Five papers intended to serve as an introduction to a complex and rapidly growing body of research are included in this volume. These papers represent the work of scholars who have studied the problem of white flight long before the current controversy over urban desegregation plans made it a national issue. Starting from very different assumptions, the participants at the symposium are in agreement on two basic points: (1) most white flight is not caused by school desegregation plans, and (2) metropolitan plans would produce the most stable desegregation. The remaining debate, particularly focusing on the impact, if any, of desegregation plans on increasing white flight is the basic focus of this collection. The contents include the following: school integration 'tipping' in Mississippi; the importance, perplexities, and possible policy implications of white flight research; and the role of the courts in school desegregation and white flight. (Author/AM)
Symposium on
School Desegregation
and White Flight

August, 1975

Contributors:
Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan
Micheal W. Giles, Everett F. Cataldo, Douglas S. Gatlin, Florida Atlantic University
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Co-Sponsored By:
Center for National Policy Review
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Washington, D.C. 20064

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University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

This symposium was organized with assistance from the National Institute of Education. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed at the conference or in the individual papers presented do not necessarily reflect the views of NIE.
FOREWORD

The Center for National Policy Review is a privately fund-
ed public interest law group providing research and legal repre-
sentation to organizations seeking to improve enforcement of
civil rights laws. Current areas of interest and activity in-
clude school integration, equal opportunity in obtaining mort-
gage credit, housing opportunity for low and moderate income
families and protecting the interests of the poor and minorities
in the operation of federal revenue sharing programs. The Notre
Dame Center for Civil Rights, also privately funded, engages in
research of recent civil rights history, analyzes current civil
rights issues and seeks viable solutions to civil rights prob-
lems.

As sponsors of the Symposium on School Desegregation and White
Flight, we are indebted to the panelists and participants, the
National Institute of Education and Gary Orfield, the editor of
this volume. Our hope and belief is that the research findings
discussed at the Symposium and presented here make an important
contribution to public understanding on an issue long clouded by
rumor and supposition.

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William L. Taylor
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The papers in this volume were prepared with remarkable speed and care by a group of scholars working on the problem of white flight long before the current controversy over urban desegregation plans made it a national issue. The papers are intended to introduce the reader to a complex and rapidly growing body of research.

Since the time of the symposium the editor has encountered additional excellent research still in preparation for publication. Particularly impressive is the work of Professor Christine Rossell of Boston University, Professor Jane Mercer of the University of California at Riverside, and Professor Charles Clotfelter of the University of Maryland. Other research and analysis in this area have been done by Charles V. Willie, Harvard University; Meyer Weinberg, Integrated Education; and Robert L. Green, Michigan State University.

Starting from very different assumptions, the participants at our symposium, including Professor Coleman together with most other researchers are in agreement on two basic points: (1) most white flight is not caused by school desegregation plans and (2) metropolitan plans would produce the most stable desegregation. The remaining debate, particularly focusing on the impact, if any, of desegregation plans on increasing white flight is the basic focus of this collection. Individual scholars also, of course, hold very different views about the way these findings should affect national policy. Professor Coleman's study was recently published by the Urban Institute in Washington and is available from the publisher.

Gary Orfield
SYMPOSIUM ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND WHITE FLIGHT

Co-sponsored by the Center for National Policy Review, Catholic University Law School, Washington, D.C. 20064 and the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

August 15, 1975

Held at the facilities of The Brookings Institution Washington, D.C.

AGENDA

10:00-10:15 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
William Taylor, Center for National Policy Review
Ray Rist, National Institute of Education
Gary Orfield, Brookings Institution

10:15-11:00 CASE STUDIES
Micheal Giles, Florida Atlantic University
Luther Munford, University of Virginia Law School

11:00-11:45 NATIONAL DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan
James Coleman, University of Chicago

11:45-12:00 COFFEE BREAK

12:00-12:45 NATIONAL DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS con't
Marshall Smith, National Institute of Education
Gary Orfield, Brookings Institution

12:45-1:30 THE COURTS, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND WHITE FLIGHT
Panel:
J. Harold Flannery, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
William Taylor, Center for National Policy Review

This symposium was organized with assistance from the National Institute of Education. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed at the conference or in the individual papers presented do not necessarily reflect the views of NIE.
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SCHOOL INTEGRATION AND WHITE FLIGHT

Reynolds Farley
University of Michigan
Introduction

This summer Professor Coleman has been cited for demonstrating that school integration policies, particularly busing, have been ineffective. He has argued that once schools in a large city are racially integrated, white parents move to the suburbs or enroll their children in private schools. Professor Coleman's findings appear to support the thesis that "white flight" is an inevitable result of school integration. This led analysts and commentators to conclude that courts and federal agencies should be less active in overturning school segregation and should not order busing.

This paper reviews findings of recent studies of school segregation and then tests the idea that school integration is a major cause of white flight from the nation's largest cities. Finally, busing and other techniques for integration are discussed.

What Do We Know about Trends in School Segregation?

During the last two decades many studies of school segregation have been completed (Pettigrew, 1957; Pettigrew and Cramer, 1959; Matthews and Prothro, 1964; Stinchcombe, McDill and Walker, 1968; Crain, 1968; Kirby, et al., 1973; Crain, et al., 1973; Farley and Taeuber, 1974; Zolotch, 1974; Rossell and Crain, 1975) and there is consensus about several major points. First, for more than a decade after the 1954 ruling, there was little actual desegregation of schools. In the Deep South racially separate school systems persisted while in northern cities the neighborhood school system insured that only a few blacks attended schools with whites-(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971a, Table 176; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967, Appendix A).

Second, beginning in the 1960s new pressures affected those districts, particularly southern districts, which maintained segregated schools. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed the Justice Department to act as
plaintiff in desegregation cases and required that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare terminate funding in districts whose schools were not integrated (Orfield, 1969; Slippen, 1975). By the late 1960s, the federal courts annunciated new principles of integration and overturned delaying strategies such as ineffective freedom of choice plans (Bolnar and Shanley, 1974, Chap. 1; Fiss, 1974).

Third, there has been much more desegregation of schools after 1968 than in previous periods (Kirby, et al., 1973, pp. 188-91; Farley, 1975, Table 1). Southern states, responding to court orders and federal pressures, have generally dismantled their racially separate systems. In the North, segregation has declined by a small amount in many districts and by a large amount in those places affected by court orders such as Denver and San Francisco. Declines in segregation have been greater in the South and by 1972 schools in that region were more integrated than schools in the North or West (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974a, Table 201; Farley, 1975, Table 1).

Fourth, busing has been frequently used to achieve integration. In its 1971 decision concerning Charlotte, the Supreme Court upheld busing and racial guidelines as techniques for integration (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 1971) and since that time courts have employed these techniques in many locations. In Charlotte, where the schools enroll about 85,000 students, the number bused rose from 24,000 prior to integration to 47,000 after (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1972a, pp. 35-6). In Nashville, about 31,000 of the district's 95,000 students rode buses before integration; 47,000 after (Race Relations Law Survey, 1971, p. 96).

Fifth, federal courts continue to insist upon the within-district integration of schools. To be certain, the Supreme Court's 1974 rulings concerning Detroit and Richmond prevented the pooling of city and suburban students to achieve integration. Nevertheless, that Court upheld numerous integration orders limited to specific districts in the North and South. Integration is typically defined by the courts as a situation in which black and white children attend the same schools regardless of where they live within the district (Bolnar and Shanley, 1974, pp. 27-45).

Sixth, the residential distribution of blacks and whites impedes school integration. Within large cities whites are segregated from blacks meaning that neighborhood schools are racially homogeneous (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965; Sørensen, Taeuber and Hollingsworth, 1975). Additionally,
central cities and their suburban rings differ in racial composition. In 1973, blacks made up about one-quarter of the population of the nation's central cities but less than 5 percent of the suburban population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974b, Table 4). The contrasts are striking in the largest metropolises: 71 percent black in Washington, 8 percent black in its suburbs; 44 percent black in Detroit, 4 percent in its suburbs; 51 percent black in Atlanta, 6 percent in its suburbs (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971b, Table 23).

Although there is agreement about these six points, there is less consensus about three other issues. First, has integration been a major cause of white flight from public schools in large cities? Second, given the extent of residential segregation what techniques, if any, will integrate schools? Third, in what ways has busing been a success or a failure? We first describe the effects of school desegregation for white enrollment.

Does School Integration Cause White Flight?

To systematically test the idea that whites leave public schools once they are integrated, we considered all cities having a population of 100,000 or more in 1970. We excluded those cities in which blacks made up less than three percent of the public school enrollment. This left 50 southern and 75 northern or western cities for which data were analyzed. In 1972 these districts enrolled more than 60 percent of the nation's black elementary students and 20 percent of the white (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974c, Table 1).

Since the 1960s, the Office of Civil Rights has gathered data showing the racial composition of students and staff in each public school¹ (U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics, 1969; U.S. Office for Civil Rights, 1970, 1972 and 1974). The first year for which these statistics are available is 1967 and the most recent year is 1972. These data pertain to school districts which typically are coterminous with city boundaries. However, districts in several southern states include an entire county. This analysis is restricted to elementary schools since a previous investigation showed that school segregation patterns in secondary schools were similar to those in elementary schools (Farley and Taeuber, 1974, p. 903).

Measuring racial segregation in schools was the first step. For each district, we compared the school-by-school distribution of black and
white students\(^2\) and calculated the index of dissimilarity, a measure which ranges from zero to 100. If all schools in a district had exactly the same racial composition, there would be no segregation of black students from whites and the index would equal zero. If a district were so thoroughly segregated that all white students went to exclusively white schools and blacks to exclusively black schools, segregation would be maximal and the index would equal 100. Large numerical values of this index reveal that white and black children attend separate schools while small values mean that all schools in a district have about the same racial composition (properties of school segregation measures are discussed in Zolotch, 1974). This index measures whether blacks and whites attend the same schools but does not reveal whether they go to the same classrooms or interact with each other within schools.\(^3\)

Table 1 reports these segregation scores for the twenty largest central city school districts in the South and North. In 1967 schools were thoroughly segregated in most cities as indicated by scores exceeding 90. Between 1967 and 1972 segregation decreased sharply in districts affected by extensive court orders: Nashville, Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa, Charlotte and Oklahoma City in the South; Denver and San Francisco in the North. Modest decreases in segregation occurred in many cities while in such places as Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Philadelphia segregation increased after 1967.

--- Table 1 ---

Changes in segregation were measured by subtracting a district's index in 1967 from its index in 1972. Districts undergoing integration have large negative scores (see the third column of Table 1) while districts in which segregation did not change or increased had scores closer to zero.

If integration produces white flight, those district's whose segregation scores fell drastically should also have lost many white students. For each city, we calculated the percentage change in white enrollment between 1967 and 1972. These changes are shown in column 4 of Table 1. In some districts—Washington and Atlanta, for instance—white enrollment fell by 40 percent during this five-year span. Many cities lost one-fifth or one-quarter of their white students and a few districts including the county-wide districts for Tampa and Ft. Lauderdale registered gains in white enrollment.
Table 1 -- Measures of School Segregation, Percentage Change in White Enrollment and Annual Growth Rates of Population for the Twenty Largest Central City School Districts by Region

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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-3</td>
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*Data refer to Dade County.
*Jacksonville city is identical to Duval County.
*Nashville city is identical to Davidson County.
*Data refer to Broward County.
*Data refer to Hillsborough County.
*Data refer to Mecklenburg County.
*Data refer to Miami-Dade County.

Sources: See Figure 1 for sources of school data. Population data from: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1970, PC(1)-Al, Tables 23 and 24; Current Population Reports, Series P-20, Nos. 34 to 594.
We tested to determine if changes in white enrollment were systematically related to changes in school segregation. Figure 1 presents a plot of these data. The change in school segregation in a district is plotted along the horizontal axis while the district's change in white enrollment is shown along the vertical axis. Since the changes in school segregation differed greatly by region, data for the 50 southern cities are shown separately from data for the 75 northern districts.

-- Figure 1 --

In the graphs for both regions, the points are very widely scattered meaning that changes in white enrollment were not strongly linked to changes in school segregation. The figure indicates that the majority of the 125 districts lost white students. In some of these districts losing whites, there was also a sharp decline in segregation while in other cities losing whites, school segregation did not change after 1967. The graph includes the linear regression of the dependent variable--change in white enrollment--upon the independent variable--change in school segregation. In neither region is there a significant relationship between school integration and white flight.

Reports of Professor Coleman's study indicate that the relationship of white flight and school integration was strongest in the largest cities. It is possible that these variables are related in the large cities but this may be concealed in Figure 1 since it refers to all 125 large cities. To investigate this, another figure was drawn based upon data for the twenty largest central city school districts in each region--the places listed in Table 1. Figure 2 shows these results.

-- Figure 2 --

Again there is a very wide scatter of points. In some locations which lost many white students such as Oklahoma City and San Francisco, levels of school segregation also declined sharply. Other cities--including Seattle, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Chicago, Cincinnati and Washington --lost many white students but their school segregation did not change. The linear regression models reveal no significant relationship of white flight and school integration in the nation's largest cities.

These results appear to conflict with those of Professor Coleman. There are many reasons for these differences. He analyzed data for white students while this paper presents information for all non-black students.
Figure 1 — Percentage Change in White Enrollment Plotted Against Change in School Segregation, 1967 to 1972, for 125 Cities of 100,000 or More

50 SOUTHERN SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Percentage Change in White Enrollment (y)

75 NORTHERN SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Percentage Change in White Enrollment (y)

Average change in white enrollment: -22.2%
Average change in school segregation: -33.7
Regression line: \( y = -23.14 - 0.266x \)
(regression coefficient not significantly different from zero)

Average change in white enrollment: -15.3%
Average change in school segregation: -11.1
Regression equation: \( y = -15.70 + 0.054x \)
(regression coefficient not significantly different from zero)

Figure 2 — Percentage Change in White Enrollment Plotted Against Change in School Segregation, 1967 to 1972, Twenty Largest Cities or Districts in Each Region

20 SOUTHERN SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Percentage Change in White Enrollment (%)  

Average change in white enrollment: -22.8
Average change in school segregation: -24.7

Regression line: $y = -34.23 + 0.262x$
(regression coefficient not significantly different from zero)

20 NORTHERN SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Percentage Change in White Enrollment (%)  

Average change in white enrollment: -17.8%
Average change in school segregation: -3.8

Regression line: $y = -14.57 + 0.038x$
(regression coefficient not significantly different from zero)

Sources: See Figure 1
His data pertain to all grade levels while this paper discusses enrollment trends at the elementary level. Another important reason for the difference may be the emphasis he placed upon observations for a few cities which experienced desegregation, particularly Atlanta and Memphis. In both places integration plans went into effect between 1972 and 1973 and these two cities account for a large share of the aggregate desegregation considered in his analysis.

Whites have been migrating out of the Atlanta central city at least since 1960 and white public school enrollment dropped sharply prior to school integration. Undoubtedly the white outmigration continued between 1972 and 1973 when the schools were integrated. Exclusively white "freedom schools" sprang up in southern cities in reaction to public school desegregation. However, these are often short-lived as parents appreciate the tremendous costs of establishing private school systems (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1972a, pp. 38-9; 1973, pp. 8, 17, 29 and 36). Many Memphis parents enrolled their children in private schools in 1973 but it is probably that enrollment in such institutions will eventually decline and white students will return to the public schools.

Do Whites Leave if the Proportion Black Is High?

It is possible that whites anticipate school desegregation and move away from a city before the schools are actually integrated. If this occurs, it is probably related to the racial composition of a district. That is, if the proportion black in a city is low, an integration order—even if it entails busing—will likely involve few students and the integrated schools will be predominantly white. However, if the proportion black is high, many children will have to be shifted out of their neighborhood schools and white students may be a minority in the integrated schools. Where this occurs, whites may leave the public schools prior to integration.

By 1967 only a few cities had integrated schools and neither the courts nor federal administrators had issued thorough desegregation orders. School integration and busing became important national issues after 1967 and thus we analyzed changes in white enrollment between 1967 and 1972. These were related to the proportion of students black in 1967. If our speculations are valid, the greatest decreases in white enrollment occurred in those cities where the proportion black was highest in 1967.

Figure 3 presents data concerning this issue. Percentage change in white enrollment (shown along the vertical axis) is plotted against the proportion of the district's students black in 1967 (shown along the horizontal axis). In both regions, changes in white enrollment were inversely related
to the proportion black. In the North, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion black in 1967 was associated with a very small decrease in white enrollment, about one-half of one percent. In the South, the relationship was much stronger and an increase of 10 percent in the proportion black was associated with a decrease of 5 percent in white student enrollment.

-- Figure 3 --

These data are consistent with the hypothesis that whites fear integrated schools with large black enrollments and withdraw their children from public schools prior to integration. They are also consistent with many other hypotheses. Cities with a high proportion black may have particularly unfavorable tax bases, may be losing employment, may be viewed by whites as dangerous or may have an especially old stock of housing.

To further explore this, we tested a model which included both change in school segregation and the proportion black in 1967 as independent variables to predict changes in white enrollment. We speculated that whites would be particularly prone to leave public schools in those cities in which the schools were integrated and the proportion black was high. In such places, very many white students would actually attend schools with many blacks.

In neither region of the country did we find evidence supporting this hypothesis. That is, using two variables—change in school segregation and the proportion of students black in 1967—proved no more effective in predicting changes in white enrollment than did using just the change in segregation. Cities in which the percentage black was high and whose schools were integrated did not lose unusually high proportions of their white enrollment.

The data in Figure 1 to 3 do not prove that there is no white flight in response to school integration. To be sure when public schools are desegregated or when they become predominantly black, some white parents—perhaps many—hasten their move away from the central city. However whites are moving out of central cities for many other reasons. We have shown that cities whose schools were integrated between 1967 and 1972 did not lose white students at a higher rate than cities whose schools remained segregated.
Figure 3 -- Percentage Change in White Enrollment, 1967 to 1972, Plotted Against Proportion of Students Black in 1967, for 125 Cities of 100,000 or More

Average change in white enrollment: -22.2%
Average proportion black in 1967: 16.3
Regression line: \( y = -1.31 - 0.504x \)
(Regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at .025 level)

Sources: See Figure 1.
What Effect Does Population Redistribution Have for School Integration?

The nation's largest cities have been losing population--especially white population--throughout the post World War II era. It seems likely the outmigration of whites has increased recently. In cities where suburban housing was available to blacks--including Cleveland, St. Louis, Cincinnati and Pittsburgh (Taeuber, 1974, p. 14)--there was an outmigration of blacks during the 1960s, a migration pattern which is probably now occurring in other cities.

Since detailed figures are only available for census years, it is impossible to assess the current migratory movements of whites and blacks. Table 1, however, shows growth rates of the total population in the largest central city school districts for two periods: 1960 to 1970 and 1970 to 1973. Several cities--such as New York, Los Angeles and Dallas--which grew in the 1960s declined in the 1970s. Many cities which lost population in the last decade are now losing population at a much faster rate. In Detroit, for example, the annual loss rate grew from 1.0 percent last decade to 2.6 percent this decade; in Atlanta, from 0.1 to 2.9 and in Buffalo, from 1.4 to 2.6 percent. Many of the locations whose growth rates for the 1970s exceed those of the 1960s are cities which recently benefitted from large annexations--Memphis and Tulsa, for example--or are county-wide school districts--Tampa and Ft. Lauderdale.

The outmigration of whites affects school enrollments. In the 125 school districts analyzed in this paper, the decreases in white enrollment between 1967 and 1972 was 16 percent. Nationally, white public school enrollment fell by only 5 percent in this span (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974d, Table 1). The difference between these rates of change reflects the continuing movement of whites to suburban locations. A declining proportion of white students are attending schools in districts which have a high proportion of black students--typically central city school districts--and a larger proportion are in the suburban districts which enroll few blacks. We have indicated that the 125 central city school districts enroll more than three-fifths of all black students but less than one-fifth of the white. Because of these migration patterns schools in such cities as Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Newark and Washington became largely black prior to the use of busing. Even if there is a moratorium on busing and integration, the exodus from central cities will
continue and schools will soon be predominantly black in Buffalo, Dallas, Houston, Milwaukee and many smaller cities. Recent demographic trends support the Kerner Commission warning that within two decades there would be "...a white society principally located in suburbs, in smaller central cities and in peripheral parts of large central cities and a Negro society largely concentrated within large central cities" (U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 407).

What Strategies Are Available to Integrate Public Schools?

Residential areas in the urban United States are highly segregated by race. The federal courts continue to hold that the Constitution requires that black and white children living within the same district must attend the same, not separate and racially identifiable, schools. Given these constraints, how can integration be accomplished?

There is no one strategy which will prove effective in all districts. In smaller cities, where the proportion black is moderate, closing a few exclusively black schools, open enrollment plans, pairing black and white schools and altering attendance zones may be effective (Foster, 1973; Pettigrew, 1975, pp. 816-20). Nationally, more than 46 percent of public school students ride buses (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974a, Table 215; Mills, 1973). In the South, and to a lesser degree in the North, busing has been used to maintain segregated schools. Some southern districts desegregated their schools by switching the distinction of buses rather than by busing more children (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1973, p. 66). In the St. Petersburg area, for instance, schools were thoroughly integrated without increasing the number of children bused (National Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1972, Table 4). Several integration plans, including that for Charlotte, called for decreases in the average time children spent on buses (National Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1972, p. 329). Integrating Richmond's schools by pooling city and suburban students would have actually reduced the number of children riding buses (Pettigrew, 1975, p. 827).

Schools in many large cities, however, will be integrated only if children go to schools outside their own neighborhoods. Gordon Foster (1973, p. 31) observed:

Whether busing is the only way cities can be desegregated is still an open question, but most of the
techniques that do not involve busing have unquestionably failed. The segregated housing patterns that prevail in cities which have seriously attempted to desegregate either voluntarily or under court order almost always necessitate additional transportation.

As a rule of thumb, comprehensive desegregation plans for cities usually require that thirty to fifty percent of the pupils be bused...

Busing, for integration purposes, is obviously not popular. In 1974, 82 percent of a national sample of whites and 35 percent of the blacks opposed busing (National Opinion Research Center, 1974, Question 92). Critics contend that busing has failed to raise the achievement levels of black children and has engendered greater racial hostility. The evidence on these points is not convincing and the reaction to busing has varied greatly from one community to another (Weinberg, 1970; Armor, 1972; Pettigrew, et al., 1973; St. John, 1975). Since large-scale busing for integration has been done for only a few years, it is far too early to conclude about its effectiveness. Given residential segregation and the constitutional requirement that all children attend the same schools, busing is one effective technique. Nationally it has not been a major cause of white flight from cities and, in many communities, it has been accepted (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1972a; 1972b; 1973).

Although busing may be necessary in the short run, it may be more desirable to integrate schools in the long run by minimizing racial residential segregation. If central cities and their suburbs were more alike in racial composition and if both whites and blacks were welcomed in all neighborhoods, residential segregation would decrease. A variety of studies show that economic differences between blacks and whites do not account for residential segregation (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, Chap. 4; Taeuber, 1975, pp. 836-7; Hermalin and Farley, 1973). Public opinion studies report that the majority of blacks prefer to live in racially mixed areas, not in exclusively black neighborhoods (Pettigrew, 1973, Table 5). Traditionally whites have opposed opening neighborhoods to blacks and discriminatory real estate practices account for much of the present residential segregation (Foley, 1973; National Academy of Sciences, 1972, Chap. 3; Taeuber, 1975, pp. 840-1). White attitudes are changing rapidly and by 1972, 84 percent of a national sample claimed it would make no difference to them if a Negro with the same income and education moved onto their block (National Opinion Research Center, 1972, Question 46).
The willingness of whites to accept black neighbors includes an acceptance of integrated schools. That is, in 1974 only 5 percent of the white respondents in a national sample said they would object to sending their children to a school where a few of the children were Negroes and only 28 percent objected to a school where half of the students were Negroes (National Opinion Research Center, 1974, Question 94). The majority of whites oppose busing for integration but apparently do not object to public schools which have large black enrollments.

It is unlikely that residential segregation will soon disappear. Nevertheless in considering strategies for school integration, policy makers should keep in mind that the receptiveness of whites and the economic potential of blacks now exists for a high degree of residential integration. To the extent that this comes about it will have far-reaching implications for race relations including school integration which is neighborhood based.

Footnotes

1In 1967 and in each even numbered year since 1968, data were collected from all school districts enrolling at least 3,000 students and from a sample of smaller districts.

2This paper compares the distribution of black students to all non-black students, a group called white even though it includes Indians, Orientals and Eskimos. For further discussion, see (Farley and Taeuber, 1974, p. 890).

3The index used in this paper differs from the one used by Prof. Coleman. However, both indexes measure whether black and white students attend the same schools and neither index is dependent upon the racial composition of a school district. Zolotch (1974) computed both indexes for 2,400 school districts and found that they correlated at +.88. Substantive conclusions drawn on the basis of one index will be similar to those based on the other index.

4Letting: \[ y = \text{percentage change in white enrollment} \]
\[ x_1 = \text{change in school segregation} \]
\[ x_2 = \text{percentage of students black in 1967} \]

The regression equations are:

South: \[ \hat{y} = -2.88 + .0221x_1 - .5093x_2 \quad r^2 = .33 \]

North: \[ \hat{y} = -12.84 + .0720x_1 - .0641x_2 \quad r^2 = .01 \]

The only statistically significant regression coefficient is that for percentage of students black in 1967 in the South.
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DESEGREGATION AND THE PRIVATE SCHOOL ALTERNATIVE

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Once bastions of racial segregation, southern schools now lead the nation in desegregation. Southern black and white children now attend the same public schools on a scale unprecedented five years ago. The success of desegregation enforcement has generated a counter current of parental resistance. Significant numbers of southern white parents have avoided the impact of desegregation by transferring their children from public to private schools. In some districts a mass movement of whites to private schools has drastically altered racial balances in the public schools. The shift has been less extensive in other districts, but in varying degrees throughout the South, it has produced unstable racial balances and threatened the intended social and educational goals of desegregation. Thus, the task facing many school policy-makers is not simply how to achieve acceptable racial balances but also how to minimize the loss of white students.

This paper summarizes findings of an intensive study of southern white parent's decisions to transfer their children from desegregated public schools to essentially segregated private schools. The study is set in seven desegregated school districts in the State of Florida. The districts are Dade (Miami), Duval (Jacksonville), Escambia (Pensacola), Lee (Ft. Myers), Leon (Tallahassee), Manatee (Bradenton), and Palm Beach (West Palm Beach). These districts are county-wide and surrounded by districts also undergoing desegregation. Thus, residential relocation was an impractical means of avoiding desegregation for parents in these counties. Only the private schools offered the possibility of sanctuary.

The seven districts were selected to provide variation in size, region, and socio-demographic characteristics. Four of the districts are among the 100 largest in the United States. Dade ranks 6th with an enrollment of over 250,000. Duval with over 120,000 ranks 20th nationally. Palm Beach with nearly 80,000 and Escambia
with over 50,000 rank 49th and 82nd respectively. Two districts are located in smaller SMSA's, Lee (30,000 approx.) and Leon (23,000 approx.) and one is non-metropolitan, Manatee (21,000 approx.). The percent black in the student population falls between 18 percent and 33 percent. The districts are spread throughout the State, reflecting Florida's cultural heterogeneity: Dade and Palm Beach on the southeast coast; Duval on the northeast coast; Leon, and Escambia in the northern panhandle; and Manatee and Lee on the west coast.

While segregation in public education was declared unconstitutional in 1954, desegregation did not begin in earnest in the seven districts until after 1968. Under court orders and H.E.W. threats, significant desegregation had occurred in four of the districts by 1970 and all seven were declared unitary in 1972. Enrollment statistics for private schools in Florida are not complete but available data indicate that private school enrollments increased with the advent of desegregation. In the seven counties of the present study private school enrollments increased by over one-third between 1970 and 1973. Most of this growth occurred in the large metropolitan school districts of Dade, Duval and Palm Beach. Of course, some increase in both private and public school enrollments could be expected simply as a result of the rapidly expanding population of the state. However, in three of our seven study districts -- Dade, Duval and Palm Beach -- the public schools have experienced declines in white student enrollment. Dade county lost about 20,000 white children in the public schools from 1968 to 1972, while Duval county lost approximately 11,000 over the same period. In Palm Beach county, the number of white students in the public schools increased up to 1970; thereafter, desegregation took effect and the district's white enrollment declined by a little more than 1,000 in the next two years while the county's population burgeoned. Clearly, in none of the districts of the present study has the movement
of whites to private schools resulted in complete resegregation of the public schools. The flow of white students to the private schools, however, has not been trivial in magnitude.

Data

Studies of white withdrawal from desegregated schools have commonly used the school district as the unit of analysis. When the focus of concern is on the behavior of individuals, however, such an approach is flawed. For example, if one finds that school districts with higher percentages of students riding buses also have the largest declines in white student enrollment, one is tempted to conclude that busing leads to white withdrawal. Such a conclusion assumes that those students leaving the system are also those riding the buses, an assumption which may or may not be valid and upon which a policy decision ought not to be based. The present study avoids this problem by focusing on the decisions of individual parents to comply with desegregation by keeping their children in the public schools or to avoid desegregation by transferring their children to private segregated academies. With the individual as the focus of analysis the effects of various conditions in the schools and characteristics of the families on the compliance/avoidance decision may be directly assessed.

Data for the study are drawn from surveys of white parents of school age children in each of the seven districts. Interviewing was conducted early in 1973. Within the time frame of the present study, avoiders are defined as parents with a child attending a public school in the 1971-72 school year but transferred to a private, all white school in 1972-73. Compliers are defined as parents with a child in the public schools in both 1971-72 and 1972-73.
Compliance/avoidance behavior was determined independently of the survey instrument through the use of public and private school records. In six of the seven counties, pupil locator files or computer listings of students were used as the basic sampling frame for the complier sample. In each of these districts students attending the public schools in both 1971-72 and 1972-73 were randomly sampled from the lists. Each of these six districts also kept records on students transferring from public to private schools. In districts where the transfer lists were acknowledged to be incomplete, visits were made to all sizeable private schools in the county to request information on new students for 1972-73. The combined list from public and private sources constituted the sampling frame for avoiders. In some districts interviews were sought with parents of all students on the avoider lists; in other districts where the lists were longer, random sampling was employed.

The sampling procedures in the seventh district differed. Access was not permitted to official public school records in this district. Complier interviews were obtained on the basis of an area probability sample, with blocks chosen at random from census tract data. These blocks were canvassed and interviews obtained in households with public school children. Rejecters were identified from lists provided by nine of the largest private schools in the county.

A total of 1,386 avoiders and 2,112 compliers were interviewed. The data were weighed to reflect the estimated "true" ratio of compliers to avoiders within the districts. In addition to the interviews, information on the schools attended by the respondents' children was obtained from official school sources.
Findings

One of the most sensitive issues in school desegregation is the racial composition of schools. The policy of desegregation mandates that black and white children attend the same schools. On the other hand, resistance to desegregation frequently has been related to the percent black enrollment in the schools and it is commonly feared that a tipping-point in the black-to-white exists beyond which the rate of white withdrawal accelerates and the schools eventually become all or nearly all black. Indeed, some have called for a halt to desegregation efforts in urban districts with high percentage black enrollments for fear of white withdrawals and resegregation. The linkage between percent black enrollment and white withdrawals is, thus, a central concern for desegregation planning and policy-making.

Respecting this linkage our data indicate a threshold point for avoidance in the vicinity of 30 percent black. Respondents with children attending school 29 percent or less black transfer to private schools at a rate of approximately 2.3 percent. By comparison, parents with children in schools 30 percent or more black, avoid at a rate of approximately 6.4 percent. While avoidance was uniformly higher for those with children in schools more than 30 percent black, avoidance was highest for those whose children had attended a school 29 percent or less black in the preceding year. Thus, movement across the threshold from a school 29 percent black or less to a school 30 percent or more black appears particularly likely to produce avoidance.

Apart from racial balances, the most controversial aspect of desegregation is the use of busing. In a recent national survey conducted by the U. S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights, 73 percent of the white respondents said they opposed the use of busing for school desegregation and 58 percent favored a legislative prohibition against it. Despite the apparently overwhelming attitudinal opposition to busing, our data show no relationship between whether or not a child was scheduled for a bus ride and the decision to avoid desegregation, once the percent black enrollment in the school was controlled.

A companion issue to busing has been the distances involved in desegregation plans. It is the fact that considerable distances are involved in desegregation that has necessitated the use of buses. Objections to desegregation also focus on the neighborhood and the school to which the child is being bused. Sensitive to these issues desegregation planner often have bused black students, disproportionally closed schools in predominantly black neighborhoods, and downgraded the level of previously black schools. Our data suggest the concerns over these factors may have been over-rated. Indeed, when the black concentration in the public school was 29 percent or less, the rate of avoidance was no greater for respondents with children bused more than 12 miles, assigned to previously all black schools, or assigned to schools in predominantly black neighborhoods than it was for respondents with children bused less than 12 miles, assigned to previously all white schools, or assigned to schools in predominantly white neighborhoods. Clearly, long bus rides are to be avoided where possible and due consideration should be given the condition and quality of schools, but our data indicate the the dominant feature conditioning avoidance is the racial composition in the desegregated schools.

Turning from the conditions imposed by desegregation to the characteristics of the avoiders, resistance to desegregation in the South is commonly attributed to lower status persons with racist views. In contrast our data clearly support a positive
linkage between social status and avoidance. Upper income respondents and re-
pondents with a college education are more likely to transfer their children
to private schools, largely because they can afford to pay the cost of private
school tuitions. Furthermore, racial prejudice appears to be unrelated to the
decision to avoid desegregation. Avoiders are no more likely to be racially
prejudiced than compliers. Finally, Florida is a state benefitting from con-
siderable in-migration from non-southern states. In fact, 40 percent of our re-
spondents were born and raised outside the south.

Contrary to expectations, Southerners in our sample were no more likely
to avoid desegregation and place their children in private schools than non-
southerners. This is so despite the fact that our non-southern respondents
indicated greater attitudinal acceptance of desegregated education than did
our Southern respondents. In summary, avoidance of desegregation transcends
racial views and regional upbringing, but not the ability to afford it.

Policy Implications

These findings appear to support multiple district desegregation plans of
the type proposed for Detroit. Several urban school districts have suffered
severe losses in white enrollments coincident with desegregation: The large
urban districts of the present study -- Dade, Duval and Palm Beach -- have also
lost white students but not in sufficient numbers to significantly alter the
racial balance in the public schools. The most apparent reason for this difference
in outcome is the geographic scope of the districts. Dade, Duval and Palm Beach
are large county-wide districts surrounded by districts also undergoing desegre-
Residential mobility is thus eliminated as a means of avoiding desegregation and consequently as a force toward resegregation. Similar results in many urban areas might be achieved by consolidating districts for purpose of desegregation.

For school districts desegregating under conditions similar to our seven districts, the findings suggest that maintaining racial balances in all schools under 30 percent black would be rational policy from the standpoint of minimizing resegregation. In many urban districts the, however, racial balance exceeds 30 percent, thus, making it impossible to keep schools below the threshold. Multidistrict desegregation, including predominantly white suburbs with the central cities could bring the over-all racial balance below the threshold level. Such plans, of course, would require the use of busing. While busing may lead to verbal protest, our data suggest that it is unrelated to avoidance behavior and, therefore, may be employed without penalty to achieve desirable racial balance.

Finally, our findings are inconsistent with the stereotype of the resister. Some school officials have argued that desegregation has been made easier by the flight of die-hard racists from the public schools. In fact, no such benefit appears to accrue through avoidance. Our results indicate that avoiders are no more racially prejudiced than compliers. Moreover, while resistance is commonly attributed to lower-class persons, avoidance of desegregation through the private schools, however, appears to be an upper class phenomenon.
No doubt, this is in large part a function of the costs associated with this behavior, but even with income controlled, avoidance was no less likely among respondents with some college than among the less educated.

The social/attitudinal characteristics of the avoiders have ramifications for the public schools. First, upper-status persons are among the strongest supporters of public education. An outflow of such families, therefore, is doubtless deleterious to public support for the public schools. Second, research suggests that the benefits to black children or a desegregated educational environment arise in part from the presence of middle and upper-class white students. Avoidance, therefore, disproportionately removes a category of students particularly important for the educational goals of desegregation. In summary, avoidance does not remove the racially prejudiced from the schools but does remove children whose presence is important from the standpoint of the success of desegregation and continuing support for the public schools. Thus, even if the number of avoiders does not reach proportions great enough to cause resegregation, the phenomenon of avoidance may still pose real problems for school policymakers.
FOOTNOTES


3. Florida Dept. of Education, Florida Educational Director (Tallahassee, Fla: Dept. of Educt., Textbook Service).

4. See for example the Coleman and Farley Papers in the present series.

5. The literature here is voluminous. For a general discussion of this see Herbert Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Relations (N.Y. John Wiley & Sons, 1967) passim.

SCHOOLS THAT QUIT 'TIPPING' IN MISSISSIPPI

by Luther Munford

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SCHOOLS THAT QUIT 'TIPPING' IN MISSISSIPPI¹

By Luther Munford

White flight from school desegregation has long frustrated community leaders and courts trying to desegregate the nation's classrooms. As described by some observers, white flight rapidly and irreversibly leads to black or nearly all-black schools, once the ratio of blacks to whites in a school reaches a "tipping point." Research in Mississippi, however, has uncovered school districts where "tipping" has not only stopped, in some cases it has even reversed. Events there call into question the universal applicability of tipping theory and suggest that white flight may not be the insurmountable barrier to desegregation that some analysts have feared it would be.

According to tipping theory, white flight depends totally on the racial composition of the schools. To quote the late Yale law professor Alexander M. Bickel:

Integration soon reaches a tipping point. If whites are sent to constitute a minority in a school that is largely black, or if blacks are sent to constitute something near half the population of a school that was formerly white or nearly all-white, 'the whites flee, and the school becomes all or nearly all-black; resegregation sets in, blacks simply changing places with whites. The whites move, within a city or out of it into the suburbs, so that under a system of zoning they are in white schools because the schools reflect residential segregation; or else they flee the public school system altogether, into private and parochial schools.'²

Bickel was seeking to explain the process that reduced the white enrollment in the Canton, Mississippi, schools by 97 per cent. Whites there fled the public schools after a court order tried to create a three-to-one black-to-white ratio in each school to reflect the racial composition of the school district as a whole. On the surface, Bickel's theory seemed a plausible explanation for the white flight that took place in Canton, and it dovetailed with previous casual observations elsewhere.
A closer look, however, at Canton and 29 other Mississippi school districts under similar desegregation edicts during 1969-70 showed changes in enrollment patterns that defied his theory. For example, in Amite County where the first semester of white flight left the schools more than 90 per cent black, the white enrollment doubled in the second term. In Marion County, where the schools had become more than 80 per cent black, a similar return of whites to the public schools took place. All in all, of the 55 majority-black schools in 30 districts, 31 showed an increase in their white enrollments in the second term of full desegregation and 10 showed no change either way.

These changes made no sense at all to someone trying to fit them into the mold of traditional tipping theory. It is an established tenet of that theory that once "tipping" begins, it is never reversed. Former Washington, D.C. school superintendent Carl F. Hansen, who thought the white exodus began whenever a school's population became 30 per cent black, once wrote:

The evidence is clear that the racial composition of a school shifts from white to black within five years after the 30 per cent point is reached. It tends after that to reach 99 per cent in a very short time.4

The changes did make sense, however, if looked at from a different perspective, one that assumes that in racially balanced school districts white flight ultimately depends on the black/white ratio in the population as a whole rather than just the ratio in the schools.

THE POPULATION RATIO THEORY

That white community attitudes toward desegregation and other racial issues are closely keyed to the black/white ratio in the population is a proposition that has become commonplace in the analysis of southern politics, yet conventional tipping theory ignores it altogether. Scholars have used it to explain variations
in the character of the politics of individual counties, and even states. In
general, the accepted thesis is that the more whites are physically outnumbered,
the more hostile they are to equality for blacks.

In the 30 districts, although the schools began to "tip" the black/white popu-
lation ratios remained stable. Whites did not shift from neighborhood to neighbor-
hood or even from district to district looking for a whiter school. This stability
has several explanations, such as the fact that the time period was so short, ap-
proximately a year, that they may have maintained a hope the court orders would be
reversed. More importantly, the racial balance plans, by equalizing the racial
proportions of all schools over a wide geographic area, made it very costly to
find a whiter public school. Families were not willing to uproot themselves from
job, friends and community, particularly when they could avoid desegregation either
by sending their children to one of the new segregated private schools or by not
sending them to school at all.

When the population ratios stayed stable, white resistance to desegregation
seemed to "stabilize" also and the "tipping" stopped. For each community, a per-
centage of whites would desert the desegregated public schools; that percentage
was closely associated with the general level of white community hostility toward
blacks which in turn depended on the black/white ratio in the population. But
once that percentage had left, no more would leave. More dramatically, if "too
many" fled, some would come back. That is what seems to have happened in Amite
and Marion counties in complete defiance of the "tipping" theory. In neither
county were whites sufficiently outnumbered to sustain the level of hostility
toward blacks that was manifested by the initial flight from the public schools.
As a consequence, large numbers of whites returned to the schools, even though
the schools were majority black.
To take another example, white resistance in Forrest County, where whites outnumbered blacks four to one, initially contradicted the population ratio hypothesis. Despite the predominance of whites, their "Citizens for Local Control of Education" was one of the most forceful white protest groups in the state. When the desegregation order was put into effect, a boycott pulled 17 per cent of the white children out of the public school system. The boycott won a resolution of praise from the state legislature and should have "tipped" the schools over the 30 per cent mark. But it did not. When the second semester of desegregation got under way, the boycott collapsed, the protestors returned to the schools, and the population ratio theory was vindicated.

**THE DATA**

The table and graph illustrate the changes in white enrollment for the 30 districts over the course of three semesters. The semesters were fall 1969, before the racial balance court orders went into effect; spring 1970, the first semester of full desegregation; and fall 1970, the second semester. What emerges from these statistics is a striking correlation between the percentage of whites who left the public schools and an estimate for the black population ratio. Mathematically, for districts that implemented full desegregation plans, the population ratio "explains" 88 per cent of their white flight.

Furthermore, the only districts which lost white students between spring 1970 and fall 1970, and thus appeared to tip, were those that had suffered less from white flight in spring 1970 than the population ratio theory would predict. On the graph, circles represent the percentage of white students lost between fall 1969 and spring 1970. The stars show the percentage lost between fall 1969 and fall 1970. Arrows illustrate the change between spring 1970 and fall 1970. An arrow that points upward indicates a district that continued to lose students.
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<td>North Pike</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pike²,³</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹Incomplete plan spring 1970
²Inadequate plan spring 1970
³Inadequate plan fall 1970

**Coefficients of Determination**

- PCDWE Fall 1970 depends on BPP
  - $r^2(30\text{ districts}) = .38$
  - $r^2(22\text{ districts}) = .72$
- PCDWE Fall 1970 depends on BPP
  - $r^2(29\text{ districts}) = .74$
  - $r^2(27\text{ districts}) = .83$

All correlation coefficients were positive and significant at the .01 level.

Source: Calculated from reports to the court.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Percent White in Spring 1970:</th>
<th>Number of Schools Showing:</th>
<th>Average Change for all Schools in Category:</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Gain</td>
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<td>91-100</td>
<td>no schools in category</td>
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Schools in districts with incomplete or inadequate plans were not included in the calculations. Source: Calculated from reports to the court.
THE PATTERN OF WHITE FLIGHT FROM THE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS

% Drop in white enrollment, 1968-69 to Spring 1970 to Fall 1970

Estimated Black Percentage of Population

(*) District with inadequate plan fall 1970.
Fall 1970 PDWE (27 districts) = 1.94 BPE - 67.3; r = +.91. Source: Table 1.
after spring 1970; almost all such arrows lie below the regression line indicating the average white flight for each population ratio.11

Similarly, every downward arrow represents a district which gained white students. In those districts tipping not only stopped, it was reversed. Table II shows the phenomenon by school. It places each school in a category according to its per cent white enrollment and then calculates for each category the average change in white enrollment between the spring and fall terms. According to the tipping theory, the minority white categories should all show additional losses; instead, each category showed, on the average, a gain.

CONCLUSION

These results should be taken with caution. The study encompasses only a short time period and a limited number of districts. The districts were not typical of the "average" American school district. Many were rural. None needed additional busing to implement desegregation. All were under strict racial balance court orders. Unlike northern urban districts, they were not, for the most part, surrounded by whiter school systems to which hostile whites could flee.

Nevertheless, the experience of those school systems seems to suggest that tipping theory is not a rock to which a national desegregation policy can be moored; it is sand that shifts with the tides of demographic change in the community and the type of desegregation plan a school board adopts. In particular, any study which purports to examine tipping must look both at whether or not the community has a racially balanced school system, and whether or not the black/white ratios in the community are shifting. In the 30 districts studied, racial balance plans coupled with stable population ratios stopped "tipping," whether they could do so elsewhere is at least worth further study, and whether they should do so deserves to be part of the national desegregation debate.


3. The districts were all combined in the case Alexander v. Holmes County School Board, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).


5. A 1961 survey of 2000 counties looked at voting patterns among southern Negroes and discovered that the larger the black population proportion in a county, the smaller the percentage of eligible Negroes who were registered to vote. They attributed the phenomenon to increased levels of hostility toward Negro voting in the white communities of the blacker counties. The pattern they found was strikingly similar to the pattern of white resistance to desegregation in the 30 Mississippi school districts (see graph on page 5):

   If we examine the relationship between these two variables over the entire range of southern counties, we see that increases in the proportion Negro up to about 30 per cent are not accompanied by substantial declines in Negro registration. . . . As the proportion Negro increases beyond 30 per cent, however, Negro registration rates begin to decline very sharply until they approach 0 at about 60 per cent Negro and above.


7. There was no compulsory school attendance law in Mississippi during this period.

8. The estimate is based on the 1968-69 black/white ratio in the schools. It was necessary to use an estimate because the only precise population figures are compiled by census tract, and the district boundaries did not coincide with those of the census tract.

9. During spring 1970, four districts implemented only partial desegregation plans and four others put into effect plans the courts later found inadequate. During the fall, two districts used inadequate plans and one failed to report to the court at all.

10. In statistical terms $r^2 = .88$; the correlation between the black population ratio estimate and the percentage drop in each district's white enrollment shows a high .88 (of a possible 1.0) statistical association between the two sets of data.

11. The result would be the same even if the regression line for spring 1970 has been used. In effect, the arrows merely show the pattern by which the correlation coefficient increased.
WHITE FLIGHT RESEARCH
ITS IMPORTANCE, PERPLEXITIES,
AND POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Gary Orfield
Brookings Institution
Social scientists played a visible though modest role in preparing the groundwork for the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision. With the publication of the 1966 Coleman Report they became significant participants in the national debate over urban school segregation.¹ In recent years, intense public attention has focused on social scientist David Armor's controversial research suggesting that the courts have been mistaken in their recent decisions requiring desegregation through large-scale busing programs.² The most recent controversy has arisen over claims by James Coleman, perhaps the nation's best known sociologist, that urban desegregation is self-defeating because it merely speeds up the departure of a city's remaining white residents. Too often, selective, half-digested reports of preliminary research findings are disseminated by the media and become weapons in the intense political and legal battle being fought in major cities.

Obviously the white flight question has great policy importance. Research showing conclusively that particular actions either enhance or destroy the possibility for a biracial urban future would deserve the most serious attention by public officials. Unfortunately, however, such research has not yet been produced. Reaching any kind of firm conclusions on these issues turns out to be an
enormously difficult and complex process. This is because there are so many different and powerful forms of change taking place in urban centers that definitively relating changes in white population to particular actions requires analysis controlling a great many factors which are interrelated in decisions to move. Any conclusive analysis would also require a body of national survey data not now available relating the policy changes directly to decisions to move or enter private schools, rather than merely demonstrating a statistical association.

All we have now are preliminary studies, some national, some local, employing very different kinds of data and based on different analytic assumptions. Though the evidence raises important questions, it is impossible now to demonstrate that school integration, in itself, causes substantial white flight.

This paper will first discuss briefly the difficulties of sorting out the various forces working toward accelerated suburbanization. Second, it will describe the very severe long-term problem of flight not caused by desegregation plans but tending to undermine their viability. Third, it will suggest that not only central cities but some inner suburbs as well are vulnerable to ghettoization in the absence of policies to alter the basic demographic trends in urban areas. Fourth, the analysis will suggest that discussion of housing integration as an alternative to school integration is probably misleading. Finally, it will discuss the policy implications of the imperfect information now available.
The Complexity of the Research Problem. At first glance the research problem appears to be relatively simple. The difference in white enrollment before and after desegregation is attributed to white resistance to the desegregation plan. These figures are commonly used by newspapers, local school officials, and desegregation opponents. Among other things, this method ignores the general trend toward declining enrollments, both in cities and in many suburbs. It also ignores the established patterns of white outmigration which developed long before the school issue was litigated. It neglects special local circumstances which occur simultaneously with desegregation.

Even when scholarly research attempts to make statistical provision for these trends, other complexities arise. Is school desegregation the sole cause of a decision to move or does it merely trigger earlier departures by some families almost certain to move anyway? Are there other significant changes in the city or in the metropolitan area at the time that account for an observed change in enrollment and residence patterns? Is accelerated flight a continuing problem produced by desegregation or is it a one-year spurt generated by the tumult of change? Does the statistical model exclude major influences on family choices? Inadequate treatment of any of these issues could produce seriously misleading policy conclusions.

Even simple definitions can have enormous implications for the meaning of research findings. Thus, in testing the proposition that whites are fleeing from school desegregation, the researcher must define "desegregation." Different definitions of this word can produce wide variance in the findings.
Most white flight research, including Professor Coleman's, defines desegregation as any situation where there happen to be significant numbers of black and white children in the same school at a particular point in time. In the absence of a city-wide desegregation plan, most such children in "desegregated" schools will actually be attending school on the periphery of an expanding ghetto. Usually, these are not integrated neighborhoods in any meaningful sense, but rather communities in rapid transition from all white to all black residential patterns. When one looks at enrollment patterns in such "desegregated" schools and observes the rapid shifts in the racial statistics, some conclude that the integration of the school "caused" its rapid resegregation. Actually, underlying these statistics is a very simple tautological principle--as ghettos expand, the neighborhoods they expand into become increasingly black.

The danger of reasoning from an inaccurate definition of desegregation in determining school policy can perhaps be illustrated by a comparative example from the housing field. Newark, N.J. in 1940 ranked as the most desegregated big city in the U.S., but during the 1960's it actually experienced an increase in segregation while most cities were moving in the opposite direction. It is conceivable that an analyst could draw the conclusion from this data that residential integration is counterproductive and results in increasing segregation. If on the other hand, one noted that the black and white housing markets in the city were highly segregated, except along ghetto boundaries, one could draw the more reasonable inference that rapid ghetto expansion produces an increasingly black city.
statistically to be integration was actually only rapid racial transition of neighborhoods. If one made the first kind of inference, the policy conclusion might be that nothing should be done to integrate housing. The second conclusion, on the other hand, would support a recommendation for a major effort to permit wider dispersion of the growing black population, thus producing more stable pattern of integration.

Moving back to the school example, evidence that white flight increases after desegregation must be interpreted with considerable caution. If stabilizing the white population is a major long term policy goal, it is very possible that desegregation over a much broader area, not no desegregation at all, is the best procedure. In fact, this conclusion is accepted by Coleman. Given the fact that there is no way to prevent further expansion of the ghettos, spreading school and housing segregation are virtually inevitable in the absence of a powerful policy to alter the normal self-fulfilling prophecies of neighborhoods transition.

This brief discussion of some of the complexities of white flight research does not mean that the question cannot be studied effectively. It docs indicate, however, that results of tentative research should be read with great caution.

White Flight and Urban Change. Interpreting white flight research requires an implicit or explicit model of the process of racial change in a metropolitan area, particularly a set of assumptions about housing segregation, the nature of the causal relationships between school and housing decisions, and the future population prospects of central cities in the absence of school desegregation. White flight is related
not only to school desegregation but to the underlying demographics of the community, the consequences of division of metropolitan area into many separate governments and school districts, the nature of the local housing market and perhaps even to such elusive qualities as the area's racial climate and the record of the local leadership in handling racial issues. To firmly establish any argument about white flight one would need some kind of general theory or urban racial change to develop testable hypotheses about the factors causing white flight.

Convincing analysis requires treatment of the number of simultaneous changes influencing urban life and public attitudes during the past few years. The range and diversity of factors which might influence the rate of racial transition can be suggested by a simple, non-inclusive list of common conditions in cities during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

1) record levels of housing construction, overwhelmingly concentrated in the suburbs
2) major urban riots
3) rapid continued movement of urban jobs to suburban facilities
4) trend toward racial polarization in city politics and the emergence of black political leaders
5) increasing crime and public fears of violence
6) more rapid expansion of ghetto boundaries made possible by 1968 federal fair housing law
7) increases in strikingly disproportionate central city taxation in some areas
8) decline in the actual level of central city services in some cities
9) housing subsidy programs of unprecedented magnitude which tended to accelerate racial transition in the city, create opportunities for lower income whites in the suburbs, and, sometimes, end with the elimination of thousands of units from the central city housing stock.

10) major financial incentives, in terms of down payment and financing, for young families to purchase new outlying suburban housing.

The basic analytic problem is that most of these major changes all work in the same direction—toward increased suburbanization—and thus their effects can easily be confounded. Moreover, there are other, specifically educational, problems. Many city schools have deteriorating physical plants and the local newspapers carry reports of steadily declining achievement test scores. Teacher strikes have eroded confidence and sometimes produced substantial enrollment declines. Financial crises have forced rising student-teacher ratios in some cities.

Separating out the influence of various elements is exceedingly difficult but vitally important if one is to draw any valid policy conclusions. It is difficult because the problems interact in shaping family decisions. Whites leaving Atlanta in 1973, for instance, decided in an atmosphere affected not only by a modest school integration plan but also in a climate of polarization over the drive of Maynard Jackson to become the South's first big city black mayor. 6/

A family that leaves Detroit when a school integration plan is implemented will also be aware of the city's income tax, its 1967 riot, the extremely high level of violent crime, the cutbacks in the police force, the city controversial black mayor, the massive housing
abandonment in the city, the recent loss of more than a fifth of the city's job base, its severe current economic crisis, etc. While the school crisis might be the final factor that determine the family to move now, the general condition of the city virtually guarantees that the family would move eventually and that it would not be replaced by a similar white family. Not only do the various forces work in the same direction, but several are simultaneously intensifying.

The indications that the school issue, it itself, is not a sufficient explanation for white flight can be found at every side. If the changing racial composition of the public schools was the central problem, for example, one could expect a heavy increase in the enrollment of whites in relatively inexpensive Catholic schools, schools which are heavily concentrated in central cities. They are real alternatives for many of the Catholic ethnic concentrations directly threatened by racial change. These schools, however, have declined sharply in enrollment in recent years.

Is it White Flight or Simply Flight? The assumption that the rapid movement of white families from the central cities is a flight merely from racial contact has been substantially undermined by recent evidence that minority groups themselves are beginning to "flee" very rapidly where they are allowed to buy suburban housing. Black public school enrollments are stabilizing or declining in a number of central cities and black middle class families are increasingly moving to their inner suburbs. Among middle class black families who retain central city residence, there are substantial numbers who have fled to private school. The intensity of the black desire to escape central city conditions is indicated by a survey of black Chicago residents, in which 54 percent said they would prefer to live in the suburbs.
The situation in the Washington metropolitan area suggests possible future patterns. In the first four years of the 1970's the Washington black population fell by 5 percent. The city's suburbs, on the other hand, experienced an astonishing 61 percent increase in black population in this brief period. The decline in central city black population during this period was more than twice as fast as the outmigration of the city's remaining whites. Almost three-fifths of the total suburban population growth during this period came from new black residents.  

More than a third of the black children in the Washington metropolitan area attended suburban schools by 1972 and the number is steadily rising. District of Columbia public school statistics show that even among the blacks who remain in the city, about 10,000 are using private schools. The city, in other words, is experiencing "massive black flight," and its public schools were becoming not simply black institutions, but black lower class institutions.

Elementary school enrollment declined 5.4 percent in the single year between fall 1973 and fall 1974. Obviously these families are not fleeing contacts with blacks, but are responding to both the problems of city life and the attractions of the suburbs.

The schools of California's largest cities indicate the complexity of the issue. All growth in black enrollment in the Los Angeles area is outside the central city. Although the Mexican American enrollment has grown rapidly in the nation's second largest school system, the black enrollment is little changed since 1968 and recently entered a period of significant decline. The Chicano student population
has expanded 30 percent since 1968. During the last two school years, the black enrollment has actually dropped 5 percent.\textsuperscript{14/}

The results are even more confusing in San Francisco, the first big city outside the South to implement an extensive desegregation plan. The San Francisco schools have been experiencing not only white flight but also "black flight" and even "brown flight." From September 1972 to September 1974, San Francisco's black enrollment declined by a ninth and its Latino enrollment fell by a twelfth.\textsuperscript{15/}

The California statistics could be interpreted to black resistance to contact with Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and to black and brown hostility to San Francisco's growing numbers of Korean and Filipino students. It is, of course, far more plausible to attribute the movement to many of the same long-term factors that shaped white suburbanization.

**Policy Recommendations and their Context.** Failure to consider the accelerating decline of many of our largest central cities and their diminishing appeal for any family with any options can introduce a conservative bias into the interpretation of policy implications of research findings. If one focuses the research tightly on the short-term effect of school desegregation on white migration, and future research should actually demonstrate such an effect, the research could be read as evidence against doing anything. If one widens the focus to include the whole array of forces influencing locational decisions over a period of years, it is clear that the dominant trends point directly toward a particularly severe form of both racial and social class isolation in central city school systems. If the latter diagnosis
of the problem is correct, the policy implications are quite different. Assuming that the onset of school integration only highlights and perhaps temporarily accelerates already well established social trends, one could recommend major efforts to change the structure of incentives and perceptions that have shaped these trends.

Public discussion of white flight research in recent months has focused on the assertion that school desegregation has greatly intensified outmigration, usually based on newspaper interviews with Professor Coleman. Several scholars, employing more sophisticated analytic techniques than Coleman's, have concluded that desegregation plans have no discernible effect, on average, on the rate of white suburbanization.17/

Yet, even if one were to concede the validity of Coleman's method of analysis and accept his results at their maximum force, his study suggests only that the initiation of desegregation in a city with half black enrollment will produce an additional loss of 5.5 percent of the white students. This "flight" is significantly less than the same school system can expect to lose for other reasons in a normal year. In other words, the results show, at worst, that desegregation of a half black big city system might bring the schools to their final ghetto status about a year sooner than otherwise projected.18/

Coleman finds that the effect is much weaker in the Northern cities and very small in cities below the top 22 districts. He has found no evidence of continued additional loss resulting from long-term impact of the desegregation plan after the first year.19/ In most cities where desegregation issues are still pending, in other words, the effect of school integration on population movements is uncertain, probably small or nonexistent, according to available data.

Research which focuses on the possible incremental effect of the initiation of desegregation is, of course, a valid intellectual
undertaking. Policy recommendations, however, which are made without any reference to the broader causes of migration should not be taken seriously. If our central cities are moving very rapidly toward the condition prophesized by the 1968 Riot Commission report, then a policy proposal to slightly lower the rate of outmigration by ignoring unconstitutional school segregation can have only the most marginal importance.

**Issues Needing Research.** Serious recommendations about school desegregation policy should be based on analysis of alternatives that might lessen the incentives for the departure of the middle class and even provide some encouragement to the return of middle class white and black families to the central city and its schools. Two policies suggest themselves and both raise important research issues. First, one could try to determine why many cities experienced little or no loss after desegregation while some others had a massive drop in white enrollment. Closer study of the best and worst cases might well suggest procedures and methods that can avoid this initial loss of enrollment or forms of federal assistance that would be particularly helpful. Similarly, there should be close analysis of Atlanta and Memphis, whose massive losses weighed heavily in the Coleman study.

More important, in the long run, there should be serious study of the value of metropolitan desegregation plans. Such plans are now in operation in a substantial number of the largest school districts in the South. Las Vegas also has one and Louisville is implementing one. By eliminating segregation in predominantly white
schools through entire metropolitan areas, these plans may diminish
the incentives for suburbanization and eventually lower some of the
barriers to return of middle class families to the central cities
and their schools.

The only research available on this issue, the study of Florida
school districts reported by Professor Giles and his colleagues,
suggests that the metropolitan approach does indeed tend to avoid
any significant transfer out of the public school system. This issue
needs careful comparative research.

The White Flight Issue in Suburbia. Although the discussion of
white flight has focused on central cities, the problem may actually
become most serious in inner suburbs, when ghettos spill over city
boundaries in a growing number of metropolitan areas. Because most
suburban school districts are small, a relatively modest number of
new black residents can often make a significant impact on a district's
enrollment patterns. This can help create a self-fulfilling prophecy
of transition to a ghetto school system.

This process is evident in two suburbs adjoining the Watts ghetto
in Los Angeles, Compton and Inglewood. Both communities went, in
relatively short periods of time, from almost all-white systems to
almost completely black enrollments. One of the communities,
Inglewood, had a desegregation plan. Compton did not. Yet both went
through a brief biracial transition and then resegregated. They
behaved very much like a section of a big city undergoing racial
transition. In fact, they are parts of a huge metropolitan city.
The reason they go through the entire process so rapidly and completely,
why they are so extremely vulnerable to white ghettoization, is that the entire system is really only a large neighborhood. The school district boundaries isolate the individual small suburb from the diversity of the metropolitan area. The small isolated nature of the school district, superimposed on a process of residential change based on monolithic ghetto expansion meant that suburban districts once far "whiter" than the city became far more segregated than the city in a brief period of time.

Inglewood, Calif., a working class suburb of almost 100,000 people, began receiving black residents in the 1960's, a number of whom left their homes in Compton after that suburb became part of the Los Angeles ghetto. By 1970, when a court ordered desegregation, there were about one-fourth black students in the schools and a substantially lower proportion of black residents. The next year, the percentage rose to 35%. Within four school years the system had become overwhelmingly black. The court took the rare step of formally releasing the district from most parts of desegregation plan, since there were few whites left to integrate with. An analysis of the dynamics of the Inglewood situation emphasized the futility and heavy social cost of attempting to deal with the issue one individual community at a time:

The freedom to leave encourages a high degree of rancor. People are able to take hard-line positions... because they are not ultimately dependent on a negotiated settlement.... The process is exacerbated by the fact that each individual decision to move out increases the pressures on the remaining residents to move.
When looked at in this way, the problem of school desegregation takes on metropolitan significance. People may relocate from community to community within the same metropolitan area without affecting their job and other important social relations. Relocation outside the metropolitan area is another matter. In short, they have a stake in the metropolitan area that they do not have in a particular suburban community.

Without a cross-district desegregation plan the inner suburbs near city ghettos and the suburban communities most willing to practice genuine fair housing tend to become the focal points for black movement and for school resegregation. In the St. Louis metropolitan area, for example, the suburb of University City had been an early leader on housing integration. By 1972, its school enrollment was 55 percent black, with a larger black majority in the lower grades.

The problem will become increasingly evident in the inner suburbs of New York and Newark. Even during the 1960's the inner ring of suburbs was losing 3,000 whites while gaining 9,000 blacks and 2,000 Puerto Ricans in an average year. This problem became substantially more serious in the 1970's. Housing changes meant that the area was headed toward growing numbers of ghetto suburban school systems.

Where suburban school systems are small and black suburbanization begins in earnest, the only alternative to continual repetitions of the Inglewood experience would be some kind of desegregation plan crossing district lines, preferably with supporting housing policies. The most immediate and dramatic benefits of a metropolitan desegregation plan might well accrue to inner suburbs.

School Desegregation and Housing Integration. The only way to truly avoid the problem of white flight and to accomplish stable school
integration, some researchers suggest, is to integrate housing. Once civil rights laws strike down suburban housing discrimination, the argument goes, the schools will be quietly integrated as a natural result of changing residential patterns.

It may well be, however, that this argument can be turned on its head. It is hard to imagine how stable housing integration, involving large numbers of blacks, could be achieved in any reasonable period of time without a framework of area-wide integrated schools. Unless the normal process of channeling black residents to limited areas breaks down completely, there will be suburban ghettos with their own segregated schools. Once channeling is directed toward a particular area, that area tends to become steadily more black unless new white families continue to move in to replace those who depart in the normal process of rapid residential mobility.

Under the existing system there is virtually no incentive for a white family desiring to avoid segregated ghetto schools to move into a neighborhood with a substantial number of black neighbors. In all probability, based on past experience, the neighborhood school will become an overwhelmingly black school in the near future. Even those who would accept integration will very seldom accept this. Therefore their logical choice is to seek out one of the many segregated white areas in the metropolitan community. Without a desegregation plan, in other words, the white family often does not perceive a choice between an integrated and an all-white school but only between an all-white school and one that is almost certain to become virtually
all black. The only way one can break into this cycle of expectations is to assure families that the schools will be integrated wherever they move and that they will not become overwhelmingly non-white anywhere. This assurance could powerfully support a serious campaign for housing integration, if federal, state and local officials ever decided to mount one.

Any stable large-scale residential integration, extending beyond communities with special institutions and particularly favorable attitudes, probably requires solution of the problem of segregated schools. This seems certainly true in considering residential integration in the inner city-black neighborhoods. Americans have become so accustomed to thinking of ghetto expansion as an irreversible, inexorable process that there has been very little serious thought about the possibility of a significant movement back by young white families into central city ghetto neighborhoods.

There are several reasons for thinking that such a reverse movement might be possible, at least in certain central cities which remain viable economic and cultural centers. The skyrocketing cost of housing, severe environmental restrictions on building in many suburbs, the increasing costs of supporting the two-car, high energy consumption lifestyle, as well as the trend toward far smaller families and more working wives are all compatible with a possible central city revival. Such a reverse migration is now taking place in several parts of Washington, Philadelphia, and some other major cities. The
renovated communities have proved particularly attractive to young professionals, the very group that city leaders are most eager to attract and retain. Very few of the new residents, however, use the public schools. As a result residence is largely limited to those without school age children and those able to afford private schools. This means that the great bulk of middle class families would have to pay a prohibitive penalty to live in the central city. If the central city schools were integrated on a level that reflected the population distribution of the metropolitan area, this cost would be eliminated. The attractions of accessibility, diversity, energy economy, cultural opportunities, and the basically superior quality of older buildings might then permit a significant in-migration. Once such a migration reached a substantial scale, it would diminish the costs of maintaining school integration.

White Flight as a Triumph of National Housing Policy. The phenomenon described as "white flight" by students of school desegregation is often seen, in another light, from another angle, as a true triumph of the basic tools of U.S. housing policy during the post-World War II period. Facilitating white suburbanization has been a basic goal, explicitly at first and implicitly to this day. Federal policies have helped shape the environment in which every family makes their choice about where to live and those policies have skewed the choice very heavily in favor of the suburbs. Even last year Congress enacted a major incentive for movement to the outermost suburbs. When these policies are superimposed on a dual housing market, where blacks are
excluded from most new suburban housing, they are clearly policies fostering white flight.

The policies have taken many forms. Until 1950, the Federal Housing Administration openly favored segregated suburban developments in granting mortgage insurance, insurance commitments which aided both in the initial construction financing and in the sale of the housing. Until the late 1960's, HUD took no significant action against segregation in public housing.27/ The massive new housing subsidy programs created by the 1968 housing act were often used in ways that had the consequence of increasing segregation.28/ This year's large tax credit for the purchase of new homes unintentionally provides a powerful incentive for movement to the outermost suburbs. The policies have drawn investment to the suburbs, created powerful financial incentives for young families to choose suburban homes, and often intensified and expanded central city segregation.

One dramatic example of the relationship between federal housing policy and the departure of white families was provided in Detroit in the early 1970's. A program for low income homeownership was implemented in a way that saddled poor minority families with over-priced deteriorated housing they could not afford to maintain. The process created a temporary artificially inflated market allowing lower income white families to sell out and get enough money to leave for the suburbs. A former director of the Detroit FHA office, William Whitbeck, analyzed the results of a disaster which ultimately
left the government holding 11,000 vacant, unusable houses:

What happened in Detroit is that the white flight from the city was facilitated by the FHA to the nth degree. Not only did the readily available FHA insured mortgages facilitate somebody selling and leaving the city, but of course we insured the other end of the transaction, when he bought a new house out in the suburbs. We greased the skids the whole way. It's no wonder that Detroit lost 190,000 people from 1960 through 1970. The system was like a greased runway.2

Federal housing policies have worked to facilitate exactly what is happening now. The results greatly reinforce segregation. The federal policies have been sustained, powerful, and effective. There has been no significant offsetting effort to retain or return young middle class families to the central cities. If the problem is to be controlled, there surely must be one.

Policy Implications. Existing research on white flight and urban desegregation can support only limited policy recommendations. The current research findings suggest that the implementation of a desegregation plan, in itself, would have little or no impact on racial patterns in most communities where the issue is still open. The very limited experience with city-wide desegregation plans in the North and West, however, means that this conclusion rests on a very modest empirical base. The data suggests that any possible effect of desegregation plans on migration patterns is largely limited to the nation's biggest cities, suggesting that desegregation of many smaller cities can be feasibly undertaken without accelerating white departures.
The available research suggests that the first year of desegregation is a critical period for decisions to leave the public schools or move to another school district. This problem might be moderated by expansion of the small federal program providing special assistance for the transition, as well as strong leadership supporting compliance with the law.

The research also contains some indications that the problems would be significantly diminished by metropolitan desegregation. While the evidence is limited, it strongly supports the argument that the process works better when it incorporates the racial and-economic diversity of the metropolitan area and maintains substantial white majorities in desegregated schools.

The basic forces generating both white and black suburbanization are many-faceted and most are independent of school desegregation plans. There is no evidence that stopping school desegregation would stabilize central city racial patterns. If the pattern of flight is to be significantly modified, positive, coordinated, and often metropolitan-wide desegregation efforts dealing with both housing and schools will be required.
Footnotes


2. Extraordinary public attention was focused on an article critical of busing written by Professor David J. Armor. ("The Evidence on Busing," *Public Interest*, No. 28 (Summer 1972), pp. 90-126); the article did not reflect prevailing social science opinion (see: Thomas F. Pettigrew, Elizabeth L. Useem, Clarence Normand and Marshall S. Smith, "Busing: A Review of 'The Evidence'," *Public Interest* (Winter 1973). pp. 88-118.


16. *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 13, 1974 reports that the Korean population grew more than 100 percent and Filipino residents more than 50 percent 1970-1973.

"School Desegregation, 'Tipping,' and Private School Enrollment," 1974 finds a very small effect in predominantly white school systems. Professor Rossel's analysis, unlike Coleman's actually measured the effects of desegregation plans. Her conclusion from an elaborate analysis of 86 northern school districts was as follows: "...school desegregation has little or no effect on white flight, as measured by change in percentage white enrolled in public schools. Even in the two high desegregating school districts that had significant white flight, it is minimal ... and temporary. White flight stabilizes to a rate lower than the pre-desegregation period by the third year after desegregation in the only two districts that showed any significant change. Desegregating under court order does not increase white flight, nor does massive desegregation in large school districts."

18. James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John Moore, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73," unpublished Urban Institute Working Paper, July 1975, p. 53. Coleman suggests that extrapolation from his data indicates a far more dramatic initial loss in desegregation of a system like Detroit, with nearly three-fourths black pupils. Since no such city-wide plans have been implemented, this conclusion is untested.

19. Ibid., p. 59.


22. Ibid., p. 86.


SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
WHITE FLIGHT: THE ROLE
OF THE COURTS

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Introduction

In the debate about the existence of a link between court ordered school desegregation and "white flight", a good deal of confusion has arisen over what courts have actually decided in school desegregation cases and what factors influence their decisions. This brief article represents an attempt to dispel the confusion by summarizing the major legal principles that govern courts in determining whether a wrong has occurred and, if so, what remedies may properly be applied. In posing questions about the role of the courts, the article uses quotations by sociologist James Coleman not to stir further debate with him but because his quoted views will illustrate popular misconceptions about what courts do and why they do it.

1/ Have courts gone far beyond Brown v. Board of Education and sought to cure segregated conditions in the public schools that were not caused by the deliberate acts of public officials? [Dr. James C. Coleman has identified the elimination of racial segregation within schools "whatever the source," as an "explicit policy aim" of the federal government. And he evidently believes the courts have responded affirmatively to this aim:

I think the courts Constitutionally should limit their actions to undoing the effects of official discrimination. But the very large proportion of school segregation by race and by social class is due to individual action, and I think courts overstep their bounds when they try to counterbalance those individual actions.]

2/ No. The courts have not so acted. The allegation that the courts have sought to deal with de facto segregation -- that is, segregation that comes about accidentally or as a result simply of segregated housing pat-
terns -- has been made most frequently about non-southern school desegregation cases.

Yet in the first non-southern case to reach the Supreme Court, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, the Court made it clear that racially segregated schools in Denver were in violation of the Constitution only because they came about as a result of deliberate acts of school officials. The Court's concern was with "petitioners' contention that respondent School Board engaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate segregation ...." It was up to the plaintiffs to "prove that the school authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation ...."

Intentional segregative action by the school board could be proved, said the Court, by looking to whether the board had structured attendance zones, built schools to a certain size and in certain locations, used mobile classrooms and student transfer policies, assigned faculty and staff, and closed certain schools so as to maintain segregation in the school district.

Lower federal court decisions have been consistent with Keyes. For example, in the Boston case the district court ordered desegregation because it found that school officials had engaged in a litany of segregative acts. They had overcrowded predominantly white schools and underutilized black schools. They far more frequently had built new facilities -- new schools or annexes -- to aid white students rather than blacks. They approved options for individual students to enroll in schools to which they normally would not be assigned, for the most part, only white students for vocational schools. They administered racially discriminatory vocational school entrance examinations. They not only assigned black teachers only to black
schools but placed in those schools a lower proportion of experienced teachers and a higher proportion of provisional teachers. They drew attendance zones and student feeder patterns so as to maintain segregation.

It is true that there was a period, roughly 1958 to 1963, when plaintiffs in some cases sought a remedy based solely on the fact that racial segregation existed, that there was proof it was harmful, and that the state assigned children to public schools. If the courts had accepted these arguments, it might be said with some justification that they were acting against de facto segregation and were proceeding in part on sociological considerations.

But the courts decisively rejected these arguments. The Tenth Circuit in Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, Kansas, wrote that

\[8/\]
a school board [need not] destroy or abandon a school system developed on the neighborhood school plan, even though it results in a racial imbalance in the schools, where .... that school system has been honestly and conscientiously constructed with no intention or purpose to maintain or perpetuate segregation. \[9/\]

Since then, lawyers for minority children have sought in almost all cases to prove that segregation was the result of deliberate acts of school officials, and courts have ruled for plaintiffs only when satisfied that such acts have occurred. Indeed, as pointed out by J. Harold Flannery at the symposium, prior to the de facto cases lawyers had successfully litigated Northern cases using this theory, including Clemens v. School Board \[10/\] and Taylor v. New Rochelle. \[11/\]
One area of the law not yet settled is whether school segregation is unconstitutional if caused by intentionally discriminatory acts by public officials other than school officials. In *Swann v. Board of Education* the Supreme Court referred to "a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools" as necessary for federal court intervention. The Court, however, did not reach the question of state action by other than school officials.

In *Milliken v. Bradley*, the only non-southern case other than *Keyes* to reach the Supreme Court, the Court also alluded to the possibility that discriminatory housing practices carried out by the state which caused segregated housing patterns could serve as a basis for remedying school segregation. It concluded that, "in its present posture, the case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations."

Once courts have determined that a legal wrong has occurred, have they sought to devise relief that goes beyond that necessary to remedy the wrong? [Dr. Coleman has criticized the courts for attempting, in his view, to "impose a system-wide remedy to correct what is legally a localized wrong."]

No. In *Swann* the Supreme Court made it clear that "the nature of the violation determined the scope of the remedy." This was reemphasized in *Milliken*: "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."

Confusion on this question has stemmed from the fact that it is not always easy to determine with surgical precision how far-reaching an impact the
wrong has had. Rather than proceed school by school to make an exhaustive inquiry whether segregation was the product of specific acts of wrong doing, the courts had adopted certain rules of judicial convenience based on common sense.

Two such rules of convenience -- which may be called the doctrine of reciprocal effect and the doctrine of assumed intent -- were formulated in Keyes. The first suggests that if some schools in a district are all black or all white as a result of deliberate action, it may be assumed that these acts had a "reciprocal effect" on the racial composition of other schools. The second suggests that if school officials deliberately segregated some schools in the district and other schools are also segregated, it may be assumed that this happened through design not accident. School authorities can seek to overcome these presumptions, but the burden of proof properly rests with them to show that segregation in one school did not affect other schools and that the segregation was not intentional.

Have the courts based remedies on particular sociological theories? [Dr. Coleman has said, "If integration had been limited to racial integration, if there had not been an attempt to carry out widespread class integration, then the fear of [racial] incidents would have been much less, and the experience with integration would have been much more positive.

No. The courts remedy legal wrongs alone. In Swann the Supreme Court said that

[t]he task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution. In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation.
And in removing Swann from his active docket, Judge James B. McMillan wrote, "This court's orders are based not upon the theories of statisticians but upon the Constitution of the United States." 24/

Apparently Dr. Coleman believes that the courts have acted on his findings that schools consisting of a majority of advantaged students offer the best prospect for improving the achievement of disadvantaged children while maintaining the achievement of advantaged children. Yet only one case has been found in which a court has cited class segregation as a wrong to be remedied apart from racial segregation.

In Hobson v. Hansen, the track system employed in the schools of the District of Columbia to group students according to ability was in part invalidated, because standard aptitude tests were used to measure ability and these tests were found to discriminate against socio-economically disadvantaged children. The courts generally have not been concerned with the possibilities of class discrimination. In fact, in such cases as Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. and Morgan v. Hennigan remedies appear to have been adopted to cure legal wrongs that involved principally lower income whites and blacks.

Indeed, Judge Sobeloff in Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 1 of Clarendon County, South Carolina rejected sociological theories on optimum racial composition of schools (suggested as a means of avoiding white flight) when the implementation of such theories would leave many schools all black saying that, "[w]hite flight is one expression of resistance to integration but the Supreme Court has held over and over that courts must not per-
mit community hostility to intrude on the application of constitutional principles.” The Court in Brinson also rejected the theory that a particular racial balance was necessary to best promote learning: “[s]chool segregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to black children and immeasurably taints the education they receive. This is the precise lesson of Brown.”

Do these limitations on courts mean that they cannot seek to implement those plans that are most educationally sound and that are most likely to be accepted by the community? [Dr. Coleman has argued that] “[o]ther branches of government can initiate policies such as desegregation in ways that excite fewer fears among middle class parents, and thus generate less counteraction.”

No. Courts cannot, of course, allow basic constitutional rights to be sacrificed to community opposition. "[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."

[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial authorities, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingeniously." But working within this general principle, courts can and do seek to implement the soundest and most acceptable remedies.

They take care to minimize disruption:

-- transfer of juniors and seniors may be limited even more strictly
than is the transfer of other students, so that a school spirit, necessary to stability, will be carried over after the school is desegregated;

-- partially constructed schools or additions may be completed although the site on which the construction is taking place would not have been approved for the building of a new school.

Every attempt is made to minimize the distance children will have to travel to attend school:

-- strict neighborhood school systems will be approved if sufficient to eliminate segregation;

-- pairing and clustering of schools should begin with closely proximate schools and move to noncontiguous zones only if necessary;

-- busing will not be approved when it creates a risk to students' health or significantly affects their education.

And courts frequently undertake to give all affected members of the community access and do not merely create their own remedies without citizen input. 34/ "A solution that tries to enlist the better nature of a community in a constructive manner is not a surrender to community prejudice." 35/

Courts also have imposed restraint on themselves by requiring that whenever possible remedies should be devised by school authorities. They "have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems." 36/ "Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults." 37/ For example, in Quality Education for All Children, Inc. v. School Board of School District #205 of Winnebago County, Illinois, 38/ the court wrote that "it would not be appropriate for the Court to become an
activist and formulate a program of integration for the School District."

Ten and a half months later, when still no acceptable plan had been put forth, the court reiterated this view.

Finally, and perhaps most notably, the courts have, where choices were available, favored desegregation plans which offer the best prospect for stability. The aim is "not only [to] protect black students from intimidation but .... also .... to achieve a more stable educational environment for all students." In an urban context, the best prospects for achieving stability in the racial composition of desegregated public schools often exist in those areas where the school district encompasses an entire metropolitan area, including both city and suburbs. This was the case in Swann, where Judge McMillan approved a systemwide plan in which the racial proportion in each school in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was close to the 71% - 29% white-black student ratio in the system as a whole. This left no public schools that would serve as havens for those seeking to avoid segregation, and in integration indeed has proved stable.

There are, of course, relatively few metropolitan school systems with systemwide desegregation plans, but available data does not suggest that they have provoked white flight. Indeed, in the one district covered by Dr. Coleman's study, Tampa-Hillsborough, the data contradicts his general conclusions linking desegregation to white flight. In Tampa a drastic decrease in segregation was accompanied by a substantial increase in the contact of blacks and whites and little, if any, white flight.
The other instance of a metropolitan plan, Nashville-Davidson, provides a further example of stable integration. The system has about 80,000 pupils and, although initially suffering some white loss to private schools, after three years of operation has succeeded in minimizing both "white flight" and racial incidents, while maintaining a racial balance in the schools which reflects the overall population in the area.

The principal limitation on the courts' seeking stability is that they cannot in the name of stability go beyond what is necessary to correct the wrong. In cases coming from Richmond and Detroit the Supreme Court was unable to find a wrong which would justify metropolitan relief even though such relief might offer the best prospects for a stable desegregation program.
Conclusion

In sum, federal courts in determining both whether a wrong has been committed and the appropriate redress have been actuated by legal principles, not by sociological or educational theories. In deciding upon the existence of a wrong, the courts have been insistent that psychological or sociological evidence of harm is not sufficient absent proof of deliberate action by public officials to segregate schools. On the issue of remedy, courts do have more flexibility, but here too they face constraints that prevent them from adopting plans solely because they conform to sociological or education theories. When courts in fashioning remedies have used their equity powers to consider matters such as the stability of a desegregation plan, the plans adopted often have been consonant with research findings on the best ways to maximize educational benefits through integration. But such plans, particularly those applying to city-county school systems, have not been shown to have counter productive results. Indeed, far from promoting "white flight", they appear to have achieved stable integration.
Footnotes


5/ Id. at 198.

6/ Id. at 201.


8/ Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, Kansas, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964); Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).

9/ 336 F.2d at 998.

10/ 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).


13/ Id. at 32.


15/ Id. at 728 n. 7. Concurring, Justice Stewart said that "a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district lines might well be appropriate" if there were shown "purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws." Id. at 752.


17/ 402 U.S. at 16.

18/ 418 U.S. at 744.

19/ See id. at 200, 201, 203.

20/ See id. at 207-208.
See id. at 208-211.


402 U.S. at 16.


Note 7 supra.

429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970).

See id. at 827.

See id. at 826.


Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 24 at 300.


Swann v. Board of Education, supra note 10 at 16.


Id. at 1002.


A side effect of such plans also may have been to accomplish class as well as racial integration, but this was not the reason for their adoption. And since they were systemwide, the objectives of stability and class integration do not appear on the surface to be at odds with each other, as Dr. Coleman suggests. Of course, if as a result white parents fled the public school system entirely and enrolled their children in private schools, then the goals would be at odds. But this appears to have happened, if at all, only in the initial, somewhat uncertain stages of implementation of desegregation plans.

New York Times, July 17, 1975. This is to be distinguished from the principle that white flight cannot be the basis for limiting a remedy to less than that required by the Constitution such as where a plan would leave a number of all-black schools.

See notes 16 and 17 supra.


Millsiken v. Bradley, note 12 supra.