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Abstract: The nature and structure of academic power in American higher education is described and compared with the British and Continental modes of academic organization. Structured power is described as providing influence to certain groups, systematically backing certain values and viewpoints at the same time subordinating others, and determining whether activities will be influenced by monopolistic or pluralistic forms of participation. The analysis concluded that the general structure of higher education in the United States is appropriate for the wide range of training opportunities needed to extend higher education to all that can benefit from it. (Author/JMF)
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Foreword

This study describes the nature and structure of academic power in American higher education and compares it with the British and Continental modes of academic organization. It is pointed out that structured power provides influence to certain groups, systematically backs certain values and viewpoints at the same time subordinating others, and determines whether activities will be influenced by monopolistic or pluralistic forms of participation. Clark and Youn believe that history has favored this country by providing it with a structure well suited to the diverse missions and needs of American institutions, with the capability of responding adaptively to both present and future demands. They conclude that the general structure of higher education in the U.S. is appropriate for the wide range of training opportunities needed to extend higher education to all that can benefit from it. Burton R. Clark is professor of sociology and director of the program for Comparative and Historical Studies at the Institute for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, and Ted I.K. Youn is a doctoral candidate at the Institute for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.

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Introduction

Power is rooted in the structure of formal organizations. To analyze power, we begin by tracing the structural power of various groups and values. We can do this for large sets of organizations that compose a system or for individual institutions. (On the topic of "inter-organizational fields" as units of analysis, see Warren 1967; Warren, Rose, and Bergunder 1974). In line with this institutional approach, our first goal is to analyze the general nature of academic power in the United States by examining the basic structure of our national "system" of higher education. To bring insight and order to this analysis we take three approaches: a cross-national approach to provide a perspective on the American structure by discussing basic features of Continental and British modes of academic organization; a historical approach to provide a perspective on the American structure and its distinctive features by summarizing the origin and subsequent development of its major institutional types and forms of control; and a contemporary structural approach to provide perspective by sorting out levels of organization, from the department to the nation as a whole, which characterize the nature of embedded authority and influence at each level.

In these discussions, we hope to demonstrate the usefulness of comparative and historical perspectives in understanding modern American practices. Such perspectives help us to identify what is basic and what is superficial, what is lasting and what is transitory in our own system. They may also lead to concepts and categories that are necessary for fundamental understanding that otherwise might elude us.

In the penultimate chapter, "Academic Power: Concepts and Perspectives," we extract from the earlier discussions certain concepts, typologies, and specific approaches that seem useful in the study of organized academic power. We identify a number of forms of authority that are found in educational systems and categorize them according to their internal integration. We also propose a way of looking at educational structure that combines organizational analysis with historical analysis by examining the persistence of certain organizational types and forms. The last section discusses the consequences of different patterns of national academic organization. What if power is organized in one way or another? What difference
does it make? There is good reason to believe that the primary structure makes a great difference. By defining and articulating the interests of different groups, an authority structure can affect the implementation of research, teaching, and other tasks of higher education. The historic evolution of a system will shape the modes of change and reform. As Hastings Rashdall, the great historian of the medieval university, has pointed out, "the direction which a reaction assumes is determined by the direction of the forces against which it reacts: the reformer is as much indebted to his environment as the conservative" (Rashdall 1936, Volume I, p. 266).

In this regard, there is some reason to think that history has favored this country by having presented us with a structure that expresses many interests and is capable of both continuity and adaptive response to present and future demands. However, the current efforts of the best and the brightest in system management may be tilting the structure in directions that will be a curse for future generations. The retention of a certain type of structural balance may be seen as the basic problem of academic organization and power.
Continental and British Modes of Academic Organization

The general structure of academic organization on the Continent combines faculty guild and state bureaucracy. Each of these forms has a long history. The understructure of guild-like faculty clusters originated in the medieval period; the university began as a guild, or more accurately a confederation of guilds, at a time when the guild was the common form for the organization of work in cities (Rashdall 1936; Haskins 1957; Thrupp 1968; Baldwin and Goldthwaite 1972). Instructors, and in some cases students, borrowed this form as a way of collectively implementing a common interest. In the process they acquired certain rights and privileges, established self-government, and developed means of defense against adverse actions of other groups. When a king or a pope initiated the enterprise, ordinarily he would charter a group as a recognized guild. Also academicians drifted into the guild style of self-regulation themselves, where a group of masters jointly controlled a territory of work, elected one of their own as head, took oaths of obedience and fealty, and, in smaller domains, individually exercised personal control over journeymen and apprentices. The guild form ultimately became the primary organizational base for the university, and provided a controlling mechanism and sturdy foundation that has endured for eight centuries and still appears in modern higher education (Reeves 1970; Ashby 1974; Clark forthcoming (a)).

The superstructure of state administration developed at about the same time as city-states and other local authorities attempted to regulate academic bodies. However, its genuine strength developed later when the national state emerged as the primary source of political authority and learned to use modern administrative methods. In one country after another on the Continent, building a nation meant encapsulating higher education in a public bureau. There was either the full nationalization of higher education, in which nearly all units were placed under one or more ministries of the national government, as for example in France after Napoleon or in Italy after unification in 1870; or there was a complete governmental embrace at a lower level, as in Germany where the universities came within a ministry of a Land government. Most important, the emerging governmental framework did not have the benefit of initiating new educational
systems but had to administratively embrace existing faculties and universities that had retained guild properties. The chaired professor in the European university of the last several centuries was a direct descendant of the guild master of old, in that he held a permanent appointment, exercised great personal power over assistants and students, and, together with other chairholders, monopolized decisions about what would be done within the university as well as in such major subunits as the faculty and the institute, especially regarding determination of faculty membership and curriculum. Thus guild authority was maintained by combining personal and collegial rule at the same time as faculties were changing from voluntary associations related to government to formal parts of government (Clark forthcoming (a)). The understructure continued to serve the interests of senior faculty. Not only was it supported by traditions that had been developed since twelfth-century Bologna and Paris, but it was also bolstered by the ideologies of each age. Indeed, the leading educational ideal of the nineteenth century, that of the German research-centered university, provided the rationale for rule by professors (Turner 1972; Chapter 4). While allowing for a ministerial framework, the reforms proposed by Wilhelm von Humboldt and others in Berlin in the 1810's stressed the necessity of freedom in research and teaching if scholarly progress and national advance were to be served. The eminence of German academic science during the rest of the century gave worldwide credence to a system of organization in which the autonomy and prerogatives of chairholders were central. These nineteenth-century ideals were congruent with baronial power and collective self-rule.

Guild organization that combined personal and collegial rule generally disappeared from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century industry and commerce. Marx ascribed this withering away of guild organization to the spread of capitalistic modes of production; Weber ascribed it to the spread of bureaucratic organization (Marx 1965; Weber 1950). Although elements of guild organization survive in modern craft unions and professional associations, the question of continuity between the old guilds and the new forms remains unanswered by historians (Thrupp 1968). But private entrepreneurship did not penetrate the arenas of Continental higher education, nor, in general, the realms of state activity and public administration in which there was no-profit-seeking activity. The important result was that the guild-like university never had to face this competitive form.
As the state and national governments erected their administrative superstructures, bureaucratic forms grew stronger, although they had only partial control over the entrenched academic guilds. While ministries established national rules in such policy sectors as budget, admission, curriculum, and personnel, except during occasional periods of authoritarian suppression, they did not actively enforce them, because to do so would improperly invade the rights of guild self-determination and, later, the acquired rights of professors to freedom of teaching and research. "Bureaucratic" systems of higher education characteristically made many rules but enforced them weakly and encouraged much evasion. As chairholding professors became protected civil servants, their right to rule was usually enacted into state law and codified in state administration. Thus even the rules of the state often strengthened personal rule and collegial monopoly at the operating levels. In this climate, university-level administration had little opportunity to develop. The professors did not want it; the ministry took care of overhead services; and the "administrative directors" and other agents of the ministry located at the universities generally had only partial control over the professors and their elected deans and rectors.

Compared to the United States system, the Continental structure, which combines faculty guild and national ministry, minimizes institutional competition and the play of market forces. Such nationalized structures as those of France and Italy have attempted to equalize institutions: for example, the university degree is an award of the national system and not of the individual institution, and to study law at one university is the formal equivalent of studying law at another. Faculty are appointed within a single national personnel system, and promotion involves movement from one civil-service rank and salary to another. Uniform standards deter the separate institutions from competing for talent or emphasizing distinctive approaches. This uniform approach has had the unanticipated consequence of inducing faculty members to transfer their guild forms of authority, originally meant and still appropriate for small-scale organization, to the large-scale organization of national systems (or, in Germany, to a subnational or provincial level) in order to protect themselves against politicians and bureaucrats. Committees of senior professors often end up as a systemwide academic oligarchy. The guild as well as the bureaucracy prefers to control a domain of work.

Thus European academic organization has fostered excessive order, with institutions inclined toward unity and uniformity. New forces,
plans, and organizational forms have had great difficulty in penetrating such structures. As a result, the main thrust of recent reforms in the nationalized systems increasingly has been to counteract this uniformity. As these systems have attempted to move from elite to mass higher education within modern, complex economies, they have had to face more heterogeneous demands from ever greater numbers of students of diverse interests and backgrounds as well as from industry and government for highly trained manpower. They face the problem of creating diverse programs and approaches within the heavy constraints of structures that are uncomfortable with planned or unplanned diversity. Adaptiveness then becomes a very great problem: neither the deliberate action of planners nor the unplanned interaction of competitive institutions is a powerful force compared to the institutional strength of academic oligarchs and ministerial bureaucrats. Major efforts in reform may be mounted occasionally by central authorities under such extraordinary conditions of crisis as existed in France in 1968. But such efforts apparently have lasting impact, only insofar as they disperse control and otherwise open up the domains long monopolized by the forms. A central edict may disperse control, with the commander disbanding old units and turning the troops loose to experiment and regroup. The post-1968 French reform, officially disbanding faculties and allowing instructors to regroup in new units of education and research (UERs), has moved in this direction (Pfister 1972; 1975; Forgerand 1975; Furth and Van de Graaff, forthcoming). More fundamental reform in the nationalized systems will probably stem from efforts by many countries to regionalize government. Shifting toward decentralized government and administration would increase regional and local influences on the character forms, encourage institutional responsibility and ambition, and inject some elements of competition. Reform is leaning in these directions, as a reaction to the old uniform system, but its potential effect remains questionable in face of the structural and ideological forces that favor centralization in modern government.

The British mode of academic organization is also historically rooted in guilds, but the British superstructure enforces a very different combination of vested interests from those on the Continent. The British state bureaucracy has played a considerably lesser role (Berdahl 1959; Ashby 1966; Briggs 1970; Reeves 1970; Halsey and Trow 1971; Scott 1973; Moodie and Eustace 1974; Annan 1975). As chartered corporations composed of chartered colleges that could and did accumulate their own endowments, Oxford and Cambridge, dating from the thirteenth century, developed extensive autonomy from
the controls of local and national departments of government. The four Scottish universities—St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh—originating in the fifteenth centuries, also were independent of governmental bureaucracy. In the nineteenth century, after six centuries of an Oxbridge monopoly, England developed civic universities in industrial cities such as Manchester and Birmingham and a unique academic holding company for the nation and the Empire, in the form of the University of London, which had affiliated colleges in India and Ceylon, Africa and the West Indies, as well as in England. Again, the mechanism of a chartered autonomous corporation was used instead of the Continental device of placing the university within a governmental bureau and teachers within the civil service. Autonomy meant that each institution was free to admit its own students, arrange its own courses, hire its own faculty, own its own property, largely raise its own income, and pay its own bills.

Guild control flourished in this British pattern of remote state supervision, especially in the two oldest universities, whose historical primacy and prestige have subtly defined for all other universities a towering British style of academic control. Immensely elaborate and only partly codified rules and norms of personal privilege and collegial hegemony developed among a welter of chairs, departments, facilities, colleges-within-universities, senates, councils, and courts. But guild authority was not the only form of authority within the autonomous individual university. Especially outside of Oxford and Cambridge, laymen systematically have been included in an upper tier of academic government (the “Council”), and a key administrative post has been provided in the form of the vice-chancellorship. These participants have not been completely dependent on the professors, nor have they operated as functionaries of the state. Since they, and especially the Vice-Chancellor, are responsible for the welfare of the institution as a whole, they have helped tilt the guild interests of the professors toward a sense of corporate identity.

In short, compared to academic organization on the Continent, the British universities, responsible for their own administration, have developed different forms of participation. Infused with the old autocratic and collegial rights of the professoriate, bureaucratic and trustee authority has had a local role—a major role compared to the Continent, a minor one compared to the United States. Compared to the concentrations of power found at the top and at the bottom in the Continental systems, the British system has a weaker top but a strengthened middle at the level of the university. British faculty clusters have had to work with administrators and laymen who hold
university-level responsibility rather than with officials in a government bureau.

The professor's control beyond his autonomous institutions is more subtle and elaborate in Britain than in the United States. The practice of "external examiners," by which students are tested by professors from other institutions (and hence by which their own teachers are indirectly and informally assessed), has served to connect institutions. When such connections became standard, a whole "inter-organizational field" may develop conformity by mutual tacit agreement; a set of norms grounded in basic consensus may evolve (Warren, Rose, and Bergunder 1974; Clark 1965). Such controls as are elaborated from the bottom up can be more compelling than the formal regulations of national systems. Their power in Britain helps to explain why that country seemed to have a system long before it had a formal system and why uniform practice and a shared commitment to certain standards may be more prevalent in a system of autonomous institutions than in a system of nationalized administration. Collegial pressure can be more cohesive than bureaucratic pressure among institutions as well as within them.

University autonomy has been so strong in Britain that we can speak of the bottom controlling the top of the national "system" until after World War II. The University Grants Committee (UGC), created in 1918 as a way of funneling increasing amounts of government money to the universities, has consisted mainly of university professors who have received money directly from the British Treasury and doled out lump sums to the individual universities. As formerly independent organizations became parts of an emerging national system, this "buffer" mechanism was heralded internationally as an excellent way of preserving institutional autonomy (Berdahl 1959). It was also, of course, a grand case of national academic oligarchy, one in which traditional commitment to high standards of performance became institutionalized. But increasingly during the 1950's and the 1960's, growing national financial support has brought with it more direction from the top. The autonomy of the University Grants Committee was considerably diminished in the late 1960's when it was placed under the national Department of Education and Science. The Department has become a formidable instrument of government policy, able, for example, to pump monies into a nonuniversity sector at the expense of the universities, particularly those universities considered bastions of privilege. The Department and the UGC now operate as policy centers in a national system; they determine not only salary scales but the direction in which the universities are encouraged
to move. The British now have moved toward the Continental mode in which nearly all units of higher education fall under a single national bureau. Traditional autonomy still remains a force and resists this nationalizing movement. Yet nationalization is proceeding at a time when the central government has modern administrative methods for achieving integration, as well as a compelling need to economize in a high-cost sector, and at least some of the time, the ideological inclination to eliminate private enterprises and to seek equality and equity through the administrative arms of the central state. In a system in which there has been much voluntary convergence, centering on emulation of the academic styles of Oxford and Cambridge and the subtle connections forged by external examiners, nationalized administration has induced even more convergence.
The Historical Emergence of American Academic Organization

The general structure of academic organization in the United States is a mixture of forms of organization and types of authority, a unique combination that has resulted from the conditions under which different sectors have emerged, the development of vested interests, and the impact of earlier forms on later ones. The first institutional type to emerge was not the university, as in Europe, but the small independent college now known as the private liberal arts college. That form was organized from the top down, as Protestant groups in the colonial period established boards of managers, drawn primarily from outside academic life and from outside governmental authority, to hire and fire teachers, appoint and dismiss a president, and otherwise be responsible for the enterprise (Hofstadter and Metzger 1955; Rudolph 1962; Whitehead 1973). Trustee authority thus preceded either administrative or faculty authority; this method of governing later became customary even in the public sector. There was little or no guild organization among either faculty or students. The small private colleges multiplied rapidly during the westward expansion of the nineteenth century, spurred especially by civic and denominational competition (Tewksbury 1932; Naylor 1973). Although many of these voluntary associations without state support did fail, some 900 were in existence by 1900, and as a whole they were firmly fixed in the country's educational structure.

The university form of organization came late to America: the first university to be established as such, Johns Hopkins, dates only from 1876. Other older institutions had evolved from college into university: Yale developed "graduate work" in the 1850's and awarded the first American Ph.D. in 1861, and Harvard established a graduate department in the 1870's (Hofstadter and Metzger 1955; Storr 1958; Storr 1973). Other universities soon followed, and the important, prestigious, private university sector was well established by the turn of this century. At the same time, a public university sector was also emerging. The first universities supported by individual state governments date from the 1780's and 1790's, but it was not until after the Civil War and toward the end of the nineteenth century that they developed fully, due in part to the greater resources provided the states by the national government through the famous land-grant
legislation of the Morrill Act (Hofstadter and Metzger 1955; Veysey 1965; Storr 1953).

The emergence of the university after the institutionalization of the four-year college meant that a two-tier structure developed; advanced specialization was pursued in graduate and professional schools, which, as distinctive components of the university, were superimposed on the college structure. If the German university had been borrowed in its entirety, the American university would have accepted students directly out of high school as qualified to enter directly into the professional and graduate schools. But the borrowed idea of the research-centered university had to be adapted to established American expectations and the vested interests of the undergraduate college (Jencks and Risesman 1968). Thus a new comprehensive university emerged that included general education at the bottom and specialized education at the top. The general education offered by the state university served as its main basis of appeal for support from the state population and authorities. The undergraduate college of the private university served as an analogous basis of appeal for support from alumni and for effective competition against the hundreds of colleges that did not become universities. On the graduate level, the scientific disciplines and the research scholars were preeminent.

The device of a trustee board was carried over from the private colleges into both public and private universities: by the first half of the nineteenth century it was the chief American mechanism for bridging the gap between public accountability and professional autonomy, in sharp contrast to the assumption on the Continent and elsewhere that a governmental ministry was the appropriate mechanism. With trustees given formal responsibilities, no superior administrative bodies—a state department of higher education or a bureau in the state bureaucracy—developed. Instead, campus administration was subordinate to the trustees. In private universities and even more so in public universities, a separate group of administrators developed, headed by a president who was appointed and delegated authority by the trustees. Presidential leadership came into its own during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The presidents were swash-buckling captains of erudition in the eyes of Thorstein Veblen (Veblen 1954). Bureaucratic administration located within the institution itself, rather than within a higher state ministry, became by the turn of the century another distinctive feature of the American mode (Veysey 1965).

Then, too, the setting in which trustees and administrators operated was always inherently competitive within and among the major
sectors and the individual states. The competitive dynamism of the small colleges accelerated in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the autonomous private universities and the state-supported public universities set out in descending order of preference: to become great research universities; to become well-regarded American universities that brought honor to supporters; or to establish themselves firmly enough so that students would continue to appear, the faculty would not leave, and the bills would be paid. Much of the present structure of American higher education is a result of the system's openness, which was typified in the nineteenth century by combining private initiative and voluntary association with a multi-state fragmentation of public control, where numerous governmental authorities originated and developed public higher education under conditions that varied greatly according to time of settlement and regional differences within the large continental territory. No national office played any continuing role in this unplanned aggregation of institutions, as it did in the French central-administration version of the European mode; no state dominated the others, or even set the pace, as in the Prussian influence on the other Länders in the German federal-structure version of the European style. Instead, the American conditions led to dispersed control, unparalleled institutional diversity, and marked institutional competition.

If the university came late to America, guild forms of academic control came even later. Faculty claims of authority were preceded by the trustee mechanism and by strong university administration. As forms of faculty control emerged, they were conditioned by and blended with trustee and administrative control within the framework of a local legal entity. In contrast to the Continent, where academic organization began as a confederation of guilds, the original American building block was the unitary college. Then, when the college required formal subdivision to handle increased specialization, it was the academic department and not the European chair that emerged as the lower operating unit. The department existed at Harvard by 1825 and was firmly in place throughout the country by 1900 (Duryea 1973). As we will show in the following section, this organizational form allowed both for a certain amount of personal rule in specialized fields and for collegial decisions in certain matters about which professors cared the most, much in the style of the chairholding professors on the Continent. An ideological claim to guild-like rule was also gradually elaborated, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, which drew on the oldest traditions of the university, the great nineteenth-century
German model of the research university, and the concept of academic freedom. But the American department developed within the hierarchy of an established administrative superstructure. Professors had to win the right to decide matters of curriculum and personnel selection within a context of a young administration that was itself subordinate to the powers of lay trustees.

Faculty influence has varied considerably among the major and minor institutional sectors of the diverse American system, correlating generally with the age and prestige of the particular types of institutions. For example, faculty influence has been higher in leading private and public universities and in the leading private colleges than in the less prestigious institutions in each of these sectors. And it has been relatively low in two sectors that emerged late, in which origins and development grew out of extant modes of administration in American elementary and secondary education. One of these sectors began to develop in the last half of the nineteenth century in the form of "normal schools" for training elementary school teachers. In the first decades of this century, these evolved into "teachers colleges" that awarded the bachelor's degree and prepared secondary as well as elementary school personnel; still later these evolved into "state colleges," public comprehensive colleges, and recently in some cases they have assumed the title and even the competence of "state universities." This sector's historical association with state boards of education who were responsible for lower schools permitted patterns of heavy dominance by trustees and administrators that were more characteristic of lower than higher education. Such control has been even stronger in the community college sector, a twentieth-century phenomenon that predates World War II but did not flower across the country until the great expansion in mass higher education of the 1950's and 1960's. This form originated and developed as an upward reach of systems of secondary education. Community colleges have been staffed extensively by secondary school administrators and teachers and governed, either by local boards of citizens, who also govern the lower schools, or by boards built on this model.

It has been primarily in the community colleges and secondarily among the state colleges that instructors have been inclined to join faculty unions, a new form of faculty influence (Garbarino 1975). The relative powerlessness of these teachers has been further increased by the growth of an organizational structure that increasingly separates those at the top from those at the bottom. Unionization is yet another experiment in combining collegial and bureaucratic rule. And now union officials are added to the set of interest groups.
All of the major sectors identified above contain so many different mixtures of purposes, programs, and clientele that we must classify additional subtypes. The private sector, which now has only one student to the public sector’s three, remains enormously varied. The private university contains at least three important subtypes: the research-centered university, highest in prestige and national in orientation (for example, Chicago, Columbia, Yale); the secular-urban-based university, lower in prestige and more local in orientation (for example, Boston University, New York University, George Washington University, University of Cincinnati); and the Catholic municipal university, less prestigious, oriented both to locality and Catholicism (for example, University of Portland, University of Dayton, Seton Hall University, St. John’s University). The 800 private colleges have shown equally great variations in quality and commitment: the secular, elite liberal arts college, competitive with the top universities (for example, Swarthmore, Reed, Amherst); the middle-rank institution that usually maintains a modest religious connection (for example, St. Olaf, Baldwin-Wallace, Westminster); and the rear-guard places struggling to gain or retain marginal accreditation and in some cases still completely dominated by a denominational board or an autocratic president (for example, Oral Roberts, St. Joseph, Bob Jones). The institutions at the tail end of the academic procession, inferior to the best high schools, are “colleges only by grace of semantic generosity” (Riesman 1956). And similarly in each of the public sectors—university, state college, community college—dispersed public control has produced a great range in the mixture of purpose, program, and academic quality: the University of Mississippi qualitatively differs from Berkeley; Western Kentucky University differs extensively from Brooklyn College or San Francisco State University; and suburban Foothill Community College (Los Altos, California) is an academic showpiece differing radically from such downtown community colleges as Chicago Loop College and Los Angeles City College, both of which, with more than 20,000 students, face large numbers of poor students from minority backgrounds and offer dozens of one- and two-year terminal programs along with the academic courses that permit later transfer to four-year institutions.

The development of so much variance among and within the major sectors led long before World War II to an unparalleled national diversity. This primary characteristic of American higher education has developed along with a second: marked competition among institutions striving to enhance their own position in an unmanaged market of producers, each in search of financial resources, personnel,
and clientele. The privately controlled institutions competed not only with one another but also with the public campuses as they developed. Competitiveness extended even to public institutions within the same state system: to wit, the rivalry between Michigan State University and the University of Michigan, UCLA and Berkeley in California, Southern Illinois and the University of Illinois. A third distinctive feature of American higher education is the hugeness of some major parts as well as the whole. After a quarter-century of rapid development following World War II, official statistics in 1970 counted more than 2,500 institutions and eight million students. By the mid-1970's, New York had a huge state system of 64 institutions and 325,000 students; New York City operated a separate system of its own, with 11 institutions and 250,000 students. This placed the total scale of operations for the entire state of New York second only to the huge public system in California, with its nine state university campuses (enrollment 122,000), 19 state colleges (291,000), and 103 community colleges (957,000), with total enrollment for the state in excess of 1,372,000 (American Council on Education, 1974; State University of New York 1974; Lee and Bowen 1971).

Especially from a cross-national and historical perspective, the size and internal complexity of the American "system" are staggering. Generalizing about the American mode of academic control is thus extremely difficult. One method is to establish levels of organization that potentially can be applied to all nations (Van de Graaff, editor, forthcoming), and then to compare the nature of authority at each level in the United States with what we know about the Continental and British modes. This approach will bring us face-to-face with contemporary structure and the ways that the interests of various groups are rooted in it.
Organizational Levels in the American National System

We will speak primarily about the state university and the state college, although much of what we say bears also on the other major sectors. We will also occasionally discuss the American system as if we were foreign observers somewhat taken aback by the odd ways exhibited by those of another land.

At the lowest level of organization, the department is the standard unit. In comparison with the chair and its often-related institute, the department distributes power more widely: first, among a group of full professors, then, reduced portions to associate and assistant professors. The chairmanship of the department is an impersonal position in the sense that it commonly rotates on a three-year term among the senior faculty rather than remaining the fixed possession of one person. The incumbent must consult with other members, full professors and perhaps tenured associate professors, on some issues, and, on other issues must consult with the entire faculty. In such meetings, majority vote has been the common device for decision making. Thus, the department has been primarily a collegial body, unified in its common interest in a discipline and also somewhat hierarchical in the ranking of full professor, associate professor, assistant professor, and instructor (Clark 1961; Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor 1967; Ben-David 1971; Baldridge 1971; Blau 1973; Epstein 1974).

But the department is also a bureaucratic unit. The chairman is not only a spokesman for his colleagues to higher levels of authority, but is also the lowest representative of general academic management. He or she is responsible to one or more deans and one or more campus officials (president, academic vice-president, provost) and to a much greater degree than the chaired professor, the incumbent is accountable "up" an organizational hierarchy as well as "down" to colleagues of equal or near-equal status. He is often appointed by the administration, after consultation with department members, and serves at the pleasure of the central campus officials. Therefore, at the level in chair systems where the personal rule of the professor is strong, the American department system blunts the authority of the chairman by bureaucratic and collegial controls. The department sometimes can be particularistic in its decision making, through the
efforts of a towering figure in its midst or by heavy politicking in the voting of a collective body. But such tendencies are damped by the combination of lateral control within a collegial body and vertical control of higher officials. The situation of dual authority also induces the collegial body and the bureaucratic staff to watch one another. In this way, nearby administrative officials serve to check arbitrary power within the department. The tensions of the system fall most heavily on the chairman, because he is in the middle, placed between faculty and administration, and expected to assume responsibility on an ambiguous foundation of authority.

The next level up in the American university structure is the college (for example, the college of arts and sciences), or the school (for example, the school of medicine, law, or business). The college of arts and sciences commonly includes the basic disciplines—all the departments of the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. This central college also commonly has hegemony over undergraduate and graduate education, over everything, that is, other than the professional schools, which now operate almost exclusively on an advanced, post-graduate level. This is in contrast to the European system where professional study begins immediately after the secondary level and is organized in faculties that are parallel to the faculties for the humanistic and scientific disciplines. The basic college or similar units commonly have a dean for the undergraduate and one for the graduate realm. The department staff at most universities teaches at both levels and hence falls within both of these two major administrative jurisdictions. The deans are usually appointed by top officials of the university and operate more as true members of the central administration than do the department chairmen. The deans of the professional schools are somewhat more autonomous, although they usually are appointed rather than elected, and have the status of administrative officer. Each deanship is an administrative office staffed with assistant deans and other supporting personnel, a base of administrative power independent of faculty bodies and superior to constituent departments.

The college or school also has one or more collective bodies; for example, the faculty of arts and sciences, the faculty of the undergraduate college, and the faculty of the graduate school, which meet occasionally, hear reports from their own committees and the deans, and decide by collective voting. There is thus a dual structure within which the administrative officials and the faculty bodies must devise ways of separating and joining jurisdictions. Typically, the administration controls the budget, the teaching staff supervises the cur-
riculum, and both oversee student conduct. There are many dual-
membership committees, and certain professors develop administra-
tive capacities and relations of mutual trust with certain administra-
tors, and thus serve as a bridging oligarchy. On most campuses, the
broad academic collective bodies have little to say in the crucial area
of personnel. The hiring, promoting, and firing of teaching staff falls
to the individual department, which does the basic personnel work
and usually has primary influence in junior appointments. The higher
administrative officials and committees of professors appointed by the
administration must approve all appointments and exercise this power
(and the funding of requisite positions), which has serious conse-
quences in the case of expensive, tenured personnel.

The relationship of administrators and academics at this level of
organization may be characterized as a bureaucratized federation of
collegial groups. As in the chair-based systems, where the counter-
part unit is the faculty, the American college or school is a relatively
flat structure comprising a number of formally equal collegial bodies,
the departments, which may total fifty or more in the central college
(arts and sciences) on large campuses. But it also has an administra-
tive office that is hierarchically superior to the departments and is
clearly a part of a large administrative framework. Bureaucratic au-
thority is here much stronger than in the traditional systems of the
Continent, which systematically intrude upon the power of subordinate
groups and are interested in applying common standards.

At the third level of the university campus as a whole, the Ameri-
can structure exhibits a complex blending of the authority of trustees,
administrators, and professors. The laymen who serve on the board of
trustees (or regents) that is formally at the apex of control are sup-
posed to guide the long-term development of the institution in the
name of broad interests of the larger society. In public universities,
they are usually appointed by the state governor, who is the head of
the financing of the public sector, and hence may represent one or
another political point of view, usually conservative. In private uni-
versities, they are largely elected by the existing trustees, with per-
haps some participation by alumni, and tend to become self-perpetuat-
ing boards of relatively well-to-do and conservative businessmen
(Veblen 1954; Beck 1947; Rauh 1967; Hartnett 1970). Like such
boards in other sectors, they are part-time and amateur, meeting per-
haps once a month, or as seldom as three or four times a year, al-
though certain members (the chairman or the members of an execu-
tive committee) will meet more often and devote much time to the
institution. As their most important power, the trustees appoint the
administrative head, the president or chancellor, and officially delegate much to him, while retaining residual powers and ultimate legal control.

Of course, what is delegated has been defined broadly by the historical evolution of respective powers of the boards and the administration, with a gradual drift from close trustee supervision to management by professional administration. Formal administration increasingly came into its own at the campus-wide level of organization, beginning with the reign of the strong institution-building presidents (Veysey 1965). Here—utterly unlike Continental systems and chair-based systems around the world, a large class of administrators has developed who are neither of the faculty and controlled by it nor of a state ministry of education and directed by it. As experts in such specialties as student admission, recordkeeping, personnel policy, physical plant management, library operations, budgeting, public relations, alumni affairs, and university planning, they compose an administrative structure within which they work for and at the pleasure of the president, the vice-president, the treasurer, and the business officer. Their specialized roles and training dispose them to points of view different from those of trustees, faculty, and students (Otten 1970; Lunsford 1970). They are generally grouped together in a large administration building that physically reinforces their mutual contact and interest.

At the same time, the academics have some collective and representative bodies operating across the campus and at major segments of it, for example, in the form of an academic senate or a board of permanent officers. But the faculty grasp tends to be weaker than that of the administration and trustees. The professional-school bodies are usually split off from the inclusive ones of the central "liberal arts faculty" of the undergraduate college and the graduate school. All-university committees that embrace every school and college are commonly appointed by and report to the chief administrative officer.

The American structure at this level thus differs considerably from other countries by combining the presence of laymen as trustees, responsible for general policy and holding ultimate responsibility and power, with the operation of an administrative corps answerable to the trustees and holding delegated authority, jurisdiction, and responsibility. As of the lower levels, the campus-wide structure is relatively flat and considerably federative, because the many departments, colleges, and schools retain impressive powers and degrees of influence in many sectors of decision making, particularly over personnel and curriculum. But the structure is also clearly hierarchical, with-central
administrators and trustees superior. As a result, day-to-day activity entails an intermingling of the respective forms of authority of professors, bureaucrats, and trustees. In sum, the control structure of the American university is a federation of collegial groups that is bureaucratically ordered and supervised by laymen.

As we have the single campus and move up to wider administrative levels, the patterns of control become more divergent. The private university largely drops from view because it is not formally part of larger webs of organization. Its own trustees are the highest point of control. Traditional supervision of the conduct of private institutions has indeed been light, consisting largely of periodic evaluation by regional voluntary associations for general institutional "accreditation" and by professional associations for specific professional and scientific programs (discussed below) that pose little threat to any except marginally qualified institutions.

In the public sector, the years since World War II have seen a set of arrangements emerge at essentially a fourth level of organization, a coordinating structure for sets of universities within multicampus state universities. The University of California, for example, which at one time was virtually synonymous with the Berkeley campus, became a nine-campus system of institutions formally equal to Berkeley. In addition, sets of state colleges and community colleges also became, as nonuniversity sectors, more strongly organized as multicampus state systems (Lee and Bowen 1971). The controlling board of trustees moved from the single campus to the state level, and a "state-wide university administration" was created on top of the existing, and growing, campus administration. The central administrative staff rapidly became an imposing force, allocating resources and controlling the decisions of campus administrators by its power to establish uniform categories and to enforce compliance. Central multicampus administration is less accountable to the teaching staff than campus administration is to the trustees. A new division of interest has emerged as campus administrators and faculty unite to protect their own welfare against university-wide administrators who have a responsibility for the whole and a view from the top that is shared only with the trustees. With this elaboration of administrative superstructure, control has moved even further away from the dominant modes of chair systems, where the collegial control of professors has tended to dominate all levels up to that of state or national ministry of education. In the first level above the campus, professors have only minor places: in general, the higher the level, the lower the participation of professors.
Because education in the United States from earliest times was made the responsibility of state rather than national government, a fifth level of organization is important in the American structure. It has been to the state executive branch (the governor, the governor's budget and finance officers, and sometimes the department of education) and to the state legislature that the trustees and chief administrative officers of the universities and emerging university systems must turn for support—a situation that remains despite the great increase in federal grants of the postwar period. At this level, American higher education becomes a segment of public administration in the form of a large set of subgovernments within the separate states. The degree of integration into state government has varied considerably, given the different traditions, politics, and administrative structures of the states—from specific approval of narrow items in university budgets, such as faculty travel or the purchase of typewriters, to constitutional autonomy and lump-sum allocation that set higher education apart from all other governmental activities.

Also at this level, but apart from the regular offices of government, may superboards recently have been established for the purpose of coordinating all units of higher education supported by the state, thus bringing state colleges, community colleges, and universities together under one loose administrative framework. In attempting to map this organizational territory, recent research has pointed to four types of situations that vary in degree of central control and in proportion of members drawn from the public compared to members drawn from institutions (Berdahl 1971). The first type, with no state coordinating board at all, was found in as many as seventeen states as late as 1959 but in only two states a decade later. The second type, a board voluntarily organized by member organizations, also decreased in the same period from seven states to two. The third type, a formal coordinating board, spread from ten to twenty-seven states; and the fourth and most rigorous type, a "consolidated governing board," increased from sixteen to nineteen in number. Thus, the shift was clearly to the third type, which is essentially a formally mandated superboard placed over the existing boards of trustees that top the institutional sectors at our fourth level of organization. And within that type, there has been a trend toward boards that have a public majority and advisory powers—from three to eleven states—and boards that had a public majority and regulatory powers—from five to fourteen states. In these high councils, professors have virtually no role. "Faculty representation at the level of the 'superboard' is likely to be minimal or nonexistent" (Garbarino
1975, p. 11). Groups of professors may make occasional presentations, but they must turn to the officialdom of their own professional associations and, increasingly, their own unions to effect systematic purchase on state-level control.

To make matters even more complicated, this fifth level of state and regional academic organization in the American system also finds a set of nongovernmental associations playing a special role in accreditation: the awarding of legitimacy to institutions and the degrees they confer. Six regional voluntary associations judge whole institutions, among them, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools or the New England Association of Colleges and Schools (Sheiden 1960). Supported by annual fees paid by member institutions, each association has its own headquarters and small administrative staff. It draws on professors from within its own area, and sometimes from the outside, to compose the ad hoc committees that visit, evaluate, and report on various institutions, commonly on a five-year cycle. The operation of these associations permits a mild degree of professorial supervision and encourages consensus across a large domain of organizations. And the occasion of the accreditation visit calls for a self-assessment of weaknesses as well as strengths by the administration and faculty of an institution. But the accrediting association is an important pressure only on institutions that hover around a low threshold of quality—or, occasionally, an experimental college whose ways deeply offense established academic canons (Kerner 1970). Notably, these associations do not attempt to administer institutional equality and they do not serve as a private counterpart to the European ministry of education, which, as in Italy and France, attempts to equate the work at various institutions within the framework of state-certified national degrees. Nor are they equivalent to the English external examiners with their institutional commitment to the uniform maintenance of high standards. Rather the associations arose in the American context of dispersed control as a device for ensuring minimal competence and for establishing rudimentary norms of acceptable behavior. They do not have the power to stop already-qualified institutions from doing largely as they please. That power resides with the state agencies that top the individual state systems.

The peculiar subsidiary role given to the accreditation associations seems to have developed historically as a compensatory mechanism in a national system characterized by so much dispersed control, institutional diversity, and competition. Their role is congruent with considerable institutional inequality.

In international perspective, the sixth or national level of org-
ganization in the United States has been uncommonly weak. The foreign observer searching for order in American higher education could find no ministry of education, no formal structure that reached out from Washington, D.C., to embrace universities and colleges. Nor did any standing voluntary committees, councils, or commissions play a significant coordinating role. As late as the 1950's, the national Office of Education gathered statistics, administered a few categorical aid programs such as vocational education for the public schools, but dared not disturb state superintendents of public instruction, much less presidents of universities. Leaving aside special wartime efforts centered on scientific research, the nearest thing to systematic federal intervention was the "GI Bill" administered by the Veterans Administration, which gave financial support to veterans of World War II and later wars. In the 1950's, the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health began to influence scientific research and teaching in the universities in voluntary rather than mandatory fashion. However, professional schools of medicine and scientific departments at some universities have gradually become heavily dependent on national funds, essentially becoming federal-grant units within state and private universities (Babbidge and Rosenzweig 1962; Orlans 1962; Kerr 1964; Wilson 1965). The Office of Education became a major enterprise in the 1960's, administering major grants for higher education as well as elementary and secondary schools and developing the resources, personnel, and orientations that permit it to behave more like a European national bureaucracy.

The funds of the national government now come to universities and colleges in several forms. One is student-centered funding, by which the government makes grants and loans to individuals who, in turn, can purchase their education anywhere they want, including private institutions. This form plays heavily on the market features of American higher education, relying on consumer choice to guide development in a disorderly system. A second form is institution-centered, by which funds flow directly from the government to the institution. As in national systems in other countries, such funds vary from categorical allotment for specific programs to broad lump sums for general institutional support. A third form is discipline-centered, by which funds for research and, on occasion, teaching are distributed to specific departments, research centers and individual professors.

An increasing amount of indirect manipulation by various bureaus and central councils of the national government has resulted from national funding. The early 1970's saw the emergence of direct influence when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to-
gether with the Department of Labor decided to withdraw all federal funds from an institution that failed to present an effective affirmative action plan for employing women and minorities. Other such direct interventions, not possible ten or twenty years ago, appear on legislative and executive agendas (for example, the requirement that medical schools set targets and quotas for training certain types of doctors, in the name of national medical manpower policy, as a condition for the continuation of federal funding).

However, it remains the case that American universities and colleges do not think of themselves as part of a nationally administered system, and, in comparative perspective, they are not. The basic institutionalized lines of influence found at the national level in Italy, France, and now even Britain remain strongest in the United States at the level of the fifty states. Although the federal lines grow in importance, they remain uneven and secondary. And, some national policies are designed to enhance control of the individual states: to wit, a national law enacted in 1972 required all states to have some type of planning group ("1202 Commissions," named after the number of the law) for all public higher education, thus prompting superboard influence at the state level.

Thus, in formal organization, the United States has at best a quasi-system of largely indirect influences at the broadest level of control and coordination. Compared to the situation that existed before World War II, there is more of a formal system; compared to what obtains nationally in most countries of the world today, there is little. The private sector, topped in stature by such universities as Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale, remains independent and strong. The public sector is still essentially composed of the fifty states, within which individual public universities and colleges control personnel selection and compete with one another and with the private schools for students and faculty. Among the major advanced systems of the world, the American system remains the one structured to be most disorderly and to approximate a market of freely interacting competitive units (Ben-David 1972). It remains the most heavily influenced by the unorganized decision making that can be seen as "social choice"; it is at the opposite end of the continuum from unitary bureaucracy (Banfield 1961; Clark 1965; Warren 1967).

The trend is clearly toward administered order, with some coordination provided by voluntary associations of administrators and professors headquartered in Washington, D.C. (Bloland 1969; Bloland and Bloland 1974), as well as by the increasing influence of a number of federal agencies. But market conditions remain the basic element.
The national level of control is still not tightly structured and has only fragmented influence over an assortment of universities that vary greatly in purpose and ethos as well as in size and resources. Fragmentation remains strong relative to the forces of system building.

To summarize the nature of academic control in the United States from an international perspective: the national center still possesses relatively little formal authority but is much stronger than it was a decade or two ago; the middle levels of organization (state, multicampus system, and campus) are strongly organized, with the authority of trustees and administrators predominating over faculty prerogatives; and the lower levels (colleges and department) retain impressive decision-making powers in the areas of personnel and curriculum, areas in which professors care most about, exercising collegial and personal rule. The various levels and the several major forms of authority constitute not only a division of powers but also a set of counter-vailing forces. In organization and authority, the "system" is not only inordinately large and complex but also fundamentally unsystematic.

The voice of students remains weak in all levels of formal councils despite the great attention paid in the 1960's to student protest and student participation in governance. It remains true in the United States that students vote mainly with their feet: they have much choice in where to attend and what field to pursue. They can choose not only what unit to enter but also can make the "exit" decision, moving from one organization to another (on exit and voice, see Hirschman 1972). With so much initial choice and later exiting, the viability of many individual colleges and universities depends on either adaptive response to clientele or the establishment of an ideology of unique performance. Since distinctiveness lays claim to clients in a way that sameness does not, many institutions attempt to develop a special character instead of passively accepting a uniform role (Clark 1970; Clark, Heist, McConnell, Trow, and Yonge 1972).

When we compare the distribution of authority across six levels of organization in the American system with those of the Continent, we see that powers usually found at the top elsewhere are located here at middle levels. Provincial and national ministries of education in other systems have taken care of the administrative overhead services involved in making appointments, paying salaries, running the physical plant, and supporting students. Little administration was considered necessary immediately above the domains of the professors, and, in any case, their strong guild organization did not permit it. Weak administrative structure at the university level thus became characteristic. But in the United States the tradition of institutional
autonomy demanded the handling of overhead services at the college and university itself, and the required government and administration became fixed in trustee and administrative authority that was separate from and above the domains of the professors. As administration became located on campus, the emerging class of university officials developed a vested interest in keeping it there, fighting against a shift that would move jurisdiction to the staff of state authorities.

In summary, the forces for change in the 1960's and early 1970's have affected this complicated control structure in the following ways: growth has led to increase in unit size at all levels, deepening the need for coordination within and between units and thereby favoring the development of more and larger administrative groups. Campus-wide administration has grown measurably and has become increasingly professionalized, with administrators even tending to use scientific management techniques in attempting to improve central assessment and effective intervention; administrative systems have grown larger and stronger at the level of state government; and new ones have developed at a level between the university and the state in the form of multi-campus university systems. The first major outcome of modern trends is ascendence of administration at these three levels. Administrators are so important that they overwhelmingly make up the membership of commissions, private or public, national or state, that advise on educational policy, in comparison to similar European commissions, which contain mostly prestigious professors. The growth of "federal intervention," itself important, remains a minor phenomenon compared to the administrative strength of the university-to-statehouse levels of the American system. Within these levels, the tilt has been definitely upward, toward a centralization of authority and administration.

Second, these three levels have come under greater public scrutiny and political pressure. The student discontent of the 1960's caused a wide range of specific publics to watch university affairs more closely, a rise in concern that was also propelled by escalating costs, growing interest in access, and the greater visibility of a larger enterprise. Even without the organized student actions, the increased interest would have brought about more political attention and with the hostile public reaction to radical tactics on campus, intervention by external political forces was ensured at the levels that are primarily in the grasp of system administrators, boards of trustees, and state officials. A second major outcome therefore has been a growing entanglement of administration with the politics of the general political arena.
However, below these administrative levels are the academic domains whose drift is by no means determined solely by high administration and external political forces. The work of teaching and research is still done in the department, and in such auxiliary units as the research institute and the interdisciplinary program, and much policy directly relevant to the basic work is decided largely at the second level of college and school. At the levels where higher education is a structure of disciplines, collegial control remains strong, challenged mainly by bureaucratic authority of the campus administration. The disciplinary understructure is thick and tough and resistant to externally imposed change; to their frustration, political groups are usually not able to penetrate these levels. The governor of a state, as in California recently, may fume about the little time that faculty devote to teaching in the state university, but the faculty continues to find ways to save time for research, often shielded by a campus administration interested in attracting and holding faculty talent.

The growth in knowledge and the demand for experts that has typified recent decades has reinforced the strength of the disciplines inside the organizational mass of ever larger educational systems. Increased specialization in scientific and other academic fields, as well as in the upper reaches of the general labor force, strengthens the influence of those whose authority is rooted in expertise (Parsons 1968; Jencks and Riesman 1968). Administrators in the 1970's are less qualified than in the past to judge the work of personnel in the many specialized sectors, and hence must depend heavily on the judgments made by professional peers. Thus, a third major outcome of recent social trends is a strengthening of the disciplines that crosscut institutions and the creation of a national system of higher education organized along lines of occupational specialty. With the increased strength of diverse clusters of experts, organizational structure is pressed toward greater differentiation and decentralization.

The market conditions under which institutions have long been operated still prevail. Private colleges and universities still make their way by individually raising funds, recruiting faculty, and attracting students. Public institutions, although operating within administered systems and more accountable to higher bodies, also still have to face the competition generated when more than 2,500 institutions operate under dispersed control. Strengthened state coordination has not eliminated the market. The growing power of administrative staffs during the 1960's was congruent with enhanced competition in the affluent higher education economy of those years. The *nouveau riche*
among the state systems, for example, Texas, Florida, and Arizona, eagerly sought to buy and stock faculty talent on newly built or greatly expanded campuses. Developing campuses in the New York State system such as Stony Brook and Buffalo tried to lure professors from Michigan and UCLA; Princeton and Chicago. The financial downturn of the early 1970's did reduce this competitive zeal, but the basic structure and established custom of the national system continues to promote a level of competition that is different in kind from that of apparently all other countries of the world.

Some observers have been predicting homogenization of higher education under greater control by the state (Newman 1971; Hodgkinson 1971), but any trend in that direction is slight when seen in a cross-national perspective, and it may actually be the reverse, toward greater diversity in controls. The combination of huge size and decentralization seems to be bringing about an increased number of modal patterns for the distribution and combination of forms of control. An enlarged division of labor in matters of academic control also makes possible the simultaneous growth of divergent forms of authority. As a general approximation, we may say of the American system that the professional authority of faculty has increased at the lower levels, the bureaucratic authority of administrators has increased at the middle levels, and the public authority of trustees and other citizens has increased at state and national levels. American higher education as a whole demonstrates an organizational evolution that is simultaneously unilinear and multilinear (Kaufman 1971): The unilinear evolution is toward ever larger systems, with more power for high public officials and senior administrators and more scope for planners; the multilinear movement is toward greater diversity within systems, a looseness within which various professorial and professional groups can vest their interests in slices of the educational domain. Academic control in America is part of the broader modern problem of how general policy makers, administrators, and professional experts will all be able to express and combine their legitimate interests in systems of ever growing complexity.
Academic Power: 
Concepts and Perspectives

Imbedded in the foregoing sections of this report and the related literature are a number of concepts and perspectives useful in the analysis of academic power. Our purpose is to aid future reflection and research by pulling together in one place many of the analytical ideas now available. Since modern national systems of higher education, especially the American, are among the most complex enterprises ever evolved, researchers need all the conceptual help they can get to penetrate the confusion and disentangle the strands of control. Many of the following conceptions have been drawn from the general literature in organizational studies, public administration, and political science, and are based on the broadest treatments of authority available in modern thought, such as Max Weber's classic treatment of traditional, bureaucratic, and charismatic forms of authority (Weber, translated by Henderson and Parsons 1947). Yet in no sense do these concepts constitute a "theory" and they are not presented as such. Instead they offer a battery of possibilities: each idea may apply heavily, moderately, lightly, or not at all to a particular empirical case; some of the ideas offer alternative ways of viewing particular situations. Enough is already known to warrant tentative judgments about their application to the American structure and we have presented only those that already have been found useful. But there is considerable variation in the American structure that further research can better identify. Thus we can foresee having both more specific conceptual statements and modifications of the more general concepts.

Forms of Authority

If we start from the bottom of national systems of higher education and work our way up to the highest levels, what types of legitimate rule might we observe? What is the minimal vocabulary for discussing the prime ingredients in various compounds of academic authority? We have identified the following ten forms of authority.

1. Personal rulership (professorial)—All modern complex organizations, usually portrayed globally as "bureaucratic," seem to contain much personalized and arbitrary rule of superiors over subordinates (Weber, translated by Henderson and Parsons 1947; Roth 1968). Systems of higher education are saturated with this form of rule; profes-
sors have acquired extensive leeway in personally supervising the work of students and sometimes the activities of junior faculty. The personal rule of the professors has many sources: it is historically linked to the dominance of the master in the early academic guilds; it is ideologically supported by doctrines of freedom in teaching and research, which in practice have been interpreted to mean that senior professors should be free to do largely as they please; and it is functionally based on expertise and the conditions that often promote creativity and scientific advance. Then, too, as professors acquire fixed slots in a bureaucracy, personal rule is often strengthened by the rights they acquire, an outcome that is the opposite of the intention of bureaucratic order. Such personal rule has been extremely high in chair-based academic systems, particularly when collegial supervision becomes nominal and state supervision is too remote from the operating sites of academic work to be effective. It exists in lesser degrees in department-based systems, such as the American, where power is formally held by an impersonal unit and spread within it among a plurality of permanent professors. But, even there it exists, most noticeably in advanced research and teaching: for example, the supervision of the graduate student in dissertation research. Personalized authority is always potentially subject to abuse, but systems of higher education apparently cannot function effectively without it and hence it would have to be invented if it did not already exist.

2. Collegial rulership (professorial)—Collective control by a body of peers is a classic form of traditional authority (Weber, Gerth and Mills 1958). In the academic world from the twelfth century to the present, collegial rule has been widespread. It has exceedingly strong ideological support in academic doctrines of community of scholars and freedom of teaching and research. It is also based on expertise; the growth of specialization in recent decades has increased collegial rule in ever more specialities and subfields, outside of as well as inside higher-education. In chair-based academic systems, collegial rule has often monopolized coordination at faculty and university levels of organization. It is also strong in department-based systems as the professors’ preferred way to run the department and, if possible, the larger units of college, school, and university. In the American system it is generally but one element in a local compound of authority (see below).

3. Guild authority—This type of authority is a compound of the first two, blending collegiality with autocracy. The individual master has a personal domain within which he controls subordinates; the
masters come together as a body of equals (one person, one vote) to exercise control over a larger territory of work (Thrupp 1968). This combination never disappeared from certain cultures, and they were predominantly academic systems. Systems of higher education have continued to be guild-like at their operating levels, and the combination of personal rulership and collegial authority commonly dominates the substructure of national systems. The guild simply moved inside the bureaucracy (Clark. *Academic Power in Italy*, forthcoming).

4. **Professional authority**—This concept, related to the three above, remains ambiguous and problematic in application. Professions are large occupational groups whose work involves the development and application of esoteric knowledge. Until recently, professional authority has been treated in social science literature as based in expertise, "technical competence," in contrast to bureaucratic authority, which is rooted in a formal position based on "official competence" (Parsons 1968). In practice professionals exercise authority in a host of ways—personally, collegially, and even bureaucratically—and therefore their actual exercise of power falls under one of the other categories. Much authority in such professions as medicine and law, as in the case of academic authority, began in guild organization and demonstrates the persistence and resilience of guild forms even when they are placed within large administrative frameworks, as they have been in the twentieth century. In large professions controls within and on the group are generally weak and depend considerably on the operation of personal and collegial rule. That rule may be particularistic as well as universalistic, oriented to short-run profit as well as to long-run service to society, and used to dominate clients and allied personnel as well as to serve ultimate professional ideals (Freidson 1970).

5. **Bureaucratic authority (institutional)**—As the best-known idea in the twentieth-century analysis of organizations, the concept of bureaucracy needs little explanation. It refers to formal hierarchy, formal delegation of authority to positions, formal written communication and coordination, and impersonality in judging individual worth and deciding what will be done. It is the antithesis of personal rule and collegial control.

Our earlier cross-national comparisons and discussion of organizational levels made clear the importance of distinguishing who "the bureaucrats" are and where they are located. In the chair systems of the Continent they have been largely found in central ministries, where they attempt to coordinate a national (or regional) system. In
these systems university-level bureaucracy has been relatively weak. In U.S. higher education, bureaucracy grew first at the institutional level, where it constrained the guild-like ways of faculty control, and it was until recently much weaker at "ministerial" levels of governmental coordination. The American pattern has put bureaucratic authority in the service of local ambition and need and helped to build identity and loyalty at institutional levels. Even more than professors, campus officials are likely to be boosters of their own institutions, because their job rewards and career successes depend directly on the success of the entire institution. Their perspectives and interests commonly will be different from those of officials in central offices.

In short, it is not the case that a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy. Bureaucratic authority can be hooked to different chariots. It functions in different ways in different systems, depending on the organizational level at which it operates. Only a few systems, preeminently the American, have placed bureaucracy at the institutional level and there given it a primary role of institution-building.

6. Charismatic authority (institutional)—The concept of charismatic authority refers to the willingness of a group of people to follow a person and accept his or her commands because of unusual personal characteristics—in the extreme, "a gift of grace" (Weber, translated by Henderson and Parson 1947; Shils 1968). The authority of such a leader is not basically made legitimate by position in an administrative structure or by established rights in traditional line of descent; rather authority is established by personal qualities. However, the exercise of charismatic authority is commonly compounded with bureaucratic or traditional position. In U.S. higher education, charisma has appeared most often in the college or university presidency, with the leader thereby drawing authority from both personal and structural sources. Charismatic authority, like all other forms, is situational: the personal qualities of the leader must be perceived and valued by would-be followers and subordinates. The authority disappears when followers are disillusioned even if magnetic personal qualities persist.

In American higher education during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, charismatic university presidents had considerable leeway in institution-building. In this period rule by amateur trustees was partially giving way to more systematic direction, guild/forms were not yet elaborate, and many presidents were responsible for building administrative staffs as well as faculties. In
comparison, present-day higher education seems lacking in such openings for charisma, except that crisis situations as well as situations of new organization often beckon the person who seemingly has personal gifts of leadership. Even stable, established contexts occasionally open up to such personal intervention, as when a college or a professional school or a department becomes ambitious to be better or different and invites in a "builder." Charismatic authority apparently still occurs, serving certain needs of leadership, mission clarification, and change (Shils 1968).

7. Trustee authority (institutional)—Like bureaucracy, trusteeship is such a common form of legitimate authority in American higher education that it needs little additional identification. It is important, however, to recognize that it is a weak, or totally nonexistent form of authority in other national systems. Its basic role in this country is a fundamental part of what is different about the American system. Developed under the special conditions of institution-building and system coordination that we reviewed earlier, the board of trustees became a natural part of American academic governance, backed by law and assumed to be a necessary and correct way of organizing and supervising colleges and universities. Most important, this key form of authority became positioned not at national, provincial, or state levels of government but instead as an intrinsic part of operating institutions. There, like the institutional bureaucracy, it has served in part as an instrument of institutional aggrandizement, linking the participation of some influential citizens to the welfare of the individual college or university. It, too, has helped make the middle levels of the American "national system" relatively strong, building corporate identity and pride at the level of the campus. It has served to link specific segments of the general public to specific institutions, for example, Lutheran families and church bodies in the upper Midwest to a Lutheran college in Minnesota. In its many variations of public and private boards, it may be considered as dispersed public control, with specific publics, as narrow as a few families or as wide as the population of a state, represented in different institutions. In non-trustee systems, the general public, through its elected representatives and public bureaus, participates more diffusely and indirectly in the control of a large set of institutions. Dispersed public control allows for much ad hoc, uneven development, and for the particularisms of small-group preferences. Since each institution needs financial resources and roots in a sustaining social base, trustee membership is heavily weighed toward those who have money and useful connections.
The current trend toward the integration of control in multicampus trusteeship, superboard coordination, state planning, and stronger oversight by the executive and the legislature in the fifty state systems, makes problematic the continued strength of trustee authority at the institutional level. If trustees move up from the campus to the multicampus system, and if some of their former powers are assumed at higher levels of system coordination, their role in sustaining distinctive institutional identities and institutional diversity will weaken.

8. Bureaucratic authority (governmental)—Wherever government assumes some responsibility for the provision of higher education, certain executive agencies will become the loci of administrative implementation. The involvement and the extent of participation of agency staffs can vary widely, of course, depending on the historical relation of the state to higher education and how that traditional relationship has been expressed in recent policy. For example, in the first quarter-century (approximately 1920-1945) of the existence of Great Britain's University Grants Committee, when monies flowed from the national treasury to the universities via a mediating mechanism, bureaucratic involvement was minimal. The UGC, controlled largely by persons from the university, had an extremely small staff, and was not located within the jurisdiction of a regular governmental department. In sharp contrast, high bureaucratic involvement has been presupposed and exercised in the European systems that use ministries of education as embracing frameworks.

Both the British and the American systems have been evolving toward the Continental model—the British at the national level and the American at both the state and national levels—and recent governmental policies in both countries have leaned heavily toward the build-up of bureaucratic staffs. Public officials are responding to problems of equity, accountability, and duplication by enacting laws—nearly all of which require larger central offices to disperse funds, to check on compliance with stated requirements, and otherwise to implement public policy. Reform brings bureaucratic accretions, a steadily augmented permanent staff that itself becomes an interest group with vested rights and self-sustaining points of view. Like other groups in the power equation, the permanent public educational officials need allies and supportive exchanges. Thus they develop tacit agreements with key legislators and staffs of legislative committees, political appointees in executive agencies, peers in bordering agencies, trustees and administrators at lower levels, and sometimes even professors. In small traditional European systems, the
ministerial staffs have had to trade principally with the most important senior professors within the systems, the superbarons who often have been able to dominate central staff. But in the large, modern American system, with its strong institutional bureaucracy and institutional trusteeship, the growing staffs in central public offices have a place in the division of control that is sharply separated from the teaching personnel (Lee, Eugene and Bowen 1971). They must relate primarily to the levels of academic organization immediately above and below them, especially because, of all the groups holding significant authority in the system, they are the most bureaucratic in nature and they are the ones most likely to accept the logic of hierarchical control. Largely overlooked in research thus far, these central administrative staffs should be seen as bureaucratic groups that are distinct from the administrative staffs located at colleges and universities. It is they who have system-wide, rather than local, duties, responsibilities, and concerns.

9. Political authority—From its very beginnings in Bologna and Paris some eight centuries ago, European higher education faced the problem of relating to the larger controls of state and church. As the nation-state increased its strength, it became the dominant framework; throughout the world today, higher education is primarily an organizational part of national government. It is thus conditioned by the nature of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and is affected by the exercise of political authority in each government. Weak coalitional national governments are hard put to enact major legislation, but rather must move by studied indirection and incremental adjustment to safeguard a precarious consensus, as in Italy, whereas a dominant state authority can push through a big bill promising extensive reform, as in France under DeGaulle in 1968, even if implementation is slowed and attenuated by countervailing forces.

Research on higher education in the United States has thus far paid little attention to the effect of state and national political arenas in the determination of what is done in higher education. Due to traditions of private sector, campus-level control, and institutional autonomy, there has been a strong reluctance to recognize higher education as a definite part of government. Appropriate conceptualization has also been restrained by the long-standing academic differentiation between the study of public administration and policies, which is located in political science departments and schools of administration, and the study of school and college administration, which is usually located in schools of education. Still, today, of all the
social sciences, political science remains the least involved in the study of educational organization. The lack of careful research on the role of general political authority in the governance of higher education has left a near-vacuum that invites easy speculation on the dominance of particular elites, with rightists charging that leftist faculty are in control, and leftists claiming that conservative cabals of trustees, administrators, and faculty rule the campuses. Such stereotypes of academic power will be corrected only as the intricate webs of political relationships found at the highest levels of state and national systems, as well as the distribution of authority at lower levels, are considered in the analysis of authority. Such analysis can be aided considerably by concepts drawn from comparative public administration and comparative politics—concepts such as those of political centralization, administrative centralization, bureau balkanization, and clientelism.

10. National academic oligarchy—Research on European systems of higher education has shown that under certain conditions professors are capable of transferring local oligarchical power to the national level (Clark, Academic Power, forthcoming a). Operating as the major professional group within a ministry of education, they have had privileged access to central councils and offices and have been the most important constituency for top bureaucratic and political officials. The situation has been otherwise in the United States, because of the lack of a formal national system and the strong role of bureaucratic and trustee forms of authority at campus- and state-wide levels. Still, some important American professors have had means of influencing policy relevant to their most important perceived interests in the national as well as the state capital. Disciplinary national associations have been important tools, national academies and associations of scientists have advised government, and in most years since World War II, a science advisory committee has operated within the White House. Peer review by committees of professors and scientists has become standard operating procedure in major governmental agencies that dispense funds for different segments of research and education—for example, the National Institutes of Health for the health field, the National Science Foundation for the natural and social sciences, and the National Endowment for the Humanities for the humanities. The need to use specialists is very great. Thus as part of a regular process, relatively small numbers of professors esteemed in their own disciplines play a national role. The legitimate part that academic oligarchs play in determining na-
tional (and state) allocations as well as broad policies ought to be explored more thoroughly in research on American academic authority.

Levels Analysis
The ten forms of authority identified above could easily be extended into a longer list in further efforts to escape the ambiguity of such general concepts as bureaucracy and collegiality and to specify terms that might be closer to reality and more helpful in research. Realistic conceptualization will be aided especially by a clearer awareness of the many levels of organization at which authority should be explored and the great variations in forms of authority at different levels. Cross-national analysis has revealed the necessity of attention to levels: To what units of organization in France and Germany does one compare the American department? To what governmental level in the United States does one compare the operations of a ministry of education in a German Land? Even a minimal awareness of levels can help analysts avoid such simple mistakes as comparing higher education in France to higher education in California. France is a whole country with a unified national system, whereas California is a segment of a country, a part that has extensive interchange with other parts in a national complex characterized by extensive institutional competition and high personnel mobility.

The power of decision making in areas such as finance, admissions, curriculum, and personnel selection is often distributed at different levels of organization and in different degrees at several levels and it is therefore differentially influenced by the forms of authority characteristic of those levels. For example, personnel selection tends to be the prerogative of the lower levels, influenced heavily by the collegial rule of professors, whereas budget determination has gravitated upward; influenced more than in the past by governmental bureaucracy and political authority. To progress in the analysis of academic power in the United States we will need to delineate more sharply the many levels of organization that stretch from the classroom and the laboratory to the Congress and the White House.

Integration Analysis
Organized social systems vary greatly in degree and form of internal integration, and organizational analysis has had great difficulty in grappling with those that are not tightly linked. Analysts have preferred to study single organizations, rather than networks of organizations, and to approach the unitary system as a problem of bureaucracy and hierarchy. These analytical biases have been particularly inappro-
appropriate for the study of academic authority, because, even in the single unit, organization may be inordinately loose and the legitimate exercise of power is often decidedly nonbureaucratic. Fortunately, during the last decade organizational analysis has increasingly recognized the problems of coordination and exchange among units that are loosely connected and not bounded by a unitary hierarchical structure (Levine and White 1961; Clark 1965; Warren 1967; Terreberry 1968; and Evans 1971). First, analysts have studied the problem of how individual organizations relate to their environments; then they have examined the relations among organizations (Thompson and McEwen 1958; Thompson 1967); most recently they have tackled whole sets or “fields” of organizations as the units of analysis rather than the individual organizations themselves (Warren 1967; Warren, Rose, and Bergunder 1974, Chapters 2 and 8). There is a sense that the older conceptions of coordination in formal organizations are increasingly inadequate for the understanding of how organized social units relate to one another in ever larger and more complicated webs of organization, and analysts are attempting to devise new ways to think about “organized social complexity” (e.g., LaPorte, editor, 1975).

Certain parts of the literature on system linkages are increasingly pertinent to the study of complex state and national systems of higher education, even if the descriptive materials are centered on health organizations or urban renewal agencies. Elementary classifications are available that help us go beyond such arguments as whether the university is really a bureaucracy or a community or a political system. One such framework has been provided by Warren (1967) in a typology of contexts in which organizational units interact in making decisions. His four types, containing six dimensions, range roughly along a general continuum from tight to loose connection: a unitary context, in which the units are parts of an inclusive structure; a federative context, in which the units primarily have disparate goals but some formal linkage for the purposes they share; a coalitional context, in which disparate goals are so paramount that there is only informal collaboration among the parts; and a social-choice context, in which there are no inclusive goals and decisions that are made independently by autonomous organizations. The latter three types—federative, coalitional, and social choice—are found frequently in systems of higher education. A university that is complex and internally fragmented may actually operate as a federative rather than an hierarchical bureaucracy; a peak higher education association, such as the American Council on Education, may operate largely as a coalitional organization; with some tendency to evolve to-
ward a tighter federative arrangement in order to represent higher education more effectively to the national government (Bloland 1969; Bender and Simmons 1973); and many autonomous private universities and colleges, freely competing and interacting with one another and with public campuses, may constitute an interorganizational field that is mainly social-choice or market-like in nature, but perhaps with some subtle systematic linkage provided by mutual tacit agreements that develop over time and hence edge the whole set of organizations toward minimal coalitional arrangements, and even some regularized contact, for example, that of a league, that provides bits of a federation.

As research grapples with the exercise of power and authority in large academic systems, such important differences in type and degree of integration will have to be explored.

Developmental Analysis

Everyone agrees that we should learn from history to avoid repeating errors of the past and to sense better what road we are on, and etc. But systematic approaches to that task are hard to come by and we generally leave the history books untouched or attempt to absorb their lessons as bedtime reading. One way to use the past systematically to help explain the present and predict the future is to make seriously the historical origin and development of the major forms of organization and control that comprise and characterize the present structure of higher education of a nation or state. The units of analysis are current components, and the search is for a developmental answer to the questions of why they exist and how likely they are to persist. The more we engage in cross-national comparisons, the more insistent become the historical questions.

For developmental analysis, three questions may be posed: (1) Why did a certain present-day form originate? (2) Once it was initiated, why did the form persist into the present, sometimes enduring over centuries of marked turmoil and change? (3) How did earlier forms condition later ones as they emerged? The question of persistence is the central one. Persistence may be rooted in apparent effectiveness: a given type of college or form of control seems to remain a more efficient tool than its possible competitors. Or, persistence may stem from lack of competition: the form in question may have developed a protected niche in higher education and has never had to face an open battle against other forms that may be equally or more effective. Or, persistence may follow basically from a set of sociological forces that turn an organizational form into an end in itself, a veritable
social institution. "Tradition" makes the establishment form into a valued way of doing things that is unconsciously assumed to be correct; participants become interested in perpetuating a form that serves and protects them and together become a vested collective interest as they develop legitimated rights, and appropriate ideologies develop that justify the traditionalized ways and the vested interests (Stinchcombe 1965). These sociological phenomena are seemingly at the heart of organizational persistence. They help to establish protection against possible competitors and thereby make irrelevant the rational question of comparative effectiveness. They help give certain types of colleges and universities and certain forms of academic control a stubborn capacity to survive all types of pressure, including the efforts of powerful reformers, and to project old ways into the future.
Consequences of Different National Structures

Power can be studied for its own sake, but it becomes more interesting in both theory and practice if we identify its consequences. What difference does it make for certain intentions and outcomes of education whether the authority structure of a national system of higher education takes one form or another? It is always possible that teaching, learning, and research will go on about the same, relatively untouched by the structures of control that encase day-to-day activities. But there is reason to suspect that this is not the case, since structured power gives influence to certain groups, systematically backs certain values and points of view while subordinating others, and determines whether activities will be affected by monopolized or pluralistic participation.

Seen against the backdrop of European and British modes of academic organization, our earlier accounts of the historical production and organizational levels of the American system pointed to certain key characteristics of the American mode: dispersed control, institutional diversity, competition, and a major role given to trusteeship and institutional administrative authority. Four main consequences of this set of authority characteristics may be hypothesized.

1. The persistence of institutional inequalities—Local control that is responsive to specific demands and special clienteles will produce unlike institutions, compared to central control responding to nationally or regionally-articulated demands and interests. Dispersed control leads toward diverse institutions that present different programs, attract different mixes of students, and develop different aggregations of faculty and financial resources. There will be rich institutions and poor ones, “noble” ones and “less-noble” places. In short, there will be extensive stratification of institutions, and equal treatment of students across institutions will not be possible in the sense of a promise of similar quality of training and value of degree.

Of course, fragmented and dispersed control is correlated with institutional inequality. Systems of concentrated authority may attempt to plan diversity for the parts under their control. Conversely, institutions operating under dispersed control may move toward uniformity, rather than diversity, through voluntary imitation of leading institutions. This type of institutional drift has been often noted
in the countries characterized in past years by a high degree of institutional autonomy from central control. Yet the basic tendency seems to be that concentrated control leads toward uniformity, dispersed control toward diversity. Reformers who value mainly equality of opportunity and treatment will usually prefer increased central control, wanting to use mandates of the state to lessen institutional inequality, while reformers who value diversity and choice will prefer continuation of dispersed control.

2. The formation of corporate identities—The fundamental characteristics of the authority structure of American higher education encourage the development of organizational identity at the level of the college or university. In contrast, identity formation at this level is dampened in systems of concentrated control, since fundamental responsibilities are lodged at a higher, all-system level. Under dispersed control, many institutions must take considerable responsibility for their own survival and viability; under competition, they must guard their own advantages and seek to reduce their competitive disadvantages. The locating of trustee and administrative authority at the campus level historically in the American system also puts two powerful groups to work on the construction and protection of the identity of the individual institution. As a result, the problem of distinctive organizational character has been given relatively high priority in American academic administration.

3. The facilitation of scientific progress—The American authority structure seems conducive to scientific advance, particularly in the leeway granted young scientists to move among institutions in search of individual autonomy, collegial support, and resources. Such individual mobility depends considerably on dispersed control and competition among autonomous institutions. In contrast, mobility is restrained in national unitary authority structures, where all academics are members of a single corps, and uniform civil service procedures stress seniority over merit and also prevent institutions from making differential offers. In addition, chair-based systems have been noted for the power of individual professors and the dependency of younger academics on the wishes and inclination of a patron. Ben-David has hypothesized that the leading role of the German and American systems of higher education in scientific productivity in different historical periods has been related to the considerable amount of institutional competition they have allowed (Ben-David 1968; Ben-David 1971).

Numerous features of higher education and society will influence scientific progress. Thus, it is possible that centralized control may
provide less favorable conditions. Current research in the history and sociology of science is likely to soon provide more insight in this important matter.

4. The maintenance of system flexibility and innovation—In comparative perspective, the American structure of academic power favors adaptation and innovation. Financial support comes from many sources, rather than the national treasury alone; autonomous private institutions adapt to different, specific clienteles; state colleges and universities reflect state and regional differences. Institutions are relatively exposed to market forces—e.g., changing consumer interests, and competition from other colleges and universities. Dispersed control has included a differentiation of sectors, and what one sector will not do, another will. Thus, the conservatism of leading research universities in innovations in teaching and learning does not block other types of institutions from experimenting in those activities. The overall "system" is able to respond to a host of competing and often contradictory demands, needs, and interests, as its parts move in different directions. In short, the general structure happens to be appropriate for the heterogeneity of function that is implied in mass higher education.
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