In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research.

(Author/JM)
A STUDY OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS

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The impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance is examined empirically. Questionnaires administered to 234 predominantly lower-class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders provide data indicating that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. Among the findings we note that while both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socio-economic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Noting this neglect, race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research.
RACE AND CRIMINAL DEVIANCE: A STUDY OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS

Introduction

For all the public consciousness of race and its social consequences in American life there has been little systematic consideration of racial factors in the sociological study of criminal deviance. Race is typically either ignored or treated as class differentiation in theoretical and empirical assessments of the nature and genesis of such deviance (for example: Cohen, 1955; Merton, 1957; Miller, 1958; Becker, 1963; Matza, 1964. A major exception is Short and Strodtbeck, 1965; a lesser exception is Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). This lack of systematic concern would seem to be a significant oversight. If white and non-white have been separated into "two worlds of race" (Franklin, 1965), then it would appear that until the play of racial factors upon the character of criminal behavior has been thoroughly and systematically evaluated, a thorough understanding of deviance in the American experience must elude social scientists.

In this paper an attempt will be made to examine the impact of racial difference on the self-perceptions of black and white youthful offenders. While such individuals represent only one among many categories of deviant actors, they are a numerically significant and much theorized-about population. The basic question we shall address is this: As distinguished by the manner in which they perceive themselves, do criminally deviant youths constitute a homogeneous group in the general population, irrespective of their racial backgrounds, or do they constitute racially separate deviant subgroups?

If black and white youthful offenders exhibit self-profiles which are basically indistinguishable, we might conclude that there exists within the
youthful population a relatively homogeneous group of offenders likely to violate the law for essentially the same reasons, regardless of racial background. If, alternatively, we should find that race has a significant impact on the self-perceptions of youthful offenders, we might then argue that the etiology of criminal behavior varies according to differences in experience inherent in the caste-like separation of the "two worlds of race." Any argument of this latter sort would suggest that existing "color blind" theories of deviance and its genesis are in need of reformulation. To the extent, moreover, that such theories presently inform prevention and rehabilitation programs, such programs would have to be modified in a manner consonant with the reconstruction and validation of these theories.

The following research represents, then, an attempt to evaluate the impact of race on the self-perceptions of a significant sub-population of individuals who by virtue of their behavioral choices may justifiably be considered as deviant in contemporary America society (youthful offenders aged 15-30). Such an assessment, we submit, can lead to a refinement of our present conceptions of deviance (criminal deviance in particular) and its genesis. Our analysis focuses upon such characteristics as "criminal" or "straight" aspects of self (as perceived by the research subjects) and global psychological traits such as self-esteem, perceptions of self-stability, and personal control. After describing our research methods, we shall turn to an examination of observed racial differences, concluding with a speculative analysis, grounded in the data, of racially specific etiological scenarios of criminal deviance, -- scenarios we believe to be "best fit" characterizations of the blacks and whites in the present study.
Methods

Questionnaires administered to 234 black and white male inmates in Yardville Youth Reception and Correction Center in Trenton, New Jersey in 1971 provide the data for this study. Seven measures provide the focus of the present research. Of these, 4 are concerned specifically with criminal and "straight" aspects of self (set A), while the remaining 3 involve the global traits of self-esteem, stability of self, and sense of personal control (set B). Comparison of black and white scores on these measures, as well as observation of racial differences in the interrelationships between these measures, represent the basic tasks of the analysis, -- an analysis directed substantially more toward the uncovering of theoretically meaningful patterns in the data than to the enumeration of simple associations.

In the following the research setting, sample, and measures are described.

A. Setting

A large meeting room at Yardville Center was used throughout the data collection. At regular pre-arranged intervals groups of 5 to 10 inmates entered the meeting room and seated themselves freely around a large table. In each administration session inmates were told the general purpose of the study. Questions were called for, then the questionnaire was read aloud, taking between sixty to seventy minutes to complete, including a five to ten minute break at midpoint. No guards were present in the room during any session.

B. Sample

Of those inmates sampled, the questionnaires of 129 blacks and 105 whites with previous imprisonment provide the data for the present analysis.
In line with similar findings (Monahan, 1957; Chilton and Markle, 1972), the present sample shows a higher rate of disrupted family or origin status than do comparable youths in the general U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1968:22), and it shows this disruption at a higher rate for blacks than whites (Harris, 1973). Apart from this difference, however, comparisons between the two racial groups reveal little in the way of background differences. Comparisons on this score include: "seriousness" of criminal histories (Harris, 1973), present age (the mean for both races at about 22 years), age at first arrest (the mean for both races at about 15 years), the number of times and total time imprisoned previously (the mean for both races at about 1.7 times and 2 years respectively), months since last prior imprisonment (the mean for both groups at about 12 months), education (the mean for both groups at about 10 years), and family of origin socioeconomic status (both groups coming from predominantly lower-SES origins; Harris, 1973). Such similarities might well be expected of samples drawn from a correctional setting and, by reducing the possibility of confounding factors, make the job of more interesting racial comparisons easier.

C. Measures

As indicated above the core of this study involves two sets of variables: (A) four measures specifically concerned with criminal and "straight" aspects of self, and (B), three measures concerned with the global traits of self-esteem, stability of self, and sense of personal control. Given very similar demographic profiles (apart from racial ethnicity itself), and the potentially homogenizing effects of very similar intervention histories, we might well expect the blacks and whites surveyed to show little cross-racial differences in degree of criminal self-definition, proportion of income accrued from
criminal means, and perception of the relative wisdom of criminal choice (Set A variables), as well as little difference in terms of sense of self-worth, self-stability, and perceived ability to control outcomes in life (Set B variables). Similarly, we might also expect the two racial groups to differ only insignificantly, if at all, in terms of the manner in which, for each race, Set A variables are related to Set B variables. On the assumption that the experiences of poverty, crime, and incarceration are functionally interchangeable for the blacks and whites in the sample, then we should, that is, expect no racial difference in the way criminal and "straight" aspects of self support or undermine a corresponding sense of self as worthy, stable, and effective in goal-attainment. As we shall see, these and other such assumptions are contradicted by the findings.

Set A: Criminal and "Straight" Aspects of Self

Incorporated into a larger theoretical framework than that elaborated here (cf. Harris, 1973), 4 indices within the questionnaire -- described below -- were concerned with the measurement of (1) criminal and "straight" self-definitions, (2) the relative expected value of criminal (vs. "straight") choice, and (3) of criminal income (prior to last arrest).

(1) and (2) Criminal and "Straight" Identity

Appended to the back of each inmate's questionnaire was an envelope containing 16 slips of paper. In part derived from the work of Reckless et al. (1957), Farnan and Clinard (1965), and Lerman (1967), these words represented potential attributes of self to be sorted, in standard Q-sort fashion (Stephenson, 1953, Rogers, 1954), into a number of different sized piles reflecting inmates' hypothetically own self-definitions. One subset of these attributes contained the 4 terms, "Hard-Working," "Lawful," "Obedient," and "Straight." This comprised the "straight" attribute set. Another subset contained the 4 words, "Hustling," "Disobedient," "Unlawful," and "Delinquent." This comprised the criminal attribute set. The third set of attributes comprised 8 fillers, such as "Easy-Going" and "Uncertain." It was empirically possible for any subset of 4 of the 16 attribute terms to score as high as
6. Thus the measure of criminal identity and the measure of "straight" identity -- each derived directly from scoring inmates' sorts of the two relevant attribute sets -- were each free to maximize at 24 and minimize at 3 .(How both could not empirically maximize at 24 or minimize at 3 (Farriss, 1973 for details)).

(3) Relative Expected Value of Criminal Choice

Of primary concern in the research was a measure attempting to capture inmates' evaluation of two major alternative kinds of behavioral choice: "going crooked" and "going straight." Because of the importance of this measure -- and because of its relative complexity -- a detailed elaboration of its construction and use is offered as follows: Under the terms of any general sociological model in which behavioral choice is a variable, we would expect an actor's cognitive evaluation of possible goals, and means to goals, to provide the fundamental basis for such choice. Our measure of this evaluative process, "expected value," is derived from the classical formulation of "subjective expected utility" (cf. Simon, 1957:244-245) and refers to an hypothesized cognitive state of actor wherein possible goals and means are evaluated in combination. The product of this process, expected value, reflects the perceived value (goal) of a behavioral choice (means) as weighted by the subjective estimate of obtaining the value if the behavior were to be performed in actuality (cf. Strodtbeck and Short, 1964). The logic of this decision-making paradigm suggests that we would expect behavioral alternatives with higher subjectively expected value to be chosen and performed at a higher rate that those alternatives with lesser subjectively expected value.

Following Strodtbeck and Short (1964), we assume, at a minimum, that actors are able to rank the payoff values of outcomes contingent upon alternative, personal behavioral choices. We also assume that actors weight this value by the perceived likelihood of it occurring. Thus while the perceived value of being a bank president might represent the strongest reference in an actor's array of personal references, he might also perceive the likelihood of this payoff to be nil. If we express subjective expected utility as the joint product of value and probability then, in this case, "trying to become a bank president" would have a very low expected utility (if any at all).

We also assume that a choice contains a possible dis-incentive value (a subjectively expected disutility). In the general case, then, we wish to define the expected value of a choice (EV) as equal to some quantity reflecting both the subjectively expected utility of the choice (EU) and the subjectively expected disutility of the choice (ED). For the sake of parsimony and simplicity we also want this quantity to be a positive number which varies from 0.00 to 1.00, where 0.00 represents minimal expected utility and maximal expected disutility ("pure maximal loss"), and where 1.00 represents maximal expected utility and minimal expected disutility ("pure maximal gain"). To meet these criteria we must allow cardinal numbers to be assigned to the terms "utility," "disutility," and subjective "probability" and (to avoid possibly negative quantities for EV) we need a formulation in which expected disutility is expressed as a positive quantity. Expressed verbally, these criteria are met by a formula wherein EV is equal to the expected utility of choice X plus the quantity "1 - the expected disutility of choice X," with the sum of these expectations averaged to yield
an overall expression of the attractiveness of choice \( X \):

\[
EV_X = \text{Expected Utility}_X + (1 - \text{Expected Disutility}_X)
\]

where

\[
\text{Expected Utility}_X = P(U|X) \times (U|X)
\]

\[
\text{Expected Disutility}_X = P(D|X) \times (D|X)
\]

and where:

\( P \) = "the conditional probability of," where 0.00 \( \leq P \leq 1.00 \)

\( U \) = "the conditional utility of," where 0.00 \( \leq U \leq 1.00 \)

\( D \) = "the conditional disutility of," where 0.00 \( \leq D \leq 1.00 \)

\( X \) = a choice or type of choice

In \( EV_X \) then, we have a quantity which hypothetically reflects the overall incentive value of a behavioral choice. This overall incentive value is arrived at by weighting the utilities (rewards) and disutilities (costs) associated with a choice by the perceived likelihood of these outcomes actually occurring, and then, so to speak, "averaging" these (reward and cost) expectations.

Thus far only \( EV_X \) has been defined. To define the "relative expected value of criminal choice" we need to introduce the two explicit types of choice of present concern: criminal choice (C), and "straight" choice (S). To each of these we attach the term "expected value" (EV) to yield \( EV_C \) and \( EV_S \). Given the assumption that these two types of choice exhaust the hypothetical set of all classifiable choices for an act, we may define the relative expected value of criminal choice \( (REV_C) \) as:

\[
REV_C = \frac{EV_C}{EV_C + EV_S}
\]

Some questionnaire items used to assign \( EV_C \) and \( EV_S \) scores, and by derivation \( REV_C \) scores, will help illuminate the meaning of this measure. Example 1 represents in (a), a measure of the subjective estimate of the probability of a set of events (utilities) associated, for inmates, with "going straight" (i.e., \( P(U|S) \)). Part (b) in this example represents a measure of the possible utility of "going straight" (i.e., \( U|S \)).
Ex. 1: "Now I'd like you to imagine having a steady job. People say that certain good things can go along with this. Like a nice house, a good car, and good money.

(a) What do you think the chances would be of getting things like these if you had a steady job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Chance</th>
<th>Low Chance</th>
<th>Some Chance</th>
<th>Good Chance</th>
<th>High Chance</th>
<th>Completely Certain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) How happy do you think you would be if you got things like these?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Happy At All</th>
<th>A Little Happy</th>
<th>Somewhat Happy</th>
<th>Pretty Happy</th>
<th>Very Happy</th>
<th>Completely Happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sake of illustration, let us say inmate A had circled "40%" in answer to (a) and "90%" in answer to (b). On this measure of EU₉ he would score (.40) x (.90) or .36.

Example 2 represents, in (a) a measure of the subjective probability of disutilities associated with "going crooked" (i.e., P(ICC)), and, in (b), a measure of the perceived "dis-value" of these disutilities (i.e., (IHC)).

Ex. 2: "Now I'd like you to imagine having a criminal career. People say that certain bad things can go along with this. Like being in jail, bad nerves, shame and a record.

(a) What do you think the chances would be of things like these happening to you if you had a criminal career?

(Followed by the same response scale as in (a) Ex. 1 above.)

(b) How unhappy do you think you would be if things like these happened to you?

(Followed by the same response scale as in (b) in Ex. 1 above, except for the substitution of the word "Unhappy" for "Happy").

Suppose inmate A circles "80%" in answer to (a) and "80%" in answer to (b). On this measure of EU₉ he would score (.80) x (.80) or .64. Let us also suppose that in response to the "straight" analogy to Example 2 (vis-a-vis "boredom, frustration, worry and responsibility" associated with a "steady job"), inmate A circled "80%" in answer to (a) and "40%" in answer to (b). On this measure of EU₉ he would score (.80) x (.40) or .32. Finally, let us suppose that in response to the criminal analogy to Example 2, A scored an EU₉ of .24.
On the basis of these 4 scores -- $EU_S$, $ED_S$, $EU_C$, and $ED_C$ -- A's relative expected value of criminal choice could be calculated as follows:

$$EV_S = \frac{EU_S + (1 - ED_S)}{2} = \frac{.36 + (1 - .32)}{2} = .52$$

$$EV_C = \frac{EU_C + (1 - ED_C)}{2} = \frac{.24 + (1 - .64)}{2} = .30$$

$$REV_C = \frac{EV_C}{EV_C + EV_S} = \frac{.30}{.30 + .52} = .37$$

Given a $REV_C$ of .37 we might well expect inmate A to choose the "straight" behavior path -- at the time of measurement -- with regular consistency. For our purposes, however, an absolute interpretation of $REV_C$ is not necessary. Concern instead, lies in the joint distribution of these scores with other variables in the analysis.

(4) Criminal Income

A simple measure of criminal income was obtained by asking inmates to report the percent of their total income received from criminal or illegal activities prior to their present entry into prison.

Set B: Global Traits

Three measures in the questionnaire were concerned with the assessment of broad psychological dispositions. Two were derived from the work of Rosenberg (1965) and dealt with general feelings of self-worth and self-equilibrium. It was expected that these variables would be significantly related to self-definition and the relative expected value of criminal choice ($REV_C$), with stronger criminal identity and $REV_C$ negatively associated with self-esteem and stability. The third measure was derived from Rotter (1966) and Gurin et al. (1969) and attempted to tap the general feeling of being in personal control of one's fate (i.e., behavioral outcomes). While it was expected that this measure would be positively related to self-esteem and stability of self, its expected relation to the variables in Set A was not defined.
(1) Self-Esteem

Relying upon the items developed by Rosenberg (1965), 10 questions were used to index self-esteem. To statements of the sort, "I take a positive attitude toward myself," or, "I generally feel that I am a person of worth, at least equal to others," inmates were asked to respond by checking one of seven Likert-type response categories of agreement/disagreement. Scores on this variable could range from a low of 7 to a high of 70.

(2) Stability of Self

Five items (Rosenberg, 1965) were used to measure inmates' stability of self-imagery. To statements of the sort, "I've noticed that my ideas about myself seem to change very quickly," or, "I find that on one day I have one opinion of myself and on another day I have another opinion," inmates were also asked to respond in seven-point Likert fashion. Stability of self scores could thus range from 5 (low stability) to 35 (high stability).

(3) Personal Control

Based on Rotter's (1966) external-internal control items, and the later work of Gurin et al. (1969), a series of 5 items was employed to tap inmates' general feelings of being in control of their personal "fate". Relying again on 7-point Likert response categories, inmates were asked to respond to statements of the sort, "When I make plans I am almost certain I can make them work," or, "What happens to me is my own doing." Scores on "personal control" were free to range from a low of 5 (high attribution of personal outcomes to external events) to a high of 35 (low attribution of personal outcomes to external events).

Findings

The data suggest interesting cross-racial similarities and differences. Interrelationships of variables within Set A and within Set B appear very much the same for both blacks and whites. When, however, we turn to comparing the racial groups on their mean scores on the various measures such as on the "relative expected value of criminal choice" (REV) or "self-esteem" -- we find striking differences. These differences, in turn, appear to be accounted for to some extent by yet other observed cross-racial differences: the interrelationships across variables in Set A (e.g., REV) and Set B (e.g., self-esteem) vary by race. Variance here strongly suggests
that criminal and "straight" expectations and self-definitions affect self-worth and stability very differently for blacks and whites.

While the impact of these expectations and self-definitions on sense of self-worth and stability may be specific to a population of officially identified delinquents, the observed racial differences cannot apriori be attributed to "criminality" itself. Rather, as we shall argue, these differences appear in the main attributable to processes which antedate criminality and incarceration, to processes associated with what are probably the very different experiences of being a poor black as opposed to being a poor white -- each with differentially low access to the realization of mainstream goals -- in contemporary American society.

A. Interrelationships Within Set A and Within Set B

Simple correlations between the variables in Set A support only in part the general assumption of cross-racial homogeneity in the cognitive interplay of identity, the rational wisdom of broad behavioral choices which affect identity, and the economic features of such identity and choice.

As Table 1 indicates, both races show significant positive interrelationships between criminal self-definition, the relative expected value of criminal choice, and illegally earned income. Similarly, both races show significant negative correlations between "straight" self-definition and these criminal aspects of self.

Though there are no significant differences (Z scores) between races in the strength of the correlations in Set A, there are two comparisons which approach significance and these are worth noting. Both comparisons
have to do with the degree to which "straight" and criminal dimensions appear polarized -- perhaps morally opposed -- for the two races. First, the correlation between "straight" identity and criminal income, understandably negative for both races, is stronger, more polarized for whites ($r = -0.548$) than for blacks ($r = -0.416$) ($Z = 1.259$). Second, and perhaps more important, the correlation between "straight" identity and criminal identity, -- again, expectably negative -- reflects more polarization between these dimensions of self for whites ($r = -0.839$) than for blacks ($r = -0.777$) ($Z = 1.319$). Though these differences are not significantly strong, they are -- as we shall see -- theoretically in line with our other findings. Although "going straight" and "going crooked" (behaviorally), and "being straight" and "being crooked" (existentially) appear to be discrete and meaningful if not morally opposed possibilities for both races, the data suggest these possibilities to be somewhat more opposed and discrete for whites than for blacks.11

Turning to the correlations with Set B we find support for the basic assumption of cross-racial similarity in the interplay of self-worth and self-equilibrium.

-- Table 2, about here, --

Table 2 suggests that for both races stability of self is intimately related to positive self-esteem and to a sense of personal control in life. But while personal control is significantly related to self-esteem for both blacks and whites, the relationship is substantially stronger for whites ($r = 0.422$) than for blacks ($r = 0.184$). The difference between these correlations ($Z = 1.959$) nears significance ($p = 0.06$) and suggests a rather marked racial difference in the degree to which positive self-imagery is shorn up by a sense of control over one's fate: for whites the link between
3. Racial Differences Across Variable Means

Thus far we have looked at the interrelationships of variables within Set A and within Set B. We now turn to a cross-racial comparison involving mean scores on these variables. Where in the preceding we found some suggestive racial differences, we now find more explicit ones.

Table 3. about here

Sharp cross-racial contrast with regard to the relative expected value of criminal choice (REV) is indicated in Table 3, with blacks showing significantly higher levels of REV than whites. Perhaps the best way to interpret REV scores, and consequently this racial difference, is to note that the theoretical "break even" point in the choice between "going straight" and "going crooked" occurs at a REV level of .500 (known in expected utility models as the "indifference point"). Thus in these terms we see that while for both races sampled it is still more "rational" to "go straight" than to "go crooked," for blacks (with a mean REV level of .432) it is differentially "less rational" to "go straight" than it is for whites (with a mean REV level of .353).

Given racial differences in levels of REV, it is not surprising to see racial differences in (relative) criminal income. On this measure blacks again score higher than whites, showing a mean of 60.6% of their income coming from illegal activities compared to a white mean of 53.3% (the difference approaches significance).

In turning to black-white comparisons on the measures of "straight" and criminal identity, however, we observe a putative anomaly. While within-
race comparisons show both blacks' and whites' criminal self-definitions to be stronger than their "straight" self-definitions, blacks show higher "straight" identity scores than whites (15.29 vs. 14.31) and lower criminal identity scores than whites (15.37 vs. 15.78). In the context of observed racial differences on level of REV$C$ and criminal income "in the other direction," this finding would seem rather surprising. Our interpretation of this anomaly, while post hoc, appears to be reasonably consistent with the data, however, and is as follows.

It is not surprising that actors officially identified as bona fide deviants should define themselves (as observed above) as more criminal than "straight." Such definitions, however, are not made without reference to salient groups in which actors define themselves as members. To expect that in contemporary American society whites define themselves as members in the broad grouping "whites," and blacks in the broad grouping "blacks," is neither radical nor without empirical support. The question is, rather, how are these broad reference groups characterized by their members, and how do members perceive other representatives, mythical or real, in the grouping? Straightforwardly we assume that (a) whites maintain more extensive representation of mythical and real "straights" in their reference groups than do blacks in their reference group, and (b) whites distinguish mythical and real "straights" and "crooks" more discretely and in polarized fashion in their white reference group than do blacks in their black reference group. As such, we assume whites to be differentially more sensitive to the official certification, "deviant," than blacks. If and when such implicit or explicit definitional pressure is brought to bear, as it has been on the members of our sample, we might thus expect to find whites
on the basis of their own cognitive scheme -- experiencing greater perceived self-expulsion from "straight" groupings than blacks. 13 To the degree that the grouping schema are polarized (as suggested by the inverse correlations between "straight" and criminal identity, stronger for whites than for blacks), then such expulsion should lead to greater perceived self-expulsion into "crooked" groupings. 14 Put simply, whites who are officially identified as "criminal" show stronger criminal and lower "straight" definitions of self than comparable blacks because whites see themselves as more socially distant from other whites (mythical and real) who have not been so identified, than do comparable blacks see themselves as distant from other blacks. 15 This perceived social distance finds its analogue in psychological distance. We now turn to the question of racial differences in level of self-esteem, stability of self, and personal control.

As Table 4 below indicates, the present sample of white youths shows significantly higher levels of personal control ($\bar{x} = 23.44$) than the sample of black youths ($\bar{x} = 22.22$). This is consistent with the recent findings of others (Gurin et al., 1969; Backman, 1970). The black sample, however, shows somewhat (but not significantly) higher self-stability ($\bar{x} = 20.71$) than the white sample ($\bar{x} = 20.11$). Blacks also show significantly higher levels of self-esteem ($\bar{x} = 50.01$) than whites ($\bar{x} = 46.40$). This is also consistent with the recent findings of others, notably Rosenberg and Simmons (1971).

Thus contrary to what might be commonsense sociological assumptions, Tables 3 and 4 show black inmates to have stronger "straight" self-definitions than white inmates, weaker criminal self-definitions, greater stability of self, and higher self-esteem. We have already briefly addressed the unexpected findings on self-identity. In the next
section some additional findings will help illuminate the findings on self-esteem and stability.

C. Racial Differences in Interrelationships Across Set A and B

Simple correlations between the variables in Set A with the variables in Set B rather clearly support the contention that the impact of criminal (and "straight") self-definitions, of the relative expected value of criminal choice, and criminal income on the psychological traits of personal control, self-stability, and self-esteem is substantially different for whites and blacks.

From Table 5, it may be seen that REVc has about the same effect for both races on personal control: it appears to decrease inmates' sense of being in charge of their own fates (r = -.27 for blacks, and -.28 for whites). Apart from this, however, REVc has noticeably different effects by race. For blacks, higher levels of REVc are associated with modestly increased stability of self-imagery (r = .13) and higher self-esteem (r = .14). For whites, however, higher levels of REVc are linked with decreased stability of self-imagery (r = -.16) and lower self-esteem (r = -.20). (Cross-racial differences in r for both these correlations are significant.)

The racially differential impact of criminal income on Set B variables is even more pronounced. For blacks, higher proportions of income from criminal activities are associated with increases in personal control (r = .10), stability of self (r = .11) and self-esteem (r = .21). For whites, however, relative criminal income is associated with marked decreases in personal control (r = -.22), stability of self (r = -.17) and self-esteem (r = -.25). (Cross-racial differences in r for all three correlations are significant).
Where REV and criminal income show generally opposite effects on Set B variables by race, "straight" self-definitions show effects in the same direction for both races, but these effects are all weaker for blacks. Stronger "straight" self-conceptions, for whites, are associated with significant increases in personal control, stability of self, and self-esteem (the respective r's = .13, .21, and .30). But for blacks the comparable correlations are all lower (.01, .18, and .07). (The cross-racial difference in the positive correlation between "straight" identity and self-esteem approaches significance.)

Finally, criminal self-definition (like criminal income) shows weak but opposite effects on personal control for blacks (r = .03) and whites (r = -.11). Like "straight" self-definition, criminal self-definition shows the same direction of impact on the other Set B variables, for both races. The effect is negative for both races, but substantially weaker for blacks. Where stronger criminal self definitions for whites are associated with significant decreases in stability of self and in self-esteem (r = -.25 and -.36), for blacks criminal selfDefinitions are associated with merely marginal decreases in stability and esteem (r = -.07 and -.02). (The cross-racial difference in the negative correlation between criminal identity and self-esteem is significant.)

Let us review and interpret what we take to be the major findings in this section. It should be noted and stressed that while no single finding presented here is in itself so striking as to lead to unequivocal conclusions, the patterning of the results is more than suggestive.

First, we observe that the general impact of self-definition -- whether "straight" or criminal -- on one's sense of personal control, stability, and esteem, is apparently more salient for whites than blacks. It would seem
that the labels "straight" or "crooked" are largely inconsequential to the psychological dynamics of black inmates but important to those of white inmates (even under the condition that, as observed, both groups define themselves as more "crooked" than "straight"). We do not attribute this difference to a lack of available "straight" and "crooked" categories into which blacks might cognitively map themselves. (The data appear to confirm the availability of such categories for blacks; see pages 11-14.) Rather, we attribute the difference to what we tentatively assume to be the cognitively greater and more systematic allegiance of such self-categorization to whites than to blacks. For blacks such self-categorization, in Meadian terms, seems to involve largely the "me" -- the object of experience -- and result from relatively superficial agreement with the social-definitional pressures of others (notably the white establishment). As such, we argue, blacks' acceptance of criminal identity seems to have at its core the implicit distinction between "appearance" and "reality." As in the case of law, wherein a distinction is made between mala prohibita or wrong as prohibited, and mala in se or wrong in itself (cf. Sykes and Matza, 1957), so too a distinction may be made between identity as externally given, and identity as internally made. For blacks criminal identity seems a plausible piece of clothing, but for whites such self-definition appears to involve both the "me" as well as the "I" -- the subject of experience. While the penetration of "straight" and "crooked" definitions into the inner ("I") layers of self for whites may also be seen as a function of social-definitional pressures, the very possibility of such penetration is what, we presently believe, separates the races in the sample fundamentally. Put simply, it appears that blacks have access to the categories and "know how" to use them
when called upon to do so (e.g., when given a questionnaire like ours), while whites, on the other hand, have "internalized" these categories and take them as "real," both for others and for themselves.

In the second place, being in positions arrayed by both the increasing wisdom of criminal choice and increasing proportions of income gained by criminal means has a somewhat "positive" effect on black -- but a markedly "deleterious" impact on white -- stability and self-esteem.

Finally, given the overall tendencies of both races in the sample to define themselves as more criminal than "straight," we begin to get a clearer picture of the cognitive bases upon which whites show lower stability and self-esteem than blacks. For blacks the relationships between criminal self-definition and the measures of control, stability, and esteem are negative but inconsequential. For whites, however, these negative relationships are substantially greater, especially so vis-à-vis self-esteem. It should thus be evident that any increment in criminal self-definition is associated with differentially greater drops in self-esteem for whites than for blacks.

D. A Note on the Effects of Imprisonment

A major focus of the research in which the present data were generated (Harris, 1973) involved the impact of imprisonment on the relative expected value of criminal choice and on criminal identity. In this research and elsewhere (Harris, 1975) it was noted that imprisonment did appear to have significant effects on $REV_C$ and criminal self-definitions, though more markedly so for whites than blacks. While the imprisonment - $REV_C$ relationship proved curvilinear in form, it was noted (1973) that the imprisonment - criminal self-definition relationship was relatively straightforward and for both races involved the association of increases in imprisonment with linear
increases in criminal identity (the relevant r for blacks standing at .28 and for whites at .32). In terms of our present focus, it should therefore be evident that we observe imprisonment to be only marginally related to black inmates' self-stability and esteem, but significantly related to decreases in the stability and esteem with which inmates maintain their self-imagery.

Conclusion

The major thrust of the data suggests that when whites choose criminally deviant behavior they must traverse a greater moral and psychological distance than blacks making the same choice. If whites who have been labeled "criminal" see themselves as more psychologically distant from other whites than do blacks in the same circumstances see themselves distant from other blacks (p. 16), and if in conjunction with this whites show a weaker inclination toward the maintenance of self-stability and self-esteem than do blacks (p. 16), then two basic conclusions appear to follow. First, whites' choice of criminal behavior removes them more from a moral universe which they continue to regard as legitimate than it so removes blacks. And second, deviant identification exacts a more significant price in the psychological well-being of whites than of blacks. In light of this distinction, we believe the following racially different etiological scenarios of the choice of criminal options are suggested. We do not suggest that these are mutually or racially exclusive processes, but rather, that -- on the basis of the present data -- these processes may be distributed differentially enough by race to warrant their characterization as race-specific.

For whites the choice of these options can be understood to occur in a context characterized not simply by legal prohibitions (mala prohibita), but
y relatively strong moral prohibitions against the very behavior they choose (mala in se). Given whites' comparatively greater difficulty in justifying criminal choice, neither "affinity" (commitment) to deviant values nor "rejection" (disavowal) of mainstream-straight values (Miller, 1958; Cohen, 1955) appear to be powerful explanations of the genesis of whites' criminal deviance. (Both the affinity and the rejection arguments imply, that is, an element of moral justification which does not show up with any real strength among whites (p. 19-20)).

It also appears unlikely that for whites a sense of blocked legitimate opportunity has led to criminal deviance as an innovative route to conventional success (Merton, 1957). The whites in our sample clearly perceive it to be less rational to "crooked" than to "straight" (to a significantly greater degree than is the case for blacks), while the proportion of their income from illegal activities -- averaging about 53% -- does not appear to be large enough to indicate a preponderantly instrumental motive for criminally deviant choices.

Rather, whites sense of moral and psychological isolation suggests that their embrace of criminally deviant behavior is more likely a function of "drift" (Matza, 1964). Drift implies a situation wherein the choice of rule-breaking behavior does not in itself imply commitment to a moral schema exogenous to conventional expectations. Racial differences in the data render the following "journey or drift into deviance" more eminently plausible for whites than blacks.

A white youth may begin his criminally deviant career in a manner perhaps best described as mindless. He finds himself in a situation where the prohibitions against doing wrong are neutralized. Among his peers he is challenged to act. While in the abstract he may understand the criminal
"Wrongness" of the proposed act, in the immediate context he comes to believe -- usually with the encouragement and reinforcement of his peers -- that the abstract definition is inapplicable and that, consequently, any implication of moral violation is inappropriate. In effect he traverses a great moral distance without confronting the realization that he has done so. Stealing a car is wrong, but he's not stealing a car, he's just going to have some fun and take one for a ride! If, however, he is apprehended and thereby forced to confront his behavior as a violation, as a case of prohibited wrong-doing, he will find it difficult to maintain this neutralization and avoid consciousness of wrong-doing. If he is apprehended -- and it must be remembered that all those in our study have been apprehended more than once -- he is forced to confront the disjunction between his behavior and his standards. People in authority force such a confrontation upon him; he faces a consortium of powerful adults. The police, a judge, a probation officer, the prison psychologists and perhaps even his parents -- all strive to impress him with the fact that he has violated not merely their morality but his own as well. He becomes progressively disenchanted. In retrospect the process of neutralization seems never to have occurred. What was adventure, an expression of his masculinity or just having a good time, he now recognizes as a crime. Our prototypical white -- never having rejected conventional moral expectations, having instead neutralized them in specific situations -- now judges himself to have violated these expectations. He suffers the collectively imposed stigma of deviance, and to a certain extent, at least, he acquiesces in its imposition. He is morally and psychologically isolated. In short, having "messed up" behaviorally he is now "messed up" cognitively. 17.
If whites in our study tend toward greater moral and psychological isolation than blacks, blacks tend to better resist the imputation of morally censurable deviance and, relatively speaking, maintain a psychologically more sound sense of self. While it is clear that for blacks as well as whites the straight world and the crooked world represent separable moral universes (p. 13), it is also clear that blacks maintain this separation to a lesser extent. While both races believe it is more rational to go straight than to go crooked, blacks are considerably less sanguine about the utility of "straight" options as opposed to "crooked" options (p. 14). Although both blacks and whites see themselves as criminal, the psychological salience of this self-perception -- its socially alienating effect -- appears to be less pronounced for blacks (p. 14). A criminal identity does not appear to imply a sense of moral and psychological isolation from the everyday character of the black experience. Criminal identity and involvement has little impact upon black psychological characteristics such as self-stability and self-esteem while, for whites, the impact of such factors upon these same psychological characteristics is markedly deleterious.

It is probably true that for many blacks strong elements of "drift" characterize the entry into criminal deviance. The data indicate, however, that for blacks the drift scenario does not offer the best fit. In terms of etiological implication the crucial difference between the whites and the blacks appears to be the relative salience of self-evaluated criminal identity and involvement. If being identified as a criminal is of little or no consequence for the blacks sampled (in that such a circumstance only marginally affects their self-perceptions), then it is reasonable to conclude that for them criminal choice is not a function of the suspension or neutralization of conventional
morality. Drift rests on the assumption of commitment to a morality which cannot justify the behaviors engaged in; in these terms the conscious juxtaposition of criminal behavior against the putative stigma of arrest and incarceration should result in a strong and self-deprecatory consciousness of deviant identity. This seems to be the way the whites interpret the meaning of their experience, but not the blacks. They see themselves as deviant but less so than the whites see themselves; whatever blacks' sense of deviance it does not lead them into observable self-deprecation.

If the drift scenario does not appear to account for the etiology of black criminal deviance neither do normative or contra-cultural formulations. While it is true that blacks perceive going or being "straight" to be less rational than do whites, it is also true that the blacks perceive straight options to be more rational than "crooked" or deviant options. If going or being "straight" has a greater expected payoff for blacks than going or being "crooked" it is difficult to argue that their criminally deviant behavior is the result of a normative commitment which, in its anti-conventional emphasis, leads to conflict with the law. But simply, it does not appear that the choice of criminal options among the blacks studied is governed by commitment to criminogenic norms. The blacks find it more attractive to "go straight" than to "go crooked" (albeit to a lesser extent than the whites). But having gone crooked and being apprehended appears to be of little personal consequence to them. In light of this characterization the following etiological scenario of black criminal deviance seems plausible.

The fact that black ghettoes are often located in the heart of major metropolitan areas together with the fact that white-dominated mass-media are everywhere to be experienced virtually assures the incursion of mainstream
influences into these communities. Blacks are at once attracted to mainstream expectations such as self-mastery, autonomy, and personal success, and excluded from the possibility of realizing these expectations in the precincts from which they emanate, -- an excruciating dilemma! In such a circumstance mainstream expectations could be disavowed (Merton, 1957; Cohen, 1955), but for most the attraction of these expectations proves much too powerful for such a rejection. These expectations are, after all, the tenets by which whites seem to live and whites, as every black can testify, have had pretty much their own way in American society.

If mainstream expectations cannot be disavowed, the choice for blacks is one between sustained frustration and, we argue, a definitional transformation of the conventional opportunity structure into one in which some semblance of these expectations can be realized. Given the joint conditions of subjectively maintained conventional success norms and objectively highly limited access to the realization of these norms, one major alternative to felt frustration involves an expanded definition of morally legitimate -- if sometimes illegal -- instrumental activities. In these terms, differential access to the conventionally defined array of acceptable activities may well lead to a unique if not radical redefinition of what concrete activities fall within this array. Such redefinition is likely to involve a functional increase in the actual bandwidth of the cognitively maintained category of non-censurable (sometimes illegal) instrumental activities. This cognitive transformation, in turn, may well lead to behavioral commitment to an activity which, by conventional standards, stands outside the narrower category bandwidth. Where such "innovative conformity" from the mainstream perspective might be seen as beyond the categorical bounds of what is legitimate, moral,
and legal, from the subjective point of view it is within the bounds of conventional legitimate and moral activity -- even though known to be illegal.

Given scarce resources and severely limited access to conventionally acceptable instrumental activities, then, the structure of behavioral options in the black ghetto is just as likely as not (or perhaps even more likely) to include as approved options those which violate the law. To the degree this is so, violating the law from the perspective of the ghetto member has little self-definitional meaning; it may not even mean that the violator -- in both his own terms and those of the people with whom he regularly interacts -- has ceased to "go straight." If neutralization is the initiating factor in the genesis of white criminal deviance, then we suggest that definitional expansion is the initiating factor in the genesis of black criminal deviance.

While some behavioral options in the ghetto happen to violate the law of the larger civil community, they paradoxically afford opportunities -- from the ghetto member's point of view -- for increasing the possibility of realizing mainstream expectations. The numbers runner can be straight (honest) and usually is, even as he breaks the law. The street hustler asks and gets fair exchange for a "hot" color television set. The war ministers of two fighting gangs try to reduce conflict and succeed in ironing out truces complete with codicils on territorial sovereignty (Lewis, 1970 b). Through the process of definitional expansion illegality loses its deviant character. This we argue, explains why it is that the blacks in our study appear to be bothered little if at all by apprehension and awareness of their "official" criminal identity, even while they endorse straight vs. criminal options. In the context of definitional expansion they can be
straight even while civil authority says they are criminal. Whites, even poor whites, live and act in the mainstream and when they are apprehended they are more likely to experience moral trauma in recognition of their criminality. The blacks sampled, on the other hand, live and act in a world where success norms are the same in kind as those existing in the mainstream, but the options for their realization are, in mainstream terms, more frequent illegitimate, immoral, and illegal. In the ghetto, apprehension means only that one has been in violation of a law but probably not a morality.

Although our etiological interpretations of different patterns of self-perceptions among black and white youthful offenders are ex post facto, were they to be validated by direct test, then it might pay students of deviance as well as those interested in the prevention of crime to explore their policy implications. When dealing with drift the key to prevention and rehabilitation is likely to be found in the extent to which the neutralization process can be controlled among potential and experienced offenders, if indeed it can be. When criminal deviance is a function of definitional expansion and if, as a result of this, apprehension and recognition of one's criminality is of little personal consequence (apprehension and incarceration being an acceptable price to pay for seizing the opportunity to be someone and do something), then intervention by street workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and parole officers is likely to have little or no impact. Definitional expansion, it should be realized, is a strategic response to structural blockage -- a situation not predisposing to personal reformation. From this perspective even minimal social-structural awareness on the offender's part suggests to him nothing to be ashamed of and, therefore, no reason to
Finally, while our analyses have been race-specific, we would feel our concluding theoretical and policy-related points lost if the reader perceived them as limited to the issue of race. When groups like blacks are no longer structurally excluded we might expect a change in the etiology of their criminal deviance in the direction of the drift scenario. At this point, race would no longer be etiologically significant. While historical and age-graded events such as unemployment and adolescent frustration play a role in facilitating neutralization at various points in individual life-cycles, through the use of professional and para-professional therapists our society is increasingly prepared in principle to deal with such difficult periods in individual lives. By no means, however, are we now prepared in principle or practice to deal effectively with difficult lives created by large-scale structural exclusion.
FOOTNOTES

1. This is cleanly evidenced in the statistics on rates of offenses by age reported in the Uniform Crime Reports (1972).

2. Our study has been influenced by recent studies of black and white attributions of self-esteem. Studies reported by Gordon (1963), McDonald and Gynther (1965), McDill et al. (1966), Wendland (1967), Hunt and Hardt (1969), Powell and Fuller (1970), Bachman (1970), and Rosenberg and Simmons (1971) indicate that on several measures of self-esteem blacks score higher than whites. These findings are of particular interest because they appear to confound conventional social science expectations to the effect that the obvious disadvantages faced by blacks in American society should have a deleterious impact upon the character of their personal identity. Assuming that self-esteem is an indicator of personal soundness, the fact that blacks score higher than whites in these studies suggests that however unjust their circumstances, these circumstances do not in themselves result in self-derogation. On the contrary, these studies suggest that disadvantages based upon race alone may have the curious effect of strengthening self-evaluations.

3. In all, 202 blacks and 145 whites were administered the questionnaire. Questionnaires internally consistent across demographic items and showing no more than 5% missing responses to nondemographic items were kept; blacks not meeting these conditions totaled 32, whites 14. Of the remaining subsamples, 4 blacks and 2 whites were dropped as outliers on a number of the variables, leaving 166 blacks and 129 whites in the sample. For present purposes the questionnaires of those reporting no prior imprisonment (37 blacks and 24 whites) have been excluded. (Puerto Ricans and inmates of other races who took the questionnaire were too few in number to be included in the analysis.)

4. In addition to similarity in measures of central tendency, the distribution on these variables do not reveal significant cross-racial differences. Total sample ranges include: present age, 14-30; age at first arrest, 9-29; number of times imprisoned previously, 1-5 or more; number of months imprisoned previously, 1-120; months since last prior imprisonment, 1-168; and education, 5-15 years.

5. Concrete outcomes associated with "going straight" and "going crooked" were generated in a series of pilot studies at Yodelle through the use of open-ended questions such as, "What are some good things which go along with a steady job... a criminal career?" Outcomes most frequently mentioned (e.g., a horse... "kicks") were used in the final questionnaire.
6. The expression "having a steady job" stands for "going straight" in this example and throughout the questionnaire. Relying upon the same syntax as in Example 1 (in which the "material" expected utility of "going straight" is measured), 2 other questions tapped the expected utility of "going straight." One involved the "behavioral" outcome of "interesting work," the other the "existential" outcome of "security." Three parallel measures tapped the expected utility of "going crooked." One involved material outcomes identical to "straight" material outcomes, a second involved the behavioral outcome of "kicks," and third involved the existential outcome of "being cool."

7. The expression "having a criminal career" stands for "going crooked" in this example and throughout the questionnaire. Using the same syntax as in Example 2 (in which the "existential" expected disutility of "going crooked" is measured), 2 other questions tapped the expected disutility of "going crooked." These involved the behavioral outcome of "getting hurt," and the material outcome of "no money." Three parallel measures indexed the expected disutility of "going straight." One involved the material outcome of "bills and taxes," a second the behavioral outcome of "punching a clock," and the third the existential outcome of "boredom."

8. On the basis of "maximizing expected value" strategy (cf. Simon 1957), and the assumption of no change in REV over time, inmate A would be expected to make choices in line with "straight" career paths all the time. On the basis of a "proportional" strategy and a no change assumption, A might be expected to make "straight" choices approximately $1.00 - .37$ or $63\%$ of the time.

9. This expectation was based in part on the notion that the self-concept of the "good boy" acts as an insulator against delinquency (cf. reckless et al., 1957), and in part on the notion that the attribution of deviance creates feelings of inadequacy in the labeled (cf. Coffman, 1963).

10. These items represent a subset of the initial Rotter internal-control items which Gurin et al., (1969) found to load on a factor they identified as "personal control."

11. Short and Strodtbeck have observed (1965) that white gang members appear to preserve the dualism "delinquent/non-delinquent" more strongly than black gang members -- a finding clearly consistent with the present one. Under certain circumstances, we might add, there would seem to be schizophrenogenic possibilities inherent in the strong cognitive maintenance of this dualism. For those who strongly adhere to the dualism, undergo official intervention, and then experience post-release "failure," a set of circumstances is established which we would expect to be conducive to schizophrenia. The data seem to suggest the somewhat greater threat of this possibility for incarcerated white youths than for incarcerated black youths.
12. This finding may have general explanatory implications with regard to recent findings on black vs. white self-esteem (see footnote 2). The finding that a strong sense of personal control is a crucial underpinning in white but not black self-esteem may not be limited to the sample under study, but may well extend to the groups such as high school students -- which have typically provided the subjects for recent studies of self-esteem.

13. Such a phenomenon might be theoretically dealt with in terms of cognitive consistency formulations, with stronger white "disuniting" of the groupings leading to stronger "balance" effects.

14. It might also be suggested that the cognitively maintained groupings "straight" and "crooked", for both blacks and whites, are schema characterized by the burden of a corollary racial overlay. If so, then "going crooked" for whites has the connotation of "becoming black," as "going straight" for blacks has the connotation of "becoming white."

15. The reasoning here parallels that of Rosenberg and Simmons (1971: 125-8) when they employ the notion of race-specific reference-groups in an attempt to explain their observation of higher black than white self-esteem.

16. It was found that limited imprisonment (up to 6 months for blacks and 12 months for whites) decreases REVc for both races. This decrease has been identified as a "rehabilitation effect." Extended imprisonment (7 or more months for blacks, and 13 or more months for whites), on the other hand, increases the relative expected value of criminal choice (REVc) for both races. This increase has been identified as a "labeling effect" (Harris, 1975).

17. In support of this assertion, the reader is referred to our observation on the effects of imprisonment: imprisonment for whites is significantly related to decreases in the stability and esteem with which they maintain their self-imagery. (See p. 23).

18. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that despite their historic exclusion blacks have overwhelmingly rejected radical ideologies promising extensive reconstruction of American society. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of Communists and Socialists, such groups have made little headway among black Americans. Alternatively, a movement such as that led by Marcus Garvey -- one hand challenging white hegemony, while on the other hand accepting and championing virtually every tenet of white society -- had a meteoric (if short-lived) rise among urban blacks (Lewis, 1970a).

19. Such attraction is consistent with Bettleheim's description of the concentration camp inmates' identification with their oppressors (Bettleheim, 1960).
20. Some may see in this assertion considerable similarity to Merton's (1957) conception of innovative deviance. The similarity between this formulation and that of Merton is, however, only minimal. In the "definitional expansion" formulation, from the point of view of the actor, both ends and means do not differ in kind from those which are characteristic of the American mainstream, whereas innovative deviance implies similar ends but dissimilar (deviant) means for their achievement.

21. This sort of distinction can and does exist in many social precincts. For example, Egil Krogh and his associates can admit to criminal acts without admitting to their immorality. In the world of the steel executive price-fixing may be illegal but it is not necessarily immoral.

22. Indeed, intervention efforts may seem increasingly unwarranted and, as a consequence, incarceration increasingly inequitable. In this light it is interesting to note the role of black inmates in the politicization of the prison experience. It is the black inmate to a much greater extent than the white inmate who has come to articulate imprisonment in political terms. He is in jail not for offending a moral code but because he has offended a law which in its political inspiration has victimized him.
Table 1. Set A correlation matrix, blacks and whites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>REV C</th>
<th>Criminal Income</th>
<th>&quot;Straight Identity Score</th>
<th>Criminal Identity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REV C</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.305*</td>
<td>-.291*</td>
<td>.285*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.354*</td>
<td>-.279*</td>
<td>.334*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Income</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>.305*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.416*</td>
<td>.439*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>W:</td>
<td>.354*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.548*</td>
<td>.527*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Straight Identity Score</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>-.291*</td>
<td>-.416*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.777*</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.279*</td>
<td>-.548*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.839*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Identity Score</td>
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<td>.285*</td>
<td>.438*</td>
<td>-.777*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
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<td>.527*</td>
<td>-.839*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P ≤ .01
For blacks N varies from 117 to 127: for whites N varies from 102 to 105.

Table 2. Set B correlation matrix, blacks and whites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Self-Esteem</th>
<th>Stability of Self</th>
<th>Personal Control</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.584*</td>
<td>.184*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.464*</td>
<td>.422*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Self</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>.584*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.268*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>.464*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.307*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Control</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>.184*</td>
<td>.268*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>.422*</td>
<td>.307*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P ≤ .05
For blacks N varies from 126 to 127: for whites N varies from 101 to 104.
Table 3. Comparisons of blacks and whites on the means of Set A variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S. Dev.</th>
<th>&quot;t&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IQ</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>.4317</td>
<td>.0920</td>
<td>5.062*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>.3532</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(127)</td>
<td>.6063</td>
<td>.3275</td>
<td>1.560*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>.5329</td>
<td>.3763</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Income</td>
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<td>(127)</td>
<td>15.2857</td>
<td>3.7306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>14.3107</td>
<td>4.3228</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Straight&quot; Identity Score</td>
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<td>(119)</td>
<td>15.3697</td>
<td>3.8967</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>15.7767</td>
<td>4.3767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Identity Score</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(119)</td>
<td>15.2857</td>
<td>3.7306</td>
<td>1.777*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>14.3107</td>
<td>4.3228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P ≤ .05
+F approaches significance

Table 4. Comparisons of blacks and whites on the means of Set B variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S. Dev.</th>
<th>&quot;t&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Control</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(127)</td>
<td>22.3205</td>
<td>4.4023</td>
<td>1.950*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>23.4412</td>
<td>4.9022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Self</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>20.7063</td>
<td>7.0587</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>20.1058</td>
<td>6.9575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>50.0078</td>
<td>10.4287</td>
<td>2.458*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>46.4000</td>
<td>11.6517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P ≤ .05
Table 5.

Correlation matrix between Set A and B, blacks and whites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set B Variables</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>R^2</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Criminal Identity Score</th>
<th>&quot;Straight&quot; Identity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>-.267*</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Control</td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>-.278*</td>
<td>-219*</td>
<td>.177*</td>
<td>-.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.176*</td>
<td>-.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Self</td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>-.158*</td>
<td>-.166*</td>
<td>.210*</td>
<td>-.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B:</td>
<td>.142+</td>
<td>.213*</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>-.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Esteem</td>
<td>W:</td>
<td>-.198*</td>
<td>-.247*</td>
<td>.296*</td>
<td>-.356*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+P approaches significance
*P ≤ .05

For blacks N varies from 116 to 129; for whites N varies from 100 to 105.
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