This paper defines the "invisible pedagogy," a teaching model used in British infant schools, and discusses its relationship to middle class culture, working class culture, and "visible" pedagogy. The invisible pedagogy is characterized by several features including (1) implicit rather than explicit control over the child by the teacher; (2) reduced emphasis on the transmission and acquisition of specific skills; (3) relatively free activity by the child in exploring and rearranging an environment arranged by the teacher; and (4) use of many diffuse criteria to evaluate the pedagogy. It is suggested that the basic concept of the invisible pedagogy in infant schools is play, which socializes the child while he explores and allows the teacher to evaluate his development. Theories of learning which are consistent with the invisible pedagogy are described in general terms. The differences between visible and invisible pedagogies are described as reflecting an ideological conflict between the old and new middle classes, and the social significance of the invisible pedagogy is said to differ according to the social class of the child. Problems arising in the transition of children from homes to preschools with invisible pedagogy, and from these preschools to secondary schools and universities with visible pedagogy, are discussed. (BRT)
STUDIES IN THE LEARNING SCIENCES 2

CLASS AND PEDAGOGIES: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE

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VISIBLES ET INVISIBLES
STUDIES IN THE LEARNING SCIENCES 2

CLASS AND PEDAGOGIES: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE

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ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
1975
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Studies in the Learning Sciences is a series of major papers by scientists participating in the International Learning Sciences Programme (CERI - OECD) on the research questions with which this programme is mainly concerned:

1. Cognitive effects of scholarisation
2. Scholarisation and social strategies: (educational and economic behaviour)
3. Genetic sociology: (symbolic systems and early socialisation)
4. Non-verbatim learning and memory
5. Experimental ethnography: (literacy and lateralisation)
6. The problem of serial order in behaviour: (ethology and linguistics)
7. Theoretical models of behaviour development

The papers are published simultaneously in English and French in an effort to bring the most productive thinking in the learning sciences to the attention of a larger public.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper was written for a meeting on "Cognitive Effects of Scholarisation", itself a part of the International Learning Sciences Programme, CERI/OECD, and of on-going work on the artifacts of learning. (See Henry Nathan: Stable Rules: Science and Social Transmission, Studies in the Learning Sciences 1, CERI/OECD, Paris 1973.)

The basis of the paper was written whilst I was a visitor to the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études (Centre de Sociologie Européenne under the direction of Pierre Bourdieu). I am very grateful to Peter Corbishley, graduate student in the Department of the Sociology of Education, for his help in the explication of the concept of an "interrupter system". The definition used in this paper owes much to his clarification. Finally, I would like to thank Gerald Elliot, Professor of Physics (Open University) who whilst in no way ultimately responsible assisted in the formal expression of an "object code".
I shall examine some of the assumptions and the cultural context of a particular form of pre-school/infant school pedagogy. A form which has at least the following characteristics:

1. Where the control of the teacher over the child is implicit rather than explicit.
2. Where, ideally, the teacher arranges the context which the child is expected to rearrange and explore.
3. Where within this arranged context the child apparently has wide powers over what he selects, over how he structures, and over the time scale of his activities.
4. Where the child apparently regulates his own movements and social relationships.
5. Where there is a reduced emphasis upon the transmission and acquisition of specific skills (see Note I).
6. Where the criteria for evaluating the pedagogy are multiple and diffuse and so not easily measured.

Invisible Pedagogy and Infant Education

One can characterise this pedagogy as an invisible pedagogy. In terms of the concepts of classification and frame, the pedagogy is realised through weak classification and weak frames(1). Visible pedagogies are realised through strong classification and strong frames: The basic difference between visible and invisible pedagogies is in the manner in which criteria are transmitted and in the degree of specificity of the criteria. The more implicit the manner of transmission and the more diffuse the criteria, the more invisible the pedagogy; the more specific the criteria, the more explicit the manner of their transmission, the more visible the pedagogy. These definitions will be extended later in the paper.

If the pedagogy is invisible, what aspects of the child have high visibility for the teacher? I suggest two aspects. The first arises out of an inference the teacher makes from the child's ongoing behaviour about the developmental stage of the child. This inference is then referred to a concept of readiness. The second aspect of the child refers to his

1) B. Bernstein, "On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge", in: Class, Codes and Control I (London, 1971)
external behaviour and is conceptualised by the teacher as busyness. The child should be busy doing things. These inner (readiness) and outer (busyness) aspects of the child can be transformed into one concept of "ready to do". The teacher infers from the "doing" the state of "readiness" of the child as it is revealed in his present activity and as this state adumbrates future "doing".

We can briefly note in passing a point which will be developed later. In the same way as the child's reading releases the child from the teacher and socialises him into the privatised solitary learning of an explicit anonymous past (i.e. the textbook), so busy children (children doing) releases the child from the teacher but socialises him into an ongoing interactional present in which the past is invisible and so implicit (i.e. the teachers' pedagogical theory). Thus a non-doing child in the invisible pedagogy is the equivalent of a non-reading child in the visible pedagogy. (However, a non-reading child may be at a greater disadvantage and experience greater difficulty than a "non-doing" child.)

The concept basic to the invisible pedagogy is that of play. This is not the place to submit this concept to logical analysis, but a few points may be noted.

1. Play is the means by which the child exteriorises himself to the teacher. Thus the more he plays and the greater the range of his activities, the more the child is made available to the teacher's screening. Thus, play is the fundamental concept with "readiness" and "doing" as subordinate concepts. Although not all forms of doing are considered as play (hitting another child, for example), most forms can be so characterised.

2. Play does not merely describe an activity: it also contains an evaluation of that activity. Thus, there is productive and less productive play, obsessional and free-ranging play, solitary and social play. Play is not only an activity, it entails a theory from which interpretation, evaluation and diagnosis are derived and which also indicates a progression. A theory which the child can never know in the way a child can know the criteria which is realised in visible pedagogy. Play implies a potentially all-embracing theory, for it covers nearly all if not all the child's doing and not doing. As a consequence, a very long chain of inference has to be set up to connect the theory with any one exemplar (a "doing" or a "not doing"). The theory gives rise to a total - but invisible - surveillance of the child, because it relates his inner disposition to all his external acts. The "spontaneity" of the child is filtered through this surveillance and then implicitly shaped according to interpretation, evaluation and diagnosis.
3. Both the means and ends of play are multiple and change with time. Because of this, the stimuli must be, on the whole, highly abstract, available to be contextualised by the child; and so the unique doing of each child is facilitated. Indeed, play encourages each child to make his own mark. Sometimes, however, the stimulus may be very palpable when the child is invited to feel a leaf, or piece of velour, but what is expected is a unique response of the child to his own sensation. What is the code for reading the marks; a code the child can never know, but implicitly acquires. How does he do this?

4. The social basis of this theory of play is not an individualised act, but a personalised act; not strongly framed, but weakly framed encounters. Its social structure may be characterised as one of overt personalised organic solidarity, but covert mechanical solidarity. Visible pedagogies create social structures which may be characterised as covert individualised organic solidarity and overt mechanical solidarity. (See later discussion.)

5. In essence, play is work and work is play. We can begin to see here the class origins of the theory. For the working class, work and play are very strongly classified and framed; for certain sub-groups of the middle class, work and play are weakly classified and weakly framed. For these sub-groups, no strict line may be drawn between work and play. Work carries what is often called "intrinsic" satisfactions, and therefore is not confined to one context. However, from another point of view, work offers the opportunity of symbolic narcissism which combines inner pleasure and outer prestige. Work for certain sub-groups of the middle class is a personalised act in a privatised social structure. These points will be developed later.

Theories of Learning and Invisible Pedagogy

We are now in a position to analyse the principles underlying the selection of theories of learning which invisible pre-school/infant school pedagogies will adopt. Such pedagogies will adopt any theory of learning which has the following characteristics.

1. The theories in general will be seeking universals and thus are likely to be developmental and concerned with sequence. A particular context of learning is only of interest in as much as it throws light on a sequence. Such theories are likely to have a strong biological basis.

2. Learning is a tacit, invisible act, its progression is not facilitated by explicit public control.

3. The theories will tend to abstract the child's personal biography and local context from his cultural biography and institutional context.
4. In a sense, the theories see socialisers as potentially, if not actually, dangerous, as they embody an adult focused, therefore reified concept of the socialised. Exemplary models are relatively unimportant and so the various theories in different ways point towards implicit rather than explicit hierarchical social relationships. Indeed, the imposing exemplar is transformed into a facilitator.

5. Thus the theories can be seen as interrupters of cultural reproduction and therefore have been considered by some as progressive or even revolutionary. Notions of child's time replace notions of adult's time, notions of child's space replace notions of adult's space; facilitation replaces imposition and accommodation replaces domination.

We now give a group of theories, which despite many differences fulfill at a most abstract level all or nearly all of the five conditions given previously:

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What is of interest is that these theories form rather a strange, if not contradictory group. They are often selected to justify a specific element of the pedagogy. They form in a way the theology of the infant school. We can see how the crucial concept of play and the subordinate concepts of readiness and doing fit well with the above theories. We can also note how the invisibility of the pedagogy fits with the invisible tacit act of learning. We can also see that the pre-school/infant school movement from one point of view is a progressive, revolutionary, colonising movement in its relationships to parents, and in its relationship to educational levels above itself. It is antagonistic for different reasons to middle-class and working-class families, for both create a deformation of the child. It is antagonistic to educational levels above itself, because of its fundamental opposition to their concepts of learning and social relationships. We can note here that as a result the child is abstracted from his family and his future educational contexts.

Of central importance is that this pedagogy brings together two groups of educationists who are at the extremes of the educational hierarchy, infant school teachers and university teachers and researchers. The consequence has been to professionalise and raise the status of the pre-school/infant school teacher; a status not based upon a specific
competence, a status based upon a weak educational identity (no subject). The status of the teachers from this point of view is based upon a diffuse, tacit, symbolic control which is legitimised by a closed explicit ideology, the essence of weak classification and weak frames.

Class and the Invisible Pedagogy

From our previous discussion, we can abstract the following:

1. The invisible pedagogy is an interrupter system, both in relation to the family and its relation to other levels of the educational hierarchy.
2. It transforms the privatised social structures and cultural contexts of visible pedagogies into a personalised social structure and personalised cultural contexts.
3. Implicit nurture reveals unique nature.

The question is what is it interrupting? The invisible pedagogy was first institutionalised in the private sector for a fraction of the middle class - the new middle class (see note II). If the ideologies of the old middle class were institutionalised in the public schools and through them into the grammar schools, so the ideology of the new middle class was first institutionalised in private pre-schools, then private/public secondary schools, and finally into the state system, at the level of the infant school. Thus the conflict between visible and invisible pedagogies, from this point of view, between strong and weak classification and frames, is an ideological conflict within the middle class. The ideologies of education are still the ideologies of class. The old middle class were domesticated through the strong classification and frames of the family and public schools, which attempted, often very successfully, cultural reproduction. But what social type was reproduced?

We know that every industrialised society produces organic solidarity. Now Durkheim, it seems to me, was concerned with only one form of such solidarity - the form which created individualism. Durkheim was interested in the vicissitudes of the types as their classification and framing were no longer, or only weakly, morally integrated, or when the individual's relation to the classification and frames underwent a change. His analysis is based upon the old middle class. He did not foresee, although his conceptual procedures make this possible, a form of organic solidarity based upon weak classification and weak frames; that is, a form of solidarity developed by the new middle class. Durkheim's organic solidarity refers to individuals in privatised class relationships; the second form of organic solidarity refers to persons in privatised class relationships. The second form of organic solidarity celebrates the apparent release,
not of the individual, but of the persons and new forms of social control. (See Note III.) Thus, we can distinguish individualised and personalised forms of organic solidarity within the middle class, each with their own distinctive and conflicting ideologies and each with their own distinctive and conflicting forms of socialisation and symbolic reality. These two forms arise out of developments of the division of labour within class societies. Durkheim's individualised organic solidarity developed out of the increasing complexity of the economic division of labour; personalised organic solidarity is suggested, develops out of increases in the complexity of the division of labour, of cultural or symbolic control which the new middle class have appropriated. The new middle class is an interrupter system, clearly not of class relationships but of the form of their reproduction. In Bourdieu's terms, there has been a change in habitus, but not in function. This change in habitus has had far reaching effects on the selective institutionalisation of symbolic codes and codings in the areas of sex, aesthetics, and upon preparing and repairing agencies, such as the family, school, and mental hospitals. In all these areas there has been a shift towards weak classification and frames (see Note IV).

This conflict within the middle class is realised sharply in different patterns of the socialisation of the young. In the old middle class, socialisation is into strong classification and strong framing, where the boundaries convey tacitly critical condensed messages. In the new middle class, socialisation is into weak classification and weak frames, which promote through the explicitness of the communication code, far greater ambiguity and drives this class to make visible, the ideology of its socialisation; crucial to this ideology is the concept of the person, not of the individual. Whereas the concept of the individual leads to specific, unambiguous role identities and relatively inflexible role performances, the concept of the person leads to ambiguous personal identity and flexible role performances. Both the old and the new middle class draw upon biological theories, but of very different types. The old middle class held theories which generated biologically fixed types, where variety of the type constituted a threat to cultural reproduction. The new middle class also hold theories which emphasize a fixed biological type, but they also hold that the type is capable of great variety. This, in essence, is a theory which points towards social mobility - towards a meritocracy. For the old middle class, variety must be severely reduced in order to ensure cultural reproduction; for the new middle class, the variety must be encouraged in order to ensure interruption. Reproduction and interruption are created by variations in the strength of classifications and frames (See Note V). As these weaken, so the socialisation
encourages more of the socialised to become visible, his uniqueness to be made manifest. Such socialisation is deeply penetrating, more total as the surveillance becomes more invisible. This is the basis of control which creates personalised organic solidarity. Thus the forms of socialisation within these two conflicting fractions of the middle class are the origins of the visible and invisible pedagogies of the school. We have a homologue between the interruption of the new middle class of the reproduction of the old and the interruption of the new educational pedagogy of the reproduction of the old; between the conflict within the middle class and the conflict between the two pedagogies: yet it is the conflict between and interruption of forms of transmission of class relationships.

This point we will now develop. The new middle class, like the proponents of the invisible pedagogy, are caught in a contradiction; for their theories are at variance with their objective class relationship. A deep-rooted ambivalence is the ambience of this group. On the one hand, they stand for variety against inflexibility, expression against repression, the interpersonal against the inter-positional; on the other hand, there is the grim obduracy of the division of labour and of the narrow pathways to its positions of power and prestige. Under individualised organic solidarity, property has an essentially physical nature; however, with the development of personalised organic solidarity, although property in the physical sense remains crucial, it has been partly psychologised and appears in the form of ownership of valued skills made available in educational institutions. Thus, if the new middle class is to repeat its position in the class structure, then appropriate secondary socialisation into privileged education becomes crucial. But as the relation between education and occupation becomes more direct and closer in time then the classifications and frames increase in strength. Thus the new middle class take up some ambivalent enthusiasm for the invisible pedagogy for the early socialisation of the child, but settle for the visible pedagogy of the secondary school. And it will continue to do this until the university moves to a weaker classification and a weaker framing of its principles of transmission and selection. On the other hand, they are among the leaders of the movement to institutionalise the invisible pedagogy in state pre-schools and often for its colonisation of the primary school and further extension into the secondary school. And this can be done with confidence, for the secondary school is likely to provide both visible and invisible pedagogies. The former for the middle class and the latter for the working class.
The Class Assumptions of the Invisible Pedagogy

We can now begin to see that because the invisible pedagogy had its origins within a fraction of the middle class, it presupposes a relatively long educational life. Inherent within this pedagogy is a concept of time - middle-class time. Of equal significance because it originates within the middle class, it presupposes a communication code (an elaborate code) which orients the child early towards the significance of relatively complex independent meanings, whether these are in the form of speech or of writing. Thus, the development of specific educational competencies can either be delayed because of the longer educational life, or the child will achieve them early because of the focus of the communication code. But this does not complete the class assumptions of the invisible pedagogy. We have so far suggested two: a long educational life, and an elaborated code. There is a third.

The shift from individualised to personalised organic solidarity changes the structure of family relationships and in particular the role of the woman in the socialising of the child. Historically, under individualised organic solidarity, the mother is important neither as a transmitter of physical nor of symbolic property. She is almost totally abstracted from the means of reproduction of either physical or symbolic property. The control of the children is delegated to others (nanny, governess, tutor). She is essentially a domestic administrator and it follows that she can be a model only for her daughter. She was often capable of cultural reproduction, for she often possessed a sensitive awareness of the literature of the period. This concept of the abstracted maternal function reappears perhaps in the concept of the pre-school assistant as a baby minder, and the governess as the teacher of elementary competencies. Thus, individualised organic solidarity might generate two models for the preschool or infant school:

1. The abstracted mother → nanny - baby minder
2. The governess → teacher of elementary competencies

Under personalised organic solidarity, the role of the mother in the rearing of her children undergoes a qualitative change. As we have noted earlier, with such solidarity, property has been partly psychologised and it arises out of forms of interaction - forms of communication - which are initiated and developed and focused by the mother very early in the child's life. Thus, the mother under personalised organic solidarity is transformed into a powerful and crucial agent of cultural reproduction who provides access to symbolic forms and who shapes the disposition of her children so that they are better able to exploit the possibilities of education. Thus as we move from individualised to personalised organic...
solidarity so the woman is transformed from an agent of physical reproduction to an agent of cultural reproduction. There is, however, a contradiction within her structural relationships. Unlike the mother in a situation of individualised solidarity, she is unable to get away from her children. For the weak classification and weak frames of her child-rearing firmly anchor her to her children; for her interaction and surveillance is totally demanding and, at the same time, her own socialisation into both a personal and occupational identity points her away from the family. These tensions can be partly resolved by placing the child early in a pre-school which faithfully reproduces the ambience for her own child-rearing. Thus the middle-class mother in a context of personalised organic solidarity provides the model for the pre-school infant school teacher. The pre-school, however, amplifies the messages, and wishes to extend them in time. Here we can see a second contradiction, for such an amplification brings the middle-class mother and the school into conflict. The public examination system is based upon a visible pedagogy as it is realised through strong classification and strong frames. It is this pedagogy which transmits symbolic property. If access to visible pedagogy is delayed too long, then examination success may be considered to be in danger. We have now made explicit three assumptions underlying the invisible pedagogy. There is a fourth. The size of the class of pupils is likely to be small and the teacher-pupil ratio very favourable.

1. It presupposes a middle-class conception of educational time.
2. It presupposes an elaborated code of communication.
3. It presupposes a middle-class mother who is an agent of cultural reproduction.
4. It presupposes a small class of pupils.

Thus the social significance of the invisible pedagogy will be crucially different according to the social class of the child.

We started this section by abstracting the following points from our initial discussion of the invisible pedagogy:

1. The invisible pedagogy is an interrupter system both in relation to the home and in relation to other levels of the educational hierarchy.
2. It transforms the privatised social structure and cultural contexts of visible pedagogies into a personalised social structure and personalised cultural contexts.
3. It believes that implicit nurture reveals unique nature.

We have argued that this pedagogy is one of the realisations of the conflict between the old and the new middle class, which in turn has its social basis in the two different forms of organic solidarity,
individualised and personalised; that these two forms of solidarity arise out of differences in the relation to the division of labour within the middle class; that the movement from individualised to personalised interrupts the form of the reproduction of class relationships; that such an interruption gives rise to different forms of primary socialisation within the middle class; that the form of primary socialisation within the middle class is the model for primary socialisation into the school; that there are contradictions within personalised organic solidarity which create deeply felt ambiguities; as a consequence, the outcomes of the form of the socialisation are less certain. The contemporary new middle class is unique for in the socialisation of their young is a sharp and penetrating contradiction between a subjective personal identity and an objective privatised identity; between the release of the person and the hierarchy of class.

Whereas it is possible for school and university to change the basis of its solidarity from individualistic to personalised, i.e. to relax its classification and frames, it is more difficult for those agencies to change their privatising function, i.e. the creation of knowledge as private property. It by no means follows that a shift to personalised organic solidarity will change the privatising function. Indeed, even the shift in the form of solidarity is more likely to occur in that part of the educational system which either creates no private property, as in the case of the education of the lower working class, or in the education of the very young. We are then left with the conclusion that the major effects of this change in solidarity will be in the areas of condensed communication (sex, art, style) and in the form of social control (from explicit to implicit).

### Transition to School

a) **Class Culture Power and Conflict**

The shift from visible to invisible pedagogies at the pre- and primary levels of education changes the relationships between the family and the school. We have already noted the ambiguous attitude of the middle class to such a shift. In the case of the working class, the change is more radical. The weak classification and the weak framing of the invisible pedagogy potentially makes possible the inclusion of the culture of the family and the community. Thus the experience of the child and his everyday world could be psychologically active in the classroom, and if this were to be the case, then the school would legitimise rather than reject the class-culture of the family. In as much as
the pacing of the knowledge to be transmitted is relaxed and the emphasis upon early attainment of specific competencies is reduced, then the progression is less marked by middle-class assumptions. In the case of visible pedagogies early reading and especially writing is essential. Once the child can read and write such acts free the teacher; but of more importance, once the child can read he can be given a book, and once he is given a book he is well on the way to managing the role of the solitary privatised educational relationship. The book is the preparation for receiving the past realised in the textbook. And the textbook in turn tacitly transmits the ideology of the collection code, for it epitomises strong classification and strong frames. The textbook orders knowledge according to an explicit progression: it provides explicit criteria, it removes uncertainties and announces hierarchy. It gives the child an immediate index of where he stands in relation to others in the progression. It is therefore a silent medium for creating competitive relationships. Thus socialisation into the textbook is a critical step towards socialisation into the collection code. The stronger the collection code, that is the stronger classification and frames, the greater the emphasis on early reading and writing. The middle-class child is prepared for this emphasis, but not so in the case of the working-class child. The weakening of classification and frames reduces the significance of the textbook and transforms the impersonal past into a personalised present. It would appear that the invisible pedagogy carries a beneficial potential for working-class children. However, because the form we are discussing has its origins in a fraction of the middle class, this potential may not be actualised.

This point we will now develop. From the point of view of working-class parents, the visible pedagogy of the collection code at the primary level is immediately understandable. The basic competencies which it is transmitting of reading, writing and counting, in an ordered explicit sequence, make sense. The failures of the children are the children's failures, not the school's, for the school is apparently carrying out its function impersonally. The school's form of social control does not interfere with the social control of the family. The infant school teacher will not necessarily have high status, as the competencies she is transmitting are, in principle, possible also for the mother. In this sense there is symbolic continuity (or rather extension) between the working-class home and the school. However, in the case of the invisible pedagogy, there is possibly a sharp discontinuity. The competencies and their progression disappear, the form of social control may well be at variance with the home. The theory of the invisible pedagogy may not be
known by the mother or be imperfectly understood. The lack of stress on competencies may render the child a less effective (useful) member of the family, e.g. running errands, etc. However, there is a more fundamental source of tension. The invisible pedagogy contains a different theory of transmission and a new technology, which views the mother's own informal teaching, where it occurs, or the mother's pedagogical values, as irrelevant if not downright harmful. There are new reading schemes, new mathematics replace arithmetic, an expressive aesthetic style replaces one which aims at facsimile. If the mother is to be helpful, she must be resocialised or kept out of the way. If it is the former or the latter, then the power relationships have changed between home and school: for the teacher has the power and the mother is as much a pupil as the pupil. This in turn may disturb the authority relationships within the home: this disturbance is further facilitated by the use of implicit forms of social control of the school. Even if the pedagogy draws its contents from the class culture, basic forms of discontinuity still exist. If the mother wishes to understand the theory of the invisible pedagogy, then she may well find herself at the mercy of complex theories of child development. Indeed, whichever way the working-class mother turns, the teacher has the power: although the mother may well be deeply suspicious of the whole ambience.(1)

Where, as in the case of the visible pedagogy there are, for the working class, relative to the middle class, implicit forms of discontinuity and explicit forms of inequality in the shape of the holding power of the school over its teachers, the size of class and possibly streaming, in the case of the invisible pedagogy, there is also an explicit symbolic discontinuity which may well go with inequalities in provision and quality of teaching staff. The teacher also has difficulties, because the invisible pedagogy presupposes a particular form of maternal primary socialisation and a small class of pupils and a particular architecture. Where these are absent, the teacher may well find great difficulty. Ideally, the invisible pedagogy frees the teacher so that time is available for ameliorating the difficulties of any one child, but if the class is large, the socialisation, from the point of view of the school, inadequate, the architecture inappropriate, then such individual assistance becomes infrequent and problematic. Here again we can see that such a pedagogy, if it is to be successfully implemented in its own terms, necessarily requires minimally the same physical conditions

1) This does not mean that all teachers wish to have the power or use it.
of the middle-class school. It is an expensive pedagogy because it is derived from an expensive class: the middle class.

From the point of view of the middle class, there is at least an intellectual understanding of the invisible pedagogy if not always an acceptance of its values and practice. Further, if the middle-class child is not obtaining the basic competencies at the rate the mother expects, an educational support system can be organised through private coaching or through the mother's own efforts. The power relationship, between the middle-class mother and the teacher are less tipped in favour of the teacher. Finally, the middle-class mother always has the choice of the private school or of moving near a state school of her choice. However, because of the middle-class mother's concept of the function of secondary education, she is likely to be anxious about the acquisition of basic competencies and this will bring her into conflict with the school at some point.

Finally, in as much as age and sex statuses within the family are strongly classified and ritualised, then it is likely that the acquisition, progression and evaluation of competencies obtained within the school will become part of the markers of age and sex status within the family. For example, there is a radical change in the status and concept of the child when he is transformed into a pupil. Now to the extent that the infant/primary school fails to utilise age and sex as allocating categories either for the acquisition and progression of competence or for the allocation of pupils to groups and spaces, then the school is weakening the function of these categories in the family and community. Visible pedagogies not only reinforce age and sex classification, they also provide markers for progression within them. Invisible pedagogies are likely to weaken such classifications and in as much as they do this they transform the concept of the child and the concepts of age and sex status.

b) Class, Pedagogy and Evaluation

Interesting questions arise over the system of evaluating the pupils. Where the pedagogy is visible an "objective" grid exists for the evaluation of the pupils in the form of (a) clear criteria and (b) a delicate measurement procedure. The child receives a grade or its equivalent for any valued performance. Further, where the pedagogy is visible, it is likely to be standardized and so schools are directly comparable as to their successes and failures. The profile of the pupil may be obtained by looking across his grades. The pupil knows where he is, the teacher knows where he is and so do the parents. The parents have a yardstick for comparing schools. When children change schools they can be slotted
into place according to their academic profile. Further, it is difficult for the parent to argue about the profile for it is "objective". Clearly, there are subjective elements in the grading of the children, but these are masked by the apparent objectivity of the grid. In the case of invisible pedagogies, no such grid exists. The evaluation procedures are multiple, diffuse and not easily subject to apparently precise measurement. This makes comparison between pupils complex and also comparisons between schools. (1) Firstly, the invisible pedagogy does not give rise to progression of a group, but is based upon progression of a person. Secondly, there is likely to be considerable variation between infant/pre-school groups within the general form of the pedagogy. There is less difficulty in slotting a child into a new school because there is no explicit slot for him. Thus the mother is less able to diagnose the child's progress and as a consequence she cannot provide specific educational support. She would be forced into providing a general educational milieu in the home and this she may only be able to do if she had fully internalised the invisible pedagogy's theoretical basis. As we have previously argued, this is less likely to be the case where the parents are working class. Thus these parents are cut off from the evaluation of their child's progress. More, they are forced to accept what the teacher counts as progress.

Because an apparently objective grid exists for the evaluation of the visible pedagogies, then this grid acts selectively on those dispositions of the child which become candidates for labelling by the teacher. Clearly motivation and interest are probably relevant to any pedagogy, but their significance will vary with the pedagogy, and certainly their consequences. In the case of visible pedagogies, the behaviour of the child is focused on the teacher so that, in this case, attentiveness to, co-operation with, the teacher become relevant; persistence and carefulness are also valued by the teacher. Further, it is possible for there to be a conflict between the child's academic profile and the teacher's evaluation of his attitudes and motivation. These objective and subjective criteria may have different consequences for different class groups of pupils. Either criteria, irrespective of their validity, are likely to be understood by working-class parents. In the case of invisible pedagogy, as more of the child is made available, and, because of the theory which guides interpretation, diagnosis and evaluation, a different class of acts and dispositions of the child become relevant. In the case of visible pedagogies we have argued that the attention of the child is

(1) Paradoxically, this situation carries a potential for increasing competitiveness.
Focus on the teacher; however, in the case of invisible pedagogies the attention of the teacher is focused on the whole child: in its total doing and "not doing". This can lead to discrepancies between the teacher and parents' view of the child unless the parents share the teacher's theory. Indeed, it is possible that the dispositions and acts which are subject to evaluation by the teacher may be considered by some parents as irrelevant or intrusive or inaccurate or all three. Where this occurs the child's behaviour is being shaped by conflicting criteria. From the point of view of the teacher, the child becomes an innovating message to the home. The invisible pedagogy is not only an interrupter system in the context of educational practice, but it also transforms the child, under certain conditions, into an innovating message to the family.

This pedagogy is likely to lead to a change in the school's procedures of evaluation, both objective and subjective. Where the pedagogy is visible, there is a profile which consists of the grading of specific competencies and a profile which consists of the grading of the child's motivation and work attitudes. It is likely that the latter will consist of rather short, somewhat stereotyped unexplained judgements. In the case of invisible pedagogies, these highly condensed, unexplained but public judgements are likely to be replaced by something resembling a dossier which will range across a wide variety of the child's internal processes and states and his external acts. Further, the connection between inner and outer is likely to be made explicit. In other words, there is likely to be an explicit elaborated account of the relationship between the child's internal states and his acts. It is now possible that the school will have a problem of secrecy. How much is to go into the dossier, where is it to be kept, how much of and in what way is its contents to be made available to parents or to others in the school and outside of it? Thus invisible pedagogies may also generate covert and overt forms and contents of evaluation. Such a system of evaluation increases the power of the teacher to the extent that its underlying theory is not shared by parents and even when it is shared.

Finally, the major analysis in this section has been of idealised pedagogies. If, however, the argument is correct, that there may be a disjunction in the forms of socialisation between primary and secondary stages, or between secondary and tertiary stages, then behind weak classification and weak frames may well be strong classification and strong frames. Thus we can have a situation where strong Cs and Fs follow weak Cs and Fs, or where weak Cs and Fs follow strong Cs and Fs as, possibly, in the case of the training of infant school teachers in England. It is important not only to understand continuity in the strength of
It is more than likely that if we examine empirically invisible pedagogies we shall find to different degrees a stress on the transmission of specific isolated competencies. Thus the "hidden curriculum" of invisible pedagogies may well be, embryonically, strong classification, albeit with relatively weak frames. It becomes a matter of some importance to find out which children or groups of children are particularly responsive to this "hidden curriculum". For some children may come to see or be led to see that there are two transmissions, one overt, the other covert, which stand in a figure-ground relation to each other. We need to know for which teachers, and for which children, what is the figure and what is the ground. Specifically, will middle-class children respond to the latent visible pedagogy, or are they more likely to be selected as receivers? Will lower working-class children respond more to the invisible pedagogy or receive a weaker form of the transmission of visible pedagogy? The "hidden curriculum" of invisible pedagogies may well be a visible pedagogy. However, the outcomes of the embedding of one pedagogy in the other are likely to be different than in the case of the transmission of any one pedagogy. From a more theoretical standpoint, the crucial component of visible pedagogy is the strength of its classification, for in the last analysis, it is this which creates what counts as valued property, and also in doing regulates mental structures. Frame strength regulates the modality of the socialisation into the classification. In the microcosm of the nursery or infant class, we can see embryonically the new forms of transmission of class relationships.

Let us take a concrete example to illustrate the above speculation. An infant school teacher in England may experience the following conjunctions or disjunctions in her socialisation:

1. Between socialisation in the family and between primary and secondary school.
2. Between secondary school and teacher training. The higher the qualifications required by the college of education, the more likely that the socialisation in the later years of the secondary school will be through strong classification and frames. On the other hand, the socialisation into the college of education may well be into classification and frames of varying strengths.

Transition between Stages of Education

We have examined aspects of the transition to school; there is also the question of transition between stages of education, from pre-school to primary, from primary to secondary. These transitions between stages are marked by three inter-related features:
1. An increase in the strength of classification and frames (initiation into the collective code).

2. An increase in the range of different teachers; that is, the pupil is made aware of the insulations within the division of labor. He also learns that the principle of authority transcends the individuals who hold it, for as teachers/subjects change his role remains the same.

3. The weak classification and frames of the invisible pedagogy emphasize the importance of ways of knowing, of constructing problems, whereas the strong classification and frames of visible pedagogies emphasize states of knowledge and received problems. Thus there is a crucial change in what counts as having knowledge, in what counts as a legitimate realization of that knowledge and in the social context.

Thus the shift from invisible to visible pedagogies in one phrase is a change in code; a change in the principles of relation and evaluation whether these are principles of knowledge, of social relationships, of practices, of property, of identity.

It is likely that this change of code will be more effectively made (despite the difficulties) by the new middle class children as their own socialization within the family contains both codes—the code which creates the manifestation of the person and the code which creates private property. Further, as we have argued elsewhere, it is more likely that the working class children will experience continuity in code between stages of education. The class bias of the collection code (which creates a visible pedagogy) may make such a transmission difficult for them to receive and exploit. As a consequence, the continuation of the invisible pedagogy in the form of an integrated code is likely for working class children, and its later institutionalization for the same children at the secondary level.

We can now begin to see that the conditions for continuity of educational code for all children, irrespective of class, is the type of code transmitted by the university. Simply expanding the university, increasing differentiation within the tertiary level, equalizing opportunity of access and outcome will not fundamentally change the situation at levels below. We will only have expanded the size of the cohort at the tertiary level. From another point of view, although we may have changed the organizational structure we have not changed the code controlling transmission; the process of reproduction will not be fundamentally affected. To change the code controlling transmission involves changing the culture and its basis in privatised class relationships. Thus if we accept, for the sake of argument, the greater educational value of invisible pedagogies, of weak
classification and frames, the condition for their effective and total institutionalisation at the secondary level is a fundamental change of code at the tertiary level. If this does not occur then codes and class will remain firmly linked in schools.

Finally, we can raise a basic question. The movement to invisible pedagogies realised through integrated codes may be seen as a superficial solution to a more stubborn problem. Integrated codes are integrated at the level of ideas, they do not involve integration at the level of institutions, i.e. between school and work. Yet the crucial integration is precisely between the principles of education and the principles of work. There can be no such integration in Western societies (to mention only one group) because the work epitomises class relationships. Work can only be brought into the school in terms of the function of the school as a selective mechanism or in terms of social/psychological adjustment to work. Indeed, the abstracting of education from work, the hallmark of the liberal tradition, or the linkage of education to leisure, masks the brutal fact that work and education cannot be integrated at the level of social principles in class societies. They can either be separated or they can fit with each other. Durkheim wrote that changes in pedagogy were indicators of a moral crisis; they can also disguise it and change its form. However, in as much as the move to weak classification and frames has the potential of reducing insulations in mental structures and social structures, has the potential of making explicit the implicit and so creating greater ambiguity but less disguise, then such a code has the potential of making visible fundamental social contradictions.
NOTE I

This raises a number of questions. We cannot consider skills abstracted from the context of their transmission, from their relationships to each other and their function in creating, maintaining, modifying or changing a culture. Skills and their relationship to each other are culturally specific competences. The manner of their transmission and acquisition socialises the child into their contextual usages. Thus, the unit of analysis cannot simply be an abstracted specific competence like reading, writing, counting, but the structure of social relationships which produces these specialised competencies. The formulation "where there is a reduced emphasis upon transmission and acquisition of specific skills" could be misleading, as it suggests that in the context under discussion there are few specialised repertoires of the culture. It may be better to interpret the formulation as indicating an emphasis upon the inter-relationship between skills which are relatively weakly classified and weakly framed. In this way any skill or sets of skills are referred to the general features of the socialisation.

NOTE II

We regard the new middle class as being represented by those who are the new agents of symbolic control, e.g. those who are filling the ever expanding major and minor professional class, concerned with the servicing of persons. We are not saying that all occupants are active members of the new middle class, but that there is a structural change in the culture which is shaping their transmission. It is a matter of empirical research to identify specifically which groups, concerned with what symbolic controls, who are active representatives. In earlier papers I suggested that there were two forms of an elaborated code, object/person and that these were evoked by different class-based forms of family socialisation, positional and personal. It is now possible, at least theoretically, to show that such families vary as to the strength of their classification and frames and that such variation itself arises out of different forms of the transmission of class relationships and represents an ideological conflict within the middle class.
It is a matter of some interest to consider changes in emphasis of research methodologies over recent decades. There has been a shift from the standardized, closed questionnaire or experimental context to more unstructured contexts and relationships. It is argued that the former methodology renders irrelevant the subjective meanings of those who are the object of study. In so doing, the researched offer their experience through the media of the researchers' imposed strong classification and strong frames. Further, it is argued that such a method of studying people is derived from a method for the study of objects and therefore it is an outrage to the subjectivity of man for him to be transformed into an object. These arguments go on to link positivist methods with the political control of man through the use of the technology of social science. The new methodology employs apparently weak classification and weak frames, but it uses techniques (participant observation, tape-recordings, video tapes, etc.), which enable more of the researched to be visible, and its techniques allow a range of others to witness the spontaneous behaviour of the observed. Even if these public records of natural behaviour are treated as a means of dialogue between the recorded and the recorder, this dialogue is, itself, subject to the disjunction between intellectual perspectives which will shape the communication. The self-editing of the researcher's communication is different from that of the researched, and this is the invisible control. On the other hand, paradoxically, in the case of a closed questionnaire the privacy of the subject is safeguarded for all that can be made public is a pencil mark which is transformed into an impersonal score. Further, the methods of this transformation must be made public so that its assumptions may be criticised. In the case of the new methodology, the principles used to restrict the vast amount of information and the number of channels are often implicit. One might say that we could distinguish research methodologies in terms of whether they created invisible or visible pedagogies. Thus the former give rise to a total surveillance of the person, who, relative to the latter, makes public more of his inside (e.g. his subjectivity) which is evaluated through the use of diffuse, implicit criteria. We are suggesting that the structural origins of changes in the classification and framing of forms of socialisation may perhaps also influence the selection of research methodologies. The morality of the research relationships transcends the dilemmas of a particular researcher. Research methodologies in social science are themselves elements of culture.
It is interesting to see, for example, where the invisible pedagogy first entered the secondary school curriculum. In England, we would suggest that it first penetrated the non-verbal area of unselective secondary schools. The area which is considered to be the least relevant (in the sense of not producing symbolic property) and the most strongly classified: the area of the art room. Indeed, it might be said that until very recently the greatest symbolic continuity of pedagogies between primary and secondary stages lay in the non-verbal areas of the curriculum. The art room is often viewed by the rest of the staff as an area of relaxation or even therapy, rather than a space of crucial production. Because of its strong classification and irrelevance (except at school "show-off" periods) this space is potentially open to change. Art teachers are trained in institutions (at least in recent times) which are very sensitive to innovation and therefore new styles are likely to be rapidly institutionalised in schools, given the strong classification of art in the secondary school curriculum, and also the belief that the less able child can at least do something with his hands even if he finds difficulty with a pen. We might also anticipate that with the interest in such musical forms as pop on the one hand and Cage and Stockhausen on the other, music departments might move towards the invisible pedagogy. To complete the direction in the non-verbal area, it is possible that the transformation of physical training into physical education might also extend to movement. If this development took place, then the non-verbal areas would be realised through the invisible pedagogy. We might then expect a drive to integrate the three areas of sight, sound and movement; three modalities would then be linked through a common code.

We can clarify the issues raised in this paper in the following way. Any socialising context must consist of a transmitter and an acquirer. These two form a matrix in the sense that the communication is regulated by a structural principle. We have suggested that the underlying principle of a socialising matrix is realised in classification and frames. The relationship between the two and the strengths show us the structure of the control and the form of communication. We can, of course, analyse this matrix in a number of ways.
1. We can focus upon the transmitter.

2. We can focus upon the acquirer.

3. We can focus upon the principles underlying the matrix.

4. We can focus upon a given matrix and ignore its relationship to other matrices.

5. We can consider the relationships between critical matrices, e.g. family, peer group, school, work.

We can go on to ask questions about the function of a matrix and questions about the change in the form of its realisation, i.e. changes in the strength of its classification and frames. We believe that the unit of analysis must always be the matrix and the matrix will always include the theories and methods of its analysis (see Note II on research methodology). Now any one matrix can be regarded as a reproducer, an interrupter, or a change matrix. A reproduction matrix will attempt to create strong classification and strong frames. An interrupter matrix changes the form of transmission, but not the critical relationship between matrices. A change matrix leads to a fundamental change in the structural relationship between matrices. This will require a major change in the institutional structure. For example, we have argued that within the middle class there is a conflict which has generated two distinct socialising matrices, one a reproducer, the other an interrupter. And these matrices are at work within education for similar groups of children up to possibly the primary stage, and different groups of pupils at the secondary stage. However, in as much as the structural relationship between school and work is unchanged (i.e. there has been no change in the basic principles of their relationship) then we cannot by this argument see current differences in educational pedagogy as representing a change matrix. In other words, the form of the reproduction of class relationships in education has been interrupted but not changed. We might speculate that ideological conflict within the middle class takes the form of a conflict between the symbolic outcomes of reproduction and interruption matrices. If one takes the argument one stage further, we have to consider the reproduction of the change in the form of class relationships. In this case, the reproduction of an interrupter matrix is through weak classification and weak frames. However, it is possible that such a form of reproduction may at some point evoke its own interrupter i.e. an increase in either classification or frame strength, or both.
The Coding of Objects

The concepts of classification and frame can be used to interpret communication between objects. In other words, objects and their relationships to each other constitute a message system whose code can be stated in terms of the relationship between classification and frames of different strengths.

We can consider:

1. The strength of the rules of exclusion which control the array of objects in a space. Thus the stronger the rules of exclusion the more distinctive the array of objects in the space; that is, the greater the difference between object arrays in different spaces.

2. The extent to which objects in the array can enter into different relationships to each other.

Now the stronger the rules of exclusion the stronger the classification of objects in that space and the greater the difference between object arrays in different spaces. In the same way in which we discussed relationships between subjects we can discuss the relationships between object arrays in different spaces. Thus the stronger the classification, the more the object arrays resemble a collection code; the weaker the classification, the more the object arrays resemble an integrated code. The greater the number of different relationships objects in the array can enter into with each other, the weaker their framing. The fewer the number of different relationships objects in the array can enter into with each other, the stronger their framing.

1) If the objects in the array can be called lexical items, then the syntax is their relationships to each other. A restricted code is a syntax with few choices; an elaborated code a syntax which generates a large number of choices.
We would expect that the social distribution of power and the principles of control be reflected in the coding of objects. This code may be made more delicate if we take into account:

1. The number of objects in the array.
2. The rate of change of the array.

We can have strong classification with a large or a small number of objects. We can have strong classification of large or small arrays where the array is fixed across time or where the array varies across time. Consider, for example, two arrays which are strongly classified: a late Victorian middle-class living-room and a middle 20th century trendy middle-class "space" in Hampstead. The Victorian room is likely to contain a very large number of objects whereas the middle-class room is likely to contain a small number of objects. In one case the object array is foreground and the space background, whereas in the second case the space is a vital component of the array. The Victorian room represents both strong classification and strong framing. Further, whilst objects may be added to the array, its fundamental characteristics would remain constant over a relatively long time period. The Hampstead room is likely to contain a small array which would indicate strong classification (strong rules of exclusion) but the objects are likely to enter into a variety of relationships with each other; this would indicate weak framing. Further, it is possible that the array would be changed across time according to fashion.

We can now see that if we are to consider classification (C), we need to know:

1. Whether it is strong or weak.
2. Whether the array is small or large (x).
3. Whether the array is fixed or variable (y).

At the level of frame (F) we need to know:

Whether it is strong or weak (p); that is, whether the coding is restricted or elaborated.

It is also important to indicate in the specification of the code the context (c) to which it applies. We should also indicate the nature of the array by adding the concept realisation (r). Thus, the most abstract formulation of the object code would be as follows:

\[ f(c, r, C(x,y), F(p)) \]

The code is some unspecified function of the variables enclosed in the brackets.

It is important to note that because the classification is weak it does not mean that there is less control. Indeed, from this point of view it is not possible to talk about amount of control; only of its modality. This point we will now develop.
Classification, Frames and Modalities of Control

Imagine four lavatories. The first is stark, bare, pristine, the walls are painted a sharp white; the washbowl is like the apparatus, a gleaming white. A square block of soap sits cleanly in an indentation in the sink. A white towel (or perhaps pink) is folded neatly on a chrome rail or hangs from a chrome ring. The lavatory paper is hidden in a cover and peeps through its slit. In the second lavatory there are books on a shelf and some relaxing of the rigours of the first. In the third lavatory there are books on the shelf, pictures on the wall and perhaps a scattering of tiny objects. In the fourth lavatory the rigour is totally relaxed. The walls are covered with a motley array of postcards, there is a various assortment of reading matter and curio. The lavatory room is likely to be uncovered and the holder may well fall apart in use.

We can say that as we move from the first to the fourth lavatory we are moving from a strongly classified to a weakly classified space: from a space regulated by strong rules of exclusion to a space regulated by weak rules of exclusion. Now if the rules of exclusion are strong then the space is strongly marked off from other spaces in the house or flat. The boundary between the spaces or rooms is sharp. If the rules of exclusion are strong, the boundaries well marked, then it follows that there must be strong boundary maintainers (authority). If things are to be kept apart then there must be some strong hierarchy to ensure the apartness of things. Further, the first lavatory constructs a space where pollution is highly visible. In as much as a user leaves a personal mark (a failure to replace the towel in its original position, a messy bar of soap, scum in the washbowl, lavatory paper floating in the bowl, etc.) this constitutes pollution and such pollution is quickly perceived. Thus the criteria for competent usage of the space are both explicit and specific.

So far we have been discussing aspects of classification; we shall now consider framing.

Whereas classification tells us about the structure of relationships in space, framing tells us about the structure of relationships in time. Framing refers to interaction, to the power relationships of interaction; that is, framing refers us to communication. Now in the case of our lavatories, framing here would refer to the communication between the occupants of the space and those outside of the space. Such communication is normally strongly framed by a door usually equipped with a lock. We suggest that as we move from the strongly classified to the weakly classified lavatory, despite the potential insulation between inside and outside, there will occur a reduction in frame strength. In the case of the first lavatory we suggest that the door will always be closed and after entry
will be locked. Ideally no effects on the inside should be heard on the outside. Indeed, a practised user of this lavatory will acquire certain competencies in order to meet this requirement. However, in the case of the most weakly classified lavatory, we suggest that the door will normally be open; it may even be that the lock will not function. It would not be considered untoward for a conversation to develop or even be continued either side of the door. A practised user of this most weakly classified and weakly framed lavatory will acquire certain communicative competencies rather different from those required for correct use of the strongly classified one.

We have already noted that lavatory one creates a space where pollution is highly visible, where criteria for behaviour are explicit and specific, where the social basis of the authority maintaining the strong classification and frames is hierarchical. Yet it is also the case that such classification and frames create a private although impersonal space. For providing that the classification and framing is not violated the user of the space is beyond surveillance.

However, when we consider lavatory four which has the weakest classification and weakest frames it seems at first sight that such a structure celebrates weak control. There appear to be few rules regulating what goes into a space and few rules regulating communication between spaces. Therefore it is difficult to consider what counts as a violation or pollution. Indeed, it would appear that such a classification and framing relationship facilitates the development of spontaneous behaviour. Let us consider this possibility.

Lavatory one is predicated on the rule "things must be kept apart" by they persons, acts, objects, communication, and the stronger the classification and frames the greater the insulation, the stronger the boundaries between classes of persons, acts, objects, communications. Lavatory four is predicated on the rule that approximates to "things must be put together". As a consequence, we would find objects in the space that could be found in other spaces. Further, there is a more relaxed marking off of the space and communication is possible between inside and outside. We have as yet not discovered the fundamental principles of violation.

Imagine one user, who, seeing the motley array and being sensitive to what he or she takes to be a potential of the space, decides to add to the array and places an additional postcard on the wall. It is possible that a little later a significant adult might say "Darling, that's beautiful but it doesn't quite fit" or "How lovely, but wouldn't it be
better a little higher up?" In other words, we are suggesting that the array has a principle, that the apparently motley collection is ordered but that the principle is implicit and although it is not easily discoverable it is capable of being violated. Indeed, it might take our user a very long time to infer the tacit principle and generate choices in accordance with it. Without knowledge of the principle our user is unlikely to make appropriate choices and such choices may require a long period of socialisation. In the case of lavatory one no principle is required; all that is needed is the following of the command "Leave the space as you found it".

Now let us examine the weak framing in more detail. We suggest that locking the door, avoiding or ignoring communication, would count as violation; indeed anything which would offend the principle of things must be put together. However, in as much as the framing between inside and outside is weak then it is also the case that the user is potentially or indirectly under continuous surveillance, in which case there is no privacy. Here we have a social context which at first sight appears to be very relaxed, which promotes and provokes the expression of the person, "do your own thing" space where highly personal choices may be offered, where hierarchy is not explicit yet on analysis we find that it is based upon a form of implicit control which carries the potential of total surveillance. Such a form of implicit control encourages more of the person to be made manifest yet such manifestations are subject to continuous screening and general rather than specific criteria. At the level of classification the pollution is "keeping things apart"; at the level of framing the violation is "withholding"; that is, not offering, not making visible the self.

If things are to be put together which were once set apart, then there must be some principle of the new relationships, but this principle cannot be mechanically applied and therefore cannot be mechanically learned. In the case of the rule "things must be kept apart", then the apartness of things is something which is clearly marked and taken for granted in the process of initial socialisation. The social basis of the categories of apartness is implicit but the social basis of the authority is explicit. In the process of such socialisation the insulation between things is a condensed message about the all-pervasiveness of the authority. It may require many years before the social basis of the principles underlying the category system is made fully explicit and by that time the mental structure is well-initiated into the classification and frames. Strong classification and frames celebrate the reproduction of the past.
When the rule is "things must be put together" we have an interruption of a previous order, and what is of issue is the authority (power relationships) which underpin it. Therefore the rule "things must be put together" celebrates the present over the past, the subjective over the objective, the personal over the positional. Indeed when everything is put together we have a total organic principle which covers all aspects of life but which admits of a vast range of combinations and re-combinations. This points to a very abstract or general principle from which a vast range of possibilities may be derived so that individuals can both register personal choices and have knowledge when a combination is not in accordance with the principle. What is taken for granted when the rule is "things must be kept apart" is relationships which themselves are made explicit when the rule is "things must be put together". They are made explicit by the weak classification and frames. But the latter creates a form of implicit but potentially continuous surveillance and at the same time promotes the making public of the self in a variety of ways. We arrive finally at the conclusion that the conditions for the release of the person are the absence of explicit hierarchy but the presence of a more intensified form of social interaction which creates continuous but invisible screening. From the point of view of the socialised they would be offering novel, spontaneous combinations.

Empirical Note

It is possible to examine the coding of objects from two perspectives. We can analyse the coding of overt or visible arrays and we can compare the code with the codings of covert or invisible arrays (e.g., drawers, cupboards, refrigerators, basements, closets, handbags, etc.). We can also compare the coding of verbal messages with the coding of non-verbal messages. It would be interesting to carry out an empirical study of standardized spaces, e.g., L.E.A. housing estates, M.C. suburban "town" house estate, modern blocks of flats, formal educational spaces which vary in their architecture and in the pedagogy.

I am well aware that the lavatory may not be seen as a space to be specially contrived and so subject to special regulation in the sense discussed. Some lavatories are not subject to the principles I have outlined. Indeed, some may be casually treated spaces, where pieces of newspaper may be stuffed behind a convenient pipe, where the door does not close or lock, where apparatus has low efficiency, and where sound effects are taken-for-granted events.
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