This report is based on a visit of the World Affairs Delegation to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1975. The delegation was composed of 13 executives from U.S. organizations whose purpose was to develop an American understanding of world affairs. Observations are reported which are pertinent as evidence of the value of such exchanges and for suggesting how China might relate to world affairs in the near future. Specifically examined were Chinese foreign views encountered during the visit and the relevance of the "Chinese model." The Chinese views of the world that were noted by the group were the world being in turmoil, the possibility for avoiding another world war being excellent, and an inevitable struggle existing among the superpowers for dominance. Expressed Chinese concerns included nuclear weapons, PRC security, territorial integrity and national unification, and Taiwan. Attitudes about Sino-American relations were negative. The "Chinese model" represents current Chinese society. It covers the liberation of women, utilization of children and elderly in work force, treatment of schistosomiasis, self-reliance of local communities, preventive medicine, and emphasis on Maoist ideology. In general, the group believed that China's model appeared successful and will continue through the near future. (ND)
REPORT OF THE
WORLD AFFAIRS DELEGATION
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by Allen S. Whiting

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
UNITED STATES—CHINA RELATIONS, INC.
Report of the
World Affairs Delegation
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The World Affairs Delegation visited China in October 1975 under the sponsorship of the National Committee on United States-China Relations.
From October 6 to October 23, 1975, a World Affairs Delegation visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as one of the officially agreed upon exchanges of groups jointly negotiated by China and the United States. The delegation, sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations, was composed mainly of chief executive officers from national and regional organizations whose principal purpose is to develop American understanding of world affairs; most participants were members of the National Committee and/or the Council on Foreign Relations. It spent one week in Peking meeting with senior officials, three days in the Northeast visiting the Taching oil field and Harbin, and the remaining time divided among Nanking, Shanghai, and nearby areas.

One of the major purposes of the visit was to experience China firsthand so as to acquire a better sense of the political system and of societal development than can be gained at a distance. As concerned Americans and as transmitters of information on foreign affairs, the group considered this understanding of the world’s largest and oldest continuous society to be vitally important. In addition, this group was uniquely qualified to probe Chinese views on specific international issues, and could offer its hosts a sense of the various perspectives that exist in the United States as reflected in the individual members of the delegation and their contacts with different constituencies.

Beyond this immediate objective of exchanging views on matters of foreign policy concern, the group explored selected components of the PRC developmental experience to ascertain what constituted the "Chinese model" (never so called by Chinese, however) and to assess its potential relevance elsewhere. Previous experience by certain members in India and Africa combined with special backgrounds in engineering, medicine, and biochemistry, facilitated this endeavor. Finally, the group hoped to encourage Chinese officials to participate in the growing international dialogue over global problems of food, energy, and resources.

Obviously, these objectives could be pursued to only a limited degree, although the trip proved far more fruitful than might have been anticipated at the outset. The constraints were the conventional ones experienced by relatively large groups travelling over so varied and complex a country for so short a time. However they are worth noting at the outset so as to place this report in proper perspective. PRC interviews are extremely restricted in the range of responses that can be elicited below the very highest level, in this case Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing. Observations and reactions on virtually all other occasions are identical with views expressed in the public media. Even among top officials a one-shot exchange is necessarily somewhat formal and superficial by comparison with repeated contact. As a further complication, the separate interests of individuals in the group naturally necessitated
a scattering of questions in lieu of a more systematically developed dialogue. Finally, the trip coincided with advance arrangements being negotiated by Secretary Kissinger for President Ford's arrival shortly thereafter. This immediate context probably conditioned Chinese statements somewhat and should be noted for comparison with reports of other delegations, both prior and subsequent.

There is no need to recapitulate the experiences and reactions of the delegation in its general encounter with the Chinese political system and society as manifested in visits to communes, kindergartens, a teacher's college, factories, an oil field, housing developments, and a hydroelectric project. These have already been amply detailed elsewhere; for instance, in the report of the Seventh Congressional Delegation to the PRC which covered much of the same itinerary only a few months earlier. However, selected aspects of the itinerary which pertain to "the Chinese model" and its relevance abroad will be discussed briefly following an examination of Chinese foreign policy views encountered on the visit. These are pertinent both for evidence of the utility in such exchanges and for the larger question of how China may relate to world affairs in the foreseeable future.

THE CHINESE WORLD VIEW

Throughout the eighteen-day visit, statements on Chinese foreign policy echoed in verbatim repetition the main themes of statements issued over the past several years, most notably by the late Premier Chou En-lai in his report to the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, Vice Premier Teng's speech to the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974, and similar declarations there by Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, as well as editorials and commentaries in Jen Kin Jih Pao (People's Daily) and Peking Review. Familiar formulations—the world being in turmoil, the situation being excellent, and the struggle among the superpowers for hegemony making world war inevitable—characterized most Chinese analyses. There is no need to repeat these well-known positions here.

However, the specific elaboration of particular points in these larger themes did offer suggestive nuances and, on occasion, revelation of a more complicated view than can be derived from published materials. No direct quotation was permitted for attribution to Vice Premier Teng and Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung, but paraphrase was approved. In addition, the group met with Vice Minister for Foreign Trade Yao I-lin; chief of New China News Agency Chu Mu-chih; and officials of the host organization, the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. Drawn principally from the remarks of Teng, Han, and Yao, the more interesting observations concerned expectations of war, nuclear weapons, specific Asian situations, and views of the United States.

When Chinese officials clarified their forecast of "another world war," they focused on Europe and the Middle East as probable flashpoints of a Soviet-American confrontation. Thus it is regional rather than global conflict which is projected as most likely. Moreover, they specified that conventional rather than nuclear weapons will be used. In short, they do not expect a world-wide conflagration with all of the consequences implied in Armageddon scenarios.
In addition, the PRC believes this war can be forestalled, if not avoided altogether, by vigilant countermeasures against what is defined as "the polar bear" or "the Soviet drive for hegemony." While the United States still maintains "a slight nuclear superiority," Soviet conventional forces are allegedly superior in the European theater. This position was buttressed by appropriate citations from Western sources, including reports of NATO estimates. Special stress was given Soviet military expenditures and deployments since "detente" began to characterize U.S.-Soviet relations, 1971-72. Chinese advice calls for a bolstering of NATO strength, including an independent European nuclear force if necessary.

Both consistency and contradiction mark this posture. On the one hand, Chinese officials deprecate the nuclear weapon as an instrument of warfare, insisting it is only used to intimidate and threaten. This justifies the forecast of a conventional war. On the other hand, China has acquired its own nuclear capability and continues to expand this power, albeit somewhat more slowly than had been predicted abroad. Furthermore, PRC officials emphasize the steady erosion in the American nuclear superiority since signing of the atmospheric test-ban agreement in 1962 and the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1963. Yet if nuclear weapons have only political utility for Soviet-American brinkmanship, why acquire them, why argue for an independent European nuclear force, and why link the nuclear weapons balance with estimates of war?

Some possible clues to a partial explanation of these inconsistencies emerged in various remarks addressing specific aspects of the nuclear weapons problem. Taken in toto they suggest that PRC strategic positions have emerged in a comprehensive framework that places primary emphasis on the conventional weapons balance. As expected, top priority was given to a "no first use" (NFU) pledge as a first step toward the reduction and ultimate total destruction of nuclear weapons. Surprisingly enough, however, a top official suggested that the United States might persuade the Soviet Union to join in such a declaration, whereupon China would probably be able to win French agreement; Great Britain and India would almost certainly follow thereafter. Although the credibility of any Soviet promise was casuistically dismissed as "a separate issue," his proposal, nonetheless, explicitly countered the basic posture anathematizing Soviet-American negotiations and vilifying alleged Soviet perfidy. It also would remove nuclear weapons as a deterrent to compensate for a conventional weapons imbalance in Europe.

Perhaps the NFU pledge is hortatory propaganda, but since it antedates the change in the Soviet forces in Europe, it may also address a longer-range concern. In contrast with most previous Chinese positions, public and private, the group was explicitly told that the PRC opposes nuclear proliferation "in principle" and will not proliferate "in practice." In sum, China is a virtual NPT member, if not an actual signatory. This suggests anxiety over the cumulative dangers inherent in the accidental launch or their irrational use by a "madman." One of the more polemical points made in this regard suggested that Hiroshima and Nagasaki, rather than Tokyo and Osaka, were chosen as targets for America's atomic attack in World War II because the effects were greater on "small cities." Again, both precision and polemic attended discussion of India's detonation. On the one hand, they credited it only as a "nuclear device," without alleging any weapons capability. On the other hand, they attributed the event to "Soviet assistance," ignoring the Canadian component altogether.
The sum and substance of these conversations on nuclear weapons seemed to go beyond exchanges with earlier delegations, suggesting the utility of future conversations on various aspects of the problem. With growing interest in the Republic of Korea for acquiring an independent nuclear capability in anticipation of a possible American disengagement, there may be an eventual Chinese interest in a regional approach to arms limitation.

The discussions lacked sufficient detail and were of inadequate duration to go more deeply into these issues, however, much less to reveal what actually underlies the professed anxiety over a Soviet-American war arising in Europe or the Middle East. A mixture of motivations could conceivably include a self-serving sense of Chinese security needs prompting a deflection of Soviet pressure from Asia by persuading NATO to continue an arms race, as well as a desire to project China's political presence in an area remote from traditional Chinese interests. Finally, of course, there could be a genuine concern over the Soviet-American power balance and what it portends for Soviet policy worldwide.

Of these various possible motivations, security needs were expressly denied by PRC officials. Consistent with Chou En-lai's 1973 formulation, Soviet strategy was depicted as embodying a "feint to the East, attack to the West." Literally reversing the thrust of remarks made in 1971-73, they dismissed the Soviet military force confronting China as "only a million men," which posed no serious threat to "800 million people." They argued that Moscow's disposition of force, three-fourths in Europe as against one-fourth in Asia, revealed Soviet strategy as aimed at Europe first, China second. Without denying an ultimate threat in some distant future, the Chinese insisted they had no fear of attack now.

This self-assured posture was indirectly substantiated by the failure to show our group any air-raid shelters. Informal examination of those under construction in Harbin showed little sense of urgency despite Harbin's vulnerability, being within a few hundred miles of the border. Moreover, it provides the main railroad juncture for northeast China through which must pass all tank car shipments of oil from nearby Taching. The relatively more relaxed Chinese estimate of the Soviet threat was also reflected in the willingness to express open displeasure over various aspects of American policy, thereby diminishing the sense of detente which earlier had served as a political counter to Moscow's military concentration of forces.

With regard to specific Asian situations, the interviews also proved illuminating, providing insight into aspects of Chinese policy not evident in public statements. One top official, without prompting, volunteered information on the Cambodian recovery of Wei Island from communist Vietnamese forces, suggesting Chinese support for the smaller ally against Vietnam on this matter which allegedly was not susceptible to compromise because it involved a question of territorial integrity. By implication, a similarly uncompromising position may be taken by Peking when it confronts the Vietnamese possession of islands in the South China Sea, known as the Spratleys or Nansha, to which China lays claim.* This assertion of inviolable

*On March 22, 1976, Taipei's Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement reiterating that the Spratleys and Paracels "have long been an inalienable part of China...." The statement was issued in response to a report that Vietnam had recently published a map claiming the islands.
principle also raises some question about the eventual disposition of conflicting Sino-Japanese claims to the Senkakus or Tiao Yu Tai (presently patrolled by Tokyo's navy), reportedly "shelved" in order to facilitate negotiation of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty.

Territorial integrity and national unification were also identified as at issue in Korea. Vice Premier Teng chose his words on this subject with particular care, emphasis, and solemnity. He did not expressly demand the withdrawal of American forces from the southern half, as publicly argued by Pyongyang and Peking, but neither did he encourage any hope for compromise on the northern half's stated objective of unification on its terms. More significantly, he linked this issue in principle with Taiwan, a matter which both he and all other officials cited as the main obstacle to the normalization of Sino-American relations.

Taiwan's importance was underscored by all Chinese, regardless of their role or level of responsibility. While Sino-American trade might be increased somewhat by the granting of most-favored-nation treatment and the settlement of outstanding claims over property seized in China and assets frozen in the United States, these were "minor" compared with "the major obstacle, Taiwan." Teng affirmed China's readiness to wait five, ten, or one hundred years if necessary to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.

Teng's formulation implied a distinction between a prolonged period of patience with respect to this ultimate objective and the more immediate desire for American disengagement from the island. While there was an explicit concession that the U.S. need not immediately break the political and military ties if the timing seemed inconvenient (an apparent allusion to domestic political problems facing the Ford administration), all comment reflected a deep sense of frustration and disappointment over the failure of American policy to move more rapidly on this question.

This seemed to be obliquely reflected in a minor matter which flared up during the group's tour. One week before Secretary Kissinger's arrival to arrange for President Ford's visit, People's Daily prominently printed a harsh statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attacking the United States for "undisguised interference in China's internal affairs and a flagrant violation of the Shanghai Chinese-American communique." This was the strongest accusation against Washington since the Nixon visit. The explicit subject was Tibet and minor activities associated therewith manifested in the forthcoming visit of a refugee Tibetan cultural troupe and a so-called "Tibetan Affairs Office" which had functioned in New York since 1964. Chinese officials focused on this issue briefly, but with considerable vigor, during the group's discussions; in view of the matter's marginality, such emphasis suggests it served as a surrogate for the Taiwan question.

Privately, Peking officials frequently cite "the Japanese formula" as offering a precedent for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Specifically, they insist that Washington (1) withdraw all military personnel, (2) terminate the security treaty, and (3) end all diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Implicit in "the Japanese formula," however, is the continuation of trade, investment, and tourism under non-official auspices, as has been the case since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China in 1972.
Japan arose in a more direct context as Chinese officials offered their view of U.S. security arrangements in the arc of Asia. They acknowledged the right of individual countries to determine their own defense needs, while maintaining "in principle" China's opposition to all foreign bases and foreign troops. This not only applied to Thailand and the Philippines, but to Japan as well, where the formula, "Japanese-American relations first, Japanese-Chinese relations second" signalled acceptance of the Mutual Security Treaty and American bases there. This accorded with previous visitors' reports of Chinese compromise in the face of Soviet pressure for a "collective security pact" in Asia and for possible naval bases in the wake of American defeat in Indochina.

Concerning the United States itself, however, a "lesser evil" approach prevailed throughout the conversations and the media contacts experienced by the group. While Soviet activities posed "the main danger" of war, "struggle between the two superpowers for hegemony" characterized the present international situation. Possible pique with the administration was reflected in Vice Premier Teng's failure to allude even once to President Ford's forthcoming visit. The absence of any favorable reporting on American society, while negative stereotypical images abounded in New China News Agency dispatches on crime and unemployment, prompted questions by the group as to accuracy and motivation, without eliciting an encouraging response. Children's booklets published in 1974, found in commune stores and homes, still portray the Korean War in vivid terms of heroic Chinese youth bayonetting "American devils." When one of the group noted to an interpreter the contrast in treatment of each country in the media and educational materials of the other, the young man responded, "we can't forget the past," and spoke heatedly of atrocities by U.S. servicemen in China before 1949. When officials were queried over the omission of any reference to the United States role in the defeat of Japan, the thirtieth anniversary of which was commemorated in a People's Daily editorial that included "the Soviet people" in its tribute, only evasive answers resulted. In short, the personal warmth, hospitality, and friendship which characterized the group's interactions throughout China, contrasted with official handling of the United States throughout the discussions and in the public media.

Obviously, no trip of this limited scope could hope to elicit a valid sense of public opinion. However, instances of anti-American attitudes among younger persons cautioned against any easy assumption of a more friendly disposition prevailing in newer generations less personally involved in the civil war in which Washington sided with the Nationalists against the Communists. At the top, Vice Premier Teng recalled President Nixon's justification of his historic trip in terms of "American national interests." In this regard, the ritualistic reference to "the spirit of the Shanghai Communique" which occurred in all greetings, ceremonial toasts, and briefings may reflect reality more than rhetoric. This document nowhere alludes to "friendship," but instead frankly declares, "There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies." Almost one-half identifies expressly conflicting positions on general principles and specific issues, characterizing the 1972 exchanges as "serious...frank...extensive...earnest...candid." While it was clearly the Taiwan portion of the communique that offered the immediate point of reference for many of the allusions made by
Chinese speakers, the broader content still seemed relevant for understanding the dichotomy between the interpersonal experiences of the group and the overall sense of Sino-American relations.

THE CHINESE MODEL

As previously indicated, the group's itinerary was not unique or unprecedented in any way. Detailed descriptions of places visited and briefings offered exist elsewhere, precluding the necessity for recapitulation here. However, the delegation's special interest in world affairs put a different perspective on the trip, perhaps best presented in terms of "the Chinese model" and its potential relevance abroad. Without presuming to cover this topic, much less exhaust it, some salient impressions and observations emerged both individually and collectively, justifying at least a summary statement.

The role of women proved to be of daily interest and importance for its implications elsewhere. At every point, whether in the elite interactions between a high official and his female interpreter or in a low level factory briefing, the spirit of mutual respect and equality between sexes was manifest in the informal interventions and exchanges that occurred. Women in charge of residence or neighborhood committees communicated a dynamic grasp of responsibility in their discussions of primary education, child care, marital relations, birth control, clinics, and public discipline, all of which fall within their purview. The struggle for full equality is not ended, as frankly conceded in private and in print. However, the self-assurance and vigor which characterizes those presently in charge and those of potential leadership, particularly women under forty, impressed the group as establishing a firm position from which there can only be an advance and no retreat. This impression was reinforced by graphic posters on sale in major bookstores at a nominal cost which portray women in a wide range of roles but always in the forefront, whether of agricultural production, mechanized labor, or militia duty.

While recognizing the genuine revolution of mores (and perhaps of economic patterns as well) that must occur before this can be emulated throughout the world, the role of women in China seemed pertinent as a developmental model on three levels. As the briefings put it, "women have been transformed from consumers into producers," thereby diminishing their demand on the economy while adding their contribution. This provides a double benefit to a developing society with scarce resources, material and human. Nowhere is this more evident than in the many workshops run by "former housewives." At a second level, the women's control over the local services and daily living needs provides the best informed and most concerned source of direction, permitting the disciplined de-centralization of management in areas particularly susceptible to bureaucratic apathy, ignorance and corruption, as evidenced elsewhere. This goes far to explain the high standards of health, cleanliness and civic order which impress all visitors to China.

Last but not least, the liberation of women from their traditional role as bearers of children and water has raised the self-respect and
sense of dignity of half the population, a major gain by any measurement of human progress. The quiet assurance with which women explained their activity on pumping teams at the Taching oil field, as operators of highly sophisticated medical equipment, and as producers of iron and steel in small-scale foundries testified to the individual's higher self-esteem. The impact of this for women in traditional agricultural cultures cannot be exaggerated, despite a generally lower level of work role that often seemed to be assigned to women.

A related aspect of social development that impressed the delegation as of potential relevance elsewhere was the mobilization of all able-bodied persons, young and old, in some sort of productive or supportive activity. This utilization of children and the elderly who would otherwise be idle provides valuable labor for jobs requiring it, as well as a psychic sense of participation that carries with it important political and social benefits. Two examples of labor value that arose during the trip pertained to agricultural development and preventive medicine. The newly announced goal of "the basic mechanization of agriculture" by 1980 requires a wholesale transformation of farmland, including *inter alia* the straightening of irrigation ditches, the levelling of the terrain, and the filling in of ponds. This will maximize the efficiency of machinery. The effort is a slow, laborious one where every additional pair of hands is of value. School children marching to and from the fields as part of their weekly regimen demonstrated the program in action, as did airplane flights over whole areas already changed in appearance.

The second case concerned the battle with schistosomiasis. Led by Dr. John H. Knowles, former Director of the Massachusetts General Hospital, some of the delegation visited the Wusih Research Institute for the Prevention and Medical Treatment of Schistosomiasis. Particularly impressive was the policy of mobilizing the population to dig up the mud, apply poison by repeated and concentrated spraying, and change marshy infested land into productive farms. Thus, manpower was combined with epidemiological analysis to combat this major, debilitating and, ultimately, deadly disease with unprecedented success.

Beyond the material gains from involving women, the young and the elderly in constructive activity, political indoctrination and national unification are also served by such policies, provided they are properly implemented. Active involvement in collective effort can be rewarding in itself for the individual and for the regime. Alienation and anxiety may not be the necessary concomitants of social change, modernization, and urbanization. Participation can generate a proper pride and sense of responsibility that knits otherwise disparate social groups into a common whole. These collective political and individual psychic gains may well outweigh the economic costs that are measured in terms of efficiency or input-output calculations.

A third feature of the system is its emphasis on "self-reliance," a term which literally bombards the visual and aural senses from all directions. This places a premium on utilizing local resources for local needs through local decision-making. At the county and commune levels, "self-reliance" is evident in small-scale industry which furnishes most of the mechanization and electrification which has raised agricultural productivity. It also provides much of the clothing and small household items which have improved living standards. This has multiple effects which are evident even on so
brief a trip as this. Transportation is basically reduced to short-haul via canal boat, animal cart, tractor cart, or small truck. Material is cannibalized from scrap; nothing is wasted. Local products are designed and planned for local needs; the market conditions are readily ascertained. Bureaucratic paperwork is reduced with successively higher levels acting as "clearing-centers" for residual problems that cannot be ironed out below. Finally, the sense of pride that comes with participation, rather than with possession, cements local unity and in turn national unity.

This confronts problems endemic to developing societies, particularly of large scale. The mobilization of local resources and the adaptation of production to local needs are of particular value where limited capital, raw material, and technology characterize a pre-modern economy. Management skills are inherent in the peasant who has had to survive while coping with the natural elements. The question is how to mobilize him for a larger good than the benefit of his immediate family. Conversations on the commune revealed that considerable attention is given to the private plots, now guaranteed in the new constitution, as well as to privately owned pigs, chickens, and rabbits. In addition, however, the collective enterprise appears to generate support because it visibly services local needs and is not, as in the Soviet Union, primarily and visibly an instrument of the national economy.

This is most obviously reflected in discussions about the annual plan. Except for sectors of high national priority, such as petroleum production and higher grade iron and steel, the planning process is an active dialogue between lower and higher administrative levels, where the local input is perceived as critical to the success of the plan. National campaigns emerge from Peking stressing agricultural development on the "Tachai county" model or industrialization on the "Taching" model. But their implementation and duration varies according to local decisions and local conditions, a fact made evident by the widely different emphases given to the "anti-Confucius, anti-Lin" and "Water Margin" campaigns in Harbin, Nanking, and Shanghai. Similarly, national targets for increases in grain output are refined and adjusted to different performance capabilities for individual communes based on differing natural conditions.

Of the various components which comprise the "Chinese model," this is perhaps the most important, and yet the one least susceptible to systematic study by a short visit where information is gained largely through official briefings. Yet regardless of actual performance, both discrete and aggregate, most members of the group were impressed with the degree to which the ideal of self-reliance has been propagated as a model for emulation and for evaluation of performance. The involvement of workers in management discussions must have some influence on behavior, if not on all decisions. Such consultation appears compulsory where other systems rely on orders from above. This equates experience with education in some instances; in other cases it produces a horizontal process in an inevitable pyramidal structure. A healthy feature in any large system that tends to hierarchy, this appears to be of particular value in a socialist society where management decisions affecting virtually all aspects of life can become bureaucrati zed. This can degenerate into ever greater tendencies toward passivity and inertia both on the part of the populace at large and in the bureaucracy itself.
Another feature of the Chinese experience that impressed all of the group, but especially those who had been there before 1949, is the degree to which the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter have been met by making them of sufficient priority in national planning and economic development. Only thirty years ago the Huai River ravaged the countryside with water surplus and shortage, being ranked with famine and pestilence as the three "natural and unavoidable scourges." Now a truly staggering engineering scheme is slowly but surely assuring safety and livelihood to tens of millions who live within reach of this multi-purpose river control project. Human power still pulls heavy carts in as modern a city as Nanking, but the pullers appear healthy in contrast with the emaciated and tubercular coolies of three decades ago. Clothing is uniform but adequate; housing is improving in new suburban construction although space is scarce as are private amenities. The emphasis of "serve the people," while not on consumer goods as such, clearly translates into an assured supply of food, clothing, medical services and shelter to meet the minimal needs of all.

In addition, special emphasis is placed on health, particularly preventive medicine, to the visible benefit of children and the elderly. Here some of the most celebrated aspects of the Chinese model need only be mentioned, such as the "barefoot doctors" or paramedics, neighborhood clinics, and the use of traditional medicine. Aside from the more routine uses of acupuncture for the relief of pain, more dramatic experimentation has led to its rapidly increased application for anesthesia in major surgery. The multiple reduction of training, personnel, equipment, and post-operative effects on the patient was demonstrated in the removal of a benign thyroid tumor, performed by two doctors in their twenties with only three years of medical school, assisted by a single nurse. The only equipment in the room was a standard blood-pressure gauge. The patient remained conscious throughout, being encouraged to talk so as to assist the surgeon in operating close to the larynx. Where money is tight and training at a premium, short cuts such as acupuncture may do much to bridge the gap in health standards between the less and the more developed societies. A panoply of Chinese practices helps to make a little go a long way.

This cursory description of selected aspects of the Chinese model which may pertain to problems elsewhere does not, of course, identify those components of the system, traditional and modern, which may uniquely qualify this society for the successful functioning of these aspects. Comparisons are invidious and often ill-informed, so some of the more salient Chinese characteristics might be merely identified as possible clues to the model's dynamic process, leaving to others the job of specific comparison.

It was evident to "old China hands" in the group that communism did not create a collective consciousness, but merely capitalized upon its traditional role in China, expanding the boundaries beyond the family and clan to the commune and the nation. The driving work ethic and disciplining group membership also antedated Mao's writings in Hunan and Yenan. These cultural traits are not found universally, perhaps least of all in combination. Their pre-communist existence in China accounts for much of what has been accomplished to date.
However, these traits did not produce anything similar on a national scale before 1949, raising another feature of the system which impressed the delegation, namely the pervasive role of the Chinese Communist Party. The overall planning, administration, and control of life in the PRC once again lies in Party hands after the hiatus of 1966-73 occasioned by the Cultural Revolution. Not all planning is correct nor are all Party members models for emulation, but the institution transcends the cult of Mao and is certain to survive his passing from the scene.

This calculation does not extend to relations at the leadership level where logic, historical precedent, and some evidence suggest tension, if not struggle, may paralyze policy at times and push it to extremes on occasion. Serious political and economic problems confront the leadership over the coming decades and future decisions may alter the present Chinese model. However, within these acknowledged limits, the ubiquitous Party penetration of all facets of management in this totally managed society offers an instrument of policy with few counterparts elsewhere. It too is compatible in kind, if not in degree, with the imperial bureaucratic system that managed much of Chinese society over some two thousand years.

Another prominent feature is the ideology. This appears in a more proportionate and practical role on a trip through the countryside than when viewed from afar through the propaganda prism of People's Daily or Peking Review. The "little red book" was nowhere to be found except in bookstores. Instead the action-oriented components of Mao's "thought" keynoted briefings that otherwise would be indistinguishable from similar presentations elsewhere in the world. This is not to suggest that the ideology is mere rhetoric to which lip service is paid by cynical or careerist officials, although some of these "deviations" must exist because they are periodically exorcised from the body politic by intensive and extensive campaigns. However, effective linkages between the general propositions of "Mao Tse-tung Thought" and practical activity in daily life—much as religions remain alive and propagate through the application of doctrine to daily life—appear to provide an important stimulus as well as reward. Goals are defined, means are sanctioned, and accomplishment is recognized within the intelligible framework of Mao's writings. These are communicated through an omnipresent network of public media, political cadres, and small "study groups" that theoretically include virtually all the population in face to face discussion on a regular, continuing basis.

Party and ideology together present a formidable combination for the involvement and indoctrination of Chinese society in economic and political behavior according to an overall plan. It is almost impossible to address this system in terms of the conventional dichotomy, persuasion versus coercion. On the one hand, the system's performance appears to generate support and belief; on the other hand, the opportunity to challenge it or to dissent is clearly limited. Moreover the instruments of persuasion are plainly visible while those of coercion may not be evident to foreign visitors but surely are known to the inhabitants. Nevertheless, on balance the main weight would appear to come down on the side of performance and persuasion, not only because of the problems involved in coercing 900 million people, but also because of the ethos transmitted by most of those contacted during the tour. If correct, this is a vital feature of the Chinese model linking traditional cultural traits with the present developmental system.
As a final observation, some members of the delegation found that the virtues of "self-reliance," decentralized management, and mass participation in implementing decisions are wholly appropriate for China's present stage of development, but pose major problems in the not too distant future. In January 1975, Premier Chou En-lai proclaimed the goal of China becoming a modernized, industrialized state on an approximate level with that of the most advanced societies by the year 2000. If taken literally, this will require the reversal of many political and socio-economic policies which have been raised to a new level of importance since the Cultural Revolution. Automation, quality control, the sophistication of knowledge and technology, the worldwide standardization of methods and even of components to facilitate technological transfer and international compatibility, all are antithetical to the Maoist ethos as presently manifest in China.

It is, of course, possible for China to continue on its own course of development, largely independent of the world economy and technology, if the leadership and the population are content to remain at a far lower level of advancement than defined in Chou's statement. This is unlikely, however, not only because the goal has already been posited, but because transnational influences and international relations will both persuade and compel future governments to develop sufficiently fast so as to satisfy felt needs of the populace and to meet the requirements of national security.

Whether a transition from the Chinese model as presently manifest is slow or sudden, it nonetheless will pose difficult political decisions for the leadership at that time. The primacy of Mao's thought and the reinvigoration of his values since 1966 poses important obstacles to changes which may be denounced as "bourgeois restoration of capitalism" and "Soviet revisionism." Indeed, nuances of this problem were apparent during the group's discussion at a teacher's college in Nanking over what admission standards and methods were used for selecting students from factories and farms. Unbeknown to the delegation, at that very time a major debate was under way over the role of examinations and academic criteria in higher education, a particularly sensitive subject in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

In all fairness, however, it should be noted that this caveat concerns a future dilemma, not the present situation. In summary, the group was favorably impressed by the Chinese model and felt that various of its components may have selective application abroad. Without addressing its accomplishment by comparison with the China of 1911 to 1949, there seemed no way to gain a proper perspective on the system. Taken in these terms, its obvious success seemed to assure its continuing viability in the foreseeable future.

UPON REFLECTION

A trip is necessarily impressionistic; the views of eighteen participant-observers are individualistic. Therefore, no conclusions as such can be offered. In their place, a few reflections may provide some insight into the experience and its relevance to Sino-American relations.

As might be anticipated, the process of communication and interaction between two cultures as different and isolated as China and America is
hazardous. Only a long, slow, and arduous effort on both sides can overcome the obstacles and even then an exchange of views will not necessarily lead to a change of views. Expectations and hopes to the contrary can only heighten the frustration experienced by Americans who try to bridge the gap in official relations by personal interaction with China.

Nevertheless, the World Affairs Delegation left after eighteen days with the conviction that its visit was both necessary and useful in chipping away at stereotypes which solidify in isolation and must be modified incrementally through continuous interaction. Even while acknowledging social science theories concerning selective perception and cognitive dissonance as structuring "reality," discarding information which does not fit expectation while accepting that which does, the effects of such exchanges cannot be dismissed out of hand. This is particularly true for two societies whose size and location necessarily involves them one with another and each with other societies in the world, whether for bad or for good. The group found it imperative to develop not only an appreciation of what is happening in China, but for Chinese to gain an appreciation of America through means other than their official media. Only through this process can mutual understanding lay the basis for developing a dialogue on matters of mutual interest. Because such matters are likely to be of regional and even global interest as well, the effort transcends the bilateral Sino-American relationship, important as that is in itself.

An added dimension to the group's perspective was the awareness of Chou En-lai's critical illness and his imminent demise. America is undergoing a transition in self-perception and direction as it emerges from the tragedy of Indochina. China too faces a change of leadership and perhaps of direction as the founding fathers of the People's Republic pass from the scene. Under these circumstances it is critically important that communication between the two countries be deepened and broadened so as to minimize misunderstanding and miscalculation. Seen in this light, the World Affairs Delegation played a small part in a process that must continue and widen over time.
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