As humanity seeks a new social matrix which is suited to the global conditions that have ended the isolation of communities, we must learn to understand the various rhetorics of different cultures. This paper explores at length some of the richness of rhetorical theory within the classics of the East, including the "Upanishads," and in the ideas and beliefs of Mahavira, Gautama Buddha, Confucius, and Mencius. It concludes that Asian rhetorics, neglected for so long, have much to offer professors and students of rhetoric in the West. (EM)
Out in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean, those who teach and study rhetoric look two ways—to the West, where Aristotelian rhetoric is thought by many to be rhetoric itself, and to the East, where the ancient rhetorics of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Mencianism, Taoism, and Legalism stand lonely and neglected, like towering mountain peaks in a lost continent.

Aristotle and Plato, Whately and Kenneth Burke are names to be conjured with. They and multiple more not only guide but dominate the minds of professors and students of rhetoric in the United States and in the scattered few universities offering courses in rhetoric in Europe. So far as rhetoric is concerned, it is as though the great civilizations of Asia were still blocked off by the high deserts and mountain peaks that for many centuries stood as barriers along the Eurasian frontier. To explore and describe the rhetorics of the Asian classical periods is akin to replicating the thirteenth century journeyings of Marco Polo; and now, seven hundred years since, it is not altogether heartening to remember that the European recognition of the richness of the Asian culture did not flower until the eighteenth century, five hundred years—some fifteen generations—after the initial discoveries of Marco Polo were made available for European consideration.

In recent years considerable attention has been given to cross-cultural communication, but thus far its proponents have given little if
any attention to Asian rhetoric (except to note that contemporary Japanese businessmen have discovered the utility of discussion and conference skills). Still another aspect of the cross-cultural movement has been to explore the communicative needs and capacities of blacks and some other minority groups.

Matthew Arnold, more than a hundred years ago, offered a pertinent observation, in his Stanzas on the Grand Chartreuse: "For we are hovering between two worlds/ One dead, the other powerless to be born." The death to which he referred was the supernatural view of special creation, slain by Charles Darwin; what was powerless to emerge as a replacement was a materialistic concept of creation.

Borrowing Arnold's metaphor, humanity as divided between the Eastern and Western hemispheres may be said to hover between two worlds: the autocracy typical of Asia's past, and the Lockian democracy, which has been tried in various forms and seems now in retreat. Perhaps a new amalgam, the Confucian concept of individual responsibility, should now be investigated as a median way. Or, looking to India as a quasi-Asian subcontinent, we recall its age-old monistic belief in the universalism of identity, which contrasts so sharply with the individualistic pluralism of the West. Perhaps from these contrasting views may emerge a new amalgam that could be called complimentarism—consisting of genuine respect for interrelating differences working together toward common goals.

The differences between East and West may be analyzed and evaluated in many different ways. However, the question is approached, the differences are both real and significant. The East in the past century has made and is still making considerable efforts to understand and adjust to the West. It is difficult to believe that the West does not likewise
have much yet to learn from the East.

Viewing the differences rhetorically, one conclusion is that whereas Aristotle posited a moral imperative (ethos) that stressed individual purpose, both Buddha and Confucius found their moral imperative in responsibility—Confucius, of the individual to society; and Buddha, of the individual to the universal entity that comprises the individual, society, and all else in the universe. Another way of looking at the East-West divergences is to recall the injunction of Jesus: "As ye do it unto one of these, the least of my creatures, so do ye it unto me," which contrasts with the warning of Buddha that you really do it all, good or bad, to yourself; and with the view of Confucius that you do it to mankind—if good, to enhance harmony, if bad to undermine harmony. In still another contrast, the Golden Rule of Jesus asks, "Do unto others as you would be done by"; whereas, Confucius stated his rule of reciprocity negatively—avoid doing to others what you would not want them to do to you. One manner of summarizing the East-West differences is to call the former passive, the latter active. Another way is to note that the West stresses individuality (individual salvation in religion, democracy in politics, the profit system in economic); the East communalism (identity of the one and many in Indian philosophies, family and social solidarity in Confucian communities).

The point I wish to stress is that as mankind is seeking a new social matrix suited to global conditions that have ended the age old isolationism of communities, we are required by the changing circumstances to seek understanding of multiple rhetorics so that the various cultural entities may be dealt with in ways meaningful to them. In short, gunboat diplomacy by the West no longer works—and neither does gunboat rhetoric.
When we, of the West, go out into the world communicating according to the rhetorical norms derived from our own culture, the results are and will be increasingly negative. The point ought to be self-evident. But in sober fact, if the rhetorics of Asia are to be taken into serious account in the West, we in the Pacific area will have to stimulate our tradition-bound Western brethren to commence inquiries that have not yet challenged their interest. The record speaks for itself. The Rhetorics of Asia remain a closed book to the Professors of Rhetoric in American Universities.

One reason for the neglect of Asian rhetorics is that rhetoric as a field of inquiry has been dealt with very differently in the West and in the East. In the West, rhetoric has been considered so crucially important, from the time of Corax down to the present, that it has been a subject of separate and continuous inquiry. The libraries contain large numbers of works that are classified under the rubric of "rhetoric."

Rhetoric has been recognized as a special branch of philosophy—although the prestigious journal, Philosophy and Rhetoric, distinguishes the two fields as congenial and interrelated but distinct from one another. In Asia, on the other hand, in both the Indian and Chinese traditions (for different reasons) rhetoric has been too closely interwoven in the basic inquiries constituting philosophy to be treated as a separate topic. Asian bibliographies ignore the classification "rhetoric" not because the subject has been of little or no importance but because it has been all-encompassing in importance that separation of this question from other fundamental issues has been impossible. Asia's great thought systems have been rhetorical in their essence. In India, the relatedness of everything that is or that occurs has been basic, with the result that a principal study has been the nature and consequences of relationships—clearly a
matter of rhetoric. In China the major concern has been societal relatedness—the nature and the means of human intercourse—also the chief concern of rhetoric.

In my Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China, I posited this view as the central theme of the study of Asian Classics:

"Basic rhetorical considerations underlie much of the classical literature of the Eastern hemisphere. There are many reasons for this which will emerge in the following chapters. Perhaps most basic of all is the cardinal devotion of the Asian mind to the related concepts of unity and harmony. Whereas the West has favored analysis and division of subject matter into identifiable and separate entities, the East has believed that to see truth steadily one must see it whole." The result has been that in the East logic was of less importance by far than intuition. Non-thought, or feeling, was given preponderance in the classics over rationalism. In the jargon of our own day, this tendency becomes confused with "anti-intellectualism"—which is nonsense. Asian classicists were fully as devoted to the pursuit of truth as are and have been the logicians and empiricists of the West. The questions of moment always are: "what is truth?" and "how is truth truly to be discerned?" Far from rejecting the value of truth, Eastern rhetoricians have sought for it in ways different from those of the West. And while they have obviously missed some of the truth Western thinkers have unveiled, just as surely they have also discovered areas and forms of truth that have eluded the West.

The discovery of truth was, indeed, even more important to the seers of ancient India than it has been to the far more pragmatic West. We have often been content to deal with "what works," even if its identification
with Ultimate Reality eludes us. The problem was dealt with variously in the Asian classics; but always the quest was for Truth itself, regardless of its seeming utility. How, they asked implicitly, could what is True not be correct, right, and useful; how could what is Untrue be of permanent or genuine use? Instead, then, of looking for practical applications of knowledge, their attention was directed to the centrality of meaning.

The third book of the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad is a rhetorical treatise, describing a debate in which a wisdom-hungry king named Yājñavalkya (who had surrendered his kingdom to become a wandering hermit) engaged in a debate against a large number of Brahmin scholars. The importance attached to debate in ancient Indian society is indicated by the fact that the prize consisted of a thousand cows, each of which had a bag of gold attached to each of its horns. Yājñavalkya won the debate by arguing that the true universe each should seek to rule is the self—since within the self is comprised the essence of all that exists.

The Chāndogya, the longest of the 11 Upanishads, in the 6th of its eight parts, presents a dialogue between Āruni and his 24-year-old son, Svetaketu, who has just returned home after completion of his studies, swollen with the pride of his accumulated knowledge. Through a series of questions and analogies, Āruni convinced his son that everything that exists anywhere must also exist within himself. Accordingly, the surest route to understanding lies not in gathering information but in meditating upon one's own nature. By looking about to observe isolated facts, the observer becomes increasingly confused. Knowledge is the enemy of truth; thinking about disparate facts misleads the understanding. "Meditation is in truth higher than thought," as part seven concludes. The Iṣṭā
Upanishad summarizes what all of them seek to teach by warning that the pursuit of good deeds leads into darkness and the worship of knowledge to even blacker darkness. "He who sees all creatures in himself and himself in all creatures no longer remains apart." It should be noted that separateness is the worst of fates, since Nirvana entails comprehension and acceptance of the identity of the self into all being.

Whether the Truth of Hinduism is a truth acceptable to the West is, for our purpose, incidental. The point is, that to Indian rhetoric discourse had as its single acceptable aim the unveiling of truth. Mahāvīra, founder of Jainism, detailed the means by which Knowledge, certainty, or Truth may be sought. There are, he said, only two avenues. One is through Sensory Perception, together with inferences based on what is perceived, and the reception of Scriptural Revelation from the Upanishads or other sources. The senses are notoriously unreliable, since there are endless disagreements concerning what is perceived. The other avenue to Truth is Extrasensory Perception. This may lead to presumed knowledge, such as visions and telepathy—but this kind of knowledge is also unreliable and conceived differently by different individuals. However, Extrasensory Perception can and should lead to Absolute Knowledge—that is, to Truth that is self-evident, permits of no doubt, and therefore needs no demonstration.

Gautama, who came to be recognized as Buddha, utilized the extrasensory perceptive method of seeking absolute knowledge. As a Prince he was reared in luxury and shut off from the outside world to such an extent that he was a mature man before (having slipped away from the palace grounds) he saw a man who was ill, an aged beggar and a dead body and came, thereby, to realize that disease, old age, and death exist. Seeking to
understand how such evils could be permitted in a universe that presumably represents essential good, Gautama turned to study with religious teachers, but found their doctrines unsatisfactory. He joined five devout Hindu hermits who sought Truth through asceticism, and for six years lived with them in the wilderness, dressed in rags and eating barely enough to sustain life. "He discovered that instead of discerning Truth he was preoccupied with his bodily discomforts. Leaving the hermits, Gautama found a pleasant grove where he could live in comfort and determined to remain there until he found enlightenment. Mara, the Hindu devil, came tempting him to set forth upon a new career of aiding the poor and distressed; but Gautama remained true to his own mission of trying to comprehend Truth. Finally, there entered his mind the great insight: when desire ceases, life becomes whole. He sought out his former ascetic companions, the five hermits, and taught them his new understanding of the Four Noble Truths. First, suffering exists. Second, suffering results from craving. Third, suffering ends when craving is renounced. Fourth, the renunciation of craving may be accomplished by following the Eightfold Path of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Gautama did not tell his hermit friends that this "revelation" had come to him from God. Neither did he defend his new insight with logic and facts. He simply stated it. The Truth, once separated from error and clearly stated, needs no advocacy. What is important is that it be discerned and stated.

Neither did the great sages of the classical period in China seek for any external sanction to support their messages. None of them claimed to have had any divine revelation. Unlike Gautama, however, they
presented considerable argumentative support for their views. The reason was that they behaved like Professors conducting graduate seminars. Regardless of the respect which is traditional in China both for age and for learning, it was never considered in any degree disrespectful for the students to question and even to challenge the views set forth by the master who taught them. The teachings were never set forth authoritatively. They represented the best thoughtfulness of high-minded scholars, who were pleased to have their conclusions questioned, for only in that way could they know where doubt existed and what must be said to counter it.

Confucius was a rhetorician who believed that the principal purpose of speech was to enhance social harmony. Living in The Spring and Autumn Era (which extended from 722 to 481 B.C.), when the monarchy had lost authority and small dukedoms were in constant contention, he felt keenly the cost of conflict. His homeland was the small State of Lu, which was both wealthy and weak, so that it was frequently invaded and ravaged. Not only was Lu invaded twenty-one times (an average of once every fifteen years) during this period, it was also beset internally by continual struggles for power among its three principal families. As a result, Lu was abysmally misgoverned. Corruption, nepotism, and conspicuous immortality marked the bureaucrats, who lived in luxury while robbing and oppressing the common people.

Confucius was an optimist who believed that things should and could be better. He believed that the greatest social needs were for orderliness and stability, which would produce harmony. With a long view of history, he said that a Lesser Harmony had been achieved when States were established to preserve a degree of stability within their borders and that the goal of mankind was the Greater Harmony that would emerge when all the
world was united under one rule.

His political goal was a harmonious society, which he felt could be achieved if everyone felt a personal responsibility for fulfilling the duties that devolved properly upon his own station in life. Accordingly, Confucius stated the code of Li—which stressed the responsibility of subjects to obey and support the ruler, wives to respect and aid their husbands, elder sons to become the principal support for their parents, younger sons to obey and assist the elder, and friends to provide one another with mutual aid. Individualism was subordinated to the well-being of the family, community, and state. What to believe and how to behave were to be determined by a study of the past; for, Confucius pointed out, no one individual, regardless of his intellect or learning, could possibly form fresh and individual judgments as sound as those which had evolved from the sifted and evaluated experience of the race. Consequently, he looked to the past to learn lessons that would guide the people toward a better (that is a more harmonious) future.

In his Analects, Confucius indicated his rhetorical principles. First, speakers should pursue goals that are as helpful to their listeners as they are to the speaker themselves. Enforcing this was his principle of Reciprocity, which he told his disciples underlay all his teaching: "What you do not wish for yourself, do not do unto others." Then he added, "A good man, you know, wishing to prosper himself, helps others to prosper." Second, speakers should derive their messages from the experience of history. As for himself, Confucius said, "I transmit but do not create." When a student questioned whether the pathways of the past should not be abandoned when better ways appeared, Confucius replied, "The path should not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would
There were many other rhetorical principles supporting these three—as many as fourteen in all. Like Aristotle, Confucius recognized the powerful influence of emotion—which often misleads judgment. In his influential essay, "The Great Learning," Confucius noted that: "Men are partial when they feel affection and love; partial when they despise and dislike; partial where they stand in awe and reverence; partial where they feel sorrow and compassion; partial where they are arrogant and rude. Thus it is that there are few men in the world who love and at the same time know the true qualities of the object of their love, or who hate and yet know the excellencies of the object of their hatred." Like Aristotle, he recognized the primacy of ethos: "Build up your character so as to inspire the people with assurance."

The study of Confucianism has continued unabated for twenty-five hundred years; yet little attention has been paid to Confucian rhetoric. A vast amount of inquiry is needed—and rhetoricians in the Pacific area would seem to be precisely those who should commence that undertaking. Every nuance of Aristotelian rhetoric has been examined minutely, time and again. For example, there are numerous essays attempting to explain what Aristotle truly meant by the enthymeme. It is high time attention should be directed to what Confucius meant by his Doctrine of Words. Like a Semanticist, Confucius warned that: "If designations are not accurate, language will not be clear. If language is not clear, duties will not be carried out. If duties are not carried out, the proprieties will not be observed. If the proprieties are not observed, punishments will not be uniformly applied. If punishments are not applied uniformly, the people will not know how to act without getting into trouble. Therefore,
The superior man takes care that his terms be stated accurately, so that what he says may be carried into effect appropriately. He never uses language carelessly or incorrectly.

The last statement with which his Analects is concluded reads: "One cannot know people without knowing their words." It is an injunction worthy of considerable meditation, contrasting sharply with the Western notion that "Actions speak louder than words." In the view of Confucius, actions are always suspect, for it is easy for a person to enact a role with intent to deceive. But as an individual speaks, so he is—basically inescapably. His is a rhetoric worthy of an attention it has yet to receive.

If Western rhetoricians neglect the rhetorical theories of Gautama Buddha and Confucius, they at least regard their names with familiarity. We must suspect, meanwhile, that very few of them even have heard the names of other great classical Chinese rhetoricians, including Meng-k'o (known in the West as Mencius), Chuang-Tzu (or Chuang-Chou), Mo-Tzu (the romantic idealist), or Han Fei-Tzu (the legalistic, cynical pragmatist). At least, if these names are known to our rhetorical brethren, they and their ideas are omitted from the books, seminars, and articles on rhetoric. Space need not be consumed even for the summation of their systems of ideas here, for I have already spelled out my understanding of them in Communication and Culture.

It is not easy to rank them in order of importance. Mo-Tzu perhaps has most to offer to our own generation, for he was an anti-traditionalist, a pacifist who realistically recognized the need for national self-defense, and an evangelist of the simple life. His rhetorical method was to discover the basic point of view of the listeners, then to state his own
conclusions in terms arising so inevitably from his listeners' premises that they could scarcely avoid agreeing with him. Chuang-Chou represented the Taoist view that people tend to think, feel and act in accordance with natural forces that are inscrutable and transcend reason. His rhetorical method, accordingly, was to avoid analysis or thought, but to submerge himself quiescently into his own natural being, in which state he would understand and reflect the fundamental nature of those whom he sought to influence. Han Fei-Tzu believed we must appeal to the overriding selfishness of individuals and that we best can do this by arousing their ever-present fears. From such views, he developed a rounded and pragmatic Machiavellian rhetoric. Each of these one-sentence summations is woefully unfair to the complexity of the theories of these classical masters. They are meant only to invite the readers to look into the writings to see for themselves.

By general agreement of Orientalists, Mencius is second in importance only to Confucius. As a rhetorician, in all of classical Asia he is without a peer. To I. A. Richards, Part VI of the Book of Mencius remains "one of the most important arguments in the history of thought." H. G. Creel, the University of Chicago Sinologist, considers Mencius' book "undoubtedly one of the great books of the world's literature." In Chinese Confucian temples, the altar to Mencius stands beside that of Confucius and is inscribed, "The Almost as Saintly." The formidable Japanese Zen Buddhist, D. T. Suzuki, believes that Confucianism would not have become the dominant influence in China for twenty centuries had it not been for the explication and extension given to it by Mencius. Not even these eminent experts have undertaken to explicate his rhetorical theories. Yet there can be no doubt that Mencius was one of the world's
greatest, if yet largely unhailed, rhetoricians.

Like Confucius, Mencius believed that the best guide to understanding is through study of the past, to discover the pathway mapped out in the history of the race. He was severe in his condemnation of originality, which he equate with eccentricity. "Here is a man," he said to his disciples, "whose fourth finger is bent and cannot be stretched out straight. It is not painful, nor does it incommode his business; and yet if there be any who can make it straight, he will not think the way from Ts'in to Ts'oo too far to go to him; because his finger is not like the finger of other people. . . . But if his mind be not like that of other people, he does not know dissatisfaction. This should be called--'Ignorance of the relative importance of things.'"

In his book, Mencius developed two basic propositions. The first was that man is essentially good. The second is that through persuasive discourse he may be reclaimed from erroneous behavior and set again upon the path of righteousness. Through a series of analogies, Mencius shows how it is that men may live evil lives despite the goodness of their innate nature. The lamentable thing is that lost goodness is not searched for and reclaimed. When a dog is lost, or a fowl, the owner instantly sets forth in search of them. But when a man loses his own nature, he does not know enough to search it out. Like the teaching in the Upanishads, Mencius believed that, "The great end of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind."

All of the eight rhetorical principles enunciated by Mencius derive from his basic conviction of innate human goodness. They culminate in his rigorous principle of sincerity, which demands not only that speakers tell
the truth as they understand it, but also that they not speak to influence listeners until they have mastered their subject so thoroughly that what they say is utterly dependable. Perhaps his principal innovation was what I. A. Richards called multiple definition, and what we may fruitfully call rhetorical definition. The forms of definition—operational, literal, descriptive, or prescriptive—that are commonly recommended do not, Mencius pointed out, serve the common needs of discourse. What is requisite is to define concepts in terms that are mutu-
ally acceptable to both speaker and listeners. Only then is there commonality of understanding.

The great American sage, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who more than most of his countrymen, was versed in the wisdom of the East, once observed that: "There is for every man a statement possible of that truth which he is most unwilling to receive,—a statement possible, so broad and so pungent that he cannot get away from it, but must either bend to it or die of it." This judgment is purely Mencian. Men's minds most truly meet, Mencius believed, when they rise to the altitude of a selfless vision of truth. The only plane upon which agreement is inevitable is the acceptance of truth, once it is clearly and rightly stated.

If the purpose of this article is only partially achieved, it will at least point some of our Pacific colleagues toward an examination of the richness of rhetorical theory that lies within the great classics of the East. For here is a field that has far too long lain fallow, where the harvest from its cultivation should be rewardingly great.
FOOTNOTES


2. Robert T. Oliver, Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).


7. Of course, these statements of differences are over-simplifications. All that is intended in this paragraph is to emphasize that cultural differences do exist, and that they are sufficiently significant to merit attention. Western theologians are prone to believe that the religio-philosophies of the East are not quite religions; Western philosophers doubt that they are quite philosophies. We may properly ask why they should be either one or the other. Is not the East entitled to evolved systems of thought that derive from and satisfy its own ways of coming to terms with reality--in many ways different from that of the West.?
Our effort should not be to interpret the East in Western terms but to
find ways of dealing with and communicating with the East that will be
mutually satisfying.

8. Oliver, op. cit., p. 10.

9. Western thinkers, too, have, of course, sought truth through
non-logical systems, although they represent exceptions rather than
the rule. A representative approach of this kind is Michael Polanyi's___
*Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958). The German-Kantian philosopher,
Hans Vaihinger, in his *The Philosophy of 'As If*, trans. by C. K. Ogden
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1924) sought to demonstrate the view
that genuine reality is elaborately misrepresented in human rationality.
And Chaim Perelman, in one of his latter books, *A Historical Introduction
to Philosophical Thinking*, tr. Kenneth A. Brown (New York: Random House,
1965), insisted that rational, deductive, and empirical methods do not
satisfy many essential human inquiries, including, for example, the im-
portant questions that relate not to what is, but to what ought to be.

University Press, 1894; republished in Delhi by Motilal Banarsidass, 1963)
has long been the standard reference for the Upanishads. A handy, in-
expensive paperback book containing the principal ones is Juan Mascaro,*

Cultural Research Society, 1951) and K. N. Jayatileke, *Early Buddhist

12. Books about Buddhism comprise what is probably the largest to-
pal bibliography in the world, and is still expanding rapidly. As an
instance, a World Conference on Buddhism will be held August 31-Septem-
ber 1, 1976, by Dongguk University in Seoul, Korea, commemorating the 70th
anniversary of this Buddhist institution. A. Foucher, *The Life of Buddha*,
trans. by S. B. Boas (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1963) is re-
presentative. My own understanding of Buddha's message and methods is
in my *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China*, op. cit.,
Chapter V, pp. 61-83--though the earlier chapters on Hinduism are es-
ential background.

13. Since space here is far too limited for extensive treatment of
the subject, I am merely selecting and paraphrasing from my chapter on
Confucius in Oliver; op. cit., Chapter VIII, especially pp. 136-144, where
specific references are provided.


15. H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung*


18. Ibid.