The effects of participation as a salaried professional in a reform oriented organization on the participants' subsequent career is considered in this paper and studied in the context of the OEO sponsored Legal Services Program. Because of the paucity of literature on the consequences of participation in reform organizations, a related literature, that of the consequences of participation in the student movement of the sixties, is drawn on for insight and is also critically examined. A comparison of the subsequent careers of 228 lawyers involved in the program in 1967 to those of 981 other lawyers who were practicing law in 1967 indicates that program participation has an important effect on both the distribution of professional services and the rendering of reform oriented free or reduced fee work. The explanations offered stress the importance of job market factors, in contrast to previous work which has suggested that the socialization is the sole or primary means through which such effects occur. A further difference from previous work is the consideration of the effects of variation in experience in the organization—a topic which is briefly discussed.

(Author/AM)
THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL REFORM ORGANIZATIONS ON THE SUBSEQUENT CAREERS OF PARTICIPANTS

A FOLLOW-UP STUDY OF EARLY PARTICIPANTS IN THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

Howard S. Erlanger

April 1976

This paper is part of a much broader study of the Legal Rights Movement, in which I am collaborating with Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth. I am grateful to them and to our earlier collaborator, Jack Ladinsky, for their extensive work on all phases of the project; to James Fendrich, Thomas McDonald, and Gerald Marwell for their comments on an earlier draft; and to Arthur Goldberger, Robert Hauser, and Hal Winsborough for methodological advice. For the research assistance and programming which made this paper possible, I am indebted to Irene Rodgers, Pramod Suratkar, Anna Wells, and Nancy Williamson.

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the effects of participation as a salaried professional in a reform-oriented organization on the participant's subsequent career. This issue is studied in the context of one such organization, the CEO sponsored Legal Services Program, which was probably the largest and best known organization oriented to the redistribution of professional services in the late sixties. Because of the paucity of literature on the consequences of participation in reform organizations, a related literature, that of the consequences of participation in the student movement of the sixties, is drawn upon for insight and is at the same time critically examined.

Comparison of the subsequent careers of 228 lawyers in the Legal Services Program in 1967 to those of 981 other lawyers who were practicing law in 1967 indicates that participation in the Program has an important effect on both the distribution of professional services and the rendering of reform-oriented pro bono (free or reduced fee) work. In contrast to previous work, which has suggested that socialization is the sole or primary means through which such effects occur, the explanation offered here stresses the importance of job market factors as well. A further difference from previous work is the consideration, albeit brief, of the effects of variation in experience in the organization.
In the study of social reform movements and organizations, a good deal of attention has been paid to the characteristics of participants at the time of entry, but relatively little to the effects of participation on the subsequent careers of participants. There are many reasons for this state of the literature; most obviously, current participants are relatively easily to locate, while former participants are not. In addition, much of the literature on participation relates to the social reform activities of the 1960's, for which it is only now practical to collect follow-up data.

The activism of the 1960's was most evident among college youth; hence, there is a large literature on the characteristics of participants in the student movement, and there is now a small literature on the subsequent activities of these activists (Fendrich, 1974, 1975; Krauss, 1974; Demerath, et. al., 1971; Greene, 1970; Maidenberg and Meyer, 1970). This literature on the subsequent attitudes and activities of college activists is rather eclectic and is based on small samples, but it is generally consistent in indicating that former student activists have retained relatively radical attitudes, have tended to continue to participate in protests (although not as actively as in the sixties), and have tended to avoid business oriented careers in favor of jobs in the knowledge and human
services sectors. Taken together, the studies thus tend to disconfirm the maturation hypothesis (see, e.g., the discussion in Lipset and Ladd, 1972), which holds that activists outgrow their radicalism.\(^4\) The data also are inconsistent with the hypothesis that radicals become disillusioned with society after being thwarted in their attempts at radical social change (see, e.g., Mankoff and Flacks, 1972).\(^5\) However, as a later discussion will indicate, this literature has been less successful in dealing with the question of whether the subsequent careers are a result of experiences in the movement or of preexisting ideology.

In addition to the very visible reform movements like the student movement, the sixties were also marked by the formation of many reform-oriented organizations which offered full time employment in jobs having a direct impact on the situation of relatively powerless groups. Such organizations include Vista and the Peace Corps, and also a number of organizations offering reform-oriented variations of traditional professional careers (see, e.g., Gross and Osterman, 1972; Borosage, et. al., 1970). This paper analyzes the subsequent careers of early participants in one such organization, the Legal Services Program sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity. The primary question to be addressed is whether such reform oriented programs operate essentially at the margin of the profession, with participants simply taking time out to "do good" for the indigent citizen; or, alternatively, whether such programs can act as channelling mechanisms, substantially redirecting the careers of professionals who pass through them and thus effecting a redistribution of professional services in society.
THE ORGANIZATION

Although substantial reform oriented efforts took place in both the public and private sectors of the legal profession, from its inception the federally sponsored Legal Services Program (LSP) has been the mainstay of the day to day efforts to deal with the legal needs of underrepresented citizens (Koonan and Goldstein, 1972). The LSP was formed, originally under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity, in 1965, but the first full year in which it had a large number of program operating was 1967, when it included about 1200 lawyers. From the beginning, the Program has tried to shift the balance of power in the legal system in two ways. (Finman, 1971; Griffin, 1967; Stumpf, 1968). First it has tried to increase the power of indigent citizens by pursuing a strategy of "test case" or "class action" litigation. Suits have been brought—often against governmental agencies—in the name of a client but on behalf of all people in a similar situation (see, esp. Cahn and Cahn, 1964). Some major cases of this type have been won by LSP lawyers (see, e.g., Miller, 1973), and these cases have been the source of much political opposition to the program. The second strategy, and the one which has been dominant in terms of time spent per lawyers, has been that of representing indigent citizens in individual matters without special attention to broader consequences of the case. This work has had an impact simply because it gave representation to people who previously were relatively helpless against other individuals and agencies that had access to the legal system.

METHOD

Analysis in this paper will focus on the differences between former Legal Services lawyers and other lawyers in the bar in the type of practice setting, type of client served, and, for lawyers in private practice, the extent of reform oriented pro bono (free or reduced fee) work.
The data presented for LSP lawyers are from a stratified random sample of all known participants in the Program in 1967, interviewed in the Fall of 1973. The sample is a disproportionate random sample stratified by region and city size and by program quality as rated by a panel of lawyers highly knowledgeable about the 1967 LSP. The responses from the strata were weighted to correspond to the estimated true distribution in the population. The sample is biased (to an unknown degree) in that it underrepresents persons with short tenure in the Program, persons who have dropped out of the legal profession since leaving the LSP, and persons who are too mobile to be located in spite of our extensive inquiries through a variety of sources.

Characteristics of LSP lawyers will be compared to those from age stratified disproportionate random samples of lawyers listed in legal directories. These lawyers were interviewed in Fall 1973 or Spring 1974. The primary directory used was the Martindale-Hubbell Directory of Lawyers (1972), but since that directory underrepresents solo practitioners, lawyers not in private practice, and, especially, young lawyers (Ladinsky, 1964), a supplementary sample was drawn from state legal directories. The latter sample was constructed by first drawing fifteen states at random (with the probability of being chosen being conditional on the number of lawyers in the state) and then sampling from the most complete list of lawyers available for that state. Responses were pooled and weighted to correct for the various sampling ratios employed. Lawyers who retired before 1967, who received their law degree after 1967, or whose 1967 job turned out to be in the Program were dropped from this control group.
All interviews were conducted by telephone by the staff of the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. The completion rate varied over the various strata but overall exceeded 70%; the average interview lasted over an hour. The present paper reports on 228 white male LSP lawyers and 981 white males in the bar.8

CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REFORM ORGANIZATIONS

Given the scarcity of empirical literature on the consequences of participation in reform organizations (Zald and McCarthy, 1975), the literature on the consequences of participation in the student movement is the most relevant guide to the inquiry in this study. This section of the paper takes a critical look at that literature and indicates those problems which the present study overcomes.

A. The Problem of Self Selection

The most obvious problem in the literature (other than small sample sizes) is the absence of controls for factors pre-dating the participation. This problem is primarily due to the journalistic nature of many of the studies thus far, although it also appears in the only book length scholarly study (Krauss, 1974). In the study of the effects of student activism, Fendrich's papers (e.g., 1974, 1975) are the only ones which systematically use control variables.

Since people are not randomly assigned to participation in reform movements the problem of self-selection can never be fully dealt with and there is always the possibility that some unobserved variable renders
For example, control variables such as college major or prior political participation may, along with the participation and its apparent effects, be consequences of an unobserved variable such as "orientation to social reform." However, if a study includes indicators of variables which occur prior to the unobserved variable (in this case variables such as religion of family of origin, parents' SES, parents' politics, etc.) then the analysis can be more powerful. If controls for characteristics of the family of origin do not substantially reduce the relation between participation and subsequent activity, then the critic is obliged to suggest an unmeasured variable which is substantially independent of such characteristics. A difficulty in the prior literature is that parental characteristics have not been controlled; these variables are, however, available for the present analysis. In addition, self-selection is less of a factor in reform organizations offering salaried positions, because the factors leading to participation are more varied. Thus, compared to a more explicitly political movement, a reform organization does not begin with as committed a group of participants.

B. Conceptualization of the Problem at Issue

Ordinary linear regression analysis is a convenient and often appropriate technique for examining the effects of control variables on the relationship between participation and subsequent attitudes and behavior. Moreover, the ease of making inferences of time order of the variables makes path analysis a useful technique (see, e.g., Duncan, 1966, 1975). However, if these techniques are used, the analyst must use caution in the conceptualization of the problem under study.
The most likely conceptualization, given the tendencies of the recent quantitative literature in sociology, would be to define the problem as one of explaining the variance in the dependent variable. Thus, the question to be asked would be "how much variance in subsequent job choice, subsequent political behavior (etc.) can be explained by prior participation?" The difficulty with this approach is that, in reality, a variable like student activism or participation in the LSP can not explain any meaningful part of the variance in a variable like subsequent job (measured for a whole population), because the variance on participation in LSP is so incredibly low. For example, in 1967 less than one-half of one percent of the bar was in the LSP. It is for just this reason that a researcher studying the effects of participation would never consider just drawing a random sample of the population, but will always sample the participants and the control group separately.

Now, if one has a sample in which one group has been heavily oversampled, there arises the question of how to weight the responses. If one does not correct for the different sampling ratios, then the result is to artificially create variance on the oversampled variable (and also to change the variance on all of the variables correlated with it). Thus, the variance explained by the oversampled variable (in this case, "participation") will be largely a function of the extent to which it was oversampled.

As an example of the problem, consider the effects of different weights on the variance explained in the "status of practice" of lawyers engaged in private practice. (This variable will be defined and discussed in detail later in the paper.) In Model 1 of Table 1, responses of LSP lawyers are weighted such that they form 0.3% of the lawyers in private
TABLE 1  
VARIANCE EXPLAINED, USING DIFFERENT WEIGHTING SCHEMES  
(Dependent Variable: "Status of Practice,"  
for Lawyers in Private Practice)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable(s)</th>
<th>Legal Services Lawyers, as Percent of Total Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3% 13% 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Participation in the LEP</td>
<td>$R^2 = 0%$  $R^2 = 7%$  $R^2 = 17%$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (2) Participation in the LSP,  
  plus eight controls, entered  
  as groups of dummy variables | $R^2 = 11\%$  $R^2 = 15\%$  $R^2 = 23\%$ |

N.B. $R^2$ corrected for degrees of freedom. N=713
practice; in Model 2 no special weights are applied, and the difference in sampling ratios resulted in LSP lawyers being about 13% of lawyers in private practice; in Model 3 LSP lawyers are reweighted such that they comprise 50% of lawyers in private practice. As the table clearly shows, the weights make an important difference. Moreover, only Model 1 accurately estimates the variance explained by participation in the LSP.

The variation in the $R^2$ depending on the weighting scheme does not necessarily mean that the $R^2$ must be totally ignored when certain variable are artificially skewed, as examination of $R^2$'s can serve a heuristic function. But it does seem to be incorrect to define the task at hand as the determination of the contribution of the participation variable to the total variance explained in the dependent variable. An alternative approach to conceptualizing the research issue when participants have been oversampled, and the one which will be used in this paper, is to examine the unstandardized regression coefficients to see (1) whether participation has a substantively meaningful effect on the dependent variables, and (2) whether control variables have an effect on those raw coefficients. Unlike standardized coefficients, unstandardized ones do not vary with the different weighting schemes, except for rounding error.

C. Varieties of Experience

The literature on student activism has not explored in any detail the possibility that the effects of participation may vary with differences in the activist experience. For example, the leaders of the various organizations, marches, etc., presumably had a much deeper involvement than most followers, and both leaders and followers varied in the length of time they were active. Many other aspects of participation could potentially affect future attitudes and behaviors. To name a few, participants differed in the types of activities
they engaged in (especially legal vs. illegal), the types of issues they addressed, the degree of contact with the police, and the degree of official sanction (if any) they experienced. Similarly, in the Legal Services Program, participants differed on such variables as the extent of their direct contact with the poor, the types of cases they dealt with, and the courts they appeared in. Thus, a key issue in the extent to which it is the Legal Services experience in general, rather than the specific varieties of it, which affects the individual.

D. Process through which Participation Affects Subsequent Attitudes and Behavior

The literature to date has assumed that if it can be shown (1) that former activists are more radical than others in their cohort, are more likely to be in occupations oriented towards ideas or towards social service; etc, and (2) that there is reason to believe that these effects are not spurious, then the cause of the correlation between participation and subsequent attitudes or behavior is the experience of political socialization in the movement. This is, for example, the approach taken in the major scholarly follow-up studies of student activists (Fendrich, 1974; Krauss, 1974).

The assumption that any nonspurious effects of participation are due to socialization also underlay the conceptualization of the present study of former Legal Services lawyers; hence no data were collected which would allow a direct test of whether it is valid. However, comments by informants who were interviewed in depth indicate that although socialization is operative, at least two other processes are at work, especially in the shaping of subsequent jobs held. These are, first, networks yielding information about potential jobs and clients; and, second, employer preferences in hiring.
Whether similar processes have also affected former student activists cannot be determined at this time, but it seems plausible that they may have, and the possibility ought to at least be considered in future research.

Since these notions were not originally part of the study, this paper can only discuss the way in which socialization, job information networks, and employer preferences operate to shape job choice. The data will not allow a parceling out of the relative importance of the three processes.

THE SUBSEQUENT CAREERS OF LEGAL SERVICES LAWYERS

Since the Legal Services Program has been continuously funded for over ten years, and since it offers permanent employment, it is possible, of course, that most of the early participants are still there. However, as a previous paper has shown, there has been a very high rate of turnover in the LSP. Almost a third of the lawyers in the Program in 1967 left after two years or less, another 33% had left by their fifth year, and only 29% were still there when our data were collected in 1973. More important, analysis indicates that it is the graduates of the elite law schools, the lawyers with prior involvement in social reform activity, those working in the reputedly "excellent" offices, and generally those from higher status and more liberal backgrounds who tend to leave earlier. The first issue for analysis is, then, where did they go?

A. Type of Practice

White male lawyers who participated in the Legal Services Program in the early years currently have jobs that are quite different from
those of nonparticipating lawyers. As Table 2A shows, former Legal Services lawyers are less likely to be in private practice, which has long been the dominant mode of practice for lawyers. Historically, the overwhelming majority of lawyers have been in private practice (Blaustein and Porter, 1954); virtually all well-known lawyers spend most of their career in private practice (although they will on occasion put in a period of high level government service); and private practice certainly is potentially the most lucrative form of practice.

But the difference in propensity to be in private practice is only a small part of the story. More fundamentally, whether in private practice or not, former Legal Services lawyers serve a different type of client and do a different type of work. Tables 2B and 2C show this clearly. Eighty-six percent of former LSP lawyers in private practice (compared to 64% of the Bar) are either in solo practice or in very small firms, and consequently deal almost exclusively with the affairs of individuals with low or moderate incomes and of relatively small businesses. Only a very small percentage of former LSP lawyers are in firms of ten or more members, and none in our sample have moved into the major firms which often have over 100 lawyers, and handle the affairs of the major corporations and of wealthy individuals (Smigel, 1969). By contrast, 18% of the bar are in firms with 10 or more lawyers.

Similarly, former LSP lawyers who are not in private practice are heavily concentrated in nonbusiness pursuits. Fifteen percent of these lawyers have remained in "legal rights" work, with a public defender's office, a public interest law firm, a social reform oriented foundation or similar type of organization. Ten percent are primarily employed as law professors,
TABLE 2

JOB AT TIME OF INTERVIEW

(White males only; distribution year of graduation of lawyers in the bar standardized to that of lawyers in the LSP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Type of Practice</th>
<th>Former Lawyers in LSP</th>
<th>Lawyers in Bar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Legal Services Job as 1967</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Legal Services Job</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Practice of Law</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Jobs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired; Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>101%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(N)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(228)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(981)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2B Distribution Within Private Practice

| Solo Practice | 43 | 27 |
| Small Firm (2-4 lawyers) | 42 | 37 |
| Medium Firm (5-9 lawyers) | 10 | 17 |
| Larger Firm (10+ lawyers) | 4 | 18 |
| **Total** | **100%** | **99%** |
| **(N)** | **(92)** | **(621)** |

2C Distribution of Other Jobs

| Non Law Job | 13 | 30 |
| Salaried Counsel for Business | 3 | 30 |
| Salaried Counsel for a "Legal Rights" Organization | 15 | 2 |
| Activist Government Agency | 16 | 2 |
| Other Salaried Counsel (Mostly government agencies) | 43 | 30 |
| University Faculty | 10 | 7 |
| **Total** | **100%** | **101%** |
| **(N)** | **(77)** | **(306)** |

1. Interviews conducted in Fall 1973 and early 1974

2. Responses also weighted to correct for stratified sampling. Unweighted N's are shown.

3. See text for further elaboration.
in general teaching at least one nontraditional course such as welfare law, consumer protection, etc. Another 43 percent are in miscellaneous salaried positions, mostly for federal, state, and local government departments, while only 16 percent are staff counsel for a business corporation or working in a nonlaw (usually business) job. As Table 2b shows, this distribution is very different in the Bar, for which 60 percent of lawyers not in private practice work either in a nonlaw job or as a salaried counsel to a business corporation. (The percent of law faculty is roughly the same in the bar, but the courses taught are different.)

B. Further Differences within Private Practice

Firm size is a traditional indicator of the type of work engaged in by a lawyer in private practice (Carlin, 1966; Ladinsky, 1963), but as such it is really a proxy for several aspects of practice such as type of clients (business rather than individuals; relatively wealthy business and individuals), income, type of courts appeared in (federal, and state appeals, rather than lower state and county courts), physical work setting (large firms generally have posher offices and are located in the "better" parts of town), types of cases (contracts, trusts, tax, etc., as opposed to matrimonial, criminal, or personal injury); etc.

To try to tap more of these dimensions, Carlin developed a broader index of client status (1966: 202). The advantage of such an index is that it allows for the situation in which one or a few lawyers practice on a small scale numerically but on a large scale in terms of impact (cf Goulden, 1972; Green, 1975). Handler (1967) used a variation of this index in
his study of the bar in a small midwestern city, and found it to be more useful than firm size in such a context. Exploratory work on the current data set indicated that firm size, wealth of business and individual clients (weighted by percent of time devoted to clients of different types), and professional income could be combined into a useful, yet parsimonious indicator of "status of practice" (Handler, et. al., forthcoming). Table 3 shows a sharp differentiation between former LSP lawyers and other lawyers in private practice on the status of practice index. For example, although the scale runs from 0 to 14, half of the former Legal Services lawyers, as compared to only 19% of other lawyers in private practice; score below 3. Similarly, only five percent of Legal Services lawyers, as compared to 28% of others score above 5. Differences of this magnitude represent a major redistribution of legal services away from the upper middle and upper classes, and towards the middle, lower middle, and lower class. This redistribution is especially important given that the lawyers leaving the LSP are on the average slightly more elite in social background and training than the bar as a whole.

Two other aspects of private practice are particularly relevant in assessing the impact of the Legal Services Program on the subsequent concern of participants. One of these is the extent to which clients of minority backgrounds, which have historically been underrepresented in the legal system, are served. Table 4 shows that former Legal Services lawyers are also much more likely to have a large percentage of minority (primarily black) clients. Close to half the lawyers in private practice have only a few clients from minority groups; for former Legal Services lawyers, the figure is closer to a quarter. Similarly, only about 12% of the private practice bar, as compared to 29% of former Legal Services
Table 3

SCORES ON STATUS OF PRACTICE INDEX

(white males in private practice only; distribution of year of graduation of lawyers in the bar standardized to that of lawyers in the LSP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative Percent of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score on index (range 0-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4

**PERCENT OF CLIENTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS**

(white males in private practice only; distribution of year of graduation of lawyers in the bar standardized to that of lawyers in the LSP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of clients who are members of minority groups</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent of Former LSP Lawyers in Bar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 16%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 26%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 36%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 46%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 51%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 76%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: (N) indicates sample size.*
lawyers, have a third or more minority clients. Another impact of the LSP on subsequent private practice is on the type of pro bono (free or reduced fee work) done by lawyers. The obligation to do pro bono work has long been part of the ethic of the legal profession, but historically the extent and range of this type of work has been quite limited (Carlin, et. al., 1966; Marks, 1972). Even today the average lawyer spends a rather modest part of his or her time on pro bono work; generally performs this work for traditional clients such as relatives, friends of clients, church groups, charities, and indigent individuals; and generally uses a case by case approach, engaging in drafting of legal documents, the rendering of advice, and representation in criminal courts (Handler, et. al., 1975; Lochner, 1975). Our data indicate that former Legal Services lawyers are more likely to do pro bono work, but, most important, they are more likely to take on clients and cases oriented towards law reform, rather than to individual adjudication—for example welfare rights cases, consumer cases, migrant farm workers, or inmates of mental hospitals.

Data standardized by year of graduation show that in the year prior to being interviewed, forty-two percent of former LSP lawyers, as compared to 27 percent of other lawyers in private practice, did pro bono work oriented to social reform.

C. Analysis of Control Variables

As discussed earlier, a major task in a study such as this is to attempt to determine whether the apparent effects of participation in the social reform organization are spurious. Although the analysis here cannot be definitive, it is aided by the presence of indicators of the political and social reformist orientations of the respondent's family of origin. These variables
include father's political stance, parents' participation in social reform organizations, mother's religion, and father's occupation. (Several other indicators were also available, but they did not affect the findings reported below.) For the respondent himself, data were collected on prior political activity, year of graduation from law school, and educational characteristics (type of law school attended, class standing), all of which may be expected to affect the type of practice a lawyer takes up. Although the relationships among these control variables as well as the direct and indirect effects of these variables on current job would be of some substantive interest, these considerations are not relevant to the task at hand. Rather, the analysis here seeks only to gauge the effect of participation in the LSP on the lawyer's subsequent career, net of the effect of these controls. Hence, in the analysis of spuriousness, control variables were for the most part entered into the model in one group.

Let us first examine the effect of the control variables on the propensity of former Legal Services lawyers to go into salaried or non-law jobs. Examining the simultaneous effect of all controls except prior job, the effect of participation in LSP is unchanged. Prior job is, however, a critical control variable, since about three-fourths of former LSP lawyers moved into the Program from another job, and one would expect the contacts and experiences of that job to influence the type of job held subsequent to being in the Program. To analyze the influence of prior job, the most appropriate control group to which LSP lawyers can be compared is one composed of other lawyers who changed jobs during 1965-68, a period roughly equivalent with the span of time in which LSP lawyers joined the Program. Since lawyers are rarely fired and tend,
once established, to stay in a job for a long period of time, most lawyers are not "on the market" and thus their careers cannot appropriately be compared to those of the more mobile lawyers. When Legal Services lawyers are compared to this control group, the propensity of LSP lawyers to avoid private practice totally disappears, even without any control variables being included in the model. Thus, the apparent LSP effect in this regard seems rather to result from a tendency for lawyers who change jobs to be in salaried or non-law jobs rather than in private practice.

Turning now to a consideration of lawyers in private practice, a comparison of rows (a) and (b) in Table 5 shows the simultaneous effect of all controls except prior job on the three characteristics of private practice previously discussed. The table indicates that these control variables have little effect on the tendency for the Legal Services lawyers to have a lower status of practice or to do more reform oriented pro bono work. Percent minority clients is reduced somewhat more than the other variables, and an additional control for status of practice reduces it further. At this point, however, the difference between participants and non-participants in the percent minority clients is still statistically significant (p < .005). The Legal Services effect for the status of practice and pro bono variables seems, then, to operate primarily in an additive fashion to the control variables. This can also be seen in Table 6, which shows the direct effects of the control variables in the regression analyses which yielded row (b) of Table 5. Since the control variables are entered as groups of dummy variables, the regression coefficients are most easily interpreted as mean
TABLE 5

EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM ON CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PRACTICE
(White males only; N=713)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Mean Score, non-participants</th>
<th>Effect of Participation in LSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index of Status of Practice</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>(a) Without controls: -1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Clients</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>(b) Controlling for variables: -1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Social Reform Pro Bono Work</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>(c) Controlling for factors above plus status of practice index: -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. These factors are entered as sets of dummy variables.
### Table 6

**EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION IN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM ON CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PRACTICE**  
*(white males only)*

*(Table shows mean scores on dependent variable, adjusted for effects of all variables shown in the Table.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables [N]</th>
<th>Status of Practice Index (range 0-18)</th>
<th>Percent Minority Clients (range 0-100)</th>
<th>Does Social Reform Pro Bono Work (range 0-1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in LSP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes [92]</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No [621]</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Graduation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1955 [343]</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960 [103]</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1964 [99]</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965+ [168]</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional [168]</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager-Proprietor [269]</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [276]</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Political Stance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Liberal&quot; [122]</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Moderate&quot; [278]</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Conservative&quot; [275]</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents' Activity in Social Reform Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Very Active&quot; [102]</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Somewhat&quot; [179]</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Little&quot; [151]</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;None&quot; [274]</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother's Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant [339]</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic [195]</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish [158]</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activity Prior to Graduation from Law School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Oriented [37]</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [102]</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None [574]</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Law School Attended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National [115]</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Regional [163]</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [435]</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Class Standing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Quarter [312]</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [401]</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Multiple Classification (Dummy Variable Regression) analysis
2. Regressions done with weighted N's; unweighted N's are shown.
   N's do not always sum to 713, because a category for missing data on each variable was included in the regression equation but coefficients for these categories are not shown in the Table.
scores on the dependent variables (Andrews, et. al., 1967; Melichar, 1965), and are presented in this way in the table. Although based on regression, the table is presented primarily for descriptive purposes, to show the interested reader the effects of the control variables net of each other.

Let us now consider the effect of control for prior job on the findings for the three characteristics of private practice. As discussed earlier, the most appropriate control group for this analysis is comprised of other lawyers in the bar who changed jobs at the time that the LSP lawyers joined the Program, and who are now in private practice. The job held by a lawyer prior to making a job shift in the period 1965-68 is a relatively good predictor of the job held in 1973-74. Lawyers who were in solo practice in the earlier period are more likely to have a relatively low status of practice in the later period; lawyers who were in larger firms have higher status practices in the later period, etc.

But the important point for the analysis here is that for two of the dependent variables, the effect of participation in the Legal Services Program again appears to be independent of the effect of prior jobs. The score on the status of practice index and the rendering of reform oriented pro bono work are both virtually unaffected by the whole set of control variables (Table 7). Combined with a control for status of practice, however, the control for prior job does erase any statistically significant difference between the Legal Services lawyers and the control group of other lawyers in the percent of clients who are members of minority groups (Table 7). The observed difference in percent minority clients is thus partly attributable to differences in background, education, and prior job, and partly attributable to an indirect effect associated with the lower status clientele served.
Table 7
EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
ON CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PRACTICE

(Table includes only white male LSP lawyers who had a prior job, and other lawyers who changed jobs in the period 1965-68. N=210)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Mean Score, non-participants</th>
<th>Effect of Participation in LSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index of Status of Practice (range 0-18)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Clients (range 0-100)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>+10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Social Reform Pro Bono Work (range 0-1)</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>+.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effect of Participation in LSP
a) without controls
b) controlling for year of graduation, and background and educational factors
   -1.67 + 5.9 +.19
c) controlling for factors above, plus job left in 1965-68
   -1.65 + 6.4 +.20
d) controlling for all of the above, plus status of practice index
   --- + 2.7 +.17

1. These factors are entered as sets of dummy variables.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A. The Effects of Participation

Given the limits of quasi-experimental design, the conclusions here must be tentative. But within these limitations, the data for white male Legal Services lawyers clearly indicate that participation in the Program leads to a redistribution of service among lawyers in private practice. Former Legal Services lawyers in private practice have a less prestigious practice (as measured by types of clients, type of work setting, and professional income) and they do more pro bono work oriented to social reform than do other lawyers of comparable background and experience. Former Legal Services lawyers who do not go into private practice also seem to have quite different careers than their counterparts in the bar; most especially, they seem to shun corporate counsel and non-law jobs. This is basically the pattern of subsequent jobs predicted in McCarthy and Zald's analyses of recent trends in social reform movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Zald and McCarthy, 1975), but the conclusion here is somewhat different in that the effects seem to be directly attributable to participation in the organization, while Zald, McCarthy, and others (e.g., Wilensky, 1956) seem to imply that the career patterns follow from prior commitments.

The process by which participation in the Legal Services Program affects a lawyer's career seems to be at least three fold. First, part of the effect is doubtless due to socialization and training. In the LSP a lawyer learns to view the problems of the "little guy" as important, of if he already has this view, it is reinforced. He also receives training in the skills relevant to these problems, and conversely, fails
to become trained in the types of law most relevant to corporations and wealthy individuals. Secondly, this socialization and training makes the lawyer a specialist of sorts, and thus limits his attractiveness to some potential clients, employers, or colleagues with whom he might form a partnership, while enhancing his attractiveness to others. Even if a lawyer wishes to change his specialty, he may not be as attractive to a potential employer as a new graduate or one with some other type of prior experience.

A third way in which participation in the LSP may affect the lawyer's subsequent career is by placing the lawyer in a milieu in which he is much more likely to hear about some types of jobs and make contact with certain types of clients than others. A variety of studies, examining many different occupations, have found that a clear majority of jobs are obtained, not through the "open market," but through information gained from personal acquaintances who have either direct or indirect knowledge of the availability of a particular job. (This does not mean that these acquaintances have influence with the potential employer, but rather that they make a person aware that a good job exists). Moreover a substantial percentage of persons who change jobs are never directly on the market, but rather hear of a job through informal channels at a time that was opportune for them. The reliance on informal processes is especially characteristic of lawyers, for whom formal recruitment mechanisms primarily exist only upon graduation from law school. And, even if a lawyer goes into practice on his own, he is still dependent on the same type of network for clients. The LSP lawyer, especially one who worked primarily on service cases, during the course of his work saw only poverty level clients, appeared almost exclusively in the lowest level courts,
and had contact primarily with government agencies dealing with the poor. The network of associations thus generated was very different than that of say, a lawyer in a medium sized firm, a lawyer working directly for business corporation, etc.

Emphasis on the socialization and job market effects of participation in the LSP is not to deny that there could also be a self-selection effect. Such an effect would most likely operate through a prior orientation to social reform or through prior career choices. Granted, controls for these and related factors such as year of graduation, law school attended, etc., are imperfectly measured. But it is striking that together they have so little impact on the relationship between participation in the LSP and the status of practice or the rendering of reform oriented pro bono work by lawyers in private practice. In addition, the conclusions are strengthened because of the inclusion of several indicators of characteristics of family of origin which one would expect to cause a reformist orientation. This is much preferable to a design which controls only for factors which may themselves be consequences rather than causes of social reformism. A critic of the conclusions drawn must, then, develop an argument for an unmeasured self-selection variable which is so slightly related to those variables examined that this unmeasured variable could account for the effects found in this study.

In addition, it is important to note that the explanation presented here does not require an absence of self-selection. Rather, the argument is that, in the case of self-selection, the three processes outlined, and especially the job market factors, would tend to reinforce the decision made. In short, lawyers join the Program for a variety of reasons, but overall, participation tends to lock them into a less prestigious or
business oriented career than that of comparable lawyers. The importance of Program effects as opposed to self-selection effects can also be seen in a comparison of lawyers who stated different motives for joining the Program. When asked why they joined, forty percent of LSP lawyers now in private practice mentioned a reason which would appear to have an explicit social reform content, e.g. "I felt I had a duty to help the poor;" "I wanted to work with these types of issues," etc. Another 15 percent more generally mentioned that they thought the types of cases would be "challenging," that they "wanted the community contacts," etc., while the remaining 45 percent mentioned only factors like the desire to gain practical experience, the location of the office, the steady income, etc. If the observed effects of participation in the LSP were spurious, then one would expect that these effects would be strongest for those lawyers who report a reformist motivation for joining. However, analysis indicates no statistically significant differences between the three groups on the dependent variables. Moreover, in so far as there are differences, lawyers explicitly citing a social reform motivation for joining are actually somewhat lower than either of the other groups in both the percent minority clients served in private practice and the rendering of reform oriented pro bono work.

Obviously, the argument here must be tentative, since no direct data on the job changing process for LSP lawyers are available. What has been documented here is a "black box" effect, and three possible processes (four if self-selection is included), seen as complimenting each other, are suggested to explain it. This is presented as an improvement over previous studies, which have by and large assumed that if participation had real
effects, they must be the result of socialization. But in the future, these processes need to be sorted out, and others hypothesized and investigated.

B. The Effect of Variation in Experience

One important consideration in the further analysis of the effects of participation in a social reform organization is the effect of variation in the experience of different participants. Probably the greatest difference in experience in the LSP was between lawyers engaged in law reform and those doing service work. As noted earlier, from the outset the LSP had dual aims: the serving of the immediate needs of individual clients through direct adjudication of their cases, and the changing of laws affecting the poor, primarily through class action or test case litigation. Those lawyers who spent a significant amount of their time on law reform work experienced a very different milieu; in some local programs they even worked out of a different office (Carlin, 1970).

While doing law reform work a lawyer had substantially less direct contact with clients than did other LSP lawyers. Most of the time on such litigation is spent researching the law, preparing lengthy briefs, appearing before the court, and, on occasion, preparing appeals to higher courts. In doing this work, the Legal Services lawyer may have undergone a different type of socialization and training than the lawyer doing service work exclusively. First, the political component of his or her work was different, being focused on change in the centers of power, rather than the working through of change for discrete individuals. Secondly, lawyers in this type of work might be expected to put a premium on meticulousness, skill in legal research, and ability to draft complex briefs.
For lawyers doing service work, the pressures were different. Our data indicate that these lawyers carried very heavy caseloads, generally averaging over 100 open files at a time. With this type of workload a lawyer, no matter how conscientious, was still in a situation in which he could not pursue every angle of a case, or devote a good deal of attention to detail.

The different combinations of socialization, training, and concomitant job information networks and employer preferences would seem to lead to different subsequent careers for lawyers engaged in the two types of work in the LSP. One might expect differences in the type of salaried job taken, the status of client served in private practice, the extent to which minority clients are served, the degree of social reform oriented pro bono work; etc. However, even with the rather large sample used in this study, examination of the effects of variation of experience is hampered by small N. For example, the N for LSP lawyers who went into private practice is reduced to ninety-one, which is inadequate for extensive analysis. Thus the analysis here must be tentative; but it hopefully will serve to suggest the importance of pursuing such differences in future research.

Only about 15 percent of the lawyers in the LSP spent a majority of their time on law reform work, but half spent an average of at least one day a week. Analysis indicates that in so far as doing law reform work has an effect on subsequent career, it is for the lawyers who did one day a week or more, versus those who did less than one day a week. White male lawyers who were engaged in law reform work are less likely to be in private practice than are other LSP lawyers, 39 percent to 62
percent. However, contrary to expectations, the particular non-private practice job taken does not seem to have been affected by the law reform experience.

On the other hand, having done law reform work does seem to affect two of the three indicators of type of current work for lawyers in private practice. Lawyers who did law reform work have a substantially higher status of practice. Controlling for all the variables discussed in the previous section (including prior job), the mean status of practice for these lawyers is 3.78, as compared to 2.83 for lawyers who almost exclusively did service work. (This higher status of practice does not, however, reduce the percent of minority clients, which is the same for both groups.) In addition, lawyers who did law reform work in the LSP are more likely to do law reform pro bono work in private practice; the adjusted percentage is 48 percent versus 39 percent for lawyers who had almost all service cases. This difference is not, however, statistically significant, in part because of the reduced N for this analysis. It is important to note that for both these dependent variables the effect of variation in experience within the organization is additive to the effect of participation in the organization itself. The high status of practice score for lawyers who worked on law reform and the low social reform pro bono score for lawyers who didn't are still substantially different from those of the control group.

C. Consequences for the Redistribution of Professional Services

Finally, let us turn to a consideration of the implication of the findings here for programs like the LSP. In recent years there has been increasing concern about the distribution of legal services across the
population. The services of lawyers are quite disproportionately purchased by business corporations and affluent individuals; not just the impoverished but also the vast middle class is underrepresented (see, e.g., Christensen, 1970; Mayhew and Reiss, 1969). This can also be seen in the data from our survey, which shows that fifty-three percent of the individual clients of lawyers in private practice have incomes over $15,000, while the census shows that only sixteen percent of adult Americans have incomes of that amount.

The Legal Services Program directly generates a redistribution of the services of lawyers towards underrepresented groups through its rendering of service without fee to indigent citizens on a massive scale. But the analysis in this paper indicates that the Program also has very important spillover effects. Lawyers participating in the Program apparently do not just take time off from other pursuits to work with the poor, nor are they just doing what they would have done in the absence of their participation. Rather the Program acts as a structural mechanism which redirects lawyers to a different kind of client and to different types of issues. Service to the indigent is expanded because of the greater amount of pro bono work performed by former Legal Services lawyers and because of their propensity to take on clients and cases that challenge the status quo. Service to citizens with moderate incomes is expanded through the tendency of Legal Services lawyers to go into solo practice or into relatively small firms, which serve a greater proportion of this type of client rather than corporations or wealthy individuals. In addition service to minority clients is increased as a concomitant of this lower status of practice.
These findings indicate that the well-known problem of turnover in programs like the LSP is not necessarily a problem at all. Once a cohort of professionals has stayed long enough to be affected by their participation (and analysis indicates that length of service in the LSP is not an important predictor of subsequent practice), it may be desirable that they move out into the community and make room for a new cohort. The subtle redistribution in the type of recipients of professional services will not in itself be sufficient to correct the inequalities in the system, but it will be an important step in that direction.
NOTES

1 This deficiency has been pointed out by many authors, including Killian (1964) and Sherif and Sherif (1969).

2 There are several reviews and interpretations of this literature, including Lipset (1968) and Lipset and Alibach (1966). A few of the more important individual works are Flacks (1967), Kenniston (1968), and the critique by Finney (1971).

3 All of the studies cited are of the U.S. student movement, except that of Krauss, which is on Japanese activists. Krauss' study contradicts a variety of oft-quoted journalistic accounts, some of which have found their way into the sociological literature.

4 The hypotheses outlined here are discussed in more detail in Fendrich (1974) and Krauss (1974).

5 Of course, such dropouts would be very unlikely to be reached in a sample survey. See, for example, the discussion in Carey (1968).

5A The history of the LSP is discussed in more detail in a separate publication (Handler, et. al., forthcoming).

5B Such opposition led to the removal of the Program from the OEO and the creation of an independent "Legal Services Corporation" to oversee it.

6 All analysis of "current job" refers to the predominant job held at the time of the interview. Many lawyers hold more than one job simultaneously (one of our respondents reported holding four), and the predominant job was defined as the one in which the respondent spent 60 percent or more of his time or earned 60 percent or more of his income. (95 percent of all respondents having more than one job could be classified in this way. For the other 5 percent, a predominant job was designated on the basis of time and income shared among jobs.) Preliminary analyses indicated that concentration on the predominant job did not affect the conclusions drawn in this paper.

7 Sampling and weighting procedures are discussed in greater detail in a previous paper. (Erlanger, 1976)

8 Most of the difference between the original sample size and the N reported on here is due to the various exclusions reported in the text. The remainder is due to the unfortunate necessity to exclude blacks and women from the analysis, because of their small sample size in both the LSP sample and the control group. (This is in spite of the fact that blacks and women each comprised about an eighth of the participants in the 1967 LSP.) As a subsequent footnote will detail, white males, black males, and white women who were in the LSP all appear to have quite different distributions of current job.
This problem is remedied to a certain extent in Krauss' more recent work (Fendrich and Krauss, 1975).

In the study of the effects of particular programs, there is occasionally a way to do a more controlled study. If it happens that the program turned away candidates that it would have taken except for a lack of positions, and if those turned away are initially similar to those accepted, then a good control group is thereby generated.

See, e.g., the discussions of regression artifacts in Campbell and Erlebacher (1970), Riecken and Boruch (1974: 174ff), or Weiss (1972). Goldberger (1972) has, however, formally set out at least one plausible model in which regression artifacts would not occur. For a more detailed discussion of regression artifacts and other issues in the evaluation of social programs see the papers in Bernstein (1975).

For discussions of other limitations of approaches which seek to explain the variance see Duncan (1975: 63-66).

As discussed above, LSP participants and non-participants were sampled separately using a stratified design and unequal sampling ratios. Weights to correct for this design were retained in the analysis here. Dropping these weights would change the coefficients but not the conclusions here.

For example, the otherwise important multivariate analysis of Fendrich (1974) seems to be flawed in this regard.

Since this is primarily a study of lawyers who left the Program, the discussion is cast in the past tense, and the term "Legal Services lawyers" is used synonymously with "former Legal Services lawyers." However, it should be noted that the Program is flourishing today in much the same form as it did in 1967. (See Handler and Hollingsworth, 1975)

The characteristic most likely to affect employer judgments of a former student activist is probably the existence of an arrest record, which in some quarters was virtually a membership badge in the Movement. Business employers are much more likely than those in the human services sector to reject an applicant solely on those grounds.

The current positions of the twenty-nine non-white male lawyers who were in Legal Services in 1967 is as follows: in same Legal Services job, 33 percent; in different Legal Services job, 2 percent; solo practice 9 percent; firm of 2-4 members, 9 percent; firm of 5-9 members, 4 percent; counsel for business corporations, 6 percent; university faculty, 14 percent;
activist government agency, 5 percent; legal rights job, 1 percent; other salaried job, 1 percent; non-law job, 14 percent; retired unemployed, 1 percent. Note that percentages based on such a small N are unstable, especially when based on weighted data. The control group sample yielded only eight black lawyers, too small an N for analysis.

The job distribution for white women is also based on small Ns, twenty-two for the LSP lawyers, and twenty-eight for the bar. For the list that follows, the LSP percent is shown first, followed by a slash and then the control group percent. Unlike the comparisons for white males shown in Table 2, the data here are not standardized by year of graduation. Same Legal Services job, 8 percent/0 percent; different Legal Services job, 2 percent/0 percent; solo practice 42 percent/15 percent; firm of 2-4 members, 2 percent/16 percent; firms of 10 or more members, 2 percent/6 percent; counsel for business corporations, 1 percent/4 percent; university faculty, 4 percent/11 percent; other salaried job, 6 percent/20 percent; non-law job, 0 percent/14 percent; retired unemployed, 33 percent/16 percent.

Preliminary analysis of the data using controls for year of graduation revealed no important interaction effects. However, since the former Legal Services lawyers are much younger than the control group, in cross tabular presentations the year of graduation of lawyers in the control group has been standardized so that the distribution for that group matches that for the LSP lawyers.

The varieties of "legal rights" work are discussed in Borosage, et. al., (1970) and Marks (1972).

The status of practice-index is the sum of scores on three separate indices, each of which was first converted to a Z score based on the distribution for the control group. The three sub-indices were: (1) log, of firm size (solo practice = firm size of one) (2) income from the practice of law during the preceding year (corrected for multiple jobs), and (3) a "status of clients scale", based on the wealth of business and individual clients, weighted by the proportion of time spent on each type of client. A score of 3 on one of these sub-indices indicates that the lawyer's raw score was within one standard deviation of the control group mean on that index. One point was then added or subtracted for each standard deviation above or below the mean in which the respondent's score fell, up to a maximum of three points. A score of zero on a sub-index thus indicates that the score was three standard deviations below the mean, a score of six indicates that it was three standard deviations above the mean. Since the distributions on all the sub-indices were heavily skewed to the bottom of the scale, the Z score technique is technically not appropriate. However it was used because it generated a score which could meaningfully be added to those on the other sub-indices. Experimentation with different scoring methods and analysis of the sub-indices independently did not affect the findings.
21. When LSP lawyers are compared to the bar as a whole, prior job is omitted. For reasons explained below, prior job is added to the other controls only after lawyers with stable job histories are dropped from the control group.

22. The conclusions drawn in this paragraph are based on analysis of a logit model (Theil, 1971), a log linear model which yields more accurate estimates than regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous. A maximum likelihood estimation procedure was used. The analysis was repeated using regression, and the results were the same.

23. Perhaps the findings would be more precise if various control groups were used, depending on the number of job changes engaged in since the early sixties. Sample size does not permit this procedure.

24. Small sample size for each of the various types of salaried jobs precludes further multivariate analysis of the differences between the LSP and the control group.

25. The regressions were run with weighted data to correct for disproportionate sampling ratios for strata within the Legal Services sample and the bar sample. However, the most efficient use of the available data dictated no further use of weights to correct for the over-sampling of LSP participants.

26. Tables 5-7 are based on dummy variable regression (multiple classification analysis), a variant of the general linear model (Cohen, 1968). A global test for interactions in which each category of each control variable was interacted with the variable "participation in LSP" indicated that, for each dependent variable addition of the interaction terms did not significantly increase the corrected $R^2$.

For the dichotomous variable "does social reform pro bono work," analysis was also done using the logit model cited earlier. This analysis yielded stronger findings than those reported in the text for the regression analysis; the LSP effect was actually somewhat greater with the control variables than without. The regression findings are presented in the table because they are more easily interpretable.

27. Fractional weights were used, so the significance level is not affected by artificial increase in sample size. However, the significance level is not as accurate as with a true random sample because the weighting scheme used sacrifices some efficiency in sample design. Because of the relatively large $N$, rather small coefficients are statistically significant. Hence significance levels are not shown in the tables, but for small coefficients are reported in the text for reference by the interested reader.
One important finding which emerges is that in this national data set, social background and educational variables do not have nearly as strong an effect on status of practice as would be expected from earlier studies in individual cities (e.g., Carlin, 1962, 1966; Ladinsky, 1963, 1967; Lortie, 1959). This finding will be elaborated on in a forthcoming paper.

Since the data analysis is of necessity limited to white males, the pronoun "he" is used in this argument. It is hypothesized that the process is similar for women.

Major firm lawyers whom we have interviewed on this issue indicate that "bad training" is viewed as a serious problem. In addition, there is the problem of "lateral entry" to firms. Major firms find it preferable to bring in new lawyers at the bottom (i.e., fresh out of law school) or at a senior level; they do not like to bring in lawyers with a few years of experience not directly relevant to the firm's specialty.

See, for example, the studies reviewed by Granovetter (1974: 5-6). There is no study of the job-finding process for lawyers, but studies of other professionals (e.g., Brown, 1965; Shaprio, et. al., 1965; Granovetter, 1974) are consistent with the description in the text.

There is no way of knowing the extent to which the findings here can be generalized to the study of student activism. There have, however, been hints in that literature that differences in experiences are relevant. For example Greene (1970) reports his impression that the former leaders of the Berkeley FSM are more radical than the followers, although he has no control for self-selection. Krauss (1974) begins with a separation between leaders, activists, and intermittent activists, but then has to collapse categories because of insufficient N. At least one study has also indicated that variation in the intensity of experience is important; in a study of students at Kent State, Adamek and Lewis concluded that, in spite of the problem of self-selection, there was evidence that the "extreme social control force applied by the National Guard (in May 1970) radicalized the students most directly involved" (1973: 347).
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