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ABSTRACT An analysis of the literature dealing with the responsiveness of public institutions to their clientele constitutes the main body of this interim project report. The analysts adopted Dahl and Lindblom's classification of political decision-making processes for summarizing the range of governing systems possible in public education. These four governing systems are (1) hierarchy (control by professionals), (2) bargaining (control by competing elites), (3) polyarchy (control by nonelites), and (4) price (control by consumers). Attention is given to the particular decision-making arrangements employed in each model and to the conditions that have made these arrangements successful or unsuccessful in producing decisions responsive to the interests of the public being served. A preliminary research design is proposed to identify those conditions that would (1) make public school teachers and administrators more responsive to elected school officials and (2) make school boards more responsive to the interests of the public. A summary program budget and an extensive bibliography are also included.

(Author/MLF)

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MILESTONE 1: REPORT OF PROGRESS

Program R1501

THE RESPONSIVENESS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

TO THEIR CLIENTELE

by

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John David Grove

June 1, 1973

CENTER FOR THE ADVANCED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

University of Oregon
Section I

REPORT OF PROGRESS
I

REPORT OF PROGRESS

During the past six months we have been reading and analyzing a variety of social science literature dealing with the responsiveness of public institutions to their clientele. The results of this activity are reported in Section II, "The Responsiveness of Public Institutions: A Bibliographical Essay."

On August 1 we will present an inventory of propositions which will distill the findings on each of the four models of school governance into theoretically meaningful statements relating structural characteristics of governance to the responsiveness of public school programs. Finally, by November 30 we will have completed a rather detailed manuscript on current knowledge about alternative forms of school governance in America.

In the program addendum to the proposed scope of work submitted on February 23, 1973 and in our subsequent conversations with the program supervisor, we requested that a decision on our request for an option to renew would be made on the basis of this first milestone review. It was agreed that an early decision on this matter was necessary to allow for adequate planning of research activities for fiscal year '74 and '75. This is necessary input because the academic year begins in September and most personnel decisions must be made by that time. Our proposed research activities in FY '74 also call for work in a number of school districts. This will require some lead time to identify the districts and gain entry to them. To help you make the option to renew decision, we are adding a preliminary discussion of our research plans for FY '74 and '75. Also included is an approximate budget to cover the activities described.
Section II

RESPONSIVENESS IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
II
RESPONSIVENESS IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS:
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

In our basic program plan entitled, "The Responsiveness of Public Schools to Their Clientele," we noted that many Americans are dissatisfied with the performance of public schools despite numerous accomplishments. We singled out two complaints in particular, the non-responsiveness of school systems and the lack of opportunity for the involvement of citizens in school affairs, as deserving investigation. Our first task (Milestone 1) in dealing with these complaints was to review the social science literature on the responsiveness of public institutions to their clientele.

We immediately recognized that what is good in public education is neither self-revealing nor self-fulfilling. Mere expressions of what is wrong with the present educational system and proposals for remedying these wrongs are not sufficient to assure responsive action by public school officials. What was needed, we discovered, was not another set of recommendations on what to do to make public education more responsive, but a specification of the institutional framework within which responsive educational programs will be chosen. In the context of American public school systems, the primary task confronting us, in other words, is to identify those conditions which would make public school teachers and administrators more responsive to elected school officials and those conditions that would make School Boards more responsive to the interests of the public.

This study of the governance of schools, in other words, will deal
primarily with the interfaces among the major groups of actors in public school systems and not with the detailed processes and actions within these groups. The major groups contributing to educational choice are students and their parents, elected public school officials, the superintendent and his staff, and teachers and administrators in the schools. We will try to describe the incentives built into alternative patterns of governance in school systems and how those incentives can be changed to make the public schools more responsive to students and their parents.

To facilitate our review of the literature on responsiveness, we adopted Dahl and Lindblom's classification of political decision making processes for summarizing the range of governing systems possible in public education. These four processes or governing systems are 1) hierarchy, 2) bargaining, 3) polyarchy, and 4) price. Their major characteristics are presented in the following table.

**SYSTEMS OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE**

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<th>Locus of Decision-Making Power</th>
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This preliminary review of the literature and bibliography will attempt to ascertain how public institutions falling within each of these major categories respond to the public they serve. Attention will be given to the particular decision-making arrangements employed in each model (who makes what decisions at what level). We will also attempt to indicate the conditions which have made these arrangements successful or unsuccessful in producing decisions which are responsive to the interests of the public being served.

In hierarchical decision-making processes most decisions are made by the leaders of the organization. They decide when, under what conditions and with whom to consult if outside advice is desired. There is usually no way for non-leaders to displace leaders if the organization's decisions run counter to the non-leader's interests. When this model is applied to school districts it presumes that the Superintendent controls most decisions in a district. School Boards act less as decision-making bodies and more as communications links between the Superintendent and the public. Client demands are presumed to be internalized by the professionals within the school organization. And the primary opportunities for citizen participation are in board and budget elections. The major norms governing decision-making are the professional norms of the administrative staff and the teachers. Ideas for change and innovation come through professional communications channels.

Since decision-making in most school districts approximate this model we will rely on the politics of education literature to describe the characteristics of hierarchical decision-making.
In organizations which rely on bargaining, decisions are negotiated by various leaders representing groups with different goals. Each leader or group has enough power to block the attainment of the goals of other leaders. Bargaining refers to a number of methods for resolving differences among leaders by making mutually beneficial exchanges. In public school systems the model suggests that superintendents, school boards, interest group leaders have goals and decision resources which vary from issue to issue. The interdependencies thus created set up situations in which bargaining can take place. Boards bargain with community leaders who command economic resources needed by the schools. Elite norms still dominate decision-making, but opportunities for other values to enter the decision-making process whenever people holding those values control some resource needed by school officials. The extent to which school officials will be responsive to outside values is a function of the distribution of decision resources salient to the issue among leaders, the intensity of preferences on the issue among leaders, and the distribution of preferences among leaders.

Bargaining is a familiar decision-making process in American politics and to a lesser extent in public school systems. Again, in discussing this model of governance, primary attention will be given to the literature on bargaining in school districts.

The polyarchical decision-making model assumes that non-leaders (the public and clientele of organizations) control adequate resources to dominate most decision-making situations. Leaders compete for the support of non-leaders both to gain office but also to gain support for programs.
being considered by the organization. In school systems polyarchical
decision-making would be recognized by widespread citizen and parent par-
ticipation in school decisions. Superintendents and school boards would
openly solicit the opinions of various publics on most issues. Within the
district most decisions would be made by committees on which public mem-
bers would be included. Implementation of school programs would also
involve maximum community participation. Decision-making would be slow
and the outcomes would be compromises.

Many public organizations have attempted to bring citizen groups into
their decision-making processes. The Community Control movement has at-
ttempted to give parents more decision-making power. However, Community
participation was made an integral part of the OEO programs and the Model
Cities program. Since both of these programs have been extensively eval-
uated, we will pay particular attention to them as a means of gaining
insight on the responsiveness of polyarchical governing systems.

In the price or market system of decision-making consumers make basic
decisions by exchanging money (in most cases) for services. The sum of
individual exchanges determines the mix and quality of the services pro-
vided. The market model assumes that individuals have a variety of goals
and tastes, that there are alternatives to satisfy the different tastes,
that information is available on the various alternatives and their likely
consequences, and that consumers have free choice. The market model applies
to most private schools. If it were to be applied to public schools each
school would be a more or less independent service unit contracting for
teachers and auxiliary services independently and selling its educational
services to students for a tuition fee. The role of school boards would be to collect taxes and distribute some kind of exchangeable medium (say a voucher) to parents. Boards would also regulate and inspect schools regarding minimum requirements and conditions. They might also establish minimum rules for the operation of schools. The superintendent and his staff would be employed by the school board and would have no direct control over the curriculum or services being provided by the schools. Individual school principals could contract with the district office for services (testing services, psychological services, etc.) but the responsibility for selecting and providing educational services would reside in the individual schools.

We will review several suggestions for educational reform which rely on the market model for making educational choices. In addition, we will review some literature on family choice in the educational marketplace to find out the constraints on consumer sovereignty in the area of educational choice.

THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

No hierarchical school system is explicitly designed to concentrate authority. Indeed, the fundamental school board resource is its representative responsibility. That hierarchical decision-making systems are the norm is a result of the erosion of representative functions. How this came about can be seen best by analyzing the decision resources available to school boards and superintendents. From the normative view of lay control of education, school boards speak for 'the people.' In a
society in which symbols associated with popular sovereignty have such high salience, the mere act of representation is a potential resource. If the school board is perceived—at least by the superintendent—as being a potential mobilizer of various publics, its power is enhanced.

Although legal authority and representative function are the most universal of the potential resources available to school boards, others may exist in specific districts. In their study of a rural community in upstate New York, for instance, Vidich and Bensman discovered that the school board was closely allied with prevailing community elites (Vidich and Bensman, 1960). Others have found this to be the case in communities characterized by an allegedly monolithic elite structure (Kimbrough, 1964).

The whole question of utilization of political elites by school boards is complex, and needs further explanation than is possible here. Our assessment is that the interaction between community political elites and educational decision-makers has been exaggerated. Gittell and Hollander's comparative analysis of six urban districts (1968) finds little evidence of interaction, much less efforts and influence between educational decision-makers and other more generalized political actors. Still, the question should be dealt with because so many students of educational administration have followed sociologists and political scientists—uncritically—into the thicket of "power structure" research. Early studies suggested that major educational decisions were shaped directly by "prime movers" in the community. Hence, school boards could mobilize key members of the power system to do battle (if need be) with the superintendent. By the same token key influentials were said to set the major policies of
the educational system. Obviously, the lack of reliable support for this most popular hypothesis does not mean that educational decision-making is completely autonomous. What is suggested is that the political elite(s) of a community may—depending upon the issue, the community, the style of the board—be unavailable as a board resource.

The superintendent's potential resources are more limited in scope but potentially more effective in an exchange. His primary resource is his professional reputation for expertise in matters pertaining to education. The exchange between bureaucratic experts and elected laymen is hardly unique to school boards. The analogies which come most readily to mind are city council and city manager, and legislative committees and executive department. The medium of bargaining is similar to all these situations, yet there is something both unique and puzzling about the resources of the superintendent of schools. We have a tradition of "lay control." The existence of local school boards—almost uniquely American—attest to this tradition. In contrast with, say, England, the popular assumption that laymen should influence educational policy-making is viable. Simultaneously, however, we accord greater deference to superintendents than is true of most other public "professionals" (Martin, p. 50). This curious ambivalence actually strengthens the value of expertise, since there are virtually no institutional controls on superintendents other than accountability to the board. Superintendents, then, use their expertise in a disguised fashion, insisting that they are held in check by an alert board while attempting to establish a monopoly on technical skills and information. As Minar notes:

"The technical expert, the district superintendent, is likely to flourish in those community settings where expertise and division of labor are assigned intrinsic value....Where his "employers" on the board and in the
community trust and value expertise [the superintendent] is likely to have much more discretion and initiative, right up to the highest policy level" (Minar, 1964, p. 141).

The claim for expert status by the superintendent is buttressed by another belief which can be used as a resource to evade lay control: the separation of education and politics, and the consequent insulation of educational decision-making from broader based political conflict. The "reforms" of 1890-1910--initiated in response to the growing influence of urban political machines--produced a conventional wisdom which is still intact among administrators: the separation of policy-making from administration, and concentration of authority in the office of the superintendents. Keeping schools out of politics also meant minimizing the legitimacy of political conflict, and hence the legitimacy of "outside" influence as represented by pressure groups (Salisbury, 1967).

In contrast to overtly political bodies, such as state legislatures or city councils, school boards and administrators define pressure groups as outside the proper influence system. (Hess and Kirst, 1971). The "normal" resource of an interest group is the perception by a decision-maker of its legitimacy (Zeigler and Baer, 1969). Admittedly, perceptions of legitimacy vary from group to group, issue to issue, and so on, but there is a general assumption on the part of most politicians that groups have a right to be heard. Superintendents do not share in this assumption. (Crain, 1968, pp. 115-128). Further, only about half the school board members accept the legitimacy of group originated demands (Jennings and Zeigler, 1971). When the claim for expertise is successful, interest group influence will be minimal, as in New York:

In the last two decades, education in New York City has become amazingly insulated from political and
public controls. One could accurately describe the situation as an abandonment of public education by key forces of political power within the City.... Weber's theory of the emergence of a specialized bureaucracy monopolizing power through its control of expertise characterizes the role of the education bureaucracy in New York City. The claim that only professionals can make competent judgments has been accepted. Civic and interest groups have responded ambivalently. On the one hand they accept the notion of the professional competence of the bureaucracy, but at the same time express a hopelessness regarding their ability to change the system (Gittell, 1967, p. 209).

To a lesser degree, teachers suffer from a comparable denial of legitimacy. They are employees of the school district. Employees, runs the official argument, have a right to be heard, but not to participate. If teachers accept the employee role, their organizational influence will be minimal. Similarly, students (and parents) have not yet been accorded a legitimate voice as the consumers of the educational product. They are accorded considerably less voice than consumers normally exercise. They are not free to "vote with their feet." Since their choices are limited, their resources are largely confined to protest. Protest normally isolates the protesters from sources of power, thus proving to be an inefficient mechanism (Lipsky, 1968; Wilson, 1961).

The relative insulation of boards and superintendents from the constraints of political bargaining (the "group process"), leaves us with the task of understanding how boards and superintendents share their power. Superintendents, like city managers, are products of the demand for efficiency, and the increasing complexity of educational policy. In the early years of the public school system, the authority to manage schools was in the hands of school boards. Boards had leaders, raised money, selected
texts, and even interviewed prospective students (Callahan, 1966). However, in the middle of the nineteenth century, school rapidly became compulsory and free. Simultaneously, the country leaped enthusiastically into the Industrial Revolution, with its accompanying population explosion and urbanization. As schools grew in complexity it became apparent that lay boards did not have time or inclination to continue management. Various schemes (including the currently popular "community school"--the division of large cities into small districts, each with its own board) were tried; but finally the boards gave up. In the latter half of the nineteenth century boards began to hire professional administrators who slowly and inexorably began to assume not only administrative but policy-making authority (James, 1967). Around 1895 a rear-guard action on the part of boards was conducted in an effort to prevent the abolition of boards. Superintendents proposed that responsibility for instructional policy be turned over to them. Once appointed, superintendents were to be independent of boards. Boards--patronage oriented and imbedded in the partisan politics of the community--managed to win this fight, retaining their authority to hire and fire superintendents. Thus, the shape of educational policy-making was set: each contestant retained some resources (Callahan, 1966). Indeed, noting the erosion of board powers, Carlson maintains that the board's most important function is selecting a superintendent (Carlson, 1972).

Winning the fight to retain legal authority over the hiring and firing of superintendents did not, of course, do much more than keep retreat from turning into rout. The decline in the number of districts (thereby, the increasing centralization of policy-making) continued to be a major
component of the ideology of "scientific management." Since 1932, four-fifths of the school districts in the United States have disappeared, while pupil populations have risen by 15 million. The ratio of board members to student population has increased from one to 46 in 1932 to one member to 300 pupils in 1967 (James, 1967). Further, superintendents predict—and approve—even more centralization in the future (Andes, et al., 1971). Clearly, complexity works to the advantage of superintendents.

Hines' (1951) fifty year history of the Eugene, Oregon school board illustrates the trends which James and Callahan outlined. His study shows the gradual assumption by superintendents of the responsibility for the instructional program, then for the selection and supervision of the professional staff. From these beachheads the superintendent expanded his domain to budget preparation and fiscal control, purchasing, school site selection, plant management, and public relations. The assumption of board powers was gradual and not invariably uncontested. Conflict erupted at each new expansion of superintendent's authority, and was not necessarily resolved during the incumbency of the superintendent that initiated the "power grab." But the general thrust of the change is unmistakable when viewed over the long sweep of time.

According to Hines, the first erosion of board power occurs when the superintendent (and central office staff) assumes control over the instructional, or educational program. Curiously, the educational program is the one area where boards have theoretical legitimacy; yet it is the first to go. In virtually all studies classifying issues coming to the attention of the board, matters bearing upon the quality of the educational program rank last in terms of the attention devoted to them by the board.
It is common knowledge that boards of education devote little time and thought to the problems of the educational program per se (Greider, et al., 1961).

A systematic study of a national sample of school districts by Jennings, Zeigler and Peak (1973) provides clear support for the earlier generalizations. In this study, it was assumed that the superintendent would have a well developed idea of an appropriate educational program for his district, and that the board's function would be to react (much in the manner of Congress reacting to the initiative of the "chief legislator," the President). Accordingly, we examined the extent to which boards were able and/or willing to muster significant (e.g., close to a majority) opposition to the superintendent about the content of the educational program. About one-fourth of the boards qualified. However, we further reasoned that--given the agenda setting authority of the superintendent--overt opposition would give us only a partial image of board-superintendent exchanges. Policy may be controlled by preventing conflict over a threatening issue from ever being joined. We found that only four percent of the boards exercised independent agenda-setting authority.

As one superintendent in an earlier study candidly put it, referring to the board members and the educational program:

They don't know anything about it; but the things they know they talk about, like sidewalks, sites, and so forth. I let them go on sometimes because I don't want them to talk about curriculum. (Kerr, 1964, p. 51).

This is an example of an adept superintendent avoiding overt board disagreement over a potentially controversial issue by the practice of non-decision-making. On the other hand, the occasional superintendent who is
passive or dominated by his board may anticipate board opposition and avoid an issue (in spite of his preferences) because of his expectation of defeat. To minimize these pitfalls we constructed a composite measure consisting of degree of opposition, and the subjective probability which board members attribute to the likelihood of the superintendent winning an overt contest between himself and the board over the content of the educational program.*

The results are presented in Figure I, which illustrates the distribution of scores graphically. The higher the score, the greater the superintendent dominance of the board. The medium score is a mere 0.12, indicating that the majority of districts in our sample fall toward the superintendent-dominant end of the continuum. Further, the negative value of the indicator of skewness (-0.51) indicates that relatively few districts appear at the board-dominant end of the distribution. The skewness can be readily observed in the departure of the curve from normality.**

The basic resource of the board is its representative capacity. However, we have seen that relatively few boards have been able to escape superintendent

* The percentage of board members who rarely or never oppose the superintendent per board and the percentage of board members predicting defeat were computed for each board, and the combined into a single measure of superintendent dominance by computing the square root of the sum of the squared values of each individual measure and converting these sums into their standardized equivalents.

** It should be stressed that no absolute interpretation should be placed on these scores. A score of zero, in other words, should not be construed as an indicator of equivalence between superintendent and board. The correct interpretation of the scores is that they represent the degree of superintendent dominance relative to other districts.
domination, and (presumably) assert their representative resources. How does it come about that the representative resource is under-utilized? A fundamental contributing factor is simply the board's image of its opportunities. Dykes states that "what the school board does depends in large measure on the board's view of itself in relation to its responsibilities" (Dykes, 1965, p. 17).

Basically, we see Dyke's assertion as allowing us to classify boards along a continuum according to the degree to which they accept a representative or "professional" role. A board which sees itself principally as
a mechanism through which various segments of the community can participate in the formation of educational policy will behave much differently from one that views its role as being a protective buffer between the professionals who run the schools and the public whose children are educated in them. In the former instance, public(s) support or opposition will be a salient input for the board. In the latter case, the professionally oriented board is less inclined to perceive and act upon expressions of popular values. Such boards will place greater reliance on technical expertise. The board which subordinates its representative responsibilities to what it perceives to be its responsibilities to professional educators is likely to accept an administrative definition of its job.

Gross, Mason and McEachern's seminal study of school boards and superintendents in Massachusetts makes it clear that, from the point of view of the superintendent, the two roles are incompatible and the professional role is preferred. One of the items used to ascertain degrees of professionalism is: "In deciding issues the board members vote as representatives of important blocs or segments." The model superintendent response was "absolutely must not" and 68 percent of the board members agreed with their superintendent (Gross, et al., 1958, p. 225).

Our assumption led us to ask the direct question: "Do you ever feel any conflict between your responsibility to the public and to the school administration?" Each board was given a score to reflect the percent of its members who responded negatively. Thus, high scores indicate relatively high degrees of professionalism in school board orientations, whereas low scores are indicative of representative boards. Figure 2 arrays these scores graphically. Our use of this question as a surrogate
for professionalism is based upon our understanding of the values of superintendents to insulate the school. Hence, more "representative" responses indicate a linkage with the community, or non-professional attitude.

The distribution of scores indicates that a majority of American school boards tend to perceive their roles as being consistent with the values of professional educators. In terms of the language of the theory guiding the essay, the majority of boards define educational markets in such a way as to give superintendents the advantage. Rather than serving as a conduit to channel popular views to the administrators, boards came

**Figure 2**

**Distribution of Boards by Role Orientation: Mean**

**Board Scores on Professionalism**
to define their job as "selling" the administration's program to segments of the community.

Not surprisingly, there is a significant positive correlation (.35) between board professionalism and superintendent dominance: superintendents win (partially) because boards want them to. As Lipham, Gregg, and Rossmiller put it: ...."board members [tend] to engage in role avoidance—delegating the decision-making power to the superintendent of schools."

Lipham and his colleagues found, for instance, that 90 percent of all school board members thought that they should not serve as spokesmen for segments of the community; yet slightly over one-fourth of the citizens thought this was a good idea (Lipham, Gregg, and Rossmiller, 1969).

The McCarty and Ramsey report (1971) does contain a graphic description of a typical professional board:

The superintendent of schools made certain that no issue came up that would raise the ire of any board member....Therefore, there was very little in the way of controversy, argument, debate, or the like....School board meetings were very short since they were confined to approving the recommendations of the superintendent....Much of [the superintendent's] work was done behind the scenes. He frequently contacted board members....and probably knew exactly how every vote would be beforehand. This allowed him the option of failing to bring up issues that might lead to a confrontation or raise some question regarding his authority.

The school board members felt that Dr. X knew school matters well. He had a doctor's degree and long experience with the schools. Why should they question him. Or, as it was more often put, "Who am I to question him?" Improvements were made, but conspicuous issues such as sex education....were brought up only after the superintendent was relatively assured that everyone agreed on them....The counselors, administrative assistants, principals, or any person involved in any way in school policy were all hand-picked by the superintendent.
Perhaps the key issue in the decision-maker role is that of selecting board members....The school board itself urged people to run....and they usually did so unopposed....Candidates were always suggested by the superintendent....in terms of their name, the person's prestige in the community, his talent for being down to earth on crucial issues, and his compatibility with the other board members (McCarty and Ramsey, 1972, pp. 173-174).

If this type of board-superintendent exchange is a victory expertise and the erosion of representation, there are still variations in this pattern: representative roles do, occasionally, become articulate and superintendents occasionally lose. In looking for explanatory factors in exploring this variance, we can address ourselves to the character of the board, the level of conflict in the community, and the nature of the issues (whether routine or episodic).

A beginning clue as to when we might expect to discover exceptions can be found in the well-worn (but still interesting) idea of status. We are, of course, accustomed to expect an association between social status and political behavior, but Minar has given the concept of status a more refined definition:

The differences in decision-making we would suppose to derive from differences in conditioning to, understanding of, and outlook on expertise and the division of labor [are]....differences rooted in the experience of status groups. Thus the better educated and those in professional and managerial occupations are those who respect and understand specialization and delegation, those who see it in their own life routines. (Minar, 1966, p. 832).

The higher-status professional's respect for technical skill can be observed operating throughout the history of school (and municipal) reform. As Hofstadter notes (1955), municipal (and school) reformers sought to attack the partisan bias of ethnic politics by the application of modern
business methods, especially scientific management. "Efficiency" and reform were virtually synonymous terms. Accordingly, administrators began to assume the role of business manager (Callahan and Button, 1954, p. 80).

The middle class respect for expertise results in a curiously ambivalent exchange with the superintendent. As we noted, opposition to the superintendent is relatively scarce. However, it is strongly associated with social status. Higher status boards are far more likely to oppose the superintendent than are lower status boards. (Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973). Initially, this finding, contradicts the assumptions of Minar (see also Gross, et al., 1958, p. 95). Further, Bowman (1962, pp. 1-4) found higher status boards considerably more inclined than lower status ones toward permissiveness and granting decision-making latitude to the superintendent. Why, then, do our higher status boards appear less "professional" than they should be?

In addition to respect for expertise, higher status boards have—in their status itself—a resource (Zald, 1969, pp. 105-106). Higher status persons are generally more informed, articulate, and have a more coherent ideology than do lower status persons. Thus, while they respect expertise, they also possess more of it than lower status board members, (but not necessarily superintendents). However, while they oppose the superintendent more often they are ultimately less successful as antagonists: compared with lower status boards they are less likely to win when they oppose the superintendent (Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973). Their opposition, then, is relatively easily overcome; they lack the tenacity of lower status boards. The latter, although less likely to challenge the superintendent,
are more likely to persist as the conflict becomes heated. They are less persuadable.

Aroused lower status boards usually spell trouble for the superintendent. They are, as we have noted, not clear in their understanding of the division of labor between superintendent and board. Thus, there is a negative association (-.20) between board status and desire to maintain class supervision over the superintendent (Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973). Such boards spend more time on routine, internal issues at the expense of the educational program. The emergent picture of the lower status boards is one of overconcern with administrative detail, failure to delegate authority over routine matters to the superintendent, and forfeiture of responsibility to oversee the general educational program. The opposite is true of higher status boards. However, their inability to ride a conflict out minimizes the effects of their concern with general educational policy.

Although efforts to link the decision-making style of boards and superintendents to the structure of influences in a community have proved futile, there is still the possibility that the decision-making style of a board will impact upon the exchange with the superintendent. If, for example, the board is immersed in bitter factional conflict, it may have little opportunity to contest the superintendent. Political scientists who study collective decision-making assume the existence of factional conflict, and concentrate upon bargains and strategies of influence. When one examines school boards, it is important to understand that intra-board conflict is not considered legitimate in the eyes of professional educators. As Dykes says, "Factions exist in hundreds of school boards throughout the country. In every instance they present obstructions to the proper
functioning of the board and to the work of the superintendent" (Dykes, 1968, p. 152).

One might well wonder why this is the case, and the answer is not difficult to ascertain. Factions are "bad" because they contradict the administrative ideology tenet of "unity." Salisbury captures well the essence of the ideology:

Educators have tried very hard to achieve and maintain consensus among all those engaged in the educational enterprise. Unity is a prerequisite to a reputation for expertise, and it thus adds to the bargaining power of schoolmen as they seek public support. Unity inside the school helps justify independence from "politics" (Salisbury, 1967).

In spite of the official ideology, school boards do have intra-group disagreement. In order to tap the nature of this disagreement, we constructed a threefold typology of school boards based upon: 1) the extent of the disagreement, and 2) the development of reasonably permanent coalitions. Boards in which the majority of members perceived little or no disagreement, were characterized as consensual. Those in which the majority perceived relatively frequent disagreement but no stable coalitions are described as pluralistic. The remainder, which have both frequent disagreements and stable coalitions fell within what we term the factional category. Figure 3 indicates the resulting distribution of boards in the sample.

As we can see, relatively few boards resemble "little legislatures," i.e., have stable factions. On the other hand, the ideology of unity does not prevent the entirely human characteristic of arguing. The majority of boards are pluralistic, with frequent disagreements, but none serious enough to produce permanent friction. Finally, quite a few boards measure
up to the factional ideal. The basic question is: Are superintendents justified in their fear of conflict? Do consensual boards provide more freedom for superintendents? The answer is not as unequivocal as we might expect.

It is true that consensual boards behave pretty much according to the expectations of the superintendent. They are exceptionally high in "professional" orientation and quite likely to be dominated by the superintendent (Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973). Yet the factional boards are even more likely to defer to the superintendent, even though their acceptance of the professional role is not quite as high as is the case for consensual boards. What probably happens is that factional boards would like to take a poke or two at the superintendent but are debilitating by the rigidity of their factions and seriousness of disputes. Energy is directed inward. Given the high level of tension to such boards, their inability to control the superintendent might disappear if a coalition was able to achieve a working majority. From the superintendent's point of view the consensual board is preferable to the factional one—despite the latter's slightly greater acquiescence—because of the lower potential
for upheaval. Pluralistic boards are clearly the most difficult for superintendents to dominate. Their frequent squabbles but infrequent coalitions suggest a board engaged to some degree in debates over the substance of educational policy yet capable of resolving conflict. In these boards, the lowest level of superintendent dominance is found. Such boards represent the most serious short-run threat to the superintendent. They can keep him off balance with shifting alliances and the articulation of diverse points of view.

Our view of the superintendent-board nexus as a small social system incorporates the more general view of forces affecting educational policy. The interaction among board members and the superintendent produces forces affecting behavior which are beyond, and in some cases independent of, forces emanating from the community (Charters, 1969). Such forces contribute to the continuity and stability of the small social system and serve to insulate it from the larger political community.

Who shapes these group norms? The superintendent or the board? Superintendents frequently express an interest in socializing board members into their own definitions of the situation, as evidenced in their frequent use of phrases such as "orienting new members," "educating the board," or "making the board more professional." We know, of course, that most boards fit well into the superintendent's definition of the situation, but we do not know how much work he has to do to achieve a "professional" board.

The most extensive treatment of the socialization of board members is by Kerr (1964). Kerr was particularly interested in illustrating how the older board members and superintendents inducted new members into the system—by applying to them the status of "freshmen," and by using the
common sanctions of humiliation and criticism, and ultimately social and intellectual isolation if the new member persisted in deviant behavior. Kerr documents the process whereby new members of the board come to accept the view that concern for the instructional program was not their affair, but rather lay within the province of the administration, even if the new members had displayed close attention to the educational program during the campaign.

Kerr, given the limitation of his data, gives the impression that the superintendent is the major socializer and that he always wins. Certainly, the conventional doctrine of superintendents virtually requires that they treat boards as in need of education. The raison d'être of the institution of the superintendency places board members in the position of pupils:

The superintendent should expect the board to look to him for leadership in the educational affairs of the district...He alone is in a position to see the total picture, and, furthermore, he must carry the responsibility implicit in the role of chief school officer. (Ashby, 1968).

There is, in addition to frequent professional repetition of the liturgy of the expert, considerable emphasis upon the political role of the superintendent by a growing group of students of educational administration, most of whom (in an effort to explode the argument of neutrality) describe the superintendent as a skillful manipulator in the tradition of Lyndon Johnson. Actually, his ability to co-opt the board is constrained by the resources available in the exchange. Peak has summed up the dangers of the over-active superintendent:

Not only is he violating the norm of keeping education out of the arena of political conflict, but he is also
likely to find himself in a contest with the board over the mobilization of political resources. The exchanges would involve but one type of currency—political support. In a sense, the superintendent would be competing with the board on the latter's "home turf".... the superintendent would be engaged in an out-and-out contest to see whether he or the board (assuming, of course, that the board wished to compete) could muster the most political clout (Peak, 1971).

These assumptions suggest that the best strategy for superintendents is to avoid "meddling in board politics as such." Some findings in support of Peak's statement are: 1) superintendents who intervene openly in the election of board members are more likely to encounter opposition, 2) the results of superintendent's efforts to "educate" board members, or to build private coalitions of community support are mixed at best. In large cities and suburbs, there is a strong negative association between conscious indoctrination and superintendent dominance; the reverse is true in small towns. Thus, a heavy-handed approach succeeds in antagonizing board members in larger places. Further, there is no discernible effect on superintendent dominance of the effort to build external political coalitions, except in large cities, where it has a small positive effect (Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973). In fact, the more superintendents engage in overt efforts to muscle boards, the less likely they are to dominate them!

Not only does "playing politics" in a manifest fashion reduce the value of the superintendent vis a vis the board; he may very well find himself in the job market if he does so. Superintendents can keep their jobs, and influence, by ignoring the pleas of political scientists and students of education and politics that they recognize their "true" status as politician. If selecting a superintendent is the most important job of
the board superintendents should be wary of giving them this opportunity. Superintendent turnover is clearly related to levels of conflict on the board. The more opposition within the board to the superintendent the greater is the turnover. Also, there is evidence that superintendent turnover is linked to board turnover, i.e., the rapid infusion of new members into a stable system (Iannaccone, 1967; Jennings, Zeigler and Peak, 1973); in turn, there is some evidence that board turnover is linked to community political instability (Walden and Blue, 1970; Goldhammer and Farner, 1964). We shall return to the question of linkages between board-superintendent interactions and community conflicts; but for the moment it is sufficient to observe that community political instability is largely beyond the control of the superintendent. His only option—and frequently this option closes quickly—is to stay clear (Browder, 1970). Superintendents can, however, avoid starting a community conflict by minimizing the visibility of the school system (Charters, 1953; Zeigler and Peak, 1970).

The insulation of the schools from the larger framework of community politics cannot be guaranteed. Community tension does have some clear spill-over into the exchange between board and superintendent. The structure of board decision-making is remarkably attuned to levels of perceived community tension: consensual boards are associated with very low levels of tension, pluralistic boards are unaffected, and factional boards are strongly associated with high levels of community tension. The following figure based on estimates of tension and conflict by board members, shows the relationship (-1.0 equals very low tension, 1.0 equals very high tension):
The factional board, with its stable coalitions of antagonists, reflects the hostilities of the community; the consensual board, with its pattern of harmony and unanimity, mirrors the placidity of the community environment. Not surprisingly, consensual boards are found most often in small cities.

The level of tension in a community also translates into board-superintendent conflict, but not necessarily in a diminution of superintendent influence. No matter what kind of community we consider, the higher the level of community tension, the greater the tendency of the board to oppose the superintendent. The translation is most immediate in large cities. Yet in those very places, increased tension in the community actually strengthens the hand of the superintendent in his exchange with the board. One reason for his improved position is the probability that the board will become factional and direct its energy inward. Further, the complexity of the educational system in large cities makes it difficult for the board to challenge the superintendent efficiently. The complexity of the system renders it almost impervious to change (Rogers, 1968). However, in spite of his ability to overcome opposition (perhaps because of it), the superintendent leaves himself open to the only possible challenge: the right of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Board</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$ Tension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensual</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factional</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4

Distinction of Boards by Level of Tension
the board to fire him. The battle then becomes one in which the use of "the ultimate weapon" is the only possible strategy.

Boards in smaller districts behave quite differently. On the one hand, there is a less direct translation of community tension into opposition to the superintendent. On the other hand, when opposition does develop, it is likely to be nearly unanimous and effective. Usually in the large cities, the board divides into opponents and supporters more or less evenly. In smaller areas, there is usually consensus either for or against the superintendent. Unlike large city boards, small town ones are willing and able to overcome the technical expertise of superintendents. Small town boards, as Vidich and Bensman (1968) note, are likely to conceal conflict if they can, but are also likely to devalue the resources of the superintendent if they elect to respond to high levels of community tension (Alford, 1960). Small towns are, after all, characterized by greater homogeneity of values and political leadership (Bidwell, 1965). In such an atmosphere, the expertise of the superintendent actually may be a hindrance: he appears as the alien expert and may remain unintegrated with the community.

The translation of the mood of the community, then, into the characteristics of the board-superintendent exchange is partially dependent upon the nature of the community. Although tension about schools is generally low, an increase in tension heralds an upheaval in the exchange between board and superintendent (Minar, 1967; Masotti, 1967).

The decisional structure of the schools is, to generalize, insulated from the political process, routinized, and dominated by the administration. Is such a culture "normal" or "functional" for a society? Viewed as an essentially conservative institution (Key, 1965; Lane and Sears, 1964;
Zeigler and Peak, 1971), one which stresses consensus values, minimizes tensions, and thus homogenizes the oncoming generation, the educational system has worked rather efficiently. However, there is a reasonably strong probability that the apolitical view of educational policy-making is coming to an end and that the governing pattern—as described here—will be modified. There are several conspicuous symptoms of change:

First, there is the gradual reduction of routine at the expense of external issues. Demands for increased participation on the part of traditionally disfranchised groups are increasing, and the issues they raise are not generally technical (e.g., student rights); second, pressures are building from both the national and sub-local levels against the monopolization of influence by the central administration of local school districts (Coleman, 1970; Fantini, Gittell, and Magot, 1970). In some cases, national and sub-local coalitions are forming abetted by such strategems as the Office of Economic Opportunity's support of experimental voucher plans; third, there appears to be a gradual fragmentation of values in the society (Toffler, 1971), making it increasingly difficult for schools to make decisions.

Schools have been—irrespective of the blandishments of theoreticians—unresponsive and isolated. The rhetoric of change has disguised an unyielding and rigid bureaucracy (Goodlad, 1970). Consequently, the assault on the schools is beginning to worry administrators who (even if they had read the work of researchers) could not have prepared themselves for coping with widespread demands for change.
Decentralization

Decentralization, as an effort to provide some relief from the rigidity of hierarchical systems, is a device which has not proved uniformly successful in even a modest re-allocation of decision-making authority.

Yet the very existence of decentralization schemes lends credence to the possibility of reducing the insularity of schools. We have noted that the level of community tension finds expression in the board-superintendent exchange. Opposition to the superintendent (nascent bargaining) develops in high tension areas. Decentralization efforts occur generally in an effort to abate this conflict—to diffuse it—and thus may, ironically, minimize bargaining opportunities. Such a result is, of course, not inevitable. It is important to recognize that the implicit goals of decentralization are more in the direction of achieving bargaining rather than polyarchy.

Decentralization is an administrative technique whereby a central authority delegates functional responsibility and some decision-making to officials of the local school system, each of whom administers schools in a particular area. The term decentralization is not to be confused with "Community control" which denotes power redistribution.

There are many forms of decentralization which are essentially different steps toward the establishment of semi-autonomous community school boards. Of the 28 cities with populations over 500,000, 8 have decentralized their whole school systems or given some units in the system's autonomy.
The different forms of decentralization can be divided into eight categories which are further steps to the establishment of semi-autonomous community school boards. The eight categories are: 1) Systems with decentralized decision-making but with centralized administration (Riverside, California); 2) Systems with administrative decentralization but with centralized instructional and supporting services (Garden Grove, California; Baltimore, Maryland; Hillsborough, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Clark County, Nevada; and Nashville, Tennessee); 3) Systems with administrative decentralization and decentralization of instructional and supporting services (Broward County, Florida; Portland, Oregon; Fairfax County, Virginia); 4) Systems which are in the process of decentralizing and providing for community participation (Minneapolis, Minnesota; Seattle, Washington; Milwaukee, Wisconsin); 5) Systems with administrative decentralization and community participation in some or all of the subdistricts (Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Montgomery County, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; St. Louis, Missouri); 6) Systems with decentralized administration and services, and community participation in some or all of the local districts (Fremont, California; Atlanta, Georgia; San Antonio, Texas); 7) A system with some local districts controlled by a locally-elected Board of Education, while the remainder of the system remains under centralized administration (Washington, D.C.); 8) A system which is completely subdivided into local school districts, each governed by a locally-elected community school board—A system with total commitment to community control, (New York, New York). For further details see "Decentralization and Community Involvement: A Status Report, ERS Circular, 7(1969).
The immediate objective of such decentralization proposals is to break up the unwieldy bureaucracies that have evolved with the growth of the city and its school system. Bringing the administration nearer to the consumer, it is argued, will make schools more responsive not only to parents and students, but also teachers (Marcson, 1971).

Experience with city wide decentralization plans in New York City, Detroit, Philadelphia, Boston and Los Angeles suggests that any effort to redistribute power in the school districts would be met by a coalition of opposition in state and city legislatures and Teachers' Unions (the most noteworthy example is the Bundy Plan in New York City). Although there are a number of plans to decentralize administrative school systems which would increase parent participation, only two major cities have adopted comprehensive city-wide decentralization plans (ERS Circular, 1969).

In evaluating the effect of decentralization on the responsiveness of the school systems, it becomes immediately apparent that in New York and Detroit (the only two areas to have comprehensive decentralization plans), attempts to decentralize and perceptions of racial integration become interrelated (Jenkins and Shepherd, 1972). Administrative decentralization received considerable support at a time when racial integration was a high priority. In 1969, decentralization plans received overwhelming support by New York Civic leaders (LaNoue and Smith, 1971:75). However, by 1971 racial integration was in the process of being re-evaluated and consequently, decentralization plans received little support from the general public. In Detroit only 37% of whites and 29% of blacks supported the implementation of decentralization plans (Walker and Aberback,
1972:64). Obviously, the impetus behind decentralization, like racial integration, is on the decline.

The professional elites largely opposed decentralization plans. The teachers' unions in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit and New York have largely opposed school decentralization, and only in Washington and Baltimore have they supported current decentralization plans (Gittell, 1972:6). The Council of Supervisory Associations have gone on record as opposing decentralization plans because they felt it would be used to purge white officials and would be a forum for intolerable demands by the community (LaNoue and Smith, 1971). In a survey of fifty New York City elementary school principals, Dale Mann (1970) has shown that principals perceived community involvement would affect their autonomy and authority.

One of the more important aspects of decentralization is the election procedure—each district board elects its own school board members through non-partisan proportional representation elections, who have the power to choose their own superintendents. These elections, it is hoped, will increase the number of participants, especially minority groups. However, as Table 1 shows, the results tell a different story.

The actual turnout for these elections (about 15%), although compared with anti-poverty and model cities elections is reasonably good, tends to favor white middle class (Jenkins and Shepherd, 1971). The survey taken by The Institute for Community Studies shows that although whites constituted 40% of the pupil population, they elected 72% of the new school board members. The typical board member was a white male Catholic, professionally trained with two children, and living in his district for about nine
TABLE 1
Comparison of Racial Backgrounds of Local School Board Members (Averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Pupil Population Non-White</th>
<th>% School Board Members Non-White</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.C. Under Decentralization</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit Under Decentralization</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Marilyn Gittell, 1972b:678).

years with his children in parochial schools (Gittell, 1972b: 678; U.S. Senate Select Committee, 1971). Similarly in Detroit, only 30% of the school board is black in a city whose school population is 63% black. However, when one compares these results with the city population tables—it is obvious that the elections quite accurately reflect the ethnic and racial composition of Detroit and New York. The racial composition of New York is: 72% white, 19% black, 9% hispanic and 2% other; for Detroit: 70% white, 28% black.

To summarize this analysis of the effects of decentralization on sets of clientele, we find that under decentralization, public schools are still fairly responsive to a fairly homogeneous set of professional elite groups. The increased participation, which was the result of decentralization, shifted the balance of power from liberal whites with city constituents to more conservative whites from the neighborhood. Minority groups were never able to mobilize to affect the elections. Professional elite groups
have constantly opposed decentralization and consequently have managed to control the movement. Recent research shows that support for decentralization is declining in both white and black groups. One reason may be the expense involved. The Bundy Report suggested the cost of decentralization would be an additional $50 to $100 million a year for New York City. Los Angeles officials have estimated a cost of $30 to $60 million a year. When money is tight, people look to other systems to make schools more responsive.

THE BARGAINING MODEL OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

When hierarchical systems—even those with some degree of decentralization—prove to be unresponsive (under conditions of heterogeneous demands), political bargaining occasionally develops and becomes institutionalized. About twenty-five percent of the school districts in America have characteristics associated with bargaining structures.

Bargaining systems, unfortunately, tend to be rather constrained by the difficulty of widening the arena of conflict. Our assessment is that bargaining systems, although technically meeting the criteria of elite competition, are generally not as robust as political bargaining.

The relatively closed educational system in America is one which the various articulate publics have found remarkably impermeable. At the risk of redundancy, it is worth repeating that American education is symbolically democratic. As we have seen, however, few insiders pay more than lip service to the concept of lay control and many actively oppose it. Martin, perhaps most severe among those who expose this conflict between symbols and reality, laments:
Thus is the circle closed and the paradox completed. Thus does the public school, heralded by its champions as the cornerstone of democracy, reject the political world in which democratic institutions operate. (Martin, 1962, p. 89; see also Salisbury, 1967, pp. 408-420).

Legitimacy—the key to successful negotiation between elected officials and various publics—is difficult to establish. Information—a basic resource in the arsenal of the lobbyist—is hard to pry loose from the iron grip of the superintendent. Clearly, the opening of school districts to environmental demands hinges upon the extent to which educational decision makers conceive their role as legitimately entailing acknowledgement of and response to such demands. On this score, we find that the mass public, in keeping with its attachment to the symbols of democracy, is disinclined to accept the notion that school board members should follow their own judgment; they want them to "do what the public wants."

While not denying the fact that—in most cases—the public does not know what it wants, board members typically do not view their role as representing the public; two-thirds of them believe they should follow their own judgment. Even more adamant are superintendents. Three-fourths of them believe board members should be "delegates" rather than "representatives" (Jennings and Zeigler, 1969, p. 4). Needless to say, board members and superintendents mis-perceive the public's view and assume, wrongly, that it is congruent with their own.

Of course, such usages of various categories of role orientations are well known and well worn. They provide, at best, a clue about linkages between governing elites and public demands. Obviously, school boards and superintendents have some interaction with agents of the community. To get more precisely at the nature of this interaction, Jennings and
Zeigler, (1971), categorized school boards according to the legitimacy and responsiveness accorded to group demands and individual demands. While it is possible for boards to be equally responsive to both types of demands, in fact the two response styles are negatively correlated. Further, group responsive boards and individual responsive boards differed appreciably along a variety of dimensions. The conditions which lead boards to be responsive to group demands are those which lessen the responsiveness to individual sources of preferences and cues. Boards are considerably more group oriented in the complex environments of metropolitan areas. Demands originating from individuals receive more sympathy in small towns. It seems that the ambience of small towns is conducive to the sort of informal, almost casual inputs of information so characteristic of our images of hinterland America (Vidich and Bensman, 1958, pp. 194-201). Even if these constituents are formal group spokesmen, they are not recognized in this fashion. They are seen as fellow merchants, farmers, luncheon club or church members, former high school classmates, relatives, friends, or perhaps just some residents with whom to pass the day. The exchange is non-threatening, and the intensity is low.

It is only when one moves into the complexities of urban life that there is any appreciable exchange between formal organizations and elected and appointed school officials (Jennings and Zeigler, 1972, 1972). Not only do such officials have a positive effect toward groups (e.g., accord them legitimacy), but they see more of them. However, even in those urban, group-oriented districts, interest group activity is sporadic at best. Indeed, urban districts are "groupy" only in comparison to small town and rural ones. A sizeable portion of the districts are hardly boiling
cauldrons of interest activity. To the contrary, they seem to be functioning with a minimum of formal group life. (Jennings and Zeigler, 1972).

Whereas Jennings and Zeigler's conclusions about the paucity of group life are based upon comparative surveys, Smoley's (1965) study of pressures on the Board of School Commissioners in Baltimore provides corroboration by an exhaustive case study. Using minutes of the board and some additional published sources, he considered 2,300 issues during a seven year period, Smoley revealed that even in a large city—interest groups are largely uninvolved:

Of the 2,389 issues considered by the Board of School Commissioners, only 207 included participation by outside groups—less than ten percent! Furthermore, much of the participation which did take place contained no hint of attempted influence, but was action in the performance of official functions to provide service to the Baltimore school system. (Smoley, 1965, p. 180).

Smoley's analysis also provides insight into how superintendents can use their resources to minimize external demands. Superintendents usually set agendas for board meetings, and load them with trivia—nuts and bolts problems of administration which neither boards nor interest groups can understand. At first glance, the inclusion of administrative tasks in the agenda may seem risky, but the strategy is successful. Immersed in trivial administrative matters rather than major issues of educational policy, boards do not provide a forum for interest arbitration. Over 2,000 of the 2,389 decisions concerned staff personnel and the school building program. Only a handful related to instructional affairs. Most issues were routine and quickly resolved. The skillful use of trivia is a powerful weapon.
Further evidence of isolation appears when we probe into the distribution of activity among types of groups. The results are unequivocal: the most active voice is that of the PTA, followed (distantly), by teachers. (Smoley, 1965; Gross, 1958; Jennings and Zeigler, 1972). Almost two-thirds of the board members in the Jennings and Zeigler study cited the PTA; about one-third recalled demands by teacher groups. After these two, the list declines through civil rights groups (29%); various business, professional and service clubs, down through the much feared (but relatively quiescent) right wing groups (13%) to the rarely active labor organizations (3%). PTA's and teachers are most active, and we will return to them for a more thorough analysis. At this point, let us note newly that most of the interest group action is controlled by "in-house" organizations whose major thrust is to create a climate in which the status quo goes unchallenged. There is an "establishment" tinge to the group spectrum.

If the usual decisional climate is ideologically cool, there is no gainsaying the fact that it does, on occasion, become quite heated. When issues lose their routine, technical flavor and strike deep at emotions, then the superintendent may find himself in the midst of group-dominated conflict. Such conflicts surrounding the resolution of episodic issues are rare but usually spectacular.

Granted that schools are now commonly described as the center of turmoil (teacher strikes, student revolts, taxpayer revolts, busing, community control, and the like), even in the 1960's relatively placid districts probably outnumbered the tempestuous ones. Some districts cope with their problems over a long period of time with a minimum of strife.
Others—those which capture the imagination of the mass media—seem to be caught up in perpetual conflict. What may best characterize school district phenomena of this type is a model of episodic crisis (Iannaccone, 1967; Campbell, 1968, pp. 50-52). Most districts experience crises and unrest at one time or another; the difference is that some few are marked by frequently recurring episodes whereas most enjoy rather long periods of calm between crises.

What happens when episodic crises erupt? When the district population becomes antagonized, support for school policy dwindles, group demands increase, and the interaction between educational decision-makers and unattached individuals decreases (Jennings and Zeigler, 1971; Jennings and Zeigler, 1972). Imagine, for example, a school beset by scandal or fiscal chaos. As popular support dwindles, an increase in group demands sets in. As public confidence in the school continues its descent, the loss of confidence is articulated and given explicit focus by interest groups. They pinpoint, according to their own objectives and interests, the specific aspects of discontent to which they will address their efforts. The decline in popular support becomes less generalized as group activity increases. Groups clearly thrive in an atmosphere of conflict between the governed and the governors. Such a condition of stress is a precipitant condition for group activity, irrespective of the social complexity of the community. The board and superintendent are in a state of siege.

The threatening environment of group activity surely sets educational governance apart from other public decision-making processes, where group activity is normal and group activity considerably lower keyed. School boards, unlike most governmental bodies, are (in normal times) accustomed
to individual exchanges, consisting of cues rather than demands (Summerfield, 1971). Such cues may have affective content, but quite often simply consist of feedback to the board, signals about the reception of their actions. When individual cuing does consist of preferences on pending policies, such preferences are not seen as vigorously made demands. Since individual, unattached communications are typical of communities with a high level of satisfaction with educational policy, the content of the communications is usually supportive and not directed toward alterations in basic policy.

Group communications, more often reflecting the ressentiment of the masses, are addressed toward serious ideological conflict (except when coming from supportive organizations such as PTA's). Can organizations translate their anger into observable phenomena? If not, their activity would make little difference, since school boards and superintendents would have little evidence of the state of public opinion. The evidence is that group activity is strongly associated with financial defeats, teacher firings, and superintendent turnovers. (Jennings and Zeigler, 1972). Small wonder that they are feared! Of particular interest is a strong association between the activities of political organizations and superintendent turnovers. When superintendents insist that education and politics do not mix, they are not just mouthing platitudes. Again, there is strong incentive for superintendents to use their resources to buffer themselves against the assault of "outside" groups.

In addition to their control of the agenda—and their aggressive use of trivia—superintendents have the advantage of an institutional structure designed, as we have seen, to insulate schools from the erratic.
winds of community conflict. Such devices as at large, non-partisan elections serve to minimize the link between public anger and group demands. Although it makes intuitive sense to argue that large electoral units increase social heterogeneity and hence exacerbate group conflict, the opposite is true. Ward elections (a minority phenomenon in school district organizations) increase the likelihood that interest groups will provide a clearer focus for grievances which are likely to be neighborhood based. Similarly, partisan elections place the educational decision-making process squarely within mainstream, conflictual politics, thus providing a visible target for interest groups.

Linkage opportunities are also reduced appreciably by the self perpetuating recruitment pattern characteristic of school boards. When, as is frequently the case, incumbent board members are able to perpetuate their influence by bringing like-minded colleagues to the board, interest group activity (and individual communications as well) tapers off considerably. Boards in these circumstances appear almost akin to closed corporations, insulating themselves from the hue and cry of interest group politics. Popular uprisings or expressions of discontent come slowly to the attention of the board, since cues are internally generated. Boards and superintendents value a public display of unity, generally eschew identification with group originated values, and avoid public conflicts. About 90% of the votes observed by Lipham, et. al. (1967), in twelve Wisconsin districts, were unanimous.

The only groups welcomed into such dynasties are PTA's and, less often, teachers. Their comparative acceptance stems from their semi-official status.
The PTA--with its membership strongly biased in favor of the social characteristics not comparable to those of school boards--function not as a demand generating group, but rather as a buffer or defense mechanism. It does not translate mass hostility into specific demands, but rather communicates the policy of the board and superintendent to its clientele. It coopts potentially disruptive parents, de-fusing conflicts before they begin. (Dahl, 1961, p. 155; Koerner, 1968, p. 26).

Teachers' organizations (the local affiliates of the National Education Association and of the American Federation of Teachers) occupy a curious place in the array of group activity. Of all the groups engaging--however sporadically--in efforts to influence the content of educational policy, teachers should have the highest legitimacy. They are not outsiders. Furthermore, they generally confine their activity to narrowly defined issues, such as teacher hirings, firings, conditions of work, and salaries. Yet teachers' organizations are a distant second in group activity. (Jennings and Zeigler, 1972). In spite of some very visible political activities, teachers' organizations are apparently no more influential today than they were more than a decade ago. In 1956, Griffiths concluded that "Teachers as a group have little or no say in the formulation of school policy." (Griffiths, 1956, p. 106). In 1969 Rosenthal wrote "... they (teachers' organizations) play a negligible part in determining school policies ..." (Rosenthal, 1969, p. 154).

Why is this the case? A variety of explanations for the weak position of teachers have been advanced. Most relate, directly or indirectly, to the occupational norms of teaching, and the authority structure of the school system. Most prominent among the explanations are: 1) the employee
status and orientation of teachers, 2) the non-political tradition of education, as it translates into organizational quiescence, and 3) the administrative domination of schools and teachers' organizations. Each will be examined briefly.

Teachers—and especially teachers' organizations—use the word "profession" to the point of abuse, but it is difficult to agree with this self concept. Among other attributes, professions are presumed to have some degree of autonomy in exercising their special competence. Yet, teachers cannot exercise much independent authority even within the classroom—to which they are assigned. Nor do they control entry into teaching or assessment of colleagues' performance. Legally, they are employees, not professionals. More importantly, most teachers are emotionally employees. Traditionally, superintendents, principals, and other administrators have made decisions for teachers with the expectations that "teachers would be grateful for the generosity bestowed upon them." (Goldhammer, et. al., 1967). The upsurge in "militancy" should not obscure the fact that most teachers accept the employee orientation, which requires a basic loyalty to the "boss." Some teachers—and the number appears to be growing slowly but inexorably—have adopted a genuinely professional orientation, which impels them to seek to expand the power of teachers at the expense of administrators and lay authorities. However, Corwin's general conclusion is that teachers find the employee role more compatible. Two-thirds of the teachers he studied claim that they:

Make it a practice of adjusting their teaching to the administrator's views of good educational practice and are obedient, respectful and loyal to the principal; that they do look primarily to the judgment of the administration for guidance in cases of disputes in the community (over a textbook or speaker) . . . Approximately
one half of the sample, too, agreed that their school's administration is better qualified to judge what is best for education. . . . one half of the sample agreed that teachers who openly criticize the administration should go elsewhere. . . . on the other half, less than half of these believed that the ultimate authority over major educational decisions should be exercised by professional teachers (Corwin, 1966).

Corwin estimates that only about 10 percent of teachers have enough non-employee characteristics to qualify them as militant. Zeigler (1970) found that going on strike was not considered professional by most teachers. Even collective bargaining is viewed with suspicion (Doherty and Oberer, 1967). The fact that most teachers are not militant should not be taken to minimize the "teacher revolt." Obviously, some teachers are seeking more power and, equally obviously, administrators are resisting. While the number of "weak stoppages" (e.g., strikes) underwent an "irregular but gradual decline" from 1945 to 1966 (Lieberman and Moskow, 1966), they began to surge upward around 1968 (National Education Association, 1968).

Nevertheless, predictions of increased militancy must be taken into account. This is especially true since school boards and superintendents regularly issue statements about dealing with teacher militancy (whether or not they have experienced it). Also what we know about militancy may lead us to speculate about the future. Teachers are far more willing to challenge established authority in big cities, and in the North East and West than they are in small towns and in the Midwest and South (Zeigler, 1970). Not surprisingly, large city school districts are more likely to experience teacher strikes. Further, popular support for strikes is also greatest in these areas. Indeed, segments of the public—particularly those with union affiliations—are more sympathetic to teachers than has
popularly been assumed (Almy and Hahn, 1971). However, opportunities to form coalitions with various outside groups are constricted by the non-political tradition of the teaching profession and the dominant position of administrators. In sun, the reason why teachers are not more active is that they do not wish to be. They are comfortable in their employee station. Even when strikes occur, the issue to be contested is usually salary and working conditions, not authority.

Closely related to the acquiescence which accompanies the employee image is the acquiescence of the non-political organization. Of the two teacher organizations, the older, larger, still dominant National Education Association sits clearly in the non-political tradition in contrast with the smaller, urban-oriented American Federation of Teachers. NEA local affiliates have—until recently—opposed strikes, and eschewed political activity of any kind. The official ideology of the NEA was that the "professional" stature of teachers would suffer if the organization became involved in the rough and tumble world of politics. Hess and Kirst (1972) report, for example, that only tiny fractions of teachers even discuss school board elections, much less try to influence their outcomes. Although leaders of NEA locals are more politically inclined than followers (Luttbeg and Zeigler, 1966), they are partially immobilized by a non-stable membership (Lindenfeld, 1963; Clark, 1964).

Finally, there is administrator dominance of schools and associations. The National Education Association, in addition to stressing professionalism, stresses "unity." Administrators and teachers, therefore, are in the same organization. Administrators have—until very recently—controlled the NEA policy-making machinery, and they still dominate most locals. Pressure on teachers to join the NEA is fairly wide-spread, with
administrators proudly announcing that their school is "100 percent" (Doherty and Oberer). The role of administrator in the NEA parallels their role in schools, and even the influence of the administrative point of view in schools of education. Schools of education are typically more authoritarian, and products of such schools more acquiescent, than is true of other portions of the University (Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958; Jennings and Zeigler, 1970). Further, there is a strong relationship between acquiescent behavior and administrative approval within the school (Jennings and Zeigler, 1969). The cry for unity, therefore, serves the administration well, and the NEA is the vehicle which enforces the ideology.

The AFT—which represents a minority of teachers—has a more militant, less acquiescent membership. It excludes administrative personnel from membership and has traditionally supported political action. Its success in winning representation elections in large cities—notably New York—has spurred the NEA to a substantially more militant position (so much so that administrators are considering pulling out). Still, the NEA is the major teachers' organization and it does speak more authoritatively for "unity" (e.g., administrative dominance) than for teachers. Administrators are even more opposed to teacher militancy than school boards (especially when teachers' revolutions have actually taken place), and are almost obsessed with authority. As the American Association of School Administrators puts it: "We pledge to resist any effort to displace the superintendent and his authority in matters affecting the interest and welfare of school personnel" (cited in Rosenthal, 1969, p. 19).
Bargaining, then, appears to be a rather pale alternative to hierarchy. The groups which bargain successfully are generally "establishment," such as the PTA. The range of alternatives is generally modest. Bargaining in school politics does not generally appear the bargaining of the normal political process.

When bargaining systems become obviously unresponsive, the frequently advocated "cure" is community control.

Community Control

Community Control is a form of participatory democracy and whether participation is democratic depends on the context of that participation (Zwiebach, 1969; Kramer, 1972). Altshuler argues that most people today believe that "A decisive test of good administration is responsiveness to reasonable client desires." (Altshuler, 1970, p. 8). He sees the central issues concerning community control as "social peace and political legitimacy, not abstract justice or efficiency." In a personal note to his analysis of community control he supports the decentralization of cities because he sees it as a partial solution to this problem.

The type of community controlled schools described below are all located in predominantly low income, minority group communities. They are distinguished from the middle class free schools in that the children who attend come from parents who have traditionally had no significant control or options in the formal education process. The type of community control school we are referring to are the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration districts (Ocean Hill-Brownsville, I.S. 201, and Two Bridges), the Woodlawn experimental school project, Morgan Community School and the Anacostia Community School project.
In his analysis of thirty community controlled school projects, Tim Parsons found that in each project the community and parent involvement is much more extensive compared with the typical public school (T. Parsons, 1970). The impact of this community participation on school policy and reform has a direct bearing on the question of responsiveness. Although the number of models of educational participation are small, there are a sufficient number to be able to evaluate the impact of community participation.

The new impact of community and parental participation has an immediate impact on the selection of school board members, who not only reflect the racial composition of the community but who are more oriented to local needs. Table 2 compares the racial composition of the school board members in the experimental educational models with the racial composition of the students enrolled.

**TABLE 2**

Comparison of Racial Backgrounds of Local School Board Members.

(Averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Pupil Population Non-White</th>
<th>% School Board Members Non-White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Control</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts in N.Y.C.</td>
<td></td>
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(Source: Marilyn Gittell, 1972b, p. 678).

If we compare the above percentages in Table 2 with the percentages given under decentralization, it becomes immediately apparent that the
school board members under community control models do tend to reflect the racial composition of the student population much more than under decentralization models. Also, the socio-economic status of the school board members under community control models is much lower compared to the members under decentralization. However, the low SES of school board members does not curb the level of participation. On the contrary, socio-economic factors had little impact on the extent of community participation (Gottfield, 1970).

The extent of participation by the community was found to be substantial in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment. For example, in a study conducted by the Institute for Community Studies on the parents of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment, 36% of the respondents said they belonged to the Parents Association and an overwhelming 86% of the parents claimed that they had been to a school in the last year. Respondents to the survey were found to be knowledgeable about the experimental school and had feelings of efficacy concerning the school. When asked whether the schools in Ocean Hill-Brownsville were better or about the same in comparison with before the creation of the experiment, nearly three quarters of the parents responded in the affirmative. In short, the attitudinal survey shows that the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment, in its short existence, did fulfill many of the goals of a community controlled school district. "The parents developed enough efficacy to participate and acquire knowledge pertaining to school matters and find confidence in their educational leaders." (Gottfield, 1970; Gittell, 1972a).

Although the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment was more open and more receptive to parents and community, it is not clear whether the over-all
change in environment would or could influence student achievement. In an inconclusive attitudinal study conducted in I.S. 201, the findings did show an unusual degree of student feelings of efficacy as compared with other black children in ghetto areas (Gittell, 1972a, p. 130). If the Coleman Report is correct, that feelings of efficacy and academic achievement are strongly related, then perhaps one could infer that community control of the school district influences student attitudes of efficacy which, over time, will produce increased achievement. Studies of the Anacostia project and the Adams-Morgan project shows that performances on teaching tests and teacher morale have all improved consistently since community control has started (LaNoue and Smith, 1971).

The community impact on school policy has had a lot to do with the racial composition of the community. Experimental models such as Ocean Hill, I.S. 201, Anacostia and Adams-Morgan community projects are all rather homogenous communities (black or Puerto Rican) and consequently were able to establish their own structure and election procedures without racial tensions. The Two Bridges district, on the other hand, is more racially heterogeneous (40% Chinese, 35% Puerto Rican, 18% white and 12% black) and found it much more difficult to innovate. A fairly large and active middle-class community opposition confronted the district board from its inception (Adele Spier, 1969). Fewer new educational programs were adopted in the district and it was judged by many to be a failure early in its history (Adele Spier, 1970, p. 2).

Racial conflicts were also present when participation was transcended into community control in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville project. Community rejected the existing distribution of power in school decision-making and
assumed the powers traditionally expressed by the city board of education, the teachers union and the supervisory staff. In the Spring of 1968, the governing board of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district attempted to oust thirteen teachers, five assistant principals, and one principal from the district without formal charges. The board's action prompted UFT to remove 350 members from the district in order to force reinstatement of the 19 who had been discharged. This dispute unfortunately fanned racial animosity since the chiefly black and Puerto Rican district was pitted against what it labeled a repressive white power structure—UFT, many of whose members were Jewish (See Alsworth and Woock for Chronology of events). This conflict suggests that if sufficient power is lodged in the local district—community conflict will result. Community participation with a certain power resource will immediately be in conflict with traditional power holders. The more the community seeks power over their schools the greater will be the conflict, especially if it pits one racial group against another.

In summary, we find that community control does fulfill, to some extent, some of the hopes of those who want to see a school more responsive to parents and students. Although when racial diversity was present—very little change occurred. However, it became apparent in the Ocean Hill experiment that a redistribution of power caused the two sets of clientele (elites and consumers) to merge into a conflict. There is obviously a high price to shift power bases.

Genuine control of non-elites was not seriously contemplated in the various theories of community control in education. Another major effort to provide a viable set of competing elites was in the Office of Economic
Opportunity programs and Model Cities programs. The following review of the literature on these two government programs will hopefully direct us to new approaches of polyarchical governance of schools.
The whole notion of responsiveness in the OEO and Model Cities programs is tied up in the concept of community participation. Unfortunately, the linkage between the two was never explicitly established in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which created the OEO, nor in the congressional Record or in committee reports (Boone, 1972:446). The Act's dictum that community action programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served" was inserted as an afterthought by the architects of the Act; it was left to the OEO to subsequently clarify what was meant by maximum feasible participation and who were eligible to participate. Richard Boone, one of the architects, attributes the emergence of the idea to three factors: 1) civil rights activities which engendered the notion of participatory democracy, 2) contacts with representatives of the poor who asked to plan and operate their own programs in place of the "oppressive service bureaucracies with their institution of credentialing systems acting to reinforce professional prerogatives and the status quo," and 3) a commitment to develop programs which helped people to help themselves (Boone 1972: 446-447). Underlying these factors was the belief of the architects that community action programs were essential to the reordering of local institutions so that the "have-nots" would have an opportunity to participate in the public and private sectors of the community (Boone, 1972: 446).
The purpose of OEO's "war on poverty" was to provide services to the poor and to mobilize and coordinate public and private resources to this end. The Act provided for the granting of federal funds either to local public agencies or to private, nonprofit corporations. In most cases the instrumentality was a new private agency, the Community Action Agency (CAA), created for the purpose of planning, coordinating and administering the community's war against poverty. The initiative came from local public and private leaders, with representation on the governing boards distributed among public and private social welfare agencies and representatives from the "establishment." But within a year the Washington OEO became advocates for the poor, insisting upon the allocation of at least one-third of the seats to representatives of the poor (Boone, 1972) and encouraging the creation of neighborhood associations of residents to support, criticize, recommend and operate programs (Strange, 1972).

The advocacy role of OEO brought it into conflict with the local elected officials who resented their lack of control over the programs and with public social-welfare agencies who resented the anti-professional bias of CAA staff and clientele. Resident participation was becoming a major issue in Washington, especially after the confrontations in several cities in which the poor were seeking greater participation in or outright control of the programs. As a result, the Model Cities program, building upon earlier urban renewal programs, de-emphasized participation. Established by the 1966 Demonstration Cities and Metro-Development Act, Model Cities differed from OEO in several major respects: 1) local governments were charged with responsibility for the administration and operation of the program, 2) the scope of activities was
broadened to include land-use planning and physical rehabilitation, in addition to several service programs, and 3) participation of residents was limited rather than maximized and governmental and business participation was guaranteed (Strange, 1972). Because of the OEO experience, it would have been impossible to eliminate participation since such action could have led to serious conflict. But the Act's call for "widespread" participation was in contrast to OEO's "maximum feasible participation." Rather than to stipulate the acceptable degree of participation, Model Cities required only that structures be developed through which neighborhood residents could participate. In one sense, participation was strengthened by requiring that information and staff be provided to citizen groups as well as technical and financial assistance. The purpose was to ensure the effective participation of residents (Strange, 1972). Under President Johnson, HUD was supportive of most any arrangement agreed upon locally to fulfill the participation requirements, but under Nixon there has been an attempt to limit the neighborhood groups to an advisory capacity or at the most, the exercise of a veto over plans. In 1969, HUD prohibited the exclusive initiation of projects by citizen groups and required all cities to give assurances that "the city's ability to take responsibility for developing the plan" was not impeded (Strange, 1972).

Mechanisms for Participation

A. OEO. Approximately 90% of the local poverty agencies are private, non-profit corporations. Very few are the products of grass-roots organizations, rather, they were mostly organized by the community
leaders: elected officials, public and private social welfare agencies, business, labor and civic interests, religious organizations, etc. In some cases, the initiative was taken as a counter to civil rights organizations which threatened to apply for OEO funds (Austin). Referred to as the Community Action Agency (CAA), these organizations had governing boards and their own staff. In a few cases representatives of the poor were elected to the boards, but turnout was so dismal that OEO stopped funding elections. In most cases, representation of the poor is indirect, accomplished through neighborhood associations which were created by the CAA's, and composed of residents; the boards of the neighborhood associations are generally selected by residents at open meetings, and these boards usually select the local representative to the CAA board (Hallman). The Neighborhood associations also function as critics and supporters of the CAA, engage in neighborhood improvement activities, make recommendations and review CAA plans in varying degrees, and sometimes administer a project. In most cases, they are limited by a small budget and no staff, except for assistance they receive from the CAA staff. (Austin; Hallman; Strange 1972; Kramer 1969).

How this structure was utilized seems to depend upon the local definition of the causes of poverty. Both Kramer and Hallman note two definitions, both of which are supported by OEO publications. The first defines poverty in terms of individual deficiencies or failures. The remedy is to provide services to individuals to help them escape poverty: education, job training, health, welfare, etc. The job of the CAP, in this perspective, is to design, coordinate and distribute community resources to the underserved portion of the low-income
population. According to Kramer, this view was also associated with a belief in the centralization of power in CAA and the delegation of rather limited advisory functions to the neighborhood associations; the poor were seen as participants but not as the controlling force in decision-making. Along with this view was a commitment to values of administrative efficiency such as the merit system and evaluative criteria (Kramer, 1969:3-5; Hallman, 1972). The second definition views poverty as a failure of society and its institutions. Since the social and economic systems hold the poor powerless, "only as the poor acquire political influence can they change community policies and conditions that prevent them from acquiring their fair share of society's goods and services" (Kramer, 1969:5; Hallman, 1972). Social action based upon the solidarity of the poor becomes the remedy. In this perspective residents are to control the CAA, with decision-making authority decentralized to autonomous neighborhood associations (Kramer, 1969).

Although poverty was described as a complex, multifaceted problem, these two definitions epitomized the different perspectives of the participants. Most every CAA reflected both perspectives, but the emphasis given to one over the other affected the way in which residents participated and the consequent conflicts. In discussing the four major avenues of participation provided by the OEO program, Kramer considers these interrelationships:

1. CAA policy-making. More than any other mode, OEO emphasized the importance of resident participation on the CAA governing board
as voting members. The board was viewed as a tripartite coalition of community interests' concern with poverty: the poor, public and private social welfare agencies, and the leaders of important elements of the community. Inclusions of the poor was based upon a conviction that people should have a voice in decisions affecting them. But it was also believed that the failure of prior efforts to help the poor was due to the failure of social agencies to involve their clientele in program development, resulting in "welfare colonialism" or "paternalism" which the poor resented. According to this view, the poor knew best the needs, problems and attitudes in their neighborhoods. The efforts to secure participation often resulted in controversies and conflict.

One reason was that it was possible for the CAP to be established outside the existing governmental framework, thus leading inevitably to a power struggle. Another factor was that the diffuseness of the legislation encouraged conflicting interpretations of maximum feasible participation. For example, opposing the official view of the poor as participants in a community coalition formulating CAP policy was the belief of minority spokesmen that the representations from the target areas should control the program by constituting the majority of the members of the governing board and the executive committee (Kramer, 1969:9-10).

The advocates of control by residents argues that only in this way could low-income persons learn how to take responsibility and acquire citizenship skills so that they could become more capable and less dependent. They must be given the opportunity to manage their own affairs and make their own mistakes (Kramer, 1969:6-10).

2. Program Development. This mode of participation occurred through the neighborhood associations established by the CAA's
Their functions varied, but in the larger urban areas they usually: 1) elected representatives to the CAA boards, 2) reviewed and evaluated, and sometimes had a veto over, agency programs and personnel assigned to the area, 3) sponsored service programs, such as information and referral, and engaged in organizing activities, and 4) advisory or policy-making powers with regard to a neighborhood multi-service center—the underlying rationale was three-fold. First, it was initially expected that the advice and suggestions of the associations would be useful to program planners and social service agencies in developing new and more effective services; in this role they served in an advisory capacity as consumer panels. Secondly, the act of participation was considered to have socio-therapeutic value in overcoming a sense of alienation and powerlessness. Third, without some form of neighborhood organization to engage the poor in the war on poverty, they would exercise their power to refuse to be clients. The conflict between participation and control was reflected at this level "in the strain between the advisory and consultative roles usually ascribed to the poor initially and their desire to assume more policy-making functions in planning, sponsoring, and administering services, as well as in reviewing, screening, and vetoing programs for their area." (Kramer, 1969, p. 12).

3. Social Action. This was the most controversial mode of participation and most directly reflected the definition of poverty as the consequence of institutional failure. The assumption was that the poverty of the poor was perpetuated by their powerlessness, and only as they organized as a pressure group could they influence the bureaucracies and bargain with those institutions that affected their lives. Rather than
providing services, the role of CAP was to support the development of indigenous organizations in low-income areas through which the poor could assert their influence in the community decision processes from which they were excluded. Strategies for increasing the power of the poor ranged from self-help and cooperative economic ventures to conflict tactics. The more militant activities were usually taken outside of the CAP "umbrella." Within CAP the poor were organized around social service issues directly affecting them. The objective being to improve their daily living conditions and imparting skills in decision-making and bargaining. These efforts were not always distinguishable from the neighborhood associations (Kramer, 1969, pp. 13-18).

4. Employment. The least controversial mode was employment as aides or in other nonprofessional capacities on the staffs of the poverty agencies. Apart from the economic advantage accruing to the poor employee, the rationale was to counteract the professionalism and credentialism of the social welfare bureaucracies which had failed to attack the causes of poverty—employment of the poor would bring into the agency their perspective and experiences with poverty so that the professional staff would be more sensitive to the real needs of their clientele. In return, the employee would learn better work habits, become motivated to improve his skills and serve as an interpreter of the agency's programs to the neighborhood. Conflicts developed over the relatively small number of such jobs in terms of the demand for them and the proliferation of positions that required formal education and training, both of which produced frustration among the poor who assumed that the poverty program would be a source of a large number of new jobs (Kramer, 1969, pp. 18-20).
The actual mix of the four modes of participation in most communities is suggested in two studies. The first is based upon the examination of OEO programs in thirty-five communities by seven investigators under contract to the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and summarized by Howard Hallman, a staff member. The second is based upon an investigation of twenty communities by David Austin. The populations of the communities in both studies ranged between 50,000 to over 500,00. The basic structural features of the poverty programs in the communities of both studies are essentially the same. The CAA's are private, nonprofit organizations whose governing boards consist of at least one-third representation from the target areas, representations of the public and private social welfare agencies, and community representatives. In only three of Hallman's and two of Austin's communities, residents had a majority on the board. In most cases the CAA's had established one or more neighborhood associations which selected the resident representatives to the CAA boards. Furthermore, most of the programs were subcontracted to other agencies, such as the board of education and voluntary social welfare agencies; few were actually operated by the CAA's themselves. Most of the neighborhood associations of Austin's communities had less than $100 annual income, and no association had either a program or clerical personnel under their direct control, although in 14 cases CAA personnel were assigned as staff advisors. Of the issues involving the local associations, Fifty to sixty percent...dealt with improvements in either the environment or in service programs other than those of the CAA in a single neighborhood. Ten percent of the issues involved neighborhood self-help projects including
tot lots and credit unions. Ten percent involved program or organizational issues with the CAA, and ten percent organizational issues within the association. Ten percent involved issues at a citywide, county, state, or federal level. To a very substantial degree, these target-area associations took on the characteristics of neighborhood improvement associations. Very few of the issues with which they were concerned had any direct relation to the economic aspects of poverty. (Austin, 1972, p. 411).

Hallman notes that all the CAA's in his sample dispense services, the most prominent being Head Start. Neighborhood Youth Corps and neighborhood service centers. But the mix of services and organizational activities are dependent upon the underlying assumptions about the causes of poverty. In about one-half of the thirty-five communities it seemed apparent to him that the emphasis on services reflected the view that poverty is a result of individual failure. The stress was on education, training and health services designed to improve the individual's chances of escaping poverty. These communities began their war on poverty by providing services which ameliorated existing conditions, and then became concerned with forms of participation which stressed self-help.

The other half of the sample seemed to emphasize institutional failure as the cause of poverty. These communities fall into three groups of equal size. The first believe that social institutions have failed to provide services in sufficient quantity and quality to respond to the needs of the poor, and that present services are too fragmented. The emphasis is on planning and coordinating processes which link services to one another, and the initiation of new services and organizations if necessary. By implication, the major responsibilities fall upon the professional staffs of the CAA's and the service agencies. In the large urban centers, however, the CAA's are confronted with significant agency resistance, leading to the strategies adopted by the second group: all-out
efforts to force institutions to change their current practices, emphasizing the organizing of neighborhoods "to build strength to confront the established agencies with citizen power." The tactic means continuous controversy between the CAA's and the "governing coalition," until either the CAA's retreat or the coalition gives in; in no case has the latter occurred. By the very nature of the strategy, the CAA's are precluded from performing a coordinating role among the various agencies dispensing services to the poor. The third group of CAA's in one way or another operate from within the "governing coalition," either because they are a part of the city government under a sympathetic mayor, are dominated by majority appointments, or the "coalition" allows an agency on its fringes to initiate change. According to Hallman, communities following this approach "have the most complete program, combining a broad array of services, planning and coordination, and resident participation, although the latter is under certain restraints so that it does not lead to open confrontation." (Hallman, 1968).

Austin's categorization of communities, according to the level of participation, emphasizes variables other than the definition of poverty, but his discussion of the 20 communities, 17 had an operational definition of participation which emphasized its advisory nature. The basic characteristic is a structure for citizen involvement which is an adjunct to the administrative operation of the agency, with citizens having responsibilities but no authority. They're expected to criticize staff proposals and suggest improvements, but incorporation of suggestions is at the discretion of the agency's board. The seventeen communities falling within this model were categorized as Limited, Active and Adversary:
1. Limited participation: In eight communities there was low attendance by poor representatives at CAA board meetings and little participation in its discussions. In two cases there were no neighborhood associations, and in the remaining cases they were late in getting started. Where they did exist they worked on short term neighborhood improvement projects. They had no advisory responsibilities for service programs and there was only sporadic review of CAA proposals. Moreover, they did not become involved in public controversies over CAA organizational issues or the programs of other service agencies.

2. Active Participation. In five communities, attendance of representatives of the poor at CAA board meetings was high, and so was participation in board discussions. These representatives initiated alternatives to staff proposals, but they did not form a voting bloc in board decisions. When they did push a proposal, they were usually defeated. The neighborhood associations had a formal advisory role in program planning for their area, and, on occasion, involved themselves in controversies with CAA over budgets and program plans, but they did not become involved in issues external to CAA relating to the service operations of other agencies. Nor did the associations form a coalition within the CAA or across neighborhoods. The result "resembled a traditional pattern of ward politics, with target-area associations and representatives actively promoting the interests of their particular area in competition with other target areas in a process of bargaining over details with central CAA staff and with the leaders of the CAA board, within basic policy and priority limits over which target area representatives had no real control." (Austin, 1972, p. 415).

3. Adversary Participation. In another five communities, like the
second pattern, there was high attendance and participation by representatives of the poor at the board meetings, but the representatives also operated consistently as a voting bloc. They were able to win on key issues. Moreover, they frequently introduced alternatives to staff program and budget proposals. The neighborhood associations formed a coalition on CAA issues dealing with budgets, programs and personnel, but the coalition didn't act on controversies involving other service agencies; they served to define issues and to provide support for their representatives on the board.

In another three communities Austin identifies what he calls Political Adversary Participation. The basic structure for organizational advisory participation was present in these CAA's, but it was little used. Major attention focused on the mobilization of neighborhood associations as action groups over issues involving public and private service agencies. Representatives of the poor, "liberal" at-large members and the CAA staff were in substantial agreement on the basic program, and in board splits. The poor were usually in the majority. Individual neighborhood associations became involved in controversies with the school board, city hall, housing authorities, police department, and other community institutions. Tactics included open meetings in the neighborhoods on issues, the circulation of petitions, organized mass attendance at public hearings, picketing and demonstrations. The associations also formed a coalition, encouraged by CAA staff, which became "a substantial force in contests between black residents and official institutions," though the CAA did not finance or provide staff assistance. Later, the coalitions became major centers of leadership in the mobilization of blacks as an adversary force in the
political system, independently of the CAA.

Although Austin does not dwell on the point, it's apparent that that form of participation roughly parallels Hallman's notion that organizing activities and programs follow from the definition of poverty. Austin notes that in the Limited Participation communities CAA board members from both the target area and non-target areas viewed poverty as a consequence of individual failure rather than discrimination or economic exploitation. Dispensing services rather than mobilizing the poor through neighborhood associations seems to have been emphasized. In the Adversary Pattern, on the other hand, there "appears to have been a link between resident action and changes in institutions outside the CAA," lending credence to the belief that poverty was viewed as the result of institutional failures. At the very least, residents were able to turn an advisory process of participation which the community leaders designed for them into one of the confrontation within the CAA's over bylaws, allocation of funds, personnel appointments, and demands that the boards take positions on controversies involving other agencies. Neighborhood associations played a much larger part in program development and provided a supportive constituency for their representatives on the board. In the Political Pattern, the institutional definition of poverty was most apparent, with the emphasis of the CAA program on mobilization and social action rather than on services.

Austin, however, attributes these participation patterns to variables other than Hallman's definition of poverty. The degree of participation, he notes, is directly correlated... 1) with the size of the population of the inner cities, and 2) with the number of blacks in the target areas.
He also notes that the Limited Participation communities had stable social systems and power patterns resulting from an absence of large scale immigration in the 1950's, and they also did not have any organized political or social movements based upon poverty or minority problems. In the Active Participation communities, the poor and minorities had some prior experience in "protecting their self-interests in city-wide programs," while in the Adversary Pattern the formation of the CAA's coincided with the beginnings of an aggressive civil rights movement among blacks. In the latter cases the elected officials resisted resident participation for fear that the target areas would become independent bases of political power. In the Political Adversary Pattern, the communities involved had large black populations and prior experience with locally initiated action programs around the problems of poverty before the passage of the OEO legislation. Moreover, each had a black middle class leadership group with an independent financial base and which had been involved in civil rights activities. In these cases "racial confrontation between black citizens and white-controlled institutions was already an issue with the community and...this confrontation either shaped the nature of the issues within the CAA or served to define the thrust of the community mobilization program with the CAA." (Austin, 1972, p. 418). Although Austin does not specially draw the conclusion, the qualitative data would seem to indicate that the nature of participation and the utilization of the CAA structure is a function of the class or racial "consciousness" of the residents (Hallman's variable of poverty definition), prior organizational experiences and skills, and support from other organizations and movements.

Kramer arrives at much the same conclusion from his study of five
CAA's in the San Francisco Bay area. In speaking of the types of conflict over questions of representation of the poor on the agency boards, he comments that

...the charades of the politico-ethnic community influenced the particular mode of conflict resolution of the issues around resident participation (that is, whether it was a debate, game or fight). Where political power was more concentrated and structured on a partisan basis and where minority votes had a significant impact on election outcomes, the political stakes were naturally higher and conflict more likely. A history of previous involvement in community controversies by indigenous leadership cadres capable of organizing an ethnic coalition seemed to be the other set of factors associated with a contest. (Kramer, p. 181).

Within the ethnic community, this study has found its density, organizational experience, and leadership are important variables influencing what can be called "coalition capability." That is, the capacity to organize and maintain an association of minority and allied groups that can mobilize appropriate and sufficient power to counteract the concentrated power arrayed against them. This power may be political, as in San Francisco, or bureaucratic-professional, as in Santa Clara (Kramer, 1969, p. 185).

B. Model Cities

The Model Cities program has received less attention in the literature due to its "newness" and the longer period of time taken to get it underway in the communities. James Sundquist's book, *Making Federalism Work*, and especially Chapter Three, is the most comprehensive account of the early experiences of the program, and as a consequence, much of the discussion is a summary of his descriptions which are based on interviews of officials in 27 localities in 8 states.

Model Cities, of course, is an outgrowth of the urban renewal program. It sought to overcome the major criticism of the earlier program to the
effect that the emphasis on the physical rehabilitation of slum areas ignored the social problems of the inhabitants. In the planning stages, the architects of the program also reacted to the OEO experiences. In particular, the program re-emphasized comprehensive and coordinated planning before action was taken and also the ultimate responsibility of municipal and county governments for both planning and administration. Despite the de-emphasis on resident participation, the planners were committed to citizen participation. The term, "widespread participation" was deliberately used in the Act, and it was reinforced by HUD instructions which called for the "active involvement" and "meaningful role" for neighborhood residents. But no mechanism or formula was prescribed. According to HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver, "It will be up to the cities themselves to devise ways in which citizens will participate" (quoted by Sundquist, 1969, p. 85). But before funds were forthcoming from Washington, HUD officials made clear that a structure acceptable to both the residents and the city must be negotiated between the two sides. According to Sundquist, the resulting negotiations resembled a labor-management dispute with HUD sometimes assuming a mediating role, but not dictating the terms of the settlement. The incentive for agreement was federal funds (Sundquist, 1969, p. 91).

However, HUD did establish some standards. There must be "some form of organization structure which embodies neighborhood residents in the process of policy and program planning and program implementation and operation; residents must be "fully" involved in those processes; the leadership of that structure must be accepted by the residents as representing their interests; the "structure must have clear and direct access to the decision-making process of the City Demonstration Agency" (The
city agency with responsibility for the program); residents must have advanced information on matters to be decided and "some form of technical assistance" to help residents make knowledgeable decisions (quoted by Sundquist, 1969, pp. 91-92). In short, residents were to participate in the decision-making process, but were not to control it. Moreover, the capacities of citizen participation were strengthened through the supply of information and technical expertise. But the structure of participation was to be locally determined.

In Sundquist's sample of localities, eleven cities were participating in the Model Cities program. Of these, four had proposed a "unicameral" structure and seven proposed a bicameral structure (six of the latter planned to create new organizations to represent the neighborhoods while the other intended to use the existing CAA). In the bicameral scheme, residents would participate through an independent organization "in developing and reviewing program proposals in more or less equal partnership with the city's public and private agencies." In the unicameral scheme, "residents and the agency representatives were to join in a single planning process." Sundquist notes that the choice between the two reflected its experience with OEO. Cities experiencing the mobilization of the poor into a political force with a confrontation philosophy choose the bicameral structure while the cities where the poor had been unorganized or less assertive proposed the unicameral model.

Sundquist observed that the cities that had proposed a unicameral scheme in 1967 had moved to a bicameral arrangement by 1969. In part, the HUD standards on participation forced this. In fact, those standards "make little sense except in terms of bicameralism." (Sundquist, 1969, p. 92).
Moreover,

Cities that earlier had not contemplated establishing independent neighborhood organizations were doing so, and those organizations everywhere were becoming stronger and more assertive—particularly as they became increasingly aware of their 'rights' under HUD guidelines. And they were being provided funds to hire staffs, including advocacy planning staffs, or employ their own consultants (Sundquist, 1969, p. 92).

The ability of resident organizations to enforce their "rights" appears to have been substantially enhanced by the willingness of HUD officials to hear protests directly from the resident groups. And given HUD's policy that funds would not be forthcoming until agreement had been reached locally on the participation structure, protests could delay or indefinitely postpone the implementation of the program in the community.

The general structure of the unicameral and bicameral patterns are illustrated in the following figure. The bicameral model is broken down into three subtypes, according to the relationships existing between the governing authorities, the official agency of the city—CDA, and the neighborhood resident organization. Some of the bicameral cities have acceded to demands that the resident organizations have a de facto right to nominate or approve the selection of the CDA director and his key staff members. The third major type, Resident Control, appeared in only one city (Cambridge, Mass.) after residents succeeded in demanding from the city council the right to approve the city's application and to have a controlling majority on the CDA governing board.

In the bicameral structures the role of the CDA is rather precarious. More particularly,

The unified bicameral organization illustrates the structure in a community where relationships between the city...
Figure 5

Model City Organization Schemes

**UNICAMERAL**

- Identification
- CDA
- Task forces or committees including neighborhood residents as individuals

**BICAMERAL**

- Identification
- CDA
- Identification
- NRO
- Staff assigned
- Joint agency-resident task forces or committees using CDA staff

City Hall oriented

- Identification
- CDA
- Negotiation or confrontation
- Staff
- Advocacy planning staff
- Neighborhood resident committees

Neighborhood oriented

- Negotiation or confrontation
- CDA
- Identification
- NRO
- Staff assigned
- Neighborhood resident committees

**RESIDENT CONTROL**

- Negotiation or confrontation
- NRO
- CDA
- Staff assigned
- Neighborhood resident committees

hall and the neighborhood leadership are reasonably harmonious and the city demonstration agency has been able, so far at least, to maintain the confidence of both. CDA staff is assigned to work with neighborhood committees (or joint committees representing both the neighborhood and public and private agencies) and is acceptable to them.

The [bicameral] unified structure illustrates the pattern of relationships that most city authorities appear to have in mind in submitting their original applications. However, where anti-city hall feeling turned out to be strong in the neighborhoods, and as the neighborhood organizations have become more aggressive in seeking control of the planning process, CDA directors inevitably have found themselves unable to maintain the confidence of both the city's governing authorities and the neighborhood leadership and to bridge the gap between them. Thus caught in the middle between antagonistic forces, the CDA's have had to concentrate upon maintaining the confidence and the political support of one or the other. As illustrated in the diagram of the city hall oriented structure, some of those CDA's have chosen to maintain their identification with their city halls and negotiate at arm's length with the neighborhood organizations. The latter, under the circumstances, have become the neighborhood groups most vigorously demanding, and placing most reliance upon, their own advocacy planning staffs; and the essential negotiations—or confrontations—take place between the advocate planners and the staffs of the CDA and its associated official agencies as the Model Cities plan is developed. In other cases, as shown in the neighborhood oriented diagram, the CDA directors have looked for their political support to the neighborhoods rather than to city hall, have located their offices in the neighborhoods rather than downtown, and have attempted themselves to assume the role of advocate planners, serving the neighborhood organizations. In this subtype, the arm's-length relationship—or confrontation—comes to be between the CDA itself and city hall, and the essential negotiations between the neighborhood and the governing authorities tend to take place after the neighborhood and the city demonstration agency have agreed upon the model cities plan they will present. (Sundquist, 1969, pp. 95-97).

During the period Sundquist was studying the problem, the Model Cities communities were organizing their programs and engaging the required planning period prior to implementation of program plans. As a result, participants had not yet had sufficient experience with the various structures
to render an evaluation. But on the basis of his observations, Sundquist offers the following comments:

1. The unified bicameral structure will not prove to be durable because there are real differences between city authorities and slum dwellers, even when the neighborhood is all white. The neighborhood organizations, as they begin to provide a voice for a heretofore unorganized and silent population, are bound to bring to the surface latent antagonisms, so that the CDA will be increasingly unable to represent both sides.

2. If the CDA Director resolves his dilemma by identifying with the neighborhoods as in a neighborhood-oriented structure, he places himself in an impossible situation, since he is appointed by the city authorities and he cannot entirely escape that identification. Moreover, any accommodation on his part to neighborhood proposals that are unacceptable to the elected officials places the burden of rejection on the mayor and city council in a public forum, rather than having them buried at the staff level. Furthermore, as the CDA becomes an advocate for the neighborhood organizations, it sacrifices its potential to exercise "the powers of mayors, city managers, and city councils to bring about concerted action by the many public and private agencies whose resources are to be mobilized." (Sundquist, 1969, p. 99). This power to coordinate, drawing upon the authority of the chief executive, was a major reason for placing the Model Cities under the control of the city government. The probable consequence is that the CDA will find itself back in the middle between city authorities and residents, trying to mediate between the two, but trusted by neither.

3. The most stable structure appears to be the city hall-oriented
subtype in which the CDA recognizes its allegiance to the city hall as a
city agency; in the long run the neighborhood organization is not likely
to trust them anyway. They would be able to perform in the coordinating
function envisaged for them. The tensions and conflicts associated with
negotiations between neighborhood organizations and the CDA, and between
their respective staffs, may be undesirable from the city's perspectives.

But where the gulf between a city's officialdom and its
slum leadership is wide, an open bicameral structure that
compels communication and negotiation on a sustained basis
appears to offer the most promising mechanism for recon-
ciliation. It not only forces the city to be respon-
sive but provides a means for bringing about a better
understanding in the neighborhood of the problems
faced by the city as a whole (Sundquist, 1969, p. 101).

In most cities new neighborhood organizations were established. In
some cases existing groups were asked to send delegates to a central body,
but usually this was not accepted as sufficiently open and representative,
in other cases delegates of the neighborhoods were selected through mun-
icipal elections. But in most cases the organizations were formed at
open meetings in the sub-neighborhoods, which either choose their delegates
at large or by geographical areas. Oftentimes, the OEO's CAA's partici-
pated in organizing and publicizing these meetings.

The relationships between resident members and staff were ambiguous
and difficult. Where residents had won control of the planning process,
there was little question as to who was in charge. In other cases a "re-
relationship of equality was postulated with residents and professionals
working together as individuals on committees and task forces;" Sometimes
the staff openly took the initiative; and in other cities the residents
were given the impression that the staff existed to help them assemble
their plan.

But the residents were necessarily slow in getting started. The leadership was untried, the members diffident, the task overwhelming, the meetings long and tortuous and marked by parliamentary tangles. The resident organizations were troubled by what might have been an excess of democracy; they consulted elaborately in subneighborhood meetings, and in many cities membership on committees was open to all residents who wished to join. Communication was difficult; one CDA director remarked that residents and professional staff often emerged from meetings with quite divergent impressions of what had happened. The professionals fretted over the delays, and the residents were resentful if the staff moved ahead independently (Sundquist, 1969, p. 105).

Towards the end of the year-long planning period, the professionals generally took charge in order to meet HUD deadlines, and in fact in two cities outside consultants were called in to help compile the document. And because of the deadlines, there was little opportunity for review by resident organizations or by city officials.

The Results.

It is rather difficult to evaluate the results of citizen participation in the OEO and Model Cities programs for several reasons: Different operational goals in different communities; large variations in the organizational structures which evolved; absence of literature evaluating the consequences of particular forms of participation structures; variations in social, economical and political environments; etc., etc. In a large sense, each community program was an experiment in itself, so that the evaluator labors under the absence of a control group against which the programs can be assessed. This probably accounts for the abundance of
impressionistic judgments found in the literature.

On the broader question of the success of the program in reordering the communities' social, economic and political decisions, there is considerable agreement that Model Cities has little chance. As Kramer concluded from his study of several of the more militant OEO programs, "Although a new center of minority influence was established in each community, the CAP did not appear to disrupt the prevailing structure and balance of power in any significant way." (Kramer, 1969, p. 257). City agencies were rarely attacked, but rather became angered by the actions of the poverty people. Interest in voter registration and election issues was stimulated, but there was little impact on elections. "The political systems in all three communities were sturdy and resilient enough to absorb this new structure without the distribution of power being seriously altered." (Kramer, 1969, pp. 257-258). Austin broadens the indictment:

[N]resident participation in the Community Action Agency did not institutionalize, as an ongoing operational process, a broadly decentralized process of citizen participation in organizational decision-making. It did not create participatory democracy around significant decision-making or establish popular sovereignty over the operation of a set of service programs....If the dynamic of citizen mobilization around the issue of black citizens versus white establishment is separated out, then it is even clearer that the operation of resident participation did not significantly extend the practice of broadly based participation in decision-making about public issues and public programs. (Austin, 1972, p. 419).

But then, most observers agree that participation has "forced policy-makers to deal with problems of race" (Strange, 1972, p. 465), and it has established precedents for involving the poor and minorities in decisions affecting their lives. (Ibid., p. 466). Even though the assault on the
Status quo was unsuccessful, the words were repeated many times in Sundquist's communities, "This community will never be the same again."
(quoted by Sundquist, 1969, p. 77).

No one argues the point that the OEO and Model Cities programs touched a large number of the poor. But the extent to which the poor participated actively in the programs is another question to which few authors address themselves. In a study of over fifty settlement houses and neighborhood centers—private social agencies with a history dating back to the 1880's—located in thirty-four cities, Hillman indicates that these agencies have difficulties involving the poor and that the leadership comes from either the middle class or upwardly mobile, but he concludes that the poor can be organized "if there is a generous investment of staff time" (Hillman, 1968, p. 39). Also interesting are the observations that the poor are more interested in specific services than action on long-run solutions to basic issues, and that simple organizational structures, notably ad hoc groups, dealing with a specific problem invite better participation of the very poor (Hillman, 1968, p. 40). Even though the stakes in the OEO program were much greater, Kramer's findings replicate the above:

This experience of attempting to organize the poor is the three communities demonstrated that it was possible, with the investment of a substantial number of staff, to organize and sustain for relatively short periods of time small neighborhood associations that could involve a selected group of residents in a variety of self-help and neighborhood improvement activities... More often than not, the more sophisticated and upwardly mobile members dominated and those with less income and organizational experience tended to drop out. (Kramer, 1969, p. 237).

He goes on to state that the issues of interest to these groups "were generally of immediate local concern, represented the lowest common denominator
of interest, and rarely involved the development of any long range plans." (Kramer, 1969, p. 237). It was a common observation among the neighborhood associations that "the hard-core poor were much more interested in the here-and-now and emergency needs and not in long-range programs that would not directly and immediately affect their condition." (Kramer, 1969, p. 257).

Despite what appears to be relatively low participation in the programs, the OEO programs had some impact on the social service agencies. In general, the agencies resented the activities of the poverty people, but Sundquist cites examples in which the pressures from the CAA—the inducement of federal funds, and the potential threat of competition from the CAA's changed agency policies and attitudes. These include "outreach" and case-finding efforts in which clients are searched out rather than waiting for them to appear at the agency center; the bringing of services to the neighborhood; respect for the rights of clientele; hiring of teachers' aides by school districts; and a more humane attitude on the part of bureaucrats toward their clients (Sundquist, 1969, pp. 47-61).

Austin reports that the poor had some successes in their relationships with public agencies in the communities he studied, but these were confined to those cities which had an adversary pattern of participation. They usually were the result of direct action by neighborhood associations and the coalition of such associations. But, "At best, these impacts were few in number and in most instances limited in scope." (Austin, 1972, p. 419). Given Austin's description of these communities, it seems debatable whether these limited successes were the consequence of participation in the poverty program or the growing political power of the blacks. They may have been
achieved even if the poverty program did not exist in the communities. Along these same lines, Kramer questions whether some of the successes of the poor in the San Francisco Bay area were the result of citizen action rather than financial inducement or OEO requirements for participating public service agencies. With regard to these service agencies, he identifies four strategies that were used to affect the focus and content of their programs:

1. "Seduction" or persuasion through financial incentives. OEO had funds to channel to agencies who were interested in extending their services to the target areas, but as conditions of the grants, agencies usually had to agree to submit their proposals for review by representatives of the target area, consult with them on matters of program and staff, assign professional staff to the neighborhood, and perhaps employ indigenous personnel. The amount of money available to the local CAA's was small in terms of community expenditures on the existing social services so that the CAA's had little leverage in inducing the participation of agencies through financial incentives. The exceptions were the Legal Aid Society and the State Department of Employment, both of which received substantial amounts of poverty funds which allowed for an expansion and redirection of services.

2. "Infiltration" by indigenous nonprofessionals employed by the social service agencies or the CAA's. This was viewed as a major method of improving the services to the poor: the nonprofessionals were expected to educate the professionals and to improve communications between the agencies and their clientele. But their impact on altering policy and practices was limited. Their influence was generally limited to securing
modifications of policy on a case by case basis.

"The relative lack of impact of indigenous personnel on their employing agencies might be explained by the following factors, apart from their co-optation: The small number of nonprofessionals employed by any agency, high turnover, and the fact that most of them were employed as part-time teaching aides in programs such as Head Start. They may have also presented a threat to professionals... and the aides' own disabilities as untrained, poorly paid persons in dead-end jobs with no evident future also minimized their influence. (Kramer, 1969, p. 244).

3. "Monitoring" by the poor as representatives on agency advisory or CAA policy-making bodies.

This form of consumer consultation was quite unprecedented in the social services, and as a requirement for OEO support, it provided a sanction for access by clientele to the agency staff and board members responsible for developing and operating the program. There was considerable variation in the forms and structure of this monitoring function, ranging from occasional consultation on the selection of indigenous personnel, inclusion of low-income target area representatives on a policy-making board or membership on an advisory committee along with professional staff, to a wholly indigenous advisory committee attached to an agency. (Kramer, 1969, p. 245).

As a consequence of these arrangements the professional staff of agencies "had to meet and confront target area representatives on a regular, formalized basis" which served "as a check on and reducing the range and content of unilateral agency planning." (Kramer, 1969, p. 245). Yet, Kramer was not able to find any evidence of actual changes in policy and practice resulting from this monitoring function, though the participants reported some changes in attitudes towards each other and their work.

4. "Attack" by organized pressure groups from the target areas.

There were primarily, efforts to persuade or pressure bureaucracies into performing their duties more effectively and equitably, to secure legislative action, and to change policies. These generally were pursued through
neighborhood improvement associations or ad hoc coalitions organized around specific grievances. As a consequence, relatively inexpensive services were improved without much controversy: more frequent street sweeping, litter signs, neighborhood clean-ups, traffic safety measures, new street lights, and more adequate library facilities. Some success was also achieved in establishing public housing authorities. (Kramer, 1969, pp. 231-233). In general, however, social action was not extensively used.

Perhaps the most enduring result of the OEO and Model Cities programs is its impact upon the organization of minority groups as a potential political force outside of the programs. As Strange observes,

considerable evidence indicates that their political role and influence has been enhanced. Minority group members have been provided access to governmental and community influentials. The act of participating has provided specific individuals with valuable political education, experience, and skills. The leadership structure of the minority community has been altered, primarily through the addition of younger and more militant spokesmen. This broadening of the leadership structure may have farreaching consequences for the minority community which cannot be easily anticipated. Finally, minority group members have obtained some significant control over resources such as jobs, access to information and officials, access to mimeographs and other equipment providing opportunities for disseminating information, recognition, prestige, and money. All of these resources are vital to successful participation in the American political process. It is in the broadening of minority group leadership and the provision of training and resources for political action that the emphasis on citizen participation may have had its most important impact. (Strange, 1972, p. 467).

But what can be said about the institutions? In Austin's communities the structures for participation were variations of an ideal model of "formal cooptation" used by Selznick to describe the voluntary associations sponsored by the TVA, that is, a "process of creating citizen groups as
adjuncts to a formal organization, with responsibility but no authority." (Austin, 1972, p. 413). This model was implicitly adopted by the local initiators of the poverty programs because it was the traditional and accepted pattern within social welfare agencies. The ideal model features a process in which CAA board members, including representatives of the poor vote according to their individual convictions on the policy and program recommendations of the professional staff, the expectation being that most final decisions will be unanimous; the representatives of the poor, selected by neighborhood organizations, are spokesmen on the board for their areas, and they also report back to the neighborhoods on issues before the board. Authority for administering board decisions is lodged in the professional staff. Requests for adaptations made by residents are to be accomplished within fixed frameworks of policy and budget. Participation is expected to produce criticisms and suggestions which the board may incorporate in its decisions at its own discretion, and it is also expected to establish an identity for the CAA within the neighborhoods, leading to greater utilization of its programs and public support for the organization (Austin, 1972, p. 414). The implementation of this model, according to Austin, varied as a consequence of local conditions. The ideal was never realized in the Limited Participation communities; it was substantially realized in the Active Participation cases; and in the Adversary situations residents were able to transform the advisory process into one of confrontation with the CAA's. The correlates, as discussed before, were demographic characteristics, organizational experience and skills of residents, and the presence and aggressiveness of the civil right movement.
In Kramer's study of the more militant CAA's in the San Francisco area it is evident that the local governing coalitions initiated the poverty programs with the same ideal model in mind for citizen participation. But local conditions were not conducive to this form. The same variables that Austin notes as associated with the adversary pattern of participation were also present in the Bay area, and after two or three years the ethnic minorities were successful in gaining control. But in so doing, the minorities alienated the "governing coalitions" and lost the support of those controlling the resources needed to significantly affect the conditions of poverty. On the other hand, the minorities were not able to exercise their new power effectively for political purposes (Kramer, 1969, chapter 11).

The basic dilemma is posed by Sundquist. Can the same organization engage in a planning and coordinating role, seeking cooperation and coordination of existing social service programs, and also an organizational and social action role, mobilizing the agencies' clientele to pressure them for changes? In the OEO program he provides evidence that one role drives out the other. The Model Cities sought to overcome this dilemma by returning responsibility of the program to elected officials who would have both the authority and control over the resources needed to coordinate the efforts of the different agencies involved. This meant that residents could no longer control the programs in their area. But HUD officials were not willing to sacrifice resident participation. Even though residents could not control the structure, they were given resources to enhance their capacity to participate—information, money, technical assistance, and a "right" of access to the decision-making structure.
This fact, along with HUD's insistence that the participation structure be agreeable to the residents, enabled the residents to negotiate with local officials over the structure of participation. Their success is probably reflected in the Nixon Administration's effort to put further constraints on participation by confining the power of residents to the exercise of a veto over program plans. It is apparent that the same conflicts between residents and the "governing coalition" that appeared in the OEO program were surfacing in the Model Cities context despite the difference in the formal structure. It is yet to be shown, according to Hallman, that the various federal agencies are willing to utilize Model Cities as a vehicle to coordinate their local programs (Hallman, 1972).

Factors Encouraging Responsiveness.

1. A major factor in both OEO and Model Cities was the attitude of Washington officials and their unwillingness to approve local programs and disburse funds unless residents were participating. In the case of OEO, this came in the form of regulations establishing formulas for participation and refusal to approve local plans that did not conform. The underlying belief was that local residents did not have the resources and power to bargain effectively with the community Establishment so that Washington OEO had to take up their cause. In the Model Cities case HUD refusal to approve city plans over protests from neighborhood groups forced the cities to negotiate with the groups over participation structures and program plans. The incentive to come to agreement for both sides were federal funds for the city and target area. In all likelihood the change in attitude by the Nixon Administration towards resident participation has
strengthened the cities' position (Kramer, Austin, Sundquist).

2. The Model Cities requirement that the resident group be provided information, staff and technical assistance strengthened their bargaining capacity, though questions remained over the relationship between the residents and their staff. These resources allowed residents to document their case and confront the city with alternatives (Sundquist, Arnstein, Kloman).

3. The prior existence of minority and/or poverty issues in a community seems to have contributed significantly to resident participation in OEO. There was already interest in issues involving the target area residents so that interest did not have to be generated from scratch. An active civil rights movement in a community was probably instrumental in 'culcating a belief that problems of the ghettos were the result of institutional rather than individual failures, leading to an orientation towards social action which requires mobilization of residents into groups rather than services which requires individual casework. Moreover, residents already had some experience with organizing activities and had developed some leadership skills, both of which were transferrable to the local poverty program. In short, the effort to secure resident participation benefitted from the climate created by the civil rights activities and the experience gained in their organizations. In the case of Model Cities, experience with participation in OEO appears to have affected the structuring of the local organizations. In fact, local CAA's actively involved themselves in organizing resident participation in Model Cities (Sundquist, Kramer, Austin).
Factors Inhibiting Responsiveness.

For ease of exposition, factors impeding effective participation or constraints on the organizations in responding to demands are listed. The listing does not imply any ordering of importance among the factors.

1. In the initiation of the local OEO programs, target area residents had no voice in deciding upon the basic organizational structure and pattern of service programs. These parameters were established by the "governing coalition" before residents were invited to participate. (Austin, 1972). As a result, residents could accept the advisory model and a pattern of services emphasizing the provisioning of social services, or work from within and without to change these orientations.

2. Even though OEO emphasized that planning and program development was to be done locally to meet local needs, requirements from Washington increasingly limited local discretion. National emphasis programs such as Head Start and Legal Aid were packaged in Washington and pushed onto the local programs in order to get quick results. Congressional earmarking and the establishment of lists of priorities by regional OEO offices further limited local discretion (Austin, 1972; Strange, 1972).

3. The rapid inclusion of communities into the poverty program without a corresponding increase in total funding by Congress severely limited the ability of local officials to do what they wanted. Residents often participated in decisions regarding which programs to cut, but seldom in decisions on what program to initiate. In addition, the lack of funds crippled the ability of local CAA's to induce or "bribe" other agencies to participate in the poverty program in which case they would be subject to
OEO requirements relating to resident participation (Austin, 1972; Strange, 1972; Kramer, 1969).

4. In both OEO and Model Cities the documentation required and the short and shifting deadlines for submission established by the Washington agencies often resulted in little review of program proposals by the governing boards and neighborhood organizations before submission. Moreover, participants became lost in the "sea of deadlines and maze of documents." In both cases, the importance of the professional staff was enhanced (Austin, 1972; Strange, 1972; Sundquist, 1969).

5. The opportunity for the poor to gain employment as nonprofessionals on the staffs of CAA's and participating agencies was viewed as an important mode of participation. Understandably, the poor opted for this mode rather than the decision-making positions on the governing boards which were not compensated. Capable leaders were lost to the staffs where they functioned under the supervision of the professionals (Strange, 1972).

6. The dual goals of coordination and participation of OEO and Model Cities are contradictory. In order to survive in interagency politics at both the local level and in Washington, the programs had to place restrictions on participation. Otherwise, other agencies would not cooperate in the programs (Sundquist, 1969; Strange, 1972; Kramer, 1969).

7. In the OEO program little assistance was given to support participation. For example, board members were not compensated; staffs were not provided to neighborhood organizations; indigenous employees were not given training. These were corrected in the Model Cities.

8. The long and detailed planning period in the Model Cities
discourages the involvement of residents who seek immediate solutions to their problems (Strange, 1972).

9. Local poverty boards were charged with responsibility of mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of municipal, state, and federal agencies in the target areas, but they were given little authority to do this. As a result, cooperation had to be obtained through persuasion, financial inducements, or the threat of competition from CAA's undertaking the same functions in the poverty areas. Whenever the CAA's organized residents as an interest group to pressure the agencies, the agencies became resentful. They also resented the anti-professional attitude of the CAA staffs and residents and the threat of competition. Without their participation as a delegate agency of the OEO, residents could not gain access to them in an advisory or decision-making capacity or as nonprofessional staff members. (Sundquist, 1969; Kramer, 1969; Hallman, 1972).

10. Both OEO and Model Cities did not have sufficient inducements to secure participation. The poor are primarily concerned with day-to-day problems of living. Neither program could offer immediate tangible benefits that were perceived as relevant to individual problems, particularly jobs (Kramer, 1969).

Our general assessment, then, is that the lessons of the OEO and Model Cities experiences should be carefully heeded in designing responsive schools.
The Price or Market Model of School Governance

One response to the unresponsiveness of public schools has been to return the major educational choices to the principal consumers of education, students and their parents. Milton Friedman (1962) has advocated this position for many years. More recently consumer sovereignty has been revitalized in discussions of educational vouchers.

The voucher scheme seeks to make the public schools more directly responsive to parents in basically two ways. First, it seeks to replace regional school boards by establishing local school policy. Secondly, it seeks to exercise a more direct control by allowing parents to choose whether or not any given school's policy warrants his support through the use of the voucher. The school must look to the consumer rather than to a central bureaucracy for funds. The school operates in a basically decentralized framework, making its own decisions on the use of funds and being responsive to parents.

Unfortunately, whether voucher models will make schools more responsive to the consumer is purely a speculative question. Although there are two different voucher models (The Center for the Study of Public Policy CSPP, and John Coons and his associates, 1971), only one district (Alum Rock, California) in the nation has implemented a limited version of the CSPP. The feasibility studies conducted in Gary, San Francisco and Seattle during 1971 came to nothing.

Research on the effects of family choice in schooling is contradictory, confusing and limited. However, there is some evidence to suggest that schools do not become any less responsive to consumers. A number of writers of vouchers have suggested that communities will become more
fragmented, on racial and class lines, when each parent has an individual educational choice. After the first year of its voucher experiment, the Alum Rock School district reports that no change in the racial makeup of its school occurred (J. Lewin, 1972: ). Rawitsch (1972), Sederberg and Alkire (1972) report that schools in the Minneapolis experimental school's program became more socio-economically homogeneous after one year of operation.

If education choice does not aggravate stratification, it certainly does not encourage mobility. Reporting about family choice on the Alum Rock Voucher experiment Mecklenberger (1972: 24) states that 75% of the parents choose their 'neighborhood schools'. Similarly in Minneapolis' experimental schools program, 74% of the students attended schools in their original attendance areas.

The quality of the school's program is one of the most important factors affecting individual choice. In the Minneapolis' experiment 59% of the parents reported to the school district that the most important factor in their selection of the school was that school's program (Sederberg and Alkire, 1972: 22). Further evidence of the importance of school program in Minneapolis is provided by Rawitsch (1972: 8), who reports that the one traditional school in the experimental school's program area was the only school which lost students; the other, less traditional schools each recorded net gains in the number of students attending them. Similarly in Alum Rock, over 60% of parents in the experimental voucher program opted for new and non-traditional programs.

As stated earlier, the information on voucher schemes and related areas is scarce. Unfortunately much of the information that has been
analyzed from Alum Rock and Minneapolis has little to do with institutional responsiveness. Except that currently funded vouchers are unlikely to increase the stratification of a community and given a choice most students opt for non-traditional programs.

While the results are not yet in on vouchers, there is a great deal of theoretical and empirical literature on individual choices in the educational market place. What follows is an attempt to summarize the rationale for greater choice in education, and to summarize what evidence is available on the factors which affect the educational choices currently made by parents and students. It is still unclear that the goal of responsive schools would in fact be encouraged by a movement toward a market model of school governance.

Consumer sovereignty in the marketplace has long been a central tenet of classical liberal economic theory. Milton Friedman (1962: 8-9) argues that freedom in the marketplace is both an end in itself and "an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom."

Competition is seen as essential in the maintenance of consumer sovereignty:

By introducing alternative sources of supply, competition expands the choice available to consumers. Moreover, these alternative sources are likely to use different methods and approaches, or even to develop wholly new products, thus greater variety makes expanded choice really meaningful. Since consumers can shift their trade from suppliers who do not please them, suppliers have a strong incentive to provide what the consumers want . . . (Downs, 1970: 264). Without choice, progress would be replaced by stagnation, and mediocrity would be substituted for "the variety and diversity of individual action" (Friedman, 1962: 4).
The essentiality of choice and, concomitantly, of competition in schooling has been a theme of various economists and political scientists since at least the latter eighteenth century, when Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, wrote:

Have . . . public endowments contributed to encourage the diligence, and to improve the abilities of the teachers? Have they directed the course of education towards objects more useful, both to the individual and to the public than those to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord? . . .

In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it, is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune, or even their ordinary revenue and subsistence. In order to acquire this fortune, or even to get this subsistence, they must in the course of a year, execute a certain quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is free, the rivalry of competitors, who are all endeavoring to justle one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavor to execute his work with a certain degree of exactness. . . . Rivalship and emulation render excellency . . .

The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished more or less the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence, so far as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund altogether independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions. (Smith, 1937: 716-717)

In the last decade, critics of public schooling, in Canada and Great Britain, as well as in the United States, have revived (if, indeed, they

1Another early writer on the subject of choice and competition in schooling was John Stuart Mill (1929: 126): "A general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government . . . in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established by the State should only exist, if exist at all, as one among many competing experiments . . . ."
were ever dead) demands for "diversity" and "choice" in public schooling.

In the mid-late 1960's, the so-called "romantic" critics (i.e., Holt Silberman Kohl, etc.) wrote about the deadening lack of flexibility in the classroom:

> We cannot have real learning in school if we think it is our duty and our right to tell children what they must learn. We cannot know, at any moment, what particular bit of knowledge or understanding a child needs most, will most strengthen and best fit his model of reality. Only he can do this. He may not do it very well, but he can do it a hundred times better than we can. The most we can do is try to help, by letting him know roughly what is available and where he can look for it. Choosing what he wants to learn and what he does not is something he must do for himself. (Holt, 1964: 220-221)

There is some evidence that parents, too, desire greater choice in schooling. In Seattle, 75% of a sample of parents interviewed by a University of Washington research team indicated that "parents should be able to choose schools for their children"; 13% were undecided; and 11% disagreed (Bureau of School Service and Research, 1972 in Mecklenberger and Hostrop, 1972: 63). In Alum Rock, California, 57% of a sample of parents interviewed by a research team from the Santa Clara County Office of Education agreed that "parents should be the ones to decide what types of elementary school education their children receive"; 24% were undecided; and 20% disagreed (Mecklenberger, and Hostrop, 1972: 263). Boyson (1970: xiv), writing about England, reports that "various surveys made by the Institute (for Economic Affairs) since 1963 show that there is a desire amongst all classes of people for more choice." Some (cf. Boss, 1973) have interpreted the many defeats of recent school bond elections as persistent demands on the part of parents for greater influence, if not choice, over the quantity and quality of schooling.
In the latter 1960's and early 70's, a number of Systemic models for encouraging and sustaining choice and competition in public schooling were advanced. The Center for the Study of Public Policy CSPP, 1970 and John Coons and his associates (1971), among others and the U. S. Office of Economic Opportunity have forwarded the concept of education vouchers. Mario Fantini (1970, 1971) has advanced the idea of "public schools of choice." The U. S. Office of Education has, for a number of years now, supported a number of million-dollar experimental schools projects across the U. S. Kenneth Clark (1969) and Jessie Wray (1970), from different viewpoints, have suggested the establishment of alternative, competing school districts. Anthony Downs (1970) has advanced the idea of furthering competition within the public schools by overlapping attendance area boundaries. And James Coleman (1966) has forwarded his concept of "open schools": schools in which students could sub-contract their education to competing persons and organizations outside of the public schools.

Alternative model builders, as well as "romantic" critics have presupposed the limitedness of, yet never systematically defined, the existing range of schooling options available to parents for their children: alternatives to the present market structure of schooling have been proposed with little knowledge of either the scope or the workings of the existing educational marketplace. Economists of education have concentrated their energies largely on the aggregate social costs, benefits, and effects of public schooling. Political scientists have studied power and administrative decision-making in schooling. Sociologists have examined the effects of school and classroom structure on STET but never how or why those children got in that school and that classroom in the first place.
The facts are that there is an educational marketplace; that parents do select the locus of their children's education; and that the processes and outcomes of consumer behavior in schooling can be studied.

This outline attempts to (a) summarize current knowledge about or related to family choice in schooling, and (b) develop a "portrait of the processes" (Coleman, 1957: 3) and outcomes of such choice.
Writers on family choice in schooling generally have acknowledged two, or sometimes three types of choices available to parents who desire to affect the locus of their children's schooling: moving the family residence, sending the children to a private school, or appealing to school district administrators (cf. Fantini, 1971: 92; Fuchs, 1969: 55; Benson, in Coons and Sugarman, 1971: 4; Friedman, 1962: 91; CSPP, 1970: 1-2). Anthony Downs (1970: 266), however, recognized a somewhat wider range of alternatives:

Parents living in big cities can send their children to private schools, buy entry into suburban schools without moving (in some cases), or actually move into the jurisdictional area of some other school within the big-city system or into a suburban system.

Other authors, too, have cited additional ways in which at least some parents exercise choice in schooling. Christopher Jencks, testifying before the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity (SC on EEO, 1971: 10984) pointed out that

a number of school districts in northern New England which do not maintain public high schools but instead provide payments to parents to send their children to either a neighboring high school or private academies, depending on the parents' choice.

The chairperson of that committee, Senator Walter Mondale, mentioned that native Americans in some States receive Federal monies for their children's schooling, and can choose where to spend it (SC on EEO, 1971: 10984).

George La Nous (1971: 144) notes that "dual enrollment permits a student
to select his curriculum from two or more learning centers" and "exists in almost every state." Coleman (1971: 85) suggests an additional set of options available to families: some cities allow free choice at the high school levels. Here, the pupil has a choice among all schools in the city, although schools are not located to make two schools easily accessible to a child.

Most of the above mentioned authors assume, usually implicitly, that there are few, if any, alternatives within schools. Downs (1971: 267) and Fantini (1971: 92) state that what little variation there is within schools is due primarily to chance and to personality variables, both of which, they say, families have little control over.

Examined closely, the literature on family choice in schooling offers a patchy series of largely undocumented statements about the range of schooling options available to parents. Certainly it is plausible, as many of the above authors have stated, that rich Anglo parents have more options than poor non-Anglo parents; but there is a dirth of empirical evidence concerning the full range of choices available to rich or poor, Anglo or non-Anglo.

One factor which confounds any such examination is the considerable variance, at least within our experience, of schooling options from school district to school district, and from city to city. The number, kind, and availability of options within and outside of the public schools in Eugene, Oregon is considerably different than in Portland, Oregon, both of which are different than in Seattle, all of which are different than in San Francisco, and so on.
Without claiming that they are generally extant in the U. S. or even in more than a few cases, several additional ways in which parents are offered a greater range of choices within the public schools should be mentioned. In Portland, and likely in at least a few other racially heterogeneous cities, it is very easy, indeed encouraged, for racial minorities to go to predominantly Anglo schools and vice versa. It has also been possible in at least one metropolitan area -- Hartford, Connecticut -- for inner-city youth to go to suburban schools. Chicago, Portland, and probably other urban school districts, have "magnet" schools -- schools of the school district many attend. Most school districts, in Oregon anyway, have some form of an administrative transfer mechanism, by which they are geographically programmed; some school districts make it very easy to get such a transfer.2

Options are also available to parents and students, with seemingly increased frequency in the past several years, within individual schools, at an elementary level. Notable examples are the U. S. Office of Education experimental schools in Tacoma, Washington; Berkeley; Greenville County, South Carolina; Newark, New Jersey; and San Antonio, as well as the U. S. Office of Economic Opportunity-financed education voucher experiment in Alum Rock, California. This, and our suspicion that in at least two, during the 1971-72 school year, almost 2000 such transfers were granted in major Oregon school districts. In four out of the five largest districts in Oregon, more than 80% of the transfer requests received were approved (McMillan, et. al., 1972: 6-7).
some schools it is possible for parents to request and receive room (and thus teacher) changes for their children, tends to throw some doubt on Downs' and Fantini's generalizations (cited above) concerning options within schools.

Two additional ways in which families select the locus of schooling for their children have been either missed or ignored in the literature. First, parents may affect the locus of their children's schooling by not sending them to school — this is the case of the Amish, who will not send their children to school beyond the eighth grade (see Arons, 1972) as well as those parents who have chosen to educate their children at home, outside of any school; and those parents (such as migrant farm laborer parents) who keep their children out of school so that they may work and earn money vital to the families' survival. According to a pair of recent newspaper articles (Keller, 1973: 1,9), a small, but increasing number of families in the Northwest are pulling their children out of the public schools and either educating them at home or forming "family schools." One particular group, the National Parents League, "fed up with 'paganism and permissiveness' in the public schools," has established 40 such "family schools," half of them in Oregon and Washington (Keller, 1973: 1).

Likewise, children may choose not to go to school, or to go to school only for part of the day, or part of the year. That many students choose

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3 For a more lengthy and extremely interesting discussion of the concept and rationality of parents selecting education for their children by not sending them to school, cf. West, 1970: 212-218.
to do this is evident not only from high drop-out rates, but also from low average daily attendance figures (cf. Nagle, 1971). And there is some evidence to suggest that these are very rational choices: the 1957 U. S. Office of Education study on school drop-outs (USOE, 1957) suggested that most students who had dropped out in the period studied (1951-54) had dropped out due to economic necessity. There is also evidence which indicates that additional years of schooling makes little difference in the earning capacity of non-Anglos (cf. Weiss, 1970; Hanoch, 1967; Harrison, 1971; Michaelson, 1968): perhaps schooling isn't the best investment a young non-Anglo person could make for herself or himself.

A Summary and Typology

At least the last five, and possibly all seven of the following types of choices are available to parents in all public school districts:

1. **Choice of alternatives within geographically assigned public school.** Parents may affect the locus of their children's education by either (a) altering the room (and teacher) assignments of their children, or (b) selecting one of several sub-programs for their children.

2. **Transfer, part-time or full-time, to another school in same public school district.** Without moving, parents may (a) enroll their children in dual enrollment programs (part-time in another school), or (b) enroll their children full-time in a school other than the one within whose area they fall. This would include magnet school, administrative transfer, and desegregation programs.

3. **Transfer to a school in another public school district.** Without moving, parents may have their children attend a school in a district other than in the one in which they reside. This would include both rural to urban tuition exchange schemes and urban to suburban desegregation schemes.
4. **Transfer to a non-public school.** Parents may send their children to a school or schools outside of the public school system. This would include parochial, military, trade, "free," community controlled, and other non-public schools.

5. **Move place of residence to another part of same public school district.**

6. **Move residence to another school district.**

7. **In school/out of school.** Parents may decide not to send their children to school; children may decide not to go to school.

In this typology, it is types 4, 5, and 6 which have been commonly referred to in the literature, and types 1, 2, 3, and 7 which have been largely ignored.

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Either of these could be accomplished without the family ever having to move: it is general knowledge that at least some students change their residence, and thus the school they attend, by moving in with (or telling school officials that they have moved in with) friends or relatives.
FACTORS DETERMINING THE OUTCOMES OF FAMILY CHOICE IN SCHOOLING

The social science literature, in a remarkably non-systematic manner, identifies a number of factors influencing the outcomes of family choice in schooling. Six types of variables are evident in the literature: demographic variables (race, financial resources; family size; age of children), geographic variables (proximity of school to home, after-school care, transportation routes; safety of route to school), information-related variables (information sent to parents; information received by parents; ability of parents to interpret information), school-related variables (school program; school environment or "atmosphere"), policy-related variables (admissions criteria), and social-psychological variables (alienation; social effectiveness of parents; educational expectations; valuation of education; family decision-making processes).

Demographic Factors

Race and Financial Resources. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned, and most obvious, determinants of family choice in schooling are the race and financial resources of the family (cf. CSPP, 1970: 1-2; Levin, 1968: 34; Ginsberg, 1971: 379; Benson, in Coons and Sugarman, 1962: 91; etc). The general conclusion is that poor people are severely limited in the schooling options available to them, at least in relation to the number of schooling options available to more wealthy people. Not only can poor people not afford to send their children to private school, but they cannot
afford the expense of housing and property taxes in the school districts with "better" schools. Information and transportation costs also are a greater burden for poor people than for wealthier people. Non-Anglos are limited in their options even further by their generally low incomes, as well as by their exclusion from certain residential neighborhoods and certain schools.

Family Size. The number of children attending school may become an important determinant of family choice in that some parents may not desire to separate siblings who could be attending the same school. The National Education Finance Project (NEFP, 1971: 40) contends that "if they have more than one child, it is likely that few parents will select different schools for each of their children." Empirical evidence regarding this claim is available only from two sources, and is contradictory: The chief reason that non-desegregating families said they had made such a choice, according to Weinstein and Geisel (1962: 25), was one of not wanting to separate their siblings. Recent evidence that over 25% of the families with more than one child in voucher program school chose different schools for their children.

Age of Children. Rhodes (1972: 2) suggests that "as the child gets older, the parent's decision is increasingly less important as a determinant of choice." Data from Minneapolis' experimental schools program (Sederberg and Alkire, 1972: 23, 88) tend to support this: at an elementary level, 76% of the sample of experimental schools parents responded that they had had the most influence in deciding which school their children would attend -- only 16% responded that their children had had the
most influence; at the high school level, only 32% of the parents responded that they had had the most influence -- 36% responded that their children had had the most influence.

**Geographic Factors**

**Distance to School.** The geographic or time distance of schools from families' homes is cited by a number of authors to be the major determinant of family choice in schooling. The CSPP (1970: 4), for instance, asserts that "most parents will, of course, choose schools near their homes even if they have a much wider range of choices." (The National Education Finance Project (CEFP), 1971: 40; Rhodes, 1972: 1; Kamman, 1972: 38; Downs, 1970: 288; and Havighurst, 1970, in Mecklenberger and Hostrop, 1972: 52, all make similar statements.) Jencks SC on EEO, (1971: 10988), though as non-empirical, qualifies such a conclusion: "If people really perceive a difference between schools, most of them seem to prefer the school which is supposed to be better, even if it is not in the neighborhood." Empirical evidence is so sparse as to be inconclusive, but at least some of it points in directions other than those suggested by the above authors. Binderman (1972: 497), in a study of family choice-making behavior in a Southern freedom-of-choice school district, found the perceived difference in distance to the Anglo and to the Black schools to be an important variable in the desegregate/non-desegregate decision-making process; the perceived difference in distance was, however, highly correlated with degree of alienation, leaving the significance of this finding unclear. Weinstein and Geisel (1962: 25), in another study of family
choice-making behavior in a freedom-of-choice school district, found that desegregating families often gave as their chief reason for desegregating their perception that the Anglo school was closer than the Black school. The perceived closeness of the schools, however, accounted for only 25% of the variance between desegregating and non-desegregating families. Reporting about family choice in the Alum Rock voucher experiment, Mecklenberger (1972: 24) states that 95% of the parents chose their "neighborhood" schools. In Minneapolis' experimental schools program, 74% of the students attended schools in their original attendance areas. The central of three attendance areas, however, drew 48% of its students from outside of its attendance area (Rawitsch, 1972: 4, 6). Butler, et al. (1969: 19), in a national study of family residential moving behavior found that, surprisingly, accessibility to work and to schools, which are traditionally assumed to be major concerns of the household, do not show up (as being important) here. Rather the emphasis is on the convenience to the household of personal and retail services.

Other Geographic Factors. Sonnenfeld (1972), in a study of family choice in Eugene, Oregon public schools, provides evidence on the importance (at an elementary school level only) of several additional location-related factors: traffic between home and schools, safety of routes to schools, proximity of schools to after-school care.

Butler, et al.'s findings perhaps could be attributed to the abundance of "neighborhood" schools: if, in fact, no matter where they took up residence within an urban area, families were close to an elementary school, it would seem logical for "accessibility . . . schools" to not be a major familial concern.
Information-Related Factors

**Quantity and Quality of Information Available.** There appears to be agreement in the literature that there is presently a paucity of information about schooling options available to parents (cf. Downs, 1970, pp. 264-293; CSPP, in SC on EEO, 1971:11088-11113; Ginzberg, 1971:378-389; etc.) Downs (1970:275) suggests that parents have to make choices only on the basis of personal impressions gained for comparing experiences in different schools with their friends and acquaintances or with the few national test scores that professionals release to them.

Wilder (1968, cited in CSPP, 1971:11098) notes that parental knowledge about public schools is highly dependent on parents' socio-economic status. In his study of school district information programs and parent knowledge about schools, he reports that "an absence of school structured information activities had virtually no impact on the knowledge of middle-class parents," while significantly reducing the amount of knowledge of poor parents.

Putting the question of quantity of information in relative terms, one might ask whether there are times when parents are better equipped than are the public schools to select schools for their children. Partington (1970:40) believes that there are times when parents are clearly more knowledgeable about their children than are the public schools:

In the case of children starting school at the age of five, neither Local Education Authorities nor schools have probably even met the children or had any dealings with them at all, so that the parents must be in the best position relatively to know the child's needs.

He also believes, however, that

On the other hand Local Education Authorities have access to more information about their schools than do parents. The result is that each party has information vital to the other if the most suitable choice is to be made on the child's behalf, and there is very little traffic of
information between them...the same is true of choosing a secondary school at 11.

In regard to the quality of information available to parents, Rhodes (1972:1) warns that

most data coming to parents from the conventional sources of achievement tests, IQ tests (all group data) and classroom grades may be totally inadequate in determining the child's ability or academic potential.

Influencability of Parents. A number of authors doubt the ability of parents "to make informed judgments, even if the available information were much better than appears likely" (Ginzberg, 1971:379). Ginzberg goes on to suggest that

one must consider the influence of demagogic leadership in persuading ghetto parents to opt for one or another alternative. We do not postulate that each parent will make a decision on his own.

Friedman (in Maynard, 1967) posits that "the rich are always the taste-makers." The CEFP (1971:40) contends that

observations and interviews indicate that parental judgments with regard to schools tend to be based largely on what they know about the clientele attending a school rather than knowledge of the nature and quality of the educational program.

Jencks (SC on EEO, 1971:11010) testified that "one of the factors that complicates the picture is the perception of a good school in the poor people's eyes is the school rich people want." Binderman (19/2:492), however, found social influences to be less important, at least in the case of families making a desegregate/non-desegregate decision: according to his computations, (and accepting his measurement) neither Black nor Anglo social approval significantly affected parents' decisions to send their children to desegregated or non-desegregated schools. Data from Minneapolis (Sederberg and Alkire, 1972:25) indicate that parents felt that information
published and distributed by the public schools was considerably more influential in their choice of schools than were their neighbors or friends.

In response to the suggestion that parents are vulnerable to "school hucksters," West (1970:220) writes:

To reply that when ordinary people are allowed to buy their own education, they will be at the mercy of "commercial pressures," especially advertising, is to lose a sense of proportion and to miss the burden of much previous discussion....it seems that the citizen cannot escape the pressure of "propaganda" advertising even under the present state system....

But even though many families may be duped temporarily by one commercial advertiser, it is difficult to believe that they will not promptly use their opportunity to transfer their attentions to other suppliers and other advertisers after unsatisfactory experience with the first.

School-Related Factors

The course offerings and the general atmosphere of environment of the school or schools which parents are considering sending their children to are both central to parental choice in schooling. Sonnenfeld (1972), in his research, concludes that at the secondary level, the schools' programs and general environments were of primary importance in parents' requests for transfers out of or into particular schools. Keller (1972:33), reporting about a mass exodus of parents from one particular inner-city high school in Portland, notes that not many people seem eager to go there...."Parents just want to send their kids there, especially black parents.... They don't like the atmosphere, and they don't think the kids are learning."....parents fear the school offers a watered down curriculum, interracial hostility (and interracial dating), and discipline problems....

If test results, welfare rolls, and dropout rate are any indication, Jefferson needs....extra help more than any school in the city....
Then there is the building itself....students congregating at streetside worsen the school's public image ....Jefferson has had four principals since 1968. Teacher turnover is also high.

School programs also seem to have made a significant impact on parental choice of schools in Minneapolis. There, 59 percent of the parents in the experimental schools program reported to the school district that the most important factor in their selection of the school was that school's program (Sederberg and Alkire, 1972:22). Further evidence of the importance of school program in Minneapolis is provided by Rawitsch (1972:8), who reports that the one traditional school in the experimental school's program area was the only school which lost students; the other, less traditional schools each recorded net gains in the number of students attending them. Similarly in Alum Rock, over 60 percent of parents in the experimental voucher program opted for new and non-traditional programs—in spite of the fact that over 95 percent of them continued to send their children to their "neighborhood" schools (Education Summary, 1972:3). Jencks (1971: 10988), also, underscored the importance of the nature of the school, testifying that

> If people really perceive a qualitative difference between the schools, most of them seem to prefer the school which is supposed to be better even if it is not in the neighborhood....a lot depends on the degree to which the schools become different from one another.

Policy-Related Factors

**Admissions Criteria.** Admission to most public schools is based primarily on a single criterion: place of residence. Children are slated to attend particular schools depending on whether or not they live within those schools' geographically demarcated attendance areas. The boundaries of these attendance areas are permeable to various degrees, depending on
the particular school district (cf. McMilan, et al., 1972). Arons (1971:353-354), Downs (1970:287-289), McMilan, et al., (1972:5), and Sonnenfeld (1972) all recognize the importance of these attendance area boundaries in that both the drawing of attendance area boundaries and the interpretation of the permeability of those boundaries are subject to subjective interpretation by school district officials. Arons (1971:347-349) and two other authors (Ginzberg, 1971:378; and Coons and Sugarman, 1970:27) recognize that determination of admission policies at private schools also affects family choice in schooling: such policies may discriminate against people not of certain religious sects, races, or levels of intelligence.

Social-Psychological Factors

Alienation. Binderman (1972:497) found that alienation and powerlessness, or the lack of it, was an important variable in the desegregation decision for the families which he studied: he found alienation and powerlessness to affect not only the amount of information that parents had about the public schools, but also their perception of the differences in quality between Black and predominantly Anglo schools and of the differences in distance to the two schools. Weinstein and Geisel (1962:26) reported that those families in their study who had sent their children to desegregated schools tended to be less alienated and more "pioneering" in nature than were non-desegregating families, even when the education of the parents was controlled for.

Social Effectiveness. According to Partington (1970:43-44), the eloquent and persistent parent, literate and persuasive, who understands the official mind, who knows how to find out for himself what his rights are, is more likely than
any other parent to have his way, without necessarily having a stronger case than his more reticent neighbor.

Sonnenfeld (1972:30) speculates that it is likely that people with lesser amounts of schooling cannot wage as effective an argument with a school administrator (over obtaining an administrative transfer) as could a person with greater amounts of schooling. Levin (1968:34), also, alludes to the importance of parental social effectiveness.

**Educational Expectations.** The educational expectations of the parents for the children were strongly related to the desegregate/non-desegregate decision of Southern Black families, but unrelated to decisions of parents of Wisconsin kindergarten children concerning hypothetical levels of school desegregation decision for their children tended to have greater expectations for the duration of their children's schooling than did non-desegregating parents. This finding is in concordance with the findings of another study of freedom-of-choice decision-making, by Cagle and Becker (1967, reported in Binderman, 1972:491). Rhodes (1970:14-15) found that there was no relationship between the parent's estimate of how much education their child would receive and the concept of educational institution designed to meet the need. Parents seemed to be saying that their child may not be the brightest and may not go the furthest in formal education but their child deserved the best education possible.

**Valuation of Schooling.** Critics of plans to increase family choice in schooling (cf. Ginzberg, 1971:379) have speculated that poor parents will not allocate the personal "time, energy, and interest" necessary to make "informed judgments." Data concerning the socio-economic distribution of valuation of schooling and the effect of that valuation on family choice in schooling are (again) both patchy and inconclusive. Coons and Sugarman (1971:16), though admitting the roughness of their measure, cite the fact that poor school districts "often tax themselves at a higher rate
than to richer school districts" as evidence that poor people are as quality
conscious in regard to schooling, if not more so, as are wealthy people.
Bulter et al., (1969:27) report families, regardless of socio-economic
status, race, or urban/suburban residence, would prefer "a neighborhood
with a better than average school system but higher than average tax rate"
(78 percent) to "a neighborhood with a lower than average tax rate, but
worse than average school system" (15 percent). Binderman (1972:492)
found the valuation of education to be unrelated to parents' desegregated
non-desegregated decision.

**FAMILY Decision-Making process.** Weinstein and Geisel (1962:24) note
that in their study, non-desegregating families tended not to have a
lower amount of discussion about the desegregation decision than did deseg-
regating families; nor did they have shorter discussions. Non-desegregat-
ing families did, however, share the responsibility less than did desegre-
gating families.

**Some Additional Factors**

The social science literature, now summarized, paints a wide-ranging,
if incomplete, picture of the determinants of the outcomes of family choice
in schooling. Here we shall attempt to fill in some of the conceptual gaps
left by the literature.

(1) The literature fails to recognize the importance of the precip-
its of **active parental choice-making.** Not all families actively select
schools. Those that do, we postulate, are doing so for some particular
reason(s). Those factors which "trigger" active parental choice-making
certainly affect the course and the outcomes of family choice in schooling. If, for instance, parents are seeking and evaluating schools other than the one their child is presently attending because they feel that their child is being alienated by the educational philosophy and style of that school, they are likely to be extraordinarily conscious of educational philosophy and style of that school, they are likely to be extraordinarily conscious of educational philosophy and style as they are searching, and further, they are likely going to be seeking a philosophy and style other than the one in the child's present school.

(2) Although the literature recognizes that race is often a direct or indirect burden to non-Anglo families attempting to exercise choice in schooling, we note that it must also be, in a few cases anyway, an asset. In Portland, for instance, the city school district has community-based psychologists soliciting blacks to transfer to predominantly Anglo schools. Pressures on the school districts to desegregate their schools may not result in non-Anglo families obtaining their most desired choices, but it may result in an increase in the number of schooling options available to such families.

(3) In its consideration of the relationship of distance to family choice in schooling, the literature fails to take into consideration the concept of "spatial indifference zones." Two economic geographers, Clark and Rushton (1970:491) contend that "consumers who have not chosen the nearest place do not show any tendency to choose from among the other alternatives on the basis of distance." Later, they qualify this statement, postulating the existence of "spatial indifference zones"--zones within which consumers would be indifferent to differences in distance (Clark and
Rushton, 1970:496). The discovery of such zones in parental choice in schooling would be quite significant.

(4) The existence and interpretation of policies concerning compulsory attendance, provision of transportation, and racial balance must also influence family choice in schooling.

Compulsory attendance laws may have an influence on family choice in schooling in that, depending, of course on how they are enforced, they may limit the availability of non-school educational or non-educational options to families. At 14 years of age, those students, in many states, who may desire to work or travel full time rather than go to school, are prevented from doing so by law.

Transportation, particularly the provision, cost, and adequacy of school district and city bussing, can be influential to the degree that it facilitates or obstructs access to various schooling options. School districts may, for instance, restrict options available to some students by only providing bussing to students who live farther than 2 miles from any school.

School district and judicial policies concerning "acceptable" and "ideal" racial balance in the public schools also affect the school choices available to parents. As we have mentioned above, it may be extremely easy for non-Anglos to transfer to predominantly-Anglo schools, while it being extremely difficult for the reverse to occur.

(5) Two social-psychological factors influencing the outcomes of family choice in schooling are not mentioned in the literature. The loyalty, or commitment, of parents to their family, their children's schools, and to their neighborhood conceivably could play an important part in
determining how quick parents are to attempt to leave a less than satisfactory school situation. Hirschman (1970:53) writes that "the importance of loyalty....is that it can neutralize within certain limits the tendency of the most quality conscious customers or members to be the first to exit."

Putting this in the context of schooling, one might postulate that, to the degree that they are loyal to their neighborhood, parents will tend to more readily move out of their neighborhoods.6

Hirschman (1970:43) also suggests that the "general readiness of a population to complain" could be important in determining how people respond to dissatisfactory situations. One might postulate, then, the existence of a norm for exit or voice: if, in a particular community, there was a norm for leaving (existing) from, rather than attempting to change, such a situation, then one might predict that any given family in that community would tend to seek out other schools, rather than to stay and change a dissatisfactory school.

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6 For a further explication of the implications of loyalty, see Hirschman, 1970:76-105--"A Theory of Loyalty."
3. THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY CHOICE IN SCHOOLING

Very little is known about the effects of family choice in schooling. Some authors have speculated about the outcomes of various proposals for increasing family choice in schooling; and a few researchers have studied trends in situations where family choice has been facilitated. But there is little basis for comparative analysis of either speculations or empirical data: Theorists have failed to recognize that when they talk generally of the effects of "increasing" family choice, they are implying a constant or near-constant base-line level of family choice. In fact, there may be great variance in levels of family choice (even before "increasing") from school district to school district. In the few instances in which the results of choice-making have actually been studied (all of these instances are case studies), there has been no attempt (and probably no reason for an attempt) to estimate the relative levels of choice in those particular school districts as compared with levels of choice in other school districts. Until a standard measure of levels of family choice in schooling is developed, whether it be a measure as gross as a differentiation between "high," "moderate," and "low" levels of family choice, or whether it be a finer measure, it will remain difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the "effects of family choice in schooling."

With the above as a disclaimer, we shall, however, examine the suggested results of family choice in schooling on (1) the demographic composition of schools, (2) the quality of schooling, (3) the responsiveness of schools, and (4) other aspects of the family-school relationship.
The Demographic Composition of Schools

The significance of the racial and socio-economic composition of a school has been a matter of considerable dispute (cf. Coleman, 1966; Dyer, 1968; Lyle, 1967; Weinberg, 1968; St. John, 1970, 1972; Mayeske, 1972; Jencks, et al., 1972; and Harper's article, 1973): it remains, however, a variable of enough importance for us to mention here.

Some of those writing about the projected results of increasing family choice in schooling (cf. LaNoue, 1971:139; Lyon, 1971:7; Ginzberg, 1971:374) have predicted that poor-quality schools, particularly those of the inner-city, will lose middle-class children, and that Anglos will select away from non-Anglos. Others (cf. CSPP, 1970:55; Coons and Sugarman, 1971:19) have suggested that, to the contrary, a properly regulated family choice system could result in increased racial and socio-economic integration.

Of the three instances where the effects of family choice on the demographic composition of schools have actually been studied, in only one had family choice been found to have no effect. After the operation of the first year of its voucher experiment, the Alum Rock school district reports that no change in the racial make-up of its schools occurred (J. Levin, 1972). Rawitsch (1972:15-21) and Sederberg and Alkire (1972:48,50) report that schools in the Minneapolis experimental schools' program became more socio-economically homogeneous after one year of operation. In Eugene, Oregon, it was parents of predominantly high socio-economic status who were utilizing the school transfer program—generally going to some schools and away from others (Sonnenfeld, 1972:5, 23-24).
The Quality of Schooling

One might measure the quality of schooling by measuring educational inputs (those commonly measured include rates of school attendance, quality of peer environment, and quality of teaching) or, more preferably, educational outputs (how much, and what, the children have learned).

Authors who have predicted the effect of increased family choice in schooling on the quality of schooling, however, have generally utilized only gross definitions of quality of schooling or its improvement, and are far from being in agreement. Lyon (1971:9) warns that increased family choice is "likely to carry risks of unacceptable variation in the quality of educational services." Partington (1970:40), on the other hand, believes that the claim that family choice leads to increasing disparities between schools is "fraudulent, because this is to say disparity does not already exist." LaNoue (1971:39) suggests that there is no research to show that public schools are "better" when in greater competition with private schools. But Areen and Jencks (1972:56) contend that "there is no evidence that Catholic schools have served their children any worse than public schools." Coons, et al., (1971:66) believe that increased

7 The quality of the peer environment is usually measured in terms of the socio-economic composition of the school, or scores on standardized aptitude tests.

8 The quality of teaching might be measured either in terms of the number of years teaching of staff members, the colleges where teachers received their degrees, the number of advanced degrees teachers have received; or by a subjective measurement of teaching ability, arrived at via classroom observation by experts.

9 How and what children learn is generally measured by their performance on standardized achievement tests.
family choice in schooling would lead to "improved" schooling for everyone, coming about particularly through the "better matching of schools and children....by the judgments of parents and children than by an impersonal attendance boundary for the neighborhood or the judgment of an expert."

H. Levin agrees that "even the poor might experience some improvement in their schooling," but also believes that increased family choice may "change the relative distribution of schooling opportunities in such a way that present disparities in income and opportunities among social and racial groups would increase." Fuchs (1969:56) suggests that increased family choice in U.S. schools would both more creatively use the talent of teachers and would better meet minority needs.

Those who have actually studied the effects of family choice on the quality of schooling have looked largely at educational units. Rawitsch (1972:61-62), assessing the New York City Open Enrollment program, notes that those children who transferred to Open Enrollment schools were generally brighter than those who remained in their inner-city schools. Fox also concludes that children transferring to Open Enrollment schools were receiving improved education in those schools, at least as measured by levels of fighting, (1966) quality of teaching (as judged by observing "experts") (1967), and improvement in reading level (1967).

The Responsiveness of Schools

A major goal of the various proposals to increase family choice in schooling has been to increase the responsiveness of schools, particularly public schools, to their clientele. It is generally felt by proponents of these plans (cf. CSPP, 1970; Areen and Jencks, 1971:327-335; Friedman,
1962:85-107; etc.) that by allowing parents to spend their schooling monies where they desire--i.e., by allowing them to leave (exit) from or never go to dissatisfactory situations--the functioning of the educational marketplace would be such that, in the short run, at least some students would end up in better schools, and in the medium-long run, poor firms would be driven out of the marketplace. Hirschman (1970:51-53;26-27) and LaNoue (1972:139), however, suggest some qualifications to this thesis. Differentiating between the responsiveness of the marketplace and the responsiveness of individual schools, Hirschman suggests that (1) not all schools would be equally responsive, in that

If one assumes a complete and continuous array of varieties, from cheap and poor-quality to expensive and high-quality, then deterioration of any but the top and bottom variety will rapidly lead to a combination of exits: the quality-conscious consumers move to the higher-price, higher-quality products and the price-conscious ones go over to the lower-price, lower-quality varieties; the former will still tend to get out first when it is quality that declines rather than price that rises, but the latter will not be far behind.

...voice is likely to play a more important role in opposing deterioration of high-quality products than of lower-quality products....If only because of economies of scale, it is plausible that density is lower in the upper ranges of quality than in the lower and middle ranges. If this is so then deterioration of a product in the upper quality ranges has to be fairly substantial before the quality-conscious will exit and switch to the next better variety. Hence the scope for, and resort to, the voice option will be greatest in these ranges; it will be comparatively slight in the medium-and low-quality ranges.

and that (2) exit-causing markets may tend to dissipate consumer dissatisfaction, rather than to focus it:

No matter what the quality elasticity of demand, exit could fail to cause any revenue loss to the individual firms if the firm acquired new customers as it loses the old ones.

...A competitively produced new product might reveal only through use some of its faults and noxious side
effects. In this case the claims of the various competing producers are likely to make for prolonged experimenting of consumers with alternative brands, all equally faulty, and hence for delay in bringing pressure on manufacturers for effective improvements in the product. Competition in this situation is a considerable convenience to the manufacturers because it keeps consumers from complaining; it diverts their energy to the hunting for the nonexistent improved products that might possibly have been turned out by the competition....

LaNoue suggests that "marketplace analogies do not fit well to the educational world" because

Private schools....do not view increasing their share of the market in the same way corporations do. This severely limits the possibility of consumer accountability. Although there is no research on the matter, the most plausible generalization is that the more desirable the private school, the less the parental accountability.

On the other hand, Lyon (1971:8) and Fuchs (1969:56) both believe that increased family choice would tend to hold schools more accountable to parents, particularly to poor and minority parents. And what evidence there is from school districts that have facilitated family choice indicates that, indeed, families are choosing schooling options other than those traditionally chosen for them by school officials. In Minneapolis, over three quarters of the parents of elementary school children selected non-traditional school alternatives (Rawitsch, 1972:6). In Alum Rock, where officials were expecting 10 to 20 percent of the parents in the voucher program to select non-traditional alternatives (Mecklenberger, 1972:25), 60 percent made such choices (Education Summary, 1972:3). In Eugene, 65 percent of the transfer requests for the 1971-72 school year at the junior high level were to or away from a highly innovative school (Sonnenfeld, 1972:13).
Other Aspects of the Family-School Relationship

Three additional aspects of the effect of family choice in schooling on the family-school relationship have been mentioned in the literature: the effect of family choice on (a) parental attitudes toward the public schools, (b) parental involvement in choice-making, and (c) parental demand for information concerning schooling.

Parental attitudes toward the public schools. Fuchs (1969:55-56), writing about schooling in Denmark, remarks that a significant effect of the existence of Freeskoler (state-supported non-public schools) is "that they remove much conflict from the public schools" and that "a striking characteristic of Free Schools is the general coincidence of goals on the part of parents, teachers, and administrators, and the harmonious relationships between these groups." She goes on to suggest that "a system with publicly supported alternatives is that freedom from the monolithic compulsion of huge bureaucratic organizations may free the public schools of debilitating conflict." Patton and Anderson (1972:63) believe that "parental choice in selecting schools for their children will tend to reduce the anti-school sentiment that has developed in recent years." In Minneapolis, where high school parents have fewer options to choose from than do elementary school parents, high school parents also report a higher degree of dissatisfaction with the school district (Sederberg and Alkire, 1972:90).

Parental involvement in choice-making. Partington (1970:40), Fantini (1971:93), and Rowley (1969:157) posit that once parents are given greater opportunities to select schools for their children, not only will more parents become involved in active decision-making, but that parents will
also become much more knowledgeable and competent decision-makers.

**Parental demand for information.** In Minneapolis, it appears that as parents have taken on greater responsibility for selecting the locus of their children's education, they increasingly perceived the need for, and have demanded, more and better quality information concerning the public schools (Alman, 1972). This small amount of evidence adds some credence to speculations made by the CSPP (in SC on EEO, 1971:11094-11096) that parents, as they are given greater choice in schooling, will probably want several kinds of school information that will facilitate between-school comparisons, judgments about whether individual schools are living up to their unique claims, and qualitative school information...such as other people's perceptions of school atmospheres and teacher attitudes.
Section III

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH DESIGN FOR FY '74 AND FY '75
III

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH DESIGN FOR FY '74 AND FY '75

We are proposing an additional two years of research to complete the work begun under our current contract entitled, The Responsiveness of Public Schools to Their Clientele. We are now preparing analyses and specifications for four models of school governance in America. We have in very general terms called them the hierarchical model, the bargaining model, the polyarchical model, and the price or market model. The research activity we propose calls for field testing the four models during fiscal year 1974 and for developing guides for implementing the models during fiscal year 1975. To carry out these activities we proposed a tentative research budget for the two years totalling $277,370. (See the attached Summary Program Budget).

Field Testing Models of School Governance FY '74

During the first of our proposed two years of research we plan to field test our models in a number of school districts around the country. Hopefully, we will be able to identify and gain access to two or three school systems which approximate to the conditions and characteristics of each of our four basic models of school governance. Our objective is to carefully analyze the entire decision-making (or governance) process in the districts in order to make our models more accurate and realistic. We will be looking primarily at a number of institutional characteristics of each school system in terms of their effects on the responsiveness of the district's educational programs to the demands and preferences of the district's clientele. As an example, we will analyze how the electoral rules...
affect the kinds of people selected to school boards and their willingness to assert themselves on policy issues. Similarly, the recruitment procedures for various school officials will be investigated. Particular attention will be given to the patterns of authority within each district being investigated. We will want to know who participates in what kinds of decisions, at what levels, with what effects. Especially important will be the budgetary and financial procedures employed by the districts. They have important consequences in terms of who received the benefits and who pays the costs of educational services in each district. An assumption underlying the notion of responsive schools is that the costs of educational services should be more closely related to perceived benefits different groups receive from them. The budgetary and financial arrangements in districts also affect the allocation of power and therefore are tied directly to the patterns of governance and response in the districts.

In addition to analyzing the institutional framework within which responsive educational programs are chosen in each district under study, we will also analyze a number of intervening variables that tend to constrain institutions from being responsive. For instance, we may analyze the skills, desires and values of the participants. Whatever the contours of the decision-making models, we assume that parents, teachers, students and administrators will be involved in new patterns of interaction. The typical pattern of interaction in the normal school districts is hierarchical. We have made reference in Section II to the tendency of school boards and other possible participants to abdicate their responsibilities to the superintendent. In several of the governance models such abdication would be impossible. Yet, we will certainly conclude in our theoretical inventory
that the assumption that previously disfranchised groups will be able to participate efficiently is not warranted. Indeed, the ability of the superintendent to dominate the school board in today's educational system is to some extent a function of the inability of the lay board to match professional resources with the superintendent. Why, then, should we expect a decentralized scheme to result in increased participation and satisfaction, if, in fact, resources are unequal? For this reason, we will wait to investigate the incentives required for meaningful participation in school system decisions. For example, one set of students might have been politicized and organized because of recurrent student strikes. Another might have been systematically dominated by administrators. Similarly, the proposed parent participation might consist of a totally co-opted Parent-Teachers' Association, or alternatively, a militant group of minorities. In some districts, the participants might have had considerable skill in political bargaining, and others, they might not. In some districts, they might have participated in various organizational schemes designed to maximize communication skills and others might not. Our point is that we will want to analyze not only the characteristics of the district, but also the characteristics of the participants. In such a way we hope to develop clues as to the most appropriate way to make schools more responsive.

Some elaboration on the kinds of districts we might work in is called for. To study price or market models of school governance, for instance, we might look into a private school arrangement, a public school employing performance contracts, and a district experimenting with vouchers. Under polyarchical models we might select some public alternative school
arrangements, a free school system, and possibly even some other public program (such as a Model Cities program) which emphasizes community control.

The expected product at the end of the first year would be a detailed study of alternative patterns of governance which brings together theoretical analysis and sufficient empirical research to allow us to specify the conditions under which each model will be responsive to specific clientele and specific demands.

Implementing Reforms for More Responsive Schools FY '75

During the second year our research activity will be directed to preparing guidelines for school districts wishing to implement specific reforms. Our report at the end of 1974 will specify the conditions under which each model is likely to produce more responsive educational programs. We recognize, however, that each school district is now operating in some environment and that the particular environment affects the present pattern of governance in the district. For instance, we believe that a community atmosphere of conflict between the governed and the governors tends to encourage group activity and consequently, bargaining. In other words, in FY '75 we will be addressing ourselves to the problem of the conditions which tend to move a system from one pattern of governance to another. We will also be addressing the same problem from the point of view of the administrator who wishes to bring about change and the requisite conditions that must be present for him to do it.
### SUMMARY PROGRAM BUDGET

The Responsiveness of Public Schools to Their Clientele

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<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
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**Note:**

Salary Benefits = 13.38% of Salary & Wages

Indirect Costs = 44.80% of Salary & Wages
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