The university exists in its own right as a fundamental construct in the system of beliefs, traditions, myths, saga, governments, churches, and other social institutions and structures that comprise the hallmarks of Western culture. In an attempt to understand the university and its value system, pertinent issues are discussed: (1) the university as an organization (G. Lester Anderson and Kenneth P. Mortimer); (2) values in higher education (G. Lester Anderson and William Toombs); (3) the university as an organization and how it differs from a business (Donald C. Hambrick); and (4) the American scholar in 1976 (G. Lester Anderson). (Author/KE)
Reflections on University Values and the American Scholar

G. Lester Anderson & Associates
Reflections on University Values and the American Scholar

G. Lester Anderson & Associates

Center for the Study of Higher Education
June 1976

The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Further Study of Universities as Organizations: Off-Beat Ideas</td>
<td>G. Lester Anderson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and New Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to &quot;The Further Study&quot;</td>
<td>Kenneth P. Mortimer</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values in Higher Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I — The University and Enduring Values</td>
<td>G. Lester Anderson</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II — The College and Values of Adaptation</td>
<td>William Toombs</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III — Does the Difference Make a Difference?</td>
<td>G. Lester Anderson</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The University as an Organization: How Is It Different from a Business?</td>
<td>Donald C. Hambrick</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Scholar, 1976</td>
<td>G. Lester Anderson</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
June 30, 1976 marks my formal retirement as Director of the Center for the Study of Higher Education and Professor of Higher Education at The Pennsylvania State University. For more than three decades I have played a variety of roles—teacher, administrator, interpreter—at a number of host universities, those unique institutions Talcott Parsons has collectively termed “the most critical single feature of the developing structure of modern societies.”

These many years as participant-observer have affirmed my concept of the university as an institution that transcends national boundaries or time dimensions. It exists in its own right as a fundamental construct in the system of beliefs, traditions, myths, saga, governments, churches, and other social institutions and structures that comprise the hallmarks of Western civilization. The fundamental bases of this institution, its values, are derived for the ancient Greek philosophers.

The university and its value system is not easily understood, readily accepted, or universally admired by the society it purports to serve. Universities as organizations have been called bureaucratic, political, disorganized, irresponsible, unaccountable, anarchical, anachronistic, and inefficient. There is validity in all these charges, yet I would remind the critics that the “life of the mind” is self-directed and does not operate on a nine to five schedule.

In my retirement statement, which appears in the collection, I posed the question, “Whose university is it?” Does it belong to the board of trustees? Is it an extension of the state or national government? Does the administrative hierarchy of the college control it? Do the scholars within its confines have first claim? Does it exist for the benefit of its student clientele? One answer is, of course, that it belongs to everyone and to no one.

It is my hope that the materials selected for inclusion in this volume will lead to an enriched understanding and appreciation of the university as an institution. The idea of the university has endured for centuries. I do not fear for its survival, but I do despair at those who would seek to demean, manipulate, undermine, or constrain a lasting legacy of our culture.

G. Lester Anderson
University Park, Pennsylvania
May 21, 1976
THE FURTHER STUDY OF UNIVERSITIES AS ORGANIZATIONS:
OFF-BEAT IDEAS AND NEW DIMENSIONS

G. Lester Anderson

Dr. Larson, Members of My Family, Colleagues, and Friends:

It must not go without saying that Margaret and I feel both honored and pleased for this day. What I have been able to accomplish with the generous support of my family is being recognized. But in a more fundamental sense, what is being noted is the productivity of the Center for the Study of Higher Education and its quality—studies, services, and teaching that have been significant to the University, the Commonwealth, and the nation. A few of the studies have been commented on in other lands. Such success as the Center has had has come about because of the imagination, vigor, insight, and commitment of what I believe is a remarkable full-time professional staff—supported by talented, curious, and perceptive graduate students; seasoned and technically competent part-time persons who helped get the work done; and, finally, those too often unhonored and unsung persons who deciphered almost indecipherable handwritten manuscripts and voices on tapes and put them into typescript with words correctly spelled and commas right, who answered telephones with courtesy, responded to requests of students with tact and gentleness, ordered and cancelled fleet cars, made travel arrangements and prepared travel vouchers that did not come back, found lost papers, saw that there was hot water for coffee, and generally took care of the rest of us well.

It is all these persons, unidentified by name but nonetheless real, whom I have just noted, who make my retirement truly a joyous occasion. I feel that as I retire I have been a winner and largely because of my associates.

The larger University community has also done well by me, my colleagues, and the Center. Presidents, provosts, vice presidents, deans, directors, and senators have talked to us when we called, counseled us when we asked for counsel, praised us when praise was good supervision, warned us when we might have otherwise ventured into deep trouble, and, in every way, week in and week out, made us feel that we were doing well, that we were contributing to the welfare of the University, that our counsel was taken seriously—in short, that we were significant to the life of the University.

Finally, may I express my appreciation to my colleagues in the College of Education who accepted me as an acting dean, played my game the best they could, and who, when they found me difficult at times, as they did, were reasonably patient and understanding.

I am retiring from the best seven professional years I have had since I began teaching school in the dust bowl of Nebraska in 1932.

And now, why am I here today to read a paper addressed to an announced topic? I am not only served in the Center; I also serve. I was told in January by one of my colleagues, speaking for all, that on May 7, a Friday, there would be an affair associated with my retirement and that I would read a paper in which I should reveal my current thoughts concerning universities as organizations. Now here I am, doing what I had been told to do. Even though I will drop a few names in this paper, I hope you can understand that this is in
a sense a personal statement, a culmination of my thoughts resulting from my experiences, my reading, and my associations over the years.

What I should like to accomplish is this. I should like us to get an enriched understanding of the university as an institution, to appreciate it as a fundamental construct in our Western culture, to conclude as Talcott Parsons (1973, p. vi) has recently concluded, "that higher education, including the research complex, has become the most critical single feature of the developing structure of modern societies." I should like it, if over time, numerous persons representing a number of the disciplines (the humanities, philosophy, sociology, history, and political science are such) could help us of the academic community to perceive through their studies of the university the university as a highly stable, immensely powerful, exceedingly complex institution, essential to the survival of our culture. It is not to be picked at, threatened, cajoled, manipulated, bargained with, or otherwise demeaned if it is to continue to be what Parsons believes it to be: "the most critical single feature of the developing structure of modern societies." I encourage further study in support of understanding the university as Parsons conceives it.

In 1958, I completed a paper of some 10,000 words for the 1960 edition of the Encyclopedia of Educational Research (3rd edition) on the "Organization and Administration of Colleges and Universities." The paper was to be a survey and analysis of the research literature and related studies addressed to the topic. The research at that time had not gone much beyond the survey stage. We knew such things as the average size of boards of trustees, the percentage of trustees who were appointed or elected, by private and by public institutions. Beck (1947) had studied the professional, business, and related activities of boards and told us that boards were made up of elitist males; but this research was an exception to the normal counting and tabulating. There were varieties of other data concerning such items as class size, enrollments, structures, line and staff relationships, faculty-student ratios and so on. The literature, at best, was normative; but even then we had very little normative data, as is true to this day. I wrote that most of the literature was ad hoc, descriptive, often anecdotal and hortatory. There were a few institutional histories of great quality, e.g., Morison's Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936 (1936). There were fascinating tracts such as Veblen's The Higher Learning in America (1918), a scathing criticism of the institution of higher education. But the literature was sparse.

About the same time, I had become sufficiently concerned about conflict on the campus—particularly that between administration and faculty (you will remember that students were docile in the 1950s)—that I decided to see what was being said or written about conflict on the campus. The American Council on Education had held a two-day symposium in 1959 on the topic "Faculty-Administration Relationships" and published its findings. The statement was remarkably thin. The discourse scarcely went beyond the idea that those in conflict should "communicate"—that is, I gathered, talk to each other. This communicating would lead to understanding and understanding would lead to resolutions of conflict. Thirty minutes of thinking about this formula leads one to realize that it will not wash. The conference did call for a variety of studies that might reveal cause-effect conflict relations. Perhaps I have been a bit unfair in my criticism of the conference; but, as one reads the conference's seventeen "Proposals for Further Study or Action," the inference has to be that we did not know much at that time. There was no available theoretical or conceptual base; those who were speaking at the conference were simply winging it. They could only talk about democratic processes, delegation of authority, and such other cliches of the times.
The fact is that at that period I felt I learned far more about conflict on the campus from two novels I read in the 1950s than from the writings about higher education. They were Mary McCarthy's *The Groves of Academe* (1952) and C. P. Snow's *The Masters* (1959). These two novels at least recognized the significance of the elements of the political process, i.e., the nature of power and authority and the structures through which they operate in academe. In fact, I understand that Snow considered the nature of power to be the central theme of his *Strangers and Brothers* series of novels of which *The Masters* is but one.

Douglas McGregor, of management science fame, had to become president of Antioch in order to learn about conflict on the campus and that he as president had to adjudicate it. In his "retirement" statement, he tells how upon accepting the post he believed he could bring the consultant skills he had perfected at M.I.T. into service with the democratically oriented faculty of Antioch and that the faculty would then make proper decisions. Later he wrote that he could not have been more wrong. He found irreconcilable vested interests, and he found that only he could reconcile them. He wrote, "the boss must be the boss." Then he resigned as President of Antioch and returned to M.I.T.

But I did go to work to see if I could find a better conceptual base for conflict than a "good guy-bad guy" theory. I thought I found it in a conflict between service and administrative offices that were bureaucratically organized, and had to be, and the faculty that was collegially and oligarchically organized. I came to believe that the two groups were operating from different assumptions about how decisions should be made; hence, conflict was often the norm of the interactions.

Just a few days ago, I observed these words on the dust jacket of Blau's relatively recent book (1973) on *The Organization of Academic Work*.

The basic question . . . is how can academic institutions cope with the dilemma resulting from the incompatibility of bureaucracy and scholarship, a dilemma created by the recent tremendous growth of higher education, the consequent expansion of universities and colleges, and the tendencies of large academic institutions to develop complex administrative machineries that may endanger scholarly pursuits.

The dilemma as I now see it is that the scholar as an independent thinker is distrustful of bureaucracy and he reacts not only intellectually but emotionally to the constraints it places on him, yet he cannot exist without the materials and machinery that only a bureaucratic structure can provide, e.g., libraries, laboratories, accountants, personnel offices, and so on. I have at this time concluded that conflict is endemic and permanently embodied in the collegiate environment. Somewhat later, I will comment on the Cohen and March classification of universities as organized anarchies.

I continue to believe that I was on the right track in the 1960s and am at this time, but I also believe my views were and are simplistic. I am not alone. Many others who are studying the university currently are simplistic in their description. Here we come to the heart of the matter. Universities as organizations have been called bureaucratic, political, disorganized, irresponsible and unaccountable, anarchical, ruled by oligarchs, anachronistic, and inefficient. I could add several more adjectives to the list. In fact, according to our own man-on-the-street wisdom the university appears to be all these things. If we cannot dismiss
these characteristics presumably conflicting, as organizational pathology, as I believe we cannot do, what then is the university, anyway? Hence, I believe we must continue our study until we achieve a more comprehensive and much enriched understanding.

You can well ask me at this point, "Why? What difference will it make? Haven't we been doing all right? We do have crisis points, and the organizational behavior does seem idiosyncratic at times. But studying the university as an organization is busy work, not particularly relevant to the real work of the university—getting ahead by adding new material to the universe of knowledge through the disciplines and educating people liberally and professionally."

Critics of those of us who "study higher education" have a point. Some of our studies have been irrelevant and inconsequential. Moreover, no one study can expect to make much difference. And it would seem to many that the university as an organization is not all that complex and its management should be quite straightforward, e.g., "Operate it on sound business principles and all will be well!" But on looking closely, it is not all that simple.

In his 1960 edition of *The Governance of Colleges and Universities*, John Corson, a worldwide consultant in public administration and management science, expressed some concern that there was not a rich literature on college and university organization and administration. Corson gave us an excellent, in fact a unique and, in current terms, indispensable book in 1960 and an even better one in the 1975 revision. This is what he wrote in 1960:

> What is needed is clearer recognition of the distinctive characteristics of the university as an administrative enterprise. In spite of the fact that universities have existed for centuries, little has been written that aids the administrator or the student to identify the respects in which the university differs from the business firm, the military, or the public organization as an administrative enterprise (p. 41).

He then goes on to observe:

> Does the administrative process by which a university arrives at and carries out its decisions differ from that of a business firm or a governmental agency? Is the influence of board members less great or greater in the university than in the corporation? Must university executives—presidents and deans—possess skills not needed to the same degree by their counterparts in private and public business? And the faculty—does it play a greater, lesser, or different role than the core staff members of a business or a bureau? The answers to these and related questions are not readily available in what has been written about the administration of colleges and universities. Yet the answers are needed. They are needed to help trustees, presidents, and faculties better understand their own institutions. They are needed to discourage loose generalizations about "administrative efficiency" founded on comparisons with business enterprise and governmental operations. They are needed to supplement the "management studies" of colleges and universities that focus on such matters as "mechanization of accounting and student
records," "portion control of food served," "utilization of classroom space," and "elimination or reduction of maid service in dormitories" (p. 119).

Finally, he calls for comparative studies, saying that educators should look outside the university world and utilize the knowledge and experience that has proved useful there as it is applicable to university organization and management.

Again, let me repeat the question, "What difference does it make? Why not operate under such concepts of productivity and efficiency and intrude modern management techniques into the university complex?" The answer is that it makes all the difference in terms of what is valued in the university and the maintenance of those values. It seems clear, as a theory of organization emerges, that different modes of organization and operation do make a difference in the functioning of organizations. If bureaucratic forms for university organization grow and prevail, decisions will be made in bureaucratic terms. Efficiency or measures of output will be controlling. Goals will be explicitly set in measurable outputs. Persons skilled in the technologies of management and organizational evaluation will dominate the system. Governing standards will reflect: How many degrees were granted? How many credit hours were generated? How many faculty contact hours by rank were spent in the classroom? How many public lectures were held? How many persons attended? How many pages of scholarly publication were generated by the faculty? However, not much will be reported about quality. Order and efficiency will be controlling concepts.

If community or collegial forms of organization are permitted to dominate the system, decisions will be made according to other criteria. Efficiency will be only an incidental criterion of worth. Values without quantitative counterparts will be held in high esteem. Questions of the following type would reveal the worth of the college or university: How much freedom is present on the campus? What prize winning books were written? Is the campus congenial to the eccentric? Are students challenging? Are rules flexible and lightly enforced? Do avant-garde or deviant processes or ideas of education find a warm reception?

Let me recite a modest anecdote—trivial in one sense but symbolic in an important way—that illustrates that those of the professorate and those of the business-industrial complex live in different worlds. A professor at Buffalo, holding a distinguished appointment, a man who had also been a college dean, was an important officer in the SUNY faculty union. He was informed by the Buffalo vice president for business affairs, who had come to his office from a vice presidency with Sylvania, that the faculty union could not meet on company time. The professor asked, "And what is company time?" The vice president replied superciliously: "Everyone but you knows—from 9 to 5." My professor friend replied, "Not to me and my associates. I control my own time in serving in my university role. I work evenings and on weekends and I sometimes play golf on weekdays between 9 and 5." The union from then on met on so-called company time. I am sure the point is made.

The more fundamental question is: Who is to make the decisions on the campus and see that they are carried out. Relevant to this point I want to pose a simple but fundamental question. "Whose university is it?" At first you may dismiss the question as somewhat ridiculous. But I ask, "Did the business vice president have an authority to define company time superior to that of the professor?" I insist that to ask "Whose university is it?" is not a ridiculous question, and that when its import is fully understood the many
ambiguities that handicap the university in being a university will become fewer. Perhaps the answer to my question, "Whose university is it?" is at best an ambiguous one. I will not develop the question further at this point in the paper. Rather, let me review briefly what "significant others" are doing and saying about colleges and universities. Such a review may indicate the needs for us who are of the university to come to know ourselves better so that we can defend ourselves better over the next several years.

First, our friends and critics outside the walls of academe are taking a hard look at us who are inside—how we organize ourselves and how we operate. They often do not like, let alone appreciate, what they find. They say we are inefficient. They say we are not sufficiently productive—that our faculties do not work hard enough. They find our employment practices discriminatory and our admission of students the same. They say we as a group are wasteful in our duplication of programs. They say we educate too many persons for too few jobs. You can easily add a variety of charges to this list.

But there is more. Our critics who are in civic organizations, in our legislatures, courts, and executive governmental offices and bureaus, who write editorials or for journals, learned and popular, are among the many who are proposing changes. A variety of boards and agencies are sitting in judgment—labor relations boards, state and national; a variety of agencies out of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; auditors from everywhere; business management teams assembled by governors; and many more.

What is happening is that the important decision makers may soon no longer be faculty councils, departmental bodies, deans, vice presidents, provosts, and presidents operating under the watchful eye of responsible boards of trustees. Witness: the faculty union for Pennsylvania's state-owned colleges bargains directly with a representative of the governor—completely by-passing presidents, local boards, and the State College and University Directors. The matter of conflict, about which I spoke earlier, is often taken away from internal bodies and settled by outsiders in a process called binding arbitration.

Many institutions can no longer allocate their resources according to criteria of internal professional judgment related to educational worth. This allocation is made by bureaucrats in offices in state capitals who often do not understand what they do. The process that gives these bureaucrats power is the line item budget. I might here facetiously answer my question, "Whose university is it?" by saying that if it is anyone's it belongs to budget managers in state capitals and funding agencies in Washington!

But, again, what is the point? The point is that the university is still perfectly capable of exercising social responsibility. It is still capable of making decisions that serve the general welfare. It is still capable of handling its finances responsibly and honestly and of choosing its staff and students in society's best interest. It can answer with few exceptions all challenges about efficiency and accountability. I do not wish to claim that it should not be accountable; it must be. But accountability is not control or management, and the university does not fare badly in terms of accountability. As examples we can cite three recent court cases relating to university management of its affairs that have been decided in the university's favor—the decision not to tenure a specific professor at Penn State, the move by an HEW agency to withhold Federal funds from Maryland educational institutions, and the right of a medical school to admit minority member students with lesser qualifications than those set as a minimum for majority member students (The Chronicle of Higher Education March 22, 1976, p. 6; March 15, 1976, p. 1; April 19, 1976, p. 9).
But the university can only persuade doubters of its ability to manage its own affairs when it knows what it is, when its spokesmen know what it is, when its decision makers know what it is, when its faculty and the students know what it is, and ultimately when those who guard the public interest know what it is. This they now only vaguely know, and this is not enough.

We who can or will study higher education as an institution and as a process can ultimately inform all of us and thus perhaps save us from the meddling and corruption that stems not from venality but from ignorance.

Let me be less rhetorical. The “five score” reports of the Carnegie Commission on higher education have added abundantly to the available knowledge about higher education. Let us use this knowledge and add to it, to turn away those who make false or stupid observations or charges. An illustration: Since 1900 when the population of the United States was 76,000,000 and enrollments in colleges were 238,000, we have made these advances; in 1930, 123,000,000 people and 1,100,000 in college; in 1960, 180,000,000 people and 3,600,000 in college; in 1970, 205,000,000 people and 8,600,000 in college; and 1976, 214,000,000 people and 11,000,000 in college. The percentages of the total population who were in college advance like this: 3 tenths of one percent in 1900, 9 tenths of one percent in 1930, 4.2 percent in 1970, and 5.1 percent in 1976. Now, man-on-the-street wisdom would say this increase could only be accomplished by diluting the quality of those admitted into colleges and universities. But Taubman and Wales (1974), two competent economists, have this to say in a technical report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education:

It is apparent that the quality of college students has not declined. In fact, throughout this period of 40 years, during which a substantially greater percentage of high school graduates entered college, it has even noticeably increased. The basic explanation of this phenomenon... can be summarized as follows. In the 1920s only about 60 percent of the most able high school graduates entered college, whereas by the 1960s the corresponding figure was about 90 percent (p. 19).

To broaden the generalization, today’s college students are brighter and receive a better high school education than students of any prior generation.

Almost every aspect of the organization and operation of higher education has been illuminated by the Carnegie Commission studies. There is, however, only modest evidence that those who should pay attention to the Commissions’ reports are doing so. Nonetheless, study must go on and attention must be paid if the institutions and processes of higher education are not to become seriously flawed.

I do acknowledge that in all that I have been saying, I may be overreacting. Why do I acknowledge this? Higher education institutions have so long endured and are so little changed in their value commitments and in their structural forms over a period of nearly a thousand years that it might be presumed that they will endure in much their current structural form for another thousand years. And it is to illuminate these value commitments and structural forms that I propose once again that those who have the disciplinary tools of inquiry, the insights of values manifest and the knowledge of operations noted on the basis of examined experience, accelerate their studies of higher education. In the realities of
values that have endured and structures that have evolved, we will find the positive constructs of power that can maintain the autonomy, the integrity, and the purpose of the university.

What, if we seek, will we find? Let me suggest what these might be. First, the university is not simply an organization; it is an institution. And here I follow Selznick (1957) as I discuss the university as an institution. An institution is an organization infused with value. The university expresses values that are fundamental to Western civilization and Western culture. It rests on values contributed by Greek civilization and culture that are basic to the civilization and culture of the Western world. These values are the values of the examined life, of the life of the mind, and of the power of the mental or intellectual cognitive processes that produce knowledge. These are fundamental and enduring. While useful, they transcend utility. They are of the essence of the university. They give the basis in need and meaning to the work of scholars who labor within the institutions we call colleges and universities. Scholars are, as Emerson noted, “Man (and women) Thinking.” They create, conserve, and transmit knowledge. The creative acts of scholars are among the ultimate products of human behavior in our Western culture. Let us then study the contemporary scholar as Ladd and Lipset (1975-76) and a few others are doing, interpret and disseminate our findings, and then let the scholar work without witch-hunts, harassments, or even petty carping.

Both in the institutional and the social role of scholars, our Washington colleagues, Roger Heyns, Allan Ostar, and Alice Beeman were serving not just us or their constituent universities and colleagues but were serving all Americans when they challenged Secretary of the Treasury Simon for advocating individual giving only to those institutions that “are really assisting in the fight to maintain our freedom... Otherwise the largesse of the free enterprise system will continue to finance its own destruction” (The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 29, 1976, p. 5).

Mr. Simon’s statement reveals that he understands little or nothing of universities on the one hand, and that he is only arming the critics of freedom with his naive assumption that universities are anything other than our society’s chief means of advancing toward greater freedom. Mr. Simon and many others of us might well go back and read of the Walgreen affair with the University of Chicago in 1935 (New York Times, April 14, 1935 and June 6, 1937), and Harvard’s refusal to give way to a Harvard alumnus who said he would not contribute to his alma mater unless it censured “subversive faculty” who had, he alleged, used Harvard’s prestige to subvert American interests (New York Times, June 20, 1949).

A few paragraphs back I quoted Talcott Parsons, perhaps America’s most eminent sociological scholar, who, in his preface to The American University, said: “I had long decided that higher education, including the research complex, had become the most critical single feature of the developing structure of modern societies.” Then he went on to add: “It was indeed this conviction which led me, in the first place into intensive concern with its study. From this point of view (this) book can be understood, not only as a monographic study of a particular organizational phenomenon in American society but as a contribution to the understanding of the modern world in a larger sense” (1973, p. vii).

Second, the university is without dimensions of time or place. I have noted that its fundamental value orientations are embodied in the writings of Greek philosophers (primarily Plato and Aristotle) of more than 2000 years ago. But the university is not
unmindful of the contribution of the poets, the dramatists, the sculptors, the architects, and the lawgivers of Greece. The structure of the contemporary university was present in the medieval university; the faculties of philosophy, theology, law and medicine are the forerunners and models of the disciplines and the professional schools that constitute the contemporary university. The curricular trivium and the quadrivium are the precursors and models of the disciplinary departments that represent both the heart and power of the contemporary university.

At a round table on higher education held in 1964 in Asuncion, Paraguay, Dr. Juan Gomez Millas, then minister of public education in Chile, stated that "Higher Education is clearly a world-wide function of intellect" (quoted by Anderson, 1965). He went on to say that:

The duties of the university ... transcend the limits of regional integration and aim consistently at identification with the rest of the intellectual world. The life force of the universities is a historical and ecumenical process rooted in total human culture. It is a whole that constantly strives for ultimate completion of its parts, each of which is joined by infinite bonds of reason to the rest.

The American university is perhaps uniquely prosperous, but it is otherwise both heir and companion of universities everywhere over the last 800 years.

Third, the university is a conserving institution and a conservative institution. Indeed, the university is reactionary at times when it resists those who would shift its value system and reform its structure and operation. In the current mood that change is of the essence if higher education and its institutions are not to be decadent and counterproductive, constancy and conservatism are anathema. But I certainly do not glow or applaud as one innovation and another are paraded before us. Some are not innovations—open admissions has been the norm in many mid- and far-western public institutions since the Land-Grant act of 1862, despite its more recent discovery by New York City educators who must now apparently abandon the idea. Others are simply extensions of current practice. Again, mid- and far-western universities, as well as Penn State, have been major purveyors of adult and continuing education for some years. The agricultural and home economics extension agents have been with us since the turn of the century (Fortman, et al.). I recall a student at the University of Buffalo who, after taking evening classes for 27 years, earned her degree. Nontraditional study is not all nontraditional. But, despite the contemporary educator-administrator’s cries of consternation or crisis and pleading for change or reform, the university is slow to respond.

Princeton Professor of History, Lawrence Stone, has just edited two volumes published by the Princeton University Press (1975) titled The University in Society. He gives us historical perspectives of the English, continental European, and American universities from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century. He writes as follows in the preface:

Every institution partly reflects the social, economic, and political system, but partly also it lives a life of its own, independent of the interests and beliefs of the community. The university, like the family and the church, is one of the most poorly integrated of institutions, and again and again it has been obstinately resistant to changes which were clearly demanded by changing conditions around it. And yet, in the long run,
no institution can survive indefinitely in glorious isolation, and the interaction between the university's own built-in conservatism and the pressures upon it to adapt to new external conditions is one of the most potentially illuminating, but most practically obscure aspects of the process of historical change. What is abundantly clear is that the response of the university to external change has been neither simple nor immediate. There were no uniform series of changes in the universities of Europe in conformity with such major upheavals as the Renaissance, the Reformation, secularism and the Enlightenment, the rise of the bureaucratic nation-state, the rise of the bourgeoisie, or the Industrial Revolution, and any attempt to force the history of higher education into any such Procrustean mold is bound to fail (pp. v-vi).

Stone goes on to say:

Nor does the history of the university lend any support to theories about its simple function to inculcate established values and transmit established cultural norms. It has certainly performed such functions in all countries and at all times, but its obstinate resistance to the values of an industrialized society in the 19th century, for example, or its encouragement of subversive and even revolutionary ideas such as 14th century Lollardy or 20th century Marxism, hardly lends support to any notion of its role as no more than an agency of socialization. The university has not been a Parsonian functionalist institution responding slavishly to social needs. Nor has it been a Marxist superstructure, automatically providing the ideological props for the group which currently controls the means of production. Nor is it helpful to apply Max Weber's division of functions between the training of a cultivated gentleman and the training of a specialized expert, since most universities have always tried to do both at the same time (p. vi).

Professor Stone's statement may be summarized by saying that the university is both integrated into the culture and aloof from it. It can be sensitive to the crises of states and upheavals of social beliefs and mores. But it also lasts through the rise and fall of states and empires, wars and revolutions, plagues and famines, religious conversions and transformations, and the holocausts perpetrated by mad rulers. It is important to note that universities as institutions are older than the contemporary nation state. While we celebrate this nation's bicentennial in 1976, Harvard celebrated its tricentennial 40 years ago.

Fourth, the university is a peculiar institution. We use the word peculiar in the sense that it does not conform to normative concepts of organization, to the stereotypes that men-on-the-street have of it, or to the ideals those of us who are in universities would like to see it represent. The university is no ivory tower. The institutions may seem to be aloof to the hurly-burly of contemporary strife, even neglectful of its obligations, and professors may seem to be eccentric in their interactions with political or economic institutions. Perhaps this is this eccentricity that Secretary Simon does not understand. The university is, nevertheless, analytical, disputatious, courageous, and influential in the affairs of states and nations. The problem is that universities and their professors operate on their own terms. The professors form a company that seems to stand aloof, i.e., they are an island. But the Keyneses and the Kissingers, the Oppenheims and the Tellers, the Mansfields and the Humphries, the Frankfurters and the Douglasses, the Levis and the Schlesingers, all movers
and shakers in national affairs, had their start or lived much of their lives in so-called ivory towers.

The universities are the abode of the largest assembly of talented people working to a common end that exists. I do not presume that professor-scholars are the only bright people. But universities concentrate their bright people and, as such, are unique.

What I have been attempting to establish as I discuss the university as an institution, i.e., infused with value, as an institution without boundaries of time and place, as a conserving and conservative and as a peculiar institution is this: The university is indigenous, it is powerful, it can stand against the world as the world may threaten it, it belongs to everyone and hence to no one. It is fundamental to our culture not as a social agent, but rather because in large measure (not entirely, but in large measure) it is our culture. To know this and to understand this is to stand firm as others would use it, would corrupt it, would transform it, or at times would seek to destroy it (as has happened in some fascist and some revolutionary nations.)

Let me now be somewhat explicit about what I would like to see in the years ahead by way of studies in higher education, particularly as they relate to administration, organization, or governance. I will give brief attention to studies in three areas that are now in the literature. I will also suggest consideration of two other areas that I believe could be dealt with analytically or as case histories or both and that could perhaps set a new course for university operations in these areas. All these are but examples of the types of research I espouse; the list is limited, not definitive.

The three areas where existing research illustrates that which we need more of are: (1) historical studies, (2) studies that reveal the motives associated with decision making on the campus and the implications of these, and (3) a significant study that tests the variety of roles a president might play on the campus in terms of an organizational model that is defined and described. The two areas that I believe would reveal concepts, processes, and insights that might well change in a major way current and projected administrative challenges are: first, institutional planning; and second, leadership and management in periods of so-called crisis. Now let me comment on certain research activities that we need more of.

Some two years ago, David Madsen, an historian at the University of Washington, wrote a brief history of the land-grant colleges for a book the Center is sponsoring. Madsen was not happy with his chapter and it was not what one would call superior. But his observation was this: We don't have enough monographs! I believe his statement was perceptive and accurate. As an example of what we need more of, I would cite Kinnison's brief book (in a sense a monograph) titled Building Sullivan's Pyramid (1970), a bad title because you have to know the history of Ohio State to know its significance. Its subtitle is An Administrative History of Ohio State Universities. Anyone who is interested in institutional development and in institutional decision making will be fascinated by it. As for institutional development, it took 10 years to locate the university, and it took another twenty years to establish the pattern that permitted Ohio State and other land-grant colleges to become major universities. This seems to have been the universal pattern for the 1862 vintage of land-grant colleges, and it appears that Federal City University, founded as the land-grant university for the District of Columbia, will have to run the same course. So much for the
time required in stabilizing a developmental pattern, a variable too seldom considered in institutional development. Regarding a second dimension, decision making, Kinnison reports that it was not until Rutherford B. Hayes became governor of Ohio and turned the location of the university into a political decision that the location matter was solved. Second, it was only after Hayes returned to Columbus, after having served as the nineteenth president of the United States, and became a member of Ohio State's Board of Trustees, that Hayes' political adroitness again resolved a conflict—the character of Ohio State. He was able to bring about a decision that Ohio State would be a complete university with a full development of the liberal arts. I frequently tell students in my classes that all educational decisions are ultimately political decisions. The Kinnison study reveals how the process operates. You are perhaps curious concerning the title. Sullivant, a member of an old Ohio family served as secretary of the Ohio State Board of Trustees in its early days. He had a conception of the university as a series of building blocks that formed a pyramid at the top of which were the blocks labeled "liberal studies." His symbolic pyramid was built because of the political astuteness of former President Hayes.

A second study that supports the concept that all decisions are in the end political is reported by Carmichael in his volume, New York Achieves a State University (1955). By document analysis and use of interviews, he is able to report how the power of private higher education in the Empire State which had kept public higher education weak and limited had to give way to the power of labor and the Jewish community. Labor demanded colleges and universities that were inexpensive (for labor's children), the Jewish community demanded public colleges that would not discriminate (for Jewish children.) The creating of the Young commission and the establishing of the State University of New York in 1948 were politically expedient for Thomas E. Dewey. He also created SUNY under its own board of trustees which he could control, rather than placing it under the Board of Regents, which he could not control, i.e., another political decision.

A third study I wish to recall is reported by the Yale sociologist, Burton Clark, in his volume The Distinctive College (1970). Clark tells the story of the development of three colleges—Reed, Antioch, and Swarthmore to their present distinction. He utilizes the concept of institutional saga with significant effect, and while the sagas are in a sense case histories they reveal the power of a president to infuse the organization with value and give it a distinction and distinctiveness that ultimately creates for each college a life of its own which the members (administrators, faculty, and students) must support if they are to remain members. When we read Clark's material, we can begin to comprehend that an institution lives in its own right and belongs not to any group of persons but is no more nor less than a relatively autonomous although highly interactive element of the social culture. The studies are classics in revealing the process of the institutionalization of an organization, i.e., how colleges become value infused and hence become institutions.

One element of decision making on the campus that to my limited knowledge has seldom been analyzed or even noted is that of the motivations operating when seemingly straightforward decisions are made. Two studies that reveal the motivations that can be at work are Gardner's, The California Oath Controversy (1967) and Parsons', The Feinberg Law: A Case History at the State University of New York at Buffalo, 1963-67 (1970). In the reporting of the first study, Gardner opens the book with the following paragraph:

To report the story of any great controversy is manifestly to engage myth and reality, opinion and fact, legend and truth. When a dispute is
long and complex, such as that which engrossed the University of California during the period 1949 to 1952, fact and fiction become more difficult to separate. However, there is one grand myth of the loyalty oath conflict, tenaciously clung to by some out of ignorance and by others for ideological reasons, which might be exposed to light at the outset: that this was mostly a conflict over principles. It was not. In its main outlines and principal events it was a power struggle, a series of personal encounters between proud and influential men. Ideals and beliefs boldly enunciated early in the dispute were surrounded little by little as tribute to personal hostility, stubbornness, and bad manners. And in the end most of those who hold uncompromisingly to their ideals—that small band of scholars unwilling to sign the oath—were victims of the battle, not its chief protagonists (p. 1).

The Parsons' study reports the details of the decision of five faculty members at Buffalo who refused to sign the affirmation required by New York's Feinberg law. The affirmation, not an oath, was this:

This is to certify that I have read the publication of the University of the State of New York, 1955, entitled "Regents Rules on Subversive Activities" together with the instructions set forth above and understand these rules and regulations as well as the laws cited therein are part of the terms of my employment. I further certify that I am not now a member of the Communist Party and that if I have been a member of the Communist Party I have communicated that fact to the President of the State University of New York (p. 291).

I will not go into the matter of how the confrontation came about, a situation for which I in the role I was playing in the merger determination process was probably as responsible as anyone. But the confrontation between one non-signer, a Quaker lecturer in philosophy by name Newton Garver, and the director of personnel, an evangelical Christian bureaucrat by name David Price, has held for me a major fascination as it reveals the motives of two men—one who chose not to obey the law and the other who chose to administer it. The situation developed to the point where, among other things, there was an exchange of letters between Garver and SUNY officials. I will quote portions of these letters:

In a letter to the acting chief administrator, SUNY, Garver wrote as follows on June 8, 1964:

I have neither the competence nor the inclination to argue about the status and meaning of the applicable statutes and regulations. Suffice it to say that I cannot agree that the Feinberg provisions are so innocent as you make them out to be. I have, however, thought a good deal since I wrote you last about the principles which must govern my decision, and it seems appropriate to try to make them clear to you at this time.

My principal guidance on this matter comes from a remark Jesus made in his sermon on the mount:

Again, you have heard that the men of old were told, "You shall not swear falsely, but you must fulfill your oaths to the Lord." But I tell you not to swear at all, either by heaven,
for it is God’s throne, or by the earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king. You must not swear by your own head, for you cannot make one single hair white or black. But your way of speaking must be “Yes” or “No.” Anything that goes beyond that is rooted in evil.

The religious tradition to which I belong has built upon this remark a custom of speaking plainly and directly—of avoiding flattery, judicial oaths, slogans, jargon, abstractions, hollow formalities, and other forms of speaking that go beyond the plain direct speech that Jesus commended.

I do not want to enter into a controversy about this tradition of plain speaking and the scruples it entails; the point simply is that whether this tradition is sound or not, it is one to which I am committed (pp. 86-87).

Parsons now reports as follows:

On June 25, 1964, Garver received a telephone call from SUNY Vice President for Personnel, David Price who, though not a practicing member of the Society of Friends, or Quakers as was Garver, nevertheless held a religious persuasion which sprang from a similar base and motivated similar principles as did Garver’s. Unlike Garver, however, Price did not scruple to sign the Feinberg Certificate as a “vain protestation.” To the contrary, Price viewed the certificate as a positive force for academic freedom which helped the university repel attacks upon it. Price’s call had an unsettling effect on Garver and his response to it not only revealed his strengthened conviction to seek counsel, but may have had a decided effect on Garver’s willingness to carry through with the legal fight (pp. 90-91).

Garver then wrote to Price as follows:

I have had your phone call of June 25th on my mind. What you had to say was very different from what others have had to say. I have often been confronted with practical considerations, the implication apparently being that nothing but a pragmatic or utilitarian argument for one’s action could reasonably and responsibly be considered. But you have confronted me with the thought that there may be men who follow the traditions and principles to which I am committed and who have considered carefully the Trustees’ Certificate, but who have no such scruples as I have about that certificate, and even feel duty-bound to help police its execution by members of the SUNY faculty. I am still not sure to what extent your remarks are to be considered an official answer to my letter of June 8th; but in any case I had not anticipated that an officer of SUNY would give such forthright acknowledgement of the validity and relevance of the Christian principles and traditions to which I referred. That you have done so makes it the more difficult for me to give an adequate answer to your view that those principles and traditions do not properly entail any scruples about the Trustees’ Certificate (p. 91).
On July 8, Price replied to Garver in a lengthy letter, of which the following is a part:

I'm of evangelical persuasion, committed to a personal relationship with Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord, believing that God is revealed to those who come to Him through Christ by Scripture as interpreted by the Holy Spirit. I have never been a member of a Friends meeting, but attended the Providence Meeting occasionally while I was at Brown and the Cambridge Meeting regularly while at Harvard. In World War II, I was a conscientious objector. From doctoral core fields of political theory and public law (now rusty, because I backslid into administrative rather than research or instructional pursuits), I have a general acquaintance with the secular and religious development of the problem of church, state, and conscience, and remain active in conservative Christian lay service.

My faith neither compels nor permits me to refuse compliance with the Feinberg Law...

I have, in accepting public employment, affirmed that I will support the laws of the land. If I were to find a conflict between such laws and my understanding of God's will for me, I would resign my public employment. I find no such conflict, insofar as the Feinberg certification provisions are concerned. (pp. 96-97)

And then, as I would assume most of you know, the confrontation became Keyishian, et al. versus the Board of Regents of the State of New York, which reached the United States Supreme Court in 1964. The court decreed that the Feinberg Law was unconstitutional and thus reversed a decision of the court that had found the law constitutional in 1952. It is interesting to note that Keyishian et al. versus Board of Regents was cited in the court decision that we at Penn State call the Wells Keddie case (1976).

But most significantly is the conclusion I must reach that when the integrity of the university was represented by the belief systems of professors of integrity, in each instance the integrity of the university prevailed. I should say that there never was any presumption that any of the non-signers including Mr. Garver, the Quaker, was a communist. They simply would not conform to the administration of the law as prescribed in forms prepared by agents of the regents and the trustees of SUNY. In addition, let it be noted that the Quaker lecturer and the evangelical Christian bureaucratic recognized each other as persons of deepest religious commitment, each doing what he found it necessary to do, with no thought of personal hostility, questioning of motives, or aspersions on each other's intelligence and understanding.

I should now like to recall two recent and complementary studies that I believe may have no great immediate significance but that may stimulate other studies that collectively will become important. When I say they may not be immediately significant, I do not mean that they are not well done. They are indeed superb. The two studies reported by Cohen and March appear in a journal article, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice" in the Administrative Science Quarterly in March 1972, and in a general report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education titled Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President (1974).
It is completely impossible to outline the studies and report their findings here. I can say that I believe that anyone who wants to understand the university could read them with high interest as well as profit. By analysis and the use of sophisticated tools, the authors conclude that the university is best described as an "organized anarchy." An organized anarchy is characterized as having problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation. The authors then observe:

Organized anarchies require a new theory of management. Much of our present theory of management introduces mechanisms for control and coordination that assume the existence of well-defined goals and technology, as well as substantial participant involvement in the affairs of the organization. When goals and technology are hazy and participation is fluid, many of the axioms and standard procedures of management collapse (p. 4).

The authors consider a series of metaphors that implicitly prescribe a role for the president of a university. Such metaphors are competitive market, collective bargaining, democracy, consensus, and independent judiciary. The role congruent to the metaphor of anarchy is described as follows:

The President is a catalyst. He gains his influence by understanding the operation of the system and by inventing viable solutions that accomplish his objectives rather than by choosing among conflicting alternatives. "Management" in an anarchy involves the substitution of knowledge and subtle adjustment for the explicit authoritative control of bureaucracy (p. 39).

One may agree or disagree with the idea of organized anarchy. However, the accommodation of administrative role to organizational constraints is essential. This accommodation is essential for all academic administrators—vice presidents, deans, and departmental chairpersons as well as presidents. Hence, once again we must strive for greater understanding of the nature of the university if these managers are to be effective not only in their day-to-day responsibility but also in their responsibility to protect the integrity of the university.

I have cited what I believe to be significant prototype studies that could be used as models for further studies. Let me now briefly look at two areas of organizational activity that I believe need immediate and long-range attention and can be illustrative of many areas that need study. They are planning and crisis management, and the two are not unrelated.

The need for academic planning was significantly recognized, at least in the contemporary meaning of planning, only after World War II. It received major attention in the spectacular growth of higher education in the decade of the 1960s. But there was no model for planning readily adaptable to educational planning. I remember offering a seminar on educational planning, as I recall, in the summer of 1968 at Buffalo. We did have a considerable collection of plans of institutions around the nation including one that had been developed for the recently created State University of New York at Buffalo, a reincarnation of the University of Buffalo. These plans were studied in some detail. The only guide to planning that I could locate at that time was a small pamphlet produced by a consulting firm. As best I could determine, it was modeled on such industrial planning concepts, for example,
as General Motors might follow. The essence was: (1) state what you want to achieve, e.g., start a school of library science; (2) justify its importance, e.g., "it would satisfy a community need and would be congruent with the total institution"; (3) estimate resources needed, e.g., building and staff; (4) prepare a cost estimate, i.e., a potential budget; (5) specify the steps to make the plan a reality, e.g., find space or build a building, hire a dean, recruit a staff and student body, state objectives of the enterprise, and create a curriculum. (All is, of course, to be set forth in elegant language with appropriate tables and charts if current planning modes are to be observed.)

But events of recent days shake our confidence in planning, certainly as it has been carried out in a variety of institutions. The two major public sectors of higher education in New York state merit careful study as case studies of "what went wrong." And perhaps out of knowing what went wrong, more valid concepts of planning can be created. In the City University the applause that greeted open admissions is not yet quiet, but open admissions has been abandoned. New colleges created in the last decade are being closed or merged with others, financing is in a shambles, and tuition for City University—free to those admitted since 1847—is seemingly inevitable and will be achieved "without a plan." The State University of New York at Buffalo is undergoing such abandonment of "glorious future plans" and is so retrenching that the situation seems almost nightmarish.

Planning between the years 1962 and 1968 at SUNY/Buffalo resulted in the following elements: (1) building a completely new campus on a new site of 1000 acres to accommodate 40,000 students; and (2) expanding and improving programs, and establishing schools of architecture and library science. Now, under retrenchment, it is proposed by a faculty review committee that the schools of architecture and of library science be closed out, although there are no such schools other than these in either SUNY or City University. The estimate of future enrollment is now 25,000. The new campus is less than half built, money to finish it is not currently available, and there is no promise of completion although, as originally planned, the new campus was to have been completed a year ago at a cost of $650,000,000. The situation in New York is by no means unique. The Chronicle of Higher Education of April 12, 1976, cited the state of higher education in Alabama and the retrenchment in the name of low priority that Governor Wallace foresees for higher education there.

On my own knowledge, I could approximate a case study of the Buffalo situation and raise one significant and highly valid question. The question will emerge from the following example. The decision to move the campus to a new site was made by a local board of trustees for the university and by central university planners and others of the central university staff who were cognizant of what has been called "Nelson Rockefeller’s edifice complex." The decision was opposed by the Buffalo president, most vice presidents, deans, and the faculty senate. The pertinent question is, "Who should control planning?" But, in addition to the matter of control, the future projections that were so far off the mark, in terms of resources and enrollments, raise questions of the adequacy of prediction technology and its rightful place in planning. We know manpower need projections have been notoriously weak reeds on which to base program development. If prediction studies are off the mark so frequently, the question becomes one of planning in terms of contingencies. "How do we do that?" then becomes a second question.

Some will say that SUNY and CUNY were victims of bad planning. If so, let us as students of higher education give the academic community some case studies of successful
planning, including valid criteria of success; and let us examine the assumptions, presuppositions, and operations of character of both successful and unsuccessful planning. If I were to generalize, I would say that laudable changes in higher education have been brought about more often by superior leadership rather than by the plans of master technicians.

Since this is not an essay on planning, I will not pursue the matter further. I have recorded observations, however, from which I must infer that current planning in academe is without a strong conceptual base and a guiding theory of the nature of higher education. Secondly, our technologies for planning are at best crude. Students of higher education should construct a conceptual base and a guiding theory on which planning could be based. Then we may be able to answer questions of this type: How large is too large for a single campus enrollment? What is the role of a campus president in planning? How can or shall we handle the mass of data that computers are capable of producing? When can we have good normative data concerning costs of student personnel services, ratio of time spent in administering to time spent by faculty in full-time faculty activity, preferences of students for high-rise or low-rise residence halls, a proper mix of classrooms of a variety of sizes for a given set of instructional activities, how to achieve flexibility in curricular or program design to maximize career choice opportunities for students, and so on. Finally, we ask, "What are the alternatives to planning as we have experienced it over the last thirty years?" I fully believe such alternatives exist, and it will be the task of research and analysis to produce them.

Now let me say a few words about one more phase of institution behavior whose handling by academic administrators seems to be very difficult. While I do believe university officials are too ready to label adjustments that are often required by them as crisis points in the university's development, the university does have crisis situations that must be responded to when they emerge. While universities are now experiencing a money crunch, only a few are in my view experiencing a financial crisis. Of course, the best tactic is anticipation and prevention, but that too seldom seems to be understood or feasible.

Universities and colleges do have crisis situations, two of which occurred in the period following World War II. These need only be identified, not described, to be known to you. They were (1) the McCarthy era and accompanying or predetermining activities, such as the California Oath incident, the Feinberg Law, the considerable "firing" of suspect faculty and (2) the student agitation, rebellion, and violence that began with the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964 and involved a number of institutions for the next six or seven years.

Do we have good case studies of administrative and institutional response in either instance? Few, in my opinion. We had a spate of essays, books, and studies telling us as best the authors could why students were in rebellion. But there are few publications about what institutions were doing by way of coping. Some institutions seemed in turmoil during the McCarthy years. Others were without anxiety or at least without overt evidence of anxiety. Why, for example, did the University of Wisconsin in McCarthy's home state seem to be immune to his attacks? It certainly was not that the University of Wisconsin was conservative or that the state of Wisconsin was conservative. Why has not more been done by way of study in this area?

Let me make an observation or two about each of the situations just named. The history of education indicates that student rebellion has been the norm in higher education over the centuries and that rebellion has no dimensions of time or place. Rebellion existed in the medieval university and no developed nation has been immune since then. Student
rebellions in France in 1968 were a significant variable in the change of government in France and the withdrawal of deGaulle from the political arena there. Students of France in 1976 are now striking against educational reform. In 1969 and 1970, students of Japanese higher education were asking if the universities of Japan could survive the violence of students. Frederick Rudolph (1962) has documented the fundamental reform of the American college that was achieved by student activism in the first half of the nineteenth century, reform that was opposed each step of the way, opposed even by that presumed master teacher, President Mark Hopkins of Williams College.

The first things that those who participate in the governance of universities should know is that nowhere and at no time has the university been able to integrate students into the system so that they could achieve reform without rebellion or violence. Given this situation, what should be done? Social psychologists and organizational theorists should be able to give us some clues to achieve optimum solution—i.e., avoidance of rebellion or violence. But when rebellion and violence come, how should they be handled? Should presidents be highly visible, moderately visible, or invisible when students revolt? Should student personnel officers be considered disciplinary officers or interpreters of student activity? To what degree and when is it proper to call upon external police authority? How can channels of communication be kept open to the student activists? What items can be negotiated with students in rebellion; what items, not? To what degree do student rebellions or revolts represent tests of power, resistance to noneducational constraints, frustration with situations that are only tangential to higher education, or to what degree do they represent fundamental value conflicts relevant to the University—philosophical, ethical, disciplinary, or social? The question is not whether there will be a next-time crisis involving student rebellion, but rather can the higher education establishment respond constructively in organizational management, governance, and leadership when it does come?

Mix (1972) has reported on the "time of troubles" at SUNY/Buffalo in the spring of 1970:

During and after the "time of the troubles" in the spring of 1970, when the effects of student-cancelled classes were being measured, when the university was "under siege," the doors to many offices in the buildings involved were not closed. Even after the secretaries had gone home, and long after most faculty had left, the university remained open due in some measure to professional staff. With few of the traditional incentives, such as merit raises, lightened loads, or even a thank you, staff members attempted to communicate, to provide at least watchdog service, to be in contact with students, to man rumor centers, to ensure that perhaps the next day might be possible, to begin the mending process. "The center will not hold" seemed the most appropriate comment, even if unvoiced. Somehow it did hold. From these days a new recognition emerged for many whose primary function in the institution was to provide the milieu in which others could learn, teach, and create (p. 331).

Mix has made not only an interesting but pertinent observation—that it was essentially the professional but nonteaching staff that kept the university open. What else might we learn about institutional responses to times of troubles if we had more case histories?
Brendan Gill in his delightful essays, *Here at the New Yorker* (1975), tells that his first speaking engagement at a university (it happened to be Indiana) “turned out to be a nightmare because the audience was academic. I did not know then what I know now—that college professors like a talk to last at least an hour, with everything being said at least three times” (p. 4).

My talk has been perhaps too long. But I do not want to say it again with a lengthy summary. I do, however, repeat questions I have raised earlier: Whose university is it? Who shall control decision making? Who shall control planning? Can we preserve a value system that has been basic and indigenous to our civilization and culture as embodied in the university against those who would have universities simply respond in short-range perspectives to the marketplace or to short-range calculations of manpower studies, or industrial concepts of efficiency and productivity? We assert that research, sophisticated and disciplinary based, conceptual and theoretical, concerning the nature of universities as institutions is not busy work but is our best defense against the premises of those who would have the university be something that it has never been and never should be. Let us come better to know what we are. We of the university represent a commitment to the worth of the examined life, to the life of the mind, to the primacy of knowledge, and to the ideal of the scholar at work—autonomous, unfettered, uncommitted except to the idea of personal integrity and that which represents the best of the West. Whether we be humanists or artists, social scientists or natural scientists, or professionals who owe our competence to knowledge produced by scholars, we are completely dependent on the university with its value orientations and its integrity, its resources of organization and management, its fiscal support and of leadership. Let us not demean it or abandon its defense; let us understand it in order to protect and preserve it.
REFERENCES


Mix, Marjorie C. "The 'Other Professionals' in University Governance." Educational Record 53 (Fall 1972): 331-36.


REACTION TO "THE FURTHER STUDY"

Kenneth P. Mortimer

When those of us planning this afternoon's program determined there ought to be a reactor to this paper, we were concerned that it might be inappropriate for one Center staff member to publicly critique the thoughts of another—especially on a day where the author is being honored for his many accomplishments. To do anything less than provide a serious commentary would, however, not do justice to the spirit of the values that Lester Anderson has instilled in the Center for the Study of Higher Education—an open discussion of ideas, free expression of intellectual dissent, and the commitment to intellectual honesty.

This introduction sounds like I am about to lower the boom; the truth is quite to the contrary. I like this paper and I hope you will all read it carefully for the lessons that it teaches.

When the Center staff originally asked Dr. Anderson to prepare this lecture, we had in mind an updating of his 1963 paper, "The Organizational Character of American Colleges and Universities." In that paper he contrasted bureaucratic, collegial, and communal models of organization and concluded as follows:

Our assumption continues to be, then, that the prevailing basic organizational pattern of institutions of higher education is bureaucratic. Our analysis has been colored or influenced by this assumption and carries a certain bias, although we have also recognized that colleges and universities may modify their presumed bureaucratic structures so as to become communities (p. 17).

In 1976, Dr. Anderson has chosen to emphasize different things, and appropriately so. The paper to which I am reacting puts a great deal more emphasis on the fundamental conflicts between bureaucracy and scholarship.

It is important to understand that the paper is an intensely personal statement, and those familiar with Lester Anderson will hear him talking as they read. To say it is a personal statement does not mean that it cannot be placed in the context of the current thought on colleges and universities, as I will now attempt to do.

The reader will remember that Lester makes four points about the university as an organization. First, the university is an institution, not simply an organization. Second, it is without dimensions of time and place; and, third, it is a conserving and a conservative institution. Finally, it is a peculiar institution in that it is analytical, disputatious, courageous, and influential.

Others have termed the university an institution, particularly John Millett in his essay, The Academic Community. What do these individuals mean when they say that the university is an institution? What is an institution and how does it differ from an organization? What analogies are appropriate for the study of the university as an institution?
The church is a social institution. It is a group of people who are bound together by a common belief structure. Yet, an organization such as a church has its conflict-filled situations. The popular press of the last 10 years is full of the dissent among Catholics over the doctrinal matters of birth control, abortion, and celibacy for the priesthood.

The Sunday *New York Times* magazine recently ran a story entitled "The Politics of the Selection of the Pope." It raises such questions as Why is the pope always an Italian? What interests are represented in the composition of the College of Cardinals, the electing body? In other words, to say that the church is an institution would not exclude it from serious scholarly analysis from a political point of view.

The family is a social institution bound together by legal and/or blood lines. Are there analogies in the family as a social institution which might apply to the university? Howard Bowen, in his remarks at the American Association of Higher Education meeting in March of 1976 developed the analogy of the university as a family in at least a cursory way.

Perhaps the best line one hears about the family is that of the poet Robert Frost, "Home is the place where when you have to go there they have to take you in." Is such an analogy appropriate to the university?

A bank is a fiduciary institution and can hold assets of the states in trust. The concept of a fiduciary is one that receives considerable application to boards of trustees. The concept certainly has implications for the future role of boards of trustees in light of their criticism of late as being conduits for public pressure rather than as buffers for institutional freedom.

In fact there are other institutions to which universities might be compared such as hospitals, schools, and prisons that require a more in-depth analysis than I am prepared for here.

The major point then, is that society sponsors many institutions and that it would be helpful to know what these institutions are and how they are different from organizations. The basic point, however, is that this paper is an attempt to challenge the way we think about and conceptualize higher education. I have found in my experiences with Lester Anderson that this thinking and probing of new ideas is a characteristic of him. I am reminded of the quote by Justice Black in referring to Robert Hutchins and I think this paper illustrates it as it would apply to Lester Anderson.

When I first heard about him he was making people think. When I next heard of him he was making people think. Tonight you heard him and he has made you think. What greater service can a man perform in a world that depends more than anything else on what people think—far more, in my judgment than on what people do (quoted by Frank L. Keegan, "It's Time to Reread Robert M. Hutchins," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 26, 1976, p. 40")?

The second point about this paper relates to the first and that is that it makes us examine where we might be historically in the evolution of higher education and where universities as organizations are at this time. I personally tend to get overwhelmed by the
immediacy of the problems with which I deal or read about and so do many administrators, in my experience. Lester Anderson and a few other scholars are telling us that universities went through some of these things in the very recent past.

For example, John Corson reviews a book by David Henry, former president of the University of Illinois in a recent edition of the Chronicle (John J. Corson, "A Review of From Depression to No Growth," Chronicle of Higher Education, April 26, 1976, p. 21). Henry's book, From Depression to No Growth, makes certain highly relevant points about college and university experiences in the 1930's. During this decade colleges and universities experienced the following:

1. Retrenchment in expenditures
2. Pressure for institutional cooperation and statewide coordination
3. A prevailing uncertainty about the future
4. Faculty-administrative disharmony, which spurred the growth of the American Association of University Professors during the 1930's.

Corson quotes Henry as follows, "Adjustment to the social environment (when the environment was favorable, repressive, or distressing) has been a prevailing characteristic of higher education institutions from the beginning."

Lester Anderson had graphically pointed that out to us in this paper, and he is one of the few people on the scene today who continue to put these matters in some historical perspective.

Finally, I have little quarrel for the problems Lester would have us study, although I am overwhelmed by the practical problems presented in some of them. He urges, for example, more historical studies tracing the motivations of administrators as they operate in the decision-making environment. This gives me an opportunity to tell of a personal exchange I had with Lester in 1970.

At that time The Pennsylvania State University was about to receive a new president, John W. Oswald, and I proposed to Lester that we study the transition of power between presidents. Lester's response to me was encouraging, yet discouraging. He simply told me that as an assistant professor my career was not that promising. In short, it would be very difficult to study the motivations for presidential decision making in times of the transition of power.

I would urge greater attention in future studies to what I see as a basic question of this paper: "Whose university is it?" Does it belong to anybody? Does the church belong to anybody? What is its fundamental place in society?
THE UNIVERSITY AND ENDURING VALUES

G. Lester Anderson

Values and Beliefs Inherent in the Forms, Functions and Structures of the University

The University is an institution that transcends national boundaries or time dimensions. It exists in its own right as a fundamental construct in the system of beliefs, traditions, myths, sagas, governments, churches, and other social institutions and structures that we call "western civilization." The fundamental bases of this institution are derived directly from the Greek philosophers, notably Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These bases which constitute a belief and value system are:

1. The "examined life" is a desirable human achievement. This implies that one's belief systems, value systems, judgments and appreciations be tested by human reason if one examines the assumptions, presuppositions, and behavioral consequences undergirding them. The Socratic dialogue has become a stable and persistent model by which this is accomplished and Socrates and teacher can be equated. The Socratic method of teaching is still highly regarded in university education.

2. Plato gave meaning and justification to the "life of the mind." The university institutionalizes this value. Universities are the abode of scholars; scholars find their support and nurturance in the university. The scholar as he devotes himself "to the life of the mind" carries a fundamental value system of the culture.

3. The process and product of the "life of the mind" have consequences that require a structure in the university. In the university we find the disciplines (departments) that are derived from Aristotle's organization of knowledge. The disciplines become the building blocks of the university. They have been the pivotal and stable unit since the organization of universities in the middle ages. The commitment of a scholar is to his discipline, i.e., it becomes his vocation and is preeminent in the scholar's value system.

The scholar, committed to a discipline, is also committed to a set of beliefs and activities that give meaning to his vocation and hence are values. A discipline is first of all a methodology. The scholar "thinks like" a scientist, a biologist, a historian, or a literary critic, and shares certain attributes with his colleagues.

1. The scholar uses his methodology to express the reality of a segment of the universe of constructs, entities, processes, etc. To state a theory that expresses an item of reality and is noticed by his peers is the scholar's highest and most rewarding achievement. This is a goal of preeminent value to the scholar.

2. Since the "reality" expressed by a scholar may sometimes be in conflict with conventional wisdom and hence threatening to persons of the body politic, the scholar seeks protection to state reality as he sees it and in terms acceptable to his peers. This protection is known as "academic freedom," a value also of preeminent concern to the university and its faculty.
3. The scholar works autonomously except as he subjects his processes and findings to the judgment of his peers. He resists attempts of governmental or university authorities to determine his mode of work or his goals. He is even less sympathetic to informal interferences, e.g., from churches or social organizations. All in all, the scholar cherishes autonomy, and the university should concur in his wish.

The values surrounding the autonomous scholar seeking the nature of reality cause him to value other traditional characteristics of the university.

1. The scholar accepts the judgment of his peers concerning his work and accepts only peer judgment. Only peers, in the scholar's judgment, can validate or invalidate his work.

2. The scholar would like to view the university as a sanctuary. The medieval university claimed and often held this status. The contemporary university still prizes and retains a few of the attributes related to sanctuary. The concept protects the university scholar from the intrusions of those who would limit his freedom.

3. A third consequence of the scholar's value system and a value in itself is his participation in the decision-making processes of the university. The scholar wishes to influence the goals of the university, the admission of students, the standards for degrees, the programs offered, and appointments, promotions, and tenure of colleagues. The university is valued as a consensual institution.

4. A final value stemming from concepts of freedom and autonomy is a tolerance of diversity. Faculties are relatively homogeneous regarding the values discussed in this statement. But beyond these value commitments there is significant diversity. This diversity is inherent in the diversity of the disciplines and their uses and as an expression of freedom and autonomy. Consequently, a university and its faculty tolerate diversity of behaviors, attitudes, life styles, and commitments.

In modern times and to a rather spectacular degree in the United States, two values not heretofore of seemingly great significance have emerged.

1. The American body politic has a preeminent commitment to education. It requires literacy of its citizens and expects completion of the secondary school for all its children. It extends the opportunity for higher education to all who seek it. The history of American higher education through the last 125 years is that of a continuous expansion of opportunity and offering of higher education to previously excluded groups: women, sons and daughters of farmers and the working classes, blacks, immigrants and their children, Native Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans. The university now values higher education for heretofore ignored or neglected groups.

2. The value of education for an elite has been understood since the middle ages. Slowly over time the significance of the utility of knowledge itself has emerged. Today the university values knowledge to an exceedingly high degree for its...
utility and exploits this use. The genius of the land-grant university in creating a science of agriculture is the most spectacular manifestation of this value; the location of professional schools in a university is another.

The value system of the university has endured even as it has grown in scope and substance. Both endurance and growth are sustained by the faithful but ingenious interpretations given by the truest scholars of each succeeding age.
THE COLLEGE AND VALUES OF ADAPTATION

William Toombs

If the world of higher learning finds endurance in the values, forms, and structures of the university, then its capacity for change resides with the college. Differences between the two are rooted in several strands of history not fully visible in the American experience. Current issues, particularly those touching the value structure, emphasize these distinctions. These comments review historical characteristics very briefly, then turn to the questions that grow out of them.

The University is a corporate form. It was created by society in the High Middle Ages of the Thirteenth Century to recognize by charter and endorse by protection the values of scholarly inquiry. Actually, informal gatherings of masters and scholars, the studium, antedated that occasion and came in response to a series of “knowledge explosions.” One of the first explosions was the rediscovery of formal logic as a means of analyzing, enriching, and interpreting traditional theological texts. The great trade revivals called up a need for rhetoric to support international communication and the universities responded. Trade opened a flood of intellectual discovery by bringing in Arabic and Oriental thought. The humanism of the Renaissance led onward to rationalism and, eventually, the flowering of science. In all this, the university holds a preeminent position.

The worth of organized scholarship in meeting such fundamental cultural challenges was recognized first by emperors and popes who issued charters, then by kings, electors, and archbishops who created new universities in some profusion. The practical effect of royal and papal recognition was the right of licensure, protection from other estates of the realm, and international acceptance. As an approved institution, the university was able to refine a value structure upon which it could stand four square and construct the edifice of modern knowledge.

These values all related to the acquisition, examination, verification, and organization of knowledge. They are wholly epistemological with only minor infusions of moral, esthetic, or pragmatic values. Such a value structure includes:

1. **Freedom of inquiry**: Variousy formulated as Lernfreiheit, Wertfreiheit, or academic freedom, it maintains the independence of knowledge from state, church, and economic interests. It was and is a hard won right.

2. **High value of intellect** has been incorporated into general expression by terms like “cognitive rationality” of Talcott Parsons, “objective analysis” of James S. Ackerman.

3. **Acceptable systems of proof**: Methodological and technical procedures to sustain lines of argument are selective and heavily weighted toward quantitative and statistical methods.

4. **The Democracy of the Disciplines** acknowledges the worth of each and the superiority of none.
Open exchange of findings and procedures is not only a right but an obligation. The scholarly community advances itself most effectively when complete diffusion of results occurs. This is Polanyi's "Republic of Scholars."

The university is chartered by society but, in the words of Pasquier "built of men" (batie en hommes). These scholars are instruments of inquiry, cultivated minds at work in a network of values which links them in a grand design. But these knowledge-related values rest on a set of more fundamental beliefs about man, society, progress, emotions, mind, and spirit. In America, the college has traditionally provided this groundwork.

The college, on the other hand, is an associational form created and recreated by scholars themselves. Unlike the university, the college has no linear history. It has had many forms at many times and places, always with its own importance, e.g., several examples make this clear. In Bologna, faculty created a college to protect their interests against the students and the town. At the University of Paris, the college became the agency of special dedication for the followers of Robert de Sorbon and others as well. His college alone survived Napoleonic reorganization. At Oxford, the specialized college came a century and a half after the founding with New College whose charter noted "special aims in connexion with studies." Often they were foundations made to provide lodging for poor and books for indigent scholars. But what developed in the residential setting at Oxford and Cambridge took on a meaning of its own. The university gave formal instruction, "ordinary" learning, while the college gave "extraordinary," instruction: interpretation, elaboration, and speculation. The university emphasized general learning while the colleges concentrated in particular disciplines. It was in England that the college came to dominate the day-to-day functions of the university. America transported the collegiate form to New England when that dominance was at its peak. Thus, the full university idea came late to America and the college came without its true flexibility.

The Collegiate Values: Along with the Seventeenth Century English college came a set of values that were first those of a gentleman and only secondarily those of a scholar. The standards of a country gentleman adapted easily to a new industrial elite and to an aspiring middle class.

The Nineteenth Century concept of a Classical 'liberal' education projected the image of the educated amateur: his wits were sharpened by intellectual contact with Antiquity and thus he became capable of turning his mind to any task suited to his social status. (Donald Coleman, "Gentlemen and Players," Listener, 13 December, 1973)

He was, of course, socialized to a set of values that included "duty," "fair play," tolerance, the natural entitlements of the elite, the justice of gentlemen, and the religion of tradition. These values formed the foundation for professional education and traveled to bench and bar, clinic and church, lecture hall and legislature to give a certain lopsided unity to society. Until the mid-point of the present century the value structure of collegiate study, apart from sciences, was largely an introduction to a code of elite conduct and it formed a foundation for professional education.

The rise of science and undergraduate professional training in business, education, and teaching had eroded these collegiate values by 1950. The events of the next two decades, particularly the sixties, shattered them completely. Those recent events, with all
their irrationality and violence, portray a crisis of values. It is a collegiate crisis rather than a university crisis, as Clark Kerr and David Reisman have noted, even though the whole institution was shaken.

Today the college has become a place of engagement, of liberation, and of individual development. While the university stands solidly on its traditional values, the college which provided the underpinning is a locus for profound questions.

Some of the questions are new:
Can there be relevance as well as permanence?
In a pluralistic society, what can replace tolerance?
How does one achieve humaneness rather than humanism?
Can individualism be reconciled with interdependence?

Some of them are very old:
Can virtue be taught?
In what sense are values permanent: in what sense are they temporary, even existential?
Are values preeminent over knowledge? Should values guide the search for knowledge?
Are values implicit in knowledge and the ways of knowing?
Are values to be applied a priori or ex post facto to facts?
Are valuations made individually or collectively?

In summary, this historical vignette is intended to point out that the urgent issues in higher learning today focus on values, not the knowledge-related values of the university but the fundamental values of life perspective. Traditionally, these have been treated in the college, but the elite basis has become obsolete. This has created a collegiate crisis and a vacuum in values for those who come to advanced or professional studies.

How are the issues to be joined? Several approaches occur to me.

(1) The full import of value-laden questions can be examined as they come up within professional education. For example, today these are at the forefront:

How should human subjects be treated in experimental settings?
At what point does life begin? When does death terminate it? What rights do the unborn and the dying have?
Should research with a high potential for destruction be curtailed?
What is "secret knowledge"?

Immediately, one senses these are intricate questions that could take huge blocks of time and discussion in a professional program.

(2) Value questions can be set aside, left to individuals and to extra-academic professional groups. This might leave the university free to do what it does most efficiently — forefront research and discipline-based instruction. In some ways we are already close to this solution by default rather than design.
(3) The college, our flexible organizational form, can be reconstructed to provide a suitable foundation of values for advanced university study. At first glance this may appear a most unlikely alternative. Colleges are asked to meet so many demands from career education to open admissions that one more seems impossible. Already many experimental curricula in the independent colleges have lost touch with the university. In some cases they have deliberately ignored it. As a result, there is room for a collegiate modification set within the university but devoted to the exploration of values as a preliminary to full preparation in a discipline or profession.

There is nothing new to the general idea of a New University College. There is, however, a marked lack of the attention and analysis from the mature scholars that is precisely what will be needed to create it. The balance required in such an undergraduate institution is a delicate one: Even the Western tradition alone may not provide enough scope. Actual experience as well as contemplation and discussion may be required. Values must be:

- challenged but not destroyed,
- examined but not ridiculed,
- refined but not confused,
- extended but not inflated,
- made relative but not dissolved,
- learned/studied but not imposed.

Summary

University and college are fundamentally different forms. The English college which came to America carried a particular value set in an organizational framework that was rather rigid. Both the values and the organizational form have been destroyed by American events since 1950. This leaves a vacuum in the preparation of new scholars which will ultimately present urgent problems to advanced and professional programs. The alternatives open to an alert university faculty include (1) full examination of issues in the professional setting, (2) leaving questions to other agencies, (3) establishing a new kind of college.
DOES THE DIFFERENCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
(Contrasting K-12 and Colleges and Universities)

G. Lester Anderson

Why study higher education as such? Is there any real justification for a Center for the Study of Higher Education? Why don’t we just study education? These are legitimate questions and there is no complete agreement about the appropriate answers.

I have concluded that the differences between the elementary and secondary schools and the colleges and universities are significant. Knowledge of one does not give one any special insight into the other. We who have worked in the schools and have educated teachers for them are sometimes shocked at the opinions and views expressed about elementary and high schools by our college and university colleagues, views which we believe stem from ignorance. In turn, the scholar in the college or university often rightly feels misunderstood by the public school teachers, administrators, and the students they send to the colleges and universities. The worlds of K-12 and the college and university are two different worlds. Let me tell you some of the ways in which I believe they differ.

I believe the philosophical bases for each are different. There is no question that the schools (I shall use this word for the K-12 group) rest on a pragmatic or instrumental philosophy. Dewey is the patron philosopher. Colleges and universities, on the other hand, are pluralistic in their philosophies, sometimes eclectic, with pragmatism frequently missing. Classical humanism is historically a fundamental base for higher education particularly that which we call liberal education. The disciplines are essentially value free in a moral or ethical sense. They exist in their own right, and while the knowledge they represent and create may be useful, it is not their justification for being. In this sense the disciplines are neither pragmatic nor instrumental. The disciplines find their origin in an Aristotelian organization of knowledge.

I believe the basic roles of the schools and colleges and universities in the social structure are markedly different. The fundamental and really sole purpose of the schools is to teach or instruct, and then almost entirely to the population age five through eighteen. The schools teach to bring about the basic goals of literacy (managing word symbolism in speaking, reading and writing, and quantitative symbolism in arithmetic), the normal functioning of citizenship, social interaction, and the personal maintenance of health and general well being. Vocational education explicitly as such is at best a modest goal of the schools.

The fundamental purpose of colleges and universities is much broader; it is to be a knowledge and culture carrier or conserver and transmitter, a knowledge producer, discoverer or creator. The greatest triumph of a university scholar comes when he creates a theory that his peers take seriously. Colleges and universities are the instrumentality

---

1It is sometimes held that while Community Colleges are part of higher education they are really an extension of the K-12 systems. This point has much validity. We do not, however, believe it sufficiently relevant to our views to invalidate them and will not discuss the matter here.
through which those committed to the “life of the mind” may work. They are also instrumentalities through which “knowledge” is transmitted, and often ultimately in terms of professional service to mankind. Teaching, while of fundamental significance, is derivative of the fact the university qua university is the social institution in Western culture that maintains and renews that culture. As such, in its teaching role, the university instructs in normative terms the eighteen to twenty-three age group; in reality it is pervasive at all age levels. Vocational education (and vocation is a concept of historic and contemporary educational and cultural legitimacy) is of major significance as the colleges and universities prepare, train, and educate perhaps the upper third of the population in terms of learning capacity and motivation to professional service and to social and civic responsibility. Colleges and universities are in reality our sole source for physicians, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, attorneys, architects, teachers, accountants, and social workers, most of our lawyers, and a high proportion of nurses, among other professional groups. In a different way they contribute fundamentally to the quality of the work performed by business executives, journalists, writers, leaders in government, upper echelon civil servants, the managerial classes and others. These persons are our great utilizers of the knowledge generated by universities, primarily by the disciplinarians. The disciplinary elites (largely Ph.D.s) form a special class, e.g., economists, physicists, geologists, linguists, psychologists, historians, philosophers (cited only as modestly representational groups) as they work largely in universities but by no means entirely in them, to discover and to interpret the nature of reality to others.

I believe the organizational structure of colleges and universities is fundamentally different from the schools. K-12 systems, with modest exceptions across the nation, are very similar. They are public institutions. They are organized through school districts (local government units). Historically, they have had substantial local financial support, although there are variations on this and further change is imminent. The private sector, while substantial, is really tangential. The service (teaching students) is organized on the basis of neighborhoods, each with its school. Busing interferes with this pattern and has become an “excuse” for opposing busing. Only special education (e.g., for the handicapped or in vocational subjects) is non-neighborhood oriented. The teaching module is the class—in elementary grades of 25-35 pupils, coeducational and homogeneous in chronological age, interacting with (studying) a subject in time units of 20-35 minutes. One teacher for all “basic” subjects over the period of a six-hour instructional day is the norm. At the high school level the time module is 40-50 minutes and teachers are specialized; otherwise, the routines are much the same. Schools are monolithically organized both at the district level and on a statewide basis. The autonomy of units, such as departments in the university enjoy, is unknown in the schools.

Colleges and universities are divided into two basic groups, private and public, in terms of financing and control. The public control of four-year colleges and universities is not exercised by local governments (except in New York City which is actually a city-state). In large measure, they are not place bound as are the schools. Historically, the private sector has been the more powerful and deemed to be of greater quality, although the balance is being redressed. Only recently has the public sector taught significantly larger numbers of students. Financing is through tuition, philanthropical gifts, state appropriations, and, in recent decades, by federal appropriations for special categories of research, teaching, and service.
The internal organization of the university is markedly different from that of schools. Departments, as noted above, enjoy considerable autonomy and are basic organizational units of colleges and universities. Many of the fundamental decisions regarding college and university operations are made there, e.g., decisions of appointment and promotion of faculty, curriculum and program control, and budget control. This organization is in marked contrast to that of schools. There is no particular size module for instruction in colleges and universities. At advanced levels, the relationship of teacher to student in a learning and socializing experience is often one to one.

Service components of the university are highly organized and represent resources of almost unlimited variety—science laboratories, hospitals, farms, observatories, libraries, ocean going vessels, and so on. These resources are used for the advancement of knowledge as much or more than for instruction. Schools have only limited need for such support systems. As an aspect of financing these service agencies, colleges and universities manage great sums of money and need an apparatus to do so. The complex management of these support systems contrasted with the autonomy of instructional and research units, creates an internal conflict of a completely different order from that experienced in schools.

Finally, the decision making mechanisms, loci of influence, authority, and power, i.e., elements of control, are markedly different. The schools are bureaucratic institutions, almost entirely hierarchical in structure, with authority concentrated in the highest echelons; the only significant threat to this organization of authority and power in the schools lies in the authority and power of recently emerging teachers' unions. Public school teachers play only a limited and modest role in decision making. While large elements of the support sector of colleges, and particularly of the universities, are organized bureaucratically, great power and authority lie in the faculty; decision making in the instructional and research sector is highly individualistic, collegial, consensual, and often idiosyncratic. Universities were recently called “organized anarchies” by a group of organizational theorists; others have spoken of them as “happy anarchies!”

Our discussion would lead us to believe the following: To understand elementary and secondary education does not signify that one will understand higher education. The reverse is also true. Rather, to understand only elementary and secondary education is to be deceived as one attempt to understand higher education. The reverse is also true. Each element is sufficiently distinctive that to understand each, each must be studied as well as experienced.

If these beliefs are true, then to study higher education in its own right has validity. In a more fundamental sense, higher education needs and warrants careful study, as in this century it has become pervasive, exceedingly complex, and immensely costly. Society now demands that colleges and universities be responsible and accountable. But the responsibility and accounting can only be rendered and understood as the goals, the structures, and the governance mechanisms of colleges and universities are also understood.
THE UNIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZATION:
HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM A BUSINESS?

Donald C. Hambrick

I. Introduction

There currently exists a controversy of some pitch about the extent to which an institution of higher education can be governed, or managed, like a business. The current fiscal throes of both higher education and the public coffers supporting higher education prompt interested parties to suggest the need for heightened efficiency, rationalization, and sleek decision-making processes in our colleges and universities. On the other hand, many argue that the unique features of institutions of higher education make them inappropriate settings for the concept of organization and decision making that are applied in the profit sector.

The fact of the matter is that there are some important similarities and differences between businesses and higher educational organizations which are important to understand before accepting or rejecting business concepts in academia. Both institutions are complex organizations and share characteristics by merely being members of that class. Their traditions, their members, their clients, their goals, etc., do differ greatly, however. Identification and analysis of these differences will be the main focus of this paper.

It is important to point out that the paper will focus on the underlying differences between business and higher education institutions. It will not examine the implications of these differences for organizational design or decision making. It is felt that these two steps of understanding—analysis of differences and implications of differences—warrant full, separate treatment and cannot both be done justice in this paper.

The notion of establishing a clean distinction between institutions of higher education and businesses is troublesome. Neither categorization is very homogeneous. There are research-oriented universities, liberal arts colleges, professional schools, community colleges, and so on. There are manufacturing businesses, service businesses, research businesses, all profit-oriented. It can likely be said that there are some institutions of higher education that have more qualities of a classic “business” than some businesses do. Which more closely fits the model of an institution of higher education that we will be describing in this paper, a community college or a management consulting firm? The cleavage is murky. In his classic article on professional employees and professional organizations, Peter Drucker highlighted the unique features existing in any organization—business or non-business—in which the “producers” are professionals. With an awareness of the overlapping spectra of organizational characteristics, this paper will proceed to treat universities and businesses as distinct, disparate organizational categories.

Clark Kerr sees an important distinction between universities and businesses, saying:

By understanding such unique characteristics of universities as organizations, one can see why the merits of often-heard proposals that universities should adopt the practices and procedures characteristic of
institutions that existed in an earlier time, in other lands and for other missions, are open to question. While some of the strategies and methods of business might be employed by universities with some benefit, the two enterprises respond to different motivations and reward systems. There is no reliable model for university organization that surpasses the model set by the best universities themselves. Universities are clearly a genus apart.  

While this entire paper will deal with the differences between universities and businesses, perhaps an early overview of one scholar’s assessment of the differences will help set the stage. John Corson lists the basic differences between a university and a business or government agency:

1. The university’s goals are not clearly defined and are comprehensive in nature.
2. The product or service that the university produces is less tangible.
3. The customers, that is, the students or their prospective employers, exercise limited influence.
4. The faculty is made up of individuals who are highly specialized.
5. Like professionals in other enterprises, faculty expect the right of self-direction.
6. The right to participate in the making of decisions is diffused among a greater proportion of the participants in the enterprise than is typical of other forms of organization.

These differences, and others, will be discussed in this paper. First, however, there must be some treatment of the question, “Are there important similarities between universities and businesses?”

II. Similarities Between Businesses and Universities

While for Kerr the university is a “genus apart,” it must be said that the university does meet the sociologists’ definition of a complex organization. Roughly, that is a collection of people who work toward a (challenging) goal with limited resources. Anderson writes, “It seems self-evident that colleges and universities fit a general class of organizations, that the members (trustees, administrators, faculty, students, etc.) of colleges and universities are ‘organized’ to accomplish a purpose (or purposes), that the interrelationships of the members are ordered by a system of authority and rewards, that decisions are made by administrators, and that the behavior of the members is lawful though variable, and hence predictable. Consequently, general principles regarding organizations should have relevance to the organization of colleges and universities.”

Etzioni’s framework for defining “organization” would lead to inclusion of both businesses and universities in the category: “... divisions of labor; ... presence of one or more power centers; ... substitution of personnel ...”

Can it be said additionally that both businesses and universities share membership in that subcategory of organizations, bureaucracies? Anderson would say yes. Weber’s
enumeration of the characteristics of bureaucracies is well known. Selznick's summary of those features is that a bureaucratic organization "is the structural expression of a rational action," a "mobilization of technical and management skills," a "pattern of coordination," a "systematic ordering of positions and duties," and "the administrative integration of specialized functions." 7

There is little argument that businesses and government agencies are typically bureaucracies. Stephen Bailey, assessing the similarities between universities and government agencies, sheds light on the parallels between all bureaucracies:

Both types of organizations are constrained to formulate and supervise budgets; both are faced with the necessity of hiring, sustaining, firing, and retiring personnel; both must worry about organizational design and about the management of space and facilities; both are induced by events, leadership, or external threats to indulge in spurts of planning; both must pay lip-service, and sometimes more, to the monitoring of performance.

As administration phases imperceptibly into politics, both kinds of institutions must build consent among those upon whom they depend for financial support; they must compete for scarce resources with other organizations and purposes; they must devote considerable time and attention to rule making (standard setting) and adjudicating; they must make bargains, manage conflict, coopt talent, and develop systems of internal and external accountability. 8

Some activities within universities are more bureaucratically-oriented than others. The management of residence halls, sports activities, buildings and grounds maintenance, libraries, etc., is especially "organized." The academic activities in the institution tend not to be as rationalized as these support functions, but the conclusion must be drawn that the university, as it has developed and presently exists in the United States, is, along with most business organizations, a member of the sociologically-defined groupings, "organizations" and "bureaucracies."

III. A Difference: Tradition

The traditions of American businesses and universities are very different. Because of the deep-rooted nature of traditions, they are included here as factors "underlying" the organizational arrangements of the institutions. That is, despite their being organizational arrangements themselves, traditions are significant constraints in the creation of further organizational arrangements.

There are many traditions in the academic or business sector which could be discussed; however we will focus on three traditional forces in the academic sector and compare them to corresponding forces in the business sector. First, the concept of the "collegium," while no longer pursued in its purest form, is a long-enduring, pervasive base for governance in universities. In its purest form, the collegium—all scholars of the institution—make collective decisions on all matters of educational moment. They elect, to a limited term, one of their own to administer their policies. In its evolved form, the
collegium is not the formal *body politic* the pure form would suggest. Yet, the faculties of universities possess considerable authority. Commenting on this evolved collegium, Anderson writes,

> While faculty authority is frequently indeterminate, and its exact nature is often unclear—i.e., whether it is absolute or conditional, advisory or determinative—the reality of this authority is a fact of college and university organization. Faculty authority is normally exercised through groups rather than through a single person. Faculties operate through committees, “standing” and *ad hoc*, appointed and elected. They frequently operate through representative bodies called academic senates. These committees and senates operate not only legislatively, formulating policy, but administratively.⁹

Duryea gives specific evidence of the tradition of faculty dominance, saying, “by 1910 professors were not hesitant to refer to their ‘rightfully sovereign power.’” President Harper of Chicago formally stated in his decennial report that it was a “firmly established policy of the Trustees that the responsibility for the settlement of educational questions rests with the Faculties.”¹⁰

So exists a tradition in universities.

There is no corresponding tradition in business. Despite the recent stylishness of “participative management,” it must be said that the administrative model of the American business sector coincides with the classic bureaucratic model: top-down authority, or a clear definition of superior-subordinate relationships. Professional administrators make the decisions, of course based on information, assistance, indeed, *influence* from others under their direction. This tradition of administrative authority, which has as its base a tradition of *owner authority*, is fairly at odds with the tradition of the collegium.

The second realm of university tradition to be discussed is academic freedom and tenure. Perhaps these are separate phenomena, but because of their linked nature, they will be discussed together.

Corson defines academic freedom as “the guarantee to the teacher of the freedom of expression (to interpret in his teaching the knowledge accumulated as he sees it) and to the researcher the freedom of inquiry (the right to pursue his research wherever it may lead him).”¹¹ In business, on the other hand, the commitment to efficiency, through coordination, precludes workers from “doing their own thing.” Simon discussed coordination and gives an example of why workers cannot go their own ways:

> Coordination is aimed at the adoption by all the members of the group of the same decision, or more precisely on mutually consistent decisions in combination attaining the established goal.

> Suppose ten persons decide to cooperate in building a boat. If each has his own plan, and they don’t bother to communicate their plans, it is doubtful that the resulting craft will be very seaworthy.¹²

In a university, the individual’s work on a unique, revolutionary boat design, theory, or way of thinking would be acceptable, even generally welcome.
Tenure is intended to insure academic freedom. It allows that no scholar be removed from the university for a reason other than financial exigency of the school or moral turpitude of the individual. Tenure is an important tradition in American higher education. No corresponding tradition exists in the business sector. If a worker speaks out against the corporation or has a personality clash with co-workers or supervisor, that worker—even with a strong union behind him—can readily be fired. Thus, we identify another gap of tradition between the university and the business.

The third tradition in the university to be discussed is the pursuit of minute specializations by teacher-scholars. This contrasts with a generally broader exposure to tasks, goals, and workings of the organization among business employees.

The diversity of the university’s purposes and the pace of knowledge accumulation result in the existence of numerous micro-disciplines, each working toward its own goals. As millett writes: “The scope of knowledge is so great that expertise can be realized only in one field or indeed one sub-field.”

The high level of specialization relates to the discussion of academic freedom. For, in reality, the individual scholar may be the only person in the institution who can understand his research. As Corson writes:

Moreover, as knowledge has accumulated, the individual teacher or researcher has gained an additional dimension of freedom. This freedom flows from the possession of so specialized an understanding of a particular field of knowledge as to make impracticable or impossible the direction or control of his activities by others. A further consequence of this high degree of specialization is of prime organizational significance: much of what the individual does in his teaching and his research is unrelated to what his fellow members in the organization do.

How does this differ from the amount and nature of specialization in the business sector? First, despite the micro-tasks of many business workers, especially assembly line workers, it is the case that there are other people in the organization who understand and have even performed the task themselves. The shift foreman usually starts “on the line” and, therefore, has an adequate understanding of the nature of the assembler’s performance.

Second, job rotation and cross-functional mobility, especially among middle managers, is a widely used, well-documented way to broaden organizational perspectives and nurture managerial development toward the broadest of organizational goals in businesses.

The traditions of higher education, then, are very different from those of business. The concept of the collegium, or faculty dominance, the concepts of academic freedom and tenure, and the minute specializations of academic “producers” have no parallels in the business world. The implications of these differences for administration of universities is considerable.

IV. A Difference: Goals

No aspect of an organization’s strategy, structure, or operating policies can be intelligently discussed or rationalized without a firm understanding and analysis of the unit’s
goals. Lack of this understanding is perhaps the most common pitfall in discussions of administrative parallels across institutional types, especially across businesses and universities. As this section of the paper will portray, the number, precision, and measurability of goals in universities are very different from those in business.

In business, one goal is dominant—profit or, more precisely, maximization of the earnings stream accruing to the owners of the enterprise. Two clarifiers of this single-goal dominance must be expressed. First, many subgoals contribute to the primary goal of earnings maximization. These subgoals, such as market share, employee morale, and so on, are important, yet contributory to the primary goal.

A second clarifier is that there is some public controversy about whether profit should be subordinate to, or on a par with, other goals such as worker enrichment, customer service, and environmental well-being. The system of enterprise that exists in America, however, encourages achievement of these goals because such achievement affects the dominant goal, profit.

Peter Drucker alludes to a useful distinction between short-term profits and longer-term maximization of earnings streams:

To emphasize only profit, for instance, misdirects managers to the point where they may endanger the survival of the business. To obtain profit today they tend to undermine the future. They may push the most easily saleable product lines and slight those that are the market of tomorrow. They tend to short-change research, promotion, and the other postponable investments.16

This is not a castigation of profit as a primary goal. It is a castigation of short-run profit.

Drucker attempts to negate long-run profit as the dominant business goal by identifying a set of important goals. In commenting on why these goals are important, he unwittingly points to their impact on profit:

There are eight areas in which objectives of performance and results have to be set:

market standing; innovation; productivity; physical and financial resources; profitability; manager performance and development; worker performance and attitude; and public responsibility.

There should be little dispute over the first five objectives. But there will be real protest against the inclusion of the intangibles... To neglect them is to risk not only business incompetence but labor trouble or at least loss of worker productivity, and public restrictions on business provoked by irresponsible business conduct...16

In any organization, a hierarchy of objectives exists. In business, long-term profitability is at the top. The goal is generally quite measurable, expressed as the discounted rate of return on stockholders' investment. Besse comments on the precision of business goals, saying, "In a business corporation there is always one quantifiable measure of performance, variously stated as the rate of earnings on the capital invested, the percentage of profit per dollar
of sales, or the earnings per share of stock outstanding." A university, on the other hand, has multiple goals at the top of its hierarchy of goals; the goals are generally only vaguely articulated; and, they are difficult to measure.

Multiplicity of Goals

Teaching, research, and service are commonly expressed coequal goals of a university. Which is most important? Does achievement of any one deter achievement of the other two? What does "teaching" mean? These are examples of the confusion surrounding selection and pursuit of university goals.

The multiplicity of university goals negates any opportunity for singularity of purpose. But, the question that is even broader than the question of goals is the question, "For whom does the university exist?" Besse poses the question well:

What group in the university corresponds to the shareowners, that ultimate source of all corporate control and prime beneficiary of its success? The alumni? The students? The faculty and administration? The public? The sponsoring church? The legislature that allots funds? The governor who appoints trustees? Some combination of these? Or, in some cases, no one?

With the numerous distinct constituencies impacting a university, it is understandable that its goals are multiple and diffuse.

Goal Disagreement

It is not enough that a university must work toward multiple goals. It must work toward them amidst internal disagreement over the importance of the various goals. Is teaching more important than research? Is currency, through research, important to good teaching? Is there a place for applied research? These are examples of the questions eternally posed in the university. They are fundamental questions, and they are rarely answered in harmony.

Corson sheds some light on the reasons for goal disagreement:

The task of gaining consensus on what an institution shall be and how it should carry on its work is made difficult by this broad range of activities, by the various interests of many specialists, by the relative independence of many of the activities that are carried on, and by the inherent nature of many teachers.

Lines of disagreement are drawn on the basis of faculty, age, faculty specialization, administration vs. faculty, students vs. administration, and so on, through countless permutations.

Goal Vagueness

If a business has a precise goal in its quest for long term earnings, a university has goals which, even if they could be agreed upon, would, of necessity, be vaguely articulated.
What is "service to youth," "development of questioning citizens," "advancement of knowledge," or "professional development'? These are commonly expressed university purposes. And what do they say? Both everything and nothing.

It can be argued that university goals must be vague by necessity. Corson makes such an argument, stating,

Students of administration have long contended that a clear guiding purpose is an essential to the effective administration of any human enterprise. But enterprise concerned with the universality of knowledge and dedicated to the encouragement of inquiry wherever it may lead exists in an environment in which the precise definition of purpose is impossible.20

The nature of the university is gelatinous. Its factions are several and diffuse. It is understandable that its goals must be expressed as tones and themes, rather than as precise targets.

Problems of Measurement

We have already commented on the relative measurability of goal achievement in business. And, we have set the stage for a discussion of the lack of such responsibility in the university. For, with multiple, disagreed-upon, vague goals, how can measurement be achieved? How can the university's teaching goal be measured? Through knowledge-oriented exams upon graduation? Through graduates' successes in admission to and completion of graduate school? Through measures of professional contributions? None of these measures aligns very well with the general spirit of university education. And the best of the available measures, generally time-lapsed, are impractical and costly.

The problems of measuring educational effectiveness are immense, as discussed by Besse:

The quality of a teacher's performance can be judged but it cannot be quantified except as the number of hours spent in a classroom. The number of hours spent outside the classroom in order to qualify for good performance within the classroom depends on a great variety of things that cannot be meaningfully quantified: the newness of the course, the rapidity of change in the field, the range of talent and previous academic preparation among the students.21

The nature of university goals makes them quite unmeasurable. To attempt to measure the goals, is to probably mis-measure them. Etzioni comments on this:

Curiously, the very effort—the desire to establish how we are doing and to find ways of improving if we are not doing as well as we ought to do—often has quite undesired effects from the point of view of organizational goals. Frequent measuring can distort the organizational efforts because, as a rule, some aspects of its output are more measurable than the others. Frequent measuring tends to encourage over production of highly measurable items and neglect of the less measurable ones.22
V. A Difference: The Members

In comparing the "members" of a university and a business, great care must be taken to define the term, "members." For instance, the maintenance, clerical, housekeeping, and technical staffs in a university—which might amount to half the employees of the university—are not appreciably different in motivations, goals, or perspectives from their counterparts in business organizations. And, pooling assembly line workers with upper-level managers in defining the "membership" of a business organization creates obvious problems. For purposes of this analysis, the "members" of the university will be narrowly defined as the faculty; in a business, all nonowner employees.

Within a business, a dramatic array of occupational categories, personality types, etc., exist. From punch press operator, to chemist, to production manager, the orientations and motivations of these people can vary considerably. Yet, despite their seeming diversity, these people probably have a far greater identification with their firm than faculty members do with their university. With no tenure system, perhaps this organizational identification among business employees is due to what Simon labels "personal interest in organizational success." Or, as will be discussed below, perhaps the relative difference between business and academic members' organizational loyalties is due to some unique perspective of faculty members.

There are other aspects of business life which we might describe to set a base for a subsequent discussion of faculty contrast. For instance, business workers, from assembly line workers to top managers generally think of themselves as part of a task team. They might work independently, but they are ever-reminded of the coordinative nature of employees' efforts.

Next, business employees, especially those in administrative positions, tend to be highly paid, relative to faculty members. Presumably, monetary rewards are fairly important for these business people. It is important to again comment on the diversity of business employees. As Drucker points out, there are unique motivations for professional employees (broadly defined by him) in any organization.

In analyzing managerial employees, specifically, in a business, we can draw on Collins' and Moore's abstract of Thematic Apperception Test results administered to managers in mature business organizations. Collins and Moore report that these managers present common traits and attitudes:

- mobility drive—especially a drive to climb the organizational hierarchy
- positive attitude toward the boss
- high level of work and activity
- an ability to make decisions promptly, frequently with inadequate information
- a commitment to traditional middle-class beliefs and values, e.g., hard work, thrift, honesty, etc.

These traits are not entirely at odds with what we would find among faculty members, but they do set the stage for an interesting contrast.

University faculty members are professionals, and, by virtue of being in that category, expect and generally receive certain professionals' perquisites. These go far beyond
having flexible hours, as we can see from Drucker's list of perquisites accorded a professional:26

1. He has a self-contained logic; that is, he persists in the application of intellectual processes that are different from those of the administrator or businessman.

2. He has ingrained working habits. Because he has been trained to work on his own, he is apt to insist on having complete control of the way he shall do the job.

3. He applies objective standards of performance to his own work instead of accepting the evaluation of a superior.

4. He regards the imposition of conventional personnel practices "... as the very antithesis of professional status; and there is nothing he resents more deeply."27

Etzioni expands eloquently on the perquisite of professional independence, saying,

Only if immune from ordinary social pressures and free to innovate, to experiment, and to take risks without the usual social repercussions of failure, can a professional carry out his work effectively. It is this highly individualized principle which is diametrically opposed to the very essence of the organizational principles of control and coordination by superiors—i.e., the principle of administrative authority.28

Drucker would have us believe that this professional autonomy is pursued by professionals in any type organization, including businesses. Yet, accountants in a public accounting firm, teachers in a school system, or even lawyers in a legal firm probably do not have the independence and exclusive self- and peer-review that occur in universities. Probably only doctors in a hospital come close to the autonomy required by, or accorded, university faculty members.

The scholar's affinity for his discipline rather than for the organization is certainly unlike allegiances among business employees. It even, in likelihood, surpasses the discipline allegiance of many other types of professionals working in organizations. The scholar tends to view the organization in terms of its effect upon his discipline, his laboratory, or individual research project. Conversely, the business employee is continually reminded through the planning and control systems of his work's impact on the organization.

Some research indicates that the better a scholar is in making contributions to his discipline, the less will be his interest in, and affection for, the university. Caplow and McGee write:

Today, a scholar's orientation to his institution is apt to disorient him to his discipline and to affect his professional prestige unfavorably. Conversely, an orientation to his discipline will disorient him to his institution, which he will regard as a temporary shelter where he can pursue his career as a member of the discipline.29

51

50
The implications of this zero-sum allegiance pattern, while outside the scope of this paper, can be seen as considerable.

The professor spends his professional life searching for knowledge and organizing knowledge. He holds dear the traits of intellectual orderliness. Corson comments on other values held by the professor:

More than his counterpart in other institutions, he is likely to hold as important for organizational decisions such choices as absolutism versus relativism, objectivity vs. commitment, freedom vs. authority, and sacred vs. secular.30

One of the most notable paradoxes of faculty values is the contrast between scholars' penchant for intellectual orderliness and knowledge categorizations and their contrasting penchant for organizational disarray and murkiness. Parsons and Platt comment on the underlying phenomenon, saying, "That two-edged sword, the intellect, liberates from previous conformities but of necessity imposes new conformities for all those who would follow the rule of reason."31

In a university, if the collegium is operative, professors have a dual role: as the performers of the educational process and as the managers of the process. This is an arrangement that is generally not found in business organizations and one which has significant implications for organizational structure and evaluation systems. For instance, Millett raises a question:

The utilization of faculty resources requires one kind of organizational structure to coordinate the instructional activities, research activities, and public service activities. Will this same organizational structure be adequate to coordinate activities of faculty personnel management, of providing, developing, and conserving the faculty resource as a vital input?32

Finally, we might comment briefly on the personality traits of professors, recognizing the danger of characterizing all members of an occupational category as identical. Yet, their need for independence, their generally nonhierarchical orientation, and their fondness for things intellectual create images of the underlying makeup of these people. Corson provides us a glimpse of what might be the deepest feelings of scholars:

The faculty member has been trained over many years for service as a scholar. During that period he endures financial stringency and rigorous and persistent application of his mind and time to a steadily narrowing range of problems. "The personality that emerges . . . is," in the opinion of one observer, "typically underlain with a deep sense of inferiority, fear, and maladjustment, yet overlain by an almost frantic sense of superiority . . . a latent hostility to that which is non-bookish and non-intellectual . . . a fluttery insecurity" and a single-mindedness (Williams, 1958; see also Carter, 1970-71).33

This has, unfortunately, been a superficial treatment of the differences between faculty members and business employees. The focus was on providing examples which highlight the unique attitudes, expectations, and values of scholars.
VI. A Difference: The Product

In discussing the goals of businesses and universities, we have already met with a number of distinctions that will appear in this discussion of the products of the two institutions. Of course, the diversity of products and services of the business sector is immense. The "product" of the machine shop is quite different from the "product" of the advertising agency. The former is tangible and susceptible to valid performance tests; the latter is intangible and, despite great strides in advertising evaluation research, somewhat difficult to test.

Sometimes, a business "product" is not what it seems. A senior marketing executive of Revlon, Inc., once related to this writer, "We don't sell cosmetics; we sell hope." Perhaps what he meant is that "selling hope" is the company's means for selling cosmetics. Or, perhaps he was literally right: the company's "product" is a service, and the cosmetics are incidental to the service. This brief anecdote serves to highlight only one of the problems associated with discussing businesses' products, as a generic category.

Some writers have seen fit to simply distinguish between products and services in categorizing business outputs. Presumably, "products" are tangible and have measurable characteristics; services are intangible and difficult to measure. None of this adds appreciably to our understanding of the characteristics of business outputs. It does, however, reinforce the notion of diversity in business outputs and sets the stage for a more detailed analysis of university "outputs."

A key problem in discussing the product of the university is in identifying the product or products. We know from the above discussion on goals that there are multiple products of a university. But, within one product realm, say, teaching, What is the product: the teaching or the students who have been exposed to the teaching? This is an important distinction, for we are asking, Is the process the product? or Is the output the product?

An example of two writers' different answers to this question is provided by Corson and Millett. Corson, equating "process" (or activity) with "product," writes:

The core activity was and is, of course, teaching. Research has been, in theory, if not in fact, integrally related to the teaching activity. The less explicitly recognized activities of the college and university are the socialization of youth and the certification of individuals.34

Millett, on the other hand, relates products in terms of "output":

... this output has at least four items or four different adjectives: the graduated student, the re-educated student, applied service, and research results.35

Millett's interest in the graduated student instead of teaching, and research results instead of the process of research, is especially exemplary of the distinction between process and output.

Anderson, paraphrasing Gouldner, provides support for the concept of process as product:
The faculty member working as a scholar is engaged in neither production nor service in the usual sense of the terms. He works at intellectual tasks for their own sake. If his work is useful, so be it—but he is not particularly concerned if it is not.

Moving beyond the problem of identifying the university’s products, we encounter extreme problems in evaluating them. In this respect, a university is not unlike many businesses which are engaged in highly intangible service industries, but universities are probably at the extreme in engaging in outputs which are impractical to quantify or evaluate. For, the processes of knowledge creation and dissemination take place in the minds and characters of the students and faculty involved in the processes. There may or may not ever be an obvious, overt manifestation of the university’s impact on these individuals. If there is no such obvious manifestation, does that mean the university’s product has failed? If there is such an obvious manifestation, does that mean that it is due to the university? These are examples of the problems associated with measuring the university’s effect on the individual and society.

Evaluations of universities’ impacts usually involve the use of distant surrogate measures. Corson comments on this:

There have been frequent attempts to appraise the university’s product in terms of graduates’ earnings; others attempt to gauge institutional accomplishments in terms of the placement of graduates. Some studies have directed attention to the number of alumni of particular institutions that have been stimulated to continue their training beyond the college... Such studies provide useful information on faculty effectiveness and the worth of the educational program in various times in the past, but afford no precise and generally accepted measure of the effectiveness with which the function of a particular university is now being performed.

Corson, thus, identifies the problem of the considerable time lag required for measuring the effectiveness of the university. In labelling the above-described measures of university effectiveness as “useful information,” Corson ignores a serious problem in relying on any of the measures he mentions: There are significant differences in the abilities and attitudes of students who enroll in different universities. To observe only graduates’ performances, the evaluator bypasses the observation of the change or improvement of the students, and thus misses the “value-added” or true effectiveness of a school.

This discussion has primarily focused on the difficulty of measuring the teaching aspect of the university. It is commonly contended that the measure of research productivity is more ascertainable, that the number of research grants received, articles and books published, or awards won are accurate, or at least sufficient measures of scholarly output. Indeed, there is likely some qualitative achievement associated with each count in these measures, but there is not necessarily a significant correlation between these “activity indicators” and true contributions to knowledge and understanding. The intangible nature of the university’s products is one factor contributing to their unmeasurability. Another may be the unique nature of the university’s clientele, which will be discussed next.
If some writers would consider students the product of a university, can the students also be considered its clients? This two-pronged role for the student is one feature that makes him unique from a business' client or consumer. Indeed, there is no phenomenon conveniently parallel to the student. Such models as consumer, patient, dependent, ward, or inmate all miss the unique nature of the student.

In the business sector (except for monopolistic situations), the consumer has relative freedom to take his purchasing power to whatever vendors have the appropriate products, prices, locations, and so on. Businesses go to great lengths to monitor and adjust to consumer preferences. The situation is not quite the same with students and universities. First, students do not have the range of options open to them in selecting a university that another consumer might have. The student, as Leslie has pointed out, is extraordinarily tied by location in selecting a school:

First, geography is the major predictor of whether a student will go to college and which institution he will select. In fact, even religious preferences and parental alumni affiliations are better indicators than the sagacity of student choices. Second, either because of a lack of information or perhaps because of misinterpretation, the vast majority of students are not able to match their needs with the environment of an institution.

A second discrepancy from the traditional vendor-consumer model stems from the relatively dependent, unknowledgeable nature of the student as a consumer of higher education. The student is bound by a network of requirements and traditions. He cannot freely leave one university for another. The first university will have a voice in his admittance to the second. He cannot drink beer in his dormitory. The traditions of in loco parentis, while diminished, are still existent.

The very nature of the university, as a developer of students' knowledge and judgement abilities, leads to an argument of student dependency. Blau and Scott comment on service-client relationships in professional organizations:

In the typical case, however, the client does not know what will best serve his own interest. For example, the patient is not qualified to judge whether or not it would be best for his health to undergo an operation. Hence, the client is vulnerable, subject to exploitation, and dependent on the integrity of the professional to whom he has come for help.

If the student cannot determine what is best for him, neither can the university defer to the student's wishes in providing educational programs. Professional stature requires that the client's interests, not wishes, are served. Adjusting content, format, and demands of educational programs because of marketplace demands is not appropriate. However, more "market responsiveness" has existed in recent years and will probably increase due to the disequilibrium between supply and demand for higher education.
In addition to the two roles of students as customers and products, they serve a third role as “members” of the university. They participate in the administration of the university and fill a unique status as alumni, after graduation.

Stemming from the political volatility of the late sixties, students have become more assertive in seeking a role in the governance of the university. Generally, their influence is limited to non-academic aspects which bear on the student, such as discipline, living conditions, student publications, and social affairs. Some students see themselves as competent and entitled, as consumers of the educational process, to share in the academic decision making of the school.

Despite the increasing “consumers’ interests” movement in the country, there is no real business sector counterpart to student involvement in the administration of the university.

Finally, one unique phenomenon in the university is the status of the graduates. Attendance and graduation from a particular university is a very ego-involving experience and follows a graduate, or is carried by a graduate, for his entire life. The alumnus, or “ex-consumer,” votes for university trustees, promotes the university, financially supports the university, and otherwise influences the institution. Or he may do none of these. Alumnus interest is not required.

In the business sector, there is no real counterpart to the alumnus. A person who purchases a product that particularly reflects his values or abilities may identify with that product. Thus, a Cadillac man, a Gucci woman. When the purchaser is no longer actively involved with the product, however, he does not continue to think of himself as still associated with it. We would rarely hear, “I used to be a Cadillac man.”

These are but some of the distinctions between business consumers and students. Again, there are matters of degree, since businesses and universities are so diverse in their products and appeals, but there are general, basic differences between the purchaser of a business product or service and the purchaser of a university education.

VIII. Conclusions and Looking Ahead

This paper has involved an identification and analysis of underlying similarities and differences between a business and a university. The analysis has been plagued by the immense diversity of business types, and, for that matter, universities. There are, indeed, some businesses, such as consulting firms, architectural firms, and so on, that are more like universities as we have described them here, than are some universities per se.

There are similarities between a university and a business. They both belong to the category of complex organizations and share traits in belonging to the subcategory, bureaucracy. The university does have a massive business function in its ground maintenance, residence halls, purchasing, sports activities, and so on. The aim of this paper was to focus on the academic side of the university, however.
Businesses and universities differ. The traditions of the two sectors differ. The nature, number, and precision of goals differ. The backgrounds, orientations, and roles of members differ. The nature and measurability of the outputs differ. The roles and orientations of the clients or consumers differ.

This paper does not address the extent to which the differences between business and higher education are narrowing or widening. With the increase of collective bargaining on campuses, with a continued disequilibrium between supply and demand for higher education, with a continued disequilibrium between supply and demand for scholars, and with a continued skepticism of universities among the American public, the nature of the differences is bound to change. We can probably look for the gap between the nature of the business and the university to narrow.

This paper does not address the implications of the underlying differences discussed on administration or governance. The implications are important, and a useful, interesting follow-up would be a paper drawing direct relationships between the natures of the institutions and the ways they are, or should be, administered.
Notes


14Corson, "Perspectives on the University," p. 159.


16Ibid., p. 307.

18 Ibid., p. 108.

19 Corson, Governance of Colleges, p. 20.

20 Ibid., p. 123.


22 Etzioni, Modern Organization, p. 9

23 Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. 209.


26 Drucker as paraphrased by Corson, "Management and the Professional Employee," p. 29.

27 Ibid.

28 Etzioni, Modern Organization, pp. 76-77.


30 Corson, Governance of Colleges, p. 30.


32 Millett, Decision Making, pp. 91-92.


34 Ibid., p. 159.

35 Millett, Decision Making, p. 145.

36 Anderson, "The Organizational Character," p. 17.


It is reasonable for scholars to believe that their contribution to the events that make 1976 the bicentennial year was significant. The Declaration of Independence and the commitment it represented were of major consequence in establishing a new nation. The power of the document is unequivocal. It stands as a literary document of first quality and a political document unmatched for its expression of principles that rest on the noblest concepts of the rights of man. Those present at the drafting had to be scholars of the first rank, men knowledgeable of the political philosophers from Plato down to their own time. The complex of events prior to and following the Declaration drew on the wisdom and learning of Adams, of Jefferson, of Franklin, and others, and these men were able to create new conceptions about how people should be governed. There were scholars in the colonies before the revolutionists, represented best perhaps by the theologian and preacher, Jonathan Edwards, who was to become a college president. And so the fruits of scholarship indigenous to the new continent were available as the nation was formed.

But the truly watershed event in the history of American scholarship bears a date, August 1837. At a Harvard Phi Beta Kappa convocation held in Cambridge on that date, Emerson, in an address of literary distinction significant in the intellectual history of the nation, challenged those gathered together and all others of like values to work to bring forth the American scholar. On that occasion he said:

Thus far, our holiday has been simply a friendly sign of the survival of the love of letters amongst a people too busy to give to letters any more. As such, it is precious as the sign of an indestructible instinct. Perhaps the time is already come, when it ought to be, and will be something else; when the sluggard intellect of this continent will look from under its iron lids and fill the postponed expectation of the world with something better than the exertions of mechanical skill. Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of other lands, draws to a close.

Emerson set forth both a challenge and prediction. If one is to define America either in terms of geography or in terms of a product of American institutions, the challenge was accepted and met.

While the American scholar must acknowledge that he is the descendant of and heir to the scholars of Europe and their values, traditions, assumptions, presuppositions—that totality of the intellectual corpus and tradition called Western civilization—the American scholar with modest exceptions is indigenous to this nation. We gladly acknowledge our debt and dependence on the Greek philosophers; the Roman givers of law, orators and poets; the theologians of France and Germany; the scientists and philosophers of Germany who are historically preeminent; the medieval universities of Spain and Italy, of France, Germany, and England; the nineteenth century German university as a model for the twentieth century American university; the renaissance of art and learning of all central and southern Europe—nonetheless, the American community of scholars can without apology or protest ask and accept a major place in the inventory of scholars down the centuries and a preeminent place in this current twentieth century.
Who are these persons of the twentieth century here in America for whom we make this claim of preeminence? Why should they be noted? Why should we spend time in describing them or attempting to understand them? Is it of significance that Emerson's challenge was accepted and satisfied? Or, should we simply perceive the American scholar as but one of the many groups that brought this nation to what it is, as, perhaps, even minor figures compared to those who explored the continent, fought our wars, opened up the west, gave us our governments, built our factories, tilled our soil and, incidentally, contributed to making Americans the most affluent of all peoples.

It is in the context of these ideas and observations that I would like to discuss with you some thoughts about the American scholar, 1976.

I find as I review my own thoughts about the American scholar, and as I review the writings of others that there is a strong tendency to equate the American scholar and the American academician normally defined as the faculty of our colleges and universities. Such an equation is not valid. Donald Light of Princeton published what he titled "Introduction: The Structure of Academic Professionals" in the Sociology of Education Journal in 1974. Light attempts a typology for academicians, gives considerable attention to, and makes fair and cogent criticism of the work of Parsons and Platt, who have recently given much attention to the academic profession. Suffice it to say here that those who teach and do research in colleges and universities are, in pragmatic terms, academic professionals. But we cannot equate those who teach in colleges and universities with those who would be named as scholars. Light produces these concepts: (1) "Faculty are people with academic appointments at institutions of higher education," (2) "A scholarly profession...is an occupation with the attributes of a profession whose core activity is the advancement of knowledge," and (3) "An academic profession is that subset of a scholarly profession with academic appointments."

These are useful concepts and distinctions although I am not disposed to defend these distinctions against others that might well be made. I would suggest that perhaps not even a majority of the 500,000 to 750,000 persons who are members of college and university faculties are by Light's concepts "academic professionals." I would suggest that a majority of those who can be called members of a scholarly profession, a group that Light specifies as those "certified by an academic discipline and doing professional work" are also academic professionals and are those to whom we will direct most of our attention.

A few other observations are in order. Higher education institutions have notoriously bad personnel (faculty, staff, students) accounting systems; normative statistics concerning higher education are at best approximations. But we estimate that there are perhaps 500,000 legitimate faculty in accredited degree-granting institutions including two-year colleges. Perhaps less than 70 percent have terminal degrees. This group would number 350,000. Of this group, perhaps 40 percent are in teaching-research institutions, institutions with a significant cohort of professional scholars. Now we have 140,000 persons. If we estimate that another 20 percent of professional scholars (an estimate that may be too high) are at work in business and industry, research centers (e.g., Brookings—I think of Alice Rivlin and Margaret Mead, Museum of National History), in museums and galleries, in government, and so on, we perhaps have about 170,000 professional scholars. Let us also remember that folklore has it that 80 percent of those who earn a doctorate do not publish beyond their thesis.
To summarize, when we are talking about the American scholar, we are talking about something less than 200,000 persons, one-tenth of 1 percent of the population of the United States or one-fourth of 1 percent of the people of America in the work force.

Knowledge or information about America's scholars is modest in the extreme, whether directly or inferentially derived. Logan Wilson's 1942 book, The Academic Man, is perhaps the first significant statement that sheds research-based light on the American scholar.

His final paragraph (pp. 224-225) indicates both the limitations of our knowledge and the significance it would have if we did possess it as of 1942.

It is to be expected that society should show a greater concern for the results of science and scholarship than for the means used to produce those results. Yet the producers are an essential part of the product, and a complex and chaotic world which is going to be increasingly dependent upon professionalized occupations for the solution of its problems cannot afford to be indifferent to men. On every side one sees much attention being given to the problems of business and labor groups, but the internal problems of the major professions, as well as their integration with the social order, have been rather neglected. Particularly is this true of the academic profession. Until recently, comparatively little has been known about the social organization of the higher learning, and about the effects of different types of social situations upon the end results of scientific and scholarly enterprise. The most effective organization possible for the academic profession can hardly be anticipated, therefore, until we know more about its human coefficients. This immense and important task, it appears, is what lies ahead for the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of the professions.

Light's journal article, mentioned earlier, presents a bibliography of 42 items, authored by (including multiple authorship) some 45 persons. The names of the authors are not entirely obscure. They include the philosopher William Arrowsmith; Joseph Ben-David; Peter Blau; Burton Clark; the British sociologist A. H. Halsey, who writes with Martin Trow; David Riesman, who writes with Christopher Jencks and also alone; Seymour M. Lipset; Walter Metzger; Talcott Parsons; Nevitt Sanford; and Laurence Vesey, as well as Logan Wilson. All items on Light's list have been published since 1960.

While we are speaking of the American scholar-academic, the 1971 volume by Halsey and Trow, The British Academics, should be noted. Approximately 400 of the 550 pages of the book are concerned directly with the British academic and 166 tables present data. Trow is an American sociologist and Halsey knows the American academician. Their statement is significant in a comparative sense for one who would know the American scholar.

I have mentioned the Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt volume, The American University. Their materials will ultimately, and rightly, merit extreme critical attention. Also worthy of attention is the Ladd-Lipset faculty survey, which has been appearing in serialized form since September 15, 1975, in The Chronicle of Higher Education. The survey indicates that faculty members are among the most liberal of all work groups, but
that considerable diversity of value preferences is found among the individuals who comprise the academic profession. While a full assessment of the Ladd-Lipset findings must await final installments of the survey, the contents published thus far are helping to increase our understanding of the value system and concerns of the American scholar-academic.

Fiction also contributes knowledge of the scholar at work. C. P. Snow, particularly in his *The Masters*, or Mary McCarthy in *Groves of Academe* immediately come to mind. It would not be difficult to create a list of 100 novels relevant to our statement here. A few scholars have told us how they work and play. Watson's *The Double Helix* is superb. G. H. Hardy's *A Mathematician's Apology* is intensely interesting, and the foreword to the 1963 edition written by C. P. Snow is a beautiful interpretation of Hardy's life as a man, a mathematical scholar of the highest accomplishment, and a player and student of cricket. In one of his essays, C. Wright Mills has been highly revealing of how he works. Suffice it to say that the course of scholarly productivity, like the course of true love, never runs smooth.

Now let us have our say about the American scholar. The statement that follows is a personal statement. It makes no references to the sources I have mentioned. It is a synthesis, analysis, and interpretation that I have arrived at over time. It is laden with value judgments. Finally, it is only a modest reworking of a similar statement I prepared in 1963. Please judge it and be critical of it in reference to the terms just stated.

The American scholar is not understood. It is doubtful that he understands himself. This is perhaps the single most important observation that can be made about him. Perhaps understanding can follow description; and, following understanding, a fuller "realization" of the scholar's role in the American culture or American civilization. "Realization" may have the somewhat more vulgar connotation of "utilization." In a larger sense, however, realization means an integration of the scholar—his work; his values; his modes of thought; his concerns; his capacity to create, innovate, and reconstruct; his capacity to remold and transform—into the warp and woof of the American cultural web and into the nation's general well being.

If the American scholar were understood, he would be visible in main currents of American social, economic, and political activities. Although all of us can cite instances of the scholar who is at the center of these aspects of the American scene, e.g. the role of the scholar in Washington from "new deal" days until now, with Kissinger the current symbol, the scholar's role is more likely to be of the servant class—useful and used; his services bought and paid for at servants' wages; coming and going through the back doors of the structures of American organizations; speaking when spoken to; sitting in the side chairs, not at the conference tables; a technician, not a policy maker; a performer or doer, not a director; not necessarily a follower, but seldom a leader. I have reviewed this statement first written substantively in 1963 in light of the golden years of the 1960s for the academic world. I still believe it is a fairly accurate statement.

These statements are not meant cynically. Perhaps the scholar can be no more than what he now is because a leadership role might destroy him as a scholar, or greater interaction in the marketplace might distort his values or even corrupt him.

First of all, the scholar is a professional, not an amateur. He is trained, disciplined, educated to and for his work. He is a craftsman as he performs his task. He is a master of technique. The practice of scholarship is his vocation. He makes his living as a scholar.
The scholar is a dealer in knowledge, but he is more than a broker. He is a producer of knowledge, a discoverer or creator of knowledge. He produces knowledge that appeared not to exist before. He is also an organizer, marketer, collector, and distributor—a purveyor of the fruits of his labor.

The scholar is an intellectual. He not only uses his mind, his intellect; but the uses of his mind are his purpose. Others use intellectual processes—the lawyer in preparing his cases or advising his clients, the physician in making his diagnosis and prescribing his treatments, the clergyman is preparing his sermons, the engineer in designing his structures. But here the uses of the mind are at least once removed; they have a purpose of utility—to solve a problem; they are means to ends. Not so with the scholar. When he “thinks,” the product of his thinking is the end product. Emerson said that the scholar was “Man Thinking.” The product may be useful; in fact it is almost always so, but the scholar is theoretically indifferent to the uses of knowledge. Practically, he may not be so indifferent, and he may be called upon to play roles beyond scholarship, but then he is something more than scholar.

Let us digress from this line of thought and describe the scholar as a person. This description is, of course, normative, not absolute.

The scholar is typically a male—at least we estimate 80 percent are male. He is middle class, intelligent, introverted, inner-directed, and shy. He is one of Riesman’s inner directed men. He appears to non-scholars to be odd if not eccentric, but not to himself and his peers. He often considers himself misunderstood. He fancies himself as a practical man, but others perceive him as somewhat impractical. He may be given to causes, but not necessarily so. He is temperamentally cautious. He may be either liberal or conservative, but in either position may be somewhat unorthodox in his expressions of his position.

He is a family man. His wife may also be, but usually is not, a scholar. He has children who are raised conventionally to middle class standards, but his children are also likely to be intelligent, introverted, cautious, and conventional.

The scholar is a salaried man. He is typically employed by a college or university, seldom by a public school or even community colleges. But he may also be employed by museums, learned societies, government, research institutes, foundations, occasionally by business, life insurance, and even by labor unions. He is dependent on his salary. The day of the independent income or affluent wife for the scholar belongs to another century. He may supplement his salary by income from writing or lecturing or consulting, but few scholars can add substantially to their worldly goods in this way. Occasionally a scholar may write a book or invent a thing or process that will make him rich, but this is not usual.

The scholar serves an apprenticeship by attending college and graduate school. His union card is the Ph.D. degree. If a scientist-scholar, he probably earned his degree in his mid-twenties. If a social scientist or humanist, he was probably 30 or even older before he escaped from graduate school. He served his apprenticeship to a senior scholar doing hack

64
work in a laboratory or library, but also served students as paper grader, adviser, and apprentice teacher.

The scholar normally comes to his vocation without a deliberate plan to be such. The high school adolescent or undergraduate may have deliberately chosen to be a college professor, but it is not likely he did so. He may have indicated an interest in science or languages or history or such, but he normally backs into his career. He finds his days spent in college or university congenial; he finds his activities as a learner rewarded—not with money but with kind words, high marks, and election to honorary societies. Inertia often keeps him in the academic environment until he discovers that an academician is what he is slated to be.

It has already been stated that the scholar is bright. It is estimated that the average I.Q. of those who earn the Ph.D. degree is 130-135. The lower limit with few exceptions is between 120 and 125. An I.Q. of 135 is possessed by about 2 percent of the population, 1 person in 50; an I.Q. of 125 by less than 10 percent. In addition to native ability, the potential scholar must have the temperament of the introvert. Some years ago, as a graduate student, I invented for fun a one-question test for separating the potential Ph.D.s from the non-Ph.D.s. This was the question: “At the age of forty would you prefer to have $100,000 in the bank or your name in Who’s Who?” It was amazing to listen to the answers from a variety of persons. The potential scholar invariably answered: “Who’s Who, of course” ; the others, “$100,000.” Each group was surprised that anyone would choose the other way.

Now let us review in a bit more detail what the scholar does.

In the minds of some, the scholar and the researcher are one and the same. This is not, however, necessarily so. The terms are not altogether synonymous. Research is probably the narrower term. To be profoundly involved in research is to be a scholar. The scholar is not necessarily, however, limited to being a researcher in any careful definition of the latter term; scholarship involves study in and of itself as well as investigative work. It is a way as much as a process or method. Much of research is pedestrian; it can be hack work. It can be done to a formula. Some might say the same of scholarship, but scholarship is not then scholarship but pedantry.

The scholar has some of the attributes of the artist, but he is not an artist. The artist perceives truth and gives it substance in a work of art. But the artist perceives in a way different from the scholar and gives expression to truth in ways altogether different from the scholar’s ways. The artist’s expression of truth is always unique to the artist. The scholar claims objectivity and verifiability. The artist and scholar work under different assumptions, with different techniques, and produce qualitatively different products.

Originally we noted that the scholar works with knowledge. He is in the Aristotelian tradition. He begins with data, which may include ideas, and then organizes, classifies, generalizes. He works with ever higher orders of generalization, seeking universal principles, laws, truths. He is descriptive but more than simply descriptive. He is explanatory with all the subtleties implied in the term explanation. His highest concern is with order or organization. Ultimately, the scholar looks to the production of theories or natural laws as the end result of his work.
The scholar shows normal concern for the significance of his work. The test of significance is not, however, pragmatic. If the results are useful to the general concerns of man, so be it. If they are not, the scholar is not perturbed. He simply wants to know. The test of significance is the internal elegance of the ordered knowledge in terms of the criteria of scholarship, per se.

We have said that the scholar is frequently a teacher. This is so. But teaching is not his profession. We know he is not trained to a profession of teaching and our statement tells us why he is not! The typical abode of scholars is the university and universities are here to teach. Universities are supported by society as teaching institutions, and the scholar teaches because that is why universities are supported. Scholars also teach so that scholarship may be perpetuated. They must have apprentices (graduate students) so that their work is carried on or perpetuated.

Even though the scholar is a salaried man, he is not an organization man. The scholar does not give his first loyalty to his university but to his discipline. Temperamentally and fundamentally, in terms of his work as scholar, he is opposed to organization. He has all the characteristics of the individual entrepreneur. He also cherishes autonomy. The scholar cannot, however, go it alone even though he might have an independent income. He needs the facilities of the university—its libraries and laboratories. He needs the stimulation, the interaction of his peers. He needs the cheap help of students to do chore work in libraries and laboratories. Above all, he needs the prestige and power of the university to protect him in his exercise of academic freedom. But needing the university and being a university organization are not the same. The scholar is basically intolerant of administration and of bureaucracy. Probably he should be.

While the scholar is a salaried man, he does not view himself as an employee—he resents the situations that imply to him he may be. Universities have invented the phrase, officer of instruction, for professors, to remove the implications of employer-employee relationships. The university and professors have also invented two closely intertwined concepts and built them into university structures to reinforce the position of scholars in other than an employee relationship. These are academic freedom and tenure. We will not presume to discuss these concepts here but will simply assert their relevance and validity if scholars are to function as scholars in an American university.

If the scholar is not an employee, who gives him orders? The answer is, "no one." The psychologist Thorndike once asked, "Who is there to tell the scholar what to do?" The implied answer was: "No one tells the scholar what to do." Samuel P. Capen once wrote that the university must give the scholar complete freedom, including the freedom to do nothing if that is what he chooses. The scholar must be a self-directed man. He is such by definition. He is the adventurer of the mind, the intrepid explorer in the realm of undiscovered knowledge. He must go where there are no charts. Thus there is no direction, not even the direction of others.

The scholar is a threatening person. He attacks the mores, he unsettles the settled, he turns mystery into the more easily perceived, he probes the most intimate of personal relations. Society wants stability, the status quo. It does not want to think new thoughts, have its certainties become uncertain. Society fears the scholar. Sometimes in the past it has made him a martyr.
In Nevitt Sanford's *The American College*, Frank Pinner discusses the "dissensual disciplines and the pursuit of knowledge." He writes:

I term "consensual" all those disciplines with respect to which the public at large tends to have no reservations, either as to the competence of the scholars and the truth of their findings or as to the values which inform their work. Correspondingly, I term "dissensual" all disciplines whose value or procedures are widely questioned among the public, either explicitly or implicitly.

Mathematics, the natural sciences, and such applied sciences as engineering or veterinary medicine are typically consensual disciplines. Philosophy, the social sciences, music, literature, and the fine arts are dissensual. Few people in the community will express doubts about the research findings and teachings of a chemist, nor will they even question his motives and wonder about the values underlying his work. But the findings and teachings of philosophers and economists do not elicit similarly general confidence. The public tends to wonder about the worth of these scholars' work, it tends to look for hidden motives, and it easily discounts the teaching and even the data of dissensual disciplines either by directly opposing or by conveniently forgetting and ignoring them.

Pinner might have recognized that beginning with Darwin at least and perhaps up until 1940, biological and natural sciences were also dissensual—extremely threatening to the established religions. There are current remnants of society's hostility.

It is for this reason that the university protects the scholar with academic freedom and tenure. This is why it must do so.

The scholar is perhaps the most pregnant force in creating and recreating what we know as the culture of the west. Other persons might make this claim for other forces, e.g., the Christian church, the capitalistic economic system, the explorers from the 1300s on; some might make the claim for artists as the most inventive force. If, however, we should call the role on events which have had unique impacts on the history of the west in the last 100 years, what events would take precedence over these: publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Willard Gibbs' formulations of the Laws of Thermodynamics, Freud's creation of psychoanalysis and formulations of the motives of men, and Einstein's formulation of relativity theory with the writing of the simple but shattering equation, $e=mc^2$.

The case of Gibbs perhaps summarizes all we have had to say. Guy Stanton Ford, famous historian and university administrator, has written this of Gibbs:

When I was a young instructor in Yale, there were college faculty meetings that wasted, even in those days, a disproportionate amount of time on disciplinary cases, or whether a successful man who had dropped out before his degree might be listed with his class as a graduate of its year. Just before the solemnities began, often with the president of the university presiding, an elderly man, thin and carefully dressed, would shuffle into the room and take a seat in the farthest corner. He sat patient and silent throughout the session. I was curious as to who he was, for I never saw him at any other time on or off the campus. I
asked some of my younger colleagues who were Yale men who he was. They did not know. Then one day in 1903 Willard Gibbs died and New Haven and some in the college learned that they had harbored one of the three greatest scientists of the nineteenth century, a man called by an English scholar, the greatest synthetic philosopher since Newton.

Here was certainly a master of his subject, who developed "the theory of the thermodynamic properties of heterogeneous substances" and laid the foundation for the great new subject of physical chemistry and the introduction of vector analysis. Despite a world-wide fame, he drew few graduate students to Yale during his thirty-two years as professor of mathematical physics. Of those who did come only a half-dozen, by his own count, understood what he was teaching. The world of science was taught by the papers he wrote, not less than by those put forth by Mendel, and in journals almost as obscure as those in which the Austrian monk founded the subject of genetics. Any physical chemist or mathematical physicist can testify to the far-reaching influence of Gibbs as a teacher without a classroom or students . . . To the honor of Yale let it be recorded that they kept him on the staff for a third of a century without troubling him to fill out a questionnaire as to how many students he had and how he distributed his time between teaching, research, consultation with students and service on committees.

One needs only to change or add a word in this long quotation to understand the workings of the teacher and of the scholar. When Ford writes: "Any physical chemist or mathematical physicist can testify to the far-reaching influence of Gibbs as a teacher without a classroom or students," just insert the word scholar rather than teacher or say scholar and teacher and the description is complete.

In the opening paragraphs it was noted that the scholar is not understood, hence not appreciated or his contributions not realized. The question follows: What should society do about or for the scholar?

There are no easy answers. While it is true that the scholar is occasionally recognized with a Nobel prize or other lesser honors, nothing much is done to cultivate scholars. The scientific scholar is remaking the world. But how are things different because of the social scientist scholar or the humanist scholar? We must find a way for scholars in the humanities and history and the social sciences to begin to make the differences now in the last years of this century that the scientist scholar has been making for the last hundred years.

The conditions of human existence—war and peace, poverty and wealth, oppression and freedom—beyond all realization of the human personality in vast sections of the earth where human existence is but animal existence—these are the conditions for which we need fundamental truths. The scholars who work to reveal truths of this order are not to be doers or reformers. They have only one mission; to tell us how things are, what conditions govern, what the cause and effect relationships might be. The rest of us must listen and understand. Then we may have a "better" social condition, the peoples of the world a "better" experience.


Notes on the Authors

G. LESTER ANDERSON is Director of the Center for the Study of Higher Education and Professor of Higher Education. He earned a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, where he also became a full professor. Having served in successive roles as Dean of Teacher Education, Dean of Administration, Vice-Chancellor, Vice President for Educational Affairs, and Distinguished Service Professor of Higher Education, Dr. Anderson has long been interested in governance and administrative matters.

DONALD HAMBRICK is Director of External Relations in the College of Business Administration and Instructor in the Department of Management Science and Organizational Behavior. He is completing an interdisciplinary doctoral program in Organizational Strategy and Policy at Penn State. He holds an M.B.A. degree from Harvard. Mr. Hambrick has taught in the field of business policy and management. His research interests are in cross-institutional studies of strategy formulation and in the field of management education.

KENNETH P. MORTIMER is a Research Associate in the Center for the Study of Higher Education and Professor of Higher Education in the College of Education at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Mortimer holds a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. He was employed by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley, where he participated in project research concerned with academic decision making. His major publications are concerned with faculty participation in academic governance, faculty collective bargaining, and academic accountability.

WILLIAM TOOMBS is Research Associate and Assistant director of the Center for the Study of Higher Education. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to joining the Center, he served on the staff of the Rackham School of Graduate Studies at Michigan. Dr. Toombs has taught sociology and held a deanship in student affairs at Drexel University. His research interests include graduate education, manpower influences on educational policy, faculty development, and the educational effects of sponsored research.