revolutionary violence
which Maoists were promoting than with historical reality. In effect Western coverage abetted the Maoists in their attempt to characterize the campaign as a real revolution which consumed the passions of 800 million Chinese.

It should be added certainly that China was then, and even today remains a relatively closed society with strict government controls on the usual avenues of international communications: trade and commerce; tourist and correspondent travels; and, news and information-dissemination processes. And, as has been demonstrated, that puts investigators of mass communication, including China-watching reporters, at the mercy of unreachable sources. But as every good reporter knows, the only way to avoid that dependence is to know as much as, if not more than, the sources. In this case, that means understanding why the Chinese media operate as they do. It is clear that even a meager flow of information would have made more sense to China-watchers than it did in most cases, if they had understood the role of ideology in the policies and practices of Chinese communications.

By January 1967 the media-inspired mobilization of the masses in Shanghai was indisputable. Self-confidence and self-organization were becoming a reality for large segments of the population. Red Guard elements from throughout China had moved into the city. They helped local rebel units to politicize a broad spectrum of the population including students, workers, and peasants. Their nonspecific goals under the broad dictum "make revolution" and their unconditional support from the Maoist forces gave them entry to every
aspect of the urban community. Their spontaneous and undifferentiated thrust at one point was met by acceptance and/or resistance which set up shock waves throughout the city. Local leaders in schools, factories, and businesses joined the fray and crystallized support in one revolutionary committee after another.

While the great majority of Shanghai's ten million probably remained passive participants, except when provoked by such incidents as the rebel take-over of the Liberation Daily, there was an increasing number of active participants and an increasing interaction among them. Official policy guaranteed the rebels an access to local media's means of production--e.g., sound trucks and other amplifying equipment, paper and ink for wall posters, printing presses and postal distribution of newspapers.

Mobilization in this first phase of preparation for establishing a Shanghai People's Commune, then, resulted in a proliferation of revolutionary mass organizations each seeking to propagate its position, increase its ranks, and extend its influence over the municipal political process. In fact, an official claim has been made that:

In the January Storm the conflict was very sharp. Every group and class had to stand and show itself. At least 700 different mass organizations were formed at the level of the municipality. Some belonged to genuine revolutionary groups, some were conservative, some wanted to take advantage of economism. A few were actually counter-revolutionaries. Each had its own motives and its own purposes. The struggle was extremely complicated. (Italics added) 58

It seems fair to say that to the victorious Maoists, the
groups did represent an undesirable pluralism which had grown naturally out of their original communications campaign to mobilize the masses into political action. Further, their group goals expressed the experience of their own social consciousness which was evolving through social praxis. Motivated by Maoist media-images and enjoying the guidance of the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" as they understood them (allowing that some certainly used those thoughts to cloak their deliberate rejection of Mao's images and values), these groups continued to see the general good in terms of their own welfare. Since they did not by any stretch of the imagination share a proletarian background, it seems obvious that they would not--indeed could not, unaided--arrive at a single, mature proletarian consciousness. Freed from the imposition of the Chinese Communist Party's interpretation of what were correct policies, their own interests re-asserted themselves and became the over-riding element in defining what course of action they would and should follow.

Such a proliferation of groups, each sincerely trying to reflect the orthodox teachings of the movement's "Fathers" has a plausible, historical parallel in the European Reformation. When the monolithic authority of the Roman Catholic Church was removed by an appeal to popular action, the basic writings of the Church Fathers, including the Bible, were sincerely cited by all groups. But each group's actual socio-economic location played the decisive role in how its ideological and practical decisions were made.
Mobilization entered a second phase. Unlike the first, it was repressive because it treated the masses as objects to be pushed into alliances, not on their own terms but those defined by an external authority. The depoliticization began to take shape with a subtle shift away from commune-imagery. A New Year's editorial significantly carried in both the People's Daily and Red Flag quoted Mao: "Democracy sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means."

By the middle of the month a new media theme had emerged--more a stereotyped party line than an image--"Proletarian revolutionary groups, unite!" And on January 16th the New China News Agency carried an even more pointed phase-two message: "Only with the great alliance of the proletarian revolutionary rebels is it possible to...consolidate the power taken over and to establish new revolutionary order." It went on: "...only with such a great alliance" of revolutionary rebel groups "is it possible to have unified thinking, and rate of advance, and to display the greatest possible strength."

As they struggled among themselves to effect such an alliance, the commune-builders must have been concerned to read the ominous words of Chou En-lai to a meeting of representatives of revolutionary rebel organizations held in Peking on January 26th:

...pointing out that the implementation of the Paris Commune election system presupposed the "integration of the revolutionary organizations with the masses of the people": the gradual education and transformation of rightest elements, the isolation of ultra-leftists, and ultimately the "uniting with 95 per cent of the cadres." "We are far from having reached that stage at this point," he reminded his listeners.
Necessary and appropriate as these elements must have seemed to the leadership, they nevertheless were more than just modifications of the original commune-imagery communicated to the masses. Indeed those words proved prophetic.

The extensive democracy, initiated by media-images carried through the extended communications system, began to fade under the exigencies of Shanghai's social and economic life. In the short run, the kind of alliance that the leadership demanded could only be achieved by being imposed by an outside agent. Self-organization by the masses would have taken too long. Direct elections, supervision of officials and the process of immediate recall would have absorbed too much time and energy. Such self-governing would have critically delayed production. Only when the productive forces were again at work would the leadership allow the luxury of discussion. By then, however, it could be regulated so that the masses could "make production and revolution." The maturing of their proletarian self-awareness would have to yield to the already articulated proletarian consciousness contained in the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and interpreted by the official mass media which he once more controlled.

The adjustment of his press philosophy seems to have been more a pragmatic shift until he regained control of the media, Party, and State apparatus rather than a radical alteration of the Leninist philosophy. As Starr concludes:

Most significant in theoretical terms, the transformation of his thought from a set of dialectically developing ideas into
a static canon constitutes a significant departure from Mao's own epistemological first principles: his evaluation of dogma, it will be recalled, was uniquely trenchant. Especially paradoxical in this regard is the fact that the process of canonization appears to have encompassed even the theory of continuous revolution itself. 63

Most official references to the Paris Commune imagery were dropped from the mass media during the economic chaos and ideological fragmentation of the January storm—except in the local media which was desperately trying to establish the validity of its own Commune organization. By February 22, 1967, even those provincial echoes of the former national campaign had died away. Thereafter appeals to the Paris Commune images appear only in the clandestine communications of left-wing rebel organizations which tenaciously refused the depoliticizing theme of "Proletarian revolutionary groups, unite!"

Conclusions

The Shanghai People's Commune itself continues to remain something of an enigma. In official terms it has become a non-event. However, it is now clear that the Commune-imagery was intentionally introduced by Mao Tse-tung into the communications process for ideological reasons to politicize the masses and did, in fact, provide a real mobilizing force, which freed large segments of Shanghai's population to engage in grass-roots, political activities.

Further, the introduction of a single, repressive unity theme escalated in response to the commune-builders' failure to develop spontaneously a united ideological alliance and restore production stability in the face of economic chaos.

Unless one cynically chooses to dismiss Chinese Communist
political ideology and propaganda, even the retreat from the ideal, in which the Commune-images faded into the reality of the Revolutionary Committee, represented certain advances. That is, the short period in the communications process from mobilization to immobilization-manipulation witnessed increased citizen participation in grass-roots politics, a reduction in bureaucratic strength, and an increased consciousness among certain segments of the population of their own capacities to affect the political process through creative acts of self-organization.

Ideological debate is a real part of socialist life, not simply meaningless hairsplitting or empty rhetoric. Theory is refined in social interaction; social interaction is reflected in the Chinese mass communications. This review of the role of Paris Commune images used in political development has highlighted the difficulties the Chinese have in continuing the revolution in the superstructure. It seems safe to assume that either Mao or his intellectual inheritors will, however, continue the debate—perhaps at the violent level of the first Cultural Revolution.

The Paris Commune, "that sphinx so tantalizing to the bourgeois mind," obviously has the power to tantalize the proletarian mind and spirit as well. There is no reason to believe it has yet outlived its usefulness in Chinese eyes. Nor is it possible to say that it will not re-emerge in the communications system as a real mobilizing force in the political life of the Chinese masses.


4. Liu, Communications, p. XV.


6. This information is based on the author's research among China-watchers in Hong Kong during the Spring, 1975.


9. The Paris Commune was a class uprising in Paris while that city was under siege by German troops during the Franco-Prussian War. Adherents were called Communards. They were a mixture of proletarian and petty bourgeoisie who organized their own city-wide government which combined legislative and executive functions in the same body. The Commune held out against both the Germans and the troops of the French government for over two months. It is estimated that 200 to 300 Parisians were executed by the Communards; however, when the government troops re-entered Paris, there was a large scale blood-letting estimated at upward to 10,000 Communards or those haphazardly accused of being Communards.

31
The set of images of the Paris Commune which will be reviewed in this paper constitutes the belief system of the Chinese masses about the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the assumption of the study that when Mao introduced an image from the Commune that the people, or some segment of the masses, incorporated that image in their thinking about what the dictatorship of the proletariat should be. When it was referred to in subsequent media messages, they responded to it. It oriented them to their environment, so that they structured new information about the dictatorship of the proletariat in terms of whether it fit those images or not.

All images are stereotyped in that they over simplify reality. With repeated use, they may empty of content and become mere slogans.

For an expanded account, see John Bryan Starr, "Revolution in Retrospect: The Paris Commune Through Chinese Eyes," The China Quarterly, Vol 49 (January/March 1972), pp. 119-121; and Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), which described how thousands of Shanghai citizens gathered around public television sets to hear and be impressed by the lengthy speech.

Although the terms moderate and radical are generally accepted in the American press and academic circles, Michel Oksenberg
gives a more reasoned analysis in *Saturday Review/World*, May 18, 1974, an article titled "The Political Scramble in Mao's China." At issue, in the most fundamental sense, is the future of China: Who are to be its leaders in the post-Mao era? And in what direction are they to lead? The issues cannot be simply stated as a clash of "Left" versus "Right" or "radical" versus "conservative." Rather, the issues concern China's quest for modernity. On one side are those seeking a centralized state apparatus and an active Chinese involvement in the established international community. On the other side are their equally honorable adversaries, who feel that an involvement with the established international community will corrupt the Chinese people and make it difficult to create the ideological unanimity through which China can effectively respond to the Western challenge. (In this paper, radicals are the latter group, while moderates are the former.)


20 These terms have a growing currency. For a detailed description, see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad (Berkeley: China Research Monographs, 1969), Chapter 1. Briefly, January was a period of political and economic turmoil, while February was a period of governmental restrictions on left-wing revolutionary activities.

21 The following two works represent themselves as reflecting the official Chinese Communist Party explanation of these events: Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution, and Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, Daily Life in Revolutionary China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). Also, a report titled "Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Reviews One Year's Experience in Exercising Power," (New China News Agency, English, Shanghai, 10 February 1968 in Survey of Mainland China Press, No. 4118) traces the struggle in consolidating and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat "since it (the Revolutionary Committee) was set up in the 'January revolution' of 1967."


23 See Richard Greeman, "The Permanence of the Commune,"


28 For a careful discussion of propaganda campaigns accompanying these and other political events in Communist China, see Liu, Communications, especially pp. 87-117.


33 One of the basic charges against Lin Piao, who has been vilified in the Chinese media, was his alleged allegiance to such a Soviet model. See "Deepening Criticism of Lin Piao Through Repudiating Confucius," Peking Review 17:5 (1 February 1974), p. 3-4.


39. It is impossible to do justice to either Mao or Starr in such a brief summary of sophisticated analyses. Readers who are interested are encouraged to read: Starr, "Conceptual Foundations," pp. 610-628.


Benjamin Schwartz, "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung," p. 29: "Thus it would seem that Mao's invocation of the Paris Commune during the Cultural Revolution had much more radically anarchist implications than his reference to it during the Great Leap Forward. Indeed, some of the younger and bolder cultural revolutionaries leaped to the conclusion in 1967 that Mao was really calling for the abolition of the whole national apparatus of state and party, and was for carrying out the anarchist-communitarian 'Paris Commune' ideal." p. 29. Also see Mehnert, Peking and the New Left.


Reproduced in Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China, pp. 70-80 (quoted in text pp. 78-79); for original text, see Peking Review, No. 6 (19 May 1967), pp. 6-9.

As quoted in the text, Peking Review, No. 6 (3 February 1967), p. 13. An interesting variation is quoted in John Starr, "Revolution in Retrospect," p. 115, which cites "Talk before Central Committee Leaders, 1966 in U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 891 (8 October 1969), p. 58. "The date of these remarks is unclear, but a marginal note in the Chinese original gives the date as 21 July...Mao described it (the first ta-tzu-pao) in a talk with 'leaders of the Central Committee' as a 'declaration of a Chinese Paris Commune for the sixth decade of the twentieth century, the significance of which surpasses that of the Paris Commune itself.'"

Peking Review, No. 33 (12 August 1966), pp. 9-10. For a more convenient source, see Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution, pp. 84-96. Also, for point 9, see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the New Left, p. 101.

Translated in Peking Review, No. 52 (23 December 1966), pp. 18-23.

Consider the following China News Analysis articles cover-
ing the immediate period:

643 1/13/67 Unrest in East China
644 1/20/67 Shanghai workers' unrest
645 1/27/67 Party induces Economism in Shanghai
647 2/10/67 Peasant unrest around Shanghai
648 2/17/67 Party's Economism disrupts banks and money
649 2/24/67 Shanghai workers' slowdown and stoppages
651 3/10/67 Railroad disruptions (pp. 1-2)
651 3/10/67 Strike hits Shanghai docks (p. 5)
653 3/31/67 The Shanghai Commune--The Upheaval
654 4/7/67 Disarray in Shanghai


54 Supporting this, the following articles from SCMP:

3858 1/12/67 Message to Shanghai People to stay on jobs
3859 1/13/67 People's Daily praising Shanghai message
3861 1/17/67 Urgent Notice--Workers return to jobs!
3862 1/18/67 Shanghai rebels must unite!
3868 1/26/67 Peking workers asked to follow Shanghai workers' example by returning to work
3868 1/26/67 Call for unity to overcome factionalism and seize political power

55 "Ch'en Po-ta's Summary of the Opening Phase of the Cultural Revolution," (24 October 1966) Hsing-tao Jin-pao, Hong Kong, 28 January 1967; cited by Starr, "The Paris Commune through Chinese Eyes," pp. 116-117. The reference is, of course, not directed to Shanghai. But, if it was true during earlier months, it certainly would have applied during the peak of Shanghai's disruption. For a first hand account of events in Shanghai during this period, which conveys an impression of the confusion and disorder, see Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).


57 In fact, this ideal was never realized for lack of resources
and the increasing factionalism. Neale Hunter's Shanghai Journal gives an extraordinary eye-witness account of the struggle for control of these media tools in the streets of Shanghai.


59 "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" (TMTT) is an often used, but never defined expression. Basically it includes--but is not limited to certainly--the Collected Works of Mao and the little red book, Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung.

Two examples from a recent Peking Review (16:34 dated August 24, 1973): (1) "The socialist ideology with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought as the guide...." p. 4. It embraces the body of transmitted wisdom--perhaps like Church tradition or common law. (2) Often, however, it is more specifically directed to a particular work. "At the same time, as pointed out by Chairman Mao: 'New things always have to overcome difficulties and setbacks as they grow.' (On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.) p. 5.


64 See Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the New Left.

65 Some scholars have claimed that the originator of the Paris Commune image during the Cultural Revolution was Ch'en Po-ta, but the majority of scholars recognize the strong hand of Chairman Mao at the helm.

66 In Communist societies, as in the Roman Catholic Church, the term "propaganda" has a positive connotation.