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ABSTRACT

In an effort to clarify and synthesize recent explanations of underdevelopment and poverty in Central Appalachia, the following three models were explored: (1) the subculture of poverty model (identifies the internal deficiencies of the Southern Appalachian traditional subculture as the source of poverty problems); (2) the regional development model (providing for economic and social overhead capital, training people in skills for new industrial and service jobs, facilitating migration, and promoting private industry via a growth center strategy); (3) the internal colonialism model (identifies the process by which dominant outside industrial interests establish control and continue to prevent autonomous development of the subordinate internal colony). It was concluded that the three models should be understood as representations of the different dimensions of social existence; the human interest dimensions of mutual understanding, technical control, and emancipation should provide a framework for perceiving cultural adaptation, technical development, and redistribution of power as potentially complimentary aspects of social development; institutions should be analyzed in the context of the competitive, monopolistic, and state sectors of the national economy; class structure should be viewed in its full complexity. (AUTHOR/UC)
THREE MODELS IN SEARCH OF APPALACHIAN DEVELOPMENT: CRITIQUE AND SYNTHESIS

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ABSTRACT

THREE MODELS IN SEARCH OF APPALACHIAN DEVELOPMENT: CRITIQUE AND SYNTHESIS

Recent efforts to explain the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment in Central Appalachia can be categorized as three types: the subculture of poverty model, the regional development model, and the internal colonialism model.

The subculture of poverty model identifies the internal deficiencies of the Southern Appalachian traditional subculture as the source of the problem. Empirical studies show this model to fail as an explanation of regional underdevelopment.

The regional development model, epitomized by the programs of the Appalachian Regional Commission, is concerned with providing economic and social overhead capital, training people in skills for new industrial and service jobs, facilitating migration, and promoting the establishment or relocation of privately-owned industries through a growth center strategy. A modernizing elite is seen as the agent of the developmental process. This model provides needed resources to the region but, in the absence of a critique of domination and a redistribution of power and wealth, also serves as a rationalization of existing structures of privilege.

The internal colonialism model examines the process by which dominant outside industrial interests establish control and continue to prevent autonomous development of the subordinate internal colony. The
model is shown to be applied inappropriately to Central Appalachia, and a broader model of dependency is shown to offer the same insights.

The three models should be understood not as mutually exclusive alternatives, but as representing different dimensions of social existence. Habermas' distinction among the human interests in mutual understanding, technical control, and emancipation provides a framework for seeing cultural adaptation, technical development, and redistribution of power as potentially complimentary aspects of social development.

Central Appalachia is best characterized as a peripheral region within an advanced capitalist country. Regional institutions should be analyzed in the context of the monopolistic, competitive and state sectors of the national economy. The class structure of the region needs to be viewed in its full complexity to determine which groups have an interest in structural change.
By the mid-1960s the Appalachian Regional Development Act established as public policy that Appalachia constituted a social and economic problem for the nation. But if there is recognition of the existence of regional problems, there is no consensus on the roots of the problems or the correct strategy to overcome the region's difficulties. To clarify current views on the question, I will give a critical look at contemporary explanatory models of Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment, and attempt to provide a framework within which Appalachian problems can best be understood.

The terms poverty and underdevelopment, applied to a region, are not strictly separable in a holistic view of a socio-economic system. Neither is adequately reflected by such single indicators as income or production; both involve not only a constellation of factors, but also a relationship to the social totality. Mainstream social scientists often neglect the national and international context of poverty or underdevelopment. George Wilber describes poverty as "a system, an abstraction -- unmeasurable by itself -- with multiple properties which are capable of measurement . . . . The system of poverty is defined as the relative lack of resources and/or the inability to use resources. At a general level poverty is treated as a function of resources and mobilization." But poverty is not a system unto itself; it is a part of a broader social system. In a similar vein, Norton Ginsburg defines underdevelopment in terms of a variety of features including gross national product, demographic characteristics, spatial organization of the population, literacy, resource endowment, transportation systems, technology and industrialization. Poverty may be understood
as a property of individuals as well as collectivities; underdevelopment is used only in reference to communities, regions or nations. In this discussion, I will use poverty and underdevelopment interchangeably to refer to certain collective features of society in Central Appalachia.

Three models have been drawn upon to explain Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment. These are the subculture of poverty, regional development and internal colonialism models. Each has been developed in other contexts, and applied to the Appalachian case. Briefly summarized, the subculture of poverty model identifies the internal deficiencies of the lower-class subculture as the source of the problem. The regional development model is concerned with providing adequate social overhead capital, stimulating growth centers, and facilitating migration from the region; a modernizing elite is seen as the agent of the developmental process. The internal colonialism model examines the process and structure through which dominant outside industrial interests establish their control and prevent autonomous development of the subordinate internal colony.

Each model has a different implication for social policy. The subculture of poverty model suggests programs of "directed cultural change through social work, psychiatry, and education." The regional development model emphasizes increasing resources available to a region without calling for substantial changes in the structure of resource control. The internal colonialism model suggests the need for radical restructuring of society, with a redistribution of resources to the poor and powerless.

In a study of poverty in the non-metropolitan South, George Thomas identifies two additional causal explanations of poverty, the genetic and
the scarce resource models. In practical terms, both are non-social, representing the extremes of a continuum from the sub-individual to the ecological. The genetic explanation asserts that poverty is biologically rooted in inferior genetic traits. The scarcity thesis holds that resources are inadequate to provide affluence or abundance for all, at least in this historical period, and that poverty for some is an unavoidable outcome. Both of these explanations place the sources of poverty beyond human intervention in the short run. Neither is supported by enough evidence to be taken seriously in the Appalachian case.

The Subculture of Poverty and Appalachia

The notion of a culture of poverty was elaborated by Oscar Lewis in his introduction to The Children of Sanchez in 1961. Poverty in modern nations "is a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation along family lines." People in the culture of poverty, or, more accurately, the subculture of poverty, are characterized by feelings of marginality, helplessness, dependency, and inferiority. They have little sense of history or class consciousness. They are oriented toward the present rather than the future, toward the concrete rather than the abstract. Lewis has identified some 70 economic, social and psychological traits typical of the subculture of poverty. But he takes care to point out that the notion of a subculture of poverty is not to be applied to primitive peoples, "nor is it synonymous with the working class, the proletariat or the peasantry." It applies only to "those people who are at the very bottom of the socio-economic scale." Lewis estimates the subculture of poverty "is found only in approximately 20 percent of the families who live below the poverty level."
Traces of this approach are evident in Harry Caudill's *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, the now classic best-seller published in 1962 which helped awaken the national conscience to the plight of eastern Kentucky and the Central Appalachian Coalfields. The work is most notable for its condemnation of outside exploitation of the region, which Caudill soon came to phrase in terms of internal colonialism, but also describes the background of mountaineers in words reminiscent of the subculture of poverty model, even with shades of a genetic explanation. The ancestry of Caudill's depiction is not the writings of Oscar Lewis, but the old argument of John Fiske. Without making a serious effort at substantiation, Caudill describes the early settlers of eastern Kentucky as "a raggle-taggle of humanity... human refuse... a population born of embittered rejects and outcasts from the shores of Europe... people from the teeming and iniquitous cities of England." It is no wonder to Caudill that this sorry lot of people were so easily swindled out of their timber and mineral wealth by outsiders, and settled in chronic dependence by company towns and government relief programs. The outcome was preordained:

These forces had been at work long before the mountaineer's ancestors reached these shores, and for three or four generations before he had reached Kentucky. By 1840 they had accomplished their work. The twig had been bent. The tree had grown. The course of the mountaineer's development was determined. Consider then these forces in synopsis: The illiterate son of illiterate ancestors, cast loose in an immense wilderness without basic mechanical or agricultural skills, without the refining, comforting and disciplining influence of an organized religious order, in
a vast land wholly unrestrained by social organization or effective laws, compelled to acquire skills quickly in order to survive, and with a Stone Age savage as his principal teacher. From these forces emerged the mountaineer as he is to an astonishing degree even to this day.

Caudill's rhetoric is engaging, but the substance of his argument here is mostly nonsense, and was answered by John Campbell years ago.

The most widely read exposition of the subculture of poverty model applied to Appalachia is Jack Weller's *Yesterday's People*, published in 1965. Weller borrowed an analytic framework from Herbert Gans' study of an Italian-American community in Boston, *The Urban Villagers*. Gans outlined a model of three class subcultures: the middle-class subculture centered on the nuclear family, the working-class subculture centered on the "dominant role of the family circle," and the lower-class subculture centered on the "female-based family and the marginal male." Gans' working-class was the model for Weller's Appalachian folk class. This folk class is a reference group society, characterized by action-seeking, person-orientation, and the adult-centered family. Following Gans, Weller notes the existence of a "pathological" lower class below the folk class, although neither writer is referring primarily to this lower class in his work. Weller, nevertheless, gives the Appalachian folk culture many features of a subculture of poverty. He describes the folk culture as seriously inadequate to prepare mountain people to participate in the life of modern technological society. Defects of the folk culture include "extreme resistance to new ideas," "very permissive child rearing practices, which produce lives based almost totally on personal feelings;"
inadequate preparation for grasping ideas, concepts and abstractions; and "the inability of its people to work together." Weller is well aware of the variety of community patterns and of class differences, but these distinctions blur as he overgeneralizes his insights. The overall impact of the book suggests an all-pervasive folk culture.

The psychiatrist David Looff develops a similar critique of mountain child-development practices, drawing on his clinical experience in eastern Kentucky and certain of Weller's insights. The strong familialistic orientation of mountain people leads to an overemphasis on the infancy of their children, resulting in a regional training in dependency. Commonly encountered school-phobic reactions are a product of the separation anxiety resulting from this dependency training. On the positive side, the amount of attention showered on babies results in the virtual absence of such conditions as infantile autism and primary behavioral disorders, which may be based on emotional deprivation in infancy. A second characteristic of the culture is a lack of emphasis in developing verbal skills, leading to regional training in communication problems. Finally, the regional culture does not deal adequately with sexual development, matura-

In a study directed at the problem of child neglect, Norman Polansky and his associates follow Looff in identifying what they term regressive or pathological themes in Appalachian culture: infantilizing male children, separation anxiety, inexpressiveness, and fatalism. Their study of
families in western North Carolina and northern Georgia show that these characteristics are systematically related to stratification in mountain communities, being more apparent in lower income groups. But the focus of Poľansky's study is the mother with the "apathy-futility syndrome" as the object of intervention by a social welfare caseworker. The "roots of futility" are thus to be found in child rearing practices; the bases of the problems of grossly inadequate parents are not economic, the authors conclude.

In an article that begins promisingly by relating community stratification to technology, Roman Aguirzep and Ernest Vargas survey a West Virginia county to assess the impact of the coal industry on the socialization of children. Although their data suggest a much more complex situation, they conclude that the county has an "essentially two-class system" composed of "a controlling elite and a subordinate class of workers and indigents." Remarkably, responsibility for this situation gets returned to the family system: "A reasonable speculation is that the two-class system is perpetuated to a large extent by the different childrearing practices that shape the social behavior of the individual in the home." The article illustrates how easily a social casework perspective slides from a shallowly critical view of power and domination in coal counties to "blaming the victim" for not changing his situation.

The studies cited so far, whatever their shortcomings, seem clearly motivated by a humanistic concern for the mountain people with whom the authors have often worked closely and sympathetically for a considerable period of time. Other works are closer to what Valentine has called the
"pejorative tradition." One example of pejorative moralizing is an article by Richard Ball, which draws on studies conducted with rats to explore frustration instigated behavior. Ball describes the Southern Appalachian folk subculture as "analgesic" or in a later version "tension-reducing." Ball even quotes the notorious statement of Arnold Toynbee: "the Appalachian 'mountain people' today are not better than barbarians. They have relapsed into illiteracy and witchcraft. They suffer from poverty, squalor, and ill health. They are the American counterparts of the latter-day white barbarians of the Old World -- Rifis, Albanians, Kurds, Pathans, and Hairy Ainus; but, whereas these latter are belated survivals of an ancient barbarism, the Appalachians present the melancholy spectacle of a people who have acquired civilization and then lost it." Ball notes that "Toynbee has overstated the case... The words are, however, somewhat more accurate when limited to what may be designated as the folk subculture of the area."13 A medical journal article by Charles Goshen reaches the nadir of caricatured portrayals of the poorest Appalachians. Goshen terms the bottom 10 to 15 percent of the population as "cultural primitives" and "fundamentally uncivilized people."14

Problems of Application to Appalachia

I suggest that the work on Appalachia in the subculture of poverty tradition has a very limited validity at best because of three problems that the authors fail to confront: deficient research methodology, a blurring of community and social class diversity in the region, and a lack of historical perspective and specification. The methodological
approach in the work of Weller, Looff, and Polansky, for example, imports sociological or psychiatric categories and focuses on the pathological. They overgeneralize from problem families to the culture of one or more social classes. The limitations of these scientistic, clinical classification systems are particularly evident in comparison to the work of such writers as Robert Coles, John Fetterman, Tony Dunbar, and Kathy Kahn, whose humanistic method uses their subjects' own words to characterize Appalachian life-worlds. Their descriptions of individuals and families manage to capture the strengths as well as the shortcomings of mountaineers, and the diversity of personality types within some common subcultural themes. These accounts of the contradictions in the lives and outlooks of mountain people bear out Helen Lewis' suggestion that many Appalachians are in fact bi-cultural; they take part in the traditional subculture in family and neighborhood life, and in the mainstream culture through employment, formal education, media entertainment, and contact with public agencies.

Writers who have aimed at describing mountain communities and their cultural configurations, rather than viewing culture as explaining family pathology, have devoted much attention to the distinctions of lifestyles and life-chances among community types and among social and economic strata. Art Gallaher suggests five types of communities found in Southern Appalachia: extremely isolated rural communities, less isolated rural communities with some stores and services, company towns, county seat towns, and major urban areas. Even within rural communities, stratification systems can be complicated. Berton Kaplan identifies the "better," the "get-bys," and the "sorry" in a mountain community in North Carolina.
John Stephenson, studying the same community, develops a family typology of four divisions based on the type and regularity of employment; the divisions span cultural traits from traditionalism to modernity. James Brown's study of Beech Creek shows clearly identifiable high, intermediate, and low status family groups even in an isolated eastern Kentucky community. Helen Lewis and Edward Knipe show that families of coal miners in southwestern Virginia have characteristics that distinguish them from the families of farmers in the same area, and that coal miners' families can themselves be distinguished by the type of mining operation in which the husband is employed. Writers in the subculture of poverty tradition tend to either overlook these status, occupation, class, and community differences or fail to relate them carefully to the social location of the Appalachian subculture of poverty they describe.

Finally, these writers tend to identify the Southern Appalachian traditional subculture with a subculture of poverty, usually without an historical perspective on cultural change in the region. This problem is compounded by a general lack of clarity about the character of the traditional subculture and its change over time. To begin to sort out the question of the nature of the traditional subculture, I will review cultural change in the region over three periods: the relative isolation of the frontier culture from 1830 to 1890, the company town era from 1890 to 1935, and the spread of the modern industrial capitalist order since 1935. These dates are meant only to provide a rough outline of the periods; development in any particular community could show substantial variance.
Historical Perspectives

The popular discovery in the late 1870s of the traditional Appalachian subculture focused attention on a frontier style of life that had persisted since the relative isolation of the region in the 1830s. There is general agreement that the predominant themes of this subculture included individualism, puritanism, and familism.20 This pre-industrial, pioneer way of life cannot be equated with a subculture of poverty as described by Oscar Lewis; there is no evidence that pioneer families felt helpless, dependent, or inferior. The term "folk culture" is often used to suggest a healthy quality not present in the pejorative or pathological connotations to "subculture of poverty." But characterizing traditional Appalachian society as a folk culture may be as misleading as it is helpful. Paul Cressey comments, "The mountain culture had many characteristics of a folk society but it lacked the stability and class stratification found in typical peasant cultures. Pioneer attitudes survived in the exploitation rather than conservation of the soil and other natural resources."21 It bears remembering that the nineteenth century mountaineers were not the descendants of a tribal or peasant people, but the children and grandchildren of eighteenth century colonists from a nation-state about to enter into the major stage of its industrial revolution. Folk society, in the tradition of Robert Redfield,22 is located toward the communal end of the continuum from the Gemeinschaft solidarity of traditional society to the individualism of modern society. The Appalachian mountaineer was already the quintessential individualist. As Campbell wrote, "His dominant trait is independence raised to the fourth power."23 Although the mountain
subculture may have important aspects of a folk society, I prefer the designation of "Southern Appalachian traditional subculture," recalling that part of the tradition preserved is that of eighteenth century England and America.  

The degree of isolation of Southern Appalachia during the mid-1800s and early 1900s is often exaggerated, leading to an impression that mountaineers had lost touch with life in mainstream America. Migration from the region is no recent phenomenon; it has been a feature of the Appalachian population from the earliest time. As migration generally follows family-related patterns, many mountain families have had some communication with relatives outside the region. The Appalachian mountains were little more than a stopping place for some of the earliest inhabitants. Fiske notes that "poor white people made their way from North Carolina westward through Tennessee, and their descendants may still be found here and there in Arkansas, southern Missouri, and what is sometimes known as the Egyptian extremity of Illinois." Arthur Estabrook records these migrations as taking place in the 1820-1840 period, and again in the 1880s. Josiah Combs notes established migration streams from eastern Kentucky to Missouri, Texas, and Oklahoma by the early 1900s. Most surprisingly, a long-standing migration stream from two sources in the southern Appalachians to two areas of settlement in western Washington state, two thousand miles away, has been described by Woodrow Clevinger. The migration began around 1880, in connection with the timber industry, hit a peak between 1900 and 1917, and continues to a limited extent even to this day. Kinship groups from the counties around the intersection of
Kentucky, West Virginia and Virginia have made the greatest contribution to this stream. In 1942 Clevinger estimated that some 15,000 people in western Washington were immigrants or children of immigrants from the southern Appalachians. During the early 1930s, the central Appalachians experienced a net in-migration of people who had left earlier and were forced to return to the land by the Depression.

The penetration of the southern mountains by timber and coal corporations starting around 1880 began a process of transition toward modern industrial society. The period from approximately 1890 to 1930 can be characterized as the company town era in the southern coalfields. Coal operators had constructed nearly five hundred company towns in the region by 1920. The company towns added a new structure of dependency. Traditional family and community ties were strained by the rapid growth of the coal camps and the influx of new workers from neighboring counties and states. A grossly unequal distribution of wealth led to sharp class cleavages. "Like colonists in a foreign land," Knipe and H. Lewis write, "the owner-operators and their wives developed country clubs, ladies' literary clubs, and Episcopal and other 'establishment' churches which contrasted with the informal sectarian religion or the unclassified 'company church' of the coal camp."

The dependency, powerlessness, and lack of autonomy that characterized the labor force in the company towns, and the attitude of paternalism assumed by the coal operators, have led Knipe and H. Lewis to suggest a parallel to the structural position of a peasantry for this company town era. This analogy is not very appropriate. The essential
feature of a peasant, strictly speaking, is his relation to the preindustrial city. The situation of the miner in the company town is typical of the early stage of oligopoly capitalism -- that period of transition from an economy based on the entrepreneurial or family firm to advanced industrial capitalism in which the conflict between labor and capital is mediated by unions and a network of laws and institutions. Understanding this intermediate period, which Knipe and H. Lewis have described so well, requires an accurate designation of the stage of industrial capitalist development involved. In this sense a reference to peasantry is misleading.

The decline of the coal industry that began in the 1920s was intensified in the Depression of the 1930s. Strong antagonisms between miners and coal operators intensified. The social conflict of this period led, as Cressey points out, to a reorganization relying on such new institutions as labor unions, public health services, civic groups, and local prohibition. The introduction of massive government relief programs during the New Deal and the migration north of many mountaineers for war-time factory jobs in the 1940s also contributed to the decline of the traditional culture. By the end of World War II, highland society was clearly well along in transition from the traditional subculture toward the industrial capitalist culture of mainstream America.

The Southern Appalachian Studies, supported by the Ford Foundation, produced convincing evidence of the "passing of provincialism" by the late 1950s. Although fundamentalist religious beliefs were still pervasive, the characteristic traits of self-reliance, traditionalism, and fatalism appeared to have shifted toward the national norms. The study concluded:
the old stereotypes that have so long guided social action in the Region no longer apply to the great majority of the residents. . . . For the most part their way of life, their beliefs, their fears, and their aspirations are not radically different from those of most other Americans. If they do not share fully in the larger culture of the nation, which in truth they do not as yet . . . it can hardly be attributed to their lack of willingness to do so. To an appreciable measure their distinctiveness as a people is vested in characteristics that have persisted only because of restricted social and economic opportunities. 34 Ironically, it was just at this point in time -- when the distinctiveness of the Southern Appalachian traditional subculture was fading -- that the subculture of poverty model was popularized and began to be applied to the region.

The Failure of Explanation

The most significant test of the Appalachian subculture of poverty model is whether it can be shown to account for actual differences in the rates or processes of industrial development between the region and other areas. Dwight Billings has analyzed survey data from North Carolina which suggest that identification with the value dimensions of a traditional subculture rather than mainstream "middle-class" culture is not distinctive to residents of the mountain counties. Middle-class orientation -- on a scale measuring fatalism, achievement orientation, outlook on the future, and social class identification -- is better predicted by education, age, rurality, occupation, and race than by region. As Billings points out, "What is most interesting is that the older respondents in the piedmont" -- the age group which
participated most directly in the development of that region -- are almost identical in their response pattern to older respondents in the mountains. Since the same level of [low] middle-class orientation characterizes both mountain and piedmont areas for this age cohort, then attitudinal characteristics cannot be used to explain the lack of economic development -- and therefore poverty -- in the mountains.35

A related example is the attempt to explain the general failure of unionization in the Carolina piedmont textile belt by reference to the "folk society" of the region. This tradition, pioneered by Broadus and George S. Mitchell and drawing on the work of Howard Odum, is epitomized by Glenn Gilman's Human Relations in the Industrial Southeast, which interprets the paternalism of the mill owners in "an industry under the folkways" as providing the necessary protection for the textile labor force.36 Recent research by Melton McLaurin shows that Piedmont textile workers had a record of union agitation and organization dating back to the days of the Knights of Labor in the 1880's. The later unsuccessful strikes in 1929 at Elizabethton, Marion, and Gastonia are better known.37 Such efforts paralleled the organizing drives among coal miners in the central Appalachian coalfields over the same period. The difference is that the United Mine Workers succeeded in establishing a union in the coalfields after the mid-1930s, while the United Textile Workers failed in the Piedmont. A similar folk subculture characterizes both the Central Appalachian Coalfields and the Carolina Piedmont. The alleged fatalism, inability to work in groups, and communication difficulties of the mountain subculture did not prevent coal miners from organizing a union capable of challenging the power of the coal companies.
under very repressive circumstances. In the light of this history, the subculture of poverty or folk society seems to be an inadequate explanation of industrialization and unionization or their lack. A constant cannot explain a variable. An explanation of the success of unionization in the coalfields and its failure in the textile mills is more likely to be found in the difference between an extractive industry and manufacturing. A union has more leverage on a resource that must be extracted where it is than on a factory that can be moved elsewhere in search of a more docile labor force.

In short, the subculture of poverty model fails as a causal theory of Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment. Careful observers would apply the subculture of poverty characterization only to a small minority of the region's people -- a minority which is least influential in determining the course of the area's development. While the model may alert us to certain problems of individuals or families that may be amenable to education or social casework, we must look beyond cultural questions to get to the roots of the region's persistent difficulties.

Implications for Social Policy

The impact of the subculture of poverty model on social programs for the Appalachian region in the 1960s was not as substantial as the popularity of the model would lead one to expect. The model no doubt helped add support to the national programs devised to alter what was perceived as "low-income life styles." In this sense the model helped rationalize such national programs as Project Head Start, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the great expansion of social services that took place during the 1960s.
But the subculture of poverty model was not a major influence on the thinking of the people who devised the programs of the Appalachian Regional Development Act. The social movement to define Appalachia as a distinctive cultural and social problem region was naturally strongly oriented toward cultural idealism. The state and federal planners that devised the ARDA define the problems of regional development almost exclusively in economic terms. Their roots are in an entirely different tradition, and it was they who set the parameters of the most important social policy experiment for the area, the Appalachian Regional Commission.

Regional Development and Appalachia

The literature on development includes disciplines from social psychology to ecology. Works range from studies of the achievement motivation of individual entrepreneurs to a computerized model of "the limits of growth" for a world economy. In this section I adopt a narrower frame of reference which, for want of a more commonly accepted term, I call the regional development model. This model is concerned with providing needed resources to a region and stimulating change through the agency of a modernizing elite. Its objectives include providing adequate economic and social overhead capital, training people in skills for new industrial and service jobs, facilitating migration, and promoting the establishment of relocation of privately-owned industries through a growth center strategy. The major attempt to apply the model within the United States is the work of the Appalachian Regional Commission and its associated programs.
Regional Economic Development Theory

The field of economics has provided the traditional models of regional development. Two classic economic approaches to the explanation of growth are the export base and the sectoral or stages models. In the export base model, growth is stimulated by demand arising outside the region for agricultural or extractive products. Through the multiplier effect of income received, the local market expands and stimulates local trade, manufacturing and service activity. In the sectoral model, growth takes place in a sequence of developmental stages that result in a decrease in the proportion of the labor force in primary industries and an increase in employment in manufacturing and service industries. A prerequisite to self-sustaining growth is an adequate "infrastructure" or economic and social overhead capital provided by public investments: transportation systems; such basic urban services as water, sewers, and solid waste disposal; adequate education and health care. The level of general welfare of a region depends on the relation between the growth in economic activity and the rate of population growth. Some regions may be developmentally viable only with substantial out-migration to reduce the size of the population. In this context, manpower training is a means not only of upgrading the human resources of the region to foster its development, but also -- perhaps even primarily -- a means of encouraging migration to industrial employment elsewhere.

These traditional models of economic growth have proven to be of limited usefulness to policy makers. They give little explanation of why the external demand for coal did not trigger a process of self-sustaining growth leading to a balanced economy in Central Appalachia.
Contemporary theory has added the dimension of space to the analysis of regional growth. Spatial models begin with the central place theories of the German geographers Christaller and Lösch, and develop an explanation of industrial location. The tendency for development to take place in nodes or clusters is explained by the agglomeration economies that result from concentration of economic activities in one area. These agglomeration effects include the availability of complementary business activity, public services, and the wide range of cultural activity characteristic of city life.

As cities grow to centers of economic concentration, a system of hierarchical relationships is established among metropolitan areas and between a metropolis and its surrounding area. In this model, development is seen as an uneven and unbalanced process. A polarization of development between metropolitan areas and the hinterlands takes place, diminishing the chances for growth in rural areas. An opposite spillover effect works to provide extra income to the hinterlands through a trickling down of economic activity in the metropolis. In other words, growth in the peripheral regions is dependent upon the development of core areas.

These theories of location and uneven growth have culminated in the growth center or development pole strategy.

As a development strategy, growth centers are promoted in hopes that they will draw off the surplus population from the hinterlands and draw up the standard of living in the hinterlands to some degree by greatly increasing the income in the center. As Monroe Newman points out, the process of urban growth has not always benefited rural areas.
However, when the centers are small or sufficiently remote from their hinterlands, spillover effects do not provide a compensating flow for the polarizing effects rural areas experience. They continue to provide human, capital, and material resources to the centers but do not acquire the full range of spillover effects, missing particularly the availability of urban services, the acquisition of commuters' incomes, and the importation of decentralizing industry. This situation came to be viewed as the nub of Appalachia's problem.46

The Appalachian Development Strategy

The development goals for Appalachia were stated by the President's Appalachian Regional Commission in its recommendations to President Johnson in 1964, and did not include a growth center strategy:

The major objective of this regional development process is clear: Appalachia must attain an employment base which can sustain its people at a level of dignity and prosperity comparable to the relatively affluent nation of which it is a part. The conversion and processing of its raw materials should be done locally to the fullest extent possible. New industries, dependent not only on the resources of the region but on the strategic location and potential market which Appalachia represents, must be located in the region. The magnificent recreational resources must be developed with coordinated intensity if their employment potential is to be realized. Agricultural diversification should be accelerated and mining and timber employment and income expanded.

Private enterprise will be the ultimate employer. With the exception of necessary increases in State and local government employment, private firms and individual enterprises will create
jobs needed. But before this can happen, public investment must create the foundation on which private enterprise can then build its own job-producing structure.

The highland isolation must be overcome with modern roads and air facilities. The ribbon-towns must be provided with the amenities of urban life. A substantial effort in education, health facilities, employment services, community apparatus—all the items of social overhead neglected for long decades—must be made.

The emphasis is on the Federal government providing the public investment in economic and social overhead capital, with private industry providing increased employment opportunities within the region. The encouragement of further out-migration is not suggested by this report.

This approach is consistent with the development strategy embodied at the time in the Area Redevelopment Administration, which gave priority to the poorest areas, without particular regard for their development potential. The Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, in contrast, provided that "the public investments made in the region under this Act shall be concentrated in areas where there is the greatest potential for future growth, and where the expected return on public dollars will be the greatest." The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 is similarly oriented.

In a 1966 article economist John Friedmann draws the lessons for Appalachia that can be learned from the international experience in regional development. He suggests that the program must be sustained for a generation, a time period in accord with Rupert Vance's conclusion that a thirty year period will be necessary to bring Appalachia up to national
economic norms. Friedmann notes that sub-regions of Appalachia will have to develop their own specialized functions in the national economy, a strategy later acknowledged by the ARC's designation of the "four Appalachias:" Northern, Central, Southern, and Highlands. Three kinds of cities are distinguished in Friedmann's analysis: metropolitan areas beyond the perimeter of Appalachia, a small number of potential growth centers within the region, and a larger number of local service centers throughout the region. He makes the metropolitan areas near the region the major focus: "a good part of Appalachia's development effort should be concentrated outside the region, and . . . the region itself should be restructured and, as it were, apportioned among the metropolitan regions on its perimeter." In this proposal, such cities as Nashville, Louisville, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Dayton, Cleveland, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, the cities of the Piedmont crescent in North Carolina, and Atlanta would attract a large proportion of Appalachian migrants. Subsidiary development would take place in selected growth centers in the region. The "local service centers" would provide education, health care, and commercial functions.

The idea of making cities outside the boundaries of the region the major focus of development efforts was too politically volatile to be acknowledged publicly. Under the authority of the ARDA and the PWCEDA, and various State legislation, a series of multi-county development districts were established. For reasons of politics rather than economic theory, each district had to have its own designated "growth center."

An ARC document in 1968 set forth its interpretation of the growth center
strategy, defining growth center, growth area, and hinterlands in its own terms:

Within each planning and development district is at least one growth center to which most of the district population looks for certain services and much of its employment. By a "growth center" or "centers" is meant a complex consisting of one or more communities or places which, taken together, provide or are likely to provide, a range of cultural, social, employment, trade and service functions for itself and its associated rural hinterland. Though a center may not be fully developed to provide all these functions, it should provide, or potentially provide, some elements of each, and presently provide a sufficient range and magnitude of these functions to be readily identifiable as the logical location for many specialized services to people in the surrounding hinterland. A "growth area" is an extension of the growth center itself. It is the adjoining area likely to experience residential and employment growth because of proximity to a center or location between centers. The hinterlands are surrounding rural areas which rely upon the growth center and growth area for services and employment. The hinterlands contribute resources and manpower to the overall district economy. Some investments may most appropriately be placed in rural hinterland areas. Most particularly, these investments would be in the fields of health and education, where such services and facilities must be located close to those they are designed to serve. In this way, the labor force of the hinterland can be upgraded to more effectively participate in the growth opportunities occurring in the growth area of the district.
Growth centers are further distinguished as regional centers, primary centers, and secondary centers. As Niles Hansen points out, this formulation does a certain amount of violence to the original notion of a growth center: "The growth center policy of the Appalachian program is constrained in principle by its district program. Instead of beginning by delimiting a select number of growth centers, it has been necessary to define the centers so that each of the districts has at least one. Thus, the states have designated some 125 areas which are deemed to have 'significant potential for future growth.' If each district really has a genuine growth center, it would seem that there would be no need for out-migration from Appalachia nor for commuting to outside metropolitan areas. There would only need to be commuting -- and perhaps some limited relocation within each district -- from the hinterlands to the growth center. . . . it seems that greater selectivity should have been used in designating growth centers." Hansen favors a policy of encouraging migration from lagging areas toward "intermediate-size cities" in "the 200,000 to 750,000 population range." Instead of attempting to promote private industrial development in the small cities within eastern Kentucky, for example, Hansen supports a policy of encouraging migration to such cities as Lexington and Louisville. He suggests that such cities have greater potential for development and are more in accord with the locational preferences of eastern Kentuckians than the cities north of the Ohio River, if they must move to find work.
Elites and Developmental Change

Beyond the economic theory of the regional development model is an often implicit and unstated premise that a developmental elite is the agent of change. H. Dudley Plunkett and Mary Jean Bowman have elaborated this sociological underpinning to the regional development model in their study *Elites and Change in the Kentucky Mountains*. They identify the "interstitial person" as the "cultural bridge" between traditional and modernizing groups and investigate such key occupational groups as bankers, lawyers, public officials, clergy, physicians and schoolteachers to determine their relative commitments to change. In general, Plunkett and Bowman found the "ministering professionals" -- clergy, physicians, and teachers -- to have the most modern outlook; businessmen to be intermediate; and the local administrative elite, the "gerontocracy" of bankers, lawyers, and politicians to be the most traditional.56 The ARC strategy appears to follow the Plunkett and Bowman suggestion of cooperating with the modernizing professionals to coopt or outmaneuver the traditional business elites and the old county political machines.

The basic structure for this ARC strategy on the local level is the multi-county Local Development District (LDD). LDDs serve as the regional clearinghouse to review and comment on project applications requesting funds under federal grant programs, the A-95 Project Review and Notification System established by the President's Office of Management and Budget. Through their professional staffs, the LDDs provide technical assistance to local governments in preparing applications for
federal funds, conduct studies, and carry out a variety of other activities. The boards of directors of the LDDs typically include representatives of public officials, business, education, health, and agriculture. The LDDs, together with other multi-county planning bodies including the new Health Systems Agencies, represent the modern political, business and professional elites; few poor, blue-collar, service, or lower status white collar workers participate in the deliberations of the planners. As Donald Rothblatt notes, "in the large, LDDs hardly represent the Appalachian poor, who paradoxically are the raison d'etre for the Appalachian program."

The Track Record of the ARC

The major contribution of the Appalachian Regional Commission has been its financing of programs in the area of social and economic overhead capital. Foremost among these projects is, of course, the Appalachian Development Highway System, which has commanded over $1.3 billion, approximately 60 percent of the funds appropriated under the Appalachian Regional Development Act through 1974. Although the new highways are almost universally welcomed within the region, their contribution to the industrialization of the region is still unclear, and the proportion of the total funds devoted to the highways has been questioned. Generally, the bias of the program has been toward economic overhead capital (roads, airports, bridges, water and sewage systems, and so on) rather than social overhead capital (health, education, social services, and cultural programs). But the proportion of
the funds spent on health and vocational education programs has been increasing in the last five years. The accomplishments in all these areas have been substantial, and have undoubtedly helped improve the quality of life in the region.

Efforts to attract industry to the Central Appalachian region have achieved only modest gains. Notable successes, while celebrated, are few in number. One survey of 15 southeastern Kentucky counties showed only 17 new factories employing some 2,100 workers over the decade from 1964 through 1973. While the Southern and Northern Appalachian regions are approaching national norms of income and employment, only cities on the fringes of Central Appalachia are having much success attracting new manufacturing plants. Little is known about what kind of industry would bring the greatest benefits to the region. The costly econometric analysis of industry impact has been developed only for West Virginia, and with no apparent effect on state or federal government industrial development policy. A discouraging study by Hansen shows little interest on the part of Lexington and Louisville firms to locate in eastern Kentucky; their reluctance increases with offers of federal financial inducements.

Many of the regional development economists have never viewed as a viable alternative the attracting of manufacturing plants to the heart of the Central Appalachian region. In the view of such writers as Hansen and William Miernyck, substantial outmigration remains an essential feature of an overall development plan. Yet the out-migration that actually takes place does not follow the growth center model, even
Hansen's "intermediate-size city" version. Some of the cities that rank in the top ten recipients of Appalachian migrants between 1965 and 1970 -- including Washington, D.C., Detroit, Chicago, Baltimore, and Los Angeles -- are not even on the periphery of the region. When it comes to new jobs within the region, many mountaineers prefer to commute over long distances rather than relocate in the targeted growth centers. Indeed, in 1974 a reporter coaxed an admission from ARC States' Representative John Whisman that the growth center strategy "never really worked," and that the ARC would be following an area-wide approach to development. This development will probably be welcomed by the rural areas that received the majority of the surprising net in-migration that began around 1970 in Central Appalachia.

If the ARC's growth center strategy has not worked, neither has classical economic development theory been vindicated by the Appalachian experience. Despite substantial improvements in social and economic overhead capital, privately owned manufacturing firms have not been induced to locate in the Central Appalachian region in sufficient numbers to provide a significant supplement to the employment base in coal, local government, health and education, and local service firms.

Critical Views of the ARC

A variety of criticisms of the ARC program have been made by people whose perspectives may be characterized as left populist, radical democrat, or democratic socialist. They have taken issue with the proportion of ARC funds spent on highway construction, the inequities of the growth center strategy, the early focus of the health and vocational
education programs on "bricks and mortar" facility construction, the "moondoggle" Appalachian Educational Satellite Project, the failure to develop a water resources plan providing for public ownership, and so on. Beyond these scattered issues, the radicals raise the essential questions of "who's in control and who's really benefiting."68 One aspect of these questions is whether the acclaimed "federal-state partnership" in the dual-authority structure of the ARC is only another version of pork barrel politics, with each state governor in the program for what can be siphoned off to his state without particular regard for the development needs of the region as a whole. But the major focus of the questions of control and benefit is that the Local Development District boards reflect the interests of the traditional "courthouse gangs" and not the interests of minorities and poor and working class people. Although elected public officials sit on the LDD boards, the board members are not elected to the LDD positions per se. This is the heart of the radicals' criticism of the lack of democracy in the local planning process.

The points are well taken, but it is probably utopian to expect the ARC to reform the corruption of mountain politics in the absence of a strong grassroots movement for political change. The radicals also tend to miss some of the important changes in the style and substance of local politics. Increasingly, county officials must not be only country politicians, but also effective program administrators. The introduction of Federal revenue sharing and the return of a portion of the coal severance tax to counties in certain coalfield states have
multiplied some county budgets tenfold over the past ten years. As one
business leader active on regional planning boards told me, "Used to be
a county judge just held a little court, spread a little gravel on the
roads. Now he has a million dollar a year budget. These planning boards
have helped us educate our county officials. The new programs make
administrators out of them. And they sit down and get to know other
judges, mayors and bankers and get communication going where they never
talked to each other before." As the traditional county political
machines crumble, younger county officials with a "professionalized"
style are more in evidence. The familiar "courthouse gang" is being
superseded by a regional business and political elite which helps inte-
grate Central Appalachia, albeit as a peripheral region, more thoroughly
into the national economy and structures of the modern state.

I do not wish to suggest that the well-documented corruptions
of the democratic process in Central Appalachia are no longer commonplace.
I do argue that increasingly the crucial aspect of politics in the
mountains shares with the nation as a whole the particular distortions
of democracy in an advanced capitalist society. These issues of power
and privilege are never faced squarely by the regional development advi-
cates, a shortcoming they share with the "modernization" perspective of
which they are a part. Power and control are, however, at the center
of the internal colonialism model, to which we now turn.

**Internal Colonialism and Appalachia**

The internal colonialism model has emerged from a background of
the history and theories of colonialism and imperialism. At least
four rough divisions can be distinguished in the history of colonialism since the beginning of the modern world-system in the sixteenth century:

1. the period of agricultural or mercantile capitalism, from the beginning of Western European expansion in the 1500s through the Napoleonic Wars;
2. the "free trade" period from 1820 to 1870, during the development of industrial capitalism;
3. the classic "age of imperialism," in which the colonial powers divided up the underdeveloped world between 1870 and 1914 and which continued until 1945; and
4. the neo-colonial period which has followed the independence of the African and Asian colonies in the wake of World War II.

Theories of Colonialism and Imperialism

In view of the subsequent development of theory, it is surprising that Karl Marx himself did not develop a systematic theory of colonialism. He saw that the need for markets would send the bourgeoisie to all corners of the globe, and that high labor productivity would give the industrialized countries high profits in trading with the non-industrial world. Writing a series of articles for the New York Daily Tribune in the 1850s, Marx followed the course of British rule in India. Noting the great expense of the warfare required to maintain the British position in India, Marx calculated that the general population of England was being taxed to support a few thousand corporate stockholders and directors, military officers, and other civil servants. On the issue of Ireland,
England's "first" colony, Marx and Frederick Engels strongly supported Irish national independence both to eliminate foreign oppression of Ireland and as a step toward the emancipation of the English working class. 73

The spectacular burst of empire-building in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century gave rise to the present usage of the term "imperialism" and to a considerable body of explanatory literature. The classic study is J.A. Hobson's Imperialism, first published in 1902. Hobson, a Fabian, looked for the explanation for British imperialism after 1870 in the circumstances of the British domestic economy. He found the "economic taproot of imperialism" to be the chronic condition of underconsumption resulting from a grossly unequal distribution of incomes. Noting that the military costs of imperialism had outrun the commercial benefits of increased trade, Hobson concluded, "the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain." 74 His solution was "social reform," by which he meant the redistribution of income and the raising of the standard of living for the general population.

Although Hobson was intent on reforming capitalism rather than overthrowing it, his emphasis on the economic basis of imperialism fit neatly with Marxian theory. Emphasizing the tendency toward a falling rate of profit under capitalism, Marxists predicted that capitalist industry would be constantly on the lookout for low-cost sources of raw materials, markets for goods, and more profitable investment opportunities.
The Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding contributed an additional twist to the analysis of imperialism in 1910 with his book Das Finanzkapital, which emphasized the role of banking and industrial monopolies at that stage in the development of capitalism. Drawing on Hobson, Hilferding, and a work of Nikolai Bukharin that was unpublished at the time, V.I. Lenin wrote in 1916 what was to become perhaps the most influential study of the subject, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

Lenin drew a sharp distinction between the old and new forms of capitalism: "Under the old type of capitalism, when free competition prevailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become a typical feature." Opposing such marxists as Karl Kautsky, Lenin argued that imperialism and imperialist wars were indeed essential and unavoidable features of capitalism and would soon lead to its downfall.

Critics of Marxism have offered some alternatives to the "economic" interpretation of colonialism and imperialism. Joseph Schumpeter sees imperialism as the product of non-rational, irrational and instinctive human drives, in short, as an atavistic militarism. Other writers have emphasized political motives of national security or aggrandizement or simple power disparities as the forces behind imperialism. Most non-Marxists and a few Marxists agree that imperialism is not an essential feature of capitalism and is susceptible to reform.

Neocolonialism and Dependency

Although writing at different periods in the history of colonialism, both Marx and Lenin expected that imperialist penetration of Asia...
and Africa would have a progressive side of leading to the industrialization of these continents. They also expected that direct political control would remain an essential feature of the exploitation of colonies. Neither anticipated that the "Third World" countries would remain in a continued state of underdevelopment or that imperialistic exploitation would persist following the political independence of the colonial countries. As most of Latin America has been politically independent since around 1820, it is not surprising to find the best developed theory of post-colonial development among the radical Latin American political economists. Their key term to describe the situation is "dependence." Theotonio Dos Santos provides the most widely accepted definition of the concept:

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.

He distinguishes among the dependence of the colonial era, the financial-industrial dependence of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, and the new form of technological-industrial dependence based on the multi-national corporations which have blossomed since World War II. The specific forms of dependency are thus related to the characteristics of the world capitalist economy at the time.

Marxist economist André Gunder Frank describes the position of Latin American countries as peripheral satellites to the metropolitan centers of Europe and North America. In this formulation the metropolis extracts the surplus from the satellites in a process of the "development of underdevelopment." Challenging the view that the "dual economies" of many Latin American countries are holdovers from a colonial feudalism, Frank argues that capitalist development is a form of economic control that perpetuates underdevelopment within an integrated economy in the satellite countries. Frank's formulation of the "development of underdevelopment" has been criticized by other Marxist economists who suggest the clever play on words makes an invalid suggestion of a stagnant or deteriorating condition; Fernando Henrique Cardozo, for example, prefers the characterization of "dependent capitalist development," which takes place as foreign investment shifts from raw materials to manufacturing.

A vital contribution of the dependency model is the notion of the "infrastructure of dependency," the structures internal to the dependent country including industrial organization, patterns of urbanization, and social classes. In the exposition of Suzanne Bodenheimer, two examples of the infrastructure of dependency are the patterns of dependent industrialization and the formation of clientele social classes. Characteristics
of dependent industrialization include foreign domination of the most
dynamic sectors of industry, increasing competitive advantage for
foreign monopolistic enterprises over local firms, and the introduction
of advanced, capital-intensive technology without regard to resulting
unemployment. Clientele classes have a "dual position as partners of
metropolitan interests, yet dominant elites within their own societies."
They may include not only the industrial bourgeoisie, but also the state
bureaucracy and other sectors of the middle class when their positions:
are tied to foreign interests. The infrastructure of dependency is thus
"the functional equivalent of a formal colonial apparatus," but insofar
as it is internalized and institutionalized "much more difficult to
overcome." 81

As the colonized nations of Africa and Asia achieved independence
in the wake of World War II, they discovered as Latin Americans had that
political independence did not necessarily bring an end to economic
dependence on the former imperial rulers or on other major imperial powers.
The term "neocolonialism" became popular among Third World leaders to
describe this situation. 82 James O'Conor summarizes the characteristics
of modern neocolonialism in two points: first, it requires "the active
participation of the state in international economic relationships;"
second, neocolonial policy is designed "to prevent the newly independent
countries from consolidating their political independence and thus to
keep them economically dependent and securely in the world capitalist
system." Domestic ruling classes replace the former colonial administra-
tors, but the financial interests of the international corporations are
protected by the advanced capitalist states through the intervention of international economic organizations. The theory of economic imperialism remains relevant, in the definition of O'Connor:

The definition of economic imperialism which we employ is the economic domination of one region or country over another specifically, the formal or informal control over local economic resources in a manner advantageous to the metropolitan power, and at the expense of the local economy.

The main form of economic domination has always been control by the advanced capitalist countries over the liquid and real economic resources of economically backward areas. The main liquid resources are foreign exchange and public and private savings, and real resources consist of agricultural, mineral, transportation, communication, manufacturing, and commercial facilities and other assets.

The familiar arguments between Marxists and non-Marxists persist over whether neocolonialism is a necessary feature of contemporary capitalism or rather one foreign policy option among several. And the question of the most important cause of neocolonialism continues to be debated among Marxists: markets for goods, outlets for capital investments, or the need for raw materials.

As a counterbalance to what might appear as an exclusive concern with the economic aspects of colonialism, in recent years a number of writers have developed a political psychology of colonial oppression. These writers accept the economic interpretation of imperialism, but seek to supplement it with an understanding of the psychology that works against the spreading of revolt or revolution. They also explore the necessary preconditions for the development of revolutionary consciousness.
and will among the colonized. Two of these outstanding theorists of
the psychology of the oppressed are Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi. Both
writers emphasize the need of the oppressed to reject the models of
identity offered by the colonizers in favor of native traditions and
culture. 86

Internal Colonialism

Few of the European colonies established in the New World in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries resembled what might be called
"pure" colonialism -- immigrants building communities in a virgin land.
There were native populations to be subdued or exterminated, as in
North America, or to be subdued and worked in the silver and gold
mines, as in the Andes of South America. When these native groups did not
suffice, black slaves from Africa were imported to work the sugar and
tobacco plantations, and later in the Nineteenth Century the cotton
plantations. Thus some degree of internal colonialism has always been
a part of the American colonial experience.

The success of the anticolonial movements in the Third World
following World War II has undoubtedly contributed to the popularity
of referring to a variety of exploitative situations within both develop-
ing and advanced industrial countries as internal or domestic
colonialism. One writer has warned that colonialism is in danger of
becoming "a generic term for any form of exploitation which involves
geographic and/or ethnic components." 87 I believe internal colonial-
ism is a useful concept if defined in a rigorous sense rather than used
as an all-inclusive catchword. Two precise definitions with varying degrees of restrictiveness are advanced by Pablo González-Casanova and Pierre van den Berghe. González-Casanova seeks to distinguish internal colonialism from a class structure with a geographic or racial aspect:

Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups. . . . It is the result of an encounter between two races, cultures, or civilizations, whose genesis and evolution occurred without any mutual contact up to one specific moment. . . . The colonial structure and internal colonialism are distinguished from the class structure since colonialism is not only a relation of exploitation of the workers by the owners of raw materials or of production and their collaborators, but also a relation of domination and exploitation of a total population (with its distinct classes, proprietors, workers) by another population which also has distinct classes (proprietors and workers).

In short, the González-Casanova definition requires a dual class structure, by which I mean not a single class structure polarized into two classes, but rather two class structures, one dominant and the other subordinate, each of which may be differentiated to a greater or lesser degree. This appears to be a useful minimal definition of internal colonialism, although it is broad enough to include a variety of dominant-subordinate group relationships.

The most restrictive definition of internal colonialism is developed by van den Berghe in a recent work. His view, in part a reaction to the overly broad use of the term, is worth quoting at length:
In my opinion, the concept of internal colonialism, when so diluted, loses all of its use for purposes of social science analysis. I shall therefore propose to treat internal colonialism as an ideal type with the following characteristics:

1) Rule of one ethnic group (or coalition of such groups) over other such groups living within the continuous boundaries of a single state.

2) Territorial separation of the subordinate ethnic groups into "homelands," "native reserves," and the like, with land tenure rights distinct from those applicable to members of the dominant group.

3) Presence of an internal government within a government especially created to rule the subject peoples, with a special legal status ascribed to the subordinate groups. Typically members of the dominant group are incorporated into the state as individuals, while members of the subordinate groups have a corporate, group status which takes precedence over their individual status.

4) Relations of economic inequality in which subject peoples are relegated to positions of dependency and inferiority in the division of labor and the relations of production. Such a definition of internal colonialism excludes mere regional differences in economic development, mere class differences in the system of production, and, a fortiori, differences based on age, sex, slave status, caste, sexual behavior (e.g., homosexuality), physical handicaps, and countless others. The usefulness of the concept to understand the situation of a group is a function of that group's approximation to the characteristics of the ideal type. For instance, in the United States, internal colonialism describes the position of Amerindians quite well, of Chicanos somewhat, of blacks poorly, of Appalachian whites hardly at all, and of women, old people, homosexuals and convicts only by the most fanciful stretch of the academic imagination. This is not to
say that some of the groups excluded from my definition of internal colonialism may not be as badly or worse off than the denizens of the internal colonies. Their position is fundamentally different, however, and, hence, the internal colonial model is a poor one to understand their predicament. Internal colonialism is but one of many ways of getting the short end of the stick.

González-Casanova's criterion of a dual class structure appears to include points one and four of van den Berghe's ideal type. The latter would also require territorial separation and special governing unit for full correspondence to the internal colonialism model. In this paper I apply van den Berghe's definition as a touchstone, and use González-Casanova's definition as a minimal requirement for internal colonialism.

A few examples illustrate the confusion or carelessness that characterizes the use of internal colonialism: Eugene Havens and William Flinn, in a study of Columbia, write: "For our purposes, internal colonialism refers to structural arrangements typified by a relatively small dominant group which controls the allocation of resources, and a large subjected mass composed of various groups with unarticulated interests largely divorced from participation in the development processes and blocked from social mobility." What they describe is a class structure with little class consciousness or mobilization on the part of the subordinate classes.

William Appleman Williams refers in passing to the entire rural population of the United States around the turn of the Twentieth Century as an internal colony: "this rural majority existed in an internal colonial relationship vis-a-vis the domestic American metropolis (and the larger Western European metropolis of which New York is a part)." Again, rural agrarians
are a social class (or classes), not an internal colony. Sheila Rowbotham has characterized women in underdeveloped countries as a "colony within the colony," a description that looses sight of the distribution of women across classes and across the colonizer/colonized barrier. These are the more extreme examples.

More frequent are uses of internal colonialism which muddle class, geography, and/or race. In an admirable attempt to sort out the meanings of class and internal colony within the context of development, Dale Johnson offers a definition of an internal colony that is less precise than those of González-Casanova and van den Berghe: "An internal colony constitutes a society within a society based on racial, linguistic, and/or marked cultural differences as well as differences of social class. It is subject to political and administrative control by the dominant classes and institutions of the metropolis. Defined in this way, internal colonies can exist on a geographical basis or on a racial or cultural basis in ethnically or culturally dual or plural societies." He opens himself up for problems by adding, "Not all of these criteria need apply in order to classify a population as an internal colony." Johnson errs by making geographic separation alone a sufficient criteria for an internal colony. He writes: "Economically, internal colonies can be conceptualized as those populations who produce primary commodities for markets in metropolitan centers, who constitute a source of cheap labor for enterprises controlled from the metropolitan centers, and/or who constitute a market for the products and services of the centers." This situation of polarized development within a country is simply the ubiquitous feature of uneven
capitalist development; regional disparities are best characterized in terms of the metropolis-periphery distinction. Internal colonialism, furthermore, cannot be defined as an exclusively economic concept; it necessarily involves the sociological dimension of a dual class structure. Among the examples Johnson gives of regional internal colonies are "the Appalachian region and rural South of the United States," and "the southern region of Italy," all of which would not be covered by my definition of an internal colony. He concedes, "There is a serious question whether [my] concept may not be overinclusive."94

In a recent exemplary study of uneven development between core and periphery in capitalist industrialization, Michael Hechter examines the relationship between England and the "celtic periphery" of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Unfortunately, Hechter chooses to designate peripheral regions as internal colonies when even modest differences in ethnic identity are present. He is aware of the problems this presents: "There does not seem to be a general consensus on a small number of essential defining features of internal colonialism. . . . What if all but one or two conditions seem to be met? The danger, of course, is to so relax the meaning of internal colonialism that almost any instance of stratification may fall somewhere within its boundaries."95

The idea that certain regions of the U.S. can be likened to colonies is not new. A number of writers, including conservatives as well as liberals and radicals, have described the American South as a colony of the North. The threat posed by the industrialized North to the agricultural South was developed by the conservative Agrarian movement
in its manifesto *I'll Take My Stand* in 1930, Howard Odum noted the colonial character of the Southern economy in his writings in the 1930s, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Conference on Economic Conditions in the South reported in 1938 that the South was exploited by means of discriminatory freight-rates, the tariff, monopolies, and absentee ownership. These and other similar analogies seldom take colonialism to mean more than exploitation under absentee ownership, a situation I suggest is better understood as a normal feature of industrial capitalism.

Some variety of the term colonialism continues to be applied to peripheral regions within advanced capitalist countries. In an article titled "Colonialism at Home and Abroad," André Gorz writes:

The geographical concentration of the process of capitalist accumulation has necessarily gone hand-in-hand with the relative -- or even absolute -- impoverishment of other regions. These latter regions have been used by the industrial and financial centers as reservoirs of labor, of primary and agricultural material. Like the colonies of the great European empires, the "peripheral" regions have provided the metropoles with their savings, their labor power, their men, without having a right to the local reinvestment of the capital accumulated through their activity. Thus, no new activity came to take the place of the miners' work, for example, when the coalbeds were exhausted or became unprofitable. In this way, whole territories have become zones of unemployment and poverty, or regions emptied of their substance to the point of no return -- that is, to a point where, lacking a sufficient proportion of youthful inhabitants as well as industrial and cultural centers, these regions cease to have the capacity for development.
Lee Webb has applied the internal colonialism tag to his analysis of out-of-state corporate control in Vermont. Local businessmen control the small trade of the area, but major industry is dominated by outsiders:

The local Vermont businessman and banker is confined primarily to ownership of the tertiary level of the economy -- retail and wholesale trade, services, land speculation, and smaller industry. All of the big and profitable sectors of the economy are in the hands of out-of-state corporations. One of the reasons a classical colonial struggle has not developed in Vermont and some of America's other internal colonies is the absence of a racial, religious, or language distinction between the colonized and the colonizers. Vermont is a case of whites ripping off other whites. 98

An obvious reason not suggested by Webb is that he is describing class conflict, not colonial conflict. Webb suggests that such other areas of the United States as the Southwest, Appalachia, and the Rocky Mountain mining regions share these characteristics.

Writing on the state of Maine as another example of internal colonialism, Geoffrey Faux notes the ways in which absentee ownership results in the loss of benefits to the region:

There are rarely any employment benefits from absentee ownership in a small community. Some studies show that the immediate direct effect of a merger on jobs is negative, and there's evidence that outside ownership has a deadening effect upon growth. . . . Absentee corporations tend to bank and purchase accounting, engineering and other professional services in the corporate headquarters, rather than in the vicinity of their plants. They also encourage purchasing of supplies and materials from national firms.
Absentee corporate personnel have little interest in the community from which they derive their profits, and an absentee firm is quicker to lay off workers at the slightest sign of a downturn than is a local firm whose management feels some responsibility for the community.\footnote{99}

However accurate and astute these observations may be, I persist in maintaining they are not features of internal colonialism. As Thorstein Veblen pointed out over a half century ago, absentee ownership is characteristic of industrial capitalist development.\footnote{100} Yet it remains popular to refer to the underdeveloped regions persisting under the uneven and polarized capitalist development as colonies. One explanation may be that the vocabulary of colonization is more comfortable than that of class conflict, and regional or ethnic chauvinism is more acceptable than talk of socialism.

Internal Colonialism and Black Americans

A final theory closely related to the internal colonialism model was put forward in the 1930s by the Communist Party in its approach to "the Negro question" in the United States. This formulation considered the Negro population to be an oppressed nation, with the right of self-determination of Negroes in the Black Belt in the South. While downplayed in later years, this remained the official position of the Communist Party until 1958, when it reemphasized equal rights and integration -- an analysis that focuses on the racial, rather than the national, aspect of the oppression of black people. The Negro nation thesis has been resurrected recently by several Marxist-Leninist groups.\footnote{101}

None of these sectarian viewpoints has had any discernible impact on
those writing on the Appalachian region as an internal colony. It is likely, however, that traces of the Communist Party's analysis of the Negro Nation from the 1930s remained suggestive to such writers as Harold Cruse who applied the internal colonialism model to the situation of Blacks in the 1960s. 102

Robert Blauner has constructed a model of internal colonialism relevant to the black ghettos in the United States; his formulation is clearly compatible with Gonzalez-Casanova's criteria of a dual class structure. Blauner emphasizes "colonialism as a process rather than colonialism as a social, economic and political system." The result is an emphasis on the experience of colonization, the "colonization complex," more than the structure of colonial domination. Blauner draws his model from the use of domestic colonialism in the early 1960s by such black writers as Harold Cruse, Kenneth Clark, and Stokley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton. Blauner identifies four components of the "colonization complex:" "forced, involuntary entry" by the dominant power; destruction of "indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life;" administration by "representatives of the dominant power;" and racism as "a principle of social domination." 103 Blauner's approach has some shortcomings as a general model of internal colonialism. First, it deemphasizes the central focus of the theory of neocolonial dependency, the infrastructure of economic exploitation. Following Fanon and Memmi, Blauner emphasizes social and cultural domination at the expense of an analysis of the role of blacks in the domestic economy. Second, Blauner focuses on "police colonialism," the use of white police
in black ghettos, without elaborating the key point in the analysis of neocolonialism: the co-opting of an indigenous group of businessmen and administrators who work on behalf of the neocolonial powers. Finally, the model is too broad and appears to include all cases of minority racial group relations in the United States -- all cases of "Third World peoples" -- under the designation of internal colonialism. These criticisms aside, Blauner's analysis remains an important and influential statement of the internal colonialism model.

Blauner's analysis has in mind the position of racial minorities in the United States. The idea of blacks as an internal colony has received wide acceptance in radical and black nationalist circles at least, although the strategy that follows from the analysis has not been as clear. Some radical black writers have been critical of the model taken in a strict sense.104 The application to Native Americans is so clear that the usage has even been taken up by a government agency in reference to the Navajo.105 As the model of internal colonialism was applied to minority groups other than blacks, it was perhaps inevitable that it be checked for fit with the Appalachian mountaineers.

Internal Colonialism Applied to Appalachia

I can find no use of the colonialism analogy to the Appalachians prior to the early 1960s. During the unionization battles of the 1930s, the Left press emphasized themes of exploitation and class conflict along classic Marxian lines in their articles about the Appalachian coalfields.106 Only after the internal colonial model had been applied to
blacks did writers on Appalachia begin to speak in terms of colonialism. In his best selling 1962 study *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, Harry Caudill makes only a passing reference to colonialism: "For all practical purposes the plateau has long constituted a colonial appendage of the industrial East and Middle West, rather than an integral part of the nation generally." By 1965 he begins to use the internal colonial designation: "Economically, Appalachia is little more than an internal colonial appendage of the industrial North and Midwest." The theme was quickly picked up by activists and radical intellectuals in the Central Appalachian area, particularly the group associated with the *People's Appalachian Research Collective* and its journal, *People's Appalachia*. Richard Diehl, for example, describes the larger coal companies as corporate colonizers who form part of an international elite and a wing of global imperialism. Helen Lewis and her associates have attempted a detailed application to Appalachia of Blauner's model of the process of internal colonization of black Americans. Lewis points to the purchase by outside corporations of mineral and timber rights from unsuspecting landowners as a parallel to Blauner's criteria of "forceful, involuntary entry." She cites the social disorganization brought by the mining industry and the work of educators and missionaries as leading to the "destruction of indigenous ways of life." She sees a parallel to "administration by representatives of the dominant power" in the violent establishment of law and order among the family and clan systems, the suppression of labor organizations, and the general administration of the law by public
officials in the interests of the coal companies. On Blauner's final point of "racism as a principle of social domination" Lewis cites the bias against lower class mountain culture often expressed by middle-class and elite groups. In this analysis, such institutions as the Appalachian family and church emerge as not simply survivals of an earlier traditional subculture, but also as defensive institutions whose "closed" characteristics are in part formed in resistance to the process of colonization. By emphasizing such values as "equality, non-competitiveness, and family-neighborhood solidarity," the family and the church resist the social change that would integrate the region into the American mainstream.

I find the application of Blauner's model of internal colonialism to Appalachia to be strained at some key points. The parallel to "forced, involuntary entry" by the colonizers is nowhere near as strong as the case of enslaved blacks from Africa or the conquered Native American tribes or the Mexican people of the Southwest. In the elaborated version of his argument, Blauner distinguishes between "colonized and immigrant minorities," and suggests that the circumstances of entry of white European ethnic immigrant groups is different in character from that of blacks and possibly other people of color in the United States. The situation of Appalachian people is clearly a third variant; if they are to be treated as a minority at all, the mountaineers were an early settler group established for sixty to a hundred years before the expansion of industrial capitalism into the region. The deception and fraud used in Appalachia by the vanguard of land, timber and mineral agents does not appear to differ in kind from those techniques used.
generally by capitalists and their agents throughout the country in the period of industrial expansion.

On the question of "administration by representatives of the dominant power," the application of Blauner's internal colonialism model to Appalachia suffers from his emphasis on "police colonialism," the direct application of force by members of the dominant group. Blauner has not put enough emphasis on the neocolonial mechanism of an indigenous stratum of officials ruling in the interests of the dominant group. Helen Lewis suggests that the study of such local elite groups in the mountains is of great importance, but this conclusion and suggestions of what mechanisms to look for flow more readily from the more general "dependency" model than from the internal colonialism model.

The parallel to "racism as a principle of social domination" really breaks down in the Appalachian case. There may be prejudice against "hillbillies," but it is essentially based on bias against the lower classes, not all the people of the region. There is no parallel to the dual social structure required by Gonzalez-Casanova's definition of internal colonialism. Mountaineers are able to "pass" into mainstream America both through migration and, for some, through integration into the business elite in the mountains. White Appalachians generally have a potential for social mobility not matched by racial minorities. The traditional Appalachian subculture may be becoming a museum piece, but this is a situation far from white Appalachians as a group being accorded the near-caste position of some racial minorities in the United States.
Applying an additional characteristic of internal colonialism from van den Berghe's definition, I can find no evidence of "an internal government within a government especially created to rule the subject peoples." The Appalachian Regional Commission is not a functional counterpart of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The people of Appalachia have no distinct legal status distinguishing them from other residents of the United States, as Native Americans do in some instances. Appalachia appears to provide a very poor fit to any strict definition of internal colonialism.

Much of the attraction of the internal colonialism model, including its application to Appalachia, derives from its powerful analysis of the destruction of indigenous culture in the process of establishing and maintaining domination over the colonized group. Religion and education can play a major role in the destruction of traditional culture. The missionary movement in Appalachia can be seen as aiding, often inadvertently, the process of domination. As Lewis, Kobak and Johnson write:

... denials of mountain culture made native children ashamed of their heritage. Although churches and missionaries gave some support to certain harmless aspects of native culture and served to soften the impact and ameliorate some of the abuses of the system, the denigration of mountain culture, the development of feelings of inferiority as mountain people were "helped," also helped the industrialization process. The churches and schools taught the values of organization, planning, hard work and thrift. They legitimized the industrial process by blaming the ills of the system on the mountaineer himself. He must learn to be more "cagéy" (not so gullible and taken in by the land.
sharks), he must learn to be more thrifty and hard-working and respectful and cooperate with the mine operators. Although some missionaries saw clearly the exploitation, they still had great faith in the progress and the benefits of industrialization.\textsuperscript{114}

James Branscome and Mike Clark have brought this analysis up to date by examining the effect of schooling on Appalachian culture in the current period.\textsuperscript{115}

These arguments hit the mark, but is cultural domination a distinctive feature of internal colonialism rather than class exploitation? A common and understandable misconception, derived in part from the stress on economic determinism in vulgar Marxist analysis, is that culture plays an insignificant part in the structure of class domination under capitalism. The colonial model is seen as distinctive by Blauner for its emphasis on this ignored area: "... the colonial attack on culture is more than a matter of economic factors such as labor recruitment and special exploitation. The colonial situation differs from the class situation of capitalism precisely in the importance of culture as an instrument of domination."\textsuperscript{116} Orthodox Marxism has been particularly weak in its analysis of culture, and Blauner misses the importance of ideological hegemony in the establishment and maintenance of capitalist domination. For the beginnings of an adequate theory of the role of culture in capitalist societies we must turn to the Western Marxist tradition, and such writers as Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and the Frankfurt School theorists. The concept of cultural hegemony derives from Gramsci, and emphasizes the obtaining of consent rather than the use of force in the
perpetuation of class structures. Gwynn Williams provides a useful summary of Gramsci's notion of hegemony: "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation." The destruction of indigenous culture may be more conspicuous in the colonial situation, but a comparable process works to erode all ethnic and working-class cultures in advanced capitalist countries, a process which has perhaps advanced furthest in the United States.

Conclusions

Analogies are valuable in social analysis insofar as they summarize and illuminate certain features of the subject under investigation. In this sense the analogy between the situation of Appalachia and that of colonized countries has been stimulating and fruitful. It has focused attention on the acquisition of the raw materials of the region by outside corporate interests, and on the exploitation of the local workforce and community at large resulting from the removal of the region's natural resources for the benefit of absentee owners. But analogies, while providing insights into some aspects of reality, can obscure or distort others. A loose analogy is no substitute, in the long run, for a precise theory that can lead to more detailed investigations. In this sense the internal colonialism model applied to Central Appalachia stands in need of
revision. Several shortcomings have been pointed out; the major issue of policy conclusions remains to be addressed. Writers using the internal colonialism model have been ambiguous about what solution is appropriate for Appalachian problems. Taking the term "colony" in its strongest sense, that of a suppressed nation, would prescribe an Appalachian nationalism aiming at secession and an independent nation-state. No one has proposed such a solution, although a weaker version -- a state of Appalachia -- has been mentioned. Nor have many seriously suggested that the region would be better off if all the coal companies were owned by the local elite of "hillbilly millionaires" -- a sort of bourgeois decolonization -- instead of the national corporations and international energy conglomerates, although an exclusive focus on absentee ownership might lead to that conclusion. If the heart of the problem is defined as private ownership of the coal industry, then the possibility of public ownership, perhaps even limited to a regional basis, is suggested. If the problem is defined as capitalist ownership of industry generally, then the alternative -- some form of socialism -- takes on a dimension that goes far beyond the nationalization or Appalachianization of the coal industry alone.

A few radical economists have attempted to avoid the problems of the colonialism analogy by returning to a traditional Marxian analysis of Appalachia in the context of capitalist exploitation, and have suggested the fruitfulness of a longitudinal study of the removal of surplus value from the region over time. But this focus on economic relationships loses the valuable emphasis of the internal colonialism model on
the role of cultural domination and the contribution of the dependency formulation on the "infrastructures of dependency." Perhaps the best formulation of a research project from the perspective of radical economics has been made by Richard Simon, who reviews the historical development of the West Virginia economy in the context of dependency theory, suggesting relationships with the social and political structures of that state and with the introduction of federal government programs in the 1960s. It is time to synthesize the best of the models so far put forward, and develop a more accurate and comprehensive theory of poverty and underdevelopment in Central Appalachia.

A Framework for Synthesis

It is tempting to characterize the subculture of poverty, regional development, and internal colonialism models as, respectively, conservative, liberal, and radical models of barriers to social change. While this would contain a substantial amount of truth, the description would be misleading in one respect. From a perspective that I will develop briefly here, the three models are not, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive alternatives. Interpreted in terms of a framework developed by Jürgen Habermas, they represent different dimensions of social existence.

For Habermas, there are three fundamental conditions or media through which social systems are maintained: interaction, work, and power or domination. All human societies use these means to resolve the problems of preserving life and culture. Corresponding to each of these media are the human "interests" in mutual understanding, technical control,
and "emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint." A solution to the problems of Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment would have to be concerned with each of the three modes of culture, technique, and domination. Habermas' distinction provides a basis for viewing cultural adaptation, technical development, and redistribution of power as potentially complementary aspects of social development.

Our models, therefore, are not merely three selected from a long list of possible models of poverty and underdevelopment. They represent fundamental dimensions of social life, and may well be exhaustive of the possible alternatives if stated in a sufficiently general form. Other writers have developed similar trichotomized typologies in approaching the analysis of planned social change. Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne distinguish the normative-reeducative, rational-empirical, and the power-coercive meta-strategies of planned change. James Crowfoot and Mark Chesler outline the countercultural, professional-technical, and political approaches to planned social change. Jack Rothman characterizes the locality development, social planning, and social action models of community organization practice. I think each of these schema is tapping the same dimensions of social life identified by Habermas.

The subculture of poverty model can thus be seen as only one part of a broader framework of explanations rooted in the tradition of cultural idealism. Affirmative cultural approaches toward Southern Appalachia, exemplified by Frost and the Campbells, are the obverse side of the coin from the pejorative tradition. Although they come to opposite conclusions.
about the virtue of the traditional mountain subculture, they are contending on the same turf. The regional development model, from this synthetic perspective, is seen as resting within the contemporary technocratic image and ideology of science. As John Friedmann points out, the regionalism movement of the 1930s, as personified by Howard Odum and others, was rooted in cultural idealism. The new regionalism of the 1960s, embodied in the ARC, discarded this grounding in favor of the technical reason of neoclassical economic theory. The internal colonialism model is similarly, one component of a broad range of theories that contribute to a critique of power and domination.

This synthetic view helps explain why writers widely considered to be champions of a certain model of Appalachian underdevelopment also draw on other models. Caudill, for example, is best known for his description of the Cumberland Plateau as an example of colonialism, but in Night Comes to the Cumberlands he also paints a pejorative picture of the subculture of the eastern Kentucky poor. In one essay Caudill appears to embrace many aspects of the developmental model, while in his most recent work he has reemphasized a genetic explanation. From the other side, Weller is best known for his subculture of poverty characterization in Yesterday's People, yet he has recently described Appalachia as "America's mineral colony." Such examples can be viewed as cases of inconsistency, confusion, or conversion. They can also be seen, at least in part, as attempts to grapple with the complexity of analyzing the problems of Appalachian development.

To suggest that a dialectic of mutual interaction takes place among the modes of culture, technique, and power is not to argue that...
each of our three models of Appalachian underdevelopment is to be taken with equal seriousness. We have shown that there is no substantial evidence to support the genetic or subculture of poverty models as causal explanations of Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment, and indeed little public policy has been based on such models. From the standpoint of influence on social policy, the regional development model is clearly predominant at present. With its emphasis on mainstream economic theory and the technical aspects of development, it lays claim to being a scientific, value-free, and non-controversial approach to Appalachian development. As such, it becomes a means of introducing additional resources to a region without affecting the existing structures of resource control. In a period of extensive public disillusionment with the role of private business in our society, the prestige of the professional planner, with technical expertise, has been substantially enhanced. As Habermas notes, "technology and science themselves in the form of a common positivistic way of thinking, articulated as technocratic consciousness, began to take the role of a substitute ideology for the demolished bourgeois ideologies." The result is a more effective defense of existing structures of privilege and inequality. In the words of Trent Schroyer, "Contemporary science and technology have become a new form of legitimating power and privilege. . . . the scientistic image of science has become the dominant legitimating system of advanced industrial society." Without a broader critique of power and domination, the regional development model serves as an ideological defense of established power and influence in Appalachia. The structures of the ARC and the Local
Development Districts, from a critical perspective, are less means of decentralized democratic decision-making as much as a mechanism for arriving at a consensus among regional elites and between regional and national elites. Actions taken by national and regional planners are defended as technical decisions, rather than political choices among alternative courses of development. The most important decisions of the development districts may be the "non-decisions," the questions that are never raised, and the subjects that never make the public agenda. The issue of public ownership of the region's natural resources is one example. Humanistic alternatives to the "trickle-down" process of growth-center promotion through attracting private industry are seldom considered. Little effort has been made to promote worker or community owned and controlled industry.

Throughout this paper I have suggested that the history of the Appalachian region is best understood in the context of industrial capitalist development. I have shown that the internal colonialism model raises important questions about wealth, power, and domination without offering a satisfactory characterization of the situation of Central Appalachia. My synthesis of the three models leads to the conclusion that Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment needs to be placed within a broader critique of domination. From this perspective, Central Appalachia must be analyzed in the context of advanced capitalism in the United States. In some instances (analyzing the role of the Japanese steel industry in providing capital for opening new coal mines in the region, for example), if we follow Wallerstein, we may have to expand our horizon to the framework of the world capitalist system.
Appalachia within an Advanced Capitalist Society

In a recent work Habermas formulates a model of advanced capitalism, which he characterizes by two features: the "process of economic concentration" -- the growth of national and multi-national corporations -- and the "supplementation and partial replacement of the market mechanism by state intervention." Habermas goes on to analyze advanced capitalist societies in terms of their economic, administrative (state), and legitimation systems and the resulting class structures. Applying a similar analysis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the position of Central Appalachia.

The Economy

There is growing agreement among economists critical of neoclassical theory that a three-sector model is necessary to characterize the advanced capitalist economy in the United States. John Kenneth Galbraith delineates the market system, the planning system, and the state. As a rough demarcation, Galbraith's planning system consists of the largest "one thousand manufacturing, merchandising, transportation, power and financial corporations producing approximately half of all the goods and services not provided by the state." Making up the market system are the remaining twelve million firms which produce the other half of the non-state output of goods and services. The market system includes farmers, small retail and service establishments, construction and small manufacturing firms, and the arts. Whereas the workings of the market system bears some resemblance to the model of competition embodied in
classical economics, the planning system is oligopolistic and its stability depends on the intervention of the state. In Galbraith's view, the planning system is dominated by the "technostructure," that complex of scientists, engineers and technicians; of sales, advertising and marketing men; of public relations experts, lobbyists, lawyers and men with a specialized knowledge of the Washington bureaucracy and its manipulation; and of coordinators, managers and executives (which) becomes the guiding intelligence of the business firm. Galbraith's theory of the state is not systematically developed, but his formulation of "the new industrial state" implies a merger of the state and the large industrial corporations. In his recent refinement of this approach, the planning system is seen as having major influence with the executive branch of government (whose power is in ascendance) and some committees of Congress, and the market system is seen as limited in influence to certain members and committees of Congress (whose power is in decline).

James O'Connor has developed a similar model with a much deeper analysis of governmental activity. O'Connor also divides private capital into two sectors: a competitive sector (roughly parallel to Galbraith's market system) and a monopoly sector (somewhat smaller than Galbraith's planning system). O'Connor's state sector includes two categories: "production of goods and services organized by the state itself and production organized by industries under contract with the state." Approximately one-third of the labor force in the United States is employed in each of these three sectors. The monopoly and state-contract sectors tend to be capital-intensive industries, while
the competitive and state service sectors tend to be labor intensive. As a consequence, wages tend to be high in the monopoly and state sectors, and low in the competitive sector. Unions tend to be strong in the monopoly and state sectors, and weak in the competitive sector. Both product and labor markets tend to be unstable and irregular in the competitive sector, a circumstance which has fostered the development of dual labor markets.137 As O'Connor notes, the size of the firm is only a crude measure of its position in one sector or the other: "many large corporations also sell in competitive markets, and many smaller corporations sell in monopolistic markets."138

State sector expenditures, in O'Connor's model, are divided into two categories, social capital and social expenses, with social capital being of two kinds, social investment and social consumption. This distinction between the two kinds of social capital roughly parallels Hansen's distinction between economic and social overhead capital. Social investment, in O'Connor's terms, "consists of projects and services that increase the productivity of a given amount of labor-power and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." Examples include government subsidized roads, railroads, and industrial parks. Social consumption "consists of projects and services that lower the reproduction costs of labor and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." Social consumption expenditures fall into two categories, goods and services consumed collectively, and social insurance. Examples of the first include school, recreation and medical facilities, and the second, Social Security, workman's compensation,
unemployment insurance, and health insurance. Most of the programs
developed through the Appalachian Regional Commission are thus in the
areas of social investment and the first, or collective, category of
social consumption. Finally, social expenditures "consists of projects
and services which are required to maintain social harmony — to fulfill
the state's "legitimization" function. They are not even indirectly
productive." O'Connor includes welfare and military programs in this
category.139

This model of the advanced capitalist economy in the United States
has some obvious implications for an analysis of the Central Appalachian
region, particularly in regard to the coal industry. The coal industry
is unusual, though not unique, in having both substantial monopolistic
and competitive sectors. Manufacturing and mining industries are
generally concentrated in the monopolistic sector, while the competitive
sector is primarily composed of small factories and services. The
coal-industry thus offers an opportunity for a comparative study of
these two sectors within a single industry. Topics for investigation
include relative rates between the two sectors of capital investment,
wage levels, productivity, technological innovation, unionization, and
influence on the legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions
of the state that affect the coal industry. Contrasting business
ideologies between the two sectors need to be explored. As Central
Appalachia contains the largest concentration of firms in the competitive
sector of the coal industry, it is a particularly appropriate location
for a study of the two sectors.
The Role of the State

The institutions that compose the state, to take Ralph Miliband's definition, are the executive, the legislative, the administration (civil service bureaucracy), the military and police, the judiciary, and the sub-central governmental units. This state system is part of a broader political system, which includes political parties, pressure groups, and a variety of other institutions not defined as political, such as corporations, churches, and mass media. "The people who occupy the leading positions" within the institutions of the state system may be termed "the state elite." A crucial question is the relationship between the state (and state elite) and the dominant economic class. The designation common in Marxian analysis of the "ruling class" is often taken to mean a too simple equation of political and economic power, as C. Wright Mills points out. Miliband recalls "it is obviously true that the capitalist class, as a class, does not actually 'govern.' One must go back to isolated instances of the early history of capitalism, such as the commercial patriciates of cities like Venice and Lubeck, to discover direct and sovereign rule by businessmen."

Contemporary analysts of the role of the state in advanced capitalism, including Miliband, O'Connor, and Nicos Poulantzas, emphasize the relative autonomy of the state system. From their viewpoint, the familiar statement of Marx and Engels that "the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" has been vulgarized. As Miliband comments, "the notion of common affairs assumes the existence of particular ones; and the notion of the whole
bourgeoisie implies the existence of separate elements which make up that whole. This being the case, there is an obvious need for an institution of the kind they refer to, namely the state; and the state cannot meet this need without enjoying a certain degree of autonomy.  

But the summary statement of Marx and Engels is still too abbreviated; the state reflects not simply the common interests of the whole bourgeoisie but a compromise between those interests and the interests of subordinate classes. The balance of the compromise depends in part on the level and extent of political struggle by the subordinate classes.

Galbraith's formulation of the "new industrial state" suggests that the planning system or monopolistic sector has predominant influence over the state, to the misfortune of the market system or competitive sector. O'Connor's model makes a better demonstration of the reliance of both sectors on state activity and expenditures. While the power of the monopolistic sector may be predominant, it should not be overlooked that a major role of the state has been to maintain the alliance between big business and small enterprise in the face of broadening claims by the working class. Nevertheless, the economic interests of particular sections of capital may have to be sacrificed in the overall interests of preserving the system as a whole, and the relative autonomy of the state permits just such interventions.

In a recent work that draws on Miliband, Poulantzas, and O'Connor, Ian Gough develops the role of state expenditures as concessions to working class struggles. The expansion of social services and social insurance since the depression of the 1930s has meant that an increasing
amount of the compensation of the labor force has come in the form of social wages. Indeed, "the strength of working-class pressure," he writes, "can roughly be gauged by the comprehensiveness and the level of the social benefits." Although such programs are tailored and modified to accommodate the interests of the dominant class, Gough notes, "it is essential to distinguish their concrete historical origins from the ongoing function they play within that particular social formation. Social policies originally the product of class struggle will, in the absence of further struggle, be absorbed and adapted to benefit the interests of the dominant classes. On the other hand, whatever their particular function for capital at any time, the fact that social services are also an integral part of the real wage level of the working class means that they are fought for in much the same way as money wages, in economic and political class struggle." In a similar fashion, the class distribution of the burden of taxation also affects the real wages of the working class. This recognition of the importance of social services, income transfer programs, and tax policy helps us understand and situate such social movements in the Central Appalachian region as the Black Lung Associations and their fights for workmen's compensation, clinical treatment programs, expanded benefits from the UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, and the severance tax on coal. It also illuminates the role of the federal bureaucracy and judicial system in the reform of the UMWA and its Health and Retirement Funds, the struggle for mine safety and health, and the expansion of a variety of benefits from social security to food stamps to community mental health services.
The Legitimation System

Habermas argues that formal democratic institutions which allow universal adult voting in elections may obtain sufficient "diffuse mass loyalty" in the absence of substantive participation in public policy formulation if two conditions are present: "civic privatism" and an ideology that justifies elite rule. Civic privatism involves a withdrawal from the public realm into "career, leisure, and consumption." Both the "theory of democratic elitism" favored by mainstream American political science and the mystique of technical expertise promoted by theorists of public administration serve to legitimate the absence of public participation in political decision making. 149

Among the working class in Central Appalachia, legitimation of the political system appears to be weak at the level of specific institutions yet remains strong at a diffuse level ("patriotism"). Cynicism about public officials abounds, with ample justification. 150 The retreat to privatism is possibly facilitated by the extended family systems, which may provide sources for satisfaction even in the absence of substantial material comforts. Yet agencies of government frequently seek legitimation through a rhetoric of democratic participation. For example, TVA's claims of "grass roots democracy" disguised a policy of conceding the farm and related rural development programs to the local agricultural elites in exchange for a free hand for federal planners in public electrical power generation. 151 The ARC uses the Local Development Districts as the "local building blocks" of a program of federal-state...
cooperation. In Central Appalachia, such claims have seldom received an affirmative embrace from the working class, but they have met with acquiescence more often than active opposition.

The Class Structure

A common rhetorical excess is the description of the class structure of Central Appalachia as polarized into the wealthy and the poor. For Harry Caudill, there are "two Appalachias . . . side by side and yet strangers to each other. One, the Appalachia of Power and Wealth, . . . headquartered in New York and Philadelphia, is allied to mighty banks and insurance companies . . . . The second Appalachia is a land devastated . . . . Its people are the old, the young who are planning to leave and the legions of crippled and sick."152 The reality, of course, is far more complicated. The question is not merely one of polemical license. Any strategy for social change must make a thorough assessment of the potential interest in change of the various class groupings in the region.

It is generally agreed that advanced capitalism has led to a proliferation of class and occupational groupings between the classic proletariat (the industrial working class) and the bourgeoisie of monopoly capital.153 The expansion of service industries with its accompanied increase in grey-collar and white-collar employment has been one aspect of this increase. The development of what Galbraith calls the "educational and scientific estate" is another. Despite the increased level of average per capita income, the distribution of shares of income
and wealth has changed little in the past forty years. The "myth of the middle class" has been dispelled by careful analysis of confusing census occupational categories. The continuing existence of a "working-class majority" has been established. 154

In Central Appalachia, the expansion of state expenditures has helped create sizable intermediate class groupings of public workers (in education, local government, and public services) and workers in industries heavily subsidized by public funds (health services particularly). Unionization efforts have been made recently among municipal and hospital workers. These elements of the "new working-class" have taken their places alongside such long-established groups as coal miners, workers in small factories, small farmers, country merchants, county-seat retailers, bankers, professionals, independent coal operators, and managers for the nationally-based coal companies in the monopolistic sector, in addition to household workers, the welfare poor and others outside the standard labor force. The class structure is obviously complex, and its changes need to be analyzed over time, particularly in relation to changes in the coal industry and the growth of state expenditures. Radicals must learn to paint portraits of the region in which a variety of working people can recognize themselves.

The Internal Periphery

In a market economy, certain regions within a country will experience economic rise or decline in response to such circumstances as demographic changes, technological advances, and the depletion of resources. On this the theorists of regional growth, urban hierarchies, and uneven
capitalist development are agreed. As the core-periphery distinction is presently used by several schools of economic thought, it seems reasonable to me to apply the term peripheral to such regions within advanced-capitalist countries as Appalachia which share many of the characteristics of underdevelopment, poverty and dependency found in the peripheral countries of the Third World. Certainly the term is a more appropriate analogy than internal colony, which as I have illustrated should be restricted to a special case.

Immanuel Wallerstein has recently begun developing a more rigorous theory of the relationship of core and peripheral countries in the capitalist world economy, and has elaborated an important intermediate case, that of the semi-peripheral countries (a distinction that corresponds in part to the levels of development within the Third World countries). In Wallerstein's view, the semi-peripheral countries perform two important functions for the capitalist world system, one political and one political and economic. The political function is to avoid a sharp polarization into rich and poor countries that would foster an alliance among the poor nations. The intermediate sector develops a third set of interests based on its aim of making it into the core. The political-economic function of the semi-periphery is to provide an outlet for capital investment from core countries in low-wage industrial production.

The analogy between peripheral countries in the world system and peripheral regions within core countries obviously should not be pushed too far. As John Friedmann points out, there are important differences between regions and countries, and between poor countries and
poor regions in rich countries. The most important difference is that countries have a relatively greater degree of closure in their boundaries. Through the use of tariff barriers, control over investments, and other means, countries can achieve a relative degree of insulation from the world economy. Constitutional and political limitations on the restraint of commerce prevent any state within the United States (much less multi-state regions without separate political authority) from following similar policies of restricting trade, investment, or population movements.

These qualifications noted, Wallerstein's three-tiered system may find an analogue within advanced capitalist countries. Regionalization and regionalism, the economic and ideological manifestations of peripheral status, may well join the racial, ethnic and sexual aspects of the division of labor as functional barriers to class polarization of conflict over inequality. The possibility of attaining semi-peripheral status may preclude a strong alliance of one region with another worse off. We see evidence of this in the successful move of the Northern and Southern Appalachian regions to standard semi-peripheral status within the United States while Central Appalachia remains behind. Given the general "fiscal crisis of the state," the federal government seems reluctant to commit resources to the elimination of regional inequality -- the elevation to semi-peripheral status of all internal peripheral regions. The executive branch has resisted attempts of the Congress to expand the Title V regional commissions in the manner of
the ARC. Peripheral regions remain functional for the system of advanced
capitalism in the United States much in the way that poverty in general
has positive functions.158

With this model of advanced capitalism in the United States, and
its applications to the subject at hand, I have outlined an agenda for
my research on the coal industry and Central Appalachia.
FOOTNOTES


3 Charles A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter-Proposals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 142. Valentine contrasts two ideal types of models used by social scientists to explain the persistence of poverty in advanced industrial countries, pp. 141-147. One is the "Self-perpetuating Subsociety with a Defective, Unhealthy Subculture" (what I term the subculture of poverty model); the other is the "Externally Oppressed Subsociety with an Imposed, Exploited Subculture" (what I term the internal colonialism model). The regional development model I describe might be called, in Valentine's terminology, the Heterogeneous Subsociety with Inadequate Resources and Adaptive Elites. Valentine also offers an eclectic synthesis of his two types, the "Heterogeneous Subsociety with Variable, Adaptive Subcultures," a mixed model which is akin in a loose sense to the synthesis I develop.

4 George Thomas, Poverty in the Nonmetropolitan South: A Causal Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972). In addition to genetic and scarce resource, Thomas outlines the culture of poverty, opportunity, and maldistribution explanations. The latter two can be reconstructed to mesh with our regional development and internal colonial models. In the 1920s, Arthur Estabrook, W.S. Anderson, and Nathaniel D.M. Hirsch expounded the genetic explanation of Appalachian backwardness; see Hirsch, "An Experimental Study of the East Kentucky Mountaineers," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 3 (March 1928), 183-244.


I have been trying to think what the answer is to your question of the sources of my picture of them. It is a composite picture formed over the last 25 years, as the result of a number of visits to a friend of mine living, not in the mountains, but within reach of them in East-Central Kentucky, together with two visits to Berea College. I have been up into the mountains themselves once or twice. I realize that this is rather slight acquaintance on which to give any account of them and their life, but you may be interested to know that I have not read Gunther or indeed any sensational accounts. In fact, now that I come to think of it, I do not believe that any of my knowledge of the mountain people comes from books. (From a letter from Toynbee to Brown, 27 July 1948).

A rather extraordinary admission for an historian!


For examples of presenting an extremely impoverished community as typical, see Rena Gazaway, The Longest Mile (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969); and Bill Surfaced, The Hollow (New York: Coward-McCann, 1971).

See Schwarzwell, et al., Mountain Families in Transition, pp. 58-70; in this work, individualism, puritanism, and familism are linked to the personality, cultural, and social systems respectively.


Campbell, Southern Highlander, p. 91.


31 Knipe and Lewis, "The Impact of Coal Mining" in *The Not So Solid South*, p. 28.

32 Knipe and Lewis draw on George M. Foster's discussion of peasants, but ignore his attempt to limit the concept to a particular historic type in his "Introduction: What is "a Peasant?" in *Peasant Society: A Reader*.
Knipe and Lewis clearly are not tightly bound to their analogy between peasantry and the company town era. In an earlier version of the article cited above they concluded, "We are not greatly committed to the . . . point of view and do not insist that we call certain types of coal miners 'peasants';" see their paper of the same title read at the 1969 meeting of the Southern Anthropological Society. At least one writer has taken the analogy all too seriously: Ingolf Vogeler, "The Peasant Culture of Appalachia and its Survival," Antipode, 5 (March 1973), pp. 17-24.


Thomas R. Ford, "The Passing of Provincialism," Ch. 2 in The Southern Appalachian Region, p. 34.


Howard Odum uses the term folk society to characterize a natural social form resulting from the interaction of culture and environment; "folkways" contrast with "technicways." Folk society mediates the transition between pre-industrial and industrial society. See his paper "Folk and Regional Conflict as a Field of Sociological Study," given as the 1930 American Sociological Society Presidential Address, reprinted in Folk, Region, and Society: Selected Papers of Howard W. Odum, Katharine Jocher, et al., eds. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1964).


See the useful summary of development theories in Ch. 4, "Conceptual Bases of an Appalachian Program," pp. 33-47 in Monroe Newman,


45 On the urban hierarchy, from the viewpoint of the human ecology school, see Otis Dudley Duncan, et al., Metropolis and Region (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960); and the follow-up study by Beverly Duncan and Stanley Lieberson, Metropolis and Region in Transition (Beverly Hills:


48 Section 2 (a) of the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965.


50 The first mention of the four Appalachian subregions is made in the first issue of Appalachia, 1 (September 1967), pp. 3-5. The 1967 Annual Report of the ARC, pp. 7-9, outlines "four Appalachias" defined by the varying economic bases of the subregions: Northern Appalachia is seen in transition from a coal-steel-railroad economy to new types of manufacturing and service industries; Central Appalachia is focused on the coalfields of eastern Kentucky, southern West Virginia, southwest Virginia, and northern Tennessee; Southern Appalachia is rapidly converting from an agricultural economy to an urban and industrialized one; the Appalachian Highlands includes the Alleghenies, Blue Ridge and Smoky Mountains from New York to Georgia, a thinly populated region with potential for recreation and tourism. See also the article by the then ARC executive director, Ralph R. Widner, "The Four Appalachias," Appalachian Review, 2 (Winter 1968), pp. 13-19. In 1974 the ARC merged the Highlands into the other three subregions; see "The New Appalachian Subregions and Their Development Strategies," Appalachia, 8 (August-September 1974), pp. 10-16.


56 (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1973), pp. 24-25. Two good critical reviews of this work are by Dwight Billings in the American Journal of Sociology, 79 (May 1974), 1572-1574; and Helen M. Lewis in Social Forces, 53 (September 1974), 139-140.

57 On the LDDs see Donald Rothblatt, Regional Planning: The Appalachian Experience (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1971), pp. 150-157; and Newman, Political Economy of Appalachia, pp. 100-104. For analysis of the LDD program in one state, see Robert Flanders and John Tracy, "Georgia's APDCs at a Critical Juncture," Appalachia, 7 (December 1973-January 1974), pp. 1-12. A case study of opposition to an LDD is David Whisnant, "Revolt Against the Planners in the Kentucky River Area Development District," Southern Exposure, 2 (Spring/Summer 1974), pp. 84-102; an unusual aspect of this case of populist opposition to elite planning is the strong element of right-wing leadership which sees comprehensive planning as part of a "communist plot."

58 Rothblatt, Regional Planning, p. 157.


62 For the computerized input-output analysis, see Ch. 6 in William H. Miernyck, et al., Stimulating Regional Economic Development: An Industry Analysis of the West Virginia Economy (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970), pp. 188-203.


64 See William H. Miernyck, "Future Pathways for Appalachia," Ch. 11 in Manpower Development in Appalachia, ed. Zeller and Miller, pp. 222-238; and "Economic Characteristic of Appalachia and Potential for Financing


69 Interview with business leader A., Hazard, Kentucky, 12 January 1976.

70 For a critique of this perspective, see J.P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization," British Journal of Sociology, 17 (September 1966), 274-291; Michael Waltzer, The Only Revolution: Notes on the Theory of Modernization," Dissent, 11 (Autumn 1964), 432-440; Susanne J. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of

71 Rather than make any important distinction between the terms, I follow Gail-Omvedt: "While there are many ways to define and differentiate the concepts 'imperialism' and 'colonialism,' we will use them to refer to roughly the same phenomena -- the economic, political and cultural domination of one cultural-ethnic group by another -- with the difference that 'imperialism' focuses on the relation between the subjugated society and its alien rulers, while 'colonialism' focuses more on the situation viewed 'from below,' on the typical social structures created within the colonized society by imperialist relationships," in "Towards a Theory of Colonialism," The Insurgent Sociologist, 3 (Spring 1973), p. 1.


73 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Part I; Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Ch. 33; Capital, Vol. III, Ch. 14, Section 5; Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1968), especially the article of 21 September 1857.


In this typology, the "First World" is the advanced industrial capitalist countries, the "Second World" is the socialist countries, and the "Third World" is the underdeveloped countries within the capitalist world economy. The United Nations distinguishes between "countries with planned economies" (socialist) and "countries with market economies" (capitalist) and subdivides the latter into "developed" and "developing" countries; see the discussion in Pierre Jalée, The Third World in World Economy, trans. Mary Klopper (1968; New York: Monthly Review, 1969), pp. 3-8.


85 The school that views the motivation of contemporary imperialism as the need for markets for goods and capital investments draws heavily on the argument that contemporary capitalism generates a surplus that must


87 Joe Persky, "The South: A Colony at Home," *Southern Exposure*, 1 (Summer/Fall 1973), p. 22; this comes at the end of an article in which he has ignored his own warning and described the U.S. South as a colony. I will suggest that the U.S. South is better characterized as a peripheral region within an advanced capitalist country -- or, better, a semi-peripheral region, as a parallel to what Persky terms a "favored colony."


93 All the above quotes are from Dale L. Johnson, "On Oppressed Classes," in Dependence and Underdevelopment, ed. Cockcroft, Frank and Johnson, p. 277.

94 Ibid., p. 279, fn. 11.


96 Twelve Southerners, I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition (New York: Harper, 1930): Odum and the National Emergency Committee are quoted in Clarence H. Danhof, "Four Decades of Thought on the South's Economic Problems," Ch. 1 in Essays in Southern Economic Development, ed. Melvin L. Greenhut and W. Tate Whitman (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 30-35. Danhof dismisses the colonialism analogy as demagogic and "a touch of paranoia" (pp. 35-36); and misunderstands the argument as a conspiracy approach (pp. 44-51). Other major statements are Benjamin B. Kendrick, "The Colonial Status of
the South," Journal of Southern History, 8 (February 1942), 3-22; and
C. Vann Woodward, "The Colonial Economy," Ch. 11 in his Origins of the
New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1951),
pp. 291-320.

97 Andre Gorz, "Colonialism at Home and Abroad," Liberation, 16

98 Lee Webb, "Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Vermont,"


100 Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise
in Recent Times (1923; New York: Viking, 1938).

101 The development of this theory and its relationship to the
Communist International is traced by Theodore Draper, American Communism
and Soviet Russia (New York: Viking-Compass, 1963), Ch. 15, pp. 315-356.
Basic documents of the Executive Committee of the Communist International
are "Extracts from an ECCI Resolution on the Negro Question, 26 October
1928," and "Extracts from a Resolution of the ECCI Political Secretariat
on the Negro Question in the United States, 26 October 1930," both in
vol. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), II, pp. 552-557, and III,
pp. 124-135. Following the 1958 reversal in policy, a group called
the "Provisional Organizing Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party"
splintered from the Communist Party to preserve the self-determination
position. The successor of this group, the Communist Labor Party, has
continued to put forth the analysis; see Nelson Peery, The Negro National

102 The term "domestic colonialism" is introduced by Harold Cruse
in an essay which critiques the Communist Party position on the Negro
national question; see "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,"
Studies on the Left, 2, No. 3 (1962), pp. 12-25; rpt. in Cruse, Rebellion


106 See for example, three excellent collections of articles put together in pamphlet form: The West Virginia Miners Union, 1931: As Reported at the Time in "Labor Age," Harlan and Bell, Kentucky, 1931-32; The National Miners Union: As Reported at the Time in the "Labor Defender;"
and War in the Coal Fields; The Northern Fields, 1931: As Reported at the Time in the "Labor Defender" and "Labor Age" (Huntington, W. Va.: Appalachian Movement Press, 1972).


109 The argument is first developed in Helen M. Lewis and Edward E. Knipe, "The Colonialism Model: The Appalachian Case," an unpublished paper, revised draft, October 1970; printed in an expanded version by Lewis, "Fatalism or the Coal Industry? Contrasting Views of Appalachian Problems," Mountain Life & Work, 46 (December 1970), pp. 4-15; rpt. in Appalachia: Its People, Heritage, and Problems, ed. Frank S. Riddel (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1974), pp. 221-238. The application is further developed in Helen Lewis, Sue Kobak, and Linda Johnson, "Family, Religion and Colonialism in Central Appalachia; Or: 'Bury My Rifle at Big Stone Gap,'" in Growin' Up Country, ed. Jim Axelrod (Clintwood, Va.: Council of the Southern Mountains, 1973), pp. 131-156. In "Fatalism or the Coal Industry?" Lewis follows Charles Valentine's Culture and Poverty in contrasting the culture of poverty and exploitation models and, granting that the internal colonialism formulation has some problems, ends up with a mixed model similar to Valentine's. The "Family, Religion and Colonialism" article presents the internal colonialism model without such reservations.

102

111 See her review of Plunket and Bowman, Elites and Change, in Social Forces, 53 (September 1974), pp. 139-140.


113 Success through migration is class biased, however; see Schwartzweller, et al., Mountain Families in Transition, Chs. 6-9, pp. 121-205.


116 Blauner, Racial Oppression in America, p. 67.


The first proposal for something resembling a special legislature for the Southern Appalachians is made by George S. Mitchell, "Let's Unite the Pie!" *Mountain Life & Work*, 27 (Spring 1951), pp. 19-20; he suggests an "annual representative meeting and a permanent staff... Such a representative body ought to be... an annual assembly of all the mountain members of the state legislatures. Possibly the Members of Congress from the Mountains might be a sort of Upper House." Bruce Crawford reports on Edgar S. Fraley's idea for a State of Appalachia in "Appalachia: The 51st State?" *Mountain Life & Work*, 47 (March 1971), pp. 7-8. Dwight Macdonald proposes a state of Appalachia in "The
Constitution of the United States Needs to be Fixed," Esquire, 70 (October 1968), p. 246; but it would be formed by lumping together the present states of West Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee as part of an overall consolidation of states for the purpose of obtaining larger administrative jurisdictions. The proposal has no relation to a policy of overcoming the exploitation of the mountain region. The reorganization scheme of geographer G. Etzel Pearcy would form a state of Appalachia more appropriately from sections of southern West Virginia, southwestern Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and southeastern Ohio; see the article by Lee Harris from The Los Angeles Times rpt. as "A Plan to Reshape, Rename and Reduce U.S. States to 38," The Courier-Journal & Times (Louisville), 2 September 1973, p. E5.

120 Gordon K. Ebersole brought the idea of the Public Utility Districts from the Northwest to the Appalachians; see his "Appalachia: Potential With a View," Mountain Life & Work; 42 (Winter 1966), pp. 10-12. Harry Caudill picked up the idea and gave it wide publicity; see his "A New Plan for a Southern Mountain Authority," Appalachian Review, 1 (Summer 1966), pp. 6-11. Ebersole and Caudill were key leaders in the Congress for Appalachian Development. An issue of The Appalachian South, 2 (Spring and Summer 1967) is largely devoted to articles on CAD. On the history of CAD, see David Whisnant, "The Congress for Appalachian Development," Peoples' Appalachia, 3 (Spring 1973), pp. 16-22.


For a rare glimpse of Caudill in a relatively optimistic mood, expounding regional developmentalism, see "Jaded Old Land of Bright New Promise," Mountain Life & Work, 46 (March 1970), pp. 5-8; rpt. in Appalachia in the Sixties, ed. Walls' and Stephenson, pp. 240-246. His genetic and subculture of poverty arguments are apparent in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, pp. 1-31 and 273-301, but are strongly emphasized in his latest work, A Darkness at Dawn: Appalachian Kentucky and the Future (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1976), which begins with the sentence "Every person and society is a product of two factors, genes and culture." Thus the renowned critic of corporate colonialism in Appalachia ends by blaming the victim! Caudill's suggested bibliography at the end of the book includes John Fiske and Nathaniel D. Mitroff Hirsch (acknowledged at long last). See also his letters to the editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, 15 March and 3 May 1976, on genetics. Caudill's words ring with the bitterness of the prophet scorned by his own people.


For a model that would provide an intermediate category of medium-sized enterprises between oligopoly and small enterprises, see S. Michael Miller, "Notes on Neo-Capitalism," Theory and Society, 2 (Spring 1975), 1-35. Miller critiques Galbraith and also Daniel Bell's formulation of the "post-industrial society."


Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, pp. 44-50, 137-141.


The Fiscal Crisis of the State, p. 34, fn. 7.

Ibid., pp. 6-7, and Chs. 4-6, pp. 157-169.

I have adopted O'Connor's terminology for the three sectors, with the exception of modifying his "monopoly" sector to "monopolistic," in the interest of greater accuracy. "Oligopolistic" would be even more precise, but the concept is probably less well understood outside circles of economists. A similar qualification is offered by Baran and Sweezy: "Throughout this book . . . we use the term "monopoly" to include not only the case of a single seller of a commodity for which there are no substitutes, but also the much more common case of 'oligopoly,' i.e., a few sellers dominating the markets for products which are more or less


145 Manifesto of the Communist Party, Part I.


147 For a simplistic but suggestive interpretation of American history in terms of maintaining the coalition between the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie, see Richard E. Rubenstein, Left Turn: Origins of the Next American Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).


See Richard Parker, The Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Affluence and Equality (1972; New York: Harper Colophon, 1974), for a division into poor, lower middle, upper middle and rich classes; Parker waffles and helps perpetuate the myth he attacks by not terming his "lower middle class" the working class. A more thorough analysis is done by Andrew Levison, The Working Class Majority (1974; New York: Penguin,


Friedmann, "Poor Regions and Poor Nations," 467-470.


Note: Two papers which contribute to the further clarification of the dependency model came to my attention after the appropriate sections of this paper were typed for duplication. They are: Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment in Latin America," in Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond, ed. Chilcote and Edelstein (New York: Schenkman, 1974), pp. 1-87; and John Walton, "Internal Colonialism: Problems of Definition and Measurement," in Urbanization and Inequality: The Political Economy of Urban Development in Latin America, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius and Felicity M. Trueblood (Los Angeles: Sage, forthcoming).