The major concern of this paper is the concept of individual freedom within the framework of competitive sport. The paper examines the present status of man in regard to the future, and, especially, to the concept of freedom. It explains how the idea of freedom has been viewed in philosophy, and, more specifically, how it has been treated in philosophy of education. With regard to the latter, the author sides with Tesoni and Morris' "personification of knowledge" approach to combat modern bureautechnocracy. The paper also explains how almost all of the aspects of individual freedom are negated in far too many competitive sport situations on this continent today. It, however, is noted that there are still some programs of educational competitive sport in the United States, and that such is still the prevailing Pattern of competitive sport in Canadian education. Finally, the author describes his idea of the only way in which a concept of individual freedom can be carried out for athletes in competitive sport situations in education. (RC)
Introduction

The concept of freedom within the framework of competitive sport is the major concern or problem of this paper. The consideration of such a topic, and especially as it might relate to so-called educational sport, is absolutely vital at this time in North American sport and/or athletics. Some people might not immediately see the rationale for such a presentation, but the American Council on Education, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Ford Foundation would not have paid out "hard cash" for an exploratory study in this area of education if they had not been convinced that a searching look at the phenomenon of competitive sport was warranted at this time. It is hypothesized here that enough evidence and opinion can be marshalled to convince others that many, if not most, sports (or experiences in sports by individuals) may need to be modified by the injection of opportunities for the participants to make individual choices and decisions that will enhance the quality of life for all concerned.

Freedom is used here to describe the "condition of being able to choose and to carry out purposes" (Muller, 1961, xiii). This concept will be discussed much more fully below, but for now it will simply be stated that the problem of individual freedom in what has been identified as a transitional society (the twentieth century) cannot be safely placed aside for future reference. Even though much progress has been made in the achievement of civil rights for man on

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this continent in this century, there have been a number of developments recently in both Canada and the United States which force a reflective person to realize how precarious a commodity an individual's freedom really is.

If it is indeed true that the present society is in the midst of a great transition, and that now "we must learn to master ourselves as we are learning to master nature," then along the way it will be necessary to avoid certain traps. If man is not able to steer his course around these traps, it is quite possible that life as it is presently known on this planet will cease (Boulding, 1964, p. 24). If sport has become an important part of culture -- a culture that is in jeopardy in the years immediately ahead -- it should be employed as a "socially useful servant." Such a purpose for sport is indeed justified for "individual man" and for "social man," whether its place in the formal educational system is being considered or whether its role in society at large is the question.

The terms "sport" and "athletics" will be used here interchangeably, because that appears to be the accepted general practice on the continent. This is not to say that James Keating is not etymologically correct in his earlier distinction between these two terms, only that the public doesn't tend to recognize the former as the involvement of a "gentleman sportsman seeking to maximize the pleasure of the occasion for himself and his opponent" and the latter as the "prize-hunting athlete with a win-at-all-costs attitude."

The main problem of this analysis is, therefore, to posit a workable definition of the concept of "freedom" for an evolving democratic society today -- one that may be adapted to the experience of men in competitive sport in such a way that they may live
fuller lives while at the same time strengthening the position of democracy as a system of government. Obviously, this is a tall task that can only be considered in an exploratory way in such a relatively short paper. Further, this discussion for now will be limited to men's sport, although the problem is equally as important for women (and will be treated in a separate paper later).

The broad outline of this paper will, therefore, revolve around preliminary answers to the following questions: (1) what is the present status of man in regard to the future, and especially to the concept of freedom; (2) how has the concept of freedom been viewed in philosophy; (3) how has the idea of freedom been treated in philosophy of education; (4) what is the status of "freedom" in men's sport and/or athletics in North America; (5) what are some of the prospects for individual freedom in the future; and (6) what conclusions may reasonably be drawn about the need for, and the possibility of, introducing more freedom into competitive sport in North America in the near future?

Man's Status and Its Relationship to Freedom

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times;
It was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness;
It was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity;
It was the season of light, it was the season of darkness;
It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair;
We had everything before us, we had nothing before us;
We were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way.

When Charles Dickens wrote these opening lines for his novel, A Tale of Two Cities, he hardly knew that he would also be describing conditions in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Of course, some have much more optimism than is expressed in this passage, while others are preaching a doctrine of despair. For example, the
Nobel prize winner, biologist Albert Szent-Gyorgi, feels that mankind is moving inexorably toward calamity because society now has a "death orientation" rather than a "life orientation" -- a condition which he felt was present only forty years ago (appr. 1937). Dr. Szent-Gyorgi believes that only youth can turn the world around and ward off the "terrible strain of the idiots who govern the world." (Of course, one could argue that these "idiots" are the only ones that appear to be available at the moment!) He describes the government as a gerontocracy that "cannot really assimilate new ideas" (Reinhold, Feb. 20, 1970).

Everything that is published is not so pessimistic. Writing in the early 1960's, Henry Steele Commager explained how "never before in a mere quarter century has the world seen so many revolutionary developments in society, politics, science, and technology" (1961, p. 80). He did point out nevertheless that these "were staggering possibilities for good or evil opened up to mankind." Lest too much optimism is exhibited, consider some of the cities' problems for just a moment: pollution of air and water; exodus of high-wage industries; flight to the suburbs of those earning higher incomes; influx of those with lower incomes to slum areas; shortage of recreation areas and leadership; sharp increase in the rate of crime of all types; rise in the population of juveniles and the aged; housing ghettos with unbelievable filth; overcrowded schools with almost built-in discrimination present; and transportation jams which daily try the patience and increase the tensions of the citizenry on the North American continent (Sullivan, May 12, 1967).

In the 1970's inflation and the energy crisis cause despair even as scientists and pundits discuss what mankind must do while there is...
yet time to keep accelerating technology from becoming the master rather than the servant of earth creatures. Julian Huxley describes the present situation as the crisis in man’s destiny (January, 1967). Banesh Hoffman in Flatland (Abbott, 1952) says,

> We are like hapless passengers on a crowded escalator, carried relentlessly forward till our particular floor arrives, and we step off into a place where there is no time, while the material composing our bodies continues its journey on the inexorable escalator — perhaps forever.

In the same vein Loren Eiseley offering “reflections on man’s uncompleted journey through time” describes him as the "cosmic orphan" (SH/World, Feb. 23, 1974). He explains how man is an evolutionary "changeling" whose final problem might be to "escape himself, or, if not that, to reconcile his devastating intellect with his heart"(p. 24).

An urgent need for prompt action usually accompanies such gloomy forecasts. One different but interesting analysis of the plight of the modern Western world is offered by Clarke as he reviews the work of Joseph Campbell. The claim is that myths tell as much about men in a society as a man’s dreams tell him individually. Campbell believes that the former myths held by men have not been replaced by newer, equally vital myths today in the West. The resultant period of radical reorientation required to develop a modern mythology that will give men stability in cultural attitudes through "veiled explanations of the truth" has been forced upon the West almost too rapidly. Thus, in the opinion of Campbell, there hasn’t yet developed an adequately functioning mythology for today’s world in which man has acquired what he feels to be a sufficient explanation of the mysterious universe and man’s place in such a vast enterprise. The rites and rituals which support the social order have been vanishing. As a
result people haven't been receiving the necessary guidance available in the past to assuage the psychological crises that inevitably appear in the individual's birth to death cycle. Also, because of society's pluralism the former grand scale myths may have to be individualized and perhaps small-group oriented. Some political leaders may help, but the individual will have to conduct his own personal search in keeping to a degree with the social system's dominant values (Clarke, Jan. 17, 1972).

The concept of freedom -- the "free man living in a free country" -- is a dream or myth that means a great deal on this continent and to countless millions elsewhere. Even before Watergate and the almost unbelievable subsequent disclosures, Leonard Fein had urged his fellow Americans "to try to dream again" -- and this time in a more modest manner (Fein, Feb. 11, 1973). The old dream, he stated, was about America's "innate goodness and bestness." It is now generally recognized that technological superiority does not mean that the United States has a charter to lead all people everywhere to a "word of peace, good will, and prosperity." This is not a put-down by someone expatriated; it is an exhortation to all to develop the capacity to dream again, to promote the ideal of individual freedom in a free society -- and to so analyze sport and/or athletics philosophically that all concerned will work toward toward the inclusion of a greater amount of freedom in competitive sport as it is functioning today.

Turn where one will, there is a continuing flow of informed opinion in recent years pointing out man's dilemma or predicament
in regard to the amount of freedom available in his life. These authors and scholars have examined the situation in the Western world, not the so-called Iron Curtain countries where very little real, individual freedom is available to the average man. As far back as 1941, Erich Fromm asserted that "modern man, freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not gained freedom in the positive sense of the realization of the individual self; that is the expression of his intellectual, emotional, and sensuous potentialities . . ." His thesis is that even though man may indeed have achieved a certain amount of independence and rationality, he has still found himself anxious and powerless because of isolation. Somehow man is not ready for this isolation, and he therefore finds it unbearable. His alternatives are either to discover new varieties of submission or to move forward, accepting his new status and potential, with "the full realization of positive freedom which is based on the uniqueness and individuality of man" (Fromm, 1969, viii).

There is no doubt but that various social forces and developments are truly forcing this issue of individual freedom as a potential human value. War upon war, the cold war, and internal strife, along with "the age of triumphant science and technology" is "forcing man into a new philosophical era based on the 'why' of living" (Robertson, quoting Seaborg, Feb. 5, 1970). Can it be that these "troubled times" are "a prelude to deeper and more positive thinking in which man would examine human values and goals?" (Ibid.)

Seaborg's wishful thinking may come true; in the meantime,
however, writers analyzing freedom in society have developed a variety of misgivings. Someone like Richard Rovere, the author of *Waist Deep in the Big Muddy*, has expressed himself in an article entitled "Freedom: Who Needs It?" Writing in 1968, he found something new — "a disenchantment not only with the society in which individual liberty thrives as it seldom has in the past but with the idea of liberty itself"— and this may be considered to be most disturbing, because it means that many of the young radicals, and a number of their elders are losing faith in the usefulness of seemingly free institutions. Rovere tends to think that such feelings are without precedent in American history. He does go on to assert, nevertheless, that many have been "mistaken as to the nature and value of individual liberty and have even turned inside out the classic defenses of it." Basically, he maintains that the famous and stirring appeals for freedom and liberty have been mixed in their intent; to be sure people did want self-expression fervently, but the great freedom crusades were campaigns for collective freedom, so to speak (p. 41).

Distinguished historians like Henry Steele Commager may ask a serious question like "Is Freedom Dying in America?" because he senses that most people are "equating dissent with lawlessness" and "nonconformity with treason," and in the process there is arising a "popular indifference toward the loss of liberty" (Commager, 1970, p. 17). Is it possible that this represents a failure to comprehend what is at stake, or have a great many people of all ages decided that it doesn't make any difference in the final analysis? Is even the "free world" moving inexorably toward Skinner's "beyond freedom and dignity" concept as is embodied in his *Walden Two*? One hopes not.
Finally, Charles Reich, the author of *The Greening of America*, has told anyone who would listen that "what the times urgently demand, what our survival demands, is a new consciousness that will reassert rational control over the industrial system and the Corporate State, and transform them into a way of life that protects and advances human values" (*The New York Times*, October 21, 1970). Conversely, George Kennan, the noted historian and diplomat, who admits readily "the reality of the seriousness of the various evils to which Reich calls attention," describes Reich's proposed solution to the many evils of modern society as romantic, utopian, illusory, and hysterical. He concludes by stating that "there is, in short, plenty to do. But it is clear that if Mr. Reich's philosophy prevails, that will not happen" (*The New York Times*, October 28, 1970).

**Freedom in Philosophy**

This, then, in necessarily abbreviated fashion, is the situation. Times are exceedingly difficult, and man's freedom is being challenged and delimited for a variety of reasons. Keep in mind Muller's definition of freedom as "the condition of being able to choose and carry out purposes" (see page 1), but observe also Richard Goodwin's qualifying clause which states "to the outer limits fixed by the material conditions and capacity of the time" (*The American Condition*, 1974, p. 24). To this Goodwin adds further a "social dimension" that some might reject: "Not only does the free individual establish his own purposes, but they are consistent with the purposes of his fellows. He seeks his own wants and to cultivate his own faculties in a manner which is consistent with the well-being of others" (p. 28). One can just see Thoreau shaking his head vigorously from right to left because of the constraints.
imposed by Mr. Goodwin.

Despite the many outcries that are heard about the loss of, or the possible loss of -- or even the denial of certain individual freedoms in North America -- Walter Kaufmann has recently postulated that the large majority of people really "crave a life without choice." In fact, he has coined a name for the "malady" that seems to afflict most men. He calls it Decidophobia or the fear of autonomy or personal decision-making that affects a great many people. In his Without Guilt and Justice (Kaufmann, 1973), he delineates ten strategies by which modern man avoids making serious life decisions that would lift him from a decidophobic state to one of personal autonomy. These strategies (1) allegiance to a religion; (2) drifting by either adopting a stance of "statusquoism" or by "dropping out"; (3) commitment or allegiance to a movement; (4) allegiance to a school of thought -- less politically active than #3; (5) exegetical thinking, a "text is God" approach; (6) Manichaeism, or an elementary "good and evil" battleground approach to the world; (7) moral rationalism, or a position which claims that correct reasoning alone can demonstrate what a person ought to do in all difficult or fateful situations; (8) pedantry, which involves continued concern with minute or microscopic details "while Rome is burning"; (9) "riding the wave of the future," a shortsighted position or faith assumed by some to give support to the acceptance of dogmatic political ideologies (a belief often connected with a religious faith or similar movement); and (10), interestingly enough, is marriage -- an extremely popular strategy for women in many societies that delimits very sharply thereafter their potential for autonomous decisions in their lives (a fate that often befalls men similarly). Of course,
a number of these strategies can be combined in any one life with perhaps even more devastating effect on the possibility of a person leading an autonomous life. A truly autonomous person would strive successfully to avoid employing all of these ten strategies, or at the very most adopt only one or two of these strategies -- and to a limited extent!

It is now the time in this discussion to examine the concept of "freedom" more carefully from a philosophical standpoint. In the history of philosophy this concept has typically been employed in such a way that it has related to events that occur in the everyday relations of men, or it has involved particular aspects or conditions of social life. Despite this delimitation, significant differences of usage are still available, more or less legitimate and convenient to a greater or lesser extent. For example, the traditional, liberal meaning of freedom relates to the absence of constraint or coercion. Thus, in Partridge's words -- actually a position similar to that defined by J. S. Mills as "negative" freedom or "freedom from" -- the following definition has been typically considered first in the western world:

"A man is said to be free to the extent that he can choose his own goals or course of conduct, can choose between alternatives available to him, and is not compelled to act as he himself would not choose to act, or prevented from acting as he would otherwise choose to act, by the will of another man, of the state, or of any other authority" (Partridge, 1967, Vol. 3, p. 222).

Obviously, this appears to be a carefully worded definition and quite complete, but some wonder if it should be broadened still further. For example, there are often natural conditions that limit man's freedom by preventing him from achieving his personal goals.
Others would carry the definition one step further by the insertion of a stipulation that a man is not truly free unless he has the wherewithal to achieve his life goals. This means that he should be provided with the means or power to attain a freely selected objective. Partridge complains at this point that this is stretching the definition far too much, and that indeed the ordinary language of this assumption has been distorted. Being free in his opinion is most certainly not the same as the ways and means that one employs to achieve the goals that he has set for his life.

Proceeding from the above premises -- that is, the opportunity for uncoerced action -- any definition of the term "coercion" must take into consideration the matter of indirect control of an individual's life style, as well as those obstacles or hurdles which are overtly placed in his path. For example, a rich man might covertly employ gifts of money and other valued articles so as to deprive another an opportunity to be selected as a candidate for some private or public office. Such a tactic could be carried out in a most subtle manner -- or perhaps even unconsciously in certain cases -- by the person with the large amount of assets. Still further, a person might not know enough to select the best possible alternative action leading toward a more successful future for himself and his family, no matter whether direct or indirect methods of control or coercion had been employed to limit his freedom by another person or group of people. The only conclusion to be drawn here is that a high degree of education becomes increasingly important for each individual in a society steadily growing more complex if we wish to guarantee citizens what might be called "full" freedom.
Up to this point this discussion about freedom has been limited to the idea or concept of freedom from certain impositions or controls in life, but obviously it is vitally important that the concept of freedom for certain opportunities or alternative actions be introduced here as being more positive (as opposed to negative) aspects of freedom. Throughout the history of philosophy, for example, a number of different possibilities for, or approaches to, "the good life" have been postulated. Without becoming too specific at this point about what these approaches to the good life might be, certainly in political and social matters -- or even so-called moral matters -- the free person should look forward to a variety of freedoms of, to, in, and from as he moves through life. Here are being suggested such freedoms as freedom of thought, speech, association; freedom to assemble, worship, move about; freedom in the use or sale of property, or the choice of occupation or employer; and freedom from want, fear, etc. Obviously, these ideas are tremendously important in education and, as is being contended in this paper, the ramifications of the concept of individual freedom have only been vaguely and occasionally been considered seriously in North American competitive sport. When some individuals and/or groups become too powerful, other people's freedom is often curtailed. This situation can and does occur in both a negative and positive way in the various types of political states. Granted that pluralistic philosophical positions or stances are permitted in evolving democratic societies, what then can and should the concept of freedom mean in education and in competitive sport (within education primarily, but also in professional circles)? The remainder of the paper
will be devoted to a relatively brief description of, and the recommendation of a few possible answers to, this very thorny problem that exists here and throughout the world at the present time.

Freedom in Philosophy of Education

In his book, Future Shock, which assuredly has exerted a considerable influence on North American thought in the early 1970's, Toffler devotes a chapter to "education in the future sense" as one of his "strategies for survival" (1970, pp. 353-378). He states that "one of our most critical subsystems -- education -- is dangerously malfunctioning." His analysis has indicated that "our schools face backwards toward a dying system, rather than forward to the new emerging society" (pp. 353-354). His assumption is that the people preparing for tomorrow's world, those "who must live in super-industrial societies . . . will need new skills in three crucial areas: learning, relating, and choosing" (p. 367). Curiously enough, despite the threats which many see on the horizon for man's freedom and his opportunity to make choices about his life, Toffler envisions the eventual dissolution of this present threat to individual freedom in the world of tomorrow. He explains that,

The Super-industrial Revolution also demands a new conception of freedom -- a recognition that freedom, pressed to its ultimate, negates itself . . . this is why, despite 'backlash' and temporary reversals, the line of social advance carries us toward a wider tolerance, a more easy acceptance of more and more diverse human types (p. 282).

Despite this precious bit of optimism for the future, the story of education with its successes and yet its many failures looms large in the minds of a large number of people at present. Perhaps
it has ever been thus, but there certainly has been great difficulty recently in maintaining motivation on the part of children and young people. People on all sides question whether young men and women are being prepared to think clearly, critically, and independently about fundamental issues. There is definitely an uneasy mood prevailing in education at all levels on this continent and, for that matter, throughout the entire West as well. The importance of a sound general or liberal education has been decried with regularity, and its ideals have seemingly been deserted by the young. The revolutionary mood of the 1960's, brought on to a large extent by the disastrous Vietnam involvement, may have subsided to a large extent, but the relatively placid, "cud-chewing contentment of the semi-drug and -alcohol culture" of the 1970's is equally as frightening to those who ponder over the scary apparitions hazily delineated by the naysayers for the future. Today's students seem imbued with a sense of urgency regarding the transmission of varying types of professional knowledge that will bring about quick assimilation into the community and at least a reasonably high standard of living in the present inflationary economy.

In the opinion of the writer, the field of educational philosophy, with its present disciplinary emphasis, is "shedding very little light" for the average professional education student. It seems that there was a time, in the late 1800's and early 1900's, when a combined "common sense and rational thought approach, coupled with the occasional dash of theological fervor" stirred thought about educational aims and objectives. Such educational philosophy could possibly be identified as "normative philosophizing about education
based on metaphysical speculation." This gradually brought about
the advent of a philosophy of education "systems approach" based on
the leading philosophical schools of thought. During this period
it was relatively simple to understand what was meant by educational
freedom. So-called educational progressivism, "sired" by the great
John Dewey, involved the concepts of pupil freedom, individual
differences, pupil interest, pupil growth, no absolutely fixed
values, and that "education is life now." Conversely, educational
essentialism, championed by such stalwarts as H. H. Horne, believed
that there were certain educational values by which the individual
must be guided; that effort takes precedence over interest and that
this girds moral stamina; that the experience of the past has power-
full jurisdiction over the present; and that the cultivation of the
intellect is most important in education. Such beliefs attributed
to each broad position were, of course, only representative and not
inclusive. It was felt, however that a person should be able to
delineate his own position generally under one broad category or
the other -- and then base his professional practice on such delinea-
tion. Oh for the good old days!

Commencing in the 1950's philosophy of education on this conti-
nent began its own "Drang nach Disziplin" with a resultant "miasma"
that tends to leave the average mortal in a bewildered state. Some
have become theory-builders, while others analyzed language or various
portions thereof. Those who espoused pragmatism have maintained
their interest to a considerable degree, while others have adopted
a phenomenological-existentialistic approach that in some quarters
has seriously challenged the microscopic approach of the language
analysts. With the possible exception of the occasional effort to analyze the term "freedom" conceptually, it has remained for those with a pragmatic leaning or those with an existential orientation to give present day meaning to the urgent present day need for a new type of "human education" theory that could possibly help man obviate the effects of "bureautechnocracy" and become something more than a "trivialized man."

Such a theory which serves to revitalize the concept of individual freedom in a jaded educational setting on this continent has been postulated by Charles Tesconi and Van Cleve Morris (1972, p. 161 et ff.). Tesconi and Morris characterize the developing social culture of the past few generations as a bureautechnocracy. Possibly as a result of the managerial revolution that has taken place in this century as well, man on this continent is now faced with an "ecological problem" of enormous proportions. The prevailing environment is homogenizing man:

Bureautechnocracy may be defined as the pattern of social organization in which a pyramidal hierarchy of operational control is linked with rationalized and standardized means for reaching predetermined ends, with the overall aim of achieving systematization, efficiency, and economy (p. 161).

Such a bureautechnocratic state has certainly become characteristic of the educational system and, as a result, young people consistently have the feeling that they are being used by the system. As their self-esteem is being wounded, they are finding different techniques for striking back at the system. The end result of this scientific liberalism is that education has become steadily and increasingly anti-human while the "juggernaut of science rolls on" -- as prophesied by John Dewey as a method to eventually resolve all of the
affairs of man (p. 163).

Tesconi and Morris explain further their theory about how a "new conservatism" has set in:

The old conservatives wanted to hold on to a set of trans-social values: hard work, saving for a rainy day, personal freedom, economic self-interest. The scientific liberals wanted to reexamine these values in light of social consequences, that is, apply the method of science to determine their social adequacy. But now, the liberals have grown conservative about the method; they want to hold on to it at all costs. Thus, the scientific liberals are now learning what the old conservatives have been trying to tell them for a hundred years: there is need for some sort of stability, an allegiance to some transsocial principle. The liberals have found it in science. Moreover, the liberals are quietly accepting another old conservative insight -- there is need for an elite to make sure that the method of science is used correctly and protected from Philistine demands for harsh, unthinking "solutions" to social problems.

Now the New Left, rejecting both stability and elitism but adopting a little from each ethic -- hatred of government from the conservatives, concern for the weak from the liberals -- is bugging both right and left with its iconoclasm and demand for change and reform (1972, p. 164).

The great concern is, therefore, that "in the bureautechnocratic shuffle, men began to lose some of their humanness; they grew resistant to the difficult task of thinking about life, content to go on believing in the sacredness of science as applied to both things and men and willing to accept a system which indeed turns men into things as the necessary order of the human world" (p. 166). All of this has both immediate and direct application to the state or education today. For many the present compromise between "the Aristotelian rationalists and the Deweyan pragmatists" -- the idea that mastery of knowledge which leads to problem-solving ability -- is breaking down because it doesn't provide humanness and a concern for fellow man -- true personal significance. "If an experience
expands awareness and intensifies personal significance, it is edu-
cational" (p. 208). The upshot of this undoubtedly most insightful
analysis of the plight of education in North America today is that
drastic change is needed, and that such change revolves around the
concept of individual freedom. People must be free to make choices
about their own life plans and professional careers; this has been
known for some time. This "education for personal significance"
involves a reordering of priorities and an alteration of educa-
tional methodology.

All of this seemingly utopian argument demands practical
application to the situation at hand in education, and most particu-
larly to the question of freedom in competitive sport. The student
(or student-athlete as he -- not she -- has been typically desig-
nated) needs "to make an assessment of his own feelings and atti-
tudes, and then to compare those with the feelings and attitudes
of others" (p. 209). In this way one will truly see the real world
through his own eyes and perspective. From this can follow -- and,
indeed, must follow -- the opportunity to make a personal choice
that will result in much more of a "personal contract" than the
typical "social contract" with which youth is confronted on all
sides at present. The third stage of this educational process
should follow up immediately on the idea that the "personal encounter"
allows a personal choice that can soon result in a "gut-level passion"
to know -- what Tesconi and Morris call "affective curiosity" (p. 211).
Such an educational approach in the classroom, in the gymnasium, or
on the field would do much to bring about a "personification of
knowledge"; to establish a "joyful Socratic relationship" between
teacher/coach and student in which the student "discovers knowledge"
and explores his own feelings; and to start the student down the road to the establishment of a personal identity with a significant amount of self-esteem. What is needed desperately is the opportunity to make choices about the educational process that will result in a "self-posturing" experience characterized by a developing feeling of authenticity within the so-called anti-man culture.

**Freedom in Competitive Sport**

After a brief introduction, this paper considered the present status of man facing an uncertain future in which the amount of freedom available to him may be sharply curtailed. Then the concept of freedom was placed in philosophical perspective -- that is, how the term is defined or conceived in typical philosophical discussions. In addition to the idea or concept of freedom from certain controls in life, it was stressed further that there should be freedom for certain opportunities and choices among alternative courses of action -- a definitely more positive kind of freedom in the latter instance. It was obvious that the various "kinds" of freedom deserved most serious consideration in the educational system of an evolving democratic state.

Now the present pattern operative in competitive sport will be described with specific reference to the situation in intercollegiate athletics. Selected references to interscholastic athletics and professional sport will be introduced in certain instances where deemed pertinent. The concept of freedom as described above will be brought into the discussion whenever it seems necessary. The underlying hypothesis is that coaches of competitive sport in only very rare instances consider the concept of freedom to be an important aspect of the sport which they coach, the methodology
which they employ to carry out their duties, or, for that matter, of the total educational experience being provided to their charges within the university or college concerned. It is believed that the prevailing competitive sport situation in Canadian universities is quite different than that of most universities in the United States, but no effort will be made to prove both this and the previous underlying hypothesis from the standpoint of historical, descriptive, or experimental group method research (although such investigations would undoubtedly bring out most interesting results). This is an effort to explore the prevailing situation tentatively using a philosophical orientation in which the concepts of freedom from (a negative approach) and freedom of, to, and/or in are considered. The idea of direct or indirect methods of control will be kept in mind also, but the definition of the term "freedom" will not be stretched to include all of the ways and means needed to realize all of one's life goals. The concept of "education for personal significance" will be kept in focus to determine whether competitive sport typically provides a "personal encounter" resulting in a subsequent personal choice that eventually leads to the "affective curiosity" that Tesconi and Morris also refer to as a "gut-level passion" to know.

U. S. Intercollegiate Athletics -- 1929 and 1974. In 1929 the Carnegie Report entitled American College Athletics explained that "the defects of American college athletics are two: commercialism, and a negligent attitude toward the educational opportunity for which the American college exists." Additionally, the Report stressed that
the so-called amateur code was violated continually; that recruiting and subsidizing was "the darkest blot upon American college sport"; that athletic training and hygiene practices were deplorable and actually jeopardized health in many instances; that athletes are not poorer academically, but that hard training for long hours impaired scholastic standing; that athletics as conducted fail in many cases "to utilize and strengthen such desirable social traits as honesty and the sense of fair play"; that few of the sports which are most popular contributed to physical recreation after college; that many head coaches were receiving higher pay than full professors, but that their positions were dependent upon successful win-loss records; that the athletic conferences were not abiding by the letter, much less the spirit of the established rules and regulations; and that athletes were not receiving the opportunity to "mature under responsibility."

In 1974, some forty-five years later, there seems to be every indication that the only one of the above-mentioned areas of criticism showing improvement would be that of athletic training and hygiene practices! Even on this point a cynic would be quick to point out that improved athletic training could be expected because of the desire to keep expensive athletic talent healthy enough to "earn its keep." At any rate, in 1974 the American Council on Education discovered that "there's a moral problem in college athletics," and that "the pressure to win is enormous" (Cady, The New York Times, March 10, 1974) -- facts which have been known to cognoscenti in educational circles for decades. For example, The New York Times commissioned a survey of some forty colleges and universities and reported in 1951 that the flagrant abuses of athletic subsidization
in many colleges and universities "promoted the establishment of false values"; "are the bane of existence in American education"; "lower educational standards generally"; force educators "to lose out to politicians"; and "do further injury to democracy in education" (Grutzner, 1951). Obviously, it serves no purpose to enumerate such statements endlessly, because volumes could be filled with them before 1929 and up to the present. Thus, the emphasis in this paper will be placed on exactly how these various abuses impinge on the freedom of those who are often identified as "student-athletes."

**Relationship to Concepts of "Negative Freedom" or "Freedom from"**

The contention here is that in the United States the talented young athlete is "caught up by the system" which in the final analysis negates just about every aspect of the philosopher's definition of "freedom from" as explained by Partridge earlier. The young athlete is pressured inordinately to accept the society's goals and thereby his course of conduct is limited. The truly gifted athlete is so besieged by forceful, hypocritical recruiting that it is not possible for him to choose intelligently between alternatives available to him. In the final analysis he is compelled to act as "he himself would not choose to act" or, to continue with phrases taken from Partridge's definition, he "is prevented from acting as he would otherwise choose to act." Lastly, all of this typically takes place or is forced upon him by "the will of another man, of the state, or of any other authority" (Partridge, 1967, Vol. 3, p. 222). Translated to the realm of competitive sport in the U.S., this becomes the will of the coach or members of his staff, the president of the university or even the governor of the state, and "any other authority"
could be well-intentioned, but basically extremely shortsighted, parents, alumni, secondary school coaches, or friends.

To place these assertions in better perspective by some documentation, recall the recent statement by Moses Malone, the outstanding high school basketball star drafted by the pros: "They dragged me to as many as 24 schools; sometimes they brought me in to meet the president of the university, who talked to me like he wanted to be my father... they fixed me up with dates. Then when I got home those girls called me long distance and pretended they were in love with me" (Putnam, Sports Illustrated, Nov. 4, 1974, p. 20). If the above isn't bad enough, and it most certainly is not atypical, Putnam reports that:

Perhaps the strangest of these episodes occurred when Oral Roberts showed up at Malone's home in Petersburg, Virginia and offered to cure his mother of her bleeding ulcer. Roberts left the Malones in no doubt that his university would be a fine place for Moses to play basketball (Ibid.)

This sort of ridiculous information will be supplemented by only one other comment, this by the great basketball player and former coach, Bob Cousy:

You get a kid to come to your school nowadays by licking his boots. It's an unhealthy situation. Once you have committed yourself to begging him to come, there can never be a player-coach relationship. The kid is the boss. There are plenty of rules that govern recruiting, yet there are no rules because there is no one really to enforce them. (Goldaper, The New York Times, March 9, 1969)

In addition to the pressure exerted upon the prospective athlete to attend a particular institution, the freedom of the athlete to "choose between alternatives available to him," or not to be "compelled to act as he himself would not choose to act" is typified by the now famous statement of Illinois' football great, Dick
Butkus: "I wanted medicine, but they put me in p.e.!!" The situation in Butkus' case is simply one of an endless string of infringements upon the individual's freedom of choice by coaches eager to -- and undoubtedly pressured to -- win at almost any cost. The writer has experienced this problem first hand at three major U.S. universities to varying extents. Once to his amazement while serving as a physical education department chairman at a large university that was desirous of status as a football power, he discovered that the Athletic Association was paying an undergraduate counselor in his department "under the table" to help delinquent student-athletes to substitute courses in a way contrary to regulations and to perform other "needed services" to athletes who had either arrived on campus as dubious scholars or who were in scholastic difficulty for a variety of reasons. The point of this present discussion in regard to the concept of freedom is that other people were invariably "leading the student-athletes around almost as if they had rings in their noses." The "life decisions" are being made to a large extent by men whose very positions depend upon keeping the athlete eligible in order to win games and thereby to bring in higher gate receipts!

As Tee Moorman, 1960 Look All-American, said at the award ceremonies: "After you find out the cold facts, that you're all just there for the same reason, the fun wears off" (The New York Times, Dec. 11, 1960).

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate the various aspects of individual freedom from that of man as a social animal in a social setting. Careful analysis appears to verify the assertion that the situation has gradually and steadily developed
in such a way that the social influences now almost completely envelop the individual in the gate receipt sports in the United States, and that he is confronted typically by competitive sport's own particular brand of "Decidophobia" as postulated by Kaufmann (1973). In other words, the financially tendered student-athlete, largely because of social influences that negate his opportunity for autonomy and personal decision-making, is almost forced to choose one or more of the "strategies" described by Kaufmann (but which has been specifically adapted to the world of competitive sport). The problem is not so acute in most of the sports that do not have a direct gate receipt relationship to the rise or fall of the program, although there is no doubt but that "the system" takes away the individual's autonomy in a number of highly important aspects of human existence at the very time that the athlete is in the formative stages insofar as the development of his personality and character is concerned. A tendered athlete must not think or speak too much about social and/or controversial issues. He should always be dressed neatly when he takes a trip with the team. Certain specific regulations apply in regard to hair length, beards, moustaches, sideburns, etc. The athlete must be careful about the people with whom he associates on campus. He must be especially careful not to appear nonconformist in regard to relations with members of the opposite sex of a different race and ethnic background. He should study very diligently so as to remain eligible for competition. He should take the courses that the coaches recommend, or even recommended major and minor programs, because the coaches know which professors are "soft touches" and favorable to athletics.
This list of commandments could be lengthened further, but it will be best perhaps to conclude this aspect of the analysis by referring to the famous "ABC" professor of the Big Ten -- A for athletes; B for boys, and C for coeds. Woe to the small, insignificant golf player on scholarship who didn't alert this professor about his status and found himself with a neat D at mid-term! Of course, such a difficulty could perhaps be rectified by a coach in one sport talking to a coach in another sport, both of whom were on the physical education roster part-time, and who happened to have this lad with excellent motor ability in their physical education activity classes.

This section will be concluded by the presentation of several "isolated voices" selected at random which point up various positions and attitudes on this subject of competitive sport for men in U.S. colleges and universities. The reader should keep in mind the concept of freedom under discussion and also the matter of so-called direct or indirect control of the athlete concerned. On the one hand, professors like Michael Shaara speak out about how "Colleges Short-Change Their Football Players" (The Sat. Evening Post, Nov. 5, 1966), while on the other hand constructive organizations like the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation hold a Conference on Personal Values in Sports that recommends "re-evaluation of the relative emphasis that personal values receive in our programs" (Letter of April 10, 1963 by Jennings Davis, Jr. to Members of the National College Physical Education Association for Men). On April 12, 1967 this writer sent a letter to the Chairman of the Department of Physical Education in a sister institution within the same state in which he stated:
All of us in physical education like to think that ideally we can function happily and satisfactorily with intercollegiate athletics in one unit. In fact last year I convinced our Dean to allow me to make a presentation recommending such a union to a committee studying this proposition. Since that time, I have discovered that I was completely wrong to even consider such a possibility. The involvement of the Governor, State Legislature, alumni, and local business men, and the unbelievable extent of this involvement has convinced me that these individuals and the units which they represent are so powerful that it would be absolutely ridiculous to include intercollegiate athletics with physical education and other related fields into one professional unit on a campus such as yours or ours in this State at the present time.

It is sad to relate, but such a statement can be made about most of the fifty states in the United States insofar as the publicly-supported universities are concerned. The interdependence of sport and culture is now such that our citizens view the athletes as "cultural maximizers," and there seems to be almost nothing that educators can do to keep intercollegiate (and often interscholastic) athletics in proper perspective. Thus, last year at a professional meeting the writer was forced to smile sadly when a number of physical education administrators told him in effect: "Oh, we don't have any serious problems with athletics. You see, we are completely separate from them." This statement would be distressing even if it were made by a German professor, but the fact that it was made by a number of physical education professors in whose departments athletes are majoring in physical education, tells more than mere words can relate. It tells the informed educator that, in addition to the student-athletes involved with tenders and whose individual rights are continually being denied, the physical educators and the coaches themselves are caught up in the system and are
being denied their own academic freedom to a greater or lesser extent. Obviously, the situation should be changed radically, but who is going to be able to accomplish this and when? To make matters worse, just last week it was announced by the new President very quietly that the football programs of the various academies would be stepped up so as to be competitive . . .

**Freedom Available to Some on the Continent.** It is not the intention of the writer to convey the impression here that all college and university athletes in the United States are having their individual freedom denied to them any more than the general run of the population is facing such curtailment. Of course, many citizens are truly worried about the level of individual freedom available to all regardless of race, creed, and financial status. Kaufmann's theory of prevailing Decidophobia with people choosing one or more strategies to avoid individual autonomy in their lives deserves careful study also. Additionally, Skinner's future-oriented, behavioristic approach implying a concept of "beyond freedom and dignity" has many wondering about what the future might hold in store for them and their descendants. But in the field of competitive sport there are some colleges and universities where wise leadership has somehow prevailed with resultant opportunity for athletes to be relatively free from undue coercion and to make choices among alternatives courses of action regarding their individual lives. One has to go no further than the Little Three in New England, most Ivy League institutions, a large university like Wayne State in Detroit, and the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, to name just a few. There are, of course a number of non-gate receipt sports where the amount of athletic scholarship help
is relatively low (and is indeed declining) in the larger universities where revenues from football, basketball, hockey, etc. must be upheld to keep the entire program operational. Despite the hue and cry of many that educational progressivism has taken over the schools, competitive sport at both the university and high school levels is typically regarded as extra-curricular. It must fend for itself largely because of this shortsighted educational philosophy, and thereby are planted the seeds for a great many of the serious ills that prevail.

Canada has been most fortunate in the realm of university competitive sport, and the prevailing "amateur spirit" has definitely influenced the secondary school outlook as well. This is not to say that there aren't warning signs on the horizon. One university in the Far West (Simon Fraser) has declared itself for the scholarship pattern of the United States, and therefore does not take part in the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union schedules. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, in cooperation with the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union, recently engaged A. W. Matthews to conduct a study of athletics throughout the country. After careful analysis Dr. Matthews was able to report that intercollegiate athletics in Canada has been able to maintain its amateur spirit and educational balance, generally speaking, but that there are warning signs on the horizon that will need to be watched carefully. He stated that,

The rather wide divergences of opinion regarding intercollegiate athletics in particular, undoubtedly is an outgrowth of differing educational philosophies underlying our educational system. However, it is very evident that many persons see in U.S. college sport today much that they consider to be undesirable and foreign to the purpose of a university and see our intercollegiates inevitably being
tarred with the same brush . . . Canadian universities appear to be in a position to strive for a very high level of athletic and recreational development in international comparison. University athletic programs must be seen as a need of the people -- of individuals, of groups, and of the entire university community. This is particularly true in a cultural environment that is as heterogeneous and fast-changing as the one confronting today's university. In such context, "Canadianization" can take on a much-desired and a more positive meaning for university athletic programs. (Matthews, 1974, p. 3)

(Ed. note: It should be pointed out that Dr. Matthews was requested to include the intramural, recreational, and instructional service programs in the above report. As he explained, "In this connection it is significant to observe that the discipline of physical education in Canada has developed and is maintaining its own distinctive characteristics . . . ." (p. 3)

The above comments about certain institutions of higher education in the United States, and about the fact that a similar statement can be made on the Canadian scene generally, were made mostly in the context of this paper about freedom in competitive sport to point out that there may still be some hope for a return to sanity in competitive sport. This statement is made despite what to many is the seeming inevitability that the concept of individual freedom for the person holding an athletic scholarship in the United States today has been hopelessly destroyed. Those people who are vitally interested in the future of competitive sport in educational institutions must work their way out of the prevailing situation. The goal of a "free man living the good life in a free society" -- an aim which in itself offers certain guarantees to the student-athlete, cannot be cast aside as hopelessly idealistic and impractical.

Freedom in the Future

What is the hope for individual freedom in the future in an overpopulated world? This is obviously an impossible question to answer here, and perhaps anywhere for that matter, but it is a
query that has direct implications for the question of freedom in competitive sport in Canada and the United States -- and, of course, throughout the world eventually. Gallup, in *The Miracle Ahead*, addresses the question as to how civilization can be lifted to a new level. In suggesting "new ways to actualize our potential," he suggest a new educational philosophy of individual effort that embraces a plan covering the entire life span. Secondly, he points out that man hasn't truly taken advantage of the great opportunity for collective effort. Further, he looks to the social sciences for assistance in the solution of social problems presently causing slow progress or institutional failure. Lastly, he explains that man must develop means whereby the new generation understands the concept of change and develops ways to overcome the various "resistances" to change (Gallup, p. 24). Approaching his subject from a quite different standpoint than Tesconi and Morris with their "anti-man culture," Gallup nevertheless sees a vital role for the education profession. He asks for an educational system that will arouse the intellectual curiosity of the students and that, in the final analysis, will cause them to become dedicated to the cause of self-education and informed political activity (p. 40). It appears to this writer that this comes right back again to the fact that present-day education is not providing a sufficient quantity of humanness and a concern for fellow man -- true personal significance. "If an experience expands awareness and intensifies personal significance, it is educational" (Tesconi and Morris, p. 208). This is the plight of education in North America, and it is most certainly the plight of overly-organized sport in educational institutions. Is individual freedom a hopeless dream?
The answer to this rhetorical question must be in the affirmative unless a re-ordering of educational priorities can somehow take place. Such a dream is difficult enough for those aspects of the educational program that are indeed deemed educational, but what does such a goal mean to competitive sport that is so often automatically designated as extra-curricular? One needs to at least make the squad, before he will be allowed to play the educational game!

The intent here is not to spread "gloom and doom" even though many aspects of the present situation could easily drive a concerned person to despair. This assertion is made despite Etzioni's recent statement that social scientists are beginning to re-examine their core assumption "that man can be taught almost anything and quite readily." He continues by stating that, "We are now confronting the uncomfortable possibility that human beings are not very easily changed after all" (Etzioni, SR, June 3, 1972, p. 45).

As described earlier, there are indeed a number of schools, colleges, and universities in the United States where programs of competitive sport have been kept in educational perspective with a resultant modicum of individual freedom for the athlete. Further, this situation or condition of "educational sport" does actually still exist throughout Canadian education. Still further, there are many so-called "individual sports" functioning reasonably well even in those universities where the "Big Business" approach to competitive sport has taken control out of the hands of the educators. Thus, there are indeed many athletes today who still believe that they are "self-posturing" individuals -- and this ranges from the body-
builders seeking perfectly developed physiques, to the long distance runner who trains himself, to the skier the mountain climbers, the surfer, the parachutist -- and, of course, the tough-minded athlete who despite the outcome still makes many key decisions for himself.

Not to be forgotten in this discussion is the intelligent, sensitive, hard-working coach who appreciates this problem of freedom in competitive sport, and who makes every effort to encourage the athletes on his teams to think for themselves, to plan their efforts, to pursue their self-chosen curricula successfully, and to feel that "joy of effort" that comes from a truly fine individual or team experience in competitive sport. These athletes can be called "self-posturing" individuals. These people have made "an assessment of their own feelings and attitudes" and also compared them "with the feelings and attitudes of others." As a result they have then made a personal choice that is a wholesome blending of a "personal contract" with a "social contract." Finally, these lucky, and unfortunately all too rare, athletes have acquired a "gut-level passion" or "affective curiosity" to know more about themselves and their sport; a desire to achieve a "personification" of knowledge; and an opportunity to receive guidance along the path toward the establishment of a personal identity with a significant amount of self-esteem. (Tesconi and Norris, 1972, p. 208 et ff.)

Summary and Conclusions

In the statement immediately above, the writer has spelled out for himself the only acceptable workable definition in which a concept of individual freedom can be carried out for athletes in competitive sport situations in education within an evolving
democracy. This is the only way that competitive sport can assist athletes to live full, rich lives while at the same time strengthening the fabric and position of democracy as the best theory of government. This paper has examined the present status of man in regard to a precarious future. It has explained how the concept of freedom has been viewed in philosophy. There was a brief discussion of this same concept as it has related to the philosophy of education, and a stand was taken on the side of Tesconi and Morris' "personification of knowledge" approach to combat modern bureau-technocracy. It was explained how almost all of the aspects of individual freedom as defined are negated in far too many competitive sport situations on this continent today. Lastly, it pointed out that there are still some programs of educational, competitive sport in the United States, and that such is the prevailing pattern of competitive sport in Canadian education still.

Earlier in this paper it was pointed out that there hasn't yet developed an adequately functioning mythology for today's world in which man has acquired what he feels to be a sufficient explanation of the mysterious universe and man's place in such a vast enterprise. As a result Campbell claims that people haven't been receiving the necessary guidance available in the past to assuage the psychological crises that inevitably appear during the life cycle. If it is true that men need new myths, perhaps even more individualized and small-group oriented myths, then it seems logical that sport -- which must be recognized as a vital force in culture today -- needs to contribute positively to the creation of a new myth in the Western world. To this end a new myth is being recommended -- that of free man molding the future in competitive sport according to his personal values,
but in keeping with the values and norms of an evolving, democratic society. In the writer's opinion, this can, and indeed must, be the new myth promulgated by those guiding competitive sport in education. There can be no compromise if competitive sport is to serve as a "socially useful" force leading to the educational ideal described.

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