ABSTRACT

Proceedings of the 1974 Second Annual Conference of the Sociology of Education Association are presented. The conference, which focused upon the sociology of the school and schooling at the elementary and secondary levels, was structured around three objectives: (1) provide sociologists of education an opportunity to review past work in their field, (2) explore current educational problems and policy, and (3) move toward an agenda for future research. The six papers presented are followed by comments from discussants. The first paper, by Charles E. Biwell, "The Sociology of Schooling," laid the groundwork upon which subsequent speakers were able to build. Burton R. Clark, in "Adolescents and School Reform," briefed the conference participants on federal recommendations regarding the future of secondary education. William G. Spady, in "Authority and Empathy in the Classroom," presented a deductive model of teacher behavior. An alternative inductive approach was presented by Hugh Mehan in "Ethnomethodology and Education," in which he showed how a teacher is likely to interact with students in ways that help construct and sustain the teacher's definition of social reality. Elizabeth G. Cohen, in "An Experimental Approach to School Effect's," focused on the problem of research methodology. The overriding conference issue revolved around the balance between "large-scale organizational" and "micro," or "person," oriented research perspectives. (Author DB)

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SOCIOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL
AND SCHOOLING

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

ASILOMAR, PACIFIC GROVE, CALIFORNIA
FEBRUARY 1-3, 1974

CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
AND
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

David W. O'Shea, Editor
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APPENDIX.

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CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Friday, February 1, 1974

7:00 p.m. Session: THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCHOOLING. Charles E. Bidwell, University of Chicago.

Chairperson: Audrey J. Schwartz, University of Southern California.

Discussants: Robert Wenkert, University of California, Berkeley.
Ronald G. Corwin, Ohio State University.
Dorothy Heier, California State University, Northridge.
Richard Rehberg, State University of New York at Binghamton.

Saturday, February 2

9:00 a.m. Session: ADOLESCENTS AND SCHOOL REFORM. Burton R. Clark, Yale University.

Chairperson: Oscar Grusky, University of California, Los Angeles.

Discussants: Edward L. McDill, Johns Hopkins University.
Ray C. Rist, Portland State University.
Robert T. Stout, California State University, Fullerton.

11:00 a.m. Session: AUTHORITY AND EMPATHY IN THE CLASSROOM. William G. Spady, National Institute of Education.

Chairperson: Dudley Blake, California State University, Northridge.

Discussants: Robert Dreeben, University of Chicago.
Michael Fullan, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.
C. Wayne Gordon, University of California, Los Angeles.

1:30 p.m. Optional Special Interest Groups.

INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATION AND SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP SURVEY REPORT. Richard Thiel, California State University, Northridge.
3:30 p.m.  Session:  ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND EDUCATION.  Hugh Mehan, University of California, San Diego.

Chairperson: William Speizman, University of California, Los Angeles.

Discussants: Frederick Erickson, Harvard University.
            Dan C. Lortie, University of Chicago.
            John I. Kitsuse, Northwestern University.
            Ivah Charner, National Institute of Education.

8:00 p.m.  Session:  AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO SCHOOL EFFECTS.  Elizabeth G. Cohen, Stanford University.

Chairperson: Eleanor Blumenberg, Education Director, Anti-Defamation League, Western States.

Discussants: Clarence Bradford, University of California, Los Angeles.
            W. Russell Ellis, University of California, Berkeley.
            Jane Mercer, University of California, Riverside.

Sunday, February 3

9:00 a.m.  Discussion Groups.  Coordinator: David O'Shea, University of California, Los Angeles.

11:00 a.m.  Concluding Session:

FINAL COMMENTS BY CONFERENCE SPEAKERS

Chairperson: William G. Spady, National Institute of Education.

1:30 p.m.  ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING, SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.

Chairperson: Audrey A. Schwartz, President, SEA.
PROGRAM COMMITTEE

David W. O'Shea, UCLA, Chairman
Dudley Blake, California State University, Northridge
Eleanor Blumenberg, Western States Education Director, Anti-Defamation League
Dorothy Meier, California State University, Northridge
Audrey J. Schwartz, USC
Richard Thiel, California State University, Northridge

Assisted by:

William G. Spady, National Institute of Education

Assisting with Conference Arrangements

Robert L. Calatrello, California State College, Dominguez Hills
David McKell, California State University, San Jose
Julie Stulac, Stanford University
I. INTRODUCTION

These proceedings reflect contemporary directions and methodologies of sociological research regarding educational phenomena in elementary and secondary schools. They report on a conference which brought together 120 persons for one weekend in the congenial atmosphere of the Asilomar Conference Center near Monterey. The conference, which focused upon the sociology of the school, and schooling, was structured around three objectives: to provide sociologists of education an opportunity to review past work in their field; to explore current educational problems and the ways in which sociological research might inform the decisions of educational policy-makers, and to move toward an agenda for future research.

An extraordinary range of ideas relative to these objectives actually emerged, both from papers presented and from subsequent discussions. In fact so many were the viewpoints and proposals that an adequate summary at the time of the conference was not possible. With publication of the proceedings readers may now attempt their own synthesis. To provide initial orientation for this task, the following brief observations are offered.

At the outset, all three concerns of the conference were addressed in Charles Bilwell's opening paper which set the tone for the discussion groups immediately following, and laid the groundwork upon which subsequent speakers were able to build. Burton Clark, the second speaker, exemplifies the sociologist as policy-adviser. As a member of the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Professor Clark was able to brief the conference on the background to the Committee's recommendations regarding the future of secondary education. Regarding the relationship between sociologi-
cal research and educational policy, Clark made the point that researchers have yet to generate an adequate knowledge base. While many changes are taking place in schools, if only in terms of variations in organizational structure, we have little tested knowledge upon which to base policy recommendations. Consequently, policy recommendations from the Panel on Youth were framed in the form of proposals for pilot projects which could be intensively studied.

Given that there is so much remaining to be studied, the problem becomes one of deciding what to study, and by what means, and here, as participants frequently noted, values enter the picture. Social research and social policy interact, and as Hugh Mehan and Russell Ellis both pointed out, what one does, and how one does it, should be referred to the kind of world we want for the future. Values, therefore, enter rather directly into the policy and research arenas, shaping agendas in both. Exploration of the values problem was limited by time constraints, but it was a central concern, especially to persons involved in desegregation studies, and Jane Mercer proposed that a future conference might focus upon the issue.

Mediating between the level of values and actual research activity are conceptual models which help order the phenomena, identify relevant variables, and propose relationships among them which constitute the hypotheses to be tested. Conceptual models assume a theoretical framework, and theories of schooling are in short supply. This is especially true with regard to the central activity in schools: classroom instruction, as Dreben points out in his book on teaching. Responding to the deficiency of theory, Spady presented to the conference an extremely interesting model of teacher behavior, derived in part from Weber's categories of legitimate power or authority.
While Spady's model is deductive, working from theory to data, Mehan presented an alternative inductive approach, moving from observation to conceptualization. From Mehan's research participants gained insight into the ways in which values, again, shape one's view of the world. Specifically, Mehan showed how a teacher is likely to interact with students in ways which help construct and sustain the teacher's definition of social reality. This paper aroused wide interest as an example of the potential of ethnomethodology for unravelling the complexities of classroom processes. Certainly none of the conferees will again accept results of primary grade tests as "hard" data!

The problem of research methodology was also a main focus of Elizabeth Cohen's paper, the last to be presented at the conference. Professor Cohen made a strong plea for experimental rather than survey designs, using the example of her own work with intervention strategies to improve learning outcomes for minority students in integrated classrooms. In subsequent discussion, Mercer also argued for experiments aimed at isolating in-school factors which inhibit academic achievement among minority youngsters. In fact, she outlined nine separate characteristics of schools which may serve to replicate the overall societal status structure, and could function therefore to keep minority children in a subordinate role, even with regard to academic achievement.

The above, then, are a few of the points touched upon at the conference. As one might anticipate from a meeting which brought together many of the most able scholars in the sociology of education, the quality of discussion was unusually high. Also unusual, though regrettably not recordable, was the positive spirit of the conference. Both the content and the spirit
enabled participants to leave with a sense of having grown somewhat, both as persons and as professionals, and with renewed commitment to the challenges ahead which the conference revealed.

As program chairman, and proceedings editor, it remains for me to express the sincere gratitude of the program committee and SEA executive to the speakers, session chairpersons, discussants, and all who helped with the conference arrangements. Also, we would like to acknowledge our indebtedness to the officials of the National Institute of Education whose thoughtful co-sponsorship and funding ensured the success of the enterprise, and to whom we are extremely grateful.

David W. O'Shea
University of California, Los Angeles
II. THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCHOOLING
ADDRESS BY CHARLES B. BIDWELL
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The sociology of education now is a big success and a fairly big business. Few issues of the major or minor journals appear without an article that is about education or uses some schooling variable prominently. The journal, Sociology of Education, now is securely ensconced among the ASA publications. James Coleman demonstrated that large-scale policy-centered research can be conducted by sociologists with debatable (and debated) but by no means indefensible trade-offs between speed and care. His topic, of course, was equality of access to schooling. Two of the most successful of the Office of Education R and D Centers incorporate major programs of sociological research. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has drawn heavily on the ideas and research of sociologists. This list could be extended.

There is something, though, less than satisfying about all of this. Ten years ago I wrote that there were precious few serious sociological studies of educational organization, and I could have said the same just as easily about any educational topic within the purview of sociologists. That's no longer true; at home, when each year we sit down to assemble a reading list for our doctoral students in the sociology of education, we have a massive literature to sift through. But we don't have much trouble excluding most of it as not particularly useful for our students.

Why? It has little to do with the technical quality of work in our field. Many of the papers and monographs that we exclude have appropriate designs and use careful measurement, and sophisticated means of analysis.
The difficulty comes instead from failures of sociological imagination and less than searching attention to what schools are like as social and moral orders and what the experience of schooling is like for the people who participate in it—students, teachers, and administrators.

Paradoxically, the larger number of sociologists who have included educational variables in their research have been more interested in adults than children or youth. Theirs, of course, are the studies of social mobility and occupational attainment, which have been dominant in the United States and in Britain and on the continent as well. For these sociologists education enters mainly as a resource that people can use to maximize their life chances, and the principal question is whether having more or less of the resource is associated with higher or lower levels of occupational attainment. These studies have been a proving ground for advanced techniques of multivariate analysis, and so the variables must be quantifiable—as interval scales if at all possible. Years of schooling attained is an obvious candidate.

The result is that we don't know very much about what kind of a resource schooling is—indeed whether it represents one resource or several different kinds of resources (certificates, varieties of intellectual training, motivation and "learning to learn," repertoires of modes of conduct, moral orientations and value commitments, to name a few of the many possibilities). We also know little about how these resources are formed or acquired—through what processes, under what conditions, in what kinds of settings, among what kinds of students. Nor do we know as much as we might (though this is not my immediate topic) about the ways in which persons with differing amounts—let alone kinds—of schooling resources enter the labor
market, or about the processes governing the use of these resources, in subsequent occupational participation. Moreover, many other kinds of social participation (in the family, in religious life, in civic affairs, for example) are neglected.

Some of the underbrush surrounding these matters now at last is being cut away, by such sociologists as Althauser, Coleman, and Rossi. Althauser's research (in press) on the occupational participation of highly educated blacks and whites (and by their wives) is especially interesting as it suggests how occupational life chances, affected differently by years of schooling and kinds of schooling for blacks and whites, may have different consequences for patterns of family life and thus for the experiences in school of their children.

Althauser found that among his black families, because the men realized incomes a good bit lower than the incomes of their white educational peers, wives were more likely to work (and to work full-time), especially when the children were young and expenses high. Now several economists interested in "human capital formation" in the family have found that when the wife is employed full-time during her children's early years, the children show lower rates of gain in language learning than when the wife works less and presumably spends more time with her children. And this finding is most marked among upper status families. If these findings are true, then black children of high SES are more likely to enter school with cognitive deficits (in relation to white children of parents of similar social class), despite the high levels of education of their parents.

In a similar vein, we should not forget the work of Kohn (1969), Inkeles (1955), and others which suggests that parents' experiences at work
color the ways they raise their children—practices that surely affect what these children do and learn at school (amounts and kinds of punishment, amounts and timing of independence training and so on). And the probability that parents' work experience will be of one or another kind—say, the intensity of supervision that they experience—will be affected by their occupational life chances and therefore by the schooling resources that they command.

So here is the first of the evening's morals—that schooling must be seen as extending through time and as such may involve important feed-back loops across generations, mediated by the consequences of certain qualitative and quantitative variations in the educational attainment of parents, that is, consequences for their own life chances. We sociologists ought to be intrigued by this possibility—perhaps an interesting marriage of studies of schooling and of education and adult social participation.

This brings me to a second moral—that studies of schooling must be informed by a concern for what it is about schooling that counts for students and later as adults. Value neutrality in its current vulgar sense is not for us. No defense of solely theory-guided research on education (a rare compound in any event) that I have ever heard is very convincing. Nothing about schools or schooling as type cases of, say, socializing organizations or of one or another distinctive variety of socialization to me justifies the scope or the cost of our enterprise. Certainly such ideas as these are hardly uppermost in the minds of our patrons.

But concern for what counts for students is not enough. An equal concern must be for what counts for schools, a concern for variables that are manipulable ones in schools or schooling. Sociologists have a remarkable fa-
ility for studying things that nobody can do much about—not in a lifetime anyway without a revolution. Partly this facility comes from a commendable interest in the core elements of societies—their class structures, cultural and political cleavages, "basic values" and the like. Partly, too, it comes from ingrained habit; of course we have to include some SES dimensions in our design because they almost always "account for" a lot of the variance in everything else.

But whatever the reason, when I read our literature and ask myself what difference the findings might make for broader educational or local school policies I usually say, "Not much." Take Jencks' Inequality (1972). This book, though it has many virtues, is a classic failure to think about what is manipulable. Beginning with the question, "How can income differences in the U.S. population be reduced?" (certainly a major question and one that reflects a lively concern for what counts for students turned adults), Jencks then proceeds to show that schooling (but again, mainly simple years attained) does not have much consequence for differences in personal income streams. Who ever thought that it could? Aspects of schooling certainly are manipulable, and there are ways to reduce income differences, but schooling is not the efficient tool for the purpose.

To provide a less extreme example, perhaps you'll let me add a few more stripes to the back of equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman et al., 1966). Again we find a commendable concern for what counts for students, whether they get something like equal shares of schooling and what difference unequal shares make for what they learn, but there is a less than lively concern for what counts for schools and what differences these things might have for learning. Moreover, there seems to have been less reflection about what schools are like than there might have been.
The unit of analysis in the EEO study is the school. As we all know well, much more of the variance in learning among students in the sampled schools was within schools than between schools. This shows up again in the Harvard reanalyses of the EEO data, and these show even weaker effects of school variables on learning than did the original EEO findings. In any event, we have found out how difficult it is to alter the pupil composition of entire schools; certainly the means to do so are not securely in the hands of school officials or school boards. Perhaps schools could do something to hire better qualified teachers and give more attention to their knowledge, verbal facility and so on. Even if they did, the EEO findings don't forecast very marked gains in rates of students' learning, but as I shall suggest in a minute this may not be quite accurate.

Are there any reasonably efficient tools for redressing imbalances in access to schooling that are more readily at hand? The EEO report assumes that within-school variance is to be attributed to effects on learning that have no direct connection with schools—family or neighborhood attributes, among others.

But not necessarily. We know that there can be a lot of variability within a school from one classroom to another in many attributes that may be pertinent to learning—pupil composition, teachers' conduct, student norms, facilities, to name a few. Such variation should be most marked in the high school, where tracking rears its head. Aage Sørensen (1970) already has laid out for us an interesting array of propositions about tracking, its social properties, and consequences for varieties of learning, but I am not aware that many have followed his lead with serious research on tracking. Barbara Reynolds (1974), reanalyzing the EEO high school data, has shown that
learning may indeed vary by track, independently of unit and compositional
attributes of schools, and that a school's facilities and services to stu-
dents are in fact unequally distributed to tracks.

Schools can alter much more easily their internal characteristics
(e.g., the allocation of teachers and students to classrooms, the distribu-
tion of supplies, and services) than they can the attributes of their environ-
ments. I think that we should be attending much more and more systemati-
cally to the internal variability of schools--to their several kinds of in-
ternal division of labor, to use this term broadly. Not only are we likely
to be studying manipulable variables, we will get much closer to the reali-
ties and perhaps the understanding of processes of schooling than we have
so far.

To return to EEO, it has struck me how few organizational variables
there are in that study. Resources yes, but not such things as variation in
supervisory practices or in the differentiation of administrative tasks. I
have just said that this report is less useful than it could be because its
level of aggregation was too high. I think it also was too low. Schools,
after all, are parts of school systems, with central administrations and a
variety of supervisory and managerial practices. Policies about such mat-
ters as resource distribution and types of instructional programs and sup-
portive services to pupils are made centrally in school systems, even though
we know that there is great slippage as these policies get translated into
the work of teachers, counsellors and others who deal directly with students.

There is some evidence to suggest that administrative practices do
make a difference for the kinds of services that "people-processing" orga-
izations give to their clients--and that these practices are constrained (but
not to the point of absolute rigidity) by such "parameters" as size and fiscal support. What about schools?

A Chicago colleague, John Kasarda, and I have just finished a study that pursues this question, using data from each school district in Colorado (Bidwell & Kasarda, in press). We have found that net of community ethnic, social class and educational attributes, and net of the district's own fiscal resource base and size of student population, we can account for about 25 percent of the variance in aggregate levels of student achievement (verbal and quantitative, measured for high school students) with three variables—the percentage of teachers with Master's degrees, the ratio of all non-clerical administrative staff to professional "front-line" staff and the ratio of students to teachers—each of these variables computed for the entire system.

This study is a rough first approximation, but I find it suggestive. The strongest effects are from the two variables that measure aspects of the system's division of labor. Teachers' qualifications (to the extent that these are indicated by degrees held) have effects about one-half the strength of each of the others. As the ratio of students to teachers goes down and as the ratio of administrators to front-line professionals goes down, rates of student achievement rise.

Equally interesting, the size and resources of the district and the characteristics of its community had only indirect effects on student achievement through teacher qualifications and the professional-administrative division of labor.

If one can believe our findings, then if a school system wants to maximize student achievement it will not worry about increments to facilities (as
per EEO--recall, there were no direct paths from fiscal resources to achievement indicating unmeasured intervening variables--but instead invest heavily in well-qualified teachers, keeping the student-teacher ratio low. And it will try not to divert resources away from professional staff and into administrative overhead. Here there is a dilemma, since specialization also fosters administrative intensity. Of course, affluent districts can have more of everything, and our findings show that they do. But here I am talking about proportional investments. By the way, our findings suggest one way in which big systems find their freedom to maneuver sharply constrained.

They hire teachers faster than administrators, a good thing, but not at a rate to match their pupil population, a bad thing. (So, in our data there is a weak zero-order correlation between size and achievement.)

At any rate, my main purpose here is to illustrate just how important a school system's internal division of labor may be for students' learning and to argue therefore that we sociologists take a much harder, closer look at this relationship and others having to do with school system organization and schooling. There is a lot we don't know--aside from whether our Colorado findings are spurious or if not, whether they are generalizable.

For example, our data lump together all kinds of school district managers--superintendents, principals, supervisors, business managers, and so on. With better data we could be more precise. We could separately measure the size of components of an administrative staff--supervisors vs. business and plant management, for example. Maybe then we could specify the negative contribution of a high ratio of administrative persons to front-line professionals--perhaps to a proportionately heavy investment in centralized administration. We might also try to discover varying contributions of differing
ways of administering the academic work of a school system to student learning. Does it make a difference, for example, if a school system makes heavy use of specialist-supervisors or relies on generalists—principals and assistant superintendents for instruction, say? Does it make a difference if a school system employs functionally-differentiated supervision (e.g., assistant superintendents for elementary and high schools) or an area division of administrative labor (e.g., assistant superintendents for sub-districts)? Do these different administrative patterns vary in their effects on students' learning as other conditions of the school system vary? If teachers are not well-qualified is intensive specialist-supervision unusually good and an economically-efficient practice? If the student body is quite heterogeneous in ability or motivation do teachers perform better if left to themselves to adapt their teaching to the character of their own students or will they benefit from regular supervision?

We have found that small systems have a low proportion of administrative staff (though size has an insignificant effect on the proportion of non-teaching front-line professionals). Does this mean that all small systems have the advantage in fostering student learning? (Small systems have lower proportions of Master's degree-holders among their teachers, but remember that this measure of teacher qualification is a good bit weaker in its effects on students' academic achievement than the division of staff labor.) Marker and Gump (1964) have argued that small high schools give students a disproportionate chance to participate in a variety of extra-curricular activities (indeed force them to participate) because the students are few while the extra-curriculum is very much alike in its format in high schools of all sizes. Spady (1970) and Rehberg and Schafer, (1968) have shown that
extra-curricular participation has positive effects on students' aspirations and achievements. Now small high schools for the most part are in small school districts. Have we erred in placing so much faith in school district consolidation—overemphasizing the significance of facilities in schooling and underemphasizing the significance of teachers and of direct participation by students in a variegated school life?

Whatever the answer to such questions as these, I think we could pay much more attention than we have so far to the formal organization of school systems (and of schools as well) as incorporating important elements of schooling. Such studies are to be seen as neither an irrelevant aspect of a branch of education schools called "educational administration," nor an irrelevant and minor part of "organizational research." They may be right at the center of the sociology of schooling. And they deal with variables that are, comparatively speaking, manipulable.

These remarks bring me to the next of my morals—a very truistic and obvious one, but not much honored by sociologists of education. We must look closely at the work of teachers and others in what I have called the front-line professional staff of school systems. Another Chicago colleague, David Wiley (1973), working over the Detroit area portion of the EEO data, has found that if a term for the average number of hours per school year spent by students in school is added to the EEO equations, the variance in 'students' achievement test performance attributable to schooling rises substantially, from 14 to 27 percentage points according to the dependent variable used. This effect holds up across schools of varying facilities, teacher qualifications, and student composition. It seems perfectly reasonable, then, to suppose that amount of exposure to school is in large part a measure
of exposure to instruction: to ideas and information and the variety of things we sometimes call "curricular-content," but also to teachers and teaching, to who teachers are, to the ways they order classroom life and relate to students, and to the ways they order and present "content."

In my remarks on the formal organization of school systems I said nothing about the variables that must intervene between teachers' qualifications, or the proportionate rates at which these systems hire teachers and other professionals, and students' learning. Kasarda and I know nothing about such matters for our Colorado systems, nor do any of us know nearly as much about them generally as we might or should. Yet here we come right to the heart of the sociology of schooling.

Dan Lortie (1975) in a subtle and revealing analysis of teachers' work—unfortunately a rarity in our literature—shows among other things how enclosed teachers are within their classrooms, how weak are their ties to colleagues, and how much they derive their rewards at work from classroom life (from the personal response of their students and the fragile day-to-day evidence of learning). Ties to colleagues and colleague controls and surveillance are probably less in most professions than we often suppose (viz., Freidson's (1970) studies of physicians), but teachers are undoubtedly something of a limiting case.

If this is generally so (and I think it is), then it is obviously important for us to know a great deal more than at present about variation in teachers' teaching (and in other of their relations with students) and its sources. Our Colorado findings say only that more teachers and related professionals make a difference for students; in point of fact they may indicate nothing more. Variation in amounts and kinds of instructional supervision,
of the kinds I've suggested, may have little effect on teachers simply because teachers' work is so enclosed within classrooms.

But we must be careful. Ronald Corwin (in press) will soon remind us in print that there are varieties of autonomy; that, for example, there is a considerable gulf between autonomy born of expertness and autonomy by default or neglect. In many schools teachers' autonomy is of the second kind, and it remains an important empirical question how the enclosure of teachers affects their conduct in teaching and their relations with colleagues under varying modes of supervision. This is a question that bears looking into.

Nevertheless, teachers' work will be a good deal influenced by teachers themselves and by their pupils, whatever the supervisory mode. Lortie's studies suggest that teachers are substantially dependent on their students for reward. What does this mean for teachers' work—for the demands that teachers make of students academically and as disciplinarians? How does this relationship vary with the age of students, the specialization of the classroom, the teacher's level of skill in teaching and subject-matter competence, or the teacher's public reputation? Bill Spady will have more to say about such questions tomorrow, so I'll say no more here except to stress their high importance.

But I should note that we might look more closely at the bearing of school and classroom student subcultures on the kinds of incentives that students hold out to their teachers, the degree to which they punish rather than reward (indirectly by failing to respond to teaching, as well as directly), the degree to which they coopt them. To put the point too simply, is Waller's (1932) image of teachers and students as "fighting groups" for-
ever engaged in the "battle of the requirements" still valid, how widely, and under what conditions? What other varieties of student-teacher relations might we observe, under what conditions? Most important, what consequences do these phenomena have for how teachers teach and what students learn? It is especially important to look at the sociometry of classrooms, to identify student leaders, and to see how they and teachers cue one another and negotiate the classroom order.

I shall not say much more than this about studies of student subcultures, nor much about those of student composition or relations among students. I have taken as my task to point up some unexplored territory, and so far as peer effects on academic achievement and aspiration are concerned, the explorers now are out in numbers with good preliminary maps. This is important work, substantially advanced by McDill's excellent studies (e.g., McDill & Rigsby, 1973) and Hauser's (1970) cautionary tales. We wait for the reports to come in.

But what do we know about teachers' subcultures and the differences they may make for the ways teachers do their work? I have been fascinated and heartened to find in my own research on colleges and universities that there do seem to be differentiable faculty subcultures, centered on professors' conceptions of the functions of higher education, the aims of teaching and scholarship and their conceptions of their own proper roles as teachers and scholars. These subcultures show certain continuities with the differing varieties of rhetoric and belief that Lawrence Veysey (1965) found for the early years of the American universities—general training of the intellect, the preparation of academic specialists, and a utilitarian view of
the college curriculum. Moreover, there appear to be certain systematic relationships between the social organization of colleges and universities and their location in this subcultural space—the division of faculty labor, the time given to undergraduate students, the varieties of ties between students and teachers, and the demands that teachers make of their students.

Would we find something similar in elementary and high schools? Presumably lower school teachers are less collegial than professors, perhaps less self-conscious about their work. But if at any school level or in one or another sector of education we do find such teacher subcultures and they do affect teachers' work, what then might be the consequences for students?

We now are making a good beginning toward seeing how the social organization of instruction may affect what students learn—the consequences of varieties of incentives for students, of variation in the pacing and content of feedback about their accomplishments, of various forms of solidarity in the learning group (especially variation in the mixture of cooperative and competitive relations among students), I think here especially of the current research of McPartland at Hopkins and Cohen at Stanford. We have already seen that aspects of classroom composition and school policies on such matters as grading or "open classrooms" can influence the social organization of instruction. So can teachers as they define and set tasks, give their own rewards and punishments, give shape to the social structure of classroom activity—indeed as they take a more passive or active stance toward such matters at these. In some very limited observations at Chicago in so-called "open classrooms" in elementary schools we have found quite
wide variations in student competitiveness, in the salience and cohesive-
ness of subgroups of students, in intergroup competition and in dependence
on peers or teachers for rewards and information about task performance.
The teacher's practices turn out to be strongly related to these variations.
And we find similar but less marked co-variations in classrooms of a more
"traditional" mold.

In short, I am arguing that in our concern for student subcultures,
we not forget that the teacher is an active principle in schooling, and
that what he does must be affected by what he values and believes about his
work. Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu would have us believe that cur-
ricula, teaching practices, and teachers' beliefs and values all are in-
eluctibly constrained by the structures of knowledge that dominate a so-
ciety and more particularly characterize and defend its elites. In this
sense Bourdieu (1970) can call schooling "symbolic violence." I remain to
be convinced, but this again is an important empirical question. I would
myself begin an inquiry on this topic, indeed I have for higher education,
with the assumption that teachers' conduct can vary within wide limits and
that the problem is to locate sources of this variation, on the one hand
in given structures and problems of work (e.g., variations in supervision or
in the ability composition of pupil groups) and on the other in what teachers
prefer and believe about teaching. I would guess that these values and be-
liefs will vary a lot, and an interesting question is to see whether these
variations are related to teachers' locations in the educational "system"
(as well as to their backgrounds and training). If we can locate teacher
subcultures then we can ask how they interact with work structures and prob-
lems to affect the work that teachers actually do.
You will have noted that I seem to have violated one of my own precepts. Teacher subcultures would appear not to be very manipulable, though work structures and work problems may be. Perhaps. Nevertheless, we must know not only what levers we have for action, but also the limits on action, what in schools will be constraining along with what will be facilitative. In any event, I am rather disposed to think that in most occupations, no matter how professionalized, occupational subcultures are powerfully formed by work situations. I see no reason to think that teaching is different. If we can in fact find subcultures—constellations of preferences and beliefs that have situational loci among schools and school districts—then the question remains how much the situations themselves affect the observed constellations. And I have been arguing that many elements in teachers’ work situations are indeed manipulable variables.

Now one last moral. Most of the studies that I have drawn on this evening take academic performance as the dependent variable. I’m happy that this set of variables is gaining favor in our field; I had gotten a little impatient with the apparently never ending flow of studies of occupational and educational aspiration.

At various points, though, I have referred vaguely to "consequences for students" or to "what students learn." I meant to be vague, for I think it is about time to put the sociological imagination to work, defining the possible outcomes of schooling that are likely to be consequential for society or for the character of lives that people lead. If I am to be consistent about the situational determination of the moral aspects of human conduct and belief, perhaps I should say that the only outcomes of schooling of any importance are in fact diplomas, and perhaps knowledge, and intellec-
tual skill. But I am not sure of my ground, and I don't believe any of us is. Moreover, somewhere people must learn those social skills and forms of conduct that permit them to enter situations effectively.

Let me just list a few of the possibilities.

(1) Dreeben (1968) has written a provocative, speculative book about norm-learning and its relation to the social structure of schools. But there is as yet no important research on this topic.

(2) What of that capability that the human resources economists call "learning to learn"?

(3) What of capacities for primary social relations on the one hand and for maintaining solidarity at a distance on the other?

(4) What about propensities for social participation—in the polity, or in voluntary associations, for example?

(5) What about that outlook toward society that Shils calls "civility"?

This is a conventional enough list; the product of a not very active sociological imagination. But perhaps it suggests some directions. It would be fascinating and probably very important sometime to analyze in precise terms the moral and cognitive demands made on their members by a variety of organizations and institutions in our society—the family, work, politics and so on, to try to see how effective schools are in producing persons fitted to these demands, and to follow the life courses of persons differently prepared for various kinds and levels of social participation. We might well find little fit and little differences in life histories. Bob Dreeben in fact now is planning a first effort of this kind.

And I should stop before I outline enough tasks for a century's work.
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DR. WENKERT: Well, it's awkward to be the first discussant, because if you're fourth then you can say, oh, yes, the other three have already said all the things that are to be said.

I shall restrict myself mostly to the issues raised in my discussion group. Let me start with the simplest first, namely, questions of method—possibly the least interesting, but at least they open the door to the subject.

There was support in our discussion group for longitudinal rather than, or in addition to, cross-sectional studies. Among those large-scale studies which use survey types of material, longitudinal studies would get at the first moral of Bidwell's paper better than cross-sectional studies.

The second methodological point was a plea for field research on how day-to-day decisions are made in schools and on the interorganizational dynamics of school districts, that is, on relations between individual schools and relations between schools and their district office. My impression—perhaps this is not a good inference—is that two motives lie behind that suggestion. One is that field research would provide information about the day-to-day happenings within the school, its daily activities, which one could not get by survey methods. The other is that sociologists doing that kind of research would come to understand the situations which confront the people on the scene—students, teachers, administrators, and others. This is essential for purposes of recommending policy, and for establishing credibility.
With these remarks about the kinds of research priorities that were suggested in the group, let me lead into some of the difficulties that were raised and discussed. These are difficulties in doing policy research, and difficulties in relations between researchers and the persons who work and study in the schools.

One of the difficulties is that the Bidwell paper, while it pointed out that teachers are isolated, may have understated their vulnerability. We may cite not only Lortie's study, as Bidwell did, but also the work by Sarason, who has come to call teaching "the lonely profession." The situation of teachers may be even worse than Bidwell suggests, and it was proposed in our group that research people are among the people who make it worse. That is, when policies are recommended or research is done, it travels down the pipeline and lands on the teacher. The finger points at the teacher. So, not only is the teacher isolated, but he or she is, so to speak, the victim of changes in policy. I think that field research, if it is well done, would show whether that is true. In any case, that was the assertion.

The second way in which the relation between the researcher and the practitioner is tenuous at best and alienating at worst is that policies may be recommended, but they may disturb the vested interests of the people on the scene. Now, I suppose that is nothing new. But the point was made that not only are vested interests disturbed, but the knowledge practitioners have of what happens in schools is not honored. There is the presumption, or the implication, that school practitioners are ignorant. Their suspicion is aroused, and resentment is created. It may be the case, in fact, that researchers are more ignorant about schooling than the practitioners whom they are supposed to enlighten.
The third difficulty in this relation between research persons and practitioners arises around the issue of who is to decide policy—is it to emerge from within or is it to be imposed from without? And as I listened to the discussion, I thought that the giving of grants is in a way rather peculiar, that is, even if we consider research grants. I would personally see no objection, for example, if research grants were given to teacher unions for the purpose of improving the education of their district and their schools. Research grants could be given to practitioners, or to interested students, or to groups of parents. On the one hand there is the question of who is to originate policy, who is to make policy, who is to recommend policy, is it to emerge from within or from without; and the second question is, who is to implement policy, and is there participation in the creation of policy by those who are to implement it or would policy be imposed or be seen as having been imposed from above or from the outside?

The question of manipulation was also discussed. It has a direct bearing on this question of who is to set policy. There was agreement with the remark made in the Bidwell paper that variables have to be manipulable to be policy-relevant. The question is, at which organizational level is the manipulation to take place—at the local level or higher or lower? And I think the choice of variables depends on the answer to that question as well as on their manipulability. If a variable is manipulable and is found to have an effect on a schooling outcome, who or what stratum or what organizational level is in a position to manipulate it, and what are the other consequences of having the manipulation done at that level?

There was also a discussion of indirect effects. The question is whether to restrict ourselves to examining only the direct effects of educa-
tional practice, or whether to broaden the notion of policy-relevant re-
search by including studies of the possible consequences of existing poli-
cies in other areas, for example, in fertility, housing, and so on. Such
policies can have very profound indirect effects on schooling.

The question of value neutrality also came up. I think people gener-
ally agreed that value neutrality was not proper in these kinds of studies.
On the other hand, there was no agreement on precisely which values one
ought to uphold. And I suppose it resolves itself into a question of whose
agent the researcher comes to be, either by choice or by default.

These are all difficulties to be discussed, rather than recommenda-
tions to be implemented. I'll just make two more comments.

I'm rather worried about abstracted empiricism, that is, the search
for the magic key which can be shown to have a beneficent educational effect
across the board. Methodologically, in large-scale statistical studies, this
means the search for an effect which retains its size regardless of variations
in types of students and staff or other variations, in short, an effect that
remains constant over everything, regardless of local situations. I'm not
convinced myself that propositions which are not situationally bound, which
are not situationally specific, are going to carry us very far. One ought to
be cautious about these generalizing impulses. For one thing, if such general
effects are found, they would tend to carry decisions up the ladder to the na-
tional level. That is, if a particular manipulable variable has an effect
regardless of variations in local situations, then presumably it can be applied
at the most general (that is, the highest) level, and therefore would be acted
on by the stratum that has jurisdiction over this most general level. This
may be all right if those variables are found. But I'm not very optimistic
that they will be found and that they can be found regardless of the local situation. This suggests a concern with substantive rather than formal theory, a concern with the theory and practice of particular districts or schools rather than with schooling or anything else in general.

One final comment. I was very pleased with Bidwell's reference to the school as a social and moral order. I think the general trend is to regard schools as technical instruments, and I think that's a mistake. To regard school as a social and moral order, as a place where there is bargaining, as a place where there are established proprieties and improprieties and different versions of those among the different participants, that kind of view returns us to an earlier version of the sociology of education, such as that held by Willard Waller, and I would be pleased to see that personally.

Footnotes

1. In Seymour B. Sarason, The Cultures of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971).

DR. CORWIN: I think it was generally agreed that, within the framework of the assumptions underlying Professor Bidwell's paper, it was a tour de force, a very lively and stimulating paper. However, most of the comments in our group challenged the basic assumptions. The questions that were raised, in fact, concerned the whole genre of research as we know it today in the sociology of education; they were not really criticisms of this paper per se. A number of epistemological issues floated through the discussion.

In summarizing the discussion, what I say does not necessarily reflect my own opinion.

One of the major concerns was what kinds of outcome variables should one look at in relation to policy. In the paper attention was given, in particular, to studies of academic performance. However, some members of the group felt that our research places too much emphasis on what are essentially market-oriented objectives of schools—that is, testing and measuring the kinds of things that the child can market, as opposed to the humanistic-oriented outcomes that we tend to forget or ignore.

Another issue, in addition to what we should look at, dealt with the kinds of conclusions that can be reached from the kind of research we do. Measuring the amount of variance explained does not necessarily warrant causal inferences; it does not warrant us to manipulate variables and presumably, then, the destinies of children, especially given our rather flimsy methods—flimsy at least from the standpoint of policy, not necessarily from the stand-
point of theory. There was hesitancy on the part of some members of the group, then, to go too far by way of policy recommendations on the basis of the kind of knowledge that we can generate. Again, this was raised as a general moral issue that confronts us as sociologists, and not one confined to Mr. Bidwell's paper. (Also, from another perspective, I wonder if policy would be better served by using less advanced methods.)

At the same time, paradoxically, another theme in the discussions lamented the lack of attention to policy implications. On the one hand, the paper didn't deal explicitly with policy implications or with specific policy recommendations. For example, it didn't take into consideration the current issues of decentralization or community control, although the data perhaps had some implications for these issues (notwithstanding the reservations noted above.) On the other hand, the paper did not appear to be addressed to someone who can do something about what has been learned. Some of us felt that perhaps it's futile to talk about policy without knowing beforehand how that policy is going to be implemented, or without having some connection with the people who can do something.

There was also some concern expressed about a methodological bias in much of our research today. It was referred to in the group as "rationalism" or "scientism," i.e., the assumptions that there are ends, and that the process can be captured in abstract, often remote concepts and rigorous statistical procedures. And conversely, there was concern that we don't directly examine process, that our concepts and methods are too remote from our data and that we should get closer to our data; that we should do more than measure, for the purpose of statistical analysis, and that perhaps there are other procedures or methods that we can use to sense, feel, or somehow understand our data better.
But, I also believe that this more "direct" approach can be carried too far. There are many levels and forms of "understanding." The critical challenge is to find ways of blending different approaches—the more direct with the more abstract—so that they supplement and complement one another. After decades of ideological conflict about truth strategies, it hardly seems productive to re-hash the issues again or to perpetuate the schisms, and the myths on which they are based.

And finally, questions were raised about the notion that only certain variables can be manipulated. As the previous speaker noted, it depends in large part on which part of the system will enact policy. Before making recommendations, we need to clarify to whom we are speaking and who we feel will listen. It is quite possible, for example, that teacher cultures can be manipulated directly, as well as indirectly, through the work structure. For example, the NEA has the potential of altering work structure and teacher subcultures, and in fact, has expressed some interest in this problem. So I think we need to be somewhat cautious about labelling variables prematurely.

In conclusion, the discussion did not lend itself to a systematic analysis of the paper. Rather, the paper served to stimulate discussions about a wide range of issues generic to the field. I have tried to capture a sense of our conversations, but I must add, there was also disagreement within the group about many of the statements I have conveyed here.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCHOOLING

REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP #3 BY DOROTHY MEIER

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DR. MEIER: I will try to summarize the major issues raised in our Discussion Group briefly and confine my own comments to a minimum since I was an active participant in the group.

First, let me say that Bidwell's presentation was most useful and provocative in raising numerous issues for thought and discussion. In fact, in response, our Discussion Group managed to raise a number of questions, but came up with very few answers in the time available. Several in the group were initially discouraged at the lack of clear answers to issues raised and the seeming "state of the art." But, I think we finally reached the conclusion that the missing answers were largely a function of the extremely basic types of questions being raised—questions that many of you have probably struggled with before and most likely have at some time reached the point of "wishing they would go away." But our group felt that the questions were of sufficient importance to our undertakings that they should continue to raise them and to explore possible answers as well as possible pitfalls which might be uncovered in these explorations.

The major part of our discussion centered on the following kinds of questions. Just exactly what do we mean when we talk about policy research? What is it? How is it done effectively? What are the pay-offs and/or the dangers? Who controls, interprets, and implements? How does policy research differ from any other kind of research? Is evaluation research the same as policy research? Is all research really policy research, at least, to some degree?
As we began talking about these questions we soon began to wonder if maybe we were just re-hashing the old "basic versus applied research" argument with different terminology. But a general consensus appeared to evolve that policy research (still undefined) seemed to represent something different from either of the older notions of basic or applied research. In fact, some felt that policy research might well represent a kind of bridging between the extremes for the old basic and applied types of research. From this discussion, tentative definition of policy research was proposed.

Perhaps policy research is simply that research which has relatively immediate policy implications and, hopefully, is or has been executed following the canons of a rigorous scientific methodology. And, most seemed to agree with Bidwell that policy research must be concerned with variables that are manipulable if that research is to be effective in influencing policy decisions. Our Discussion Group, in general, expressed a desire to see more of this type of research done in the area of the sociology of education and several hoped that this type of policy research might avoid some of the pitfalls encountered in earlier research, both "basic" and "applied." However, some were less hopeful, and expressed concern over the possibility of being asked to evaluate a given program on a set of criteria which are not, to the researcher, the most fruitful or most valid criteria. Others expressed concern over a possible "hidden agenda" on the part of policy-makers which could lead to a misinterpretation or distortion of the findings in any given policy research undertaking, at least, from the perspective of the researcher and the research agenda followed. I will have some more comments on these largely unanswered questions in
closing, but first, I would like to review a couple of other themes I observed, not only in our Discussion Group, but also in the reports from some of the other groups.

A second major theme centered around feelings that Professor Bidwell's paper raised some most important and intriguing questions. There was also a kind of elation with the increased amount and variety of research and researchers in the field as reported in his paper. The more important questions raised seem to reflect Bidwell's concern with what might be called the "levels question." That is, is it more fruitful to examine schooling from the student level, the classroom level, the school, the district, the community, the social structure, the national system or even at a cross-cultural comparative level. Most seemed to agree that this question should remain an open one; that, ideally, research would continue at all levels of inquiry; and that, given current policy issues, a research focus centered on the classroom, school, and district organization might be most fruitful in light of Bidwell's argument for researching variables that are more easily manipulated.

Curiously, as discussion continued around this theme, a kind of depression evolved as several people reflected on how much had been done in the field and yet seemed compelled to raise the question; but what or how much do we really know? Do we know what a good teacher is? How do children learn? There was discussion and disagreement over these questions, out of which developed a strong critique of the continued use of academic performance (grades and standard test scores) as the primary dependent variable in much educational research, including policy research. Strong agreement was expressed with Bidwell's request that attention be given to numer-
ous possible outcomes of schooling as additional dependent variables to be investigated, but less so with his support of academic achievement gaining ground over attitudinal variables of aspiration. A side discussion developed over why the preoccupation with academic achievement as the dependent variable in our recent research. Is it easier to quantify? Is it a function of a lower middle class value structure and policy predominating in the educational system (as some have alleged) which is supposedly obsessed with achievement and advancement? Or, I would add, is it due to the fact that most segments of society can agree that children should learn some intellectual skills, i.e., academic achievement, but could not agree on many other possible desired outcomes of schooling, such as attitudes, morals, civility, etc.?

A third theme I have picked up in the session is a general concern with the linkage (or lack of linkage) between the researcher—whether he is a policy researcher or a scholar off doing his own thing—and policymakers in the process of policy formation and implementation. The linkage problem appears to be most important both in terms of planning policy as well as in evaluation of existing policies. Both those involved in or close to policy formation and researchers were and are concerned with this problem. No real solutions to this issue were reached but most felt it was important and should be explored further. I concur. For example, how did the Ryan Act—for those of you who live in California—get passed without our extensive research and comment: What has happened as a consequence of the Coleman EEO study? Hopefully, we will have some more systematic and coherent ideas evolving out of these meetings with respect to this linkage problem between researcher and policy-maker.
As promised earlier, I will keep my additional comments to a minimum since time is short and many of my thoughts are contained in the preceding comments.

I do have some further observations on the questions raised tonight concerning policy research, and more specifically, the policy researcher. We have relatively clear definitions of the role of researcher within the scientific and academic realms. And, we have the same for the role of the citizen within a democratic society. But the policy researcher, from traditional definitions, may find his "role" contains conflicts in definitions or if traditional definitions are ignored, he may find that his "role" lacks definition. In either case, the policy researcher is working from a weak position—cross-pressured from the traditional point of view or outside the system and lacking in legitimacy in the new "role." This situation may well discourage many researchers from engaging in policy research because of pressures from colleagues and personal desire to achieve in the scientific realm. But, in the case where policy research is undertaken, the researcher and his findings are much more likely to be subject to the problems of linkage, control of interpretation, etc., as raised in discussions here. I would suggest that a major effort is needed to define a legitimate role for the policy researcher, perhaps as a professional or expert.

I do not mean by these comments to de-emphasize any concerns regarding the questions of who determines the area of investigation in policy research; who controls the distribution, release, and interpretation of policy research findings; or how research findings get translated, if at all, into policy formation and evaluation. But I do think it is necessary to clarify and legitimate the role of policy researcher if these concerns are to be resolved.
One other factor important to the future development of good policy research is the ability and facility to work within an interdisciplinary framework. Policy issues or problems seldom divide up neatly along the lines of our academic disciplines. On this count, I find this conference a most encouraging happening and hope more will occur in the future.

In conclusion, I have a few points more directly related to Professor Bidwell's presentation which I would like to share with you. First, I join in the consensus that his presentation was not only a comprehensive review of the field—which was his task—but also raised some of the most basic issues and provocative questions which face us now and in the immediate future. He has set the stage well for an excellent and productive conference. But then, I must attend to my role as discussant.

Though I was pleased with Professor Bidwell's clear delineation of the levels problem in our field, I was also disturbed by his "exclusive" separation of the levels. I, along with others, have proposed that one important area of investigation exists in an examination of the interactions between the different levels of analysis. Perhaps we should not be deciding whether to look inside the school or stay outside the school, but rather we need to look at interactions both within and across these different levels of data foci and analysis. I suggest that this point may represent, in part, an exercise of the sociological imagination which Bidwell calls for and with which I strongly agree.

Professor Bidwell has clarified a germane issue in the effectiveness of policy research in his discussion of the importance of dealing with variables which can be manipulated. My concern is that he may have over-clarified the issue to the point that researchers following his guidelines
may stifle their research imagination in refusing to look at anything which is not manipulable. For example, he suggests that we should move away from the social background type variables, even though they keep appearing as dominant independent variables, because unless we have a revolution we are not going to be able to manipulate or change those variables. I agree that it might take a revolution to change the specific variables he cites. But I also think that the consistency of the findings point to an important area of investigation. Rather than abandon this approach, I would propose that new research is needed to search out the intervening and/or mediating variables possibly operating between social background and school achievement. It is possible that such intervening variables might be more amenable to manipulation than the social background variables. In other words, we cannot afford to abandon factors which can be manipulated but may make no difference in the outcomes with which we are concerned. Further, I am not sure that Professor Bidwell is being that realistic in suggesting that school and classroom variables are easily manipulated. They may be in given situations where a researcher is in control—but manipulating these variables at the national level? I am reminded of the psychiatric approach to the problems of mental health in our society.

In final conclusion, I think we must listen to the scholars of social change. They are saying that we are in a situation of rapidly increasing rates of social change. From this they predict major problems for society and individuals if the educational system fails to respond to this new situation. They raise, more urgently than before, the need for basic knowledge in learning theory and "learning how to learn." And they point up dramatically the need for effective policy research in directing the appropriate and necessary changes in the educational system.
DR. REHBerg: Professor Bidwell's paper generated a fair amount of discussion, which I'll try to summarize point by point.

First, I think one of our agreements was that if we are to seriously discuss the policy issues of education we must initially address the question of what it is that schools do. And I would suggest there are at least two modes of doing this, one by way of direct instruction—and we seem to know a little bit about what schools do with respect to the cognitive output of students, at least as measured by standardized test scores—and I think also by way of what I would refer to as indirect instruction, and I would refer to Dreeben's work on norm learning here as particularly important.

But also, I think, policy research and policy implications bring us from an empirical area into a normative area. And what we as sociologists ought to do—without blushing, I believe—is in a normative sense to ask the question: what ought schools do, and what might schools do?

Secondly, we certainly do need an expansion of our criterion variables beyond the most frequently measured set of cognitive variables. Our discussion in part took the form of recommending that efforts be made to measure certain psychological outputs—for example, life satisfaction and happiness. These are really not trite. I mean, happiness is the basic, primary concern of our life. We're the only civilization in the world to have learned that affluence doesn't buy happiness. That's profound, and I think it merits our attention as educational sociologists.
We also suggested a broader definition of the output of schooling, and possibly the work that is now being done on the socialization for competence is an appropriate heuristic construct.

Thirdly, we agreed with Professor Bidwell that we certainly need maps of what goes on in the school as a territory, as an organization, that are more theoretically isomorphic with that territory. We don't yet have those maps, but certainly we believe it's within our ability as sociologists to construct such maps and then to proceed to test the "goodness of fit."

Fourthly, we agreed that there is a dire need to increase, in Campbell and Stanley's term, the systematic variance that is due to schooling, schools as organizations. The Coleman finding that differences between schools, per se, don't make too much of a difference in terms of output, largely because schools are the same, I think recommends that as sociologists we ought to propose large-scale experimental studies.

One participant mentioned that to a degree this is already being done with the study of alternative schools. I suggest possibly we need something beyond that. There are, of course, examples of major social experimentation. One participant mentioned that in Ireland at the present time some experimental work is being done on the consequences of the introduction of standardized testing on a nationwide basis. Here in the United States, as an illustration of massive social experimentation, we have the work that's being done on income maintenance.

Fifthly, we raised a number of methodological issues, and I'll try to cite just a few. First of all, what really is our appropriate unit of analysis? Is the unit of analysis, as it is for many of us as researchers, the individual? And is that individual the appropriate unit of analysis for policymakers? Or is a more appropriate unit of analysis categories of individuals, i.e., "aggregates"?
For example, as Coleman mentions in his—no, I'm sorry, as Thurow mentions in his paper in the *Harvard Educational Review*, it may well be that a reduction in differences between the mean income levels of blacks and whites as social categories is more tractable to the manipulation of schooling than is the change in individual incomes of blacks or whites per se. I mention here too the fact that Coleman notes, again on the aggregate level, that there has been a reduction in both the coefficient of variation for income in the United States, 1920 through about 1960, as well as a reduction in the coefficient of variation for schooling attained, which suggests that on an aggregate level there is some relationship between schooling and income per se.

In terms of measurement models, again we asked the question, is it the individual level or is it the macro level that is more appropriate? Many of us, I think, are really wedded to a correlational model, and, as such, one of our criteria is the amount of variance we explain. And certainly, most of us in this room have had the great disappointment of going through very expensive funded studies, only to explain 30 or 40 percent of the variance.

I really question whether this is an appropriate model in terms of policy analysis, and I'll cite two examples. The study that was used by the FDA as a rationale for the banning of cyclamates was an experiment performed on 13 rats. I think it was seven in the experimental group and six in the control. I say "rationale" because we knew about 20 years ago that cyclamate was a carcinogenic agent. But there we have a case where a policy implication was based on a significant difference, not a percent of variance accounted for.
Secondly, again in relationship to cancer, in terms of smoking—I have read a review of Jancks' work where a psychologist said, for example, if we try to estimate the amount of variance in lung cancer that smoking per se accounts for the result would be probably two or three percentage points. But on the other hand, we know that there is a relationship and the major policy recommendations have been made on what we would term "actuarial" research data.

So the question is, in terms of policy research, whether perhaps we should shift toward, or at least be sensitive to, an actuarial model of quantifying and interpreting our data, rather than a variance explained correlational model. Now really, that is a question more than it is an assertion.

There are three other issues which, although minor, I would like to enumerate before I close. I noted in Professor Bidwell's paper—we had some dissension in the group about this, so in part I'm speaking for myself—a reference to the proposition that when the wife is employed full-time during her children's early years the children show lower rates of gain in language learning than when the wife works less and presumably spends more time with her children. Perhaps what we need here are some very carefully designed, well executed, longitudinal studies of the opportunity costs—in deference to both sexes—the opportunity costs of working parents, that is, the husband as well as the wife. One of the participants noted that there is a comprehensive review of the literature now about to come out of Harvard which suggests, after looking very carefully at a lot of this literature, that the findings are not definitive one way or another. I raise the question because perhaps it's time once again, given the tre-
mendous societal implications of women's liberation for both males and females, for a study of this sort.

I'm also reminded when Professor Bidwell talks about the effect that students have on teachers, for example, by withholding appreciation, that there's a somewhat parallel paper in David Goslin's Handbook of Socialization which discussed not how the parent socializes the child, but how the child socializes the parents. I suggest that's an appropriate model for us. Let's see how students socialize teachers. Maybe when Goslin revises his book we can insert that as well.

The final question I ask comes from the work of some of the radical sociologists and economists, Herbert Gintis particularly. If, as we believe, our schools are so enmeshed and intertwined and articulated with our social system, with our society, I personally would raise the question whether any meaningful change is possible without meaningful and substantial change in our social structure. And this brings us back, I think, to the commentary of the discussant from group three, whether revolution is necessary. I just leave that as a question.
III. ADOLESCENTS AND SCHOOL REFORM

ADDRESS BY BURTON R. CLARK, YALE UNIVERSITY

My purpose here is to speak about the report entitled Youth: Transition to Adulthood that was prepared by the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee, and especially that part of it that bears on school reform. PSAC was made up of about 15 natural scientists and 2 social scientists, one of whom was James S. Coleman, the sociologist. Coleman convinced his fellow committee members that a study should be made of the current problems of American youth and set out to organize a study group. He selected two historians, Joseph Kett, from Virginia and Robert Bremner, from Ohio State; an economist of education, Zvi Griliches, from Harvard; a demographer, Norman Ryder from Princeton; and, after we were underway, a social psychologist, Dorothy Eichorn, from Berkeley, when we discovered how little we knew concerning personal development. There was a school man on the panel, John Davis, the fine Superintendent of Schools from Minneapolis. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was an original member but had to drop off. Then, as sociologists, there was Coleman and myself, and Zahava Blum on the research staff. John Mays, then on the staff of PSAC, and now with NIE, was with us at every meeting.

The panel met monthly on Friday nights and Saturdays for over a year. We invited in groups of experts on various topics. One day we would be talking about labor market problems of the young; another time we would be reviewing comparative materials on schooling in other societies. We had one field trip to Minneapolis to look at a number of alternative schools and experimental schools that that school system has underway. After de-
ciding near the end on the rough organization of the report, we prepared and exchanged draft chapters and then had two four-day writing sessions to pull everything together and to argue the conclusions. The result is the document, parts of which you have before you, that was recently published by the U. S. Government Printing Office, and which will also be available from the University of Chicago Press.

The short first part of the report attempts to specify objectives--objectives for the environments within which the transition from youth to adulthood takes place. Frankly, we did not come to the objectives until about five minutes to midnight in the preparing of the report. It's the kind of thing we were reluctant to do: one of the things that makes the mind go soft around education is trying to specify objectives. But near the end we realized that we needed to have them and have them up front. After much revising and winnowing, we devised some seven or eight that seemed to cause us minimal pain. The objectives were of two types: self-centered objectives, which, besides cognitive skills, included such things as capability in effective management of one's own affairs; and more social objectives, such as the experience of having others dependent on one's own actions. To the extent that we were trying to be different, we were pushing in this latter direction. The most important feature of the objectives is an effort to go beyond cognition. We wanted to reiterate the importance of non-cognitive skills and capacities in coming to adulthood.

The heart of the report is seven background chapters in a Part 2 that were individually authored. There were four chapters, on the "History of Age Grouping in America," "Rights of Children and Youth," "The Demography of Youth," and "Economic Problems of Youth," about which I will say...
little since I must in a brief time concentrate on school reform. The three most relevant chapters for our purpose here were on "Current Educational Institutions," "Biological, Psychological and Socio-cultural Aspects of Adolescence and Youth,"—obviously, that one was prepared by a social psychologist!—and "Youth Culture." I will return in a moment to important items drawn from these three background chapters.

Then, the Part 3 of the Report, which you have, tried to specify seven major issues that environments for youth have to resolve in one direction or another; such as, should young people and the immediate settings in which they are found be segregated from adults or integrated with adults? And, how much age segregation should there be among the young? Should we encourage age mixing among young people, or is it preferable on balance to keep them in one-year age levels, within the grades, and in narrow blocks of the grade, as in the two-year and three-year junior high school?

Then, in Part 4, we presented some seven or eight alternative directions for change. These were our major policy recommendations, and I will return to several of them.

What, then, does this report have to do with school reform, my topic here today? I want to pick up a basic argument from three of the background chapters and then move to the policy recommendations that were most closely connected to that argument.

First, the chapter on the social psychology of youth argues effectively, with much supporting data, that there is a great range of differences in ability and interest among young people these days. These personal differences do not run on neat parallel tracks, so that, at the age of 14, a person who has developed rapidly on one characteristic will have developed
rapidly on another. The chapter also speaks about the contradictory needs of young people; for example, for both inner-directed and other-directed activity. Following these realizations, one is entitled to conclude that it would be extremely unlikely that any one institutionalized form, any single type of organization, could relate effectively to such broad differences on so many basic characteristics. We have to have more variety and flexibility in institutional arrangement for bringing young people to adulthood, simply on the grounds of their great range of individual characteristics and the uneven rates at which these develop within individuals and across large aggregations of individuals.

Then, on top of that, we have an argument out of the Chapter by Jim Coleman on "Youth Culture" that goes about as follows: there is more of a youth culture now than there used to be; that culture is increasingly strong, it embraces more of the young, and it covers more years—it picks you up somewhere around the ages of 12 to 14 and will continue your membership as long as you want to stay in it, which might be until twenty-five or, in some cases, to even forty. The youth culture attaches young people more to each other than used to be the case, and it considerably withdraws youth from adult influence. It is an inward looking culture, as so many subcultures are; and it is hard to leave, since it promises more pleasure and less pain than adult culture.

Then, a major argument of the "education" chapter that I wrote goes as follows: in this society we have had, and now other societies are having it, a shift from elite to mass involvement, in percentages of the age group involved at the higher levels of schooling. With that, we have had a shift from small scale to large scale organization, one touched upon
by Charles Bidwell in his comments on small and large schools. We have had a vast school-district consolidation movement in this country that has been running strong right up to the present time. It is interesting in this regard that the major reform document of the late 1950's on American secondary schools, the report on high schools by James Bryant Conant, took as its major recommendation the elimination of small schools. Conant said at that time—the time of the Sputnik-spurred search for excellence in the schools—that small schools were technically incompetent, that they had to be made larger in order to have more effective specialization in such subjects as mathematics and foreign languages. That report boosted along the school consolidation movement and backed the wish to have small schools become large schools. Now, fifteen years later, the greater problem seems to be that the large schools have become too large.

And why? Because it has served to increase bureaucratic control and professional prerogatives (even though these are somewhat antithetical to one another) as over against the previous situation of the informality and easy mixing of the one-room schoolhouse and the very small district—to dramatize the point by using the other end of the continuum. The needs of large scale organization will bring in bureaucratic procedure and the needs of specialized personnel will bring in professionalized norms.

Further, we have one type of organization at the secondary level that has increasingly monopolized the scene: the public, comprehensive form of secondary school organization. At the elementary and secondary level, we have had the public sector ascend over the private much more than in higher education. Within that sector, the comprehensive school won the battle of organization against its enemy, the specialized school—the spe-
cialized vocational school, academic elite school, art school, music school, etc. The public comprehensive school won the day, as a democratic, inclusive form. Unfortunately, we now know, this purportedly inclusive form has become implicated in various forms of segregation, of which the most obvious have been along lines of race and social class, depending upon neighborhood mix and the connection of the school to neighborhood catchment areas.

Basic to modern schooling is the extent to which the school has become more inclusive of the time of the young, in terms of days spent in the school per year, and hours in the day. That trend has helped to segregate young people from adults. Of course, there are the special adult agents in the school that we call teachers and principals and counselors. But other adults are out of sight and touch for most of the day, and those who are within reach are in increasingly specialized roles. The young are in a student role that has come to absorb more time, and this is a role with special qualities. It is steeped in dependency: a dependency on specialized professionals and on specialized bureaucrats, which is different from being dependent on parents, since that is a more diffuse kind of dependency. The dependency is shared by a very large number of young people. If you have a large number of people going through a common experience, sharing common problems, and especially if they share experiences of dependency and feelings of weak power, the situation will encourage development of a distinctive set of shared responses on the part of that class of people. Hence, we have argued that the way the young are separated in school and put into a particular kind of dependency has helped to create the youth subculture, a kind of counter response on the part of the young people to the situation that they are in. It is the trade-unionism of the young in respect to the school setting.
We also argued there is a separation of age groups within the ranks of the young that is largely enforced by school grades and by school organization. We have come a long way from the kind of age mixing that found its extreme in the one-room schoolhouse. The continuum stretches from that tiny schoolhouse of old—and a few are still to be found—to high schools of over 5,000 students and the New York City School District of over a million students and 50,000 teachers.

The education chapter of the Youth Report also argued that the comprehensive high school is becoming overloaded, both with public expectations and with different tasks to be performed; further, that bureaucratic and professional procedures, in trying to cope with this overload, are more and more running on a track that diverges from the needs of youth for flexibility and diversity. This problem first became clear in relation to the poor, particularly blacks and minority groups among the poor. School personnel and lower-class students have rather had a love affair, but the strain seems to have systematically worsened. Then, in the 1960's, the upper-middle class found itself becoming more and more discontented with the increasingly systematic ways of an increasingly bureaucratized and partially-professionalized staff. A result of all this is a considerable loss of confidence these days that is bound, if it continues, to affect the resilience of school organization to do a decent job. The whole legitimacy of public schooling is in question.

These are the arguments of the three background chapters that bear most on what we need to talk about here. I will now turn briefly to several of the reform recommendations.

In discussing directions for change in Part 4 of the report we struck off in different directions. We were relatively pluralistic; the
recommendations sometimes even contradict one another. But there are some common thrusts. One thrust evident in the first several recommendations we offer is the need to increase the variety of experiences for young people by various devices, including the breaking-up of the sequence of first going through school and then getting to work.

Thus, we first turned to "change in school structure," changes at macro-organizational levels. The thinking here seeks to encourage greater planned and emergent diversity among secondary schools. We reasoned in part from the diversity that exists in American higher education, where we have great diversity of institutional types, e.g., two-year community colleges, four-year state colleges, public universities, private colleges, private universities, etc. In that situation, beyond the compulsory schooling age, there is considerable consumer choice. Greater diversity among secondary schools now seems appropriate and for that we need to encourage schools to experiment with different mixes of purpose and program.

Now this is no light matter: it means for one thing a willingness to think anew about deliberate specialization. Why not more art schools? Why not more vocational schools, if they can be upgraded and kept away from the dumping-ground problem? Why not more reasoned administrative encouragement for the alternative schools? They have had a very high mortality rate, but some are surviving. They have been learning some organizational facts of life: that you have to have some division of labor between teachers and students, and even some division of authority; that you have to have some minimal order to contain unpredictability; and you even have to pay the bills. Some of the alternative schools, having learned the survival lessons, are interesting experiments these days; they could be much better monitored.
Our aim, then, was to encourage a variety of secondary schools in the public sector, as well as in the private sector, similar to what obtains in higher education. We thought this would have advantages for individual students, by way of allowing concentrated effort around one's strong interests. We thought this would also have a great advantage for organizations and for people that work in them. For one thing, I have become concerned with the problem of institutional blandness, when organizations try to be all things to all people. I see this as an ever larger problem of the comprehensive school. Comprehensiveness is great for flexibility over-time: I can see why administrators prefer it over specialized schools. But it presents problems of blandness, such as a lack of a sense of unity and purpose, that will affect young people adversely even more than teachers and administrators. Our general recommendation encourages attention to purpose: it asks those in charge of individual comprehensive schools to try to do something different from one another. In this way, attention to purpose encourages leadership—that old-fashioned thing—leadership at the grassroots level. Everything is not to be planned from on high, from school district headquarters or from the state capital or from Washington; rather we could actually allow enough leeway for institutional variety at the grassroots level so that sets of principals and teachers could actually try to do something different, as some are now trying in alternative schools.

This recommendation is enormously controversial, since it so directly questions the value of the comprehensive secondary school, which has become a hallowed American social institution and hence not something to be easily turned around. Realistically, given the embeddedness of this institution as well as its remaining virtues, any move to reinstate specialized schools
again at the American secondary level would probably result in a compromise form and the specialized form. There is no reason why one cannot have young people be in a comprehensive school in the morning and in a specialized school in the afternoon. This is being done in various places, especially around the arts. In fact, we do not need so much to think up such combinations as to go out on the terrain in American education and observe carefully what is being done. For some time, people have experimented with combining comprehensive organization with specialized lines of effort, with assigning staff and students to activities other than those in the comprehensive school.

So, then, one of our major directions of thought was around greater school diversity.

Secondly, and close to the first, is the whole problem of school size that Bidwell mentioned in his paper. To make organizational scale problematic at the secondary level, and suggest that maybe schools can be too big as well as too small, let us propose that when secondary schools have over 1,000 students you may be getting into certain kinds of problems of impersonality, etc., that you don't have in units of 500 or 200, etc. It's possible that smaller units are better than large, on certain intangibles. You could learn to measure better those intangibles, such as group spirit, that induce motivation in the young. Or consider the cross-age kind of modeling of behavior that is available in the one-room schoolhouse but that is not available in age-segregated school systems. It is possible that small units are better on a range of social objectives, and a range on individual objectives other than cognition.
And we can be practical on the matter of school size. One possibility is to have small units within large schools; the so-called cluster college notion, the idea of having houses or subcolleges within a secondary school. This is already being tried here and there. So if the high school has 2,000 students, there is no reason why it cannot be four units of 500. The student might then have the best of two worlds; in reaping the psychological and social returns of membership in the small unit while taking from the large unit its professional competence and the thrills of its football team.

Besides having small units within large schools, we could also have membership in two schools, as in the case of going to the comprehensive school in the morning and the specialized school in the afternoon. That can sometimes mean going to a large place in the morning and a small place in the afternoon. So one could have the large comprehensive and the small specialized as one way of combining several of these recommendations.

We also argue in our recommendations for greater role diversity for young people, something other than the student role, especially around the notion of the young teaching the young. This idea has made some comeback in the last five to ten years; of the young getting into tutoring of younger ones. To argue for something more than the student role is also to pay systematic attention to extracurricular activities and what their values might happen to be.

Then, fourthly, under school changes, we argued that schools could take up the role of being agents for the young, seeing that the young learn to use the larger environment of the city or the community for its learning possibilities. This would go along with cutting the daily or weekly time.
that the young spend in school, with school personnel supervising the
assignment out to other activities, particularly public service activities.

All this led on in our thinking to a second class of recommendations
around the alternative of school and work. This matter was at the heart of
what the panel finally was thinking about; namely, how to get easier move-
ment between the educational system and the institutions of work. Here we
paid attention to two possible patterns. One is the full-time stop out,
which we already have at the college level, where a young person simply
leaves the school system for half a year, or a year, or two years. He or
she stops out, instead of dropping out, and then comes back. This alterna-
tive, which could be conceived of as the front-end of a life-long possibil-
ity of recurring education, could start earlier than the ages of 17 and 18.
Young people are doing it earlier in many high schools, despite laws to the
contrary and over their parents' dead bodies.

The other pattern is a one half/one half, or sharing-time kind of
thing: being in school part of the time and out at work part of the time,
or essentially the old cooperative education, work/study pattern. There is
no reason why this kind of pattern has to be left to just certain schools,
which usually have been the vocational ones, or to certain odd colleges in
higher education. We could have this alternation of experience between
schooling and work in the younger years, and not primarily to learn a skill,
even though that could be part of the picture. It could again be an excep-
tion of youth to have some responsibility in some form of meaningful work,
to have contact with adults other than teachers and to gain experience in
interdependent activity, alongside the almost anemic and highly individual-
istic kind of activity that we encourage young people to take up in
achieving for grades in schools.
Then, finally, we did play a little bit with an idea that came out of Jim Coleman's vision, which was the possibility of putting education entirely into work institutions. We have a section that discusses the possibility of work organizations making a place for youth and blending education back into work settings. The direction of change here is thoroughly counter to institutional specialization. As you may have noticed in the materials that you have, Coleman dissented from the statement in the text, because he wanted a stronger argument about the possibility of actually putting education back into work settings. He was interested even in a complete age mixing, across all the years, so that a "work organization" would have all young people and all old people in it as well as those in the most productive years.

There are other recommendations that I will not go into here, concerning youth communities, voucher plans, public service, and so on.

The last recommendation that we made had to do with research. Early in the report we tried to state seriously that we did not want to make specific recommendations to be put into practice: that everything was to be a recommendation for pilot study, and that pilot efforts should be seriously monitored, measured, and evaluated—even intensively studied! We came back to this posture at the end; it is the kind of recommendation that should be of greatest interest to this kind of audience.

First, on pilot projects it is obvious we should have before and after measurements, that any deliberate experiments should have evaluation built in. The urge to measure and evaluate such deliberate interventions is coming on fairly strongly these days, and we can have some faith it will occur. But in addition, there is a great deal that we could do by way of
researching what is already going on. To my mind, the American educational system is a gold mine of natural experiments. There is so much to be seen in Philadelphia, and in Pasadena, and in Minneapolis, and in Palo Alto, and in New Haven, by way of alternative ways of organizing the schools, and alternative ways of figuring out relationships between school and work, the school and the community. We are tremendously under-researched in just simply finding out what is going on out there on the educational plains: sociologists, of all people, ought to be out there. We know the economists won't go and neither will the experimental-minded psychologist. Unfortunately, more and more sociologists, trained well in methods, won't go out there either. But someone should be going, not alone to interview, but also simply to look and then to return with useful ethnographies of the strange ways of the many educational tribes. In sociology, we have very much improved the quality of data processing and analysis. But if we do not improve at the same time the quality of data gathering, in terms of what is really going on out there, then we get great analyses of bad data. This is close to being a research crime, it seems to me, especially when such analyses are quickly used for policy recommendations. For example, current measures of school organization do not get us anywhere near the realities of school life. We work with such crude features as the proportion of blacks in a school or the number of teachers with a master's degree. Stopping there--because all else at the moment is without a handy measure and hence is intangible--we do not get inside the complexities of the black box to weigh even qualitatively the effects of such features as teacher subculture that we know make a difference.
Thus in the end, I say: let us increase our research by way of what we do around the pilot projects, the deliberately instituted things; and, let us get back to the field, back to the organization of the natural settings in which young people spend so much of their time for so many of their years, the settings in which some of us spend a lifetime of work. These are complicated sub-sets of society. We need to explore them thoroughly for their instrumental role in bringing the young to adulthood. In the process, we should learn something useful about improving the quality of modern life, not the least for ourselves.
DISCUSSION BY EDWARD L. McDILL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

DR. McDILL: Educational practitioners and researchers should find Professor Clark's section of the PSAC report informative in its description and assessment of three important interrelated issues. First, it documents the massive growth and significant changes in the structure of American educational institutions in the last century. Second, it adumbrates the technological and social forces which have shaped these developments. Third, it notes (and in some instances, details) some of the adverse social and psychological consequences for adolescents and college youth flowing from these features of the contemporary educational system. I certainly have no quarrel overall with the accuracy of Clark's observations regarding these matters, nor with the validity of his conclusions. Therefore, rather than spend my limited time in attempting a comprehensive and, hence, superficial critique of several of his points, I will instead elaborate upon one crucial problem for both educators and researchers which he mentions but does not develop. This is the problem of "match" or congruence between institutional characteristics and those of the students who are recruited to or select themselves into them. It is a special case of the general substantive concern with "contextual" influences, or the impact of educational institutions on student outcomes. The term "institutional-student match" employed by Clark is often referred to by psychologists as "person-environment interaction" or "individual-environment fit" (Mitchell, 1969, p. 697).

Clark raises this issue in noting some of the features that distinguish American higher education from the typical European systems. He
notes, quite correctly I believe, that one of the major problems currently facing European higher education is its homogeneity of structure. Their current problem is a consequence of the demand for greater access to college by middle and working class segments of the population—an increasing pressure for educational egalitarianism or open admissions similar to that which has been approximated in this country for several years. As Clark suggests, it would be surprising if the sharp contrast between European and American "models" of higher education did not also entail certain problems of educational organization unique to each. In particular, American educators must face the difficult task of trying to bring about an appropriate match between the personal characteristics and abilities of the enormous, heterogeneous population of youth seeking admission to college and the diversity of structure and quality of our tertiary institutions. Feldman and Newcomb, for example, in their monumental work The Impact of College (1969) document the great diversity among and within American colleges and among the types of students they attract, and conclude, after reviewing 1,400 references and more than 600 studies, that more knowledge is available on the impact of college on students than many skeptics are willing to acknowledge. Nevertheless, they hasten to add that our fund of knowledge is limited relative to the amount of time and effort devoted to the problem. In particular, they note that our knowledge is especially meager regarding the problem of student-institution "match," or as they state it, "Under what conditions have what kinds of students changed in what specific ways?" This paucity of reliable empirical evidence regarding the differential effects of institutions is particularly disturbing, I think all could agree, in light of its importance for policy-decisions and for the economic welfare and perhaps even political stability of our society.
If our knowledge of this problem is limited at the college level, it is almost non-existent at the secondary and elementary levels. In fact, McDill and Rigsby (1973) have concluded, after a careful review of relevant literature, that research on even the global (or gross) influence of educational environments (as contrasted with the more intensive study of student-environment interactions) on student outcomes is either lacking or woefully inadequate. Moreover, that which is available generally relies upon indirect, proxy measures of school environment such as the SES composition of the student body rather than direct measures which tap important structural and processual components of the environment. The latter might include the content, intensity and pervasiveness of norms exerted by teachers and peers, the systems of informal and formal sanctions associated with the norms, and the degree of social cohesion among students and between students and teachers (Feldman, 1970; McDill and Rigsby, 1973). In the last decade several researchers have challenged the utility of indirect measures of high school environment such as SES context, and a limited number have developed and tested direct measures of the quality of elementary and secondary school environments using structural and processual variables based on both macro- and social psychological theories. In general, though, this issue of crucial importance to the organization of our educational system has neither received the attention it merits nor the careful study it requires.

I wish to spend my remaining time in a discussion of selected methodological and substantive issues in the study of student-environment interactions at the secondary and elementary levels which may, in part, account for this lack of attention. The methodological problems involved in
This line of research are severe and are encountered regardless of the level of education being studied. However, several of the theoretical and substantive issues do differ across levels, owing to differences in the organizational characteristics of elementary and secondary schools and of the maturational levels of students. For example, McPartland and Epstein (1973, p. 1) have properly emphasized that one of the major problems faced by researchers interested in organizational characteristics of public schools is their homogeneity on certain key features. Potentially important variables such as authority systems, structure of competition and tasks, and sharing of responsibility for setting goals and selecting courses and assignments are relatively constant across junior and senior high schools. This lack of diversity in organizational features severely restricts research at these levels. With respect to the role of maturation in person-environment fit, Mitchell (1969, p. 703) suggests that a given interaction may be more ephemeral or time-bound than researchers realize. Thus, special attention must be paid to the developmental level of the student being studied.

The critical methodological issue in this research domain is how, in the absence of an opportunity to employ a true experimental design, the effects of school environment are to be separated from the influences of personal, social background, and cognitive attributes with which the student enters school? In statistical terms, this is the problem of multicollinearity among environmental and student input variables. In the absence of any entirely adequate solution, for none exists, the researcher must choose the statistical technique which provides the most accurate separate estimates of school effects, those of student input characteristics, and the
joint effects of both sets of variables. Werts and Watley (1969), Feldman and Newcomb (1969), Mitchell (1969), and Feldman (1970) have all summarized the more widely used methods in an attempt to provide reliable estimates of school vs. individual effects, the assumptions underlying these statistical tools, and the controversies or disputes surrounding each. Some of these techniques may be briefly mentioned: (1) test-retest differences, or change scores attributed to environment, a technique vulnerable to regression artifacts because of the failure to adjust for students' initial scores on the dependent variable; (2) Astin's input-output model in which the part correlation of the school environmental variable and the dependent variable with input variance removed only from output is interpreted as a measure of environmental impact, a technique which Werts and Watley (1969) have shown underestimates the size of the school effect; (3) conventional regression analysis with partial regression coefficients used as the measure of school influence; (4) path analysis, a special case of regression analysis involving a sequence of regression analyses within a predetermined, specified causal framework; and (5) analysis of covariance which adjusts for differences in input variables but which can produce inaccurate estimates of environmental effects if subjects are not randomly assigned to treatments (Campbell and Erlebacher, 1970).

As noted above, none of these techniques is entirely adequate in dealing with the statistical problems involved in explaining differences among naturally occurring groups. Since the limits of statistical manipulation in disentangling the complex relationships among variables are particularly severe in this research domain, it is especially important that the researcher develop, prior to collection of data, a causal framework or model.
which clearly specifies the relationships among various components of school environment, student outcomes, and the relevant input characteristics of students. As Werts and Watley (1969) have noted, too much prior research on school effects has involved a "shotgun correlational approach," which ignores the complexity of the problem and increases the likelihood of invalid interpretations of data.

One must then choose the appropriate statistical technique to test the model. Some of the general linear model techniques (Fennessey, 1968) such as multiple regression or analysis of variance, are robust statistical tools which provide stable estimates of the effects in a given model, but the model itself must be formulated by the researcher. Multiple regression strategies can be particularly informative by partitioning the explained percentage of variance in the dependent variable (R²) into three components: (1) the independent effects of various dimensions of school environment; (2) the independent effects of school and input characteristics due to the correlation between (1) and (2). Regression analysis can then be used to determine whether there are person-environment "fits" or "matches" by performing separate regression analyses on different types of students and comparing the magnitude of the regression coefficients for the measure of school environment and student outcome.

Given the above brief overview of the methodological and substantive complexities involved in environment-person interactions, what practical and scientifically useful suggestions can be offered to advance our knowledge in this important area? I will address this question by first briefly reviewing some of the substantive research dealing with these issues at the high school and elementary school levels. I will then conclude with a some-
what more detailed description of a research project with which I am familiar (and informally involved) that suggests a perhaps more profitable strategy for the further pursuit of these matters.

In the Equality of Educational Opportunity survey, Coleman and associates (1966) found that school environment (measured by characteristics of fellow students and by teacher quality) accounted for a larger proportion of the verbal ability scores of blacks than of whites; that is, a statistical interaction was shown between school climate and personal and family background characteristics. The EEO research team developed a post hoc explanation of these results in terms of a model of social interaction between home characteristics and those of the school which they labelled "differential sensitivity." Their reasoning was that students from disadvantaged backgrounds and those possessing fewer of the personal attributes known to be important determinants of scholastic performance are more sensitive to the quality of the school than more socially and economically advantaged students. Similarly, Irwin Katz (1967) presents evidence from a number of small group studies which suggest that the achievement of lower class students and those from minority group backgrounds is more responsive to external rewards from peer groups and less dependent on internalized standards than is that of their higher SES and majority group counterparts. Richer (1968) also presents evidence from a representative sample of Canadian high school students indicating that the educational plans of low I.Q. students are more susceptible to the quality of the school environment (measured by the socioeconomic composition of student bodies) than those of high I.Q. students. This finding led him to propose that the fewer attributes the individual student possesses which provide inherent motivation, the more sensitive he is to the environmental quality of the school.
As is unfortunately customary with our research efforts, a more thorough review of the literature reveals contradictory findings. McPartland (1968, pp. 231-238), for example, utilizing data from the EEO survey on all ninth grade black students from the Metropolitan Northeast, found that the effects of racial desegregation at the classroom level on the verbal aptitude scores of black students did not differ systematically according to their socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore, McDill and Rigsby (1973), evaluating data from a national sample of 20 institutions, failed to support the differential sensitivity hypothesis in their study of the effects of high school environment on the achievement and college plans of students. Specifically, no meaningful interactions were found between global school climate and student performance for students varying in terms of scholastic aptitude, academic motivation, or family SES. Thus the findings regarding statistical interaction between school environment and personal attributes of junior and senior high school students are contradictory. While several factors might account for these conflicting results, including differences in the populations studied or in the measures of school environment and student characteristics employed, we would identify the generally superficial measurement of student experiences with their environments in this research as being particularly important. In the various studies mentioned, the measures of school environment may have been too global or distal and the personal measures too crude to detect the sensitive nature of the relationship between the individual and selected aspects of the school environment which impinge intensively and/or persistently on him. As Mitchell (1969, p. 715) notes, there are few studies at any educational level which have directly confronted the critical problem
of differential environmental effects on students of different personality types, principally because of the serious methodological problems involved mentioned earlier.

A research project currently underway at the Johns Hopkins University Center for the Social Organization of Schools by McPartland and Epstein (1973) is directly addressing some of these problems (and may become a prototype for future research into the problem of student-environment match). They are studying longitudinally the effects of open vs. traditional schools on the cognitive and personal development of elementary, middle, and secondary students using field surveys, interviews, and classroom observations. They are interested not only in the global effects of specific organizational aspects of open schools (i.e., task structure and authority system) on student development but also which types of students are more or less affected by these organizational features (i.e., institutional-student match).

Thus, their research is unusual in three respects: (1) they developed a causal model specifying the relationships between specific organizational features of open schools and particular students' outcomes (i.e., they predicted that specific organizational sources of effects will be different for each of the dependent variables); (2) they predicted which types of students (in terms of earlier home and school experiences) will be more or less responsive to these organizational features for each dependent variable; and (3) they are applying a powerful method of multivariate analysis—multiple regression—to separate the main effects of various school environment and individual variables and for testing their predictions about student-environment interactions. I submit that their undertaking, involving a causal model, a rigorous research design, and a mode of analysis
suitable for testing their detailed hypotheses, will aid in alleviating one of the fundamental weaknesses noted by Harp and Richer (1969, p. 691) in their comprehensive review of research in the sociology of education: "The point to be made then is that researchers in education have tended to de-emphasize interaction effects while concentrating on over-all summary effect measures. More detailed, careful investigations of what's going on in various subgroups are needed to answer the question: Whom does the school affect?" I might add that the answer to this question is essential to the formulation of a comprehensive theory of school influences.

In sum, although we have no definitive findings at any educational level concerning treatment-person interactions, educational researchers now seem sufficiently attuned to the crucial significance of the problem area that we can expect substantial attention devoted to it in the immediate future. Hopefully, a significant portion of this research will focus on personality differences among students and not be restricted merely to racial, ethnic and social class differences, for it is evident there is substantial variation on psychosocial variables within each of these crude social categories and good reason to believe that psychological variables are important sources of key student outcomes such as satisfaction with school and academic motivation.

While it would certainly be premature to propose specific policy recommendations on the basis of existing evidence, the question of policy implications does provide a convenient route back to Professor Clark's report. In view of his sensitivity to the issues I have addressed, I must admit some surprise at his concluding suggestion (p. 91) that the construction of specialized institutions to satisfy the needs of particular seg-
ments of the young may be the future course of educational reform. While
this may be desirable for certain select groups of students who might re-
quire highly specialized educational needs (the physically handicapped, or
those with severe learning handicaps, for example), an alternate strategy,
of course, would emphasize greater heterogeneity and diversity within in-
stitutions. Given the practical ecological problems in sorting spatially
dispersed youth among specialized institutions and the desirability of
maximizing the opportunity to explore a variety of educational experiences,
within-school diversification may be a desirable alternative to between-
school specialization.
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DR. RIST: It is not uncommon to find yet another presidential level commission making a report on one of the social ills in the United States; in fact, during Richard Nixon's first two years in office, there were 50 such panels or commissions appointed by him, studying such diverse conditions as pornography, campus unrest, the use of Federal statistics, and the like. But what we have in the present report, that is, Youth: Transition To Adulthood, is the final summation, and perhaps the "last hurrah" of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). In the recent shake-up of the White House hierarchy, this particular advisory committee has been disbanded, and so Youth: Transition To Adulthood comes as a posthumous report from that committee.

Substantially, the report posits that changes in the schools are necessary because of fundamental and ongoing changes in American society; and the two most basic changes which are structuring our responses for institutional life in this latter quarter of the 20th century are the fracture of the nuclear family and the growth of an autonomous youth culture. The report posits that as a result of the above, there has emerged what are termed "youth institutions," which in the context of this report, comes to be translated to mean the schools. The ascendency of these youth institutions has meant a shift in the options available to young people. While they have had increasingly more options in consumption and leisure, due to their affluence (and the affluence of their parents), opportunities have
declined for them in other areas, particularly those related to carrying out responsible work and adult roles away from the home. In short, it is increasingly more difficult for a young person to assert his maturity through institutionally linked roles than it was a generation or more ago.

The report suggests a number of remedies to this situation, some which can be characterized as moderate, and others which could be characterized as radical. But central to all the proposals is a recommendation for pilot projects that could be expanded or dropped, depending upon an ongoing assessment of their effects. I think this to be a healthy caution, for one of the few things we have learned from the '60s is that grandiose social programs begun on faulty social science carry us nowhere. If we are, in fact, to address ourselves to social problems and to deal with them in their systemic dimensions, it's important to give lebensraum to the research in these areas. There has to be time for an ongoing assessment through the movement from the definition of the problem, to the definition of the policy, to the implementation of the program. It may be quite beneficial to social science in the 70's to express a caution in linking social science research to social change.

Given this brief summary of the thrust of what the report sees as the problems, I take the recommendations to be broadly outlined in that they provide more a catalyst to dialogue and discussion than a definitive programmatic response. There is a tremendous need for more refinement and more thought before such proposals as providing educational vouchers to all high school graduates, so as to further their education as they choose, could be operationalized. In short, what we have here is a report which should give us an impetus for discussion, rather than a manifesto for change.
I would share, several of my reservations with the way in which the report structured its analysis, and the conclusions to which it came.

1) There's a curious, a-historical dimension to the report. It is hard to get from it a sense of what the 1960's have meant for an entire cohort of the young and their relation particularly to the political process. The demise of Camelot is now more than a decade ago, and the impact of the succeeding decade on the willingness of young people to grant legitimacy and seek affiliation with dominant institutions is something which is only vaguely referred to. It's difficult to find a handle for grasping what Kent State or Jackson State, for example, has meant for the young people now coming into what is viewed as adult responsibility. Further in this vein, the more profound issue may be to ask how have the 1960's impinged on the 1970's for this particular cohort? How do we make sense, for example, of the turn-away from social analyses to transcendental meditation? I think the report lacks a sense of process, a sense of the transition in the lives of young people themselves as their own biographies begin to be shaped by the history of their society.

2) There is also lack of a theoretical framework from which to forecast, even to the near future. In the time since this report was written and has now come into publication, we have seen a tremendous swing away from the social sciences, from that perspective which provides a social critique, to such disciplines as medicine and law. Parenthetically, this year I understand 50% of the freshman class at a number of universities have declared their major as either pre-medicine or pre-law. How does such a shift in interest relate to feelings of impotence and disengagement on the part of the young which the report describes as so prevalent? What does it mean for a
supposedly isolated youth culture, with no adult models to follow, to sud-
denly turn toward two of the most prestigious, glamorous and institutional-
ized of the adult professionals? The report, here again, is somewhat deficient.
The description of youth culture represents more a still life photograph than
a film.

3) There is a fundamental question of whether, in fact, one can
eliminate any reference and analysis as to the experiences of non-Anglo stu-
dents in American education. There is at least the implicit assumption in
the report that the institutional settings supercede the various attributes
of the participants. For that reason, there is no direct reference to the
experience of Blacks, Chicanos, to native Americans, or to women. I am con-
vinced that such factors as racism or sex discrimination are critical in un-
derstanding the experiences which various youth groups have in American edu-
cation. To be a recipient of a racist education, or one which is loaded with
sex stereotypes as to what options one has for moving into adulthood, seems
to be sadly neglected. It is the reality that many young people face! Is it
not profoundly the existence of racism itself which has so distorted the kinds
of adult roles that are available to young non-Anglo persons in this society?

In conclusion, and in full awareness of my reservations, I cannot re-
main negative in my assessment of this report. It has sought to bring into
public consciousness issues which are critical to the lives of many people
and these issues are presented in a way which make them amenable to public
dialogue. There is no doubt but that access to adult roles, to adult insti-
tutions, and to adult responsibility is something which is increasingly being
denied to young people. The transition from rural to urban and from urban to
suburban have both left in their wake large cohorts of impotent young people
who have become more aware of the social system, of its machinations, and of its activities, but less capable of finding ways in which to express their disenchantment, dissent, or agreement with that system. They know more, but stand outside the avenues by which to participate in affirming or changing that same system.

There is something which has happened in the writing of this report which I feel should be nourished and sustained. I think this is one example of social science attempting to do what C. Wright Mills advocated some 15 years ago—the struggle to synthesize personal problems with public issues. As Mills wrote:

"What the social scientist ought to do for the individual is to turn personal problems and concerns into social issues and problems open to reason. His aim is to help the individual become a self-educating man, who only then would be reasonable and free. What he ought to do for the society is combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics, and creating the mass society—or put as a positive goal, his aim is to help build and strengthen self-cultivating publics. Only then might society be reasonable and free."

I see this report seeking to address issues which young people are facing, and which has left them neither able to utilize reason in such a way as to understand the linkage between their own biographies and the history of society, nor able to understand how they may maximize their personal freedom. For if, in fact, we understand freedom to be not merely the choice between set alternatives, but the ability to create alternatives, then young people have been sadly misled by what the system has provided. The report argues for options. It argues that young people need to be able to make decisions on their own as to what kinds of options they want for their lives, and for that reason alone, to sustain both reason and freedom, the report deserves our attention.
DR. STOUT: The whole document is a fun document. I'd like to discuss it briefly as a policy document. I'd like to make three points.

The first is, there seems to me to be a kind of basic dilemma in the report which bespeaks perhaps the nature of social scientists doing policy statements or, too, perhaps just the nature of what we know. That is, I see an elaborate analysis of a set of activities and an historical development of groups and individuals in the United States and then, when I come to the recommendations, I think I see them as coming down on both sides of the fence. Let me suggest why I think that.

It seemed to me that roughly half of the proposals for reforming schools suggest that we ought to make schools more comprehensive than they are at the moment. By comprehensive I mean that schools are more in control of the lives of children through diversifying those things over which they can claim legitimate right to influence. We have children experience many more things than they currently experience in different sorts of structures. And it seems to me that we, in effect, assert our influence over greater parts of their lives; that I would define as making them more comprehensive.

The other half of the proposals, I suggest, are those that relate to making the schools less comprehensive than they currently are. And the end of that continuum, of course, is, in effect, to do away with schools and put education in the work place.

Now, as a policy maker, that's a great policy document, because it allows me to do anything I damn well want...
(General laughter)

—and can point to it with pride and say, the social scientists support my position.

(General laughter and applause)

Now, I'd like to take a look at what I think are some possible consequences of taking either one of those two positions; of moving in a policy way toward either one of those two positions.

If we make schools less comprehensive than they are now, that is, press education out of the schools into the workplace, there will be those who favor the move and those who do not, as is true in any policy process. I wish to try to sort out a little bit some notions I have about who is likely to be for that and who's likely to be against it—and we can argue at some length at another time.

It seems to me teachers are going to be mostly against that. Let me tell you why. I'll make an assumption. The primary reward for teachers in the teaching act is their internalized belief that they can control the child's definition of reality. That is, the primary satisfaction as a teacher is knowing that he determines for the child the nature of reality. In fact, by moving the child out from under his influence, his determination of the nature of reality, by exposing the child to competitive definitions of reality and by doing that deliberately, it may force a teacher into a situation in which he has to compete with alternative definitions of reality given children by the teachers' social status equals, namely, persons in the work force who may hold the same degrees he holds, who may have as definite a position in the social order as he has. At the moment his only competition is parents, and he has fairly well been able to remove them as really competitive forces.
But if you now say to him that in fact he must face real competition, in that somebody out there is going to help that child to find reality, he begins to get anxious.

On the other hand, he does trade removal of the child from a conflict arena, and that may be something he is willing to trade. I'm just not sure. But I think teachers are likely to see this as a loss of control.

Many parents are going to be against it because it disperses responsible authority and it's hard for me— as a parent—to hold accountable this dispersed adult authority that has some legitimate responsibility for influencing my child. At the moment, if I really want to be angry at what's happening to my child, I only have to go one place. If you now tell me I have to go several different places in order to be angry, then that attacks my sense of my control as a parent.

Another set of parents must be convinced, it seems to me, that what they call "real learning" will take place out there; that is, reading and writing. Those parents will not accept the argument that because the kid will learn how to come to work on time and will learn adult responsibilities and so on, that important learning is happening. What they care about is real learning; namely, they care about the child learning to read. And I'm not sure you can convince them that that will take place out there.

Middle class parents are probably going to be in favor of such a thing if they can avoid having to do very much about it.

(General laughter)

That is because they can make a set of assumptions about the fact that the child is likely to be able to learn real stuff, namely, reading and
writing, and that now they can have the leisure to go out and learn some other sorts of things.

On the other hand, it seems to me that lower middle class parents may be mildly in favor of it. But they're more likely to have to bear the brunt of becoming surrogate parents, particularly if, in a high school, we disperse children to work places. By and large—at least as I understand the demographics of cities—suburban parents are much more likely to be removed from work opportunities for high school students; that is, high school students are more likely to end up working in places that are in the local community, and those tend to be predominantly staffed by what I would call lower middle class parents; and those persons, then, are going to have to be the ones responsible for doing all this work. And I'm not sure that they want to take on that much of a burden.

The third set of persons that may be against it are taxpayers, insofar as they may feel double taxation. Namely, I have to spend tax money to put kids in school; at the same time, I have to spend time and energy teaching them. The school sends them back to me to do what schools are supposed to be doing, and I may feel somewhat upset about that.

A fourth group of persons who may be against this sort of thing are the children themselves—and here I think there is a real mixed case—insofar as most work is really kind of hard and tedious and dull and not very interesting. Most work in the world, I believe, is not terribly satisfying in and of itself. And most work is not a career. So you send children into the work world in order to get experience, and they discover that the work world is not really terribly interesting.

(General laughter)
I don't know what the consequences of that are, except--

(General laughter).

--it seems to me that the primary reward the school has to offer is something called grades and experience, and I'm not sure that as a 17-year-old, I'm willing to trade off grades and experience for just doing terrible stuff part of the day.

(General laughter)

And I'm not sure that the economic system at the moment is prepared to pay me 'real' money for that, in any large numbers.

I come from a university in which roughly 80 percent of the undergraduate students work 30 or more hours a week. Now that's a kind of model of combining work and education. But the reason they are working is to get an education so they don't have to do, again, what they currently are doing in order to get the education.

(General laughter)

And they know that. And they're willing to put up with that because they know that in getting the education, the likelihood of their not ever having to do that again is increased. If you tell them at this stage, hey, that's part of real life and we're going to institutionalize that—we're going to make your life here like that life out there—they say, "No thanks."

(General laughter)

Now, it seems to me also that schools of education are likely to be against that sort of thing, primarily because schools of education are staffed to train teachers and they are staffed by persons who are prior teachers and they tend to be staffed by lower middle class persons who made it out of the lower middle class. Now you are going to redefine their lives for them in
such a way that they again have to engage the world of work and they have to know enough about it, and find it important enough, to train teachers who are interested to do it. And that seems to me a real source of resistance among university professors in state colleges and universities, and those persons train more teachers than any other single group.

Now, the question of who might be in favor of such a thing is a question I really don't want to--I really didn't address. I didn't think about it very much.

(General laughter)

Just simply because I didn't. There was no good reason for that.

(General laughter)

I am interested, however, in a kind of possible consequence of making schools less comprehensive places than they are now. It seems to me if we talk about schools and social reform, that there is at least a possibility that schools are collectors of reformers. And that, perhaps, is a desirable consequence for the social order. Schools do provide certain things for youth as youth begins to try to think through what it wants to reform in the social order. In many respects, schools provide an impetus for the itch to reform--and we can argue that one back and forth. But at least schools do provide youth with time, free time, if you will. Schools do provide youth with ideas in a systematic form; and they do provide youth with a certain degree of protection from punishment. That is, the school as an institution does intervene between the child and the social order. College students do get off better after having thrown bottles through windows in small towns in the Midwest if the college comes to their aid with the local sheriff than if those students were randomly sampled young adults coming in from someplace
outside in the community. Now, that's not necessarily the nature of reform, but it does seem to me to suggest that the school as an institution does buffer the students as the students attempt to generate some sort of definition of reform.

And so as I saw the '60's, at least one thing that occurred to me was that the youth in schools generated a tremendous source of reform, and that the kids rebelled and they challenged the system. Their ideas and hopes for change were picked up by like-minded adults who had other resources; namely money, franchise, and access to persons of influence. And I'm wondering if in dispersing students from the school into the larger social order we run the risk of having lost that source of impetus for possible reform.

And at the moment, it seems to me, on campuses students are attempting reform of another kind; a re-establishment of what they are calling the moral order. And I don't know what to make of that yet; and I don't know how important it is yet; and I don't know who's picking up on it yet. But it seems to me that it spins off in funny sorts of ways, one of which is the tremendous increase; as I look at it, of students who are declaring themselves as candidates for what I would call the helping professions. And I don't know whether law and medicine fit, or whether that's a more instrumental phenomenon that's occurring; I don't have the sense of that yet. But we can look at the tremendous increase in students declaring themselves interested in careers in criminal justice; a tremendous increase in students who are declaring themselves interested in counseling, in helping others in all sorts of ways. And that seems to me to reflect a kind of groping among youth for some sense of establishing, or reestablishing, a moral order; and it seems to me that can't happen at the moment in any other social institution we have except schools, where you do have this aggregate of youth.
These are the things I want to say, except that I am concerned that in discussions of making schools a more comprehensive experience and of making schools more diverse, the social order has not, somehow or other, already gotten past that and that intellectual critics have already dismissed schools. I am concerned that intellectuals have convinced themselves that schools cannot be a more satisfying experience for children and that their only real alternative is what I saw in the second part; namely, making school a less comprehensive experience.

So I found it a fascinating report, and one that I think is going to create a great deal of discussion among school people and among schoolboard members who are the ones responsible for making policy.
IV. AUTHORITY AND EMPATHY IN THE CLASSROOM
ADDRESS BY WILLIAM G. SPADY
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During the last few years, I, like many sociologists, have been attempting to digest the prodigious literature on the quality of and inequality in public education in the U.S. Among the many questions that arose in my desire to understand the fundamental nature of these issues, two things captured my attention sufficiently to prompt my own attempt to formulate a more adequate sociological understanding of these problems.

The first was the undisputed contention of countless writers and activists that bad teachers and bad teaching abounded in the schools. Based on my own experiences with the public schools, both as a pupil and as a parent of one, I found much that rang true on this subject in the paperbacks and periodicals of the Sixties. However, had I chosen to follow only the "high road" of sociological analysis provided by Waller, Becker, Henry, Friedenberg, Gordon, Dreeben, and Bidwell, I could have come to a rather similar conclusion about teachers without having tainted my consciousness with the likes of Goodman, Kozol, Kohl, Illich, Silberman and my own subjective eyesight. But the problem was hardly solved, for despite whatever general consensus one could reach about bad teaching from all of this, there was little on which to develop a model of good teaching—except to infer opposites from the unfavorable evidence. That such a model might be possible prompted the analysis which follows in a moment.

The second issue that compelled my attention was the lack of consensus regarding what schooling is all about. Although most educators, psycholo-
gists, and parents have focused their attention and concern on the improvement of cognitive achievement levels in individual students, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the schools are concerned with far more than teaching and curriculum. Scattered throughout what we have come to regard as the classic books and articles in the sociology of education are insightful analyses of other activities and preoccupations of school personnel besides instruction. These are customarily described as socialization, sorting and selecting, compliance and control, and evaluation.

What seemed to be lacking in this literature, however, was a framework for understanding how these processes directly impinged on and overlapped with the instructional role of the teacher and with each other. In fact, the more I thought about the whole problem area the more reasonable it appeared that the question of teacher quality (or effectiveness) could not be understood independently of the multiplicity of functions the teacher was asked to perform and how she performed them. Although my realization was slow in taking shape, I felt that sociology might provide a conceptual basis for understanding instructional effectiveness that learning theorists, curriculum developers, and students of pedagogy had been unable to fashion.

The analysis that follows is not a purely structural one; it attempts to integrate structural-functional and social psychological elements, in part because neither approach in isolation provides an adequate understanding of human behavior in social systems. In addition, it does not pretend to be exhaustive, nor does it represent any sort of final statement on the problem. Whatever insights it contains that seem reasonable a priori still require the test of impartial theoretical and empirical examination—tests which I hope you will feel inclined to undertake in your courses and research.
I also hope that the analysis will clarify the nature and function of empathy in this framework, thereby rendering the formal title of this paper somewhat germane to its content.

The Major Functions of Schooling

By synthesizing ideas found most predominately in the work of Durkheim, Waller, Parsons; Anderson, Becker, Henry, Friedenberg, Dreeben, and Bidwell, it is possible to identify five major functions that schools either deliberately or unintentionally perform in dealing with their students. These functions I will call Instruction, Socialization, Custody-Control, Evaluation-Certification, and Selection. Many points of strain in interpersonal conflict in schools can, I believe, be understood as the product of the way in which these functions are defined operationally and impinge on each other. Consequently, while it is tempting to understand and deal with each function in isolation as so many educators are wont to do, life in classrooms, hallways, and school grounds involves a constant mixture and interplay among all five.

Instruction

Ostensibly instruction is the primary (if not exclusive) public mission of the school. It involves the systematic attempt of teachers and aides to increase the information base and improve the cognitive and physical skills of students. What we typically know as the curriculum of the school are those specific sequences of experiences and sets of materials to which students are exposed in order to facilitate the acquisition of these skills. The manner in which this exposure takes place and is reinforced is a result
of the instructional process or pedagogy used by the teacher. Understanding the instructional function of the school, then, requires an analysis of the content, sequencing, and nature of students' formal learning experiences. Proposals for changing instruction must explicitly take all three elements into account. It is this arena that so often stands as the primary object of both public criticism and the focus of attempts at school reform. That real reform cannot be concentrated on instruction alone will, I hope, become clear as the analysis proceeds.

Socialization

Socialization, broadly conceived by Inkeles, is the process of developing in persons those attitudes, beliefs, expectations, values, and capacities that are necessary for the successful and compatible performance of social roles in specified social systems. Therefore, to analyze the school's role in preparing youngsters for life as adults is to consider not only the relatively limited range of information and skills that is typically dealt with via instruction in the formal curriculum of the school but also the development of the elaborate belief, expectation, and behavior codes that characterize "normal" or "appropriate" behavior in the occupational and social worlds of adults.

In other words, the socialization function of the school serves to attach social meaning, significance, and utility to the capacities developed by the instructional function; and, like the latter, it is also characterized (by Dreember and by Bidwell) as having a specific content, sequencing of experiences, and various modes of transmission (i.e., influence mechanisms). I have tried to illustrate this relationship in Figure 4 by portraying instruction as a sub-set of the larger socialization mission of the school.
Because of society's belief that schooling is both a necessity and a social good, schools have been charged with the responsibility of providing youngsters up to a given age with formal instruction. In addition, the youngsters themselves face the legal obligation of attending school, regardless of their personal predilections to the contrary. In this sense, then, the school performs a custody-control function for the larger society that.

FIGURE 1. A Diagramatic Representation of the Relations Among the Five Primary Functions of Schooling.
pervades the way in which both classroom and school-wide structures and activity patterns are defined.

By referring to Figure 1 we can see that custody-control impinges on the nature of the instructional process by making the student's role in the classroom inherently involuntary while simultaneously influencing the nature of the socialization processes to which he is exposed. In fact, progressive and humanistic criticism of the public schools usually contains references to the school's obsession with order and control. The attacks allege, with some apparent justification, that custody-control has been elevated from a desirable precondition and facilitator of the instructional function to a position of pre-eminence among all the functions. In other words, concern for instructional effectiveness has been displaced by a pre-occupation with student control and compliance for its own sake. This conflict will serve as a major point of departure for the remainder of the paper.

Evaluation-Certification

A fourth explicit set of activities in which school personnel engage is the evaluation of student academic performance for the purpose of certifying course credit and graduation eligibility. However, as Figure 1 suggests, the evaluation process in most schools is not oriented entirely to instructional outcomes; instead it also reflects evidence of both socialization outcomes (such as motivation and general attitude) and student punctuality, attendance, and deportment (all components of the custody-control domain). In fact, it is possible that the concern with custody-control may pervade the school's operations to such an extent that it biases the evalu-
tion certification function in two ways: not only at the classroom level where grades may be dispensed on the basis of the "extraneous" criteria just noted, but also at the school system level where formal certification and the awarding of diplomas depend as much on students' required exposure to twelve full years of schooling as on the skills they acquire. As competency-based graduation requirements and alternative work-study programs are discussed and implemented in various states, the operational distinction between instructional, socialization, and custodial outcomes should become clearer. For the time being, however, they are strongly confounded in most schools and most states.

Also confounded are the structural conditions and operational criteria that form the basis of school evaluation systems. As suggested in Figure 2, there are at least four operational definitions of achievement that can be and often are used in evaluating student performance and assigning grades. These definitions are the products of two variables: time and standards. The time frame in which a given standard is applied can be conceptualized as being either bound (i.e., defined by explicit upper and lower limits such as semesters, six-week units, or class periods) or open (i.e., having no specific boundaries implied). The standards that are applied may themselves be either absolute (or fixed) on the one hand, or comparative (i.e., normative) on the other.

Note that whenever evaluation is based on explicit time parameters, a selection bias is implied; the successful students in Group A and Group D are those able to meet the performance standard within the time period specified, as distinct from their peers who could not. Similarly normative performance standards are inherently selection-oriented since the performance of peers is
always being compared and differentiated. Only type A, which describes the conditions under which mastery-learning programs typically operate, minimizes the selection bias in evaluation.

**Selection**

Although the selection function of the school is often regarded as an unanticipated consequence, rather than a deliberate mandate, of schooling, it affects the life-chances and learning opportunities of students in two ways. First, access to programs, courses, teachers, and facilities within the school system are often limited to certain groups of students, often through a deliberate system of tracking. This I call internal selection. Second, opportunities for access to jobs and future educational experiences after finishing high school are differentially affected by the kinds of internal selection opportunities the student has had, what he has learned in them, and how he has been graded and certified. The latter become translated into the external selection consequences of schooling. To the extent
that formal certification mechanisms have a major bearing on post-school life-chances of students, the foregoing suggests that the selection consequences of schooling may be governed not only by personal levels of academic accomplishment but also by the kind of evaluation parameters and extraneous custodial criteria used. "Using the system" to one's own advantage in schools refers not to just one but to a set of integrated systems in which the key to future opportunities appears to be governed by the evaluation-certification process. Whoever controls the groundrules on which the evaluation-certification system operates controls the key to both the current and future opportunities of students.

The Bases for Social Control in Schools

Given that the student's participation in the instructional system of the school may be inherently involuntary, and given the school's unavoidable concern with student behavior and compliance in the classroom, it seems impossible to comprehend the question of instructional effectiveness without understanding how it is linked to the system of social control used in the school. As a result, I will focus for the next few moments on a framework for interpreting the bases and mechanisms of social control available to the teacher.

Primary Mechanisms of Control

According to Bachrach and Baratz, control exists when one party gains compliance from another in an interactional setting. This compliance may be arrived at either involuntarily, when power or force is required, or voluntarily, either via persuasion (influence) or authority. There are, then,
three primary mechanisms of social control that need to be analyzed: "power, persuasion, and authority."

Power, according to Weber, is the probability of carrying out one's will in a social situation despite resistance from others. In such situations, compliance (control) is achieved because the dominant party is perceived to be capable of controlling and manipulating a monopoly of critical resources in such a way that the other party believes he cannot sustain his present state of affairs (such as employment, reputation, or physical well-being) without enduring some intolerable loss. In effect, the party who can monopolize and manipulate the greatest number of critical resources can restrict the options or alternatives of the other party and, thereby, gain some measure of control over (i.e., apply sanctions against) him. Etzioni uses the term coercion to describe essentially the same phenomenon.

Under conditions when power is the dominant mode of control, compliance is achieved by means of either the threat or the direct use of sanctions; hence it is both involuntary and conscious in that the individual is compelled to evaluate his options and choose among a set of presumably undesirable alternatives. While power is often an effective means for assuring at least surface compliance in the short run, it breeds resentment and alienation, thereby making it a problematic strategy for engendering the kind of stable and positive affect commonly assumed to underlie and sustain long-run voluntary learning efforts.

Persuasion, on the other hand, appears on the surface to be a more compatible mechanism of control than power in that compliance is achieved without the implied threat of negative sanctions and consequences. While persuasion, like power, compels the subordinate party to select among avail-
able alternatives, the choice is based on the superordinate's ability to convince the subordinate of the inherent advantages of selecting certain alternatives without constraining the choice process by threatening to use negative sanctions. In effect, then, the subordinate's choice is voluntary and is based on the inherent attractiveness of certain options rather than the implied negative consequences of choosing others.

While persuasion eliminates some of the negative elements implied in the use of power and thereby facilitates more cooperative and positive relations among individuals, it is a highly unstable mechanism. In terms of school life it neutralizes many of the inherent status differences between staff and students, opens the conditions of school life to ceaseless negotiation and change, and assures that the participation of students in learning activities is voluntary. However, relying on persuasion forces the teacher to negotiate his every step and to justify the terms under which classroom activity takes place. While these conditions are wholly compatible with a democratic and humanistic philosophy of education, on a practical level they place an enormous demand on the teacher's influence and persuasiveness and can lead to a lack of efficiency and predictability in school operations.

In some respects the problems of perpetual negotiation and uncertainty associated with persuasion are resolved when the primary mechanism of control is authority. According to Weber, authority differs from power in two important respects: first, people comply with the requests (demands) made of them voluntarily rather than involuntarily; and second, they at least initially withhold judgment regarding the legitimacy of these demands at the time they are made.
In terms of this framework, then, it is inappropriate to regard power and authority as similar mechanisms or to distinguish between the legitimate or illegitimate use of authority. The suspension of judgment that is implied in the granting of authority to someone, already implies the existence of legitimacy. Where legitimacy breaks down, authority in the pure sense ceases to exist.

Although the suspension of judgment and ready compliance associated with authority seem to imply a kind of blind allegiance to the superordinate figure, compliance is blind only to the extent that a series of preconditions and experiences have been established. The most essential of these conditions involves trust. Underlying the subordinate's ability to suspend judgment and readily comply is his basic trust that the consequence of his compliance will enhance rather than impair his general welfare. Although trust is also implied in use of persuasion as a mechanism (for example, in accepting as valid the superordinate's interpretations of the likely consequences of pursuing some given alternative), it is the primary condition underlying the establishment of legitimacy.

The other conditions directly related to the establishment of authority and legitimacy involve the subordinate's sharing values and goals consistent with those underlying the actions of the superordinate. Compliance occurs when the demands or requests being made imply the pursuit or fulfillment of ends or conditions that are highly valued and viewed as beneficial. I will discuss some of the primary value bases that underly legitimacy in a moment.

First, however, it is important to note that both trust and the values that underlie legitimacy are not given but emerge out of both direct
and vicarious experience. The kinds of people and situations one encounters directly or is told (often by parents) are either "safe" or "dangerous" establish expectations of what and who can be trusted and what kinds of ends are most desirable. Therefore, neither specific conditions of trust nor the granting or withholding of legitimacy (and respect) are permanent conditions of social interaction. Instead, they vary according to the quality of experiences the subordinate has had and continues to have with a given kind of superordinate.

It appears, then, that the fundamental principle that operates under conditions of "true" authority is that compliance is tied to the legitimacy, respect, and deference that the subordinate grants to the superordinate party by virtue of the latter having (ostensibly) earned them. Consequently, one cannot talk about "establishing authority by demanding respect." Both authority and respect are earned through the establishment of trust and credibility. It is the bases of that credibility that I shall now discuss.

The Primary Modes of Legitimacy

In his original conceptual treatment of this topic, Weber discussed three major kinds of value orientations that legitimate the exercise of control: beliefs in charisma, tradition, and rational-legal processes.

Charismatic authority is based largely on respect for extraordinary gifts of body or spirit embodied in dynamic leaders and believed to be inaccessible to most people. Charisma is usually associated with a great sense of mission, and its strength depends on the congruence between the mission being undertaken and the needs of the people being served. The charismatic leader maintains his recognition by continuing to prove himself
to his constituents by using extraordinary means to improve their welfare. In this sense he must stimulate interest and excitement in his constituents as he meets needs that they regard as relevant and beneficial.

There are three things, then, that are implied in charismatic authority: one, the ability to "deliver the goods" that meet constituents' needs; two, the stimulating, exciting, extraordinary manner in which this is done; and three, being sensitive and empathetic to the needs of the clientele so that the right goods get delivered. While this third point is often overlooked in modern usage of the term charisma, it is a fundamental premise in the analysis that follows.

Traditional authority primarily rests on a legitimacy base that has its roots in strong attachments to and reverence for established customs and institutions. Authority is legitimated by the sanctity of tradition when the present social order (and the system of privileges embodied in it) is viewed as sacred and inviolable. This authority mode clearly tends to perpetuate the existing social order, emphasizes institutionalized status differences between people based largely on ascriptive criteria, and encourages resistance to innovation and social change.

Weber's third type of authority, rational-legal, was originally conceptualized to account for the emergence of "modern" social institutions, particularly large-scale organizations. It rests primarily on a belief in the supremacy of the law in governing social arrangements. Weber assumed that the law is rational in the sense that it reflected social norms intended to channel conduct in the efficient pursuit of specified goals. He considered this to be prototypic of the model bureaucracy; hence, this legitimating mode is often referred to as bureaucratic authority.
However, since reality overwhelmingly suggests that many rules intended to maximize efficiency and the use of people's talents are often counter-productive and therefore retard it, I am suggesting the advisability of differentiating between beliefs in the primacy of rules or law on the one hand and in rationality or expertise on the other. Legal authority depends on one's allegiance to formalized social values and codified sets of social arrangements, while expert authority rests on a strong respect for the demonstrated competence and technical resources of individuals, regardless of their formal status or characteristics.

These four modes of legitimacy (charismatic, traditional, legal and expert) form a typology that can be defined by two major frames of references, one social-structural and the other normative (i.e., value-based—see Figure 3). For our present purpose the most important of these dimensions is the social-structural. Note that traditional and legal authority are based on values and loyalties that emphasize the primacy of institutionally defined social arrangements, offices, and rules.

Therefore, authority based on tradition and legality rests on a base where the legitimated individual is acting as an agent of the institution (be it the family, the church, the state, or the school system). He inspires trust and gains compliance to the extent that the institution he represents is itself credible.

Authority based on charisma and expertise, on the other hand, emerges not on the basis of institutionalized roles but on the performance capacities of the individuals in question. Their credibility as performers cannot be adequately legitimated and supported by the institutions to which they belong; they are therefore dependent on their own personal capacities and resources.
The typology in Figure 3 reflects purely idealized or ideal-type theoretical constructions that may have few unambiguous manifestations in the real world since most compliance-control situations involve subtle mixtures of power, persuasion, and authority. Nonetheless, it provides an important vehicle for understanding the nature of social control in schools, for it provides a greater degree of precision in dealing with the concept of authority than is found elsewhere. It suggests that students may comply voluntarily and automatically with requests from teachers or administrators on a variety of grounds ranging from the latter's status as adults (traditional) or official representatives of the school system (legal) to the appeal of their personalities (charismatic) or their acknowledged competence (expert).

More importantly the typology helps to cast a somewhat different light on the notion of bureaucratic authority by suggesting that institutionally defined and legitimated authority (tradition and legality) is different from individually based modes of legitimacy (charisma and expertise). What we
have come to call bureaucratic behavior more often than not reflects attempts to formalize or legalize traditional status differences or modes of procedure in ways that often obfuscate rational, efficient, or productive action. In other words, the legal machinery of an institution may actually undermine the potential impact of the charismatic and expert performance of a professional role such as teaching.

This underscores what I have come to believe is the major struggle confronting educators, and that is the conflict between the bureaucratic demands of the "office" of teaching (or administering), embodied as they are in tradition-legal orientations, and the personal (professional) capacities necessary to perform the productive functions of the role (i.e., charisma and expertise). Those who lack these personal performance capacities often find it convenient to hide behind the bureaucratic mantle of their official position and use rules and traditional procedures to their own advantage in masking or circumventing their incompetence. The result, of course, is that the synthesis of rational and legal which Weber regarded as the ideal form of organizational operation in reality often degenerates into a struggle between them in which teachers and students both become victims of formal organizational constraints.

Student Development and the Press for Rationality

The struggle between rational and legal that I have just mentioned is an inherent dilemma in most formal organizations but creates particularly acute problems in schools. These problems are described far better than I can hope to do by Waller and by Bidwell in his classic chapter on "The School as a Formal Organization." I would like to contribute to that dialogue by suggesting the following things.
First, because of its multiple functions described earlier, the school finds itself in the unique position of having to educate, socialize, and control students all at the same time. Without oversimplifying these concepts to the point of distorting them, consider education as a process that continually expands the cognitive, physical, and psychological awareness and potential of individuals; control as a process that inherently works to restrict options and action; and socialization as a process that shares elements with both but emphasizes the narrowing of beliefs, behavior, and expectations to conform with those of some significant reference group.

The paradox is that the more effective the school is as an agent of instruction the more capable students will be seeking sources of information and capitalizing on experiences that further expand their horizons and make them aware of potentially available alternatives. This growing awareness stands in sharp contrast to control mechanisms, systems of rules, and socialization strategies that attempt to narrow or restrict access to ideas, information, settings or experiences. The result, I believe, is that an effective instructional program sows the seeds of subversion of restrictive socialization and custody-control practices by making students aware of and capable of pursuing ideas and alternatives that some agents within the school are continually trying to deny or restrict. This "undermining of institutional legitimacy" can be particularly severe: 1) where the purpose of given rules or restrictions has no apparent positive relation to the ostensibly dominant instructional mission of the school, and 2) where opportunities for access to desirable alternatives are readily available outside the school itself.
Second, the process just described is reinforced by the maturational process of students themselves. To the very young child, social control is a diffuse and pervasive aspect of life in which the distinctions among mechanisms and modes of control discussed so far in this paper are largely absent. The agents that control his life are also those who fulfill his very real needs. They embody at one and the same time power, persuasiveness, and authority, the social and moral order, the system of rules by which he is expected to operate his life, charisma, and expertise. In other words, by virtue of their status, experience, resources, and ability adults have an incredible amount of inherent and largely undifferentiated power, influence, and legitimacy that only become distinguishable as the child matures and learns to discriminate among them.

As I have suggested in earlier work on this topic, the legitimacy resources that are most susceptible to erosion are those involving the personal fallability of authority figures: i.e., their charisma and expertise. With experience and increased personal competence the child's notions and standards of competence, adequate stimulation, and the extra-ordinary change. Capacities that once boggled the mind and inspired awe of others—like tying your own shoes or riding a two wheel bicycle—rapidly move down the scale of marvels as one acquires these skills himself. With them and countless others like them go the reputations and images of many people once held in great esteem because of their presumed "unique" mastery, knowledge, and personality. The older, more experienced, and more able the child becomes the higher and more demanding are his standards of what constitutes expertise and charisma. This is nowhere more obvious than in both families and schools during the early years of adolescence, especially in settings where pressures on the
child's own achievements are very intensive and his accomplishments begin to outstrip those of his parents and teachers.

Recognizing that my observations may be too general, I would nonetheless like to suggest that these heightened standards of student expectations generate four conditions that intensify the problem of control in schools.

The first is implied in the foregoing. As students' abilities, standards, and perspectives mature, the performance legitimacy bases of adults become more clearly differentiated and subjected to closer scrutiny. In many cases their legitimacy based on charisma and expertise erodes.

As a consequence of this, the traditional and legal bases of adult legitimacy are thrown into sharper relief, eventually compelling students to recognize that the grounds on which their compliance is based have shifted from those in which the teacher's status as a performer and personality took precedence to those in which the teacher's status as an adult agent of the organization is most important. Particularly where the teacher lacks a strong personal legitimacy base, the emphasis on compliance with rules and deference to teachers as teachers will be apparent. However, to the extent that students question the utility and purpose of rules and roles that have little apparent connection to their progress as students or that impose unjustifiable restrictions on their expanding needs and capacities for autonomy, compliance based on deference to onerous traditional and legal arrangements will also cease to exist.

Third, if respect for position and rules also falters and teachers are unable to sustain their personal legitimacy, the nature of control shifts from an authority base to one involving either persuasion or power. Although control arrangements based largely on persuasion are theoretically possible,
in the absence of legitimacy they are not likely to be successful. Since persuasion more than any other mode of control depends on rational and articulate discussion as well as on elements of trust, it is highly unlikely that an individual lacking charisma and expertise would, at the same time, have the skills and credibility to be a successful persuader. In other words, while persuasion as a mechanism is distinct from that of authority, the bases of one's persuasiveness seem closely tied to the conditions underlying legitimacy. Where legitimacy is lacking, it is also unlikely that persuasion will be viable for very long, regardless of the value basis on which arguments are predicated. Consequently, I am suggesting that the result of this persistent student press for rationality and performance is a deterioration of the trust and confidence in teachers as leaders that would lead to general voluntary compliance with requests. The result is an often reluctant but definite retreat by teachers into the institutionally-supported barricades of their role behind which lie the resources that make their exercise of power possible. Control is handled through the implicit, if not explicit, threat of negative consequences occurring for failure to comply. This power is embodied largely in the legal arrangements that give staff enormous discretion in the exercise of all five functions.

Fourth, once the pervasive and explicit power of the teacher is recognized, the seeds of a continuous but often low key confrontation between students and staff ensue. In this struggle students may question the ways in which each of the five functions are carried out and challenge teachers' or administrators' moral as well as legal rights to behave the way they do. Teachers can, of course, retaliate toward intransigence with a variety of resources including refusal to provide academic assistance (instruction).
assigning low grades or giving poor recommendations (evaluation-certification), refusing access to desired courses or privileges (selection), assigning formal punishments and restrictions (custody-control), or deflating students' self-concepts, aspirations, or value orientations (socialization).

Such reactions are likely both to intensify student mistrust and resentment and to stimulate in return additional institutional efforts to maintain control over all five arenas, thereby creating a vicious circle of negativism that generates such emotional investments in the perpetuation of given "offensive and defensive" strategies and the maintenance of existing power resources that "rational" solutions seem almost impossible.

Recognizing fully the severity of the dilemma I am describing (or have created--take your choice), I do believe there may be a way out for the willing and able. In the time remaining let me suggest what that might be and in so doing return to my original concerns about good teachers and teaching effectiveness.

Maximizing Instructional Commitment and Effectiveness

Implicit in the foregoing is the proposition that as the personal resources underlying the instructional effectiveness of the teacher diminish, problems of classroom control become more acute. Its corollary is that as more attention is paid to control itself, instruction suffers even further. The time has come to identify some of those critical elements in the instructional process that bear on the ideas we have examined so far. I am hopeful that at least the beginnings of a satisfactory integration of these concepts will emerge.
The Social Conditions Underlying Achievement

Since we have already acknowledged the centrality of the instructional function in the schooling process, one of the teacher's fundamental concerns is to improve the cognitive, physical, and manual skills of the students. When these skills are channeled into productive activities and performance standards are met we call them achievements. In a February 1968 ASR article, Kemper suggests that three basic reference group functions must be operating for an individual to be a consistent performer or achiever.

First, he requires a normative reference group; that is, at least one individual who sets (high) expectations for performance and who possesses the capacity to mete out negative sanctions if these standards are not met. Normative groups demand and attempt to enforce conformity to group norms.

Second, he requires a role model (one of the four kinds of comparison group functions in Kemper's framework), someone who exemplifies and demonstrates the skills necessary for high performance by means of his own achievements.

Third, high level performance also requires an audience group, at least one individual to whom the child attributes the ability to provide meaningful positive rewards for his endeavors. As a result he tries to capture their attention and approval by behaving in a way that he believes they will find attractive.

Since the absence of negative rewards is not equivalent to the presence of positive rewards, I assume that the child will consistently undertake the risk of failing to meet normative standards only when abundant positive approval is perceived to be available. According to this framework, then, consistent high performance (achievement) will result as the product of 1) confronting expectations 2) with a clear notion of how one goes about meeting them 3) in view of the positive rewards that are probably available.
My own interpretation of this framework suggests that there is also a tendency for the role model and audience group functions to co-exist so that master performers are viewed as major rewarders and/or positive rewarders who become emulated as role models. This natural compatibility of comparative and audience group functions is further reinforced in that neither role implies a controlling function that might ultimately require legitimation. Being a skillful performer and having the potential for providing approval and positive rewards do not require legitimation: people are completely free to observe and emulate one's performance or to accept his rewards without constraint.

But the normative reference group function, which involves setting standards of performance and reinforcing them with the threat of sanctions, as inherently troublesome since the latter is characteristic of control achieved by means of power or coercion (as defined earlier). If these threatened sanctions are not to breed hostility and resentment, their potential use must be accepted as legitimate by the subordinate party. This requires that the subordinate have a set of values that supports both the importance of high level performance in given activities and the legitimacy of reinforcing substandard performance with negative sanctions.

If the teacher is to operate effectively as a normative reference group for students, the students must believe in both the importance of achievement and the right of the teacher to give them poor grades or curtail other privileges if they do not do well. Of these two orientations, the second is by far the more problematic since it operates contrary to the natural self-interest of the student. It is compounded when evaluation is done on a comparative basis, as in cells C and D of Figure 2, such that a
certain proportion of students will by definition receive poor evaluations. Few students will be able to accept a continual bombardment of this form of punishment without making some accommodation to it. This response might include rejecting grades as legitimate indices of one's performance, rejecting competition as a context for academic involvement, or even rejecting achievement as a desirable goal. In each case the disaffection of the student results from a deterioration of the legitimacy of the evaluation-certification function which, in turn, intrudes on the effectiveness of the instructional mission itself.

While the foregoing clearly suggests that the instructional function cannot be analyzed in isolation from the other four functions—particularly custody-control and evaluation-certification—Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of human needs provides further insight into the conditions that might serve to maximize student achievement.

Maslow suggests that human behavior can be interpreted as an attempt to satisfy a number of physiological and psychological needs that reflect themselves in a consistent hierarchy of priorities. Man's most fundamental needs involve physical survival and safety. Only after he has solved these basic problems can he turn his attention to meeting the need for psychological security and affection, and then, in turn, the needs for recognition and self-esteem. For our purposes, however, the most important aspect of Maslow's theory is that men will be incapable of fully realizing their achievement and creative potentials until these more basic needs for security, love, and esteem are themselves satisfied. In other words, the risks involved in deferring immediate gratifications in order to meet longer term achievement expectations will probably be too great for an individual with unmet security and esteem needs.
In terms of my earlier remarks, the major implication of Maslow's theory for the authority system of the classroom is that the imposition of achievement expectations by the teacher must be preceded by an adequate period of supportive and affirmative behavior. In this way the necessary rapport, confidence, and feelings of security between student and teacher can be established which enable the child to react positively to demands for high performance. The child must feel secure, adequate, and respected before he can consistently be expected to meet achievement expectations, and this sense of adequacy and worthiness is clearly facilitated by the teacher's expression of positive affect and approval. Perhaps the most important component of the teacher's repertory of abilities, then, is the capacity to establish a sense of rapport with students by caring about them as individuals in order to aid them in developing a sense of security and confidence. Based on Kemper's framework this establishes for the teacher a sound basis for serving an audience group function for the class, enhances the probability that he will serve as a role model, and satisfies the basic conditions necessary for students to trust him and grant him legitimacy to serve in a normative reference group capacity as well—minus the explicit use of the power that inherently resides in his institutional role.

A Model of Maximized Teacher Legitimacy and Instructional Effectiveness

When combined with Stinchcombe's analysis of the teaching role that appeared in the Spring 1970 issue of 'Sociology of Education, this entire set of factors can be synthesized into a model of the teacher's role that would appear to maximize both his legitimacy and effectiveness in facilitating student achievement. According to Stinchcombe, the central task of the
teacher involves capturing the attention of students and channeling it toward sets of informative instructional activities. It is, in other words, a performance role defined almost entirely in terms of the quality of the interaction which takes place within the classroom. In order to be a good teacher, one has to be effective at capturing and sustaining students' interests in learning activities. Although the following points may reflect the biases of a "teacher-centered" classroom, these ideas suggest that the truly effective teacher must 1) have something of substance and interest to communicate, 2) be capable of communicating it clearly and accurately, 3) be capable of communicating it in a stimulating and exciting fashion, and 4) base this communication directly on a concern for a sensitivity to the personal welfare and status of each student. These four conditions or attributes can be grouped in pairs: the first two referring to the expertise dimension of the instructional role, and the latter two to its charismatic dimension.

In effect, then, these ideas suggest that there are two major components of the expertise dimension in instruction: subject matter expertise or knowledge base on the one hand, and pedagogical expertise or teaching skills on the other. Likewise the charismatic dimension consists of two components that are entirely consistent with our earlier discussion: stimulating and exciting ways of accomplishing one's work and relating to others, and an empathetic and sensitive orientation to the clientele with whom one is dealing.

Assuming for the moment that teachers vary on each of these four dimensions, these variations can be portrayed by a general classification scheme such as that in Figure 4. This requires, of course, an oversimplification of the true state of things since each of these presumably continuous
variables has been reduced to a simple dichotomy: high and low. The horizontal dimension of the figure contains the two major components of expertise: mastery of a significant body of knowledge and expertise in exercising what Dreeben in The Nature of Teaching calls the technology (i.e., methodology) of teaching. Its vertical dimension contains the two major components of charisma: concern with the personal needs of students coupled with an inspiring and stimulating way of communicating (i.e., leading classroom activities).

According to this scheme, the ideal teacher—the target of this painful exercise—is one who clearly embodies each of these attributes in the classroom. He is high on all four dimensions and can be found in Cell 1 of Figure 4. Based on Kemper's framework, this "Type 1" teacher serves as an

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\begin{array}{cccc}
| \text{CHARISMATIC DIMENSION} | \text{PÉDAGOGICAL EXPERTISE} | \text{PÉDAGOGICAL EXPERTISE} | \\
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<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMPATHY, SENSITIVITY</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STIMULATION, EXCITEMENT</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>16</td>
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FIGURE 4. A Conceptual Scheme of Teacher Attributes Needed to Maximize Instructional Effectiveness and Personal Legitimacy.
optimum role model because of his expertise and an optimum audience group because of his charismatic qualities. The remaining 15 cells in the figure represent presumably less effective combinations of these four attributes. For example, the right-hand column (Cells 1, 5, 9, and 13) describes four very different kinds of teachers, all of whom have high subject-matter and pedagogical expertise but who vary considerably in their charismatic and interpersonal qualities. Similarly, the top row (Cells 1, 2, 3, and 4) depicts a variety of highly charismatic teachers who vary from one extreme to the other in their knowledge base and teaching skills. Note that the Type 16 teacher, who lacks both expert and charismatic legitimacy, is particularly likely to have to rely on his institutionally supported authority and power bases to gain compliance—factors that tend to make custody-control the most central function of the classroom, especially since Type 16's lack the pedagogical and interpersonal skills that underlie an effective instructional program.

Note also that there is a definite parallel between the three basic components of professionalism found in Dreeben's analysis of the teaching role and three of the four dimensions in this model. Dreeben implies that a "professional" teacher will emphasize: 1) competence and personal performance, 2) the use of effective techniques, and 3) a concern for meeting the needs of his clientele. The respective elements in this model are subject-matter expertise, pedagogical expertise, and empathy and concern.

I differ from Dreeben, however, in what I regard as the key to teacher effectiveness. In his view the most important factor in the instructional process is pedagogy; in mine it is empathy. This holds, I believe, for four reasons: 1) the teacher who is empathetic toward his students has a better
chance of meeting the basic security and esteem needs that underlie their ability to defer immediate gratification in pursuit of longer-range learning goals; 2) through his concern and the positive support he provides, the teacher increases his chances of serving effectively as audience group and role model; 3) a sustained period of positive interaction in which the interests and needs of students are taken into account aids in the establishment of the trust that ultimately underlies the legitimacy necessary both in serving a normative group function and in handling custody-control relations in a non-alienating way--issues that constantly impinge on the instructional function; and, perhaps most important, 4) empathy serves as the key mechanism underlying the effective use of expertise in the instructional process. I realize that understanding this latter point requires a somewhat different look at the model described in Figure 4 and an elaboration of the key components of empathy in instruction.

Empathy in the Instructional Process

Now that we are this far in the analysis, I am somewhat embarrassed to have to confess that my reflections on the model of the "ideal" Type I teacher suggested in Figure 4 lead me to the conclusion that the figure itself is an inadequate vehicle for describing how the components of charisma and expertise in question relate to each other. Consequently, my conclusion that empathy is the most important variable in the instructional process cannot be inferred from the diagram itself. Nor does the diagram suggest the extent to which empathy is the pivotal "enabler" as far as the impact of the other three variables is concerned.
Perhaps these relations can be understood most readily by viewing teaching expertise as a potential resource that becomes an active resource when it is translated and communicated through the social and interpersonal medium of charisma. In other words, the two elements in charisma (excitement and empathy) have a large bearing on how expertise gets used in an interpersonal context and the impact that the expertise has on those whom it affects.

Consider, for example, how dependent subject matter expertise itself is on the other three variables in the model by considering Cell 14 in Figure 4. How effective will the instructional process be in a class where the teacher is a genuine subject matter expert but lacks the ability to communicate his knowledge clearly to students, generates no particular excitement or interest in the subject, and ignores students' interests, abilities, and prior experience with the subject in targeting his mode of instruction? Unless the students are exceptionally able and highly motivated to learn the subject, it is unlikely that subject mastery alone will facilitate achievement.

What I am suggesting, then, is that subject matter expertise becomes expertise in an instructional setting only when it is presented in such a way that it both cognitively and affectively captures and sustains the interest and attention of students. Its impact on the instructional process is, in effect, dependent on its being infused with both elements of charisma so that it is presented to students in a way that they can relate to and sustain their interest in.

By the same token, real expertise in pedagogy demands not only the ability to translate subject matter content to students in an accurate and
clear fashion but also the ability to understand students' interest and needs so that both the subject and their mode of involvement in it can be made as relevant, stimulating, and productive as possible.

What this suggests, then, is that two different conceptions of pedagogical skill are possible. The first is consistent with the way I have used the term up to this point and stresses the mastery of a variety of techniques and strategies for managing students' transactions with the formal curriculum. The second reflects what I believe is implied in all of the foregoing; namely, that real expertise involves using these techniques and strategies with a particular cohort of students in such a way that their useful engagement in learning activities is maximized. In other words, pedagogical expertise does not exist independently of the classroom context in which it is being used. Underlying the positive benefit of having technical expertise is the teacher's ability to perceive how a given technique seems to be working with particular students and to modify the approach if necessary in response to these perceptions. The kind of technique, kind and intensity of affect, and kind and level of subject matter content used are all governed by this awareness-feedback capacity.

Although I may now be on the verge of rendering Figure 4 not only inadequate but invalid, this treatment of the concept of pedagogy leads me to want to conclude that at an operational level it may be impossible to separate pedagogical expertise from empathy. The reason is simply that for pedagogy to be expertly manifested the techniques employed have to be calibrated to the ability and willingness of students to have their attention in learning activities captured and sustained. While part of that process is the teacher's capacity to act in a way that enables students to engage compatibly (both
cognitively and affectively) in learning experiences, the underlying part of the process is the teacher's awareness of and sensitivity to both the cognitive and affective states of their students. It is this awareness that enables the teacher to shape instructional strategies and interaction with students in compatible and effective ways.

There seem to be four major points worthy of summarizing that emerge from all of this. The first is that whatever technical skills inhere in pedagogy itself facilitate the instructional process only to the extent that an underlying empathy capacity exists that aids teachers in assessing the appropriateness and apparent utility of those skills in the classroom. The second is that this empathy appears to consist of two kinds of qualities: 1) awareness, sensitivity, and insight as to what is really happening, and 2) supportive and appropriate response to those occurrences. Third, within each of these two domains there are two (often mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic) components that are called into play in the pedagogical process: the cognitive (or intellectual) and the affective.

In other words, by combining points two and three, it is apparent that empathy involves both cognitive and affective awareness and sensitivity and some form of appropriate cognitive and affective response. This set of combinations can, of course, be displayed in a 4 by 4 matrix similar in structure to Figure 4. I have chosen not to display this matrix partly because it is not exhaustive of what really takes place in the instructional setting, especially when you consider the fourth major point: i.e., that each component of awareness and each mode of response relates to both the cognitive (or existential) and the affective nature of the student's personal and academic situations, plus to the relations among them. Conse-
quently, if one took the matrix game seriously, this analysis would require
at least a 5 x 2 x 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 or so matrix, but I may have
lost count, and I doubt that its creation would make much sense or help any-
one anywhere anyway.

Unfinished Business

While I have failed to do justice to the important subtleties that
inhere in the complex relations among social control, authority, teacher
effectiveness, and empathy, I hope that this analysis has stimulated more
ideas than confusion. If not, I apologize. I have tried to suggest that
empathy resides at the center of the instructional process because it both
allows for the effective utilization of pedagogical skills in interactional
settings and facilitates the emergence of personally-based legitimacy as a
viable mode of classroom control. I have also tried to underscore the
parochialism and futility of the war between the Cognitives and the Affec-
tives, by showing that both are necessary elements in any discussion of effec-
tive teaching and sustained student accomplishment.

What I have failed to do, however, is to provide the magic answer about
how to make schools work far better than they do for both staff and students—
despite my having suggested that the Type 1 teacher with his insight, compas-
sion, and expertise is more likely than others to handle successfully the
inseparable problems of instructional effectiveness and classroom control.
The reason for my failure lies both in the limitations of my analysis and in
the structural constraints that teachers face in executing the totality of
their role.
Although I went to great pains at the outset to suggest that the school performs five major functions and that the teacher is the primary agent for executing those functions, the analysis has rather deliberately avoided dealing explicitly with three of them: socialization, evaluation-certification, and selection. What it did do is suggest that some of the enormous difficulties associated with the structural constraint of having to control students could be minimized, but by no means eliminated, by nurturing an approach to the governance of the classroom itself that simultaneously enhanced the performance of the instructional function. As you can see, to do this requires enormous personal resources on the part of the teacher—in fact, more resources than most teachers possess. However, even to the extent that the charisma and empathy of the individual teacher are adequate to establish the personal trust and legitimacy that allow control and instruction to proceed satisfactorily, the teacher cannot escape simultaneously serving as an official agent of the school system with respect to all five functions, a constraint that places the teacher in the bind of having to uphold and execute a variety of practices that may run counter to their own personal judgment and the perceived interests of their students.

This creates at least two major dilemmas with which sociologists of education will have to grapple before their contribution to the solution of these very real problems is more adequate than the psychologists' has been. The first is that in upholding or contributing to organizational imperatives such as the time and standards constraints implied in typical manifestations of the evaluation-certification and internal selection functions of the school (recall Figure 2), teachers may be contributing to the undermining of their personal legitimacy. In other words, personal legitimacy based on...
empathy and competence in teaching may be undermined by institutionally mandated procedures for grading and selecting students that teachers cannot circumvent. This brings the teacher's institutionally based power directly into question.

The second is that the pressures on teachers from administrators and colleagues to enforce, both inside and outside the classroom, rules and practices that cannot be justified or legitimated through "rational" discussion with students may be so severe that the best of intentions to play a Type 1 classroom role cannot withstand the imposition of Type 16 demands or expectations. To the extent that surveillance of the teacher is possible through either his performance of public monitoring duties or procedures for evaluating classroom performance, he may be compelled to act out his role as custodian of student behavior with an intensity that overrides his credibility as teacher.

Although there are other major dilemmas raised by the analysis that I have not discussed and several implications of interest to both practitioners and researchers that I have not mentioned, one thing now seems clear. The solutions needed to solve the problems posed by the school's having to perform five diverse functions simultaneously are not going to be found by dealing with people or structure alone. As the foregoing suggests, strengthening the personal performance capacities of teachers and administrators may reduce but will not eliminate the conflicts that arise out of the structuring of instruction, custody-control, evaluation-certification and selection. By the same token no rearrangement of structural conditions is going to compensate for the exceptional personal capacities needed to maximize the instructional mission of the school. To the extent, then, that solutions
are possible they must be sought in the integration of these two components of organizational life. To the extent that the foregoing may provide some fruitful starting points for this integration, it will have served a useful purpose.
Selected References


DR. DREEBEN: When I look at the diagrams and I listen to the exposition, I become more and more convinced of one thing, namely, that the schools can't exist; that the whole business is so incredibly complex, that so much is being asked of a group of people--teachers, in particular--that to expect this multiplicity of things to occur at the same time in the same place among a very diverse group of kids, is highly unlikely except under very peculiar circumstances.

I think the reason I'm so pessimistic has to do with the socialization process, which I think is the place that we really like to look, the one bright spot on the horizon; this is where we look for the enjoyable intangibles of schooling--things like originality, humaneness, tolerance, civility, and so on; a whole bunch of virtues that we would awfully much like to have kids learn.

Custody we manage okay; we're able to evaluate that more or less well. But where does this problem of multiple goals, functions and tasks come from? What is the source of this "evil"?

I find the source of evil in credentialism, in the fact (not based on definitive evidence, but on a growing body of evidence) that, particularly in this society, we're horrendously over-schooled; that most jobs in the occupational order--though that is not the only facet of society that's germane to schooling, but as adults, the place where we spend the most of our time--demand increasing levels of schooling, whether necessary or not.

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But if every job requires a credential and you do not establish the relevance of the credential to the nature of the work (e.g., in order to sweep the floor you have to be a college or high school graduate) then things get absurd.

I think a number of things follow from this. It means that through a certain number of years we have to keep kids off the street or at least out of the labor force; we have to do this because of a Supreme Court decision of some years ago that proscribed child labor. We're very much committed to protecting young people—you read Marx and some 19th century European history—and we really don't like to see a lot of little kids sitting in small cubbyholes making lace. We also have a moderately high rate of unemployment. We can't flood the labor market with kids because there are too many adults out of work.

And so what this leads to, really, is to find an institution for the mass containment and processing of kids. And what I think Bill Spady has come up with is a formulation that takes all of these constraints seriously. You have to think about how to do the tasks well, how to evaluate properly, how to pull kids into the system so that they will consider the rewards rewarding and the punishments punishing.

I have no simple answer to this question of how schools can be made to work, but I think what I can do is think of one way in which we can begin to make the gap between what we know and need to know a little smaller; I don't have an answer for the really large hole that I have to leave.

I will adopt the reactionary position that all schools should do is teach the 3 R's. If they did that and no more they would be doing a great job. And if you say that all they have to do is to teach the 3 R's, then I
I think you can consider questions of pedagogy seriously—to resurrect an old and defunct term. I think it is necessary that every kid have these sorts of basic skills; they should be literate, they should be numerate and should know a few facts and have a few simple skills at their disposal. Their adult lives will make demands in these areas.

How we reduce the constraints that involve kids in obtaining credentials, I really don't know. I'm not at all convinced by these work/study kinds of programs. I really haven't worked this out in my mind, but again I think I'm in good company. I'm not sure that anybody else has either. And I have to leave matters there; but it seems to me that we need to look for some kind of a solution that reduces the constraints of credentialism; that we think of schools primarily as instructional, and then I have a very large remainder which I really don't know what to do with, and I'm not sure anyone else does either.

(General laughter)
DR. FULLAN: I think there's a lot of value in what Bill has presented, but I want to use my time to raise some dilemmas and criticisms rather than repeat.

I think one of the basic problems is that his formulation pretty much is based upon a teacher-centered approach to learning. And let me try to specify some of the aspects of that that I see as problematic.

I listened very carefully, for example, to his definition of empathy because I think that is very crucial for what he has to say. As I heard him define it, he talked about the teacher having the pulse on the needs and interests of the clientele. And I think the definition in one of his other papers was concern for the personal welfare and interest of the student.

Now, it seems to me the problem is on whose criteria are we defining empathy. It could get very much like the participation hypothesis in decision making, where one could say that "students should be involved and participate in decisions," and then qualifying that by saying "provided that they raise valid points that are workable," and that in practice, becomes the criterion.

If we look more closely, then, at the set of variables that Bill has talked about, I see the problem here as being that their focus is upon the teacher. It's the teacher's empathy outward to the student, but it's not relational in the sense that it does not include the student's view of this, or the transaction that goes on between the teacher and the student.
Kenneth Benny wrote a paper in *Harvard Educational Review* in 1970, I think, on authority in education, and he made some distinctions between three types of authority: expert authority, rules authority and something that he called anthropological.

Regarding expert authority he used the analogies of a doctor and a patient and a doctor and a medical student. He pointed out that with expert authority, as in the case of going to a doctor, you're dependent on the expertise of the doctor without being too much concerned with learning that particular expertise. In other situations, for example where the medical student is relating to the doctor, there is concern with bringing along the student, or the developmental aspect of what this expertise means for the medical student as a learner. Now it's not particularly a perfect analogy to education, since much of education is not geared toward specialized learning. But Benny dwells considerably upon the relational component, and on how this ideally involves much more of colleagueship. It seems to me that trying to define more directly what you mean by empathy—particularly how to measure it—and what it means from the point of view of the teacher and the student in a relational framework—is a much needed elaboration. As it stands, I see the model as fairly teacher-oriented in viewing empathy out toward the student.

A second point relates to the relationship between empathy and expertise. The question is, is a given expertise relevant to the goals, objectives, and life orientations of the student? And here I think the distinction Benny makes between relational contexts in which expertise operates makes negotiating between empathy and expertise very problematic. Further, there's a very critical question here as to whether the whole area of def-
inition of expertise of the teacher is involved, and what is the relative weight in relationship between empathy and expertise if they're incongruent.

Now, having said that, perhaps I could just close with some more specific comments on what Bill has presented, and I do accept the worthwhileness of his formulation very much. And in doing this, another type of elaboration is to ask him, or ask ourselves, to try to spell out in a little more detail the causal ordering and relationship of the key variables that he is dealing with.

For example, if he is suggesting that empathy relates to motivation, which in turn relates to achievement—which is implicit in some of his statements—I think that causal connections in the core model should be extracted, and then perhaps we could get into the question of specifying causal patterns in broader organizational conditions, such as the condition that Professor Clark has mentioned, the variability of role diversity. Also, there could be several contexts of organizational forms, which would show under what conditions empathy and expertise operate in different ways.

And finally, we might think of the research needed to show how empathy might change under certain conditions of re-education, or whatever. The whole resocialization focus here, if it is to be a leverage for change, is very important; and Bill, I'm sure, has been concerned about this. But I think that's an area that one should spend considerable time on for the purposes of research.
AUTHORITY AND EMPATHY IN THE CLASSROOM
DISCUSSION BY C. WAYNE GORDON
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

DR. GORDON: I like the first part, where you remind us of the complexities of life in the circular diagram, and I think it's particularly useful to be reminded of the multifunctions that we confront, because it does constitute an impossible context, as Bob Dreeben has suggested. But more than that, its coercive implication is so massive, that the rest of what happens in terms of the adaptation that a teacher makes or the selection of style is to a large extent a coerced one, it would seem, and so the distributions that we will find in the rest of the development constitute a high degree of nonvoluntarism on the part of the teacher. This is perhaps almost independent of capabilities in some cases. It also suggests that some of those positive values are compensatory, too, that if it works, you use it.

I think the only effort I might make regarding the conceptualization and the framework would be to try to get Bill to talk to us about some of the implications of trying to make some empirical tests of it. I have a problem with merging the authority dimension and letting it assimilate to expertise, and using legitimacy as the main criterion, because you did define authority in terms of uncritical acceptance, and I like that because it's unrelated to varying sorts of legitimacy. If uncritical acceptance is the sine qua non of the degree of authority present, then you will not find all of these types of authority being assimilated to the expert dimension. In other words, I would like to keep authority as a variable by it-
self, and let the expertise dimension vary independently of that. Then, we can accept the empathy variable. The reason I want to keep authority separate is because it's not linear in its effects, as I've observed it. I think it goes like this. You can get a lot of goodies out of low authority; you get a lot of goodies out of high authority. And the middle is a disaster area. So the dichotomization of this will leave the empirical problem very unsatisfying to you, when you try to figure out what the data means in terms of the effects. So I would hope that when you get around to its application, you would treat it as a continuous variable and not let the polarities take over.

Then I would have no problem with either the empathy dimension or the expert dimension, because I think they are almost linear. But I think both of them fall off in effect when you reach a certain level. In other words, too much expertise in the classroom begins to have some dysfunctional effects, and too much empathy begins to have some negative effects—sort of too much mother in the classroom. There may be a point at which empathy—and we'd have to hear more about how this is operationalized—supports the activities in the expert domain, but doesn't dominate it; and when it tends to dominate it, some dysfunctional effects may occur.

But I think those are the normal kinds of problems that will come when you field the model and find out what predictions you can make.

My second concern is the manner in which you value-loaded the No. 1 teacher; and I liked No. 1 also. But I'm not sure I like it for everything that we want to have happen. In other words, if you would talk about the effects that you're interested in, and it is pretty clear that you're struggling with the whole area of alienation and the potential negative effects.
morale that comes with certain kinds of teacher behavior, we might be surprised if we elaborate the number of effects under consideration. The behaviors are not generically contributory to all of the "good effects" that we want, and some things that look quite unattractive to us, surprisingly, have positive predictive value. I think behaviors are generalizable, you know, in the sense that one that will maximize the cognitive, will also maximize satisfactions and voluntary compliance, as well as other effects. I would be willing to go on to creativity, autonomy and self-awareness. But I suspect that we ought to reformulate the statement to say, to the extent that you want to predict certain kinds of outcomes in pupils, then there are certain kinds of behaviors that will maximize that, and other kinds of behaviors will maximize something else. Because I think high authority, in the critical acceptance sense, at least enough mother love, you know, to lubricate the system, and some organization of the task, will produce pretty high cognitive outcomes. And when we look at the kinds of effects variables that are correlated, satisfaction doesn't necessarily take on the highest relationship to cognitive gain. The happy child may not be the one that learns the most.

Now, I'm inclined to think there is an intervening consequence of satisfaction over time for important outcomes like commitment, and if we conduct research longitudinally we may find that high satisfaction with what the teacher is doing in the long run will pay off for building commitment, and then the cognitive side may pick up.

That would be about it. I think that one other thing that you are suggesting as behavioral reality is a functional combination. That is, there are some things that not only work for the system, but they work for
the main participant, the teacher; and that's the one we're looking for. And so there is an equilibrium involved in putting together expertise, empathy and my preference for the low side of authority. What is needed is the orchestration that not only maximizes outcome, but it maximizes survival value for the main participant, the teacher.

(General laughter)

Ironically, it may be encouraging that the professional model could be the only one that's viable, because those people in some of those other cells are suffering as much as the pupils are. The distributions that I have looked at, even with a limited amount of data, tell me that there are more of the professional types than there are of the other kinds, and that surprises me. But for the reason I suggested; it's the only one that really permits survival.
AUTHORITY AND EMPATHY IN THE CLASSROOM
RESPONSE TO DISCUSSANTS BY WILLIAM SPADY
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

DR. SPADY: Mike Fullan has raised a number of important points about the model I have described reflecting a strong teacher-centered and teacher-manipulative orientation. He suggests that there is not enough of the relational quality between teacher and student implied in my analysis. If that is so, I think that the cause lies in part from a lack of time to present the full flavor of my model this morning. It is not an arena I have failed to consider in evaluating the adequacy and implications of the model.

In the papers that I have written, as well as on the occasions when I have presented this formally, I have tried to make fairly clear some of the interchanges between teachers and students that are reflected in the synthesis of elements that constitute the model, particularly the way in which empathy is the critical precondition for establishing the trust that really facilitates a two-way kind of relationship between people.

Also, in terms of the way I use expertise in this model—both subject matter expertise and pedagogical expertise—I take a very broad definition of these terms that is consistent with Morris Janowitz's definition of the way in which these two kinds of expertise could be manifested. Janowitz stresses the nature of the teacher being optimally effective when he is a resource manager, which does not imply that he is a dominant frontal teacher. Instead it suggests that the teacher, as a subject matter expert, is capable of locating a broad range of knowledge resources for the student, not that he is the exclusive source of information or skills. He is aware of what
and where the resources are, so, when necessary or appropriate, he can send
the student to those resources. Furthermore, in Janowitz's view pedagogical
skill is not blackboard technique, per se, but, in fact, recognition of how
a variety of what may be self-learning approaches or other kinds of things
will work for certain pupils and not work for others. These are all part of
the repertory of these kinds of skills that constitute expertise in my model,
and, viewed that way, it does not imply a particularly teacher-centered or
teacher-dominant mode of operation. From this perspective let me re-emphasize
that empathy then becomes the key to what we might call the sensitive and
perceptive capacities of the teacher. It becomes, then, the key to the
teacher using whatever variety of skills he may have in a variety of peda-
gogical approaches as it presumably facilitates achievement for particular
kinds of students.

So, I'll counter Mike and say that I think there is a great deal more
personal interchange between student and teacher implied in this model than
my presentation may have suggested. And I think it was due mainly to lack
of time and my wanting to at least hit the major points but not necessarily
all of the details.

I am very much interested in the question that Mike raised about
whether these capacities are changeable, teachable, or learnable. He and I
have, in fact, written an unpublished paper which has yet to be dramatically
revised concerning the extent to which we could link some of the ideas in my
16-cell table to Mike's work on innovation in schools. In that paper we ex-
plored the kinds of capacities in people we would have to change in order to
have more really flexible, responsive, and truly innovative institutions.
Although we wrote the initial draft over two years ago I think my perspectives
on these issues have not changed that much. For example, I think we clearly can change the expertise characteristics of teachers; otherwise we might as well eliminate universities or teacher training colleges. We presumably really could do something in the context of formal training to enhance teacher expertise.

The real question is what can you do about the two components of charisma? We have discussed this, and I concluded (which may betray my causal ordering) that we clearly can do some things about empathy. But I'm not sure we can do things about the stimulation/excitement component of people's roles. In other words, I'm not sure we can make better actors out of them or change their personalities to make them live wires if they basically aren't live wires. But the place to start, I think, is to work on increasing the dual component of the role, e.g., the cognitive and the affective, by creating kinds of experiences that would increase one's cognitive awareness of how things operate and how his behavior may affect others. I think the video taping kinds of techniques that some teachers' college programs (particularly the performance-based people) are dealing with which allow trainees to see how some of their pedagogical skills come across, should really be a technique used to try to get them to recognize what they look like to an audience and make them aware of how an audience responds to them.

So I think what you do to enhance the teacher's capacity to be more truly affectively identified and concerned about the student is to work on the cognitive first, and at least make him aware of the problem. The kinds of techniques that we use to do this are best left to other kinds of specialists to prescribe.
If I understand Wayne Gordon correctly, we have a real problem on our hands that may be mine and not his. But what I agree with him about is that I am trying very hard here to stress a balance. I place a lot of emphasis on the Type 1 teacher because I am trying to create a balance on the use of combinations of expertise and charismatic qualities and not simply advocate trying to rely on the dominance of any one element in the classroom. Clearly, if you consider Type 4, which would be an exceedingly charismatic person who can't deliver the expertise goods at all, you would produce a very different kind of outcome, and I think have a very different kind of classroom, than would, for example, a Type 13, who is extremely proficient in technique and a great master of the subject matter but an absolutely cold person. Neither of those extremes has any appeal for me. Based on the kind of evidence that I got from interviews with high school students this past week, plus three years of thinking about this problem, I believe that there are real problems with rather exclusively relying on either set of legitimating capacities to really get students involved and maximize their learning. Hence my interest in balance.

However I don't understand Wayne's point about authority being a variable independent of these modes of legitimacy. I was trying to emphasize that these are ways in which one can attempt to legitimate or establish authority. If you look at my Type 16 teachers who presumably lack the performance based criteria for personal legitimacy that I illustrate on the right side of the authority table, it's not that they have no authority; it's that the kind of authority that they tend to establish is authority based on the institutional (or what I call bureaucratic) character of the role. So in a sense, I'm kind of undermining Weber's notion about bureaucratic legitimacy a bit. He says that
bureaucratic legitimacy is the combination of legality and expertise; my argument is that bureaucratic authority really manifests itself in the combination of trying to legitimate and enforce tradition by legal means. So, if you synthesize the Traditional and the Legal, that's how I think schools act bureaucratically. And if you synthesize the Expert and the Charismatic, that's how I think teachers legitimate themselves professionally. They are just two very different modes of establishing and exercising authority.
Traditionally, the research strategy in sociological studies of education has been to treat the age, sex, ethnicity or social class of students, and their school achievement, IQ level, or career plans as sociological variables. The research task has been to find statistical correlations among these "variables." These correlational studies treat the variables as objective social structures which stand independently of social action.

Ethnomethodology suggests that the social activities of participants in social settings like the school are in fact structuring these objective social structures. "School achievement," "IQ test results," "career patterns," are produced by the interactional activity between teachers and students, counselors and students. Instead of treating educational features like test results and academic achievement as objective structures, instead of seeking correlations among social variables, ethnomethodology recommends studying the social structuring activities which compose these social structures.

Garfinkel (1967) phrases this ethnomethodology research strategy as the study of the "practices" or "methods" which participants employ to accomplish social interaction. Cicourel (1973) calls this the study of the "interpretive procedures" which are employed to make sense of social settings. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) suggest that social structures (events, objects) stand on behalf of, while being made up of, interactional work. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970:352) describe the research task as the search for the "members' work" that a gloss like "school achievement," or "IQ level," stands on behalf of.
The task of this paper is to review the ethnomethodological studies in educational settings which have examined the way educational "facts" are assembled by the interactional activities of the participants involved. The ethnomethodological research in education is grouped under the following headings: (1) studies of educational decision-making, (2) studies of language and meaning, (3) classroom interaction studies. After this review, I will draw their practical implications for everyday teaching-learning activities.

Educational Decision Making

In American school systems, students follow various and different career paths. For example, though they must enter in the primary grades (K-3), they exit at different points. Some of the possible "career patterns" through the educational system are shown in Figure 1.

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**Figure 1. Possible Educational Career Patterns**

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An important question to be asked about the career patterns of students going through school is: how do some students wind up in one category and not in another? How is it that some students continue through the system to the final node, while others, for example, "drop out" in their junior year of high school?

One set of explanations of differential school performance patterns deals with the characteristics of students who are in these various categories. School success is said to be the result of the presence of certain inherent, natural hereditary factors, while school failure is said to be associated with the absence of these characteristics. These features are seen to operate independently of social contexts. (See Jensen, 1969; Hernstein, 1972.)

Another set of interpretations (Holt, 1964; Silberman, 1970) suggest that school performance is a function of the structure of the school environment. The conventional school is characterized as authoritarian, teacher-centered, and compartmentalized, an atmosphere which stifles certain students and accounts for their poor school performance.

Placement decisions. The ethnomethodological interest in rule use suggests a third approach which provides for both of the above accounts: the student's career is a product of the educational decisions made about him by school officials (Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963). This perspective suggests that the student's performance in school cannot be seen independently of the school assessment procedures which produce the account of his abilities, progress, or success. That is, the child's abilities do not stand independently of the social contexts in which they are assessed. The student's abilities are constructed by the interpretive process engaged in by school...
officials who interact with the student and each other. The account generated by this interaction indexes the child's ability; the child's ability cannot be located except by such an interpretive examination.

For example, teachers interact with students; they write reports on their performance. Educational testers and school psychologists conduct educational tests of all varieties on children. These and other assessments of the student constitute a version of his abilities. These accounts taken together contribute to decisions made about the next step in the student's career.

Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) illustrate the power of this approach in their study of high school guidance counselors. The high school counselor advises students concerning their academic programs, post high school plans, and other matters. The counselor helps the student decide which classes he will take the following year. Often the classes available are arranged in a hierarchical order, such that one classroom (or perhaps "skill group", within a class) is reserved for the "better" students, another for the "average" students, a third for the "poor" students, and so on. The counselor's assessment of the child's record determines into which of these classes the student will be placed the following year. The educational counselor, by designing class schedules for the students, channels them into courses of instruction which determine the future career possibilities which are shown in Figure 1 (cf. Erikson and Schultz, 1973).

For example, say that a counselor recommends that a junior high school student take "college prep" courses. Whether or not that student has an interest in going to college, by the time he is a junior or a senior (and assuming he has successfully completed the courses), he has the academic
preparation necessary to go to college if he chooses to do so; he is seen as a "college bound" student by school officials and others. If, however, a counselor recommends that a junior high school student enroll in a vocational program or in business training, when that student becomes a junior or a senior and decides that he wants to go to college, he doesn't have the required academic training; he is seen as a "vocational student." The student and his career choices have been defined by an educational decision making process.

Now the question becomes: what is the basis upon which the counselor or other school official makes such administrative decisions? Do Jensen's "inherent," "genetically provided" or Holt's "culturally determined" factors account for these decisions? Leiter's (1974) extension of the Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) work indicates that neither of these clusters of factors, either alone or taken together, are sufficient to explain how educational decisions are made. He concludes instead that the child's abilities are not "so much a product of invariant developmental processes as they are the product of situated practices of interaction . . . ." Shumsky and Mehan's (1973) analysis of an elementary school faculty group meeting to make placement decisions provides a description of these interactional practices.

Over the course of a two hour meeting of a Child Study Team, some 20 students were considered for promotion to the next higher grade or for placement into a "special" classroom. At one point in the meeting, the principal called for nominees for the special classroom. Teachers responded with the following descriptions:

41 Principal: Mrs. Jones? (A first grade teacher)
42 Mrs. Jones: Four and a question mark
I've got seven on my list

Ok, we've got seven kids in Mrs. Susan's room who need special help, and five in Mrs. Jones'

And one who should be in learning disabilities

And Mrs. Real, do you have kids that you don't think should go on to second grade?

Well, Mike Brandon for one

He's on my list

Oh, he's on your list?

Did he take the reading test?

Yeah

How'd he do?

Wait a minute, I've got it here (pause) I think he did ok (pause), yeah, ah he got a 1.7

That's good

Yeah, but I was surprised by that. He can't read that good. He must have guessed alot. I still have him in the Bluebirds ... the slow reading group.

What about Mary and Mark? They are the only other two I'm thinking about. I think they could use it, I really do.

Ok, that's what I thought too

Mary's the stronger of the two, but they both need another year.

I'm questioning Irene too
65 Mrs. Real: I don't think she's got it kid, I don't think she'll ever do any good.

* * *

68 Mrs. Sanction: I think three, not necessarily retained, but, three that need mothers.

The following statements were made about the children considered, but not selected, for the special classroom; these children were subsequently promoted.

71 Mrs. Smith: How about Jim Mansky?

72 Mrs. Light: No, Jim Mansky's going to go on. He'll be all right.

* * *

72 Mrs. Barder: Brenda?

72 Mrs. Jones: Only if she's been absent like she's been she won't

These descriptions accomplished the work of educational placement. Fifteen of the nineteen children talked about were placed in the special classroom without being named or discussed at all. Statements like: "I've got seven on my list," "four and a question mark," "I think not necessarily retained, but three that need mothers," were sufficient to place the children referenced into the special classroom. Six other children, Mike, Mary, Mark, Irene, Brenda, and Jim were mentioned by name and statements about them provided.

These descriptions appear vague, elliptical, abbreviated; they have all the characteristics associated with "indexical expressions" (Garfinkel, 1967:4; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970:348-50; Cicourel, 1973:56). Nevertheless, these descriptions did the very serious work of educational placement.

If these descriptions and the decisions made with them were compared to a "rational" model of decision making (e.g., Parsons, 1951), they might
be faulted for their lack of rigor, detail, justification. However, since these descriptions did make placement decisions, it implies that a rational model of these descriptions would both distort and trivialize the educators' educational decision making practices. Not wanting to trivialize, but to understand how this talk did the work of educational placement, Shumsky and Mehan (1973) looked to the conversational activities of the educators themselves to see what kind of work they were engaged in.

Although these educators have produced statements that appear (to an outsider) to be abbreviated, high level glosses of the moment to moment, day to day classroom activity that led to these descriptions, the educators themselves were not bothered by the lack of scientific rigor in the production of descriptions. Statements like "three that need mothers," "they both need another year," "I don't think she's got it kid," did the work of locating candidates for the special classroom and for promotion. These descriptions are allowed to pass without challenge. Presumably, the teachers who offered these accounts have had extensive experience with the students in question. The teachers have seen the children in a wide variety of teaching situations, with different motivations and interests. When called upon to report on the children's progress, they do not present this wealth of information in detailed form. The other educators, hearing a teacher's description of a child, did not demand a retrieval of the stock of information about each child which is presumably behind those descriptions.

These descriptions are adequate, then, for the educators' purposes. Their adequacy is confirmed by the absence of challenge. Indeed, allowing the unstated particulars about each child to remain submerged is the way in which these educational decisions were made; it is an interactional display of the teachers' expertise as educators.
This observation suggests that the educators are engaged in "documentary work." Documentary work consists, from the formulator's point of view, in the production of utterances which stand on behalf of an underlying pattern which is not stated. Documentary work consists, from the hearer's point of view, in identifying a pattern behind a series of utterances such that each utterance is a document of the underlying pattern, while at the same time, the underlying pattern is identified through its individual utterances. The instance indicates the pattern, and the pattern the instance; the pattern and the instance reflexively determine each other (cf. Garfinkel, 1967:76 ff). Although the contours which constitute the characterization of certain educational categories (the pattern) are never specified, and although the features of a candidate child (the instance) are never specified, the description is sufficient to index the underlying pattern which identifies children for educational placement.

In this meeting, school children were considered for promotion or inclusion in a special classroom. The objective results of this educational placement were accomplished by the participants' interactional work. This interactional activity is captured in the participants' descriptive accounts about the children. The descriptive accounts constituted the status of each child.

Testing decisions. The results of educational testing are often assembled in tables like the following.
Table 1  Results of Language Testing in One First Grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child</th>
<th>Fall</th>
<th>Spring</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Jean)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (Clare)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (Leslie)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (Lora)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60a</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>1512</td>
<td>1566</td>
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</table>

*Tested in Spanish at home.*

Examination of this table shows children whose first language is Spanish do poorly by comparison with children whose first language is English. As the Spanish speaking children also come from poor homes, and the English speaking children come from middle class homes, a classic correlation between SES and school performance can be constructed.

However, a table of scores or a correlation based on information like this does not show how the tester made measurement decisions while scoring each child's behavior as correct or incorrect. Each child's answer is a product of a sequence of tester-child exchanges. Each child's overall test score is a composite of the sequence of measurement decisions made by the tester.
Mehan (1973, 1974) videotaped the administration of individualized language development tests to the first grade children represented by this table. That analysis exhibits the interactional mechanisms which constitute these displays. It shows that the child's answers are not the automatic result of the application of a stimulus to a child which the behavioral model supporting educational testing suggests. The child's answers and accumulated test scores emerge out of the tester's interpretive assessment of the child's actions in the testing situation. More specifically, the tester in this situation had to determine which of a number of acts constituted the child's answers and when a child answered a question.

When answering questions on this test, the child is supposed to touch the part of the picture which best represents the question asked. Many times when a child answered a question, he did not touch any part of the picture; or he covered more of the picture than was required by the question. Richard was shown a picture of a small chair, a woman, a boy, and a large chair. He was asked to find the one that is "not big." Richard did not touch the chair, instead, his right finger rested in the space between the chair and the girl:
Richard was scored wrong; however, if the tester had assigned the space between the two pictures to the chair instead of the girl, he may have gotten this answer right.

When Jenny was shown this same picture and was asked to find "she is between a boy and a girl," she did not point to the picture with one finger; instead, she formed her first and second fingers into the shape of a fork or a Y. She then placed her fingers on the page like this:

The tester scored this response "wrong." To do so, the tester had to assume the child intended to touch the boy and girl, and did not intend to "frame" the woman between her fingers. If the tester saw this gesture as a "frame," Jenny may have gotten this question right.
During the course of this same test, Jenny was shown the following picture:

She is asked to point to the picture which shows "the man who is chopping down the tree." As soon as the question was read, Jenny touched the third picture (of the man poised and ready to swing the axe). Then as the tester began scoring the response, Jenny said, "no this one," and touched the middle picture. The tester scored Jenny "correct."

This example illustrates that the tester is interpreting the child's behavior. The tester must determine which action among many actions constitutes a child's answer. Depending on where the tester punctuates the child's often continuous answering actions, different tables of scores, and hence different versions of the child's abilities can be assembled.

The testing of the child is supposed to follow a sequence in which the tester asks a question and the child answers. The child is supposed to wait for the questions to be asked before (s)he answers. The six year old
children observed in this study did not adhere to this "conversational sequencing rule" (Schegloff, 1968). Many times they provided answers before questions had been completely asked. The tester evaluated these interruptions differently; the differential interpretations can lead to different evaluations of the child's ability as the following examples illustrate.

Jenny is shown the following picture:

When she was presented a picture with two boxes, and was asked to locate a ball in one of the boxes, the following exchange took place. The tester said, "Now Jenny, there's a ball in one of these two boxes. The ball is not in this box" (the tester tapped one of the pictures with her pencil). Jenny immediately touched the other box. The tester said, "Wait a minute. Do you know where the ball is ..." Although the tester was still in the process
of asking the question, Jenny touched the box again. The tester then completed her question. She said, "... but don't guess. Do you know where it is?" Jenny shook her head "no." Jenny's first two displays—toouching the box other than the one the tester touched—although correct, were not accepted. The child's answer was not accepted until the complete question had been asked. The response which the child gave after the complete question had been asked was incorrect. So, in effect, the child changed her response from a correct to an incorrect one. Had the tester accepted either of Jenny's first two responses and answers, she may have been scored "correct."

This change in response came after the tester told the child "not to guess." It could be that Jenny interpreted this command as an instruction to stop what she was doing, rather than as a request to act out of the cognitive style of "knowing" rather than "guessing."

Further evidence that Jenny may have interpreted the instruction "don't guess" as an instruction not to act comes from her reactions to the next question. She is presented with the picture of three boxes and is told:

2:17 Tester: There's a ball in one of these boxes. The ball is not in this box. (The tester pointed to the box on the extreme left end.)

18 Jenny: I'm not guessing.

19 Tester: Do you know where the ball is?

20 Jenny: I'm not guessing.

21 Tester: Good girl, ok.

22 Jenny: These are hard for me.

23 Tester: Right! There's no way of knowing, is there?

24 Jenny: Un Un
When the complete instruction was given and Jenny was told not to guess, she replied that she wasn't. Because Jenny did not then touch any of the pictures, the tester interpreted her "non action" as an answer-to-the-question. She attributed to Jenny the knowledge that it was impossible to answer this question. The tester took Jenny's statement "I'm not guessing" (FT 2:20) as documentary evidence of the fact she understands the instruction to distinguish between knowing and guessing. It is equally plausible that Jenny interpreted the instruction "don't guess" as a command not to act. The tester reifies her interpretation that Jenny knows the difference between knowing and guessing by saying, "there's no way of knowing, is there?" (FT 2:23). Because Jenny replies, "un un" (no), the tester has evidence that the child understands. The answers reifies the tester's view that the child understood the complexities of the question and the necessity to distinguish between knowing and guessing all along.

The tester also had to choose the child's answer from among a number of displays which the child presented simultaneously. Richard is asked to find the big black ball from among the five balls shown in the picture. When Richard answers, both of his hands are on the page. The fingers of both his right and his left hand are touching the page. The right index finger touched the correct picture; the fingers of his left hand touched the other pictures:
The tester scored Richard "correct" on this question. To do this, she had to disregard the fact that Richard's left hand was also touching the pictures. She had to attend only to Richard's right hand. That is, she assigned the status of "hand which is being used to point to the correct picture" to the right and not to the left hand. It is unclear upon what basis the tester decided that in this answer sequence Richard had used his right hand and not his left hand to indicate his answer; he had used his left hand on other occasions. There is no way to decide which is the "answering gesture" by merely examining the placement of the left and right hands. Both are squarely placed on the page; neither were placed with "hesitancy." It appears that the tester's choice about the method of indicating answers was not made on the basis of the hand placement itself, but on grounds extraneous to the display. It is possible that the presence (coincidental or inten-
tional) of the child's hand on the correct picture informed this choice. It is possible that the tester ignored the left hand and inferred from the right hand placement to the "correct" answer. That is, the tester's knowledge of what a correct answer looks like can structure the perception of the child's displays.

The tester is not passively observing and recording the child's responses. The tester is actively engaged in assigning the status of "answer" to certain portions of the child's behavioral presentation. The respondent's answers are not an automatic response to the application of a stimulus (the test question) to the respondent. The respondent's answers emerge out of the tester's interpretive assessment of his actions in the context of the testing situation.

These observations are not limited to these children or this test. Virtually every question-answer exchange between the tester and the child represented in Table 1 exhibits this interpretive work. Mehan (1974) reports similar processes operating during an administration of the WISC, Roth (1974) with the Peabody, and MacKay (1973) with the California Reading Test.

Arguments are often made for self-administering tests to overcome this "tester bias." Self-administering tests only further submerge the interpretive work by which the respondent obtains an answer and the tester measures results. Furthermore, the resulting test score still does not display the reasoning ability which the respondent used to answer the questions. As analysis below will show, self-administered tests obscure the child's understandings of testing materials. The absence of this information prohibits classroom teachers from diagnosing and correcting children's work (MacKay, 1974). In sum, while an objective social structure like a test
score is composed of a sequence of interpretive measurement decisions, the test score does not display these interpretive measurement decisions.

The interpretive determination of "correct and incorrect" behavior is not limited to educational testing situations, however, as the following analysis of classroom lessons will illustrate.

Classroom decisions. In a language development lesson designed to teach children how to use prepositional phrases, a first grade teacher divided her class into four small groups. She instructed each group separately in one corner of the room while the remainder of the students worked at their desks. Each group was given essentially the same materials to work with and each group was asked similar questions.

In each lesson, the teacher demonstrated the spatial relationship of two or more objects to each other. After she placed one object "over" the other, "under" the other, "below" the other, or "above" the other, she asked the children to do the same. Then the teacher asked the children to report on their work.

Detailed analysis of videotape taken of the lesson (Mehan, 1974a) showed that the teacher treated similar responses made by children in different ways throughout the lesson. For example, before and after the lesson, the teacher told the researcher that she expected the children to report about their work in a complete sentence of the form "the square is over the line." That is, the teacher was using the rule: "A correct answer must report the facts of the matter correctly, and be in the form of a complete sentence." However, on numerous occasions during the lesson the teacher accepted less than complete sentences as "acceptable answers." Phrases like "under the grass," "it's on there," and "there" were, according to the
teacher's stated goals for the lesson, not to be accepted as correct answers. Nevertheless, during the course of the lesson, some tokens of each of these "deviant" answer types were accepted, and on other occasions, they were not accepted.

The child was supposed to produce his answer in a complete sentence in one turn. He was supposed to say, for instance, "The tree is under the sky" all at once. On six separate occasions during the lessons analyzed, the children produced all of the correct parts of the answer, but they appeared across two or more turns. (SW is the teacher; Di, Ro, JE, Ri, Pa are the children.)

OL

3:16 SW: Di, where is the red flower?
(1) 17 Di: The red flower
18 SW: The red flower
19 Di: is under the tree

7:23 SW: Listen, Ro, can you remember what I said?
24 Ro: Put it above
25 SW: Above what?
(2) 26 Ro: The green line
27 SW: All right, Ro, tell us what you did.
28 Ro: Put a square above the green line

8:03 SW: Okay, JE, can you tell me what you did?
04 JE: I put a blue triangle above
(3) 05 SW: Above what?
06 JE: The green line

8:17 SW: All right, JE, tell me what you did
18 JE: I put a blue triangle
(4) //Ro: square //SW: square
19 Ro: I'm not going to tell you guys
20 JE: Above the green line

11:09 SW: In some places I can see the rug is under the...
10 Ro: Cabinet
11 SW: Right
(5) 12 Ro: Under the cabinet
13 SW: OK, say it all by yourself now
14 Ro: The rug is under the cabinet and the TV
SW: Pa, can you tell me something that is under something else?

20 Pa: The boxes

21 SW: What are they under?

22 Pa: Under the flat blocks

23 Ro: They are under the wood

24 SW: Ok, the big blocks are under the flat blocks.

When the child's answer was spread across a number of turns as these answers were, the teacher's plan was to have the child combine the parts into a complete sentence as she did in sequence (5) above. However, of only two of the six occasions where answers appeared across turns did the teacher demand the child complete his answer (see (2) and (5)). On the remaining four exchanges, the child's incomplete answers were allowed to pass. Similar results were observed when the children responded with other kinds of answers that the teacher had said she would not accept. Phrases, pointings, and pronouns were all accepted on many occasions by the teacher even though she had said before and after the lesson that these were not to be acceptable answer types.

The procedures by which the teacher judges the appropriateness of the children's behavior in these classroom lessons have the same features as the procedures used by the tester discussed above. The teacher, like the tester, treats similar behavioral displays differently. This differential treatment of answers occurred with all types of answers, with all children, and in each lesson. Differential performance assessment implies that the determination of a correct answer is a negotiated process which occurs each moment of educational interaction.

The behavioral theory supporting educational testing and much classroom assessment treats responses as the product of a stimulus applied to a passive organism. By this view, the evaluator (teacher or tester) has a
conception of a "rule" for correctness. When the child responds to a question, the evaluator matches the particular response with the rule for correctness. Those responses that fit the rule are judged correct; those that don't fit are judged incorrect, automatically, uniformly.

The negotiated performance assessment observed in these lessons suggests that educational decision making does not conform to a matching model. The teacher or tester must interpret any rule of correctness in the moment to moment practical circumstances of each and every question-answer sequence, not passively receive a correct or incorrect response. The rule of correctness must be interpreted against a constantly changing background of features in situations which might include the child's behavior, the teacher's expectations, the structure of the question.

Before a lesson starts, the teacher may have an overall lesson plan in mind. She may be able to say what criteria she will use to judge correct answers. But as the lesson gets underway, the goals of the lesson change. The decision to accept or reject a child's answer becomes influenced within the situation, by the child who is answering the question, when in the lesson the request occurs, the child's immediately past experience, and still other features. Thus negotiated performance assessment implies the observer's evaluation of the respondent's performance is an interpretive negotiated process, not a passive matching procedure.

Language and Meaning in Educational Testing

Educational tests are used to make critical judgments about children in American schools. Test results often inform the placement decisions which lead to the career patterns outlined in Figure 1. The Southern California elementary schools studied by Cicourel, et al. (1974), used reading, intelli-
gence, and language development tests to assess the children's development. After these tests were given to first grade children in the two schools they studied, MacKay (1973, 1974), Mehan (1973), and Roth (1974) examined the children's own perceptions and understandings of testing materials.

The reading component of the Cooperative Primary Test consists of a number of words, sentences, and paragraphs along the left side of the page contained in an arrow which points to a series of three pictures arrayed along the right side of the page. The child is told to "mark the picture that goes best with the words in the arrow."

One question has the word "fly" in the arrow pointing to pictures of an elephant, a bird, and a dog. The correct answer to this question (obviously) is "the bird." The answer sheets of many of the first grade children showed they had chosen the elephant alone or along with the bird as a response to that question. When Mehan asked them why they chose that answer, they replied: "That's Dumbo." Dumbo, of course, is Walt Disney's flying elephant, well known as an animal that flies, to children who watch television and read children's books.

In a related classroom exercise, designed to acquaint the children with this testing technique, children were shown the picture of a medieval
fortress--complete with moat, drawbridge, and parapets--along with three initial consonants: D., C., and G. The children were instructed to circle the correct initial consonant. C for "castle" was the correct answer, but many children chose D. After the exercise, when Mehan asked the children what the name of the building was, they replied, "Disneyland."

The phenomenon these examples illustrate is found in a third test, the Basic Concept Inventory (BCI), used by one of the schools studied to measure the children's "language development." The child is shown a series of pictures and is asked to point to the picture which best represents the question asked. One question asks the child to "Find the ones that talk" in a picture of a man, a boy, a dog, and a table. Children frequently included the dog along with the man and boy in answers to this question. For those children who have learned to say that their pets "speak" or "talk," that is not an unlikely choice.

The test is designed to examine the child's conceptual ability, in this case the concept is "abstracting." Talking is being used as a feature which distinguishes between humans and animals. Because the child has pointed to the picture of the dog, the test results indicate the child has not yet developed the ability to use the concept correctly. However, when the child points to the dog, it is not, as the tester concludes, that he does not know how to abstract and categorize. This answer indicates instead that the child is operating within a different reality, one where pets can talk. (S)he is abstracting, but using different features to do this work.

Similarly, when the child applies the word "fly" to an elephant, or "D" for Disneyland to a fortress, this may be evidence to the tester that the child cannot abstract the similar features of objects and has "impo-
ished" conceptual abilities. But this conclusion denies the actual complexity and richness of the child's day-to-day lived life.

Drawing conclusions about the child's conceptual ability based on the products of reasoning alone obscures the very reasoning process the test hopes to measure. Furthermore, these tests are constructed from the adult point of view, where the worlds of play, fantasy, and work are rigorously separated. As this separation may not be the case for the child, these tests only fault the child for not being an adult. They do not capture the child's actual competence, the intricate and subtle ways in which the child sees the world. A few more examples will make the character of this distortion clearer.

Another item on the Cooperative Primary Test displays a picture of a house cat followed by a songbird on a perch in the first box, a tree and a flower in the second, and a ball and a doll in the third. The question asks "pets." One child I interviewed after the test was over had indicated no answer at all. When I asked the child what the word in the arrow was, he replied "pets." When he was asked what was in each of the pictures, he replied that the first picture showed a tiger and a bird, the second a flower and a tree, the third a doll and a ball. When I asked him which picture he
had marked, the child pointed to a picture of a baby chick on a row above. I then asked him why he had chosen that picture and the child replied: "Because the question says pets and that's a tiger. A tiger can't be a pet; it belongs in the zoo." This child knew what the word "pets" meant, yet he got this question wrong. His wrong answer did not result from not understanding the question, though this is what the theory of test would assume when wrong answers appear. He got this question wrong because he saw the object in one of the pictures differently than the adult tester who constructed the test. The child and the tester inhabit different realities (Schultz, 1962; Mehan and Wood, forthcoming). Where the tester saw the object to be a cat, this child saw it as a tiger. Because the child saw the object in a different way than the tester, he was not able to link the question to the picture as the adult reality would expect. But he undertook a complex and accurate reasoning process nonetheless. He found an answer, eschewing the frame considered to be in effect by the tester, and considering pictures from the entire page in order to find two animals that he could call pets.

There are numerous other examples of the complexities of these first graders' realities obscured by these tests. One question shows pictures of a girl walking with a briefcase, a plate of cookies, and a dog barking. The
question asks the child to locate the picture which best represents "bake." From the tester's point of view, the picture of the cookies is the correct answer because cookies are the product of the baking process. Many of the children I examined after they took this reading test chose either the picture of the girl or marked both the girl and the cookies. My interrogation of the children showed the picture of the girl was chosen because the children did not identify the second picture as "cookies." Some children called them "buttons"; others called them "potatoes," neither of which are unequivocally associated with the baking process. Some of the children said they chose the picture of the girl because "she bakes." Other children chose the picture of the girl and the picture of the cookies and constructed a story around them. They saw the girl "walking to the store to buy cookies" or "going to the bakery." These children answered these test questions "incorrectly," not because they did not comprehend the concept being tested, but because they did not assign the same meaning to the stimulus item that the tester assigned.

One question on the reading test asks "the cat has been out in the rain again." The first picture shows a dripping wet raincoat hanging on a coat hanger with a puddle of water collecting beneath it; the second one shows a cat playing with a ball in the yard with the sun shining; and the third picture shows an interior view of a room with a door, a floor with footprints on it, and a wall with dotted wallpaper. The correct answer is the third picture, presumably because in order to have muddy footprints on a carpet, an animal (the cat) had to be outside in the rain. One of the children MacKay (1974) interviewed who got this question right did not identify the third picture as the inside of the house; instead he said it was
the outside of the house. What the tester saw as "dotted wallpaper," he saw as "sprinkles." The child had marked the third box, and therefore got the question right. Here is an instance where the child's different definition of test objects did not prohibit him from obtaining a "correct" answer, but this instance still points out that the child does not necessarily see objects or use language in the way assumed by the test.

One question on the school language test (the BCI) asks students to decide which child in a group is the tallest. Because the children's heads are obscured in the picture, the test taker is supposed to reply, "I don't know," or "I can't tell." However, many children examined selected one specific child in the picture as the tallest. When I interviewed the children after the test, and asked them why they had chosen that boy, they replied that he was the tallest because "his feet are bigger." Investigating the thread of reasoning used by the children, then, shows they understood the intent of the question—to discriminate and compare—but they were not using the same criteria as the tester. The tester was making comparisons using only height as a standard, while these children were making comparisons using shoe size as a standard. Because these children were not using the criteria intended by the tester (but never explicated by him), answers which
indicated that one child was taller than another were marked wrong. In this case, though, a wrong answer does not index a lack of reasoning ability, but rather, the use of an alternative scheme of interpretation.

Another item in the Cooperative Primary Test shows the branch of a tree in one box, a birdhouse in the second, and a bird nest in the third. The question asks "the bird built his own house." One child MacKay interviewed checked the third box (the correct answer), but when the child was asked why he answered as he did, he said: "Because owls are too big—they can't fit into the house." MacKay (1974) concludes:

In this item, the student marked the correct answer, but the reasoning would be incorrect, I assume, from the point of view of the test constructor. The student displays the correct skill—identifying an illustrative instance—but does not know one word. The complexity of what the child knows is not recoverable from the test results.

Roth found similar distortions of the child's world with the Peabody Test, an individualized intelligence test. After this test had been administered to a first grade, he instructed his testers to inquire into the child's interpretation of test items and his reasons for answering. He found that regardless of test scores, the children examined in depth performed conceptually in ways that were not recorded by the test. The children demonstrated abstract understandings of the test items far greater than indicated by the test scores.
The child who scored the lowest on the Peabody test was examined in depth at home. One of the pictures he was questioned about showed a common household thermostat, a bolt with a nut on it, a slide projector, a fishing reel without fishing line or pole. The conventional Peabody instructions require the child to indicate the picture which best goes with the word read by the tester. The stimulus word for this question is "reel." This child had indicated the slide projector as his answer. When the tester reviewed the child's answers with him, he indicated that he had picked the picture of the slide projector because "you can reel this backwards and forwards." The child went on to provide relevant, although technically incorrect, names for each of the other pictures in the test booklet. He called the slide projector a picture camera, and elaborated the basis of his choice by saying, "there are lots of things you can show up on the wall." Roth, having observed this child's class extensively, assumed the child was referring to the movies and filmstrips routinely showed in his class. He called the thermostat a thermometer, a choice Roth found reasonable because the picture included a mercury tube inside the metal case of the thermostat. He identified the nut and bolt by the relevant term "screw." He identified the picture that was supposed to be associated with the stimulus item as a "fishing pole" by saying "this is a thing that you . . . fishing pole! It's um, ah, a thing that you roll up the thread. Whatever you call it, whatever you fish with, the hook or something. Yeah, the hook."

Roth points out that this child's performance is similar to the child who scored the highest on this test. Question 93 on the Peabody presents the word "jubilant" to the child along with four pictures: (1) a young boy with an arm in a sling and a faintly glum expression, (2) a little girl crying
loudly and pointing to a broken glass on the floor, (3) a woman crying out with pleasure and enthusiasm, and (4) a scared woman with hands in a reflex position before her face. The child reported that he had chosen picture (1), an incorrect choice. When the child was asked the meanings of the other pictures, he reported that picture (2) was 'break,' picture (3) was 'scream'; the child emitted a small scream when asked about the fourth picture. When the tester asked the child why he had chosen picture (1), the child reported that he did not know the meaning of 'jubilant.' When he was subsequently told a synonym for jubilant (happy), he located the correct picture (3).

The reasoning displayed by the first child who scored the lowest on the intelligence test, and the second, who scored the highest, appear to be similar. Both children described the pictures in appropriate terms, compatible with conventional meanings of the items, although they did not use the terms assumed to be in effect by the tester. Although the first child did not employ the term 'reel' when responding to the tester's question about that picture, he later used 'reel' as a verb, a performance which is similar to the second child's location of the correct picture when given a meaning of the stimulus item. Their descriptive ability, their ability to perform the testing task in the face of potentially distracting background noise, and their ability to relate information obtained from the past and relate it to the future is suppressed by saying these children got these questions wrong.

The educational test is constructed with an assumption that the meaning of test items is shared in common among testers and respondents (Mehan, 1973). These and other examples illustrate the child and tester do not necessarily share the adult tester's world view. This disparity between adult and child realities in turn points out the danger of making policy decisions...
on the basis of tests which have imposed the adult point of view on the world of the child.

Answers to test questions are regularly compiled into a table of test scores (see Table 1). School officials then use these tabulated results to make decisions about the child's progress in school (see Figure 1). The table of test scores is presumed to stand on behalf of the child's underlying ability. The higher the score, the greater the ability.

These examples demonstrate the danger in assuming correct answers index the child's abilities. These examples show the child is often using the very cognitive operations the test is examining even when the child answers incorrectly. Wrong answers were not the result of the lack of the ability under review. Children got questions wrong because they made interpretations of the stimulus items which were different from those made by the tester. To therefore conclude that a wrong answer is due to a lack of understanding is misguided, for the answer may come from an alternative, equally valid interpretation.

If the school wants to know about the child, not the extent to which (s)he is an incomplete version of an adult, then the child cannot be tested in terms of his deviation from the mean of adult competence. The child cannot be assumed to be operating in the world of the adult (tester); the reality of the child must be determined. In practical terms, this would mean doing away with educational tests which are only product oriented, adult centered, and relying on those which measure the child's reasoning, taking the child's point of view into account. Short of that, the educational tester and teacher can alter existing procedures. They can begin to determine the child's interpretations of educational materials. They can assess his reasons
for answering questions and take into account his meaning of materials when measuring his performance and conducting the educational enterprise.

In either case, this means taking the child seriously as a contributor to the educational enterprise. It means recognizing that the child has a way of gearing into the world, which though different from the adult's, is equally valid.

The contributions that both teacher and child make to the educational enterprise will be explored further in the following examination of classroom interaction.

Classroom Interaction Studies

Question-answer sequences. The ethnomethodologist studying conversation (notably Sacks, 1972a, 1972b; Schegloff, 1968, 1972; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; see also Churchill, 1971) has identified the occurrence of "adjacency pairs." Adjacency pairs occur in a "conditionally relevant" relationship. They are located in a manner suggestive of Pierce's (1957) "abductive reasoning": having located what seems to be a related pair, the second half of the pair is used to locate the first half of the pair, which then establishes the fact of the pair. That is, given one item in a pair, the second is expected to co-occur. The strength of this normative bond is tested by noting conversationalists' responses to the absence of the second half of a candidate pair. If the second half of a candidate paired utterance is absent, and its absence is noted, commented upon, or otherwise "made visible and accountable" (Garfinkel, 1967:3-24) by the conversationalists, then the pair can be called "conditionally relevant."

The conversational analyst mentions summons and answers; greetings, identifications of self and other, conversational closings, and question-
answer sequences as examples of conversational adjacency pairs (see especially Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). I have found the adjacency pair notion helpful when examining teacher-student interaction, for not only do questions and answers form adjacency pairs, but kinds of questions form pairs with kinds of answers. And the kind of knowledge the student can display is constrained by the kinds of questions he is asked.

Questioning styles and displays of knowledge. The following excerpt from a first grade classroom displays the adjacency pair notion.

\[\begin{align*}
1:7 & \text{Teacher: } \ldots \text{ What does this word say? Beth.} \\
8 & \text{Beth: One.} \\
9 & \text{Teacher: Very good. What does this word say, Jenny?} \\
1:10 & \text{Jenny: One.} \\
11 & \text{Teacher: Okay. Now look up here. What does this word say, Ramona?} \\
12 & \text{Ramona: Umm} \\
13 & \text{Teacher: Kim?} \\
14 & \text{Kim: First.} \\
15 & \text{Teacher: Okay. Let's say it together.} \\
16 & \text{All: First.} \\
17 & \text{Teacher: All right, say it together again.} \\
18 & \text{All: First.} \\
19 & \text{Teacher: Okay, Lillian, what does this word say?} \\
20 & \text{Lillian: First.} \\
21 & \text{Teacher: Richard, what does this word say?} \\
22 & \text{Richard: First.} \\
23 & \text{Teacher: Oh, you said it so nice and loud. What does this word say, everybody?}
\end{align*}\]
The lesson is a series of questions and answers, questions asked by the teacher, answers provided by the student. Each teacher's question is followed by a student's answer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turn</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Utterance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

et cetera

In addition, the kind of question the teacher is asking provides for the kinds of answers the students can give to these questions. The question "what does this word say" not only provides for an answer to complete the pair, but this type of question provides for a type of answer. The student answering this question is constrained to provide the name of the number the teacher is pointing to.

The child is constrained in a similar manner by questions like the following:

TEP 3

1:5 Teacher: Let's see if we can make compound words from our cards. Jenny, are you looking for one? (yeah) Andrew?

6 Andrew: Cow boy

7 Teacher: Cow and boy make .

8 Andrew: Cow boy

Many: cowboy

9 Teacher: Ok, raise your hand if you see a compound word. Perry, can you see if you see one?

10 Laurie: I do, I do
12 Laurie:

13 Teacher: What is it, some and thing make . . .

14 Laurie: Something

15 Teacher: Ok, anybody else? There are a whole bunch of 'em here, Darcy?

16 Darcy: Seashell

Teacher: Sea and shell make . . .

18 Darcy: Seashell

/Teacher: seashell

Here the teacher has specified the answer frame by starting the answer which the child is to give. The child need only complete the teacher's sentence to answer the question.

In the following lesson, the teacher is eliciting children's responses about the exploration of the new world. He asks:

TEP 1

1:12 Teacher: . . . Now, did the people in Europe know about this part of the world?

13 Student: No

/Many: Nooo

14 Teacher: And how about the Norsemen?

15 Student: Yeah

/Many: Yeah, they did

16 Teacher: Yeah, the Norsemen did. But did they tell anybody over in Europe?

17 Student: Nope

/Many: Nooo

18 Teacher: That's right. That's why for hundreds of years, no one knew about it. . . . ok, what would people say if you kept on going west you could reach India faster? What did people say to this? What were their answers to that, Lucy?
Teacher: From India! And how did they do it? Did they fly over India?

Many: Noooo

Here the children are only provided the opportunity of agreeing or disagreeing with the teacher's formulation of the answers to his own question. The child is limited to brief displays of his factual knowledge when questions which ask for nominal definitions ("this is the first one"), "yes/no" answers, or invite the child to complete or "fill in the blanks" in the teacher's questions.

Yes/no questions, sentence completion questions, and agree/disagree questions are examples of a "convergent questioning style," one which seeks factual information, usually in the form of "one correct response" (Mehan, 1974a). The convergent style contrasts with a "divergent style," in which a wide range of different answers to a question are encouraged. The following lesson, in which the teacher is asking the students about what appears in a picture she is showing them, illustrates the "divergent" style.

TEP 3

25:17 Teacher: ... What is on the picture? John

18 John: A boy, sad, like this

19 Teacher: A boy, sad like that. Why do you think he looks like that?

20 John: Because maybe he don't feel good

21 Carl: Or he got a shot at the doctor's. Or he has to get a shot.

22: Or his dog just died. Or his Mom.

23 Teacher: His Mom or his dog just died, something like that (laughter). Does anybody else have any other idea about what could be happening? Hey, that's not funny to the boy in the picture?
26:1 Joel: Nobody wants to play with him

Teacher: Joel thinks nobody wants to play with him. What else? Anybody else have an idea?

3 Student: Maybe he was sick // maybe he was bad in // no maybe school // he has to sit down

4 Teacher: He has to sit down. What kind of a story...

The teacher's questions "what is on the picture" and "why do you think..." produce a range of answers. Many children respond with possible reasons. The question-answer sequencing here is notably different that the 2A2A style identified with convergent questioning. After the teacher's "why do you think" question (25:19), a series of answers to the question is produced with no intervening activity on the part of the teacher. The teacher's talk for the remainder of this segment is essentially a reformulation of what the previous child has said and a repeat of that initial question. In each case the teacher is encouraging an expression of alternative answers. When a series of answers to this question has been elicited, there is no closure, no choice of one as the "correct one." The teacher simply continued to the next phase of the lesson, an elicitation of kinds of stories that could be written about the picture.

Question answering practices. The examples from convergent question-answer exchanges reveal other interesting features about the child's displays of knowledge in the classroom. The teacher in the first sequence discussed above asks Beth the question "what does this word say?" (OL 1:7). Beth answers "one," the teacher compliments her, "very good," and asks the same question of a second child, Jenny. Jenny also answers the question correctly. What is the basis of Jenny's answer? Did she answer because she "knew" the answer, or because she attended to the teacher's response to Beth's answer?
The possibility of students "imitating" other answers occurs throughout this exchange, and appears in the excerpts from the other lessons presented above (see TEP 3 1:14 and 1:14; TEP 1 1:12-17, 32-33). In the social studies lesson, each time the teacher asked a "yes/no" question, one child answered first, and then the remainder of the class joined the chorus of "yeses" and "noes." Question styles which allow for imitating or "chorusing" make the assessment of the individual child difficult.

The convergent questioning style can result in exchanges, which, while humorous, have serious consequences for the child. The following exchange illustrates this point.

OL

3:4 Teacher: Make a red flower under the tree. Make a red flower under the tree. Ok, let's look at the red flower. Can you tell me where the red flower is?

All: right here, right here

Dora?

5 Dora: under the tree

6 Teacher: Tell me in a sentence

7 Dora: It's under the tree

8 Teacher: What's under the tree? Dora? Tell me, the flower... Dora: The flower

9 Dora: The flower is under the tree

10 Teacher: Where is the red flower, Richard?

11 Richard: Under the tree

12 Teacher: Can you tell me in a sentence?

13 Richard: The flower is under the tree.

14 Teacher: Cindy, where is the red flower?

15 Cindy: The red flower is under the tree.

Richard: Hey, that's not red

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The teacher was instructing the children in the use of prepositional phrases. She wanted the children to report the result of their drawing in a complete sentence with certain prepositional phrases, i.e., "the red flower is under the tree." The first time the teacher asked this question, the children responded in unison with an answer which adequately describes the location of the flowers drawn: "on here."

However, the teacher wanted complete sentences with prepositional phrases, and so she continued questioning the student. Dora provided an answer which employed a prepositional phrase, "under the tree" (OL 3:5), but since this answer was not in a complete sentence, the teacher continued questioning her:

Teacher: Tell me in a sentence

Dora: It's under the tree

Now, Dora has answered the teacher's question. She has provided an answer which, in fact, is a grammatically complete sentence. However, this sentence does not have the proper subject noun, "The flower," so the teacher continues to question Dora:

Teacher: What's under the tree? [Dora] Tell me, the flower

Child: the flower

Dora has received information about the desired answer from two sources. First, another child supplies the missing noun phrase. Second, the teacher, employing a "sentence completion" form of question, supplies her with the part of the answer she had been after all along; in effect, the teacher has answered her own question here.

The tempo of this sequence picks up. Richard is asked the same question:
Teacher: Where is the red flower, Richard?

Richard: Under the tree.

One more question-answer exchange is sufficient to get Richard to produce the desired answer form:

Teacher: Can you tell me in a sentence?

Richard: The flower is under the tree.

The teacher now turns to Cindy with the same question, and Cindy, for the first time in the lesson, provides the answer that the teacher has been looking for, all in one turn of talk:

Teacher: Cindy, where is the red flower?

Cindy: The red flower is under the tree.

Richard: Hey, that's not red.

There is only one problem. Although Cindy has provided exactly the answer that the teacher wants, it does not accurately reflect the facts of what she has drawn. Richard pointed out, and my examination of her work after the lesson confirmed, Cindy did not, in fact, draw a red flower; she used a crayon of a different color. Perhaps attending to the cues provided by the other children's answers and the structure of the teacher's question, Cindy was able to provide the desired answer form. It is difficult to determine whether the child has a conceptual mastery of the materials, or a surface mastery of demands of the question when questions which allow the possibility of chorusing and imitating are used:

Because convergent questions accept only one answer as correct, the teacher often finds him/herself "searching" for that answer, while students are providing various "trial" responses which are in search of validation as the correct answer.
Teacher: Monsters, right. Ok, why did you think people were so interested in getting over to a place, remember, where did they get their spices from?

Pepe: from ?Nerea? (Near East?)

Teacher: Almost.

Many: I know, I know

Jose: From California

Teacher: No, they didn't know about California yet. Remember, we talked about it.

Student: From Europe

Student: From India?

Teacher: From India! And how did they do it. Did they fly over to India?

Many: Noooo

Teacher: No. They had to go around what?

Student: The long way around

Teacher: They had to go around what?

Student: On a boat

Teacher: On a boat, around what? Around what?

//Student: Around Africa

Teacher: Around there, up through here, and India was over here, see? Just pretend Africa's over here, ok? So they had to go around Africa and hit India. Or they had to go where, where else? What other way could they go, Jessica?

Jessica: Around there

Teacher: Yeah, okay, through the Mediterranean, and from the Mediterranean down through the Suez. But they didn't have a Suez Canal, so they had to walk about 300 or 400 miles. And then they'd hit the Red Sea and come down. Is that a long way to go?
The social studies teacher, looking for "India" as the place of origin for sprites, receives a series of answers. All were offered equally hesitantly, with cautious rising intonation at the end of the utterance. The teacher continues to receive responses until the one he wants is offered. The teacher then establishes that "response" as an answer. With question-answer exchanges like this, the student is not so much answering the teacher's questions, as the teacher is creating the student's answers out of a series of tentative displays.

I characterized the convergent questioning style above as conforming to a Q&A sequence; the interrogator asks a question, the respondent answers, the interrogator asks a question, the respondent answers, etc. However, during the course of a test or lesson, instead of "answering the question" the child can ask a question or make a request of the tester or teacher that elicits the interrogator's response. The interrogator has a number of options when this occurs: (s)he can ignore the request and continue the questioning, he can repeat the question, make some comment, or challenge the intervening activity. If the interrogator responds to the request in any of these or other ways instead of going on to the next question, the Q&A sequence is altered.

Schegloff (1972) has proposed that when one question follows another in a conversation, the question asked second is answered before the one asked first (cf. Churchill, 1971). That is, when the child initiates a "request," it becomes the interrogator's "turn to talk" (a phrase adapted from Harvey Sacks). No matter how the interrogator responds, it becomes a response to the child's request. The response to the child's request makes the interrogation sequence into an "embedded question" sequence (Schegloff, 1972).
That is, the student is able to use the interrogator's response (turn 3) to his request (turn 2) to provide an answer (turn 4) to the original question (turn 1).

An example of the child's "searching practice" occurs early in the "orientation lesson" (OL) discussed above:

OL
1:1 Teacher: Yes. Let's take our green crayon and make a line at the bottom of your paper. Just take your green crayon and make an orange line at the bottom
2 Cindy: Like that?
3 Teacher: Yeah
4 Diane: Now what are we going to do?
5 Teacher: Now take your orange crayon and make an orange worm under the green line. Pretend that's grass. Just a little wiggle. Here let me show you on this one. An orange worm.
6 Diane: Hey, can you make it on yours? Jenny: Under?
7 Teacher: No, I'm watching you make yours
8 Jenny: Over here
9 Cindy: Under?
10 Teacher: Listen, I'm going to say it just once. Make an orange worm under the green line.
11 Diane: Like that?
12 Teacher: Beautiful. Ok. We are going to pretend that green line is the grass ok? Can you pretend that with me? All right, where is the orange worm, Dora?
The teacher instructs the children to draw a line (turn 1: question).

Cindy begins drawing a line across the vertical edge of her paper and asks, "Like that?" (turn 2: question). The teacher responds affirmatively (turn 3: response). Cindy completes drawing the line. Cindy has produced a correct response to the teacher's request, but was aided in that production by the teacher's comments.

Many vivid examples of the consequences of the child's searching for answers appeared during my informal interrogation of some first grade children who had done poorly on school language development tests. I was interested in determining if their understanding of locatives was influenced by the testing materials used, and so devised two and three-dimensional variations of the standard picture identification tasks. I gave the children a series of instructions to draw or place objects above, below, on, over, or under a line or the table. The interrogation procedure was supposed to follow the QAQA sequence outlined above. I was to ask a series of questions and the children were to answer. However, during the course of this interrogation, these children presented many displays that introduced variation in the sequence, and influenced the resulting answers.

When I asked Chris to put his hand below the table, he placed his hand in the air:

To this point, we have a QA sequence. Protocol would indicate that I should continue with the next question. Instead, perhaps because I "knew" this child, "knew" this answer, I repeated the substance of the question, saying "below
the table." He then lowered his hand slowly until it was parallel with and
top:

He paused there, then his hand continued downward until it was as far down
below the table as it would go:

Realizing at this time I had influenced the child's behavior, I attempted to
neutralize the influence by saying, "Put it any place you want." Chris left
his hand in that place, and I scored that "final placement" as a "correct
answer."

But note that there are at least three separate displays given in re-
sponse to this question. The production of multiple responses was obviously
influenced by the tester's comments. When the question was repeated, the
child changed his answer; the change was from an incorrect to a correct one.
Had I recorded either of his first two responses as his "answer" rather than
questioning them, he would have been considered "incorrect" for this question.

When I asked Lourdes to place a square "under the line," she placed
the object like this: , and asked "under?" Instead of a QA
sequence, we have a QQ sequence, the child's question being accompanied by a
"request." I understood Lourdes' question to be a request for a comment on
the response she offered. The child's question demands a reply. I repeated
the question, after which Lourdes lifted up the page, placed the object on
the table, and put the paper on top of the wooden block. Once again, when the
question was repeated, the child changed her answer.
When Richard was asked to place a circle above the line he had drawn, he touched the top of the page near the top of the line, and asked "right here?" Like Lourdes' request above, this question seeks validation of the response. Again, I repeated the question, and then Richard moved his pencil to the right side of the line. Richard, like Lourdes and Chris, changed his answer when the question was repeated.

There are other responses that the tester can make to a child's request. Immediately after Richard moved his pencil to the right side of the answer, I challenged his response by saying, "Is that above the line?" Richard, at this point, changed his answer a second time, touching the line with his finger, and subsequently drawing it there.

Before I had the children place certain objects in relation to a line, I asked them to name the objects for me. When I presented Jenny with one such object, the following exchange took place:

Mehan: Now, what do you call that?
Jenny: Um a square?
Mehan: Is that a square?
Jenny: I mean a, unnn.
Mehan: What does that look like to you?
Jenny: Circle!
Mehan: Ok, can you put the circle above the line?

Jenny has made a response to my initial question in turn two, but I did not accept that response as an answer, and challenged the response. Jenny gives an alternative response, which I accepted. In effect, I bestowed the status of answer on the child's response. It is quite possible that had I continued questioning this child's answer, it would have changed again. Once again,
the alteration of the QAQA sequence results in a change in the child's answer, this time from an "incorrect" to a "correct" formulation of the answer.

Repeating the question or challenging a child's response are two ways which alter the standard QAQA questioning format and influence the child's production of an answer. There is even a more subtle way in which information about the status of a child's answer can be transmitted to her/him.

When I asked Jenny to name another object in this same task, the following sequence took place:

Mehan: Ok, what do you call that?
Jenny: Triangle?
Mehan: pause
Jenny: Square?
Mehan: Put the square over the line.

Here, after the child had named the object, instead of going on to the next question, I paused. In the intervening time, the child produced another response, equally as hesitant as the first. This response I treated as an answer, and the interrogation continued.

In each of these examples a deviation in the QAQA questioning sequence was introduced. When the questioner did not go on to the next question, but paused, repeated the question, or questioned a response, the child changed his answer. Sometimes the change was from a correct to an incorrect answer, sometimes from an incorrect to a correct answer. In both cases, the tester's activity influenced the production of the answer.

In effect, the interrogator's interpretation of the child's behavior in this classroom exercise, like the tester or teacher's interpretation of children's behavior in tests and lessons is establishing the facticity of the
child's answer. Rather than characterize an answer as the child's exclusive production, these examples recommend seeing answers as cohort productions between teacher, tester, and student.

Not all tester activity in response to a child's request for information changes a child's response; however, often the interrogator's behavior can reify a tentative answer offered by a child. When I asked Chris to draw a circle above a line, he didn't respond directly; he placed his finger near the top of the paper, and asked, "Is this above?" It seems to me that this is another instance of a child asking me to comment on his prospective answer so that he can obtain information that will help him with his final answer. Once again, I had to respond in some way to this request. Whatever the response, the child gains supplemental information which helps him answer the question.

In this case I commented on the child's request. I said, "You put it where you think above is." As the child began to draw a circle in the vicinity of where he had had his hand a moment earlier, I began to give him the next question, thereby precluding any more searching or questioning activity on his part. That is, I accepted that tentative response as an answer. My comment and quick scoring in fact created his answer out of this somewhat hesitant response.

When I asked Lillian to "draw a triangle below the line," she inquired, "What is below?" and then, as though answering her own question, first placed her hand off to the side of the table, and then moved it over its top. Thinking this might be another instance of a child presenting behavior in search of confirmation, I made what I thought was a "neutral" comment: "Ok, you put the triangle below the line." She then drew the triangle, and was scored "wrong."
If, in fact, Lillian was "searching" for information to reinforce her trial response, then the point at which I said, "Ok, . . ." was precisely the incorrect place for a formulation of an answer to a question about below. So, if Lillian took my "Ok" to be a reinforcement of her action, then it is possible that the incorrect answer is not a sole result of her lack of knowledge, but is contributed to by my intervening conversational activity.

When Lillian was asked to draw a square on the line, she touched her finger to the line and said "on?" I replied, "yeah," and she drew a square where her finger was . It is more likely that my "yeah" reinforced the trial response that Lillian had made, thereby contributing to the production of this answer.

I have said that the child can offer "trial" responses which are in search of confirmation as answers. This "searching practice" alters the standard QAQA questioning format. It becomes incumbent upon the interrogator to respond in some way to the child's request. No matter how the interrogator responds, the child then has supplemental information which aids him/her in the production of an answer.

The child's searching practice which modifies the standard questioning sequence vividly highlights activity which is normally not noticed in interrogation encounters: the interrogator and respondent work together to jointly compose the "social fact" we call an answer-to-a-question. An answer, like an educational test or career pattern, is the product of interactional activity.

The interactional accomplishment of social facts like answers-to-questions has implications for the methods used to measure the child's competence. Each of these examples documents that an answer is more than the presentation
of a stimulus to a passive recipient. The respondent is attending to contextual cues as well as the stimulus. The evaluator is interpreting the respondent's behavior in terms of a context. Once again, these findings recommend the transformation of existing performance assessment models in the interpretive direction.

Summary and Educational Implications

This set of studies recommends that the structural facts of the school are composed of structuring interactional activity. This compositional work is seen in the minute detail of each question-answer exchange in a lesson or test. It is visible as a series of answers to questions are summarized to produce a child's test score. It is displayed as educators' documentary practices formulate the next step in a student's career.

Seeing the school as composed of interactional activity implies a transformation of research strategy to the study of the organization of education as an institution, the distribution of students, their performance, and the rest as the interactional accomplishments of the people involved. Educators, like other members of society, are immersed in practical circumstances. They have work to do, decisions to make, troubles to face. Whatever they do gets done in these practical surroundings. The study of practical, daily work of educators will reveal how the social facts of education emerge in the first place. Studying everyday educational work as practical activities would foreclose invidious comparisons with rational models of social organization. Instead of faulting educators for their lack of rationality, we could come to better understand the rationality the educators are actually using.
The interactional view of the school has practical implications for educators as well. Instead of seeing the child's abilities as private and internal states, as his exclusive possession, this view recommends seeing them as interactional accomplishments, contributed to by the child, his teachers, and other educators. To be seen as "abilities" at all, the child must make them available to others. They must appear in his verbal or nonverbal displays presented in a social context, which perhaps includes a teacher, other children, a certain classroom organization, his knowledge of expected behavior. In that these displays are both elicited and interpreted by others in social context, abilities are available only in the interaction.

Because abilities are interactional accomplishments which can only appear in some social context, educators can examine the interactional demands of various classroom and evaluation arrangements. The child's display of knowledge is strained by the structure of the questioning, the situation, the task. Each arrangement imposes some constraints on the child. Because no arrangement imposes no constraints, the search for a pure environment is fruitless; but the educator can determine if any particular arrangement is consistent with his educational goals and the child's previous experiences.

As various classroom and evaluation arrangements impose constraints on the child, he must learn the interactional demands of these arrangements. He must learn what he can say, how he can say it, when he can say it, how he can move, when he can move or be still. Classroom demands, like other normative rules, have a tacit quality; they are not stated in so many words. Teachers don't announce them as the "rules of the game" at the beginning of the school year or day. Their force emerges as children violate their tacit proscription. Even if the rules of the classroom could be posted, the list would
have an ad hoc quality, as the rules would have to be interpreted in con-
stantly changing classroom situations by teacher and students.

This situational invocation imposes interpretive demands on the child. The child who does not learn to adapt to situationally imposed constraints will have a difficult time progressing through school. Teachers are not often aware that normative rules are operating in their classroom, that the child must interpret often unstated rules for appropriate behavior in constantly changing situations. The teacher who does not recognize that each classroom arrangement, indeed, questioning encounter, imposes some constraints on the child, may unwittingly hinder the child. The teacher, who becomes aware of the demands that the social organization of the classroom, any classroom, imposes on the child, gains understanding of the child's behavior and classroom organization.

Ethnomethodology proposes that structural facts are composed of structuring social activity, but we are not normally aware of the operation of these practices, in the sense that we can describe in so many words the structuring practices that maintain our objective realities. Awareness of this structuring activity, some of which has been described in this paper as "documentary decision making practices," "measurement practices," "question answering practices," makes each person responsible for the actions of which they are a part. Our interactional activity has created the existing social structure of the school; each of us has the capability of creating alternative instructional, classroom, and educational structures. Complaints about school troubles and failures cannot be blamed on displaced bureaucrats. Each of us is responsible for the world we live in and capable of making others.
1 The social structure/social structuring metaphor is described in more detail in Mehan and Wood (forthcoming).

2 Although not done explicitly from an ethnomethodological point of view, the ongoing inter-ethnic communication survey project of Erickson and associates should be consulted as well (see especially Erickson, 1973a, 1973b; Erickson and Schultz, 1973; Schultz, 1973). Erickson and Schultz (1973) in particular talk about the verbal and nonverbal features of interaction in "gatekeeper encounters." Junior college counselors are said to formulate the counseling encounter. This conversational practice accomplishes the activity of counseling.

3 The complete transcript from which these descriptions are extracted are available from Shumsky and Mehan.

4 This table is reproduced from Mehan (1973) with permission of the publisher.

5 The numbers 2:17-24 indicate lines in the testing transcript available in Mehan (1974a).

6 The complete transcript of these lessons is in Mehan (1974a).

7 There were 74 answers to the teacher's questions in these lessons. The children presented answers with only noun phrases (e.g., "the black") 23 times; four of these submissions were treated as an "acceptable answer." Prototags ("there," "here") were submitted nine times; two were treated as acceptable answers. Six of twenty "locative noun phrases" (e.g., "under the ..."

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line") were treated as acceptable answers. That is, some 2 of answers which did not meet the teacher's own criteria of correctness were accepted during the course of these lessons.

8 Pictures from the Cooperative Primary Tests. Copyright © 1965 by Educational Testing Service. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.

9 Mehan (1974b, Chapter 4) contains a review of studies examining the meaning of educational materials from the child's point of view.

10 I am not just talking to the "white middle class bias" of tests which operate against "minority" students, although these findings could be used to lend support to that argument (see, for example, Mehan, 1973). I am saying that regardless of ethnicity or SES, the evaluation practice of using test products does not reflect the child's abilities.

11 I have borrowed the notion of "convergent" and "divergent" questions from Karplus and Thier (1967), although I probably use these terms differently than Karplus and Thier. In addition, the formulation of the structure of these questions is not their concern.
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DR. ERICKSON: I am not trained as a sociologist. My social science training is in anthropology, so I get scared when I see a sociological audience, because I know I was trained to be atheoretical and sloppy.

(General laughter)

DR. ERICKSON: But people have been calling during the meeting for "ethnography" and for getting closer to what it is that people do in everyday life. I would just like to talk a bit about how I think Mehan's material gets close to everyday life and how it prevents us from committing what I call the ethnographic fallacy. I would call what Mehan does, and what I and some others do, not ethnography but microethnography. Earlier, Mehan said he was doing a more general ethnography of the classroom in addition to the videotape study. He made that distinction between "macro" and "micro" himself.

It is a microethnography dependent on a behavior record that one can watch over and over again. In this case, it is an audiovisual record, videotape. But in any case, microethnography as I define it involved the use of some kind of machine transcription of information about face-to-face interaction.

I certainly would not want to say that records made by machines are objective records of what happens. They leave things out. Where you turn the camera on and off affects what it is you are going to see afterwards.

But at least this relatively less "mediated" medium forces us to rub our noses in the buzzing confusion of everyday life.
And it seems to me that everyday life is organized differently than what I learned in my graduate training about the organization of social structure and the nature of cultural rules. Mehan in the paper had, I thought, a very instructive sentence about rules of the classroom: "Even if the rules of the classroom could be posted, the list would have an ad hoc quality, as the rules would have to be interpreted in constantly changing classroom situations by teacher and students."

It seems to me that what is going on in everyday life is people creating a joint performance of everyday life; creating meanings, and creating definitions of who each other are as social persons. We must get close enough to the stuff of that creation, as well as to the behaviors that flow from it, so that we are not laying kinds of frozen abstractions on it, and then doing things like Bales Interaction Process Analysis or Flanders Analysis on it, or moving to even broader levels of generality to talk about social class or whatever, and then not being able to tie general categories of social identification back into the more evanescent qualities of the continuous creation of what is happening face-to-face.

I am concerned that we stay close enough to everyday life and to the generative rules for its production that we do not commit the "ethnographic fallacy" that so many of my anthropological colleagues do when they go out and look at the weird people. They come back home and say, "the Bonga-Bonga do X." And then the next observer goes, and he comes back and says, "Well, I went there, but they weren't doing X." And the truth may be that the Bonga-Bonga do X, but only under certain circumstances, with certain people.

I think that we need to stay closer to the kind of ad hoc-ing and creative improvisation that Mehan has shown us—the reflexivity of social action in everyday life.
This process is rule-governed, certainly. But there are also optional rules. I think William Labov's paper on optional rules in speaking is instructive. Edmund Leach, in *Rethinking Anthropology*, said that we have to begin to consider partial order in systems; stop trying to conceive of systems as totally ordered. There are rules, there are optional rules, and there are rules for the suspension of rules, or the creation of new ones. That is what we were seeing on Mehan's tape.

When we ignore the optional rules and the ways people get around the rules and do something else, that is where I think our quantitative studies keep coming up with large pieces of variance that we cannot explain.

Finally, on who people are and what such categories of ascription as ethnicity and race and sex can explain as independent variables, one of the things my colleagues and I have been looking at in our movies and videotapes is how the definition of the situation changes continually, as a kind of cumulative process of interaction from moment to moment, so that the social personage of the people who are interacting is continually being added to by what is happening. Our analysis follows very closely that of Cicourel on the negotiation of status and role in face-to-face interaction, Goffman on definition of situation, and Garfinkel and Sachs.

I have an example from one of our own films.

This is a counselor talking to a student. The counselor is Italian-American, the student is Polish-American, and they are in a junior college. The Polish-American student has an ambiguous grade point average, a lot of C's.

The counselor says, "What did you get in Math 101?"

Silence.
"What'd I get?" the student says, in a fairly thick, non-standard accent.

"What did you get for a grade?"

"C."

"Okay. English 101?"

"I got some incompletes."

"You got incompletes?"

"I--I (pause) did complete them."

"You didn't fail anything, did you?"

So as the student became a new social person (person who does not know the idiom "what did you get?") and could not answer that question, he got a "minus interaction point". The next thing that happened was a sort of pause and ambiguity, "what are these incompletes?" At this point we have the inference by the counselor, "You didn't fail anything, did you?"

That, in turn, says to the student, "You are someone who is a potential failable." (In Harvey Sacks' terms, "You are a stoppable and friskable.") And, having been stopped and frisked by a stopper and frisker, the rights and duties of both interactional partners have changed. The counselor has become a new social person. Now he becomes the "pig"; instead of the student's "social structure coach" he has become the "social structure cop."

Those kinds of changes are the way we are for the purposes of right now get defined and created in everyday life. One more quick one.

An Irish-American counselor talking to a black student who has again rather ambiguous grades and has not taken the right course sequences.

The counselor says, "Now, as far as next semester, let's give some thought to what you would like to take there. Do you plan on continuing on along this P.E. major?"
(He is a black P.E. Major. He is also wearing a turban and a 'tiki.)

(STUDENT) "Yeah, I guess so. I might as well keep it up, my P.E., and I want to go into counseling, too, see."

(General laughter)

(STUDENT) "to have two-way, like equal balance."

(COUNSELOR) "I see. What do you know about counseling?"

(General laughter)

(STUDENT) "Nothing. I know you have to take psychology courses of some sorts and counseling."

(That is what John Gumperz and others call a "dectic response"; a strategically content-free response.)

(COUNSELOR) "Well, it will vary from different places to different places, but essentially what you need, first of all, you need state certification, state teacher's certification. That is, you are going to have to be certified to teach in some area, English or history or whatever else happens to be your bag, P.E. Secondly, you are going to have to have a Master's degree in counseling, which, as you know, is an advanced degree."

(General laughter)

DR. ERICKSON: Okay. Now Bales scores that as "giving information."

(General laughter)

DR. ERICKSON: We showed a videotape of this back to the counselor. He said, "Now, here I am explaining to him how you get to be a counselor."

At the end of the viewing session, the counselor said, "Well, now, he knows that there's somebody who can tell him what he wants to know, and I'm sure that now he'll be able to come back and know that there's somebody here who cares about him and who can help him." And he ended up his summary by saying, "I think I really got to the kid."
(General laughter)

DR. ERICKSON: The young man stopped the tape at that point and said, "He insulted my manhood. He doesn't think I'm qualified. And he doesn't just come right out and say it, like, you know, they would in the old days, but he uses some psychology—he puts some sugar on it."

So the young man was reading the social meanings. He was doing the ethnomethodological "work." He got the metamessage. And Bales cannot account for that.
DR. LORTIE: Fred, you are a hard act to follow.

DR. ERICKSON: You should see the tape.

DR. LORTIE: Talking about moment to moment interaction, I'm wondering about my lead foot and getting it in a tape recorder that is right down here. I am beginning to understand certain developments in the White House.

(General laughter)

DR. LORTIE: I want to talk about two things. I have eight minutes. I am going to allot myself two minutes to the first and six to a full-blown Hegelian analysis.

The first has reference to method and to what is, to me, a heartening consensus that has developed in the last 24 hours, that we need to get closer to the reality that we profess to be studying.

Now, always in any social gathering, when one hears words repeated frequently, one wonders whether they may have a certain ritualistic quality. I suspect, though, that it might be a good idea for us to test the extent to which we are, in fact, committed to the notion of closeness by thinking through some of the costly implications that this would have if we really started meaning it.

For example, if we are going to urge young scholars to do close-in work where they look freshly, one hopes with the same freshness that we have seen today, we are going to have to give them more time than we normally give young scholars to prove that they should be continued as assistant professors.
and ultimately given tenure. In short, I think that the styles of work which have developed in sociology are not unrelated to the kind of career contingencies that we have in the university.

Do we intend, then, to let young assistant professors fumble, get overwhelmed with data, make mistakes, and produce a limited number of papers at the beginning of their work? Because my guess is that the lead time for productive work is greater in this kind of work than in many alternatives.

Related to that, I think, is the question whether we are ready to suspend, at least for a period of time, demands for immediate and practical pay-off. I do not know what the pay-off is of the kind of work that you are doing here, but then nor do I know what the pay-off is of inaccurate and superficial work. I think to challenge too soon the ultimate value of new developments which are based on proximity and risk-taking by the researcher would be unfortunate.

There is another quaint rule that I wonder about in the practice or career stages of our business, and I wonder about its functions, too. I wonder if Bud Mehan will be doing close-in work ten years from now.

How many of you know full professors who get their own data?

What does it mean that as we get older and higher-ranked, we spend less and less time in direct contact with respondents and more and more delegate this act?

Is this, in fact, an indication of the tendency to depreciate the importance of experienced mentalities interacting with the immediate problems of data?

I suspect it is, but I might be biased.

In any event, I hope that we mean it when we say that we are going to get closer to the things we study.
Now, I am very comfortable with the kind of analysis that we heard. I find it exciting. On the other hand, I, too, am left with certain kinds of problems, and this is where I am going to do a six-minute Hegelian analysis:

There are some claims made for ethnomethodology in the paper, and they kind of fascinate me. But first I would like to do a little speculation. Let us presume, then, this Hegelian thesis. The thesis itself is that over the last ten or fifteen years the dominant model in sociology has been structural-functional.

And let us—I hope you will forgive me—indulge in just a little caricature and overstate that in this model the past is everything. There are not too many problems or puzzles, really. The prior dominance of the unseen hand of the market has been replaced by a magical wand which insures that functions will find their proper structures.

It is actually—and I do not think this is too much of a caricature—a historically deterministic point of view. The problem simply is to trace out the inner brilliance of our society.

On the other hand, when we turn to ethnomethodology or construction sociology that treats outcomes as on-the-spot, history is missing. I would say we have a kind of radical ahistoricism. Every event is a new event. We look to see what people are doing now, how they are creating. These are the verbs that we use.

Now, I am not comfortable with either extreme historicism, which leaves for me the problem of change, nor am I content with extreme ahistoricism. What teachers and principals and superintendents and professors of education and everybody else does is to some extent, at least, predetermined
by the past and by the structures which pre-exist the structural refinements, or whatever you want to call it, in which they are engaged.

I am puzzled, and I do not really have an answer, as to how we move toward that blessed state of synthesis, but I have just a couple of hunches that were stimulated by Bud's paper.

First, he has a section that he did not read in which he reports on teacher conferences about kids. The manifest context is, what will we do about these children, how many are you going to hold back, et cetera. And it sounds frighteningly casual. These kids' fates are being settled in a small conference by the teachers.

What interested me was a little different from what interested Bud. It was that there were no instances of all of mutual questioning. One teacher did not question another.

Now, is this because teachers are dumb and lack analytic capacity? That is often the implication of what we read about teachers. But I think there might be other kinds of explanations. For example, maybe we have a normative order here in which the main rule is you do not challenge a colleague, even if you suspect he or she is really moronic.

Okay. Now, let us just for a moment play with the idea that what might be going on is that there may be a dominant norm which proscribes mutual questioning.

Why? What is there about this particular occupation, particular situations confronted by people in this situation, that leads them into formulating this kind of rule?

Then we start fiddling around with functional possibilities. And there are probably long lists. Then I think the trick would be to eliminate
those which are entirely inconsistent with the observed data, come back again
in subsequent close inquiry, and test among the remaining alternatives, in
short, by moving outward, back to the context.

Part of our difficulty may be that we start too often with structure
in the large and too infrequently with structure in the small. Perhaps we
should work as often, at least, from close-in observations about reality,
noticing repetitive patterns, asking what functions may be served, and work-
ing backwards in that way.

Another example in the paper that fascinated me reminded me very much
of Holt's Why Students Fail. He has a section where he talks about the tend-
ency of math teachers, elementary teachers, to go to the board, hold a piece
of chalk, and say, "Two and two is ffff--fff--fffr--fffr--," to keep cuing the answer.

Now this alarms Holt. This is typical oppression; the middle class
teacher is stopping children from learning. Well, maybe. I suspect something
else might be going on.

I think teachers need a hell of a lot of reassurance that something is
happening in the classroom. I believe they are basically uncertain about the
nature of their work, and that whatever kinds of positive reassurance they
can produce, consciously or unconsciously, they are going to produce.

That raises an interesting question, then, about the interpretation of
these various kinds of interactions with kids. It might take the research in
quite a different direction. If instead of trying to re-prove that teachers
are prejudiced against blacks and people who are different from themselves--
let us try something else for a change.

What if, in fact, there are certain rates at which they use cues to
help kids get the right answer? How frequently do certain kinds of teachers
stimulate positive rates of response?
I suspect that history teacher we saw is a very insecure teacher. I do not think that he likes to feel that the kids do not know the answer. He uses an awful lot of cheerleader tactics. I do not know; at least it is a possibility.

But rather than looking at individuals, I suspect that looking at many cases over time, comparing rates, might lead us in a Durkheimian direction where we are thinking about patterns in terms of needs of particular categories of people.

Again, I do not wish to pretend that I know how the synthesis will occur between a concern with the larger structures and the past of our society and the emergent parts of it, but I hope that ethnomethodologists will not be as guilty as some structural functionalists of believing they have the whole truth.

(General applause)
DR. KITSUSE: Well, considering the time, I do not want to belabor some of the points that have already been made, and it will not surprise you that I join the chorus of the "get back into the school" movement.

I think that it is very encouraging at this kind of a conference to find that this suggestion and proposal is not covered over with the rhetoric that we usually get of the macro-micro and the quantitative-qualitative dichotomies to blur the kinds of issues that we have to face; namely, to find out what some of the processes are that are producing the structures that we are all presumably interested in. So I want to "sixth" that suggestion and go on to another point: the substance of some of the materials in the videotape, particularly the testing, which I will comment on in a somewhat different way than has been already discussed.

Clearly, in our system, the testing results are very heavily weighted with regard to the kinds of decisions that are made. And, as Dan Lortie suggested, sometimes in very casual ways, important, fateful decisions are processed with regard to where the kids will go, et cetera.

I think that one of the things that one might infer or draw implications from with regard to the materials that Bud Mehan has shown us is that this whole process of testing is wide open with regard to the question of reliability, and God knows about validity. It seems to me a very questionable position to take, to view the results of these kinds of materials as suggesting that what we want to do is to control more and more of the variables here--
whether or not the tester or the testee is of one sex, color, or race, and to improve the results of the tests.

I think that it would only lead to a more arbitrary selection from this whole range of kinds of behavior that Bud has shown us, as to what is supposed to be a significant characteristic of the testees. I think that what we all have to understand from this is the interactional character of the product called the test score. So I am not so hell-bent on moving in the direction of improving the testing procedure itself, but perhaps raise some questions as to whether we want to go in that direction at all, and to start looking for other kinds of results of educational procedures.

Another implication I drew from the tapes, and one I think that has been alluded to here, is the kind of attitude that the testing experience generates. Not only the testing, but the whole teaching interaction apparently generates something that perhaps we might call the schooling attitude in the child or the student. Most of us, I think, see this schooling attitude at the end of the line, or near the end of the line, when we get the students into college. There is a colleague in my department who says that education dummies everybody, by which he means the schooling process dummies everybody, and by the time they get up to the college level, they are pretty dummied up.

I experience this—given the fact that I do feel that it is important that students have the experience not only of answering questions but of questioning questions—when I lay on an assignment of that kind and make it much more open. The first response that I have been getting over a period of quarters is, well, what is it that you want us to do? And this is always what you get back, and I finally have taken the position of asking, well, what
is it that you want to get out of this kind of assignment? It is very, very
disconcerting.

As I was sitting there laughing at how the child was being very atten-
tive to what the teacher wanted, one can cry a little bit, because it is a
very sad thing that you find this when you get to the college level; that
students will not allow themselves to question the questions, and to raise
the question as to what it is they want to do with assignments that they have
got.

Now, having said that, I think that one of the things that we have
been talking about here over the past 24 hours has to do with policy issues.
This is going to be a very thin and tenuous kind of connection, but I think
that there is a connection between this kind of schooling attitude that we
produce in the process of putting children through the formal educational
process, and the question of how we would deal with this problem of youth in
transition to adulthood that was brought up in Bob Clark's paper.

It seems to me that these days, if you go around to campuses and ask
how are things on campus, they say, well, it is very quiet this year, with a
sigh of relief, as opposed to, presumably, the late '60's when things were not
so quiet. And what was it about the late '60's that made them less quiet,
apart from the fact that they were throwing bricks and whatever?

In terms of what we are trying to produce, from an educational point of view, in the late '60's there was a questioning that had begun among
students. And when you ask what might we now do in picking up from the
and developing that questioning with kinds of concerns about being more rig-
orous about the kinds of questioning you do, rather than just having rhetor-
cical flourishes on everything you are asking, I think that that is really a
genuine opportunity that we have. And I think that we tend to sit back and, with a sigh of relief, say that everything is quiet now and we can go on with the dummying process. And I think that is a matter of some concern.

(General applause)
DR. CHARNER: What this brief discussion will attempt to do is suggest how a bridging of quantitative and qualitative methodology may help sociologists and other educational researchers better understand the process of schooling.

It is interesting to note that the three previous paper presenters (Charles Bidwell, Burton Clark and William Spady), whom I consider to be traditional sociologists, each said that as sociologists we have to get into the schools and classrooms to study the social processes, social structures, and indirectly, if we accept Mehan's thesis, the social structuring of the school. Ethnomethodology, participant observation techniques and conversational analysis are three qualitative approaches for studying these processes.

To show how a bridging of qualitative and quantitative methodologies can be useful I would like to raise two questions and try to quickly answer them.

1. In general, how can ethnomethodology be useful to the more quantitatively oriented sociologist in the study of schooling?

2. What specific characteristics of ethnomethodology make it useful to a researcher studying the schooling process?

In responding to the first question I would like to raise four points. First, I believe that ethnomethodology suggests a way of closely looking at the interactions and interactional processes that take place in classrooms. A researcher utilizing ethnomethodology could study teacher-student, student-
student and teacher-teacher interactions in daily activities or take a comparative look at the teacher and student as socializing agents.

Second, ethnomethodology raises or tries to clarify some of the problems of schooling. In this way ethnomethodology can be used as a tool for policy analysis in that it raises some of the problems that policy issues and analyses should be directed toward.

Third, ethnomethodology may help in the quantifying of variables such as "learning to learn" or the softer variables which Bidwell discussed in his paper. From this we could start developing more quantitative measures of what are now "qualitative variables" and build survey-type studies which are more generalizable, and whose results could lead to program development and changes in classrooms and schools.

Finally, I see ethnomethodology as a good evaluative tool. It allows the researcher to view the kinds of interactions and processes that are taking place in classrooms and analyze the effects of different programs, or new programs, on students.

Turning to my second question, I feel that there is a mass of information available on the kinds of videotapes, tapes and interactions which Mehan presented. Different viewers of the videotapes can view the same data and see different kinds of motivations, reactions and interactions taking place. This is a very important characteristic of this type of methodology. While the quantitative methodologist is concerned with replication, variability seems to be important in this type of study; variability in how the data are perceived. If we were to view the videotape again we would see many things that we missed the first time. This is one of the major strengths of this kind of methodology. A researcher can go back to the original data many times.
to see how the different interactions and social structuring activities
effect what is going on in the classroom.

In viewing the video tapes, presented along with this paper, I tried
to view the situations a little differently than the way Mehan was present-
ing them. I will now attempt to take the data from the tapes, as I saw it,
and relate it back to the four points I raised in response to my first ques-
tion. In addition I will relate this to some of the issues that Bidwell and
Spady raised in their papers.

By providing a way of taking a closer look at the interactions and
processes that take place in classrooms ethnomethodology allows us to a) com-
pare convergent and divergent styles, b) study teachers as socializing agents,
or students as the agents of socialization, or c) analyze the effectiveness
of a teacher, specifically looking at his or her pedagogical expertise, sub-
ject matter expertise, charisma and empathy (the four components of an ef-
fective teacher suggested by Spady).

As suggested earlier, ethnomethodology can raise or clarify some of
the problems of schooling. Mehan's videotape of a number of testing situa-
tions shows how problematic testing really is. By making us aware of the
specific problems such as tester-testee interaction we, as researchers, can
try and make testing a better and more accurate science.

The quantification of variables through an ethnomethodological analy-
sis is not as easy to specify. If we take Spady's expertise variable and
look at the history teacher, from the videotape, on the dimensions of peda-
ogical and subject matter expertise we could conclude that he has some sub-
ject matter expertise but he is very low in pedagogical expertise; I would
suggest that if Spady had the opportunity to view this bit of data, he could
operationalize many of the variables he would want to study in a more quantitative analysis of teacher effectiveness. With regard to "learning to learn," which Bidwell spoke about in his paper, I would say that Jenny, in the videotape, "learned to learn" with the three boxes. She learned after the first situation, with the two boxes, that she does not know where it (the object) is and the tester does not want her to make any kind of statement (guess) about where it is. I think she learned how to learn what the tester really expected from her. While this does not suggest how a variable, such as "learning to learn," can be quantified it does help the researcher clarify an idea which is a first step in operationalizing a variable for a survey analysis (quantitative method).

As a tool for evaluation, this type of methodology can be very beneficial. If we were interested in evaluating the use of rewards in a classroom setting many of the interactions shown in the videotapes could be useful. In the numbers lesson, for instance, the following dialogue took place.

Teacher: (To a girl in the class) "What is that word?"

Girl: "one"

Teacher: (To Jenny) "What is the word?"

Jenny: "one"

While the teacher rewarded the first girl for giving a correct answer, she did not reward Jenny for giving the same correct answer. There was an inconsistency on the part of the teacher.

A second example shows how important rewards are to children. During a lesson on combining words one child pushed another's hand away so that the teacher would call on him and he could get the verbal reward from the teacher. These two vignettes show how important rewards are in classrooms and could
provide important information to a researcher who was evaluating the reward structure in classrooms.

Another process which could be of interest for evaluation is the nature of classroom interactions. In addition to suggesting the nature of the reward structure in the classroom the previous two examples portray two different types of interactions. The first was a teacher-student interaction, while the second showed student-student interaction. By viewing these, and other interactions, we could get a good idea about that nature of different types of interactions in the classroom and evaluate them on a number of criteria such as direction of interaction, length of interaction, roles within the interaction and intensity of the interaction.

In this discussion I have tried to show how ethnomethodology can show the internal variability of classrooms and schools and help researchers and practitioners understand the schooling process and its interactional components. In addition, I have tried to show how quantitative methodologists can benefit from the approaches and findings of qualitative methodologists. The quantitative and qualitative researcher should work together to try and answer some basic questions which will help to make schooling better for students.
Social scientists who do educational research on equality have been struggling like worms on a fish hook ever since the Coleman report brought to public attention the findings on inequality of educational achievement as measured by tests between blacks and whites and between other ethnic minorities and whites. The size of the difference in test scores when social class is uncontrolled is enormous. The difference is unthinkable and unbearable to a generation of intellectuals nurtured on the idea of environmental differences as the major sources of IQ differentials.

What has really built a trap for the intellectual is the patent failure of two major attempts to "explain" this achievement test differential by demonstrating that racial differences could be greatly softened by equalizing school resources or by integrating schools. At first, social scientists reasoned that if they could show gross inequalities in school resources between blacks and whites they could simply explain differential achievement in this fashion. When Coleman et al. (1966) failed in this attempt, they turned to the next environmental explanation, i.e., if differences in resources between schools which blacks attended were positively associated with differential achievement, holding constant family background characteristics, then one could argue for equalization of resources as a simple cure for black failures in the achievement area. Alas, one cannot read the results in this fashion; schools seem more alike than different in their effects on pupils.

A third attempt to explain black-white achievement differential in terms of environmental differences was the attempt to evaluate the effects of
school desegregation. If we changed the environment of the minorities by putting them in richer, whiter schools, would we reduce differentials in achievement? Survey after survey has compared the achievement of blacks in segregated vs. integrated schools. Clearly, simple-minded mixing of bodies in schools does not dramatically change black achievement scores—standing back from the current controversies, one can see that people are currently arguing over whether or not there are statistically significant achievement gains—not whether or not there are socially significant achievement gains.

The failure of these environmental hypotheses has led to deep discouragement on the part of the educational researchers—in despair, some have even fallen into the geneticist camp of explanation of achievement differences as a function of nature rather than nurture. Others have turned away from formal education altogether and are searching the underbrush for a modern industrial equivalent of the "bush school" of traditional societies.

My position on the question of explanation for black-white achievement differences and explanation for the effect of schools on students is at odds with many of my social scientist colleagues. I take the position that black-white achievement differentials, as well as the enormous differential in achievement between individuals receiving the same education, are the product of the social system we have called formal education. First and foremost, they are a product of that social construct of human ability usually called intelligence. Second, these achievement differences are a product of the social system within each school which define the rules of the game, setting up a contest where winners are highly rewarded and losers come to believe they deserve what they get in life because of their innate stupidity. The "game" played in each school has in association with it particular norms;
and these norms are built into the social structure of each classroom--into the perceptions of teachers and students--into the narrow range of tasks called educational--and into the evaluation system of grading and testing.

Although there is no accepted theoretical definition of intelligence, every school child thinks he knows what it is to be "smart" in school. Schools operate on the assumption of a single general dimension of human ability. From early in a child's career, his teacher, parents and peers attempt to divine where he fits along this dimension. Once this is adjudged, expectations for future educational success are formed. These expectations have great potential in triggering self-fulfilling prophecies. Those who expect to do well at new intellectual tasks have a much better chance of actually doing so than those who expect to do poorly.

The exceedingly narrow range of school tasks, their common core of demands for skills in explicit, standard English, and the impoverished nature of classroom interaction where teachers do most of the talking, all help to support the belief system that human ability is uni-dimensional.

By some great coincidence, skills for school tasks and abilities corresponding to the socially imposed definition of "smartness" are highly correlated with characteristics socialized into middle and upper class children. The IQ test and its first cousin, the standardized achievement test have captured these very social class differences in language usage and in formal manipulation of abstractions. Large black-white achievement test differences are not at all surprising when one takes the kinds of abilities stressed in school into account. Where we have all become seriously confused is by mistaking school-related abilities as representative of human intellectual abilities.
Boyles (1972) advances the proposition that the similarity of the school's definition of "smartness" and middle class socialization practices is no coincidence. This is a device whereby the social division of labor in the larger society is legitimated by the success of the children of the upper classes and failure of children of the lower classes in the school setting. This makes all concerned feel that inequalities in occupational success which are hinged on inequalities in educational success are legitimated and have come about through the operation of a fair contest and allocation mechanism.

The idea of the meritocracy is in the very bones of the public school. The fact that grades and IQ are not at all well related to success in the adult labor market, once you take into account the automatic benefits of holding a credential in gaining a job, does not weaken the faith held by teachers, social scientists and psychologists. What faith am I talking about? I am talking about the deeply held belief that the kind of convergent right-answer thinking rewarded in school and the kind of fluency in speaking, reading and writing standard English which are prerequisites for success at almost every school task, is the major characteristic of human intelligence and is responsible for one's success in life. These characteristics will indeed predict success--success at future schooling and test-taking experiences but not success within adult family life or success in political and community life and so on and so on.

This uni-dimensional construct of general human ability assists in every way possible to activate self-fulfilling prophecies in the school. Thus teachers and students are not at all surprised to find that some students are consistently good at every new school task and some students are
poor at every new task. As a matter of fact, the schoolroom allows one to see such a limited range of one's fellow student's abilities, that when Hoffman (1972) did his study of Perceived Academic Ability, he found that students behaved as if they knew no more about their classmates than this ranking when it came to a new non-academic task. They acted no differently than laboratory subjects who only knew names and test scores of the other participants.

The norms of accountability and evaluation built into each and every school help to account for the fact that there is such enormous variation in achievement scores within each school and so little difference between schools. Schools operate as a selection and sorting device separating winners from losers. Students are allocated to success and failure categories in a universalistic fashion, rarely approximated in the adult world. There is no parallel in adult life for the clarity with which a child comes to see himself as a failure—adults have freedom to withdraw; evaluation is never so unmistakable and so public. In adult life there are many more bases for preservation of self-esteem than in a competitive classroom situation. The adult is rarely fired for incompetence, but the school child experiences failing grades as a way of life. Part and parcel of this evaluation process is the norm of individual accountability, borrowed from early capitalist society. It is still the hallmark of the public schools for students, although never for teachers or administrators. The student is Weber's classic bureaucratic employee, evaluated and controlled from above.

In selecting out an area for proposed modification I am looking at the variance in performance within each school. The researchers have tried to examine differences between schools where blacks do better or worse. In con-

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In contrast, I am looking at variance within schools. I am positive that the social system itself is responsible for much of the gap in achievement between the top and bottom of the distribution within each school. Even on standard achievement criteria, my most general hypothesis is that this range could be greatly reduced if the social system were modified.

If one looks at the variance in black achievement, one finds that the difference of the average student in a school from the average student of all schools is not nearly as great as the difference of students from the average student in their own school. Another way of putting this is that the variation between schools in the Coleman data for northern blacks is only 10 to 14% of the total variance for four different grade levels whereas variance within a school accounts for the rest (Smith, 1972).

Traditionally, educational researchers have viewed this variance within a school as a given, based on individual differences in ability. Even though I do not deny that there are individual differences, I am asserting that the present choice of school tasks, social definition of human ability and the competitive evaluation system act to exaggerate initial individual differences by means of producing generalized expectations to do well or poorly over a variety of tasks.

To put my proposition more experimentally, if someone would allow us to create a school with an evaluation system yielding a complex profile for each child, where tasks were so varied that the evaluation profile would look like a range of craggy mountains, a school where it was assumed that each child would reach a criterion level of performance on basic skills of reading and writing, a school where groups were held accountable for their performance at educational tasks as often as individuals are held accountable—
I would predict that we would obtain dramatic achievement gains in blacks, chicanos, lower class children— even on standard measures of achievement.

I realize that the burden of proof lies with me; furthermore, I realize that the task of demonstrating these propositions is more than one can accomplish in a lifetime of research. Fortunately, I am not alone in my hypothesizing. The impact of a study like Rist's (1970) lay precisely in its hypothesis that the organization of the classroom into winners and losers was causally related to the objective achievement differences. This classroom organization, in turn, was based on the teacher's formation of expectations in terms of the child's social class. Rist illustrated with his extended case study just how such classroom organization based on expectations could lead to prophecies being fulfilled. Some educators conclude from Rist that one should avoid ability grouping within classrooms and that this will be sufficient to prevent the operation of self-fulfilling prophecies. This is far too superficial a remedial change.

If the evaluation processes in the classroom remain competitive and if the teachers and students continue to believe that there is a single dimension of human ability, public recitation and rich opportunities for invidious comparison in the heterogeneous classroom will be just as effective in triggering self-fulfilling prophecies as ability grouping. This is why tracking vs. non-tracking or ability grouping vs. non-ability grouping studies have led to equivocal results. The social system principles remain the same even though the means of attaching social labels of "smartness" and "dumbness" change.

The social system features I have selected as critical operate in an all black school, such as the one Rist studied, to produce a large number of
black students who feel incompetent and stupid at school tasks with which they are familiar and at any new cognitive tasks, even those of occupational training programs presented later in life. I propose that the same system operates with the same effects in a middle class all white school; speak to any teacher in the junior college system if you want evidence of the chronic expectations to fail found in white students who have been consistent low performers in elementary school and secondary school. The main difference between the middle-class white school and the lower class black school lies in the authority system with a much greater autonomy granted to children in middle class schools. Control is the "name of the game" in the lower class school. Also, the proportion of A's given out in lower class black schools is smaller so there are proportionately more losers in the lower class black school than in the middle class white school.

In the first part of my talk I have been describing the way a single dimension of achievement status gets built up in classrooms. I have hypothesized that those who have high achievement status have generalized expectations to do well on new cognitive tasks while those who have low achievement status have generalized expectations to do poorly. Furthermore, these expectations are not only held by ego for himself or herself; others in the classroom--the teacher and the peers--often hold the same expectation for ego's performance as ego does for himself or herself. The classroom is a public situation where evaluations by the teacher are often public and where grading practices provide a single, simple basis for invidious comparison. Teacher expectations, which are the source of so much interest on the part of the researchers, are only one variable in this interactive system. Generalized expectations based on achievement status are capable of triggering self-ful-
filling prophecies, producing a greater consistency in performance of the high-rank students across a wide range of curricular tasks, and a greater consistency in performance of the lows, than we would see if we could prevent these expectations from being formed and activated.

When we come to analyze the racially desegregated classroom, the features of the social system I have been describing have an important interaction with the presence of a sharp difference in social status, i.e., the difference in racial membership. The difficulty of adding social status distinctions between the students to this picture is that social status can act as a basis for generalized expectations for competence. What makes matters worse is that when one integrates a junior high school, one is often combining black children who are objectively less skilled in reading, writing, and speaking standard English. This means that the expectations based on being black will operate to exaggerate the expectations based on being a low achiever.

My own research and that of my associates has proceeded in the exact opposite direction from my presentation this evening. We started with the effect of differences in racial status on small group interaction (Cohen, 1972), and are only now working our way toward the racially-integrated classroom where we are forced to deal with already evolved differentials in academic skills. In the article I have asked you to read (Cohen, 1973), I describe the research process by which we learned one way to modify expectations based on race so that whites would not dominate the interaction process when we brought interracial groups together on new tasks. Susan Roper and I (Cohen and Roper, 1973) showed in the experiment called Expectation Training that we could modify these "racist" expectations only by treating both blacks and
whites—by having the blacks become teachers of the whites. In the field experiment in Oakland, called the Center for Interracial Cooperation, Dr. Mark Lohman, Marlaine Katz and I showed that effects of Expectation Training could prevent a pattern of white dominance from forming and that the patterns would not reappear even after several weeks of intense classroom interaction (Cohen, 1973).

It was in this field study that we began to experiment with restructuring the classroom in order to foster the preservation and reinforcement of equal status relations between blacks and whites. We reasoned that if we structured the classrooms of the Interracial Center conventionally, with competition and conventional academic tasks, that we would create an achievement status order which would be correlated with racial membership. The net effect would be a reemergence of white dominance in interracial interaction; we would effectively defeat the purpose of Expectation Training—in other words, having defeated the tendency to use race as a basis for evaluation we would now see groups where evaluations were being based on one's perceived academic ability—amounting to the same interaction pattern of white dominance.

I describe in the article two key theoretical studies which led us to choose the key features of the classroom which should be changed. The study by Hoffman and myself (1972) showed that perceived academic ability in an ongoing classroom has the power to act just like a status characteristic in triggering self-fulfilling prophecies on a non-intellectual non-academic game of Seal Hunting. Thus we decided to avoid conventional academic tasks and situations allowing invidious comparisons which would act to build up such an academic status ordering. Secondly, Awang Had's (1972) experiment showed that when individual accountability as opposed to group accountability was
used, the effects of social status differences were greatly aggravated. Low status children were much less likely to be active and influential if they were told that their contribution to the group product could count negatively or positively toward an evaluation of them. Therefore, in the cooperative classrooms of the field experiment we did not utilize individual accountability; the curriculum structured multiple group tasks, and the work groups were accountable for their products.

Results of the field experiment indicated that Expectation Training was not the only way to treat expectations based on race. The boys in our alternative treatment showed strong patterns of equal status behavior which persisted over the weeks of classroom interaction. Furthermore, working in the cooperative classroom structure appeared to have effectiveness as a treatment by itself.

It was really only after we had carried out this experiment of creating a radical new social structure that we were forced to realize just how powerful a manipulation this can be. We now feel that the key aspects of our alternative structure were its multiple task character, its use of group accountability, and its use of high-participation cooperating groups. On a more general level, we obviously did not create a selecting and sorting organization but an organization ostensibly designed to teach interfacial cooperation, where everyone was most certainly expected to be successful in learning how to cooperate.

At the moment, we have turned back to some more controlled studies which will allow us to capitalize on just which features of the social system were successfully manipulated in the summer school. Then we should be ready to try to combine the more conventional reading and writing skills
training with a multiple-task curriculum. In a multiple-task curriculum, people do make evaluations of each other as doing better or worse on a given task. But one's standing on one task is very unlikely to be related to one's standing on another task.

In closing I would like to make a plea for turning away from surveys of school effects, whether or not the schools are integrated or segregated. I do not believe anything constructive will appear from such studies. Rather, we need to take a fresh look at what we have been calling schooling and a fresh look at the range of tasks we have been calling educational. We need to conceptualize social system changes within schools—and this is far broader gauge than trying to manipulate teacher expectations.

I am talking about systematic experimentation using rigorous conceptualization. I am not talking about the creation of "far-out" schools where everyone operates in an ideological fervor. It will be necessary to move back and forth from laboratory to field settings and it will be necessary to rethink the whole issue of human abilities in order to create seriously modified school environments. This is a long-range task made more difficult by the unacceptability of the premises in my argument to so many people.

As fellow sociologists interested in making a difference in the field of education, I therefore urge you to give up those endless questionnaire studies on "school effects" and start to work in learning how to manipulate the social system to the learner's advantage.
Footnote

1. In this study groups of youngsters from the same classroom, whose different ranking on academic ability was perceived by all four members of the groups, showed differential rates of participation on a new task. This differential participation was predicted by classroom ranking. This occurred despite the fact that the criterion task was a game involving mostly luck, and was unrelated to classroom skills. (See Hoffman and Cohen, 1972).

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DR BRADFORD: Let me differentiate the comments I have. The first comments are directed toward the immediate issue at hand, Professor Cohen's work on the modification of the impact of social structures. I imagine civility would dictate this priority. My second set of comments are directed at the informal agenda items, the issue of policy-oriented versus basic research, and perhaps a more fundamental issue of action versus research. I think that the two sets of comments can be meaningfully related.

Let me say first that most of my remarks on Professor Cohen's work are based on her papers that were circulated at the beginning of the conference. I have not had an opportunity to digest her paper that was just read to us. But, I believe my second set of comments will be at least partially appropriate to some parts of it.

The series of studies that Cohen cites give some important suggestions about how expectations can be manipulated and how the expectations can, in turn, influence behavior in classroom-like settings. To me, the findings that may have been contrary to the researcher's initial expectations are particularly of interest. This includes the results of the first lab experiment, that both parties to the social action must be given new expectations, not just the victim of the low status assignments. The other particularly interesting result is the success of the alternative procedure in the summer school setting and its implication that the school authority structure is an effective determinant of student perceptions of peer status.
The sum of these findings would seem to have a number of implications for other research and let me comment on at least one of them. This concerns the impact of the organizational context jointly with the effect of group versus individual accountability. First as to the impact of the organizational context. Thoughtful school administrators should be pleased to see this context effect, for the schools put a lot of effort into creating a status system. Some of this is obvious; the teachers have titles, uniforms (in terms of their dress codes), and privileges that give them a higher status than the students. (Most schools have given up the platforms from which the teachers can look down on the students.) In turn, the administrators have symbols of a still higher status; privileges, servants in the form of office workers, and private, sometimes posh, offices. This is supposed to be a functional status system. It is supposed to impress students, teachers and parents as to how the system will operate best. The school organization also lets it be known that it has a status system for students. Seniors have more status than freshmen; students who obey the rules have more status than those who don't, and hard workers and achievers have higher status. Many people would argue that these are functional and relevant status factors. What I think is the main issue for this conference is that the school as an organization lets it be known that there are other factors to one's status; factors I am sure this group finds to be both irrelevant and dysfunctional for the schools' objectives. Many of these are equally obvious; rich over the poor, the white over the black, and the males over the females.

These preference systems of the authorities are not lost on the kids. The system of rewards and punishments is handed out to the students in part on the basis of their acting within this imposed status hierarchy, which, I
hope, brings me to the relationship of this to the issue of individual versus group accountability. I could argue that Cohen's studies show that organization of the summer school did, in fact, communicate to the individual student that he was to behave in a noncompetitive way, that the individual student would be held accountable for any behaviors that were not group oriented.

I believe there are a number of alternative ways of viewing the results of these studies. And as ever, this implies more research is needed. Before leaving the academic comments, let me note two things: There is an increasing amount of evidence from a variety of sources indicating that the degree of control and the expectations of the school authority structure has a significant impact on the student behaviors. The other note is a cautionary one: The results obtained in the study of the special summer program may be difficult to replicate during the regular school session. Since the treatment variable in these studies is a manipulation of student expectations, you must be concerned about whether you have selected students who are especially sensitive to this kind of manipulation. Also I might argue that students of junior high age who can be talked into going to a summer school are, in fact, the particularly manipulable ones.

And now, let me make some brief comments to the other agenda. As to the issue of action versus research, I believe Professor Cohen's work is relevant here. As a group we have some status. We have titles, we have bibliographies and we have resumes, all of which show we have special powers, and that other people recognize and give deference to our expertise. That's status. This status gives us power, not much I admit, but some. Given this status, we can sometimes tell other people what to do. We have the argument that we know more about the issue than they do, and we are really doing what
is best for them in the long run. We don't do it this directly. But, we do have the power to get to the people who are controlling things; the administrator, the media, the money. We can show our badges and credentials and then give our views. That is real power. And I believe it is the most effective weapon that we as a group of sociologists, educators, students or scholars have. I don't believe we have any choice between action and research. It is only so long as we are recognized as having special, objectively derived knowledge, that we have that special power to influence things. Give up research and we give up our status. Lose the status and we lose the special power to tell other people what to do.

I said there would be some comment on the issue of policy versus basic research. To make it very brief, I believe the distinction is often exaggerated. Much too often research is called policy oriented if it is asking for a simple answer to a hard question that would not have been asked if the evidence of long-term research had been examined. Still, the people who make decisions should do it on the basis of fact. It is your responsibility to give them the best answers you can within the real world constraints of time and money. It also is your responsibility to convince the policy-maker that the quick answer to the seemingly obvious question may not be what he really wants. Use your status to convince him he needs the answers only long-term research can give.
DR. ELLIS: This is an item from the New York Times, Year 2055.

"It has been incontrovertibly discovered, proved on the Smith and Wesson IQ test, controlling for everything conceivable, that white people are more intelligent than black people." You're in the future now. "Immediate concern was expressed for the effects this finding might have on the Presidential aspirations of Dr. Arthur Jensen, but even more important was concern for the massive unemployment among educational researchers that might ensue. But some concern was expressed for the possible political outcomes, and impact upon other minorities, of this finding.

"However, there is some hope, based on research being conducted on the West Coast of this country that, in fact, despite such findings, whites can be convinced, and so can blacks, that the blacks are just as smart as whites if the school class is organized the right way. Dr. Jensen has promised that the correction of this particular perversion of education for white students can be dealt with if he is elected President, and he believes there needs to be a re-education of whites to their true superior genetic endowment."

The point is probably as multiple as there are those of you out there to hear it. But without immersing myself in the religion of science, which upon spending my time with architects I have learned to ignore, it is very clear that there is some stupidity on our part in really doing this American thing once again to another issue. That is, we look to prove that we can act morally if we can demonstrate scientifically that it is a correct act.
I would like us to get off that roller coaster. We have jobs that are very nice; we make tremendous refinements in our measures. We measure what the community of our peers says is worth measuring, and that, of course, determines the view of the world we have.

But, in fact, I would hope--although I have no confidence whatsoever--that if science did not prove that I was equal to you, in fact that would not reorder your institutions. That is my basic point about the policy issues of this.

Secondly, I would like to comment, not so much, really, on the methodology or the findings of the research, but on something else that has come to interest me.

The particular argument that I would like to make is that we should reach into the world of unmediated knowledge of the participants in social systems of schools and find a way to explicate that knowledge; knowledge that is not mediated by self-consciousness and training in universities. Because whatever participants in social systems say about what they do, they never get it wrong, or if they do, we have ways of handling that.

One of the things we do for them as professional investigators of social systems is to have an image of their world for them. That is what we do as sociologists. We look at the world, and then we say, ah ha, there it is; there is a norm, and here is a role, and it is being enacted. And we construe the world and the order in the world for the participants in various social systems.

Unfortunately for the social systems we look at, we often impose on the order out there the rules, norms, and features of that society we live in, and that moral world is very different from the world out there, so that
the canons of science come into play. We cannot look at anything we cannot talk about with some rigor, so that the social systems we look at wind up having features that are required by the world we live in. The people who live in social systems cannot make that mistake, by and large, because they haven't gone through that socialization.

The problem I see with that is that the world of policy-makers is full of images of social systems that have been generated by participants in the social systems of social science. That is what they operate on. When they want to know how to act in a moral, or at least political way—let's separate those—what they do is they reach back into their bag of official images, pull one out and say look, we funded research, and here is what it looks like.

If they're hostile to race mixture, they say, it doesn't make any difference. Let's forget it. Stop those buses. If they fund the right kind of research that looks at a strategic set of variables that ignores that, they can say, yes, it does make a difference; let's keep it up.

I think that the problem resides in the fact that the canons of the social system of social science require that we have discrete and clear descriptive images of social systems and explanatory images of social systems. In other words, as ethnologists and ethnographers, we should be able to say as clearly as possible what is there. And if we're really good, at some point we can say why it is there and why it functions that way.

Seldom are we held responsible for having moral images. What I mean by that is, seldom are we obliged to articulate for the general consumption of policy-makers, or just plain old folks, a world informed by what we know about man—man embraces woman—what our best hopes are for humanity, to which we refer our research.
An example: At a recent meeting I attended there was an intense struggle over whether to investigate segregated schools as well as desegregated schools.

One person asked: "Would you study the relative merits of slavery and freedom?"

But, in fact, what about that? Because what our struggle was around was, how about doing what some medical people are doing now? Let us focus on health: let us take all our baggage, all our rigor, all our science, and look at a good desegregated school, an effectively—as we called it, I believe—an effectively desegregated school. Pull out the stops.

My notion was that we would look to the participants to find for us whether or not it was good or bad, effective or not effective. So what I would hope is that, primarily through the medium of the people who have to live out the stuff we're programming for them, we discover what some morally informed images of social life are and conduct our research through those we select, through those moral images we select as people.

Mehan anticipated a lot of what I was going to say. But the last sentence in his paper is, "Each of us is responsible for the world we live in and are capable of making other worlds."

Now, he says he is not sure that he wants to determine what that world is like, and I know better. After a couple of Scotches, I think I could check out where his mind is headed on those things.

But what I ask of Elizabeth Cohen, if you look at the funny little mathematics of my news release, is when you take out all the science, is the moral image implied in the research you conduct and the results you come up with—does that come to a world you would like to see?
What does it mean to manipulate relationships, the social system of the classroom, that way? And if that could be interpreted into the world of 2055, would we want that to take place?

When we invent a social system from our investigations, morally informed or not, we make life. Let us make sure that when we do research and we construct new life, we construct life that is morally informed and predicts a world we wouldn't mind living in ourselves.
DR. MERCER: I would like just to share a few thoughts with you. I think my position is some place between Liz Cohen's and Russ Ellis' as far as the way I see the role of the person doing the research in school desegregation, which, essentially and inevitably, becomes policy research, because I have found that whenever you open your mouth, whatever you say, there is somebody there from the press who wants to pick up something that is relevant to policy.

I am going to take these few minutes just to share with you a model which we have been developing that I think may be relevant in this context. During the past two years, we have been looking at desegregated schools on the West Coast, and we have now collected data on about 180 elementary schools, and we have about 30 or 40 secondary schools. This includes samples of about 30,000 or 40,000 kids. We have aggregated their individual responses to school level scores.

We began our project with a model in our heads of what an effective desegregated school would be like. All the schools in our sample are schools that have been desegregated as a result of social policy, because of busing. They are the schools in San Francisco, Pasadena, Oxnard, Monrovia--you recognize the names of the towns. So we had to begin with a model of what a good desegregated school would look like.

So we used a rather simple continuum. At one end of the continuum we said this is a segregated school; at the middle of the continuum is desegre-
regation, which we defined as simply mixing the bodies, the act of moving kids, relocating kids in different schools; and then at the far end of the continuum, we used the term integration. Integration is the process that can begin to take place once desegregation has occurred, and which we have found to a large extent has not begun to take place in most schools at which we are looking.

This is why I feel very strongly myself that research that focuses on desegregation as the critical variable, comparing with segregated schools, is simply missing the critical educational issue. The issue is not relocating children, but developing a process after that relocation that might move toward an effective desegregated school. I would argue that that is where research emphasis should be in this area.

Now, we defined an integrated school along several different dimensions. But, essentially, it would be a school in which there were quality outcomes that were equal for children of all ethnic groups, so quality equals equality, if you follow this.

Then we had to define the dimensions that we felt were significant. We said, well, academic achievement, yes; the knowledge and skills needed to make it in an industrial society. An integrated school would be producing these kinds of outcomes for all the kids who go there.

But what, in addition, would we expect such a school to produce? So we got a list of about eight or nine outcomes that we considered rather relevant that would indicate whether a school was adequately integrated. We felt that kids should have a positive self-concept, self-esteem, self-confidence; that they should have equal liking for school, that they would enjoy school. We had found in earlier research that anxiety levels were different
across ethnic groups, and we said that in a really integrated school, we would not find that some kids were more anxious in the school setting than others; that they would all feel relaxed and positive about the environment.

We felt that in an integrated school the outcome should be that youngsters would have positive identity with their own ethnic group and respect for other ethnic groups. The black kid would feel good about being black; Chicano kids would feel good about being Chicano; and that they would have mutual respect for each other; that there would be cross-ethnic friendships and mixing. These would essentially be the outcome variables in terms of the students.

We theorized that the environment of such an integrated school, the learning environment, would probably be characterized by equally positive attitudes on the part of teachers toward the children of all ethnic groups; that there would be critical variables in the school situation, and that there would be a multi-cultural curriculum. We had quite a few other variables related to the learning environment.

I am going to just jump on because I want to tell you what we found in the schools that we've looked at. First of all, we got involved in a very interesting process. It started out to be just our way of paying our dues for gathering data. We agreed with each of these school districts that if they would let us collect data we would return profiles on the results for their schools. This all started off, you see, to be a way of giving feedback for the schools to become part of this process, and we hoped they would stay with it year after year after year.

It turned out that giving the profiles back was an infinitely more interesting process than anything we had engaged in before. We started by stand-
ardizing our measures across our population, and then we developed computer profiles with which it was possible to take the average for a school and see how that average compared with the average for the entire sample. We showed the range of all the school scores for the schools in our sample, and then we did a little analysis of variance across ethnic groups, showing whether there were significant differences across ethnic groups within each school. Therefore, people could see the outcome of schools in their own district compared to other schools, as well as the outcome between ethnic groups within schools.

We did this as sort of a service operation, if you will. And we soon became involved in a very fascinating process of going back to individual schools with these profiles to show staffs what the outcomes were.

This brings me to one point that I would like to make. We discovered that in this process of feeding back information, there were some persons who completely rejected not only our philosophy of what an integrated school is, but, then, of course, would attack the measures, and so forth. That was all part of it. There were other schools that were interested and began to be very introspective about the results. Overall, we concluded that this feedback process could develop into a very significant mechanism for gaining entree to social systems to help them embark on the process of social change.

As people looked at the profiles they would see, gee, the black kids really don't like going to school here, and that the Mexican-American kids really have different levels of anxiety in our school compared to others; or that our kids seem to be quite unfriendly, according to the sociometrics.

Then they would begin to ask questions. Well, why is it that way? Is this really true? And then they would begin to test the reality against
their own experience, and then they would begin to question, begin to set
goals. And we could see a very interesting process, a system process, be-
ginning to take place.

Then, of course, the demand comes back. Alright, we don't feel good
about what is going on in our school. Now, can you help us do something
about it? Where shall we go; what kinds of programs?

We find ourselves now rather on the cutting edge of this sort of
thing, because at this point, we say, yes, it looks like you have problems.
And they say, yes, we know we have problems. And we say, well, we're not
really too sure what to tell you to do about it, because at this point in
history we really don't know very much about how people develop effective
desegregated schools. That is sort of where we are.

So at this point we felt the need, which I think is critical in this
sort of research, to develop some type of a model about what it is that is
involved in effective desegregation.

There were two or three findings that I want to share with you that
I feel are critical in this. First, we found that overall, when we put all
of our original 10,000 kids together in the sample and compared them by ethnic
groups, that the outcomes are very different. The self-concepts of black and
Chicano kids are more negative; their self-esteem--and those questions are
related to the school situation--are more negative than those of Anglo kids;
that they have higher levels of school anxiety--and these are all situational
questions, anxiety related to school situations; a higher level of what we
are calling status anxiety is the competitive situation in the school.

We find differences in identity, identification with own ethnic group;
big differences in cross-ethnic friendship within schools. In general--and
of course the achievement differences are enormous—the outcomes from deseg-
regated schools are very different across ethnic groups.

We also found, which will surprise none of you, that most of the
variance lay within the school; that on these measures only 5 to 10 per cent
of the variance is between-school; the rest is within school variance.

Now, what kinds of conclusions can we draw from this? Well, one con-
clusion could be that of Jencks; that schools really don’t make too much
difference. It is some place else. However, I think that this is a trap
that we can easily fall into in educational research, because there is another
possibility.

The other possibility is that there are institutional processes that
are so universal in all of the schools we are studying that they are generat-
ing similar outcomes. And, by looking at variance between systems that are
essentially identical, we are not going to be able to answer anything; that,
in fact, we do not have enough variance within the schools that we were look-
ing at.

Now, if this is true—and this is the way that I interpret our find-
ings—then this demands a different approach. And the approach comes much
closer to ethnomethodology and ethnography. It is to try to identify those
with regularized institutional processes which are producing the differential
outcomes in every one of the schools that we looked at, with about three ex-
ceptions, because the processes are very, very similar.

So we are now—the group working with me on this—trying to develop a
model which we want to go back and test.

It is essentially this: our basic hypothesis is that there are insti-
tutional processes operating in all of these schools, and that is why we do
not get between-school differences; that essentially the schools are geared
to reenact the unequal status structures of the larger society; that the
schools have processes which redevelop, which reenact in the school itself,
the differential status structures in the larger society. Because children
come in and then are treated differentially and unequally, as Professor
Cohen's research shows, children become socialized through the schools to
accept the unequal statuses that they are later going to occupy.

So you have unequal inputs, then the system itself perpetuates them
by the way it operates, and you get outputs that are perhaps even more un-
equal than the inputs.

I posit that there are probably nine institutional processes, at least
in the schools that we are looking at, that might account for much of the
variance. What we are going to do now is go back and take a closer look at
our most extreme social systems, to see if, in fact, there is enough variance
so that we can tease out whether these might be processes that are involved.

I am going to list them as our hypotheses; as the institutional proc-
esses which are reenacting in the schools the unequal statuses of the larger
society.

First—you would not be surprised, because of my other research—we
feel that unidimensional testing procedures, focused on norm-reference test-
ing, themselves help to reenact the unequal statuses.

And we visualize that we can compare schools that are very highly
tied to norm-reference testing, and IQ testing of everybody right down the
line, with some of the schools that have abandoned testing, and have gone to
the other extreme. They are working more with criterion-reference testing.

We are hoping to get enough variation to tease out the effects of testing as
a system variable.
The second process is the grouping practices in the schools. At one extreme would be schools where the grouping practices almost completely recapitulate the socio-economic and ethnic social structures, and other schools where the grouping practices are based upon sociometric choice and do not recapitulate differential statuses. We have discovered one school that has been using the sociometric choice approach to grouping that has some really exciting programs. I have one of my graduate students tracking down what is going on in that high school.

The third thing we see is adult models. The adult models in the school reenact the larger society. The teachers for the most part are Anglo; the para-professionals are black; the custodians are Mexican-American; the principals are men.

The perfect reenactment!

So we would say alright, there is a dimension here. There are some schools that we are looking at that are desegregated but still have all Anglo staffs. We have others that have highly-integrated staffs. We'll see whether these adult models make a difference.

The fourth dimension is parental participation. We found large differences. In the schools that we are looking at, the Anglo parents tend to dominate the parental structure. They have the power, the influence, the clout. The Mexican-American parents are the parents who aren't there, who have no clout. They are just seen as almost nonexistent by the teachers. Black parents vary. In some schools, they are powerful; in some schools, they are not. So we are getting these differences.

Well, we would hypothesize that in a desegregated school that was not reenacting differential status, we would have parents of all ethnic groups having equivalent clout; equivalent input into the curriculum.
The competitive structure of the school, the extent to which competition generates status anxiety, is another dimension worth looking at.

Another is the extent to which students are integrated structurally into the extracurricular activities of the school; that is, the extent to which the valued statuses in the school system are shared proportionately by students of all ethnic groups. This becomes a very easy thing to measure at the high school level; a little bit more tricky for elementary schools.

The pattern of busing is another very critical element. In many systems, it is the minority children who are put on the bus, who are moved into the middle class Anglo schools. They are the outsiders, so they start off, you see, as outsiders to begin with. They don't really belong there. We think that this is an institutional process that leads to differential status.

The curriculum content, of course, is mainly Anglo-centric. We do have a range here, from the mono-cultural to the multi-cultural curriculum.

And then, finally, an institutional variable is the relevance of the program to the needs of individual children. There are some schools that have a lot of special persons around to cater to the special needs of Anglo children—you know, art teachers, music teachers, speech teachers—but very little in the way of assistance for the special needs of minority children. For example, the Spanish-speaking child who is just learning English; only recently have California schools even addressed that problem.

Now, we feel that these institutional patterns—you can probably think of more, but these are the nine we are focusing on because we think we can operationalize them—probably have an additive quality. If we could some place find a school that was out at the far end on all of these, where the grouping pattern did not reconstruct the larger society; where the testing
pattern did not; where the curriculum was multi-cultural—our hypothesis is that we would find a school that was getting quite equivalent sorts of outcomes from kids from all ethnic backgrounds, and the further schools are toward the Anglo-centric ends, the more different the outcomes.

Now, whether we have enough variance in our population to tease this out, I really don’t know. But I think perhaps these kinds of questions may finally have to be answered within an experimental design, where somehow we would find some schools that would allow us to intervene and get rid of all of these institutional processes that are reenacting the larger society and see if we could, in fact, influence the outcomes at the other end. I feel, like Professor Cohen, that eventually we have to go to an experimental design, to get definitive answers.
DR. SPADY: I've been asked to Chair this final session only because I was the only invited speaker who was from NIE, given that NIE sponsored the Conference as a learning vehicle both for us as an institute and for you as professional colleagues. This responsibility I can manage, but I hope I'm not given the responsibility of being the ultimate synthesizer of all that has gone on here for three days.

I thought that we would try to have the people on our final panel this morning react to and extend some of the issues that were raised in our general discussion a short while ago. And if there was one major and overriding issue, it seemed to revolve around the balance in the work we are analyzing and proposing between a more, if you will, "structural," "sociological," or "large-scale organizational" perspective and a more "micro," "classroom-oriented" or "person oriented" research perspective.

Perhaps the issue was originally phrased in a way that created somewhat of a false dichotomy—at least our responses tended to emphasize that. But I would like to work toward an interpretive, if not synthetic, strategy here in the final session to see if there is some real common ground between these two opposites. Perhaps we can suggest a kind of research approach to this set of problems that would allow us, in fact, to link these two domains together.

Initially I would like to ask each of the panelists, in terms of the ideas presented to us, if they have some particular perspective that they might like to offer on this issue. Later we can allow for some reaction.
from you in the audience to their points of view, how they see the work that they're doing, or how they see their overall interpretation of what we've attempted to do in the previous two days.

So allow me to turn first to the person whose work has been most closely identified with a concern with the person and with individual variables and what has been described as a more psychological orientation (whether that's correct or not) and ask Mr. Mehan if he would like to jump off the cliff first.
I find it ironic that I am introduced as sitting on the far right given the way ethnomethodology is generally seen in the discipline of sociology.

I would like to respond to a number of comments made this morning and yesterday about the status of ethnomethodological research in education. First I'd like to reply to Mr. Spady's comment that my work and other work in ethnomethodology is "person centered" and "psychological" in nature. I also heard it said during this morning's session that analysis done from an ethnomethodological and ethnographic point of view is psychological reductionism. I'd like to say flat out that is not the case. Ethnomethodological studies do not reduce analysis to internal or private states. In fact, the concluding point in my presentation yesterday was that notions like "abilities" could not be seen as private or internal states. Instead, they are emergent phenomena available only in interaction.

One of the many cogent remarks that Professor Lortie made yesterday in discussing my presentation had to do with a version of a "Hegelian synthesis" between ethnomethodology and sociology. One form that such a synthesis might take could be through cooperative work between sociologists studying social structure and ethnomethodologists looking at interactional structuring activities.

I think I mentioned yesterday that I found Jane Mercer's book, *Labeling the Mentally Retarded*, very helpful in that regard. The ethnomethodolog-
cal presentation of that study is of high quality in the sense that the re-
sults are strongly located. It seems to me that Mercer's correlational study
could be extended by an ethnomethodological study. The first stage would
be a replication of Mercer's study in another setting. The structural fea-
tures which are associated with the placement of students in educational
categories like the mentally retarded would be obtained. Then, the interac-
tional activities of school personnel along the various stages of the label-
ing process would be examined to see how educational placement is accomplished.

In that version of Lortie's synthesis, a quantitative and qualitative study
would be done together to locate both the relations among social variables
and the interactional work which structure the social factors in the first
place.

A metaphor might be helpful to display what I mean by interactional
structuring activities. A friend and I were walking on one of the beautiful
Monterey beaches yesterday near a pier. The pier consists of two parts, a
fixed and stable deck that remains visible and a set of pillars interacting
with the fluid environment maintaining that structure, that are not always
visible. I was struck by the fact that when the tide is in, the pilings
which hold up the pier are not visible. The pier just appears to be on the
water. When the tide is out, the pilings which hold it up become visible.
My work is trying to reveal the activities which provide for the visible
social structure. Often special work is necessary to expose the structuring
activities.

A third comment made about interactional studies this morning was that
they are limited to the study of dyads. That is not the case. There is
enough literature in ethnomethodology available that shows that formal or-
organizations like the police, hospitals, small groups like encounter groups,
decision making processes, information processing activities can be studied

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from this perspective. In addition to a report about ethnomethodological studies in educational settings, I was proposing a metaphor for research in my presentation. A feature of ethnomethodological research in any setting is the attempt to get close to the phenomenon and capture it in its own terms without laying an alien structure on top of it.

I would also like to make clear that these studies are not being done to criticize the particular teachers and testers you saw on the videotape. And that misunderstanding allows me to comment on an issue that I have been troubled by since the conference began. My concern is that professional researchers are at a conference like this discussing the issues of the school separated from the people that have to live those issues on a practical, day to day, basis.

It is easy to make glib, offhand, and critical comments about the way schools are run. I wonder if the discussion we had this morning which was very critical of the way schools work, would have taken place if it had been in a school, with the principal and teachers sitting there. It is easy to go into a school, do a quick study, leave that school, and publish an article or book which says the schools are not meeting the needs of kids. I wonder if the participants at this conference or members of this association could not only gather information about schools, but could also remain in the schools to work with school people to determine the next step in improving education.

Russ Ellis made an important observation this morning: We must never forget that people are always living their lives. Teachers have to be in schools day in and day out. Their lives are filled with overwhelming practical problems. Therefore, if we are going to do research in the schools that
is critical of people's practices, we must face the consequences of what we are saying about the way they live their lives. Egon Bittner recently published a paper entitled "Objectivity and Realism in Sociology" in which he says that research is invalid unless the researcher can live the lives of the people (s)he is studying. That charge does not mean "go native." It implies that the researcher must feel the consequences of the day to day actions of the people (s)he studies. If the researcher has not felt the weight of the practicalities of working with kids in schools under present circumstances, then studies which criticize the teacher or school are hollow and empty.

I am calling for more cooperative research between researchers and practitioners. My rule of thumb in research in schools is that I will not engage in a project unless it is supported by all elements of the school. I seek not only school board approval, but teachers and parents must understand and accept the research. I will not do research without that acceptance. Nor will I make comments on aspects of classroom or testing interaction at conferences like this or in published work unless I have conducted that analysis with the participants.

One way I have found helpful to make the results of interactional research available to school people is through workshops. After I have gathered videotapes from classrooms and analyzed them, I have presented the analysis to the teachers in workshops. The purpose here is to implement the results of research in practical settings, not just to have research results accumulate in scholarly repositories.

Another way to incorporate the results of interactional studies into school curricula is through teacher preparation programs. Student teachers
at UCSD's Teacher Education Program engage in interactional analysis of videotapes taken during their practice teaching field experience. Here the purpose is not so much to report the results of research, but to provide prospective teachers with techniques by which they can continually analyze the structure of their classrooms.

I think an organization like the Sociology of Education Association can help close the gap between mere talk at conferences like this and the practical circumstances of teachers, children, and school officials. One way to do this is to take Michelle Peterson's suggestion and stop blaming the victims for the troubles in schools. That means suspending research which exploits teachers and students, and instead, conducting research which incorporates school people in cooperative roles.

One of the things that I hope will come out of this conference is an attempt to unify research and practice. If theory cannot be merged with everyday practice, then I don't find it to be very valuable.
DR. MERCER: The conversation this morning disturbed me somewhat, because it seemed to me that we were lining up along the old dimensions of psychology versus sociology; ethnomethodologists versus other types of people. Actually, I feel the sort of thing that I have been doing is close to what Bud Mehan has been doing. In fact, we've been corresponding, and I was excited about a paper he wrote in which he was analyzing the interaction frame within which test scores are produced. And you know, I said, my goodness, he is describing the process by which this score is generated and we get differential outcomes that are very much related to the structures.

This provided an explanatory framework for what you can find in the structures, but in the microcosm of the test situation itself and in how the score is negotiated. The paper that I read was particularly interesting because he was analyzing the interaction between the tester and the Chicano child, and the misunderstandings and misinterpretations that were going on there that all build up to a score that's 15 points lower than average.

This adds another dimension to structural analysis. I don't think we need to quarrel with each other on these issues because each person does the thing that he feels comfortable doing. One type of research helps explain what is found by other types of research at different levels. And so we shouldn't exhaust ourselves with these types of arguments because, you know, I don't think we really have fundamental differences.
The other thing that troubled me was the concern about psychological reductionism or whatever. Are we struggling again with some kind of identity crisis where we have to prove that we're different and we're special? I think we have to build our own models. I personally feel much more comfortable with a model that's essentially symbolic interactionist, that takes the social structure as the independent variable, that sees the personalities, the behaviors, attitudes and so forth as outcomes of the structure. You put people into certain types of roles with certain types of expectations, their behavior becomes molded by those expectations, and the positive and negative sanctions they receive. So the behaviors are the outcomes of the roles which are defined within the structures, and if people behave in certain ways eventually you're going to have to modify their attitudes or they're going to suffer from cognitive dissonance if their attitudes are quite different from their behaviors. And in this way they're either going to modify their attitudes so they conform with the behaviors and roles, or they're going to get out. And you know, I really don't have any trouble with this, because within symbolic interactionism, what is the personality structure but a reflection of the social structure? Why should we be hung up on this?

But each of us can select the framework we feel most comfortable with. I feel most comfortable seeing the structure as an independent variable, the behaviors and attitudes as, over time, outcomes. You might feel more comfortable coming in from the other way. But it seems to me that we have within our own discipline a theoretical framework that helps to integrate the two, so we shouldn't be arguing with each other about these issues. There are more critical things to be concerned with than our own identity crisis or whatever. I don't know whether I'm being fair or not, but I remember the
first night we were here there was a list of questions that we were asked to consider. And I don't think we've gotten to the three questions. We've gone clear around.

Maybe this was a skirting of some of the hard issues, which are really value dilemmas, which are concerned with policy research. What are the issues in policy research; the concerns for policy type models? Should we be involved in policy research at all, or under what circumstances?

And maybe I feel this particularly keenly because I've been involved in the last three days, along with Russ Ellis, with what was a very agonizing process in working with the Civil Rights Commission sorting out values about certain types of research and policy questions. We were deep in the field of ethics and values, and decisions were made, not on the basis of some empirical studies, but on some other basis, which I think we need to discuss as sociologists, especially sociologists of education, because most of what we do is somehow going to have an impact upon policy. And I don't think we should go into this willy-nilly. I think we should try to do it self-consciously and carefully, looking for the hidden agendas, making rather careful value decisions. And it would help to have a group like this talk about these dilemmas to each other; to have us sort out together some of these very real moral and ethical problems. At least, I seem to face them day to day. I presume you do. And I wish we could talk a bit about that before this conference closes, or else have another conference and direct ourselves to these questions.
DR. SPADY: Jane Mercer raises one issue which I would just like to clarify for a moment as a major point of the conference, and that's something that just has struck me for the first time, maybe because I'm a little slow. In talking about the effects of social structure on people mediated by role structures or what I might call normative structures that occur in those systems, we have focused on only one subset of the relevant issues subsumed under the title of our conference, "Sociology of the School and Schooling." Indeed, there could have been quite another set of problems that we paid closer attention to, which might serve as the focus of our next conference; there are other kinds of more "structurally oriented" problems of schooling, where we might talk about how certain structural features affect others; or, in fact, try to reverse the nature of our attention today and consider say, how, in fact, clientele or whatever affect the kinds of educational structures we create and maintain.

But we have, I believe, worked with that kind of causal model implicitly in mind. I just wanted to bring that distinction to your attention.
DR. CLARK: We seem to be getting here, near the end, to the problems of level of analysis, which certainly is a proper concern. My own levels of analysis happen to be a long way away from where the ethnomethodologists and Jane Mercer are. I'm off looking at academic power in national systems around the world at levels from that of the department or the chair-holding professor up to the level of the national government. That is a long way away from the situation of the teacher and student in American schools.

Yet, in spirit, I feel close to what the ethnomethodologists do and what Jane Mercer does. Mr. Mehan was indicating that to work at a micro-level in sociology need not involve a psychological reductionism. I want to emphasize the point. If there are any violent sociological determinists around, it is the ethnomethodologists and Irving Goffman. Goffman will give nothing to psychology. He takes psychology and pulls its subject matter over into sociology, and he won't even give them individual differences in character and personally-determined action in the interstices of roles. It becomes a matter of individuals holding roles at a distance in highly predictable ways. So there is no giving away, then, of sociological territory. If anything, it's just the opposite.

Now, in terms of levels, at any one time and at any one level, we have to take certain things as givens. The PSAC Report on Youth on which I worked had to skip certain topics and certain levels in order to concentrate at all. It was almost barbaric not to have taken race and class more seriously than
we did. The decision not to was a critical one and was made in order to focus on all youth and at fairly broad levels. You can readily note that we never got down to the classroom level of interaction, leaving us weak in the sociology of learning. Thus, there are huge holes in that particular report, in terms of levels at which various social scientists are working.

It is simply the case that no one can work at all the levels. We must expect people to specialize and to maximize their ways of seeing, which will then always be ways of not seeing.

Secondly, I want to support earlier comments about the sins of the expert, an easy thing for us to begin to fall into in sociology, especially as we attempt to catch up with economists and psychologists in the giving of advice to governments at the broadest level. We can easily fall into criticism of individual actors, particularly the American school teacher, who has come under violent attack from so many quarters in the last ten to twenty years. The easy criticism is now probably counterproductive in a major way, in promoting a loss of confidence and eliciting the kinds of reactions that people make from a defensive posture. But one of the things that we ought not do in sociology is blame individuals: that's for other people. We are in the business of looking at structure-induced behavior and situationally induced behavior. One of the great features of sociology, in terms of talking to and about individual actors, is how much you take the burden off of them, to the point where we can more properly be charged with being irresponsible in letting the individuals off the hook too much. If we take our own styles of analysis seriously and seek situations and structures that are serious constraints and pressures on behavior, then we are not going to easily blame the individuals that we happen to be observing for what is wrong in the system.
DR. BIDWELL: I've been listening to the issues that have been raised here at Asilomar, and I've become a little uncertain about them, maybe a little impatient with them.

We sociologists like to form ourselves into schools, and we spend an enormous amount of time and an enormous amount of energy fighting one school with another, trying to establish some "true" position for sociology—the phenomenological view, the conflict view, or what you will. Somehow one point of view must be overriding, and each is thought to have its own method—getting in close, or sitting in the armchair, or doing surveys, or constructing mathematical models.

Yet all this controversy is largely irrelevant to doing sociology. I assume that our primary objective as sociologists—though of course we may have other objectives in other roles—is to establish more or less reliable and generalizable knowledge about social phenomena. I also assume that there are many ways in which reliable knowledge can be obtained and that the choice of the method must be determined primarily by the problem that one wants to attack.

If the method chosen is appropriate to the problem, then the task is to use it so that it will yield more reliable, more generalizable knowledge after one gets through than we had before. This is as true of field work and phenomenological inquiry as it is on any other variety of social research. From this perspective Mehan's presentation yesterday afternoon was to me a
revelation, for it suggested one way in which a phenomenological approach can yield reliable evidence. So, too, Dan Lortie pinpointed the issue of reliable knowledge in field work when he spoke yesterday about the necessity for computing rates from field work data.

There's a seduction in every kind of sociological method, but a special seduction in field work: that one can know the situation, understand it, appreciate it—all intuitively—and find a self-justifying satisfaction in that intuition. Then the investigator forgets whether what he knows can be communicated reliably, whether the work can be replicated, whether his knowledge is more than private.

I'm as impatient as many others here with Bales' interaction process analysis as a specific method. It has its flaws. The categories are crude, and they are many times off the point. But Bales had among his primary concerns to provide for replicable, reliable evidence. That concern we all must share.

We must be self-conscious about it, but not paralyzed by it. Some of my graduate students become so worried by the thought that they somehow aren't measuring adequately that they stop their research. In this connection I can't resist telling a little story. In stone on the facade of the Social Science Research Building at Chicago is a quotation from Lord Kelvin: "If you cannot measure your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory."

Frank Knight, one of the founding members of the Chicago school of economics, was standing in front of that building one day with a colleague looking up at that quotation. He read it aloud and said, "Damn it, if you can't measure accurately, measure anyhow." There is a certain merit in what he had to say. We must try to develop as strong theories as we can, so that
we will have some confidence that because, in part, of what we will ignore and despite the measurement errors that inevitably we will make, our research will further knowledge.

Indeed, having reliable, generalizable knowledge rests on the ability to abstract confidently from the confusion of everyday life. It is not only a matter of accurate measurement, but also of knowing what to measure and what to ignore. Nothing very fruitful will result if the investigator is preoccupied with trying to describe everything, measure everything and be perfectly responsive and complete in his representation of "reality." It is an impossible task. We don't do it in everyday life, for as we have said repeatedly in this conference, we construct the "reality" of everyday life. We construct "reality" also in social science, but subject to specific purposes, propositions and procedural canons.

Now I would like to make a few comments about the issue of levels of analysis in sociology. Suppose that the sociologist is animated by an interest in "social facts"; let's say in such "structuralist" phenomena as the relationship between complexity and administrative intensity in school organizations. Propositions about relationships of this kind may be testable and useful, but they are not, by themselves, satisfying if the sociologist also is interested in understanding. He may know that the relationship is there, but he doesn't know why it's there. If you'll examine the work, for instance, of Peter Blau, you will discover that he makes certain assumptions about the actions of people. Thus, he argues that structural complexity induces problems of coordination, to which someone must respond. Spans of control get out of hand, and so more administrators are added.

There are, in short, day-to-day problems that are confronted and acted on by people, and from these actions new structural forms are likely to
emerge. Understanding the structural change comes when structure is seen as emerging from the acts of persons. Yet if social structure emerges from personal acts, these acts are constrained by social structure.

Let me give a simple example. In my work on universities, I've discovered that the interaction between people is very important for the values and norms that undergraduates learn. As certain values and norms are learned, the structure of interaction changes. But I also have found that structural characteristics, for instance, of academic departments amplify, mute or channel the consequences of interaction for the acquisition of values and norms. Thus, a given rate of interaction between student and student will have more powerful effects if the department has a lounge or a library where everybody comes together.

This finding suggests that amplifying processes are at work: a structural facilitation of interaction that is not simply embedded in the actions of people, though it affects their acts. The structural property of the department (the presence or absence of a lounge or library) had resulted from things that people did, but it later transcended these acts.

We're beginning to develop relatively sophisticated statistical designs for dealing with the connections between social structure and the acts of persons. These designs may help us to understand social phenomena in their complexity without either drowning in data or committing ourselves to limiting schools of thought. Our task, after all, is to look at the real world in an abstracting, generalizing, and relatively reliable way. This task demands that we free ourselves of the ideologies of schools of thought, focus on the theoretically tough, but interesting problems, and use whatever is the most appropriate method with as much rigor as it allows.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY SESSION
COMMENTS BY WILLIAM G. SPADY
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DR. SPADY: I will make just a very brief point to amplify one thing that I didn’t say yesterday about my own models, which bears on the concerns that were raised this morning, both by some of the participants here and in the general discussion. And that is what the 16-fold typology that I generated to discuss the nature of authority and legitimacy as it applies to the interaction at the classroom level between teacher and student is something that you might think of applying at one higher level of analysis. I am referring to the nature of the normative structure of the school as it applies to relations between administrators and teachers. This macro system helps to create and reinforce that normative climate that we mentioned just a while ago such that teachers may well feel constrained about the kind of control and authority that they attempt to use in the classroom.

Therefore, at the within-school level we have at least two kinds of sublevels to be concerned about: one is the closed-door classroom, if you will, and what goes on between teacher and student. But the model does not imply that exclusively. The model in effect presupposes that the kinds of approaches, norms, authority modes, as well as attempts at legitimating authority, that may be used by the teacher would be constrained very much by the kinds of orientations and approaches to legitimacy and authority taken by the administrators in the school. You could take that 16-fold table and ask to what extent does this apply to school principals, in the same way that you can ask how it applies to teachers themselves.
And, of course, you can attempt then to push the analysis even further in talking about school principals themselves being responsive to an administrative hierarchy that they want to climb and meeting the norms and expectations of their superiors, et cetera. Their attention to their role and definition of their role are going to be predicated on their expectations about what their superiors are looking for and the kinds of rewards that they might provide.

All of this reinforces the points that both Bob Dreeben made yesterday in commenting on my paper and that Dan Lortie made in the afternoon about the teacher being really at the bottom of this hierarchy and having to represent not only what he is as a person, but the whole load of stuff that comes tumbling down from the top of the school system in terms of mutually reinforcing expectations and demands.

The question that interests me most, because I will admit my philosophical bias toward the Type 1 teacher, is if Type 1 teachers are good both for teaching and for students, how many Type 1 teachers are going to survive in a system that essentially is espousing a kind of Type 16, highly bureaucratic orientation.

That is an empirical question that operates at two levels. One, will a Type 16-oriented system even want to recruit potential Type 1 teachers into its system; and two, then how do the potential subcultures within the teaching cadre—and I don’t mean to imply in any sense that teaching is homogeneous—how do the varying subcultures within teaching that may, in fact, coalesce around either a Type 1 or Type 16 orientation attempt to socialize new teachers to make them either more Type 1-ish or more Type 16-ish in the way they treat students.
So there are several different levels of analysis that one can use in applying that model, which I hope helps to bridge some of the gap between larger system questions or macro levels of analysis and concern with the more micro level or classroom level of ultimate interaction that seemed to be most implied in my discussion.
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1. To advance the field of sociology of education;
2. To foster intellectual exchange and social relationships among its members; and
3. To serve the professional and scientific needs of people engaged in the field of sociology of education.

To this end S.E.A. has held two major conferences. The first, at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, in March, 1973, was attended by about fifty people who enthusiastically endorsed the concept of such an association. The second conference, at Asilomar State Conference Grounds near Monterey in February, 1974, was attended by three times that number. The organization plans to hold similar annual meetings in the future as well as one-day meetings throughout the year devoted to special topics.

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