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ABSTRACT This is the third unit to the second-semester "Comparing Political Experiences" course which focuses on a specific, controversial, political issue. The unit analyzes the concept of political maintenance by studying the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) between 1918 and 1975 and its fight to secure mine safety standards. A documentary approach represents the core of instruction in this 12th-grade unit which is divided into five activities. The first activity introduces students to the structure of mines and various mining safety problems in order to grasp the meaning of the issues and problems with which the UMWA, as a political system, must deal. Activity 2 studies the organization, structure, and growth of the UMWA in the 20th century. Throughout activity 3, students relate the miners' idea of union legitimacy to the concept of political maintenance. Activity 4 examines how the union has been maintained over time by the use of such political devices as control and mobilization. Activity 5 focuses on how union interdependence with other organizations and governments also contributes to political maintenance. The activity requires students to speculate about the future of the UMWA. Each activity contains the necessary student materials and student discussion questions. (Author/DE)

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Comparing Political Experiences

Judith Gillespie
Stuart Lazarus
These experimental curriculum materials are part of a two-semester high school course, Comparing Political Experiences. The materials constitute one unit of one semester, Political Issues. The course is being developed by the High School Political Science Curriculum Project, which is one of the projects sponsored by the American Political Science Association's Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education. Development of these materials was supported in whole or in part by the National Science Foundation. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or of the copyright holder. These materials cannot be duplicated, reproduced or used in any manner without the specific written approval of the High School Political Science Curriculum Project.
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Many members of the High School Political Science Curriculum Project have contributed to the development of this unit. The project is co-directed by Judith Gillespie, Howard Mehlinger and John Patrick. The Political Systems materials are being developed principally by Judith Gillespie and John Patrick. The Political Issues materials are being developed principally by Judith Gillespie and Stuart Lazarus. Howard Mehlinger and Stuart Lazarus co-direct the Comparing Political Experiences Diffusion Project. Toby Bonwit serves as a curriculum writer and editor for the project. Dave Lambert co-ordinates the formative evaluation and the work on the validation study. All achievement test instruments and data analysis work is being done by National Evaluation Systems, Amherst, Massachusetts. Martin Sampson administers and coordinates pilot school activities. Judith Gillespie and Stuart Lazarus are directly responsible for the materials developed in this unit.

Several instructional developers and artists have made important contributions to this unit. Bruce Smith deserves special credit for his work on this unit. Bruce participated in the gathering of data for the unit. He also was primarily responsible for developing the first two activities in the unit and aided in work on the "Strike!" game. We would also like to offer acknowledgments to others for their contributions:

Leslie Aguillard: Illustration for Activity I

Toby Bonwit: Development of the three cases on the ILGWU and the three cases on the Organization of African Unity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin Heltai</td>
<td>Technical production work on &quot;Work at the Face: Part I&quot; audio-tape. Production Work on &quot;Work at the Face: Part II&quot; audio-tape</td>
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<td>Development of the three cases on the Democratic party and the three cases on Mexico</td>
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Each of these people continue to provide a creative and important intellectual stimulus for our work.

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have worked with the pilot schools and critiqued materials. Eight people are also engaged in providing case materials on schools to aid in the development of instructional units. The consultants are listed below. The asterisks refer to those individuals who are engaged in gathering case materials:

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Special thanks is extended to the pilot teachers who are testing these materials this year. Past evaluations from many of teachers and from students have produced many insights into the strength and feasibility of our ideas. This unit is a far different piece than was originally conceived because of their advice in its developmental stages. The pilot
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All of these people have demonstrably influenced the way this unit has been developed. However, the responsibility for the ideas and approaches taken in the materials should not be attributed to the APSA Pre-Collegiate Committee, the National Science Foundation, the consultants or the pilot teachers. Although their contributions continue to be invaluable, responsibility for the ideas presented here rests with the authors.

Judith Gillespie  
Stuart Lazarus
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ACTIVITY I: UNDERGROUND

This unit is about political life in a labor union -- the United Mine Workers of America. The unit will focus on this particular union in order to illustrate some general ideas you can apply to political life in other unions and in other political organizations. It will especially stress how political organizations such as unions endure over time. It takes a major effort for any political organization not to fall apart or to change as years go by. The United Mine Workers union is a good example of a political group that has managed to survive since its beginning in the 1890's. There are reasons why the union has stayed largely the same throughout its history. These reasons are what we want to explore in this unit.

In order to begin to study a union such as the UMWA, you need to know something about coal mines. Few people have been in coal mines, and a lot of folklore has developed about them. We will attempt in this first activity to introduce you to what an underground mine is like so that you can see how mines work and begin to understand the environment in which the politics of the United Mine Workers takes place.

As you read through the next pages in this activity, imagine that you are in an underground mine. When you come to exercises which ask you to use your knowledge of mines, do each of them carefully. Your teacher will give you directions as to how much to read and which exercises to do as you move through the activity.
Energy. Industrial society depends upon it. A major power source in the United States is coal. It fuels generating plants which produce electricity for heat and power. Coke, specially treated coal, fires steel mill furnaces. Chemicals obtained from coal are used in detergent, fingernail polish, mothballs, and hundreds of other products. Modern life depends upon coal.

Coal is found in veins, or seams, under the earth. It was formed from the tissues of plants that lived millions of years ago.
Generations of plants grew and died in the vast swamps which covered much of the country at that time. Debris from dead plants collected on the ground.

The plant debris decayed and formed a layer of peat, a substance that looks like rotten wood.
Occasionally, the earth's surface shifted and parts of it sank. Streams and oceans poured in, covering the peat with a shallow sea. The water carried mud, sand, and other solid particles which settled to the bottom and eventually formed a layer of rock over the peat.

The heavy rock pressed down on the peat for thousands of years. The weight compressed the peat, making it more and more dense. Finally, the pressure converted the peat into coal.
After a long time, the land emerged from the waters. Another generation of plants flourished and died. New layers of peat formed. Shallow seas rushed over the peat the next time the earth's crust buckled. And another coal seam was formed.

This cycle was repeated time after time, and many coal seams were sandwiched between layers of rock. For example, eleven seams run through parts of West Virginia and Kentucky. Some are a few feet from the earth's surface; others are a thousand feet underground. They vary from a fraction of an inch to nearly one hundred feet in thickness.
Coal deposits were formed under vast regions of the United States. The U.S. is the world's second largest coal producer. Its coal resources will last for another 1,500 years. Coal will supply energy long after such other power sources as oil and natural gas are gone.

Although America's coal deposits are vast, they are often difficult to reach. Yet coal is so valuable that people spend money and labor to build coal mines.
There are four kinds of coal mines: surface, shaft, drift and slope mines. Surface mines are built when the coal seam is near the surface. Drift mines are used when the coal lies at moderate depths. Shaft mines are used when the coal is very deep. Drift and slope mines are built when the coal lies at moderate depths.

All mines are complex, but three specially difficult problems must be solved in order to run an underground mine: shaft, drift, or slope mine. 1. There must be a way to support the roof after the coal is removed.
2. There must be enough transportation space for miners, machines, and coal to move underground.

3. There must be adequate air ventilation for all parts of the mine.

The design of any underground mine must solve air, roof and transportation problems.
Exercise 1

In this exercise, you are asked to design an underground coal mine. On the following page there is a diagram of a coal seam shown from the top looking down. Assume that you are an engineer and you've been hired to layout a mine to extract coal from the seam. Draw a rough sketch which shows how you would design a mine to solve the three major problems of underground mining.

Since it costs millions of dollars to open a mine, the mine system must eventually reach all parts of the seam so all the coal can be recovered. Your diagram, however, does not have to cover the whole seam, but it should show how your plan could be followed to eventually reach all parts of the coal vein.

Be ready to answer the following questions about your mine:

1. How will the roof be supported when the coal is removed?
2. How will miners, machines, and coal be transported underground?
3. How will air be provided to all parts of the mine?
4. How can the design be followed to eventually reach almost all of the coal in the seam?
Many people think of a mine as a big tunnel, but that image just scratches the surface. It's like thinking of a television set as a box with knobs and a screen in front, without considering all the transistors, electrical circuits, and tubes behind the scene. A mine, too, is more elaborate than it seems at first thought. It is a complicated and hazardous work environment.

The most frequently used design for underground mines in the US is the "room and pillar" layout. Compare your solutions to air, roof and transportation problems with the way these obstacles are overcome in room and pillar mines.
A long tunnel, called the main heading, is driven from the entrance shaft into the seam. The tunnel is fifteen to twenty feet wide and about six feet high. Air from outside the mine is forced into the main heading by a huge fan located on the surface beside the entrance shaft. (In the diagram, the arrows show the direction of the air flow.)

A ventilating air current, however, cannot flow both in and out of a single tunnel. Thus, a second tunnel, called the airway, is driven parallel to the main heading and about fifty feet from it.
When both tunnels are about one hundred feet long, the main heading is connected to the airway by a small tunnel called a crosscut or a break-through. The mine now has a ventilating air current. Air flows down the main heading, through the crosscut, and returns along the airway, which is connected to the surface by an airshaft.

As the two major tunnels, the main heading and the airway, are driven further into the seam, a new break-through is cut about every one hundred feet. Old break-throughs are sealed with a brick wall to force air to circulate throughout the entire length of the mine.
Only a small amount of coal is produced by digging the main tunnels. The bulk of the coal is recovered from rooms opened along both sides of the main tunnels.

The room is joined to the main heading by two smaller tunnels which run perpendicular to the main tunnel. Two connecting tunnels are necessary to provide adequate air circulation in the room. A portion of air is diverted from the main heading into one of the connector tunnels. After the air circulates through the room, it flows through a crosscut and into the second connector tunnel. Then it blows back to the main airway and is exhausted from the mine.
As the mine is developed, the connector tunnels are lengthened and additional rooms are opened. A series of rooms, or section, may extend one or two miles from the main heading, or until the entire width of the seam has been mined. Air is provided to the entire section by sealing old crosscuts.

The main heading is also the major travelway in the mine. Railroad tracks are laid along the length of the main heading so electric locomotives can haul miners, machines, and coal cars in and out of the mine. The airway functions only as an exhaust path for air and as an emergency escape route from the mine in case a disaster blocks the main heading.
Coal mined in the rooms is transported back to the main heading either on railroad tracks or on conveyor belts.

Roof support is a problem throughout the mine. Most coal seams have a hard sandstone top. The overlying sandstone is separated from the coal by a slate shield that varies from two to ten feet in thickness.
The soft slate adheres weakly to the hard sandstone. Consequently, it requires support after the coal is removed.

Steel rods, called roof bolts, are used to keep the slate overlay from falling. A machine drives the roof bolts through the loose slate into the hard sandstone, and the roof is securely held up.
Roof support in the rooms is a great problem because of the large surface area which must be braced. Roof bolts are used in the rooms, but they provide insufficient support by themselves. The major support comes from the solid pillars of coal left standing in strategic spots as the room is opened.

A large barrier of coal is left standing between the room and the main airway to prevent a cave-in from damaging the major tunnels. Since the main airway and the main heading will be used throughout the life of the mine, anywhere from twenty-five to seventy-five years, special care is taken to protect these two vital arteries from damage.
The passageway which joins the room to the connector tunnel is driven narrow for the first twenty feet to leave a large pillar of coal standing to protect the entry from a cave-in.

The room then gradually widens to its full width. The area of a room varies considerably from one mine to another, depending on the strength of the roof. A room may be anywhere from ten to fifty feet wide and two to four hundred feet long. Solid pillars of coal are left standing to support the roof the first time the room is mined. The pillars will be removed and the roof allowed to collapse when a section is mined a second time.
The room and pillar plan can be used to eventually reach all the coal in the seam. The main heading and airway are extended, and a second series of rooms is opened.

Coal on the right hand side of the main heading is reached by driving a second airway.
Then rooms are opened on the right side of the seam.

One section after another is opened, mined, and closed until the seam is completely worked out.

(Turn the page and complete Exercise 2)
Exercise 2

On the next page there is a diagram which shows part of a mine. There are four mistakes in the picture. Study the diagram and then a) identify the mistake and b) speculate about the consequences of the error.

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 
ACTIVITY TWO: WORK AT THE FACE

Work at the Face, Part I: 1920

Our study of union politics begins in the year 1920. In this lesson you will see a slide-tape that describes the kind of work miners did at that time. Coal miners confronted certain problems in their daily work. Such concerns frequently form the basis of political interests. A political interest is a benefit that a group wants to achieve because the members believe that it will improve their well-being.

As you watch "Work at the Face, Part I: 1920," try to identify some political interests of coal miners. You can make notes in the space provided below to aid you in discussing these interests after the slide-tape.

Political Interests of Coal Miners: 1920
1. Narrator: Mining is hard, dangerous work. Caleb Leadbetter knows, for he has worked in coal mines all of his life.

2. Caleb: Now it's not so bad until you get way back in there. Then, in the fall of the year, that top begins to sweat and that bottom begins to get wet. It just looks like you took a hose in there and sprayed from one end of the mine to the other. That's how wet it'll get in there. Your cars will bog down in the mud. When the season changes, then that will all dry up. Then it gets so dusty they got to put somethin' on it to keep the dust down. The further you get back, the more hazards you got. Yes siree.

3. Narrator: It's the year 1920 and only men work underground in the mines. They begin work early in the morning. Dressed in denim jackets and overalls, yarn socks, and rubber boots, the miners board the man-trip and descend an inclined plan to the main heading hundreds of feet below ground.
4. Caleb: You go in about seven o'clock in the morning, and you don't get out lots of times 'til six or seven o'clock in the night. Coal is the main thing. The company doesn't say nothin' about the miner, his conditions or nothin'. They say more about the coal. Sometimes the man trip will be comin' out at the end of the day, and there'll be a haulage train comin' out with coal. Well, they'll switch that man trip out and let the coal get out first. They don't care how long a man has been down; he has to wait 'til the coal is out before he gets out. Not on all occasions, but lots of times this happens and there isn't nothin' you can do about it.

Photo courtesy of Farm Security Administration
5. Narrator: When the miners reach the main heading, they transfer to man cars, which are pulled through a maze of narrow tunnels by an electric locomotive. Cold wind from a circulating air current penetrates their clothes as the miners ride the cars to the point where their room, or work place, turns off to the right or left.

The miners walk along a tunnel that joins the main heading to the work place, surrounded by darkness except for the light from the open-flame, carbide lamps fastened on their leather caps.

Several men work in each room. They enter the room and walk past timber cribs and thick coal pillars to the end of the cavern, where a solid wall of coal confronts them.

In many mines, the roof of the room is more than six feet high, and the men can work without stooping. But in some mines, the roof is only three or four feet high and they must work all day in a crouch that strains their backs.

The miners set safety timbers as close as possible to the face. Safety timbers are upright props five or six inches thick which support the loose rock roof. Nevertheless, rock occasionally crashes down from the ceiling.
6. Caleb: Lots of times you'll have your place timbered, but the rock will break out between the timbers. It'll just fall between them. A big piece of that top will just mash you.

You got to watch close when you work at the face. You take a mine post, when that weight comes on that mine post, and he starts to bend, you better start to run. You better get out. You hear that mine post start clickin', you see the cap board on the top of the post start cuttin' itself off and bendin' down, and you see that baby begin to bend, then you better git. Yes siree, you better git!

7. Narrator: After the safety timbers are set, the miners are ready to work coal -- to cut, drill, shoot, and load it.

In some mines, men still cut coal with a hand pick. The miners strap thick rubber pads to their knees, kneel -- sometimes in pools of water that collect on the floor -- and hack at the coal face where it joins the floor. Swinging heavy picks, they cut a line in the face about eight inches high, twelve or fifteen feet long, and as deep as the pick handle will reach. It's hard work and takes several hours. After the miners rake the fine chips from the cut-line, a massive block of coal is left suspended from the ceiling and the two sides.
In most mines, however, undercuts are made with a new, electrically powered machine. It cuts with a series of bits attached to an endless chain which revolves around a six to eight foot long bar that penetrates into the face. The miners haul the cutter into the room on a railroad track, but at the end of the track they must drag it across the rock floor into the right hand corner of the room. They set a heavy anchor in the left hand corner and connect the machine to the anchor with a feed chain. The chain pulls the electric cutter across the face, undercutting the coal in one operation.
8. Caleb: I worked on a coal cuttin' machine, and that's where the dust is made. When you get within ten feet of your buddy in a place while you're cuttin' the coal, you can't even see him. You can just see his light. He's just barely dim. You come out, and all the week end, you hack and spit up coal dust.

9. Narrator: After they undercut the coal, the miners are ready to drill and shoot. They drill a line of holes across the face of the hanging coal block. Black powder charges are linked to fuses and shoved into the holes. The holes are sealed with rolled paper cylinders filled with dirt called "dead men."

The miners gather their tools and retreat to a safe distance. The fuses are ignited, and the shots explode with a roar that shakes the room, blasting the coal block from the face and throwing it in a heap onto the floor.

After a circulating air current blows away some of the coal dust and fumes from the explosion, the miners return to their work place. Heavy steel rails and wooden ties are used to extend a railroad track to within convenient shoveling distance of the huge pile. They push an empty mine car, capable of holding about two tons of coal, down the new track to the coal heap.
This step marks the halfway point of their shift. With their backs resting against the side of the mine, the men take sandwiches and fresh water from their tin lunch buckets. Traditionally, miners carry a large lunch so that they will have extra food in case a cave-in or explosion traps them underground. The miners eat and rest for half an hour before returning to load coal.

With one man on each side of an empty mine car, the miners attack the coal heap with huge shovels. They rapidly fill the car and either harness it to a mule or push it out of the room and back to the main heading themselves. Since they are paid only for the coal which they load, each man attaches an identifying check to the car so the company weighman will record that load to the miner's credit. The sweating men return to their room, pushing an empty car. Their shovels rise and fall until it, too, is filled.

Often a father and son form a team and load coal together.
A young boy first learns about the mines when he loads coal with his daddy. The boy don't have to have no physical examination or nothin' like that; he just goes in and helps his dad shovel coal in that car. He works for maybe a year, just a helpin' his dad. Then the boy finally gets the boss to give him a set of checks so the boy can mark his own car. The boy will load about five cars a day, and his dad will let him check maybe one of the cars. That makes the boy a little spending money.

A boy's dad shows him all about the mines. He takes more care of his son than he does hisself in the safety category. His dad takes care of him and learns the boy every hazard of the mines.
As they load the coal, the miners throw aside any rock or other useless debris loosened by the blast. When all the coal is removed, the men must load the worthless gob into cars and remove it so they will have enough room to work the next day.

A man's got to take care of everything in his room. You have to clean up rock and slate. You have to lay the track to get your cars up close. Lots of times, you have to bail water out. That's all for nothin'! You don't get paid nothin' until you load coal in that car. So it don't cost the company nothin'! Lots of times people work a day or two for nothin', just tryin' to get a place to work. That's not only one miner; that's all of 'em.

Seems like miners is lower than dogs to the company. You don't have no voice. The company has all the voice. They give you a place with water in it or bad top or somethin', and they say, "You've got to work here." You ask 'em, "What about movin' this water out?," and they tell you, "That's your problem. You either work or we'll fire you."

I never got fired, but I know people that has. If the company don't like a man, they call the other companies and tell them not to hire that fella. You can't get a job nowhere then.
13. Narrator: When they first cut rooms into the coal seam, the miners leave large pillars of coal standing to support the roof. After a whole section of rooms is mined, they pull the pillars, an operation that takes special knowledge and skill.
14. Caleb: See, after you drive your rooms, then you go up in the last room and start pillarin' back. Pillarin' means to get the coal between the rooms back out. You start at the furthest point back so you kin keep the hollow section behind you. Then it don't hurt you when it falls.

Now you gotta have that fall. See the top is always pressin' down on your mine. This big weight kin ride to the other parts of your mine and ruin it, but when this big fall comes, it takes the pressure off the other parts and you can mine in there, too.

An old experienced miner can tell just about the minute the roof is gonna fall. They hardly ever let a young miner work on pillar section. We set up a thick line of timbers where we want to break that fall off. Then we hollow out the section, all the time a pullin' back. You'll be pullin' back, and you can hear that top. It sounds almost like big thunder, and the whole mountain shakes. Then you get everythin' out of there and that fall comes.

I've seen big falls come. You'd be way away from that fall, but when it came, the wind from it would blow trap doors down. I've been knocked down many a time on a big fall. I'd be goin' away from it and that air would knock you down while you's runnin' from it.
My God, one time this man was runnin' from one of these big falls, but he was late runnin'. He runned' around a big mine car, and he had his hand over in the car as he was comin' along. That top broke and caught his arm, and he couldn't run. He hollered and prayed and ever'thing else, his arm in that car. They called that company doctor, and he came to the mines. The doctor couldn't get him out. This mountain was sittin' right on that car, and he had his arm over in it. That doctor went in that mine and cut that man's arm off, and brought him out of there and he still lived. It was really somthin'.

Still, I like to work pillar section 'cause you can load more coal on that job then you can workin' a room. That mountain, a crushin' down and comin' down, it just breaks the coal loose. It just shoots out of there. The machine doesn't have to cut it. You don't hardly ever have to shoot it. You just go to work from the bottom. I've taken a shovel and just loaded one car right after another. You'd shovel right up again' the coal pile, and when you threwed that shovelful in the car, four or five shovelfuls more would roll down. It was really wonderful.
The men who work at the face -- cutting, drilling, shooting, loading and pulling pillars -- produce the coal. Yet, other workers are required underground to do necessary jobs.

Where mules are used, a stable boss and stable boys care for the animals in underground quarters.

Where machines are used, machinists are needed to make repairs, frequently in machine shops built underground.

Track-layers put down new track and repair the old.

Electricians string wires that feed energy to the electric locomotive that pulls the coal trip along the main heading.
A motorman runs the locomotive and a trip ride looks after the train.

Where the grade is steep, a helper controls the speed of the mine cars with a hand brake.

Other workers labor on the surface to prepare the coal for shipment.

Slate pickers, boys too young to work underground and old men worn out by years of underground work, remove rock and other impurities from the coal after the cars emerge from the mine.

Some men work at the tipple. The tipple is a surface structure designed to load coal into railroad cars. One at a time, the mine cars are hoisted up the sheave house, a high tower on the side of the tipple. A tripping device automatically dumps the mine car, causing the coal to fall into a weigh hopper. The company weighman records the weight next to the miner's number on the weigh sheet and removes the miner's check from the empty car.

After the coal is weighed, it drops into a series of conveyors and screens which sort the coal by size. The various grades fall through shoots into railroad cars standing under the tipple.

At the end of their shift the underground miners catch a man trip to the surface and leave for home, free until another dawn.
Coal mining is a hard, man-killing job. Miners work in a cramped space, surrounded by hazards. Yet, perhaps because they share danger and trouble, miners take pride in their job and feel a bond with their fellow workers.

16. Caleb: If I had my life to live over, I'd live it back in the coal mines.
Exercise

In 1920, there were about 640,000 coal miners working in approximately 900 mines across the country. These miners shared the political interests that you identified in "Work at the Face." People with common needs and wants sometimes form an organization to achieve their aims. A labor union is an organization designed to gain objectives that the members value. Thus, a labor union is a political system.

As you know, political systems can be put together in several different ways. If you were a labor leader in the 1920's, what kind of political system would you design for a union of coal miners?

Your teacher will assign you to work in small groups. Your group is to draw a diagram of the kind of political system that you think could achieve the political interests of miners. You can use the space provided on the next page for your diagram. Be prepared to answer the following questions about your union:

1. How will the union include all coal miners?
2. How will political activities be conducted?
3. How will political resources be distributed?
Diagram of a Union
Organization and Structure

A. Organize!: 1860-1920

A union is an association of workers organized to advance the special interests of its members. You have already learned about some of the occupational concerns of coal miners. Common interests alone do not automatically lead to effective action. Interests must be organized so that the energy of a large number of people can be focused on winning desirable goals. In this section you will learn about the history of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and its early attempts to organize the interests of miners.
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, miners battled coal companies for the right to organize a union. For years, miners formed secret societies in local areas. Members kept their affiliation hidden because the companies fired miners who joined these organizations. Yet in 1863, 1866, and 1873, these groups broke into the open and made unsuccessful attempts to unionize all miners.

Coal barons hired professional detectives, amateur thugs, and state militia to smash those early organizations with billy clubs and bullets. Miners claimed "an eye for an eye." They dynamited company property, shot company employees, and attacked unsympathetic scabs. Finally, in 1890, strong men and women rallied to the battle cry "Organize!" and formed the United Mine Workers of America, the UMWA.

The union was established to benefit its members. It worked to increase wages. The UMWA pledged to improve safety conditions: "To reduce to the lowest possible minimum the awful catastrophies which have been sweeping our fellow craftsmen to untimely graves by the thousands." The union demanded an eight-hour work day and pleaded for laws to prevent children under fourteen years of age from working underground.

The new union grew rapidly. In 1903, when John Mitchell was elected as the fifth president of the UMWA, it had 175,000 members and a million dollar treasury. Five years later, when a dissatisfied membership forced Mitchell out, the union had 263,000 members.

Despite its growth, the union had only limited success. Many mines remained unorganized. Strikes were lost and benefits failed to
improve as rapidly as the members had expected. The coal companies retained the upper hand.

As Mitchell and other early UMWA leaders struggled to build an effective national organization, another miner left the pits to enter union politics at the local level. John L. Lewis was elected president of a small local union in Panama, Illinois.

Lewis possessed a knowledge of power, people, and language that enabled him to rise rapidly in the new organization. After a short time as a local union president, John L. Lewis went to Springfield, the Illinois state capital, as a paid union lobbyist to plead the miners' cause before the legislature. He soon came to the attention of a national labor leader, Samuel Gompers, and served as a national legislative representative for the American Federation of Labor. Lewis learned about American industry, about the process of influencing government, and about the use of power. In 1916, John L. Lewis returned to the UMWA and worked at its national headquarters in Washington, D.C. He learned the economics of the coal industry and built political strength inside the UMWA.

The president of the UMWA, John White, noticed Lewis and helped him move into a leadership position. In 1918, White resigned the UMWA presidency to take a job with the federal government. The vice-president of the union, Frank Hayes, succeeded White to the president's office. White influenced Hayes to appoint John L. Lewis to the vacant vice-presidential office.

Traditionally, the UMWA had only one vice-president who was truly second in command and who was usually groomed to become the next president.
Hayes was unable to hold his position, and other high ranking union leaders forced him to resign in 1919. The union's executive board appointed John L. Lewis to fill Hayes' term in office. Lewis became president of the UMWA without a single miner casting a ballot for him. As required by the UMWA's constitution, Lewis ran for office in the 1920 election and won a full term in office by a narrow margin.

John Llewellyn Lewis retained the UMWA presidency for the next forty years. When he took office, the UMWA was the largest labor union in America. But there was disarray, misery, lack of direction, lack of spirit, and subservience to company management among the members. Lewis created a solidarity among the membership that compelled the coal companies to accept the union as a fact of life. Under Lewis the UMWA became not only the biggest, but also the richest and most powerful union in America. John L. Lewis more than any other individual shaped the political system of the UMWA.
B. Structure

At its largest, the UMWA had about 640,000 members. Currently, it has around 120,000 working coal miners and about 80,000 retired miners who are union members. How can a system be organized to include so many members and provide benefits to them?

A formal structure is required to effectively harness the actions of many different people. Following is a chart that depicts the structure of the UMWA and a description of the rights and responsibilities of each unit in the system. Compare and contrast the structure described below with the union system that you designed in yesterday's lesson. What similarities or differences can you find?
Formal Organization of the United Mine Workers of America

International Executive Board

International Union Headquarters
UMW President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer

Headquarters Staff

Field Staff

District 1

District 2

District 23

District 24

sub-district

sub-district

sub-district

sub-district

Local union

Local union

Local union

Local union

Local union

Local union
Formal Organization
of the
United Mine Workers of America

The International Executive Board (IEB)

Each union district throughout the U.S. and Canada elects one of its members to the IEB. The IEB's most important job is making policy decisions. For example, they decide what goals are most important when the union begins contract negotiations with the coal companies. After a contract is negotiated, the IEB is the first to vote on whether to accept or reject it. This group is the highest level decision-making unit in the union.

The IEB performs other important jobs. Each member funnels information between the union's international headquarters and his or her district. Board members are assigned special tasks when the full IEB is not in session. For example, some of them might help lead a strike when the international is organizing a new local. Or, at other times, some members might travel to an area to help local leaders end a wildcat (unauthorized) strike.

International Union Headquarters.

The three highest ranking officials in the UMWA are the international president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer. They run for office in union-wide elections. They are the chief administrative officers of the union and have responsibility for all of the functions of the international. International headquarters has many responsibilities. It negotiates contracts with coal companies. It organizes new local unions. The international publishes the UMWA Journal. It lobbies with
the federal and state government for laws favorable to miners. It starts new programs, for example, in safety and education. The international collects monthly dues from miners, and distributes part of that money to district and local levels.

**Headquarters Staff**

The international needs staff employees working at headquarters to perform its many jobs. For example, researchers prepare facts to use in contract negotiations. Editors and writers publish the *Journal*. Lawyers provide legal advice and represent the union in court. The UMWA president hires and fires these personnel.

**Field Staff**

The international also needs people to work in the field. For example, safety coordinators, lobbyists, and organizers are hired by the international, but they work in the field with other units of the union.

**Districts**

The international union is divided into twenty-four district units. Union members in a district elect a president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer. The secretary-treasurer handles the district's money, workmen's compensation claims, and miners' health service cards and pensions. The district's most important function is to handle all contract problems. The president and vice-president are responsible for this job. They process grievances and take cases to arbitration. District leaders see that every union miner in the area receives all the benefits stated in the contract. They are responsible for ending
wildcat (unauthorized) strikes. Some districts hire labor lawyers to represent them in legal situations. Each district elects one member to represent it on the International Executive Board.

**Sub-districts**

Sub-districts are intermediate units that stand between a local and a district office. Some large districts contain as many as ninety-six locals and represent ten thousand miners, far too many to serve from one office. Thus, the district organizes sub-districts in order to locate offices closer to the membership.

Depending on its size, a district may have one, two, or three sub-districts. The miners in a sub-district elect one or more field representatives. The field representative works with contract problems. He or she processes grievances and passes any unresolved disputes on to the district office. As an officer of the union, the field representative is responsible for stopping wildcat strikes.

**Local Unions**

The local union is the basic unit in the organization. It usually includes the workers at one mine. Sometimes, however, two small mines will join to form one local. All miners who work for a company with a contract with the union are required to join the UMWA in order to keep their jobs.

Each local elects a president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer. The members also elect two committees: the mine committee and the health and safety committee. Both have three members. The mine committee is the grievance committee for the local. If a miner is unable to settle a dispute with a foreman or with the mine superintendent,
the miner turns the grievance over to the mine committee and they attempt to settle it. The health and safety committee is responsible for seeing that the company follows the safety regulations defined in state and federal laws and in the union contract. Both of these committees represent miners on the job. In addition, local unions may elect special committees. For example, a burial committee may be selected to help the survivors of a dead miner.

There are approximately 650 local unions in the UMWA.
Union Politics: 1920-1972

In this lesson, you will learn about the political system of the UMWA over its history. You will work in small groups to examine several case studies which depict how political resources and activities were distributed within the union at various points in time. Each group member will read a different case and then report his or her findings to the rest of the group.

As you read your case study, try to find answers to the following questions:

1. How were political resources distributed within the union?

2. How were political activities distributed within the union?

Be prepared to include answers to these questions when you report to your group.

When everyone has finished reading their case, turn to page 79 and complete the group activity described there.
The Battle for Power: 1921

John L. Lewis pictured the UMWA as an army locked in battle with the coal companies. He believed the union's success in the fight depended upon strong leadership at the top and unquestioned discipline below. Only then could the union grapple with management and win benefits for members. He told the miners, "I have never faltered or failed to present the cause or plead the case of the mine workers of this country...not in the faltering tones of a mendicant asking alms, but in the thundering voice of the captain of a mighty host, demanding the rights to which free men are entitled." Thus, soon after he became president, Lewis moved to fortify his leadership position.

John L. Lewis quickly secured his position at union headquarters. The union's national secretary-treasurer was a weak man who presented no threat. Lewis appointed to the vice-presidency a man who was totally loyal to him. Yet, throughout the country, the union's district level offices were filled by bright, capable, ambitious men who were elected by area miners. One of these district officials was Alexander Howat. The struggle between Lewis and Howat for power within the union shaped the political structure of the UMWA.

The battle began in 1921. John L. Lewis decided to challenge the old leaders of the American Federation of Labor, an association composed of various national labor unions. The UMWA was the largest union in the federation. At the 1921 convention, Lewis planned to use the UMWA's bloc of votes along with the alliances he had formed with other unions in the federation to win the presidency of the
AF of L. At a crucial moment, however, three UMWA delegates led by Alexander Howat voted against Lewis and for the old leaders. Their action defeated Lewis.

Howat was president of District 14 in Kansas and was well-known throughout the union. He was an aggressive leader, continually involved in a series of strikes in Kansas. Frequently, Howat failed to follow either the laws of Kansas or the rules of the UMWA in his fights against the coal bosses, the newspapers, the politicians, or anyone else who stood in his way. These violations provided Lewis with a basis to crush Howat and protect his own leadership position.

Lewis used Article III, Section 2, of the UMWA constitution to destroy Howat. Section 2 reads as follows: "Charters of Districts, Sub-Districts and Local Unions may be revoked by the International President, who shall have authority to create a provisional government for the subordinate branch whose charter has been revoked." The constitution gave complete power to the president. No charges had to be specified. No trial was required. Lewis could remove elected district officers who opposed him and replace them with appointed officials who supported him.

Shortly after the 1921 convention, Lewis used his authority against Howat. He suspended District 14, Alexander Howat, and Howat's supporters. Howat appealed the suspension to the union's International Executive Board. Lewis defended his action, and he was upheld by a narrow vote.

Howat continued to protest, and a few other district officers began to question Lewis' tactics. Under orders from John L. Lewis,
the UMWA withdrew Howat's union card. Without a membership card, Howat lacked a legitimate right to participate in the union.

Yet Howat fought back. He appeared at one UMWA convention after another to argue for his restoration to union membership. Finally, Howat obtained a union card from his old Kansas local and had himself selected as a local delegate to the 1927 convention. But the credentials committee, which Lewis appointed, refused to admit Howat.

Howat then went to the convention floor to plead his case before the delegates. A friend of Howat's rose and asked why Howat was not accepted as a delegate.

John L. Lewis, chairperson of the convention, boomed out a reply to the question. "The credentials of Alexander Howat have not been reported to this convention because the International President returned his credentials to the local union in Kansas, which gave them to him. That action was taken because he is not a member of the United Mine Workers of America."

Another delegate challenged Lewis. The delegate argued that Howat's dues were accepted by the local Kansas union and so Howat must be a member.

Lewis roared back. "It does not make any difference what you think. The chair has ruled."

Howat was present on the convention floor. He stood and said, "May I be given an opportunity to explain to the delegates why I should have a seat?"

From the speaker's platform, Lewis' answer rang across the floor. "You will not, and you will sit down. Sit down now! The chair is talking to you!"
Howat's supporters shouted and stamped. They hissed and booed. Delegates loyal to Lewis started a counter demonstration. Men shouted and swore at one another.

John L. Lewis' voice thundered above the tumult. "May the Chair state that you may shout until you meet each other in hell and he will not change his ruling." The noise stopped. Howat was finished. He never regained a place in the union.

By the time he finally disposed of Howat as an internal foe, Lewis was firmly in control of the UMWA. Time and time again Lewis unfolded the UMWA constitution and used Article III, Section 2, against district or sub-district officials who opposed him or his policies. It was the end of effective intermediate level leadership in the UMWA. When Lewis suspended a district, there were no further elections by miners in that area. Only officials appointed by Lewis could act.
The Battle to "Save the Union": 1926

American labor unions struck hard times during the 1920's. It was a decade of the open shop, of government opposition to unions, and of wage cuts in the midst of rising profits. Many unions became disorganized and were destroyed. The UMWA was also threatened.

Coal was a depressed industry. Demand for coal was so low that it could be met by only one third of the miners working in the industry. Unemployment increased, wages fell, and mine fatalities rose. Coal operators openly violated union contracts. The eight-hour work day disappeared as companies required miners to work ten- and twelve-hour shifts. Inside the UMWA, two men battled each other to save the union.

One was John L. Lewis, UMWA president. Lewis believed there was only one way to save the coal industry and the union. "Shut down 4,000 mines, force 200,000 miners into other industries, and the coal problem will settle itself. We have decided that it is better to have a half a million men working in the industry at good wages...than it is to have a million working in the industry in poverty." John L. Lewis chided coal operators for failing to modernize their methods and urged more mechanization in the mines, despite the number of miners that machines would replace. This proposal was Lewis' plan to save the union.

Another UMWA official had a different solution. John Brophy was the elected president of District Two. He proposed government ownership of all coal mines as the best method to save the industry and the union. Brophy's proposal was popular with some socialist miners from European backgrounds and with some other high ranking UMWA officials.
As Brophy gained wider support for his plan, John L. Lewis aimed an attack against him. The union's official magazine, The UMW Journal, printed unfavorable stories about Brophy and his ideas. It ran articles praising Lewis and his plans. Although the dues from every union member paid for the publication, The Journal reflected the outlook of only one man, John L. Lewis.

Brophy prepared to challenge Lewis for the UMWA presidency and the future of the union in the 1926 election. "I was driven to the conclusion that Lewis' power had to be challenged by a candidate for the presidency of the UMWA who would offer a constructive program for rebuilding the union. I knew I would face a storm of slander. I would have to pit my puny financial resources and my links with a few individuals here and there against the Lewis machine, with all the funds of the international union at its disposal,...and with its well-oiled machinery for producing votes even where no votes existed."

Yet, John Brophy thought he could count on large blocs of anti-Lewis votes in two important districts and believed he could pick up additional votes from other dissatisfied miners around the country. In 1926, Brophy formed a campaign organization called the Save the Union Committee and launched his fight against Lewis.

Brophy and Lewis were unevenly matched. During the campaign, UMWA staff employees became full-time election workers for John L. Lewis, with their salaries paid by the union. After a day in the pits, most miners had neither the time nor the energy to work for John Brophy, even if they were willing to publicly support an enemy of Lewis. Brophy had two or three hundred dollars to spend on printing and postage.
Lewis' words were printed monthly in the **UMW Journal** and sent to every member at union expense.

Lewis won overwhelmingly. The tellers who counted the ballots reported 170,000 votes for John L. Lewis and 60,000 for John Brophy.

Nevertheless, Brophy questioned the official vote count. He personally checked the results of five local unions in one district. After talking with each member in those locals, Brophy said the actual count was 635 votes for him and 487 votes for Lewis. The tally reported by the UMWA tellers for the same five locals showed Brophy with 635 votes and Lewis with 1,473. The president of each local signed a sworn affidavit supporting Brophy's claim. Brophy filed the documents with the UMWA election board, but the affidavits were ignored.

Brophy circulated charges of widespread vote fraud and argued that he, not Lewis, had won a majority of the votes. Brophy's cause was taken up by Powers Hapgood, a delegate to the 1927 UMWA convention. Hapgood told other delegates about Brophy's claims and asked them to join in demanding a recount. Late one night, Hapgood was cornered in the hallway of his hotel and physically attacked by a small group of delegates. Hapgood stopped arguing for Brophy, and no one else championed Brophy's lost cause during the convention.

Yet, a continual flood of letters from Brophy kept the issue churning. In the spring of 1928, a Save the Union conference convened in Pittsburgh. Over a thousand miners attended. The conference theme was to capture the union from its present leaders. Speakers denounced John L. Lewis. New programs to benefit miners were discussed. Union reforms were proposed. Although emotions ran high, the meeting accomplished nothing. The participants lacked the resources to mount
a focused and sustained attack against Lewis.

Lewis used his power to demolish the last of the opposition. One month after the Pittsburgh conference, the union's executive board, on Lewis' order, expelled John Brophy from the UMWA. The Save the Union Committee was labeled a "duel movement" that threatened the legitimate representation of miners by the UMWA. Barred from participating in the union, Brophy went to work as a soup salesman. Without Brophy's leadership, the Committee to Save the Union splintered.

Under union law, Lewis had to stand for election time after time. But no one seriously opposed him after 1926 until he retired in 1960. His opponents lacked the resources necessary to effectively fight him. Those who battled Lewis could not survive in the union.
The Battle for Principles: 1936

John L. Lewis was in complete control of the UMWA, but one issue that challenged his power arose repeatedly during his career. Should district and sub-district officials be appointed by Lewis or should they be elected by area union members? By 1936, Lewis appointed nearly all intermediate union officials.

Despite Lewis' influence and his popularity with the majority of rank-and-file members, the appointive power angered some miners. The annual UMWA convention provided the only opportunity to challenge Lewis. Delegates, independently elected by local unions, could speak their own thoughts from the convention floor.

A number of independent delegates attended the 1936 convention. One of them was Frank Hudson. Following is a transcript of his recollections of the convention:

**Interviewer:** How did you become involved in union politics?

**Frank:** I was elected recording secretary of my local. I held that job a long time. Then they elected me president of the local and sent me to the international convention of 1936.

I thought I knewed it all when I was president of my local. But I didn't know the first base of union activities until I seen what went on in that convention hall.
Interviewer: What did you see at the convention that made you think you didn't understand union activities?

Frank: I seen a lot of things in that convention. I seen a lot of fights on the floor of the convention, people that was opposed to the international officers. But you didn't vigorously oppose them. They didn't allow it. You'd probably get beat half to death. There was a lot of fights right in the hall.

Interviewer: What was the issue that upset people so much?

Frank: We wanted some democracy. We wanted some say in the union. We wanted a man in the union in our district that we had some say of puttin' him in there. As things stood, John L. appointed district officials.

Interviewer: Were you dissatisfied with your district leaders?

Frank: Well, they treated miners fairly well in a way, but they wouldn't put the emphasis on a case when a man had a grievance against the company or the coal operators' association. Their great job was to please the international union, because the international union is the ones that sent them there. Now they didn't say that, but you could see that. Anybody could see that. The little man with the shovel, they don't care so much about him, if they just wanted to please their boss at the international.
Interviewer: How did the issue come up at the convention?

Frank: One man got up and said, "They tell you to leave all questions about the appointment of district officers to the international executive board. Well, the board is all appointed men, all except three of them. They have a majority and on any question that comes before the board, they vote the way one man says."

Interviewer: What happened then?

Frank: It started a chain reaction. Some of us were yellin' for democracy; others were screamin' for John L.'s side of it.

Interviewer: What did the international officers say?

Frank: John L. himself settled the argument. He stood up at that microphone - he could really talk - and he says, "It is not a fundamental principal that you're discussing. It is a question of whether you desire your organization to be the most effective instrumentality within the realm of possibility for a labor union or whether you prefer to sacrifice the efficiency of your organization in some respect for a little more academic freedom in the election of some local representatives in a number of districts."

Maybe he was right, I don't know.
Interviewer: Why do you think Lewis might have been right?

Frank: Well, we was gettin' some gains with John L. runnin' things. You take wages. Now John L. won big wages for miners. Of course, nobody was makin' too much durin' the 30's, but we was doin' O.K. You take fringe benefits. Under John L. we started gettin' $20.00 for vacation pay, and boy that was really somethin' - Old John L. makin' those coal companies pay us for takin' a vacation.

Besides, he made votin' for officers sound like a small thing.

Interviewer: What did Lewis say?

Frank: Well, he said, "After all, what's involved in this? A chance for some spirited, ambitious young men to run for office. That is all that is involved. But what do you want? Do you want an efficient organization or do you want merely a political instrumentality? That is all that is involved in this matter - business administration, effective internal policies, and no denial of the fundamental principles of democracy."

Interviewer: What happened then?
Frank: When John L. finished his say, the convention took a roll-call vote. There was 3,169 who voted for John L.'s position and 1,132 of us who wanted to pick our own district officers. I don't think we ever had a chance of winnin'.

Interviewer: Did the vote settle the issue?

Frank: No, I guess that a lot of miners kept bringing it up at other conventions. Me, I kind of lost interest in union politics after that. I still worked in my local, but I stayed out of the international. I never did hear too much about what went on at the top, only what was printed in the UMW Journal.
The Battle for Benefits: 1946-1948

By the 1940's John L. Lewis was in unquestioned control of the UMWA. No one within the ranks challenged his decisions. Solidly backed by the entire organization, Lewis led a series of strikes against both the coal companies and the U.S. government. His ability to get hundreds of thousands of miners to act in unison enabled Lewis to win the benefits that he desired for the UMWA and its members.

Perhaps the most important victory occurred shortly after World War II ended. The nation was making a difficult transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy. Negotiations between the UMWA and the coal companies began in 1946.

John L. Lewis opened the session by demanding that the coal companies pay a royalty on every ton of coal produced by union workers. The royalty payments would establish and maintain a welfare and retirement fund for miners and their families. Lewis told the coal operators, "If we must grind up human flesh and bones in an industrial machine - in the industrial machine that we call modern America - then, before God, I assert that those who consume coal, and you and I who benefit from that service - because we live in comfort - owe protection to those men first, and we owe security to their families after, if they die. I say it! I voice it! I proclaim it! And I care not who in heaven or hell opposes it!"

The proposal was unprecedented in American industry. The coal companies rejected it. On April 1, 1946, the contract expired; and, keeping with the UMWA tradition of "no contract, no work," the miners went out on strike. Ten days later the companies still refused to
accept royalty payments in a new contract. Lewis and the union bargaining team walked out of the negotiations.

The strike continued. Despite economic hardship to their families, miners throughout the nation closed ranks behind Lewis, not only because of his power, but because he was fighting for their legitimate interests. By late May, the coal fields were still closed, and the nation's energy supplies were so low that a general halt to industrial production seemed very likely.

Under President Truman's order, the federal government seized control of the mines. Lewis continued to keep the miners out. The government quickly negotiated a special contract with the union. Provisions for royalty payments were included in the agreement. Lewis ordered the miners back to work, and coal production resumed.

The government retained control of the mines because the operators refused to accept a contract requiring royalty payments and Lewis made it clear that miners would strike without it. No one doubted Lewis' ability to pull hundreds of thousands of miners out of the pits.

In the fall of 1946, the union and the government disagreed over the weights to use to calculate the royalties for the welfare fund. Lewis accused the government of backing out on its agreement. He scheduled a strike against the government unless it agreed to accept the union's position.

The government quickly went to a U.S. District court, and a judge issued an injunction prohibiting a strike. Nevertheless, Lewis called the miners out on schedule. Hundreds of thousands of miners laid down their tools and went home. Contempt-of-court citations were issued.
against the UMWA and against John L. Lewis personally. The judge fined the UMWA $3.5 million and assessed Lewis $10,000.

John L. Lewis yielded. He sent the miners back to work. Sixteen months later, the government still controlled the mines. The coal companies finally surrendered and signed a contract with the UMWA that included royalty payments to the union's health and welfare fund. Lewis had won the greatest bargaining concession in the history of coal negotiations.

By 1948, payments of fifty million dollars a year came into the welfare fund. The money built hospitals for miners, it paid for medical services, and it provided pensions for miners too old or too sick to work. When he received his first pension check from the fund, one old miner said, "God bless the day John L. Lewis was born." That miner spoke the feelings of many others.

The welfare fund was the crowning achievement in a decade of sparkling economic gains for union members. Hourly wages doubled, making miners among the highest paid workers in the nation. Lewis won compensation pay for the time miners spent traveling underground to and from their work places. For years, coal miners had to buy their own tools and equipment. Lewis won contracts that required the companies to pay for them. The economic benefits of union membership were obvious to every member. The coal companies prospered during the 1940's, and John L. Lewis battled for the union's share.

By the end of the decade, the UMWA was the biggest, richest, and most powerful labor union in America. The solidarity of the rank-and-file made Lewis the dominant figure at every bargaining table. His
opponents knew that hundreds of thousands of miners would follow Lewis' directions. John L. Lewis used that power to force the coal companies to accept the UMWA as a fact of life and to win benefits for the union.
Unlike the strife-torn 1940's, an era of labor peace settled across the coal fields in the 1950's. John L. Lewis and the coal operators' association bargained behind closed doors. These sessions always produced new labor contracts acceptable to both sides.

The change in relationships between the companies and the UMWA occurred because of the dire economic problems that confronted the coal industry. The demand for coal decreased dramatically. In homes everywhere, oil and gas replaced coal-burning furnaces. Railroads converted from coal to diesel locomotives. Steel companies still required coal, but that market was too small to support the entire industry.

The survival of the industry, and of the union, depended upon the sale of coal to electric generating plants. But these plants could burn either coal or oil, depending upon which fuel was the cheapest. Thus, the fate of coal companies, miners, and the UMWA depended on cheap coal prices.

John L. Lewis decided on a plan to save his union and the coal industry from extinction. Like all important decisions in the UMWA, the choice was made by Lewis alone, and he had the power to enforce his decisions.

Cheap coal required modernization and consolidation of the industry. Early in 1951, Lewis negotiated a new contract with the coal companies. In private, he agreed to give the big companies a free hand to mechanize the mines without union interference. The National Bank of Washington, owned by the UMWA, quietly loaned money
to large companies so they could buy modern equipment. The machines permitted the companies to produce more coal with fewer miners. Thousands of small mines, unable to afford automation, closed down.

Lewis' decision affected hundreds of thousands of people. Jobs dwindled. Nearly 300,000 miners were laid off. Yet, he expected to restructure the coal industry with a minimum of pain to individuals. Lewis thought an expanding national economy would provide jobs to young people who might otherwise have gone underground. The UMWA's welfare fund would provide pensions for older miners who were forced to retire early.

The plan was disrupted by an unexpected economic recession that swept across the country in the mid-1950's. As other industries reduced production, the demand for coal fell lower. Lay offs accelerated. Other jobs became scarce.

Desperate for work, many unemployed UMWA miners took jobs in thousands of small non-union mines called "dog holes." The dog holes paid wages for below union scale. Thus, they were able to underprice the major coal companies that were required to pay union wages to their employees. Soon the dog holes captured a large share of the coal market. The major companies were forced to lay off even more union miners.

For both the UMWA and the big coal companies, the crisis became desperate. Lewis resorted to drastic action. He led the union into a series of "sweetheart" contracts. Sweetheart contracts were secret arrangements in which both sides agreed to ignore parts of the national contract. Wages were slashed in union mines throughout the coal fields. Companies withheld required payments into the UMWA's welfare fund.
Lewis was able to accept sweetheart contracts for two reasons. First, they were negotiated in private. Only a few top union leaders knew that Lewis willingly accepted lost benefits, and these leaders were completely loyal to him. Second, coal miners did not have a right to vote to accept or reject contracts. Whatever John L. Lewis negotiated was binding on the entire membership.

Angry miners, unaware of the sweetheart deals, blamed their lost benefits on the companies. Bitterness spread through the coal fields and violence flared. Mines were dynamited. Coal tipples were vandalized by roving bands of unemployed miners. A few people blamed their plight on the union, but allegiance to Lewis and the miners' tradition of absolute solidarity prevented much criticism from being directed at the UMWA.

By 1960, the situation began to stabilize. The coal industry, given up for dead a decade earlier, was alive and looking ahead to better days. John L. Lewis had won another victory: he saved the coal industry.

The price of victory was high. The number of coal miners working in the industry decreased sharply. The UMWA had fewer members than it had at any time in its history since the early days. The union had loaned money from miners' dues to promote the mechanization that put hundreds of thousands of them out of work. Sweetheart contracts lost benefits for members who kept their jobs. The number of non-union mines increased. The high accident rate for underground workers continued. The union had won no new safety laws since 1952. Black lung disease was crippling and killing miners, but the problem was ignored.
John L. Lewis retired in 1960. Power was transferred to Thomas Kennedy, who had been vice-president under Lewis. Lewis picked Tony Boyle to fill the vice-presidency.

Kennedy was seventy-three years old and in poor health when he became president. In 1962, he became seriously ill, and Boyle took over as acting president of the UMWA. Kennedy died early in the next year. Total authority passed to Boyle. Little had changed since Lewis had departed, and the smooth succession of Boyle to the top job in the union suggested the continuation of the political system that John L. Lewis had built.
The Battle to Save Power: 1963-1972

The coal industry was entering a period of prosperity when Tony Boyle became the eleventh president of the UMWA on January 20, 1963. Yet Boyle seemed unaware of the new opportunity to win benefits for union miners. Instead, he continued a policy of complete cooperation with coal companies, a policy that John L. Lewis started when the industry was economically depressed. Boyle said, "The UMWA will not abridge the rights of mine operators in running the mines. We follow the judgment of coal operators, right or wrong." But many miners felt Boyle was wrong and refused to follow him.

Coal miners were among the highest paid workers in the country, but they lagged far behind in other benefits. They lacked unemployment protection. Miners lacked job security as companies routinely laid off older miners with only a few working years left and replaced them with younger employees with a full career ahead. There was no pay for the sick or injured miners although accidents and black lung disease made coal mining the most dangerous job in the country. Miners knew that workers in other industries were making tremendous gains and the coal fields rang with the voices of angry, dissatisfied union members.

In 1963, a massive wildcat strike appeared very likely if Boyle failed to act. Under pressure, he called for new contract talks with the coal companies. When the negotiations began, one coal miner said, "Unemployment comes first and then safety. The last thing we want is money and that's probably the first thing they'll offer us." After a new contract was signed, the UMW Journal announced it as the best
contract in union history. Boyle had won a $2.00 a day wage increase. The contract contained no other benefits. Boyle's contract angered miners, but they had no opportunity to vote on it. Tony Boyle alone decided whether to accept or reject a contract. As the new agreement went into effect, a wave of wildcat strikes swept across the coal fields. Boyle used union power to get the miners back to work. Bitterness increased, and miners began to think their union was working against their interests rather than for them. Boyle realized he would have to fight to save his power.

The control machinery that John L. Lewis had established within the union was still well-oiled, and his years of work under Lewis had taught Boyle how to use it. District officers, representatives, and organizers were appointed by Boyle. Thus, he had control over them. Boyle had control over union money. He loaned money to districts in order to increase his influence over them. The union treasury paid the expenses of friendly delegates to attend union conventions. Unfriendly miners had to pay their own way. The UMW Journal printed one article after another praising Boyle's leadership. Only unfavorable stories appeared about Boyle's critics. Over 550 bogus local unions were maintained. A bogus local is one with fewer than ten active members. These locals were allowed to send voting delegates to national union conventions, but they seldom did. Instead, Boyle appointed special delegates to represent the bogus locals.

The machinery worked well. Despite the bitterness in the union, Boyle was easily re-elected to the presidency in 1964. His position at the top seemed secure.
Anti-Boyle hostility increased in 1968. Boyle negotiated a new contract. He won a healthy wage increase but ignored the other interests of miners. Then came the Farmington disaster. A concentration of methane gas exploded at Consol No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia. Seventy-eight miners were buried underground. Tony Boyle came to the scene and commented that this was "one of the better companies to work with as far as cooperation and safety are concerned."

Rank and file members began to ask questions. Why had so many miners died at Farmington? Why was coal mining in the late 1960's an occupation that was the biggest killer of workers in the country? What was the union doing about it?

Certain that the union was deaf to their concerns, a small group of West Virginia miners formed the Black Lung Association. Black lung begins when miners breathe coal dust. After several years, the dust in the hairs in their air passages. Tiny particles of coal collect in the small air sacs in a miner's lungs. Eventually the lungs collapse, and the miner begins a slow, painful death. Since black lung is the enemy of every coal miner, membership in the association grew rapidly. A series of state-wide wildcat strikes and demonstrations in Charleston, the state capital, forced the West Virginia legislature to pass a law in 1969 that provided compensation to black lung victims. The black lung victory convinced many miners that the Boyle machine could be challenged. New leaders emerged.

Joseph "Jock" Yablonski led the group that challenged Boyle. Yablonski was a member of the union's international executive board and was well known throughout the UMWA. After Yablonski announced his candidacy for the presidency, he was fired from his job by Boyle.
Nevertheless, Yablonski continued to campaign and developed enough support to win a presidential nomination on the 1969 ballot.

Boyle used every resource under his control to defeat Yablonski in the general election. There were nearly 300 local unions in the UMWA made up entirely of pensioned coal miners. Boyle used his control over the union's welfare fund to push through a big increase in pension checks. On election day, the union hired buses to bring retired miners to the polling places. UMWA staff employees whose jobs depended on Boyle's re-election campaigned full time for him at union expense. Boyle used his control over district and sub-district officials to influence miners. One local president told the membership, "I don't want a single Yablonski vote in this local." Every issue of the UMWA Journal contained pictures and glowing stories about Boyle. The union printed nearly 80,000 more ballots than there were voting members, more than enough extra votes to stuff ballot boxes in Boyle's favor. The election results showed Boyle with 81,056 votes and Yablonski with 45,870.

Yablonski and his supporters protested. They filed detailed charges of hundreds of election law violations with the U.S. Department of Labor. They demanded that the government set aside the election results and schedule a new election under federal supervision.

Two weeks after the election, before the government could act, Joseph Yablonski, his wife, and his daughter were shot to death in their home. The murder shocked the entire country. Public outrage forced an investigation by the government. In 1972, a federal judge ruled the 1969 election invalid and ordered the UMWA to hold a new election.
This time Boyle lost, and shortly afterwards he was convicted for his role in the Yablonski killings.
Exercise

This exercise is a group activity. Each member is to present a report about the UMWA's political system at the time depicted in the case. The reports should be given in chronological order: 1921 first, 1926 second, etc.

After each report, the other group members should discuss the case and decide what kind of political system the UMWA had during the time reflected in the report. The group may ask questions of the person who made the report in order to gather additional evidence for a decision.

When the group makes a decision, write the name of the type of political system on the UMWA in the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Type of Political System in the UMWA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>1936</td>
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<td>1946-48</td>
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<td>1950-63</td>
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<td>1963-72</td>
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You may find the following information about system types useful as you make your decisions:
An elite political system is one in which most political resources are shared by a few people and most political activities are carried out by a small group.

A bureaucratic political system is one in which political resources are stratified across groups of people in the system and most political activities are carried out by people according to their position.

A coalitional political system is one in which most political resources are divided among different groups and most political activities are carried out by many different groups.

A participant political system is one in which most political resources are shared by many people and most political activities are carried out by many people.
Work At The Face, Part II: 1975

In this lesson you will see a slide-tape that depicts modern mining methods. As you watch "Work at the Face, Part II: 1975," try to identify the political interests of today's coal miners. You can make notes in the space provided below to aid you in discussing these interests after the slide-tape.

Political Interests of Coal Miners: 1975

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Compare and contrast the political interests of modern coal miners with those of miners in 1920. What similarities and differences do you notice?

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WORK AT THE FACE
Part II: 1975

1. Narrator:
   Both miners and mining have changed over the years. Today's miner is younger and has more formal education than yesterday's. A few women have joined the underground labor force. Many miners have worked outside the coal fields, frequently with the military services or with the automobile industry, and these experiences have influenced their expectations about work conditions. Some miners are determined to change conditions in the mines. One of these miners is Luther Stoner.

2. Luther:
   Minin's been good to me. I've got more than I've ever had in my life. My wife works, I work, and we make good money. We're not millionaires, but if we want to pay two or three hundred dollars for somethin', we can go downtown and pay for it.

   Sure, there's some miners that only care about makin' the big buck. There's always people like that around. But most guys are interested in comin' out of there in one piece, and seein' their friends and fellow workers come out in one piece. Just to be treated like a person, rather than a chunk of coal, is what we're after.
3. Narrator: The job has changed too. The pick and shovel are gone, replaced by earth-gobbling machines that rip out tons of coal in a minute. Mechanical mining increases productivity, but it also increases the complexity of the job.

4. Luther: We can produce so many more tons today, but the faster you mine coal, the faster the hazards come at you.
5. Narrator: The miners' workday begins when they punch in at a time clock located just outside the mine entrance, or portal. Their shift ends eight hours later when they reappear on the surface. The miners call it portal-to-portal pay because they are paid from the time they go underground until the moment they come out.

6. Luther: The company can't dog leg you no more. A man don't have to go down and work nineteen hours - go in there at daylight and come back at dark. They can't throw you in there for eight hours and make you do things that's unsafe either.

But some miners still has a fear of management. This is a fear that's been with the people, the coal miners, for years and years. They've just begun now, I think, to open up their eyes and see that the mules is gone. The fear is leavin' miners every day because they got protection. The company can't just up and fire you like they use' to.

7. Narrator: The miners board man cars when the bell that signals the beginning of their shift rings. Steel covers protect the riders in case of rock falls. The equipment they wear makes it difficult for the miners to squeeze into seats on the cars. Steel hats, red ones for new miners and black ones for the old hands, protect their heads. A wide leather belt holds a heavy battery to power their lamps and a self-contained breathing device to provide air in the event of an emergency.
When all the workers are aboard, a klaxon blows to warn other miners of the descending train, the steel cable to which the cars are attached reels-out, and the man-trip rolls slowly down the dark mine entrance to the main heading hundreds of feet below ground.

At the main heading, the riders transfer to another train for the trip to their work places, which are sometimes several miles from the entrance. An electric locomotive pulls the trip through an intricate system of white tunnels - white from the powdered limestone dusted on the surface of the mine to reduce the danger of a small spark igniting the volatile coal dust that floats in the air. Occasionally, the train rolls through a cavern-like room with a domed roof fifty or sixty feet higher than the normal six foot clearance along the main tunnel - a spectacular reminder of a past cave-in. At points where various tunnels intersect, the motorman stops the trip to radio its location to other motormen and to check that the track ahead is clear before proceeding into the darkness.
You never take a man trip down a tunnel 'less you know it's all clear. Once we was goin' up on a section, and the track went down a little hill-like and then back up. A big pool of water collected in that hollow spot. Now I wouldn't go through water with a man trip 'cause if that water gets up in those electric contacts, it'll tear you up pretty good. So I stopped the trip when we came to that water. We was still about eight or ten breakthroughs from the face.

The foreman looked at me, and he said, "What do you think, Luther?" I said, "I'm not goin' through it." So he went over and checked the pump. The fuse was blowed out. Well, he called outside for another fuse, and they got the pump goin' ok, but it was takin' the water a long time to go down.

The boss said, "Luther, you reckon we can all walk up to the face and go to work?" I said, "I wouldn't think so. If a man gets hurt up there, there's no way we'd get him out." The boss was mad, but we all went outside and worked there 'til the water went down. See the individual has the right to pull back and say, "This is not a safe area to work. I'll do anything else you want me to but I'm not goin' up there. It's not safe."
Some companies, now I ain't sayin' all of them, but some companies still try to browbeat you. Like, we had a bunch of red hats with us when this happened. Later on, the boss got those red hats off by theirselves, and he told them they should of went through that water and went to work at the face. That's how a lot of these red hats get the attitude that they gotta do what the boss says or they'll cause waves or get fired or get theirselves in trouble. You got a lot of older men that's come up pick-and-shovel style that's due to retire that got that same attitude.

I want people to know that they've got certain rights and nobody can take them away. The company can't knock you out of what you got comin' just for standin' up for your rights.
9. Narrator:

The kind of work the miners do after they leave the train depends upon the type of operation used in their mine. There are two major types of mining. One method is called room and pillar mining; the other technique is called longwall mining.

Most underground mines in the United States use the room and pillar method, taking part of the coal and leaving the rest—standing as roof-supporting pillars.

In this kind of operation, the roof bolter performs an important job. The roof bolter drives steel rods into the roof, binding its thin layers into one solid piece to keep rock from falling. The roof bolter works near the face. Standing under the last few feet of secured roof, the miner studies the eight to ten foot section of roof exposed by the most recent excavation. He or she knocks loose chunks of rock to the floor with a long steel bar. After removing the most dangerous pieces of rock, the miner moves the bolting machine into position. The miner places a long drill into a bit located on a mechanical arm in front of the machine. Raising the arm, the miner bores a hole through the unstable slate into the hard sandstone layer above. The miner drills a series of holes across
the roof and inserts long steel rods into them. The machine drives the bolts solidly into the sandstone. If the roof appears particularly treacherous, the miner bolts a thick wooden timber across the surface to provide more support.
10. Luther: Roof bolting makes the mine safer, but still nobody knows what that bolt is anchored in. I don't care what kind of bolt man you've got, he can't tell you it's anchored. I've see' it fall from fifty feet back. I've seen it cover a whole loader up, mashed the man's brains out on the loader. I had to get him out, and it mashed him flat.

Photo courtesy of National Coal Association
11. Narrator:

After drilling the first series of bolts, the miner advances a few feet and repeats the procedure until the roof is supported flush with the face. Then the roof bolter moves to another recently excavated section of the mine to secure the roof there, and other miners move into position under the newly bolted roof to work the coal face.

Cutting, drilling, shooting, and loading are still the basic methods used to work coal in room and pillar mines, but modern miners use complicated equipment to perform these operations.

The undercut is made with a saw mounted on wheels. The operator makes the chain saw snout slice a gash in the face and then follows the roof bolter to a different section of the mine where another solid coal face awaits.

A drilling and blasting team moves into the work area vacated by the cutter. Using a portable drilling machine, the miners bore several holes across the surface of the coal block and then insert compressed air cartridges or dynamite charges into the holes. Because they are flameless, compressed air cartridges reduce the possibility of igniting coal dust and causing an explosion in the mine. Where dynamite is used, federal law regulates the type of charges that can be legally exploded.
12. Luther: I think the day of the big mine disaster that kills fifty or a hundred miners all at once is gone. Now it's fallin' rock and grindin' machinery that kills 'em one or two at a time. Some people say that coal mining is just naturally dangerous and there ain't nothin' we can do to stop the deaths. Well, as far as a lot of us are concerned, coal is gonna be mined safely or it ain't gonna be mined at all.

13. Narrator: When the drilling and blasting team rotates to another work area, their place is taken by a miner with a loading machine, a low, flat vehicle that gathers loose coal into shuttle cars.

Mine machinery is low and flat by design. Frequently, miners must operate in low coal, seams as thin as thirty or forty inches; and their machines must fit into these tight spaces. In low coal, the machine operator crouches on the side of the vehicle. Despite the physical strain, miners who work low coal prefer it to higher seams.

14. Luther: I've worked coal as low as twenty-six inches. We had to let some of the air out of the tires just to get the machines in there. You really gotta be good to handle the big equipment in a tight space like that. But I like workin' low coal. It's safer. The rock can't fall as far.
The operator drives the loader into the loose coal piled on the floor and a large scoop on the front end slips under the heap. Two crab-like arms sweep the coal up the scoop and onto a conveyor belt. The coal races past the operator's shoulder to the back end of the loader, where another miner has positioned a shuttle car. In a few seconds the loader fills the shuttle with tons of coal. The shuttle car delivers the coal to mine cars assembled along the main heading. When the shuttle returns, the loader claws into the heap again. Eventually, all the coal is loaded and the room is cleared.

Then the loader and shuttle car operators move to another room and attack a fresh pile of coal. The roof bolter returns to the cleared area and begins another cycle of bolting, cutting, drilling, blasting, and loading.

A machine, called a continuous miner, combines cutting, drilling, shooting, and loading into a single operation. The operator maneuvers the big machine so that its steel snout presses against the solid coal seam. When the machine starts, the teeth on a spinning drum gouge and tear coal from the seam. The air is instantly filled with swirling coal dust that blurs the operator's vision as his light dances over the tiny particles.
As the whirling drum rips deeper into the seam, a scoop on the bottom of the front end automatically loads the coal that falls to the floor.

Photo courtesy of Eastern Associated Coal Corporation
16. Luther: You can't take no shortcuts when you're runnin' a miner. You gotta keep slack in your power cable. The cable gets damaged if you pull it too tight. You'll give somebody an electric shock. Sometimes an operator tries to get an extra foot of coal and runs the machine past the last permanent roof support. You get past those roof supports and that's dead man's land. A miner might fix somethin' on the machine while it's still runnin'. Most times, nothin' happens. But you do it enough times and you'll get teared up good.

Sometimes a miner brings an accident on hisself. He gets in a hurry. Does it the easy way. Sometimes it's the foreman. His job depends on producin' that coal. So he'll overlook shortcuts. That's not all foremen, but that's some of them.
17. Narrator:

After each attack on the face, a foreman checks for the presence of methane gas. Methane is frequently trapped in coal seams, and some of the odorless and colorless gas may be released when the seam is mined. Since the gas is both poisonous and explosive, miners use special lamps or meters to detect its presence.

18. Luther:

You cut into a coal face and you never know for sure what's behind it. You gotta watch that lamp close when you're workin' at the face. If the little flame gets smaller, you're runnin' out of oxygen. If it flares up, the methane is buildin' up.

19. Narrator:

Because an electrical spark from machinery could ignite a concentration of the gas, all electrical machines are equipped with a special device to measure the amount of methane in the air and to shut the power off the moment it rises above a safe level.

The room and pillar method is used in most underground mines in the United States. In recent years, however, another technique called longwall mining has been introduced.

With the longwall method, coal is mined by a machine that moves back and forth along a solid coal face, which varies in length from two hundred to two thousand feet. The machine slices
layers of coal from the face with a whirling shear. The loosened coal falls onto a conveyor belt that runs beside the face and is transported to loading facilities. Movable steel props, mounted on hydraulic jacks, support the roof and protect the miner from falling rocks. As the machine chews into the seam, the props automatically move forward to brace the newly unsupported roof. The roof behind the machine is then allowed to collapse. Not only is longwall mining faster than the room and pillar method, but it also recovers more coal since no pillars are left standing.

Photo courtesy of National Coal Association
Regardless of whether a mine uses the room and pillar method or the longwall technique, the coal must be moved to the surface in one of two ways.

In most mines, coal from various work areas is carried to the main heading by shuttle vehicles which automatically load it into low railroad cars. Each car holds about fifteen tons. Fifteen to twenty mine cars are assembled into a trip, or train. An electric locomotive hauls the trip to the surface. If the train must run up a steep grade, a second locomotive is coupled behind the trip to provide extra power and to serve as a safety brake in case any cars come loose.

Some mines haul coal on conveyor belts which run along the main heading to the surface. Such belts carry 1,800 tons of coal per hour.

Coal, as it is hauled from the mine, is called run-of-mine coal. Pieces range in size from large chunks to a fine powder. Run-of-mine coal inevitably contains some amount of worthless rock and other impurities. Mechanization makes it unprofitable to sort coal underground. Instead, surface workers refine and size it above ground at the tipple.
Coal is separated from slate rock and other debris in large, water-filled vats called dense-medium washers. The run-of-mine coal is unloaded into a crusher that breaks up the large chunks. The mixture of crushed coal and debris is fed into the dense-medium washer. Because the density of coal is less than that of rock and other impurities, the coal floats on the surface, while the waste material sinks to the bottom of the vat.

The waste material is pumped out of the washer and conveyed to slag heaps behind the mine. The coal is skimmed off the top and carried to the tipple, or processing plant. There it passes through a system of shaker screens which grade the coal by size. The various grades are funneled into railroad gondolas standing on tracks below the tipple. From there, the coal is shipped to consumers around the world.

When they return to the surface and punch out at the time clock, the underground miners trudge to the bath house, wash away the coal dust, and change into clean clothes before going home.

Despite the dangers and hardships, the men who risk their lives below ground amid the roaring machinery like their work.
20. Luther: Coal minin' is a special kind of job. It's different every day. You never run into the sort of a automation like you do in the steel mills or factories, where you do the same thing day after day. In the mines, you might run a continuous miner all the time, but still it's different every day because you're always in a new area. The ribs change, the roof changes, the conditions change. It really doesn't get boring. You gotta be thinkin' about what you're doing all the time, 'cause if you don't, you're gonna get hurt for sure.
ACTIVITY THREE:  I AM A UMW MINER

In the previous activity you learned about political maintenance. You learned about how the UMW has functioned as an elite political system throughout its history. Very few political organizations can maintain themselves over a long period of time as the United Mine Workers did. The question of how an organization can stay the same and how it can be maintained is an important one. However, an equally important question is this one: Why was there maintenance in the United Mine Workers when forces were developing which could easily have changed the union? The answers to these types of questions are the focus of this activity.

One answer to the question of why the UMWA was maintained as an elite organization is contained in the work of Activity Two. In Activity Two you saw how the union attempted to serve the interests of the miners—to give them higher wages, more job security, and a better environment in which to work. When a union or any other type of political organization tends to serve the interests of its members, then it has a good chance of being maintained over time. People join unions in order to get higher wages, security, or a safer work environment. If a union can serve these interests and give them these rewards, then people are likely to continue to support the union.

When people's interests are served, a particular thing happens which is very important to maintenance; people perceive the union as legitimate. It is legitimacy which is the core for supporting the maintenance of any political organization. Legitimacy is the perception of the rightness and importance of a group or its activities. The miners clearly think that higher wages are both important and justified.
In order to understand how legitimacy can promote the maintenance of a union, analyze the interview which is given in the following few pages. The interview is with Loratta. Loratta is new in the coal mines. She is one of the first women to join the United Mine Workers Union. As she states, being a member of a union is very important for her. Look at the kinds of things that Loratta has to say about the union and try to determine whether or not the union is legitimate in her mind. If it is legitimate, try to state specifically what particular things seem to make the union legitimate for Loratta.
Interview With Loratta

Loratta: I think miners are a different breed of people. Once they're gettin ready to go in, in the deep mines, mostly they think of safety first. Because when you go in, if you're not careful, you can get hurt, or even killed.

Interviewer: Are most of the things that happen the fault of the miners themselves, because they are careless? Or do you think it's because the company could have done something that it didn't?

Loratta: The only thing I can do is judge for our section. If I don't take care of me, and look out for what I can see for the next one, I'm in trouble. Like you go past a rib and it's cracked. If you don't get busy and take care of that, the next fellow that comes may not know that it's there. If I can prevent that accident from happening, I think this is a good thing. It teaches me that I am a miner. I am a UMW miner, and I've been taught things in the right way. It may be a little hard on me, but it may prevent me from getting killed.

Interviewer: I think one of the biggest questions that is raised about women coming in mines is the question of the bathhouse. Has that been a problem for you?
Loretta: Well, it makes it little hard now and then. Outside, I don't have a place, I don't have a bathroom. I said that I want one, and they tell me it was an understanding that I'd come home. I have United Mine Worker rules, too. Contract, they pull contract. I'm a United Mine Worker and I do want my own bathroom. They furnish him one, why not me? But I'm definitely not goin' to use that room and take a bath and clean, I'm not goin' to do that. I mean, I'm a lady and every inch of me is a lady, but I would like to have my own bathroom.

Interviewer: Has a mine struck since you've been there?

Loretta: Right.

Interviewer: And you walked off with them?

Loretta: That's right. Yes sir. If I know that they're strikin', I wouldn't be on that field for no money. 'Cause I am union, all the way. And if I didn't, if you go up there and work, they can certainly make it unhealthy.

Interviewer: Do you think that the union would stick by you if the miners struck over your being down in the mine?

Loretta: I think the union'd stick by me all the way.
Interviewer: What are some of the things that you think the union has done that have been good for you and good for miners generally?

Loratta: I don't really know that much about it. I stick by the union. They can't fire me for any other reason than not being able to do the work.

Discussion Questions

1. What benefits does Loratta believe she gets by joining the United Mine Workers?

2. Do you think Loratta sees the union as legitimate? What specific evidence do you have from the case which makes you think the union is or is not legitimate in Loratta's eyes?

3. Do you think this case provides good evidence for your conclusions about the legitimacy of the union? Why or why not?

4. How do you think people like Loratta contribute to political maintenance in the union?
Below are two cases about the formation of other political organizations. The first is a case about the formation of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in the United States. The Garment Workers make women's dresses, blouses, slacks and other clothes most women wear everyday the union is both large and strong. The case traces why the union began and the kinds of conditions under which the workers did their jobs. The second case focuses on the Organization of African Unity and how it was formed. Haile Selassie was the founder of the organization. It has grown and prospered as new African states have needed the political clout which comes from cooperation. Look at both of these cases and try to determine ways in which legitimacy worked to promote the maintenance of these organizations. Determine what the interests of the people involved in the organizations are and how they are served by the political groups.
Out of the Sweat Shop

The clock on the Woolworth Building across the street said 5:00 a.m. as Harry Glassman sat down at his sewing machine to begin the day's work. A hot gray dawn promised a sweltering day for New York City.

As other shop workers began climbing the musty steps of the seven story tenement house to the top floor, Harry lit the one gas lantern which hung in the center of the room. One tiny window at the end of the small room supplied the only other light for the workers.

The four men and three women who worked in this "sweat shop" were someday to become members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU). In the filth and misery of these sweat shops, people often worked up to 18 hours a day in crowded, unventilated rooms and with little or no time for lunch. Here the concept of a garment workers' union was born.

Although most of the garment making industry was centered in New York during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, other large cities had some of their own sweat shops. One factory inspector in Chicago describes conditions in a Chicago sweat shop like this:

This shop is in rear lot, over stable; entrance by narrow passage between houses in front of shop; low-ceiled and dirty, with bare brick walls; sink in room gives out bad odor; gasoline is used in pressing; the odors from the alley and stable coming up combine to make a stench unbearable alike in winter and summer; no separate closet for women; machines run by foot power; employs seven men, three women.
The garment workers were mostly Jewish and Italian immigrants. Only a small percentage of the workers were native born Americans. Because of this, public sentiment was slow to rise up against the abominable working conditions. In Boston in 1884 women and girls had to work very hard to average $6.00 per week. These women were piece-workers and were paid 15 cents for making a full length coat. It took them about three and a half hours to make a coat. In Baltimore in 1884 women coat or cloakmakers earned from $3.50 to $5.00 per week. By getting 17c to 19c for a shirt and 50c for a complete lace dress, garment workers had to work late into the night in order to earn $5.00 per week.

In New York City the effects of the sweat shops were most keenly felt. Average wages fell from $15.00 weekly in 1883 to $6.00 or $7.00 weekly in 1885. Some people with the aid of large families could earn $12.00 a week, but they would have to work fourteen hours a day to do that. Factory investigators often said that the outrageous conditions in the sweat shops were a result of the inferior standards brought here by the immigrants.

Despite the industrial depression of 1893-1896, there was remarkable growth in the women's clothing industry from 1890-1900. The number of people employed in the industry increased from about 40,000 to about 84,000, or about 114 per cent. The value of the products in the industry increased from $68,164,000 to $159,340,000, or about 133 per cent. In 1900, 32 states had women's clothing factories as against 23 states in 1890.
The tremendous growth within the industry and the brotherhood which developed among the many sweat shop workers made the local garment workers' union leaders see the need for an international union. This union, which was established in 1900, would fight for and protect the rights of the workers. Workers needed more pay, more leisure time and more comfortable surroundings if their morale was to be maintained. Garment workers were beginning to recognize that the industry truly needed them and they exercised their power through walkouts and strikes.

In July of 1910 the union formed a Joint Board of Sanitary Control to isolate the chief threats to the lives and health of the union workers. The Board cited the following conditions as most hazardous: inadequacy of fire protection; unsanitary conditions of floors, ceilings, walls, and johns; defective plumbing; inadequate number of johns and waste receptacles; lack of adequate ventilation; overcrowding; air pollution from coal and gas irons; eye strain due to inadequate lighting.

The Board of Sanitary Control formulated 28 "sanitary standards" which were specifically adapted to the needs of the industry. It also developed a method for enforcing the standards in all of the shops across the country. These methods were based on the belief that the best ways to enforce rules were through friendly investigation, constructive advice, moral persuasion, and only in extreme cases, economic pressure. If a shop employer completely met all of the sanitation requirements, he was awarded a "sanitary certificate" by the Board.
By 1913 the ILGWU had developed health and insurance benefits for its workers. Arrangements were made for the physical examination of union employees by the New York State Factory Investigating Commission. The first examination disclosed that 1.6 per cent of those examined were suffering from acute pulmonary tuberculosis. These workers were no longer permitted to work in the shops. As a result of this, the union introduced tuberculosis benefits into the workers' contracts. It also developed a health center which provided medical and dental care to union workers at an extremely low cost.

Photo courtesy of Justice, ILGWU
Haile Selassie and the OAU

Because he was so involved in the disputes between other African nations, Haile Selassie, former Emperor of Ethiopia, was one of the first to see the need for an Organization of African Unity. As one of the founders of the OAU, Selassie suggested that the organization's headquarters should be in Ethiopia's capital city of Addis Ababa. That city has become a fitting center for that organization with the advanced modernization of broadly lighted avenues and high-rise office and apartment buildings.

As a highly respected leader in Africa, Selassie was largely responsible for setting the basic foundations of the OAU charter. His philosophy of peaceful negotiation in African border disputes is now OAU policy. A strong supporter of African liberation movements and African unity, Selassie set the tone for the methods employed by the OAU in dealing with liberation movements.

Out of respect for the wisdom of old age, the African people looked to Selassie for the solutions to many of their problems. He often played a part as a third party mediator in disputes between other African nations, since all of the nations had an equal respect for Selassie as a wise leader. Also, Selassie had some very advanced ideas for the development of his country's resources. Economically and technologically, he achieved spectacular results in his attempts to modernize his ancient, old fashioned country. During his reign the Emperor and the royal family gave much of their personal land to provide modern farm development.
Extreme respect for the wisdom and experience of old age is probably the most important reason for Selassie having so much power in the OAU. His beliefs carried enough weight to convince leaders of other African nations of the need for Pan African unity. The idea of peaceful negotiation in border disputes, for example, greatly limits the number of disputes the OAU can support.

The year 1974 saw the end of the 58 year reign of Haile Selassie. Selassie had ruled his country as an absolute monarch until he was ousted from power by a group of anonymous army officers who called themselves the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee. When the Committee removed Selassie from power, they installed his son, Asfa Wossen, as figurehead king.

Although he had been the head of a monarchy for so long, Selassie agreed to call a constitutional convention which could lead to replacement of his absolute monarchy by a more democratic form of government. Selassie agreed that the power of the monarch was not eternal, and that a system of government should reflect the changes of a country over time. He supported Ethiopian constitutional reform which would make the premier more responsible to the elected Parliament and would guarantee "the civil rights of our people."

Regardless of the changes Selassie was willing to make, there continued to be political unrest in the country. Ethiopians were unhappy with the emperor's monopoly on power. Civilian rioting broke out in the capital city of Addis Ababa. There were strikes by teachers, transportation workers and students protesting rising prices, unemployment, and the lack of relief to victims of drought and famine.
The military coup which stripped Haile Selassie of his power may in one sense appear to be an unusual event. During his reign Selassie was perhaps the most respected leader in Africa, and his ideas live on in the Organization of African Unity.
Discussion Questions

1. What were the interests of the members of the ILGWU in forming the union? How has the union continued to be a legitimate organization for the workers?

2. What were the reasons for the formation of the OAU? How has the OAU continued to have legitimacy over the years?

3. What evidence is contained in these cases for the support of your conclusions of the relationship between legitimacy and maintenance?

4. Where and how do you think you might get more or better evidence for the support of your conclusions?
There is a great deal of tradition in the United Mine Workers. One tradition involves the use of the strike as a weapon against management. Like many other unions, the strike becomes a symbol for the legitimacy and integrity of the union. Throughout the history of the United Mine Workers, there have been many strikes, more than in any other industry. People have struck over wages, hours, working conditions and union contracts. Strikes have become a symbol of the solidarity of the union and its ability to serve the interests of its membership. This condition of striking has shown very little sign of easing.

The table below indicates the number of work stoppages or strikes and the number of "man days" that workers have been idle from 1961-1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Strikes</th>
<th>Workers Involved</th>
<th>Man-days Idle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>25,100</td>
<td>90,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>34,300</td>
<td>191,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>234,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>56,800</td>
<td>340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>62,600</td>
<td>258,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>88,100</td>
<td>629,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>62,900</td>
<td>158,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>206,400</td>
<td>956,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>900,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>198,600</td>
<td>627,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table demonstrates that there were over 627,000 days in which workers did not work in the coal industry in 1970. Strikes were on the increase. The table illustrates how strikes are a very real part of the working life of miners.

One reason strikes are popular is that there are many benefits to be gained. There are many pros in the calculus of an individual who wants to strike. First of all, the local unions are traditionally anti-company and want to demonstrate to management that they will strike over poor working conditions, wages and for other reasons. They feel it is necessary not to give into management on any issue so that the union will be strong and they can keep the benefits they have gained. They also feel that a strike produces solidarity, demonstrates to management that the union is a solid group which must be recognized.

Another important reason is that miners' lives are at stake in their jobs. They need to make sure everyone who works in the mines obeys the rules set out by the contract.

However, with as many strikes as are going on in the coal industry, there also appear to be many reasons not to strike. First of all, the union has often been unable to pay workers while they are out on strike. In 1970 work stoppages involved 198,600 workers with 627,000 days idle. At the average rate of $50.00 per day, it would cost the union over $31,350,000 to pay the wages of the people who are striking. The international union cannot afford this amount of money, nor can the local unions. Along with this, the courts have been consistently fining
the local unions from $5,000 to 0,000 per strike in order to decrease the number of work stoppages. Therefore, many locals are poor and can't afford to pay the court costs, let alone the salaries of those who are on strike. If workers are not in a good personal financial situation, it is very difficult for them to strike.

Also people's job security is threatened when a strike call is supported. Mine managers traditionally have taken advantage of troublemakers, trying to get them fired. Once a person is labelled as a "radical", it can be difficult for that person to maintain or change jobs in the industry. Therefore, a person's job security can be threatened by a strike.

Strikes have not only hurt the workers, but they have also hurt the union. As District 29 member, Francis Martin, has said, "Without money you can't operate a local union, and without a local union, you don't have any union. There is going to have to be a tough crackdown on wildcat strikes or the UMWA may be destroyed."* What Francis Martin is trying to say is that a union, like any other political organization, cannot run without money. When strikes and huge fines by the courts drain its treasury, the UMWA can no longer function to support the interests of the miners.

These are some pros and cons about strikes. Certainly, all miners know about the drawbacks and, in many cases, they choose to strike despite monetary hardships and job security threats. They believe that they need to demonstrate to the company that they will strike or they will be

*United Mine Workers Journal, June, 1975, p. 3.
working in miserable working conditions for low salaries again soon. Others feel differently and have come into the coal industry because of money and job security and they want to retain their jobs.

During this lesson you will begin to play a game called Strike! The game is designed to introduce you to the activity of striking as a way of demonstrating the relationship between legitimacy and maintenance in the United Mine Workers. You will play the role of a miner in a situation in which a local union is voting a strike. You will see how and under what conditions different people strike. Whether you vote for or against the strike, you will find out the consequences of your action and explore the feelings that you have about the union after you have won or lost a particular decision.

The game of "Strike!" is about four local unions who face the question of whether or not to strike over an issue of job posting. The issue of job posting is an important one to miners. The qualifications of a person hired for a job are important because miners depend on each other for their lives. If someone without experience is hired, there may be dangers. However, the company does need to hire more people. You will debate this issue and others throughout the game. The game will take about three class periods. During the game each of the four locals will vote whether or not to strike, will see the consequences of their vote, and will have continued meetings about union issues and whether or not to support the union.

In this game you will win by scoring the number of points (30) necessary to satisfy your interests. The scoring procedure and the definitions of winning are presented in the rule sheet and score sheet.
that are enclosed in your student materials. You will find all of the materials necessary to play the game contained in your student text and in the materials your teacher will pass out. On the following pages you will find a rule sheet for the game. The rule sheet shows you how to play the game. There are two issue information sheets for the first and second local union meetings. There is an opinion poll which you will need to fill out at various times during the game. In addition, you will find a score sheet and some discussion questions. You need not study these materials before you begin the game. Your teacher will explain how the game is to proceed and you will have time in class to prepare for your role.
Rules for Strike!

1. Read the issue information sheet for the first union meeting and your role profile. Think about the role you will act out in this game. Try to determine the interests of the person whose role you will play and the kinds of feelings they have about strikes. Then fill out the opinion poll on page 123 of your student text.

2. The class will divide into four locals. Each person in each local has 30 points. You should try to keep these 30 points by making decisions which further your interests.

3. Attend your local meeting. The decision of whether or not you will strike will be decided by majority rule. Act in this meeting as strongly as you can to represent your interests either for or against the strike. Be sure to state major arguments for your position.

4. Record the vote of each member of your group on a piece of paper. Use your score sheet on page 124 to record your score for this decision.

5. Your teacher will announce the consequences of your decision whether or not to strike. You will use your score sheet to determine whether these consequences are positive or negative for you.

6. Attend a second meeting of your local and try to determine whether or not you would like to change the rules for making decisions in your union. Play your role according to your role profile and the events which have happened to you so far in the game.
7. Record the vote of each member of your group on a piece of paper. Use your score sheet to record your score for this decision.

AS LONG AS YOU SERVE YOUR INTERESTS, YOU WILL WIN THE GAME BY KEEPING YOUR 30 POINTS
Your local is embroiled in a dispute with the company over job posting. The union contract sets a different pay scale for each type of job in the mine. For example, a roof bolter makes $57.00 a day, a cutting machine operator makes $54.00, a shuttle car operator makes $51.00, and a general laborer makes $48.00. Whenever a job opens, the company posts news of the vacancy on the wall near the time clock. Any miner who thinks that he or she is qualified for the job may bid on it by submitting a written application to the mine superintendent. The contract requires the company to use two criteria to choose a person for the job. First, the person must be qualified to perform the work. Second, the qualified person with the most seniority must be selected. It is easy to tell who has the most seniority, but the word "quality" is not so definite. It is sometimes unclear whether or not a bidder is qualified.

Some miners feel that management takes advantage of the vagueness of the word "qualify." According to them, the company denies opportunity for higher paying jobs to any miner who stands up for his or her rights. These miners say the company claims those bidders are not fully qualified for the job, and instead the company gives the job to someone who does whatever management says. In order to stop the abuse, these miners demand that a mine committee help make the final choice of which bidder gets the job.

The company refuses to discuss the demand. The claim that only management has a right to decide who is qualified for a job. It seems unlikely that the company would yield on its position without a long strike.

Lately, some miners have been talking in the bath house about going out on a strike to force the company to agree to their demands. This group claims the company is violating the contract, and, therefore, miners have a right and a duty to strike. Other miners are opposed to a strike. They claim the strike would be an illegal, wildcat strike and the company could discharge anyone who organized a work stoppage.

A local union meeting has been called to decide whether or not to strike. A majority rules on the question. Each member can either vote yes, to go out on strike, or no, to not strike.

How do you vote individually?
1. ______ Yes, go out on a strike.
2. ______ No, do not strike.

Now get your arguments ready for a group decision on the issue. Your goal is to get the group to make a decision favorable to the interests of the person described in your role profile.
Opinion Poll:
Feelings about the Union

Directions: Listed below are five statements about the union. These statements are opinions that you may either agree or disagree with. Please assume that you are a coal miner and indicate your opinion about the union by circling one number on the scale below each sentence.

1. I believe the union is the legitimate representative of my interests.
   
   strongly agree  agree  undecided  disagree  strongly disagree

   1  2  3  4  5

2. I benefit from union membership.

   strongly agree  agree  undecided  disagree  strongly disagree

   1  2  3  4  5

3. I personally feel a sense of loyalty to the union.

   strongly agree  agree  undecided  disagree  strongly disagree

   1  2  3  4  5

4. I think the union promotes solidarity among all miners.

   strongly agree  agree  undecided  disagree  strongly disagree

   1  2  3  4  5

5. I believe the union is an effective organization to mobilize the interests of miners.

   strongly agree  agree  undecided  disagree  strongly disagree

   1  2  3  4  5
Score Sheet for Strike!

When you are assigned a role you were also assigned a letter of A, B, or C. Be sure to remember which letter is assigned to your role. You will be scored different points for different decisions depending upon whether you are an A, B, or C. Your score will be composed of three different decisions. First, there is a decision of whether or not to strike in the beginning union meeting of the game. Second, there is a determination of the effects of the strike decision for you as an individual. Third, you will be scored depending upon the decision that your group makes in the union meeting about how decisions should be made in the future in your local.

Your teacher will aid you in determining a score for each of these three events. When you figure your score for each of these events, write it in the space below and keep a running tally so that you can make a total at the end of the game. A person wins when he or she has 30 or more points at the end of the game.

1. Strike Decision

2. Strike Decision Results

3. Union Decision-Making

TOTAL

135
A new issue surfaced after the last union meeting. This time the problem is not a conflict with management. Instead, the conflict is within the local union. The issue concerns the way the union decides whether or not to strike.

Historically, the local has always made a strike decision in the same way. The union notifies every member when a strike vote will be taken. Interested members come to the union hall, discuss the pros and cons, and cast their ballots. The question is decided by majority rule of those present. Now some miners want to change the procedure, but others want to keep the same method of deciding.

The people who want a change argue that deciding whether to strike is a very important choice because everyone loses wages when the union goes out. This group says the union should only strike when the issue is significant and when the union has a good chance to win. They claim that lately a small group of hot heads gets a bare majority emotionally stirred up about a trivial issue, and the whole union rushes into a foolish strike.

This group proposes two changes. First, they say that at least seventy-five percent of the members should participate in a decision as important as a strike vote. In their plan, no decision is reached if fewer than seventy-five percent of the membership cast ballots. Instead, another vote will be scheduled. Second, this group proposes that seventy-five percent of those who do vote must agree to a strike before the union can call a walkout. They claim these changes will help the local avoid foolish, "no win" strikes.

The miners who want to keep the majority rule have reasons for their position. They argue that the union needs to strike or it will lose influence with the company. They claim the company will deny every contention if it thinks the union is unable to back up its demands with a strike. This group says the local has too many timid members who are too gutless to fight for their rights, and it will be impossible to win a strike vote under the proposed rules. They argue the proposed changes will hurt miners and cripple the union.

A union meeting has been called to settle the issue. A majority rules on the question. Each member can either vote yes, to change the rule, or no, to keep it the same.

How do you vote individually?

1. _____ Yes, change the rule.
2. _____ No, keep the rule the same.

Now get your arguments ready for a group decision on the issue. Your goal is to influence the group to make a decision favorable to your interests.
Opinion Poll:
Feelings about the Union

Directions: Listed below are five statements about the union. These statements are opinions that you may either agree or disagree with. Please assume that you are a coal miner and indicate your opinion about the union by circling one number on the scale below each sentence.

1. I believe the union is the legitimate representative of my interests.
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - undecided
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
   
   1  2  3  4  5

2. I benefit from union membership.
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - undecided
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
   
   1  2  3  4  5

3. I personally feel a sense of loyalty to the union.
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - undecided
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
   
   1  2  3  4  5

4. I think the union promotes solidarity among all miners.
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - undecided
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
   
   1  2  3  4  5

5. I believe the union is an effective organization to mobilize the interests of miners.
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - undecided
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
   
   1  2  3  4  5
Discussion Questions for Strike!

1. Did you win or lose in the Strike! game? Why do you think this is the case?

2. How do you feel about the union at this point? What does the opinion poll say about the class results of how they feel about the union?

3. How do you think legitimacy relates to maintenance? What difference does it make whether the union is considered to be legitimate or not?

4. State some generalizations about legitimacy and maintenance which you think apply across political groups.
Two Cases: Two Political Parties

On the following pages are two cases. One is about the growth of the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano in Mexico and the Democratic party during the McGovern campaign. Look at these two cases and determine whether legitimacy contributed to maintenance of a political system in Mexico and the Democratic party. Compare your results to those you found in the United Mine Workers case.

You should answer the following discussion questions as you read the cases.

1. What are the interests of people involved in these cases?

2. What role does legitimacy play in contributing to maintenance in each of these cases?

3. What generalizations about legitimacy and maintenance can you state which apply to the UMWA, Mexico, and Democratic party cases?
Mandate For Reform

-- I understand you were a McGovern delegate to the 1972 Democratic National Convention.

-- Yes.

-- Were you also a delegate at the Chicago convention in '68?

-- No, I was a McCarthy delegate to our state convention, but Humphrey got almost all of our national delegates. I had to watch that fiasco on TV.

-- How did you feel?

-- Sick. We had friends over to watch the convention, and when we saw policemen beating those kids, we were stunned. It might not have happened if the kids had felt that they could work within the Democratic Party.

-- Were you happy with what was happening inside the Amphitheather?

-- Oh, no. For one thing, it looked like an armed camp in there -- security guards roaming the isles, harassing newsmen and delegates. For another, I don't think the delegates really represented the will of the rank-and-file Democrat. Democrats were fed up with the Johnson administration and the war. They wanted new leadership and new policies, not Johnson's Vice-President.

-- If the Democrats didn't want Humphrey, why did he have so many delegates?
Humphrey was the favorite of most party leaders because he was considered a loyal, dyed-in-the-wool Democrat. And party leaders—or should I say party bosses—picked most of the convention delegates in local caucuses, party committee meetings and state conventions. In fact, a lot of delegations were kept uncommitted so the bosses could wheel and deal.

Why do you say that rank-and-file Democrats didn't want Humphrey?

Well, look at the primary results. Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy won those, not Humphrey. He just ignored them.

What did you do after the convention? Did you work for local Democratic candidates or the national ticket?

No, I was too disappointed. I guess, I was like a lot of people who wanted a change in leadership. I just wanted to pretend I'd never heard of the Democratic Party. Even people who thought Humphrey was O.K., weren't excited about the election. And they weren't too excited about being Democrats either.

When did you get involved in the party again?

It was in 1970 after I'd read about the McGovern Commission's reform guidelines.

How did that affect your attitude?

Well, in '68 and before it was hard for most people to participate in selecting delegates to the national convention. That was one of the reasons a lot of Democrats just didn't care whether Humphrey won or not. They had no personal stake in it.
-- How was it difficult?

-- I'll give you an example from my own experience. In our state, local caucuses pick delegates to the state convention. Well, a McCarthy worker called me and asked me to attend the local Democratic caucus. I didn't even know there was going to be one. It wasn't in the paper or anything. I drove to the caucus with several other McCarthy supporters, and it took us an hour just to find the place. It was held in someone's home—in one of those fancy subdivisions where the streets run every which way.

When we finally got there, it was obvious that we weren't expected. But there were enough of us that I got chosen as a delegate to the state convention. I was a lucky one. At other caucuses, party bosses were armed with loads of proxy votes to prevent a challenge like ours. And, of course, in some states, there aren't even any caucuses. The party committees just choose the delegates.

So you can see how being a Democrat didn't mean much to some people when they were shut out like that. This was especially true in '68 when we felt so strongly about the Vietnam war and the need for new leadership.

-- How were the McGovern Commission reforms supposed to help?

-- First, they outlawed some of the abuses of the delegate selection process, like secret caucuses and proxy votes. They also limited the number of delegates that could be picked by party committees and abolished automatic seats for party and governmental officials. In '72 a Democratic governor or senator usually had to run for a place on the state delegation.
-- What was the purpose of the so-called quotas for minorities, women and youths?

-- The reformers knew that those three groups weren't very well represented in the party hierarchy even though a large number of them voted Democratic. All three groups were becoming powerful political forces, and the reformers wanted them to feel at home in the Democratic Party and not have to look outside of it. You know, they didn't mean for it to be a quota system. They just wanted the states to take some affirmative action to get these groups into the party structure.

-- Did the reforms make a difference at the '72 National Convention?

-- Oh, yes. The delegates were selected much more openly. Our local caucus advertised in the newspaper, and it met in the high school auditorium so all interested Democrats could attend. In a state like Arizona, 35,000 Democrats elected delegates to a state convention in '72, where in '68 five party bosses did it all. The percentages of women, blacks and youth also increased in '72. It was a whole different convention.

-- Do you think the reforms were good for the Democratic Party?
Representation of Women, Blacks and Youth
Democratic National Conventions

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- . . . . . women     51
- - - - - blacks      11
* * * * * youth       30

Percent of Population
-- In the long run, yes, I do. The "quota system" will probably be altered because it alienated a lot of Democrats who didn't have their own quota. But it did succeed in broadening the role of women, blacks and youth in the party, and I think that will continue.

The reforms are still too closely tied to McGovern's nomination and defeat, but neither the openness nor the quotas made that inevitable. All the candidates had women, blacks and youths on their delegate slates. Besides McGovern got most of his delegates in primary states. He didn't do as well in convention states which were affected most by the reforms.

-- What about the large number of old time Democrats who refused to support McGovern? Doesn't that defection weaken the party?

-- Not really. It hurt McGovern's chances, sure, but those guys still worked for other Democratic candidates. The party made gains in congressional and state races, in spite of Nixon's "landslide." I think most Democrats are realizing that opening up the delegate selection process will make the Democratic Party stronger.
I walked out onto the convention floor the first night and looked around. It used to be that I knew everyone on the floor. I knew which delegate was the source of power in each delegation. Now, I recognized no one. In my own home state, Montana, I knew just one delegate -- a 79 year old judge. There were six Indians in that delegation and I didn't know one of them. I said to myself, "This is a whole new ball game--and the last hurrah for me."

James H. Rowe Jr., 63 Washington lawyer. (Quoted in Newsweek July 24, 1972, p. 31).

My main concern is that I want the war to end. McGovern is the only candidate who has taken a practical approach to freeing the POW's. (Quoted in Newsweek, June 26, 1972, p. 21).

Merry Baker, a POW wife from San Antonio, Texas
How in the world could a fellow like myself ever get to be a delegate? I can't believe it's happening. I hope the process stays open.

(Quote in Newsweek, June 26, 1972, p. 21).

I know I'm just one vote, but that vote is still important. I'm just a tiny part of so big a puzzle, yet that little part is important because without it you cannot finish the puzzle. I think in my own way I'm changing the system a little bit. (Quote in Newsweek, July 24, 1972, p. 30).
Lázaro Cárdenas was a Mexican Revolutionary. He fought with the rebel armies of Emeliano Zapata and Poncho Villa. Then in 1920, at the age of 25, he became a brigadier general and provisional governor. And in 1934 he was elected the President of the Republic of Mexico. Cárdenas' chief goal as President was to fulfill the promises of the Mexican Revolution. The Revolution had begun almost 25 years before with an armed revolt against the oppressive military dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz.

Most of the time since then had been spent, first with the struggle against Díaz, and later with the leaders of the Revolution fighting among themselves. Mexican presidents had been trying to maintain control of the country and decide what future course the Revolution should take. As a result, they had had little time to carry out the extensive social, economic and political reforms pledged by the Revolutionaries. Cárdenas felt that the Mexican people would not long support a government that did not live up to its promises. Now that the Revolutionaries were firmly in power, he maintained, it was time to truly begin the Revolution.

The new President saw the peasant and the laborer as the main pillars of Revolutionary Mexico. Both groups had been extremely poor during Díaz's administration. Peasants worked long and hard on huge estates. They were constantly in debt to the landowner who controlled everything on the estate, so they had no chance to buy their own land. Workers were a much smaller group, but their life was almost as hopeless as that of the peasants because of dangerous working conditions and very low wages. Consequently, Cárdenas
wanted to make the Mexican government especially responsive to the peasants' and workers' needs.

He greatly increased the amount of land which was being distributed to landless peasants, and he approved of labor strikes against industrialists. With the President's encouragement, peasant leaders organized leagues to represent their interests. The national confederation of these agrarian leagues was known as the CNC. Labor leaders founded a national federation called the CTM in 1936, also with Cardenas' blessing.

These were important steps in organizing peasants and workers, but President Cárdenas went a step further. He wanted to incorporate the revolutionary elements of society into the official government party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). The PNR had been established by President Plutarco Elías Calles in 1928 in order to end the divisiveness which had characterized the post-revolutionary years. Calles hoped that all supporters of the Revolution in Mexico, all opponents of military dictatorship, could be united in one official government party. This party would then be the embodiment of the Revolution and would run the government. Indeed the PNR candidates easily won elections to local, state and national offices.

Cárdenas wanted the power of the PNR to rest on more than the revolutionary tradition and the prestige of Revolutionary leaders. He felt that if the Mexican people were going to continue to accept the PNR as the official government party, they had to be able to participate in its decisions. With this in mind, he reorganized the PNR and renamed it the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM).
The Organization of the
Partido Revolucionario Mexicano

Central Executive Committee

32 Regional Executive Committees

Municipal and District Committees

Farm Sector
Labor Sector
Popular Sector
Military Sector
He divided the PRM into four sectors. Membership in these sectors was based on occupations. Peasant farmers belonged to the farm sector, workers belonged to the labor sector, and soldiers belonged to the military sector. The popular sector remained unorganized during Cárdenas' administration, but it was meant to include civil servants, shop owners and other groups that didn't fit into the first three sectors. Large landowners and wealthy businessmen were not represented since they didn't qualify as supporters of the Revolution. Hence, they were outside the Revolutionary Party.

The four sectors of the party were organized on the local, state and national levels. National policy flowed from the Central Executive Committee to the Regional Executive Committees to the Municipal and District Committees. The sectors were represented on all these levels, and they had an equal input into decisions. Final decisions generally flowed from the top, but local opinions, ideas and complaints flowed upward from the bottom. In this way the major segments of society were incorporated into the PRM. The President was the chief spokesman of the Revolution and of the Party, and he had the responsibility of balancing the interests of the sectors so that the PRM would maintain its dominant position.

Through his economic and social reforms President Cárdenas tried to make the PRM the true heir to the Revolution in the eyes of the Mexican people. And his political reorganization of the party gave the various segments of the Mexican populace a direct stake in it. Cárdenas' heritage has been very important for successive Mexican presidents. The party was renamed the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in 1945 and the military sector was dropped in 1940, but in essence the structure Cárdenas provided has remained the same.
ACTIVITY FOUR: THE CONTRACT: WHO GOVERNS?

This activity focuses on two more reasons why political organizations are maintained over time. The activity will focus on control as a device for keeping political organizations stable and keeping the organization the same. It will also focus on mobilization as a means for organizing a union and governing it so that it maintains the same political structure. The structure of the United Mine Workers can be described as follows:

Formal Organization of the United Mine Workers

```
International Executive Board

International Union Headquarters
UMW President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer

Headquarters
Staff

Field Staff

District 1
District 2
District 23
District 24

Subdistrict
Subdistrict
Subdistrict
Subdistrict

Local Union
Local Union
Local Union
Local Union
Local Union
Local Union
```
As you can see from the chart, the international executive board is the top of the pyramid on which the United Mine Workers is based. It is an elite organization with the international board at its head. The international makes policy decisions and negotiates contracts. The district level organization has power over problems of interpretation and enforcement of the contract. They also handle problems of settling most strikes. In the United Mine Workers, unlike some other unions, most district representatives are elected by the miners.

The third level of organization includes the locals. There are approximately 650 locals in the United Mine Workers. These local unions and local officers usually govern one or, sometimes, two mines. They take care of all of the everyday problems of the miners. When they cannot take care of them, they go to the district level for assistance. Therefore, there is a top-down structure in the United Mine Workers. The union has had the same basic structure for the entire time it has been in existence.

This activity will illustrate how control affects maintenance in the UMW. Control can be defined as the activity of influencing others to act according to rules or norms set by a political group. When people know "the rules of the game" and leaders enforce those rules, then maintenance is aided. In the UMWA, the leaders of the organization have exerted many forms of control through their constitution, contracts, and force.

Mobilization is also important to maintenance. Mobilization is a process through which people with common goals attempt to organize their activities to affect policy outcomes. In the UMWA, John L.
Lewis was most successful in building the union by bringing workers together to achieve common goals of higher wages. Often higher wages were not given or were difficult to get, but the effort to bring people together was extremely successful.

The following case illustrates how control and mobilization operated in the UMWA during the 1930's under Lewis. Read the case on the next page and answer the questions which follow it.
Illinois -- heart of the coal fields. More bituminous coal was extracted from the Illinois coal fields than any other in 1932. As important, over sixty percent of the coal miners in the industry were working there.

Illinois also housed the core of the opposition to John L. Lewis. It was here the Reorganized Mine Workers staked their claim, where Adolph Germer and others worked against John L. Lewis. It is the home of the Illinois Miner; the voice of mine workers against "Iron John."

The master strategist, John L. Lewis, knew that the last battle for the organization of the United Mine Workers would be held in Illinois. He himself was a miner. He was a forceful speaker and had a brilliant mind. He had the wealth and power of the union behind him. He was ready for the battle and would come to terms with the "upstarts" in Illinois who were attempting to break his organization.

The battle began at a local meeting of anti-Lewis miners in Royalton, Illinois. Adolph Germer was there and many local members were attending. John L. Lewis ordered three hundred of his supporters into the union meeting. They broke up the meeting with bullets. People were wounded and others were hurt. The violence had only begun. Illinois had to be broken and had to become part of the United Mine Workers.

There was violence in Illinois. There was also a law; a law that worked against the dissenting miners. In 1929, Lewis had suspended all of the officers of District 12 in Illinois. He had appointed a provisional government. He could do this under the United Mine Workers constitution. He had done it in many other cases. The officers of District 12, however,
filed suit and asked the court to determine whether or not their ouster was legal. They also asked the court to determine which union was the legal union; that lead by Lewis or that lead by the Reorganized Miners. The court said that Lewis could not oust the District 12 officers, but it handed a major defeat to the Illinois group. It said that the United Mine Workers was the legal union of the mine workers. The union of Lewis was to stand as that recognized by the courts.
The opposition's leaders were handcuffed by the law. In addition to their inability to exercise power in the union, the mines in Illinois were struck in 1932. Their contract had expired and the company wanted a 30% wage cut from $6.10 a day to $5.00 a day. John H. Walker, President of District 12, fought the company as long as he could but finally gave in to the decrease. The miners voted against the cut in wages and they continued to strike. At this point, Walker turned to Lewis for help.

When Lewis came into Illinois, he came in with two things in mind. One was to settle the strike; the other to organize Illinois and to get the opposition forces to join his United Mine Workers union. He saw the governor, members of the company, and the union. He came out with the following statement, "The agreement, distasteful as it may be, represents every concession that at this time can be wrung from the impoverished coal companies in a stricken and almost expiring industry." In short, the workers would get the $5.00 contract, and wages would be reduced to almost 30%.

The miners had to vote on the new contract. As the vote came in, it seemed that they would reject Lewis' agreement. However, as the ballots were being carried to the union headquarters, a car pulled up beside the tellers. The ballots were put in the car and they were gone forever. The tellers claimed that they had been robbed and that the ballots could not be found. Lewis declared a state of emergency. He met with the operators and got a new agreement. It was signed and the strike was over. Very few people knew that the new agreement had the same $5.00 wage included in it.

When the miners did find out about the wage, they were angry. They held mass meetings. They even formed a new union called the
Progressive Mine Workers of America. However, the Progressive Mine Workers of America could not get a better wage. They faded out of existence as Illinois became UMWA country under John L. Lewis.

With the opposition from local union leaders and the rank-and-file gone, Illinois was in Lewis' pocket. He had used his power of force and of law against the formation of new unions in Illinois. The miners that had been mobilized against Lewis were moved into the union. Sixty percent of the union members were now back in the union. There would never be a strong alternative union in Illinois. It would be "UMWA country."

Discussion Questions

1. What means did Lewis use in order to bring the Illinois miners into the United Mine Workers?

2. How did Lewis use the rules of the union and of the court to organize miners for the United Mine Workers in Illinois?

3. What do you think Lewis's activities did to contribute to political maintenance in the United Mine Workers?
There are two major ideas that are highlighted in the Lewis case. One is control and the other is mobilization. It is relatively easy to see from the case how control and mobilization contribute to maintenance.

Control involves exercising authority or other influence over people. In Lewis's case, one large base of his control over others was charisma. Lewis was a good speaker and an imposing personality. Many people followed him because they thought he was both brilliant and politically wise.

Lewis also used other bases for control. He often used force. As you can see in the Illinois case, he used physical violence and other means to force the Illinois miners to come into the United Mine Workers. He literally wiped out his opposition. In this way, maintenance is kept because the opposition is contained or eliminated.

Lewis also used status to control the union. He used the force of law in terms of the district court's decision and his status as UMWA president in order to force out district officials who were opposed to his views. This is very common in the initial organization of the union. Often a president takes a strong personal stand and uses whatever legal means he has to enforce his decision. In Lewis' case he used the district court decision to establish the supremacy of the UMWA. He then used the UMWA constitution as a basis for appointing his own people in Illinois. These status resources used to control the union allowed him to establish dominance in Illinois.
He also had the money of the union behind him in campaigning or in influencing Illinois mine workers. Money is often a major factor in control when people are on strike and need money in order to support their families.

Courtesy of the United Mine Workers

Lewis' Victory

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Control contributes to maintenance in several ways. First, it enables people to stop opposition through using wealth, status or force as mechanisms of control. Leaders can use these resources to blunt opposition and maintain the organization. Lewis certainly used his resources in this way. Control can also help to maintain an organization by giving the authority and clout necessary to enforce rules and decisions. Once the decision was made to organize Illinois, Lewis could use his control in order to maintain the organization the way it was. He did not have to accept a new union or new leadership in the process.

Therefore, control contributes to maintenance according to the following two generalizations:

1. Control contributes to the force necessary to curtail opposition and promotes political maintenance.

2. Control contributes the resources necessary to enforce the rules of an organization and contributes to maintenance.

Mobilization can also contribute to political maintenance. In Lewis' case, he used mobilization techniques to convert opposing organizations into the United Mine Workers. He deprived them of their leadership and then provided benefits for members which demonstrated his ability to mobilize opposition groups. Lewis also organized miners in the organization by setting up a set of procedures of authority and relationships so that everyone would know their place in the rules for operating the union. People knew what the union was about, and they knew if they violated a rule, they would be penalized.

Therefore, mobilization contributes to maintenance in several ways. It gives structure to a group which allows people to follow
procedures and authority relationships which are set by that group. It promotes maintenance because the procedures and authority relationships are set. This is an important generalization about the contribution of mobilization to political maintenance.

Below you will find an outline of an interview with John L. Lewis. You will find that the interviewer's questions are given, but John L. Lewis's responses are left blank. It is your job to fill in these responses as you think John L. Lewis might say them. You will then read your dialogue in your class session and analyze whether or not you believe the dialogue to be authentic.

**Dialogue**

**Interviewer:** How do you view the role of president of the United Mine Workers? How does the president influence the rest of the structure of the United Mine Workers?

**John L. Lewis:**

**Interviewer:** What means do you use to see that the decisions are carried out in the United Mine Workers?

**John L. Lewis:**
Interviewer: What are the goals of the United Mine Workers and the president of the union?

John L. Lewis:

Interviewer: How do you organize members who are coming into the United Mine Workers?

John L. Lewis:
1974 was an important year in the UMWA. Arnold Miller was negotiating his first contract since he had been elected union president. He had pledged to democratize the union and he intended to do it in its most serious set of negotiations -- the contract under which every miner in the United Mine Workers would work.

Until 1974, many people felt that contracts had been trade-offs. The union had given in on something in order to get something else. They had obtained higher wages by giving in on sick leave and they had received more vacation times by giving in on grievances. This time the negotiating team was pledged to stick to their guns and get benefits. They did get some. They received compensation for black lung disease and other safety benefits that had never been put into a UMWA contract to date. In Miller's view, the difference between the 1974 contract and others, was both in his personal leadership style and the procedures set for the new organization of the United Mine Workers. He was not in it for position. His own charisma would not determine how the contract was negotiated. He wanted the presidency in order to help the miners. He cut his own salary and gave all the miners voting rights in the new contract. He would not sign the contract until it was ratified at every local union meeting throughout the UMWA.

Rank and file ratification was an important issue to Miller. He included every single miner in the ratification process. Local union meetings were held all across the districts of the UMWA. There were district representatives on the bargaining council, making the council large, but giving representation to different points of view.
In effect, the UMWA was, for the first time, going to sign a contract which reflected the will of the membership.

Perhaps it is best to look at the difference in the procedures of ratifying the contract from the point of view of some officials in a district in West Virginia. District 17 is one of the largest districts in the United Mine Workers. Here is what some union officials in District 17 had to say about the ratification process.

First official: Well, at the international level, Mr. Miller, Mr. Trbovich and Mr. Patrick were the negotiators, along with Mr. Yablonski and Mr. Banks. They conveyed what they had gotten out of the operators back to us at the bargaining council. In two different cases, we sent 'em back for a little more, until we felt that they had all they could get. Then we came back to the district with the proposed contract and it was voted on and ratified.

Second official: The ratification vote was done at the local level. At that time, we had 96 locals here. Now we had to get ballots out and we had to get a copy of the agreement out. And we came in here on Thanksgiving Day and we worked this office force gettin' it ready, deliverin' it out to the areas.
First official: We had a district conference in Madison, which we felt was a central location in this district. There we tried to analyze what we had in the way of a contract. From there it was simply a matter of lettin' 'em make up their own mind about whether they wanted to accept it.

Second official: Each local was asked to send their conference representatives to Madison on the Saturday following Thanksgiving. We tried to explain it to them, Article 1, Section 1 to Article 25. We spent nine hours with them. Now these conference representatives were supposed to go back to their local unions and relay the message back to them.

First official: Some of them went back and said, "Well, the district president didn't know anything about it. So I don't know what to tell ya." They were asking hypothetical questions about what if the boss does this, what if the boss does that. There's always been a sentence in this contract, ever since we've had a contract, about the issues not specifically spelled out in this agreement will be settled under the settlement of disputes article. The reason why they put that in there is because they had the good sense to know that they couldn't cover every little instance. These people wanted me to cover every little instance. You just can't do that.
Second official: I was talking with a man right after that agreement was ratified. He was arguing about why they didn't get this and why didn't they get that. I asked him about his automobile. He had a new automobile. I said, "Do you know what bargaining is?" and he said, "Well I believe I do." I said, "Bargaining is both sides putting out their cases and coming to some agreement." I said, "Let's just take your automobile. How much did that dealer want for it." He told me, "He wanted $4,200." I said, "Well what did you offer him for it?" He said, "$3,300," and I said "That's bargaining." Then I asked him, "How much did you pay for it?" He said, "$3,800," and I said,"Why didn't you get it for $3,300?" He said, "The fella wouldn't sell for that," and I said, "Now you understand bargaining. That's why Mr. Miller couldn't get you the points that you're askin' about."

This is the way that Arnold Miller chose to control the UMW. It was definitely from the bottom up. He would not personally seek to control the union from the top. He also brought many more miners into participating in the union then it had before. In effect, his mobilization tactic was simple; he wanted everyone to participate in something that was simple and fundamental as the rules that structure their everyday life.
Discussion Questions

1. What means did Miller use in order to get the contract ratified?

2. How did Miller use the rules of the union to organize miners to vote on the contract?

3. What do you think Miller's activities did to contribute to political maintenance in the United Mine Workers?

4. Do you think the union may change its political organization because of Miller? Why?
The Arnold Miller case continues to illustrate how control and mobilization can affect political maintenance. However, it also illustrates a direct attempt by individuals to change an organization. The question discussed here is whether or not Miller is indeed maintaining the United Mine Workers as the structure it always was or seeking to change it.

It is clear that Miller used a different type of control from John L. Lewis. He tried to use the vehicle of representation to control the union. He wanted every miner to represent his or her own interests and the locals to control a great deal of the decision-making power. In this way, he thought he would be a legitimate president. He would be the representative of the people and would take their suggestions seriously in making his decisions.

He also used his status as president to help to encourage participation in the union. In so doing, he set the model that if he was to succeed as president, it would be because the miners themselves were making important decisions.

Both of these resources -- representation and status -- can be used both to control a union and to change it. In Miller's case, as long as he involves others in participation in the union and retains the decision-making process for himself, he is setting up a vehicle for making himself legitimate and powerful which could continue to maintain the union in the same form. A paper democracy might be created through which miners could make minor decisions and have a voice without really affecting the decisions that were made at the top. In this case, control would be exerted involving others in decision-making and it would contribute to political maintenance.
However, Miller could also give real decision-making power to the miners. They would not only participate more, but they would directly affect the decision-making process. In this case, he would be promoting political change. The union might work in much the same way but there would be increased participation in the decision-making power among local union representatives. It is unclear at this time how Miller's strategies will turn out. By his own words he is attempting to change the union and not simply maintain it. It could work out either way.

As far as mobilization goes, Miller attempted to organize miners by getting them involved in union politics. He created more structures at the local level and tried to disperse decision-making power to the local unions. Union meetings had more attendance and participation than ever before. This form of mobilization creates more membership and creates satisfaction among the membership because they know the rules of the organization. They know them because they set the rules themselves. In this way, mobilization can contribute to maintenance as long as the local miners want to have an elite organization.

Mobilization can work toward maintenance or change. It can work toward maintenance if the participants set rules which support the former system. In other words, maintenance is achieved by having a set of union members who want exactly the same form of organization they always have had.

Mobilization can also affect change by bringing new groups into a situation and giving them decision-making powers. If both more participation and more decision power are given, then the union is
likely to change some of its policies, if not its elite organization.

Therefore, four generalizations can be drawn about how control and mobilization contribute to maintenance which are different from those which were drawn under the reign of John L. Lewis.

1. When control involves others in making decisions and these decisions support the previous decision structure, then political maintenance is promoted.

2. When control is used to give real decision power and participation to the members of the union, then political change may occur.

3. When mobilization involves the membership in setting rules which are like those of the old system, then maintenance is promoted.

4. When mobilization contributes to the rise of new groups with different ideas and organization, then political change is promoted.

Below is a dialogue that is similar to the one you filled in for John L. Lewis. Take a look at the case of Miller in the 1974 contract. Fill in the dialogue as if Miller were answering the questions in the interview. Then compare the two dialogues and discuss them in class.

**Dialogue**

**Interviewer:** How do you view the role of president of the United Mine Workers? How does the president influence the rest of the structure of the United Mine Workers?

**Arnold Miller:**
Interviewer: What means do you use to see that the decisions are carried out in the United Mine Workers?

Arnold Miller:

Interviewer: What are the goals of the United Mine Workers and the president of the union?

Arnold Miller:

Interviewer: How do you organize members who are coming into the United Mine Workers?

Arnold Miller:
Two Cases: Political Parties in the U.S. and Mexico

On the next few pages you will find two cases about political parties. Both show how control and mobilization affect political maintenance in different settings. Read the cases and compare your ideas with the UMWA cases as you are answering the discussion questions below:

Discussion Questions

1. How was control exercised in the Democratic Party? In the Mexico case?

2. How was mobilization carried out in these cases?

3. What are major similarities and differences in these two cases and the UMWA?

4. What are some generalizations you can draw from all of these cases about the effects of control and mobilization on political maintenance?
Victory in Wisconsin

When Senator George McGovern of South Dakota announced his candidacy for the Presidency on January 18, 1971, few dreamed that he would win the Wisconsin primary fifteen months later, let alone the Democratic nomination. Known mostly for his early opposition to the war in Vietnam, McGovern seemed to lack the "qualities" necessary for a successful Democratic candidacy: money, charisma, labor or big city strength. His victory in Wisconsin was due primarily to two factors: a broadly-based local campaign organization and the candidate's stand on the war and taxes.

Even before McGovern's announcement, a young Nebraskan was at work creating a grassroots organization in Wisconsin. Gene Pokorny, a 25 year old veteran of Eugene McCarthy's 1968 presidential bid, was a talented political organizer. He possessed all the necessary characteristics outlined by Gary Hart, McGovern's campaign manager: "efficient, low-key, persistent, methodical, durable (mentally and physically), orderly to the point of compulsion."

Pokorny drove into Wisconsin in November 1970 armed with a road map, a supply of three by five cards, and a list of 50 contacts. Within a year and a half he had expanded that list to 10,000 names and had established campaign committees in all 72 counties and in every city and town in Wisconsin.
Upon his arrival, Pokorny's first task was to identify potential McGovern volunteers and supporters. These people were found in many places: among students and teachers on college campuses, in liberal organizations and peace groups, and among former McCarthy workers. An important source which Pokorny wanted to tap was housewives, and during the campaign many private homes became the headquarters for McGovern volunteer groups.
Once supporters were identified and contacted, Pokorny put them to work recruiting new volunteers, canvassing every neighborhood to identify McGovern voters, registering voters, distributing literature. This operation was commanded from 39 official neighborhood centers around the state.

Person-to-person contacts were supplimented by direct mailings. Pokorny sent special letters to farmers, labor groups, peace groups—any potential source of votes, funds and, especially, volunteers. Finally, in February 1972 a special Sunday supplement was put in all major Wisconsin newspapers. It outlined McGovern's position on the war and property taxes and appealed for funds and pledges of support. An envelope was attached to make it easier for people to reply. The response was substantial, and all the names were added to Pokorny's list. Then, at the end of February Pokorny sent one final letter to everyone on his list. He invited all McGovern supporters and contributors to mobilize their friends and neighbors in the final four weeks of the campaign. They were given a task for each week:

Week 1 -- Collect a dollar a piece from ten friends
Week 2 -- Place McGovern bumper stickers on the cars of ten friends
Week 3 -- Recruit ten new McGovern voters in their neighborhood
Week 4 -- Get the new voters to the voting booth

Gene Pokorny was able to command the army of over 10,000 volunteers because they all had a common goal. Bill Dixon, a McGovern worker from Milwaukee, described it: "Everything—personal interests, egos, money, family—was secondary to electing George McGovern--a decent courageous, honest man—President."
Many people supported McGovern because of his early and vocal opposition to the war in Vietnam. But in Wisconsin he also tapped widespread voter discontent with rising property taxes. This feeling was especially strong among blue-collar workers, a group which was not likely to be opposed to the war. McGovern had co-sponsored a tax reform bill in Congress for property tax relief, and he campaigned heavily on that issue in Wisconsin.

McGovern's campaign swings through Wisconsin were coordinated by Pokorny. One of his concerns was that McGovern volunteers and Wisconsin supporters maintain their enthusiasm over the long campaign. Frequent visits by the candidate was one way of doing that. A second way was to keep in constant contact with volunteers and potential volunteers. This enabled Pokorny to offer encouragement, and give instructions, as well as receive feedback from those in the field.

McGovern's campaign visits to Wisconsin served another purpose for Pokorny. He knew that many party regulars considered McGovern a radical because of his anti-war stance. So all across the state McGovern met with county Democratic organizations, assuring them that he was "in the mainstream of Democratic Party traditions."

From McGovern's viewpoint, his personal contacts with the voter were even more important.

"The whole theory is that the little guy standing there as a clerk or a machine-tool operator, or a farmer--he's just as important as the governor and he has just as many relatives and contacts. Let the frontrunner collect the endorsements. That little guy is the secret of my success."

(Newsweek, April 17, 1972, pp. 26-31)

McGovern travelled all over Wisconsin, stopping in almost every town, visiting factories, stores and bowling alleys. Gordon Weil, McGovern's
executive assistant, called this the "blitz campaign of the bowling alleys." People were surprised and happy when McGovern would drop in to meet them, and they told their friends. "Here's a man who really cares for the little people."

Pokorny's organization and McGovern's stand on property taxes reaped its reward, McGovern won 30 percent of the popular vote, compared to George Wallace with 22 percent, Hubert Humphrey with 21 percent and Edmund Muskie with 10 percent. Weil recalls the victory:

The McGovern family and I left the Milwaukee Inn, where we had been staying, to await the returns at the Pfister Hotel where the victory celebration would take place. As we stepped into the elevator on our arrival there, a hotel man told McGovern: "The television is projecting you as the winner." That was the first news of the first McGovern victory. It was hard to believe.

With cries of "We don't want him!" "Never!" and "Strike!" 3000 students took to the streets of Monterrey, Mexico. They were protesting the appointment of Arnulfo Treviño Garza as rector of the University of Nuevo León. It was May 1971, but history was repeating itself.

Two years earlier, following a long strike, students and teachers had won the right to appoint the rector of the university. But their victory was sabotaged by the governor of the state, Eduardo Elizondo. At first he seemed to be abiding by the 1969 agreement. The state legislature did create a popular assembly, whose main purpose was to select a rector for the University of Nuevo León.

On the surface, the popular assembly was acceptable to the students. It contained representatives of local labor and peasant unions, students, teachers, the press, industry and commerce. The reality was, however, that some of the local unions were controlled by the state branch of the official government party, the PRI, and even more were dominated by the large brewing and steel industries of Nuevo León.

Thus, when the popular assembly met to appoint a rector, they chose Treviño Garza, member of an important industrial family and former president of the state PRI. When he tried to take office,
the campus exploded. Violence erupted between students and police, and many arrests were made. The continuing strike and demonstrations drew the attention of the President of Mexico, Luis Echeverría Alvarez.

Echeverría realized that the situation in Monterrey was explosive, but it also gave him an opportunity to strengthen his political position in the state of Nuevo León and in the country as a whole. There were three groups in the state who were anxious to challenge Echeverría. Monterrey was the home of large brewing and steel industries. The powerful families which owned these industries hated the liberal economic policies of Echeverría. They viewed with special concern his plans to nationalize some industries. Treviño Garza represented this influential group.

The industrialists were allied with another powerful political force in Nuevo León -- the right wing of the PRI, the official government party. This conservative group had watched with alarm as Echeverría's statements and policies moved further to the left. The governor, Elizondo, had been elected by the conservative wing of the party, and he was implementing their policy toward the university.

On the opposite end of the political spectrum were the liberal university students. They distrusted Echeverría's liberalism because of his role during student demonstrations in 1968. At that time Echeverría had been the Minister of Interior. As such, he was in charge of police and internal security when at least 33 students were killed and many more wounded in the streets of Mexico City. The memory of that tragedy did not fade easily.
If Echeverría was going to manage these three challenges, he needed to convince the students that he was truly a liberal. At the same time he had to weaken the power of the conservative forces in Nuevo León. As President of Mexico he had at his disposal the power of the central government and the PRI. He sent Víctor Brava Ahuja, the Education Minister, as his representative to Monterrey.

Brava Ahuja's first task was to prevent a more serious student uprising. And he wanted to do that by compromise rather than force. The state legislature was willing to cooperate with him. It did not want to openly resist the central government. In addition, some local PRI leaders resented Governor Elizondo because he had only recently joined the party. Formerly, he had been a member of PAN, the major right-wing opposition party in Mexico.

The legislature agreed to the student demand that arrested students and teachers be released and that Arnulfo Treviño Garza resign. Governor Elizondo's power was severely limited by this action. He had lost an ally and much of his influence in the state legislature. As a result, he resigned shortly afterwards. He was replaced by Luis Farías, who was known to be loyal to Echeverría.

Echeverría's conciliatory actions overcame much of the student resentment toward him. He also successfully weakened the conservative political forces of Nuevo León by removing two of their representatives from public office.
Control and Mobilization: Necessary Participant Roles

Both the exercise of control and the process of mobilization require that some people play supporter, advocate, facilitator, and organizer roles. In class you will practice taking one participant role which will aid you in working in political groups. You will then apply what you learn in school and community settings. Your teacher will supply you with the information you need to carry out this activity.

This activity demonstrates one more reason why organizations maintain themselves over time. The basic reason is interdependence. Interdependence occurs when groups must interact with other groups in order to get things done. The UMWA, in this case, is one actor. Various groups within the union interact with the federal government and the courts. How the federal government and the courts came to interact with the union is the story behind the 1972 election.

Read the following case carefully and determine who the actors are and what kinds of interdependence relationships these actors have. You will then be asked to sketch a diagram of the actors and their relationships in this case.

The 1972 Election: Victory for Arnold Miller

The roots for the 1972 election came in 1968 when Joseph Yablonski was killed. Yablonski had led a strong opposition to Tony Boyle in the 1969 election. Yablonski was murdered shortly after the election and his wife and daughter were also killed. He was survived only by his sons, Ken and Chip Yablonski. As a result of the Yablonski affair, the district court set aside the 1969 election and called for a new election to be held in 1972.

Arnold Miller's victory against Tony Boyle in the 1972 election was, of course, partially a result of Arnold Miller's own behavior. He was a 49-year-old disabled miner who himself has black lung disease. He had campaigned using the tactic of talking to miners in bathhouses about major issues. He was an aspiring leader who wanted the union
to be turned over to the miners, instead of the goon squads or the union president.

In Miller's own words, he came to be a candidate in the election for the following reasons:

There was an individual named Lionel Calvin who was president of a local across the mountain. He called me one Saturday night and said "We had a meeting tonight in Montgomery, about 7 or 8 of us. We formed an organization called the Western

Courtesy of the United Mine Workers

Arnold Miller meets West Virginia Miners
Black Lung Association. We're going to see if we can get a bill drafted to get this disease made compensational in the state of West Virginia. I know that you've been active in the last three or four months trying to get miners together and get more active in their own affairs. We have another meeting tomorrow night. Will you be there?"

I said, "I'll be there!" And I was. The more we got started, the more interest we created in that organization and the more miners we got together, the more apparent it became we needed a change in leadership. I went to the district officials and asked for help. We were told "We're not sticking out our necks for you, you rabble rousers." It finally progressed to a point that they sent a letter out threatening our expulsion from the union. You can imagine how that set with me. I was trying to do something for my fellow miner and someone's going to threaten me with expulsion. I guess that would scare some people. If you want me to do something, it's better to sit down and try to negotiate or try to discuss and show me where I'm wrong, and then ask me to do it. It's not likely that they're going to get anywhere, if you just come in and say "This is what I want you to do, and you got to do it." So I was more determined than ever that I was going to do something. I told the former district president that up the road somewhere we would have the right to elect our own officials and that the 500 members in that district who knew him would not be enough to re-elect him.
Miller was a determined miner. However, there were other determined miners who were sparked by the Yablonski murder. They formed a group called The Miners for Democracy. The Miners for Democracy grew directly out of the Yablonski campaign against Tony Boyle. They represented a union that would take care of miners and would be run by miners. They campaigned in every local across 23 states for Arnold Miller. They wanted badly to beat the man who had killed Yablonski and they wanted the union for the miners.

Miller's election victory was also partially due to the federal government. When Joseph Yablonski was murdered, his two sons took their case to the district court. The court nullified the election. In addition, the court said the the U.S. Labor Department would supervise the election and that Miller had the right to station observers at union polls. There were more than 1,500 polling places and more than 1,000 poll watchers in that election. The federal government had set the setting against the kinds of tactics that had been used in the Yablonski case.

The fight was bitter. Boyle accused Miller of being a "hippie" and a communist. He accused the Miners for Democracy of destroying the union and seeking to undermine the interests of the miners. It didn't work. Miller campaigned on a platform of getting benefits for miners. He campaigned in many bath houses talking to miners and finding out their opinions.

There was trouble during the 1972 campaign. Everyone knew there would be. Miller faced harrassment and so did those that were running with him. Both Harry Patrick and Mike Trbovich, the vice presidential
Miller Supporters

candidate, faced a great deal of harrassment. According to one news magazine the following was said in an interview about the Trbovich campaign: "As it is the candidates face an almost daily form of harrassment. Trbovich, who travels under an assumed name, told about the man who had followed him throughout his plane trip from Pittsburgh to Central City, always two seats behind him in the planes, two seats away in the waiting room, right behind him when he purchased a ticket. His teenaged daughter received phone calls warning of the imminent murder of her father. A rifle shot narrowly missed him."* These are

the kinds of problems that the new opposition to Tony Boyle had to face in the election.

But Miller did win. When the votes were counted in December 1972, he had a victory margin of almost 20,000 votes. He won by a vote of 70,373 to 56,334. He won because he campaigned in the bath houses and with the miners. He won because the federal government allowed him to run his election. He won also because of the hopes and aspirations of the Miners for Democracy.
Actors in the 1972 Election

1. Arnold Miller, Harry Patrick, Mike Trbovich

These were three major candidates in the 1972 campaign. Arnold Miller was 49, unsatisfied and had come up the hard way in the union. He had been a miner and had black lung disease. He had always been interested in miners and their medical problems. He had been president of a local union and felt that the union was not moving in the right direction. As a result, he started
entering into union politics to fight what he thought was a corrupt administration and to get better benefits for miners.

Harry Patrick campaigned for secretary-treasurer of the union. He had the following to say about the campaign: "The men were just plain fed-up with the whole crooked Boyle business from the top to the bottom."* He campaigned against that crookedness. Ever since his election, he has attempted to set up a new financial structure for the union.

Mike Trbovich, the vice-presidential candidate, also had his problems. As we said before, he traveled under an assumed name and his family was harrassed during the election. He was fed up with Boyle and wanted a new administration.

2. Miners for Democracy

The Miners for Democracy was an organization formed in the wake of the Yablonski murder. It was the goal of the Miners for Democracy to turn the union back over to the people. Their goals can be summarized in the following quote: "As they see it, the trap is shutting on Boyle and his machine. If he loses the election in December, the ensuing purge will oust many district and local officials who have long been beneficiaries of Boyle's patronage. Not only will many of these men lose their jobs, but more important, their books and records will be open to inspection, leading to more charges of embezzlement and misuse. The MFD fears the local Boyle operatives will become more desperate

* "Boyle Down," Time, April, 1972.
as the election nears."* They did become more desperate and the
MFD fought and won its goal in the 1972 election. They were the
chief supporters of Miller, Patrick and Trbovich. They organized
the miners to oppose Boyle.

3. UMWA Miners
The miners' loyalties were split in the election. Many were for
Miller and the others were for Boyle. They stated their feelings
as follows: "We're doing away with appointed power," said Bruce
Tucker, a 42 year old Kentucky miner. "I'm going to get to vote
for district officers for the first time in my 16 years as a
miner."** "He's low in my book", coal miner Tommy Lyle said last
week in the streets of Madisonville, Kentucky. "A cockroach
couldn't crawl underneath him"(refering to Boyle).*** Yet, Ed
Yevin, former Yablonski campaign manager in Madisonville supported
Boyle over Miller. "You can't take a man off the streets and
put him up there in Washington."**** "It takes somebody with
guts to run the union,"***** says Robert Tally, a strip mine
bulldozer operator from Greenville, Kentucky who is leaning toward

**** Ibid.
Boyle. Clearly, the miners were of different opinions and they were all quite uncertain about the implications of the new election.

4. The District Court

The district court in West Virginia heard the case of the Yablonski brothers. It ruled that the election of 1969 should be set aside. Boyle would have to run again against another candidate after Yablonski was murdered. The court said that Miller could station observers at the union polls and that the Labor Department was to supervise the voting. Across 23 states in the union there were Labor Department observers, Miller's observers and others supervising the election. The Labor Department functioned as the major administration department for the election campaign.

Think about the case you have just read and the actors in that case and fill in the following diagram illustrating how these groups interacted in the election. In the space provided between the groups, fill in two major ways you think these groups interacted in the election. The one between Miller and the courts is already specified for you.
INTERDEPENDENCE DIAGRAM

1. Observers at polls
2. Nullify 1969 election

District Court

Miners

Miners for Democracy
You'll discuss your diagrams in class. Think about the following questions, and use them for a base for class discussion.

1. What impact did the interdependence of these groups have on the maintenance of the union?

2. What generalizations can you form about the relationship between interdependence and political maintenance?
Cases of Interdependence

You have seen from the diagrams you have drawn that interdependence can effect maintenance in two major ways. First of all, resources can be used to shore-up an ailing organization. The federal government, in effect, kept the union from splitting apart by setting up rules and regulations under which elections would be held. The resources of the government, in terms of legal obligation and status, were used to help the union to maintain itself as a political organization. Whether or not it is maintained as an elite organization or not becomes a consequence of Miller's presidency. If the federal government's intervention contributes to different forms of political organization in the union, then it will have promoted change. In this case, however, it is safe to say that the resources of the federal government were used to support the organization as it existed. It did not attempt to change the political structure of the organization, but to make an election possible so that leadership could be restored.

Interdependence also functions to put barriers against change. If in order to change the organization must change its relationship with more than one organization -- with the courts, as well as the labor department, and other organizations -- then it has a tougher time changing. Therefore, interdependence, because of the multiple relationships that are involved in bringing about change, tends to slow the change process and to maintain the organization in its original form.

Following are four cases which illustrate various forms of interdependence. Read the cases and determine how interdependence affects maintenance in each of the cases. Draw a generalization about the relationship between interdependence and maintenance based on the cases.
The Union's Union

In January 1974 George Meany was the principal speaker at a dinner reception at which Louis Stulberg was awarded the Israeli Prime Minister's Silver Medal. In February 1974 Louis Stulberg sat with George Meany at an Executive Council meeting urging the end to the President's wage and price controls on labor and industry.

Who are these two men? George Meany is the president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industry Organizations (AFL-CIO). Louis Stulberg is the president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU). The interaction of these two men represents the major link between the federal government and the labor union workers in this country.

The AFL-CIO can be thought of as the labor unions' union. Besides the ILGWU, the AFL-CIO represents many of the other labor unions in the country. It acts in the name of these unions to protect the rights and security of all labor union workers. By presenting platform proposals at the national Democratic and Republican conventions every four years, the AFL-CIO exerts a great deal of political influence in the country. Without the support of labor, the entire system of democracy would crumble.

At the 1972 Presidential conventions, the AFL-CIO presented platform statements on 57 different labor-related issues. Some of these were unemployment; fair labor standards; housing; international trade and investment; air, water and noise pollution; energy; occupational safety and health; anti-poverty programs; day care centers; civil rights; national health security; workmen's and unemployment compensation; labor-management relations; campaign financing, hand gun control and the needs of Vietnam veterans.
A unanimous decision by the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, which includes both Meany and Stulberg, stated that the federal administration's wage-price controls program, which has created "economic imbalance, confusion and chaos ... should be ended now ... it must not be renewed in any guise."

The Council strongly argued the point that "there can be no justification whatsoever for a 5.5 percent standard for wage increases in the face of living costs that are rising almost twice as fast. In fact, economic justice would dictate that workers' wages reflect at least increases in the cost of living plus productivity."

The controls program "has been unfair, unjust and inequitable from its very beginning on August 15, 1971," the council said. "Workers' wages alone have been held down. Profits, interest rates and prices have skyrocketed. The result has been a decline of workers' buying power, a tightening squeeze on the living standards of most American families, a sharp drop of consumer confidence and an unbalanced economy - the worst economic mess in more than three decades."

A 12-point program proposed by the Executive Council to get the U.S. economy back on the road to health included extension of unemployment insurance for those people who remain jobless for a long time, money for many public service jobs, and lower interest rates, especially for housing. In the name of its member unions, the AFL-CIO Executive Council attacked the federal administration for continued "manipulation ... freezes and phases" for the American worker. "The time for substantive action to correct the root causes of inflation is now," the council said.
A problem such as this, where the federal government freeze on wages and prices directly affects the workers in this country, must be fought with powerful political support. In other words, the ILGWU itself could not have changed the government’s policy without the help of the AFL-CIO. Likewise, the AFL-CIO could not have reached a unanimous decision without the support of the ILGWU. The cost of living raise being denied to workers was a raise necessary in order to maintain their high standards of work production and a high morale in the industry.
The Strong and the Weak in Africa

When it was granted its independence in 1963, the Republic of Somalia never expected that its villages and even families would be split among five other nations. The national heritage was destroyed when the country was broken apart. The ethnic groups within Somalia were also separated and their history was disregarded in the name of political changes.

The problem of the Somalis was brought before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which has tried to settle the dispute. Using the method of peaceful negotiation, the OAU has brought together Somalia and Ethiopia to try to discuss their differences. Somalia argues that the land in Ethiopia on which Somalis now live rightfully belongs to Somalia. Ethiopia argues that the border between Ethiopia and Somalia was drawn by the European powers and so it shall remain the border. Regardless of their heritage, anyone living within the Ethiopian border, that country argues, is an Ethiopian citizen.

Besides border disputes, many countries of Africa also have another major struggle; that is, to try to liberate themselves from minority domination. Although most African people are black, many of their countries are ruled by a white minority government which often does not look out for the interests of the black citizens.

Many of the countries with minority rule are politically weaker than other African countries. Consequently, the weaker countries must depend upon each other's support in the fight for liberation. Liberation movements in Africa are most often supported by the OAU as well. The OAU supplies the arms for liberation battles. Because peaceful negotiation is not an effective means of freeing a country of minority rule, the OAU supports the idea of revolution in liberation movements.
The African continent is clearly divided between nations which are rich and those that are poor; those nations which are politically weak and those that are politically strong. One very rich nation in Africa which is also politically strong is the nation of South Africa. This country is governed by a white minority government.

South Africa is a big concern of the members of the OAU because she is so politically strong and rich. Even though South Africa is not a member of the OAU, the other members realize that they must work to establish a good relationship with South Africa. The member states of the OAU have banded together to try to bridge the gap between themselves and South Africa. In this way they may also learn how to bring together the most radical and moderate elements within their organization.
We thus see that in the struggle for African unity, all countries of Africa must come to some common agreements. If Africa is to become a politically powerful continent, she will have to be a unified continent. Since the nations of Africa are so diverse economically, politically, and ideologically, they must band together to draw up compromise agreements which are acceptable to all or most countries. The wealthy, strong African countries must support their weaker, poor neighbors if the ideal of Pan Africanism is to be realized.
Organized Labor and the Democratic Party in 1972

Morey Kline: Today on Meet the Newsmen we have special reports on the role of organized labor in the recent election. Let's begin with Don Druther of KBC-TV.

Don: As most viewers probably know, the Democratic Party has had close ties with organized labor since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It has been a profitable partnership for both. Unions have helped elect many Democrats with money and volunteer labor. COPE*, the political arm of the AFL-CIO, has in the past carried out massive registration drives and distributed tons of literature. The activities have usually helped Democratic candidates.

Morey: Don, isn't it illegal for unions to use members' dues for political contributions?

Don: Yes, Morey, but they can use voluntary contributions. Also money from dues can be used for "educational" and civic purposes, such as voter registration. Most of COPE's political literature, for example, wouldn't say, "Vote for so-and-so." It would, instead, describe how various candidates voted on important labor issues. That way union members would know how to vote.

Morey: What do labor unions get out of their alliance with the Democratic Party?

* Committee on Political Education
Don: They expect the candidates they support to vote for legislation favored by the unions, such as minimum wages or collective bargaining. They also seek support for their positions on other domestic and foreign policy issues.

Morey: John Reynolds, did George McGovern have a good voting record on labor issues?

John: Yes, he did. There were a few times when he voted against a labor bill, but usually his votes were acceptable. And the AFL-CIO had supported his campaigns for the Senate in South Dakota.

Morey: Then why did George Meany and the AFL-CIO refuse to support McGovern for President in 1972?
There were two main reasons. One was the war in Vietnam. Most union leaders and many rank-and-file members supported President Nixon's conduct on the war, while McGovern was an outspoken critic. Secondly, Meany and other labor leaders opposed the reform rules for choosing delegates to the Democratic National Convention. They thought that they deserved a seat at the convention without having to compete for it. It seemed to them that they had been shut out of the delegate selection process by the McGovern forces.

Walter Dudd, what effect did the '72 election have on the alliance between organized labor and the Democratic Party?

Well, Morey, to many observers, it looked like the alliance was smashed by the candidacy of George McGovern. The executive council of the AFL-CIO refused to endorse either presidential candidate for the first time since its unification in 1955. Then the unions split over the decision. Most abided by it, but over 40 unions supported McGovern anyway, and a few supported Nixon openly. In addition, some union officials suggested that organized labor shouldn't tie itself so closely to the Democrats.
It would be too much to say that the failure of the AFL-CIO to support McGovern cost him the election, but it did hurt his campaign. He was denied the official sanction of organized labor, plus the vast amount of money and volunteer labor that COPE commanded.

Morey: Walter, do you think the '72 election marked the end of the alliance between the Democratic Party and organized labor?

Walter: No, in spite of its neutrality in the presidential campaign, COPE and the AFL-CIO worked very hard for candidates at all other levels of government, and the vast majority of them were Democrats. Organized labor was still allied with the Democratic Party. They helped the Democrats keep firm control of Congress and many governorships. For example, 218 of 362 candidates backed by COPE won in House races, 16 of 29 won in Senate races and 11 of 17 won in gubernatorial races.

The concern of most labor leaders after the election was how to increase their influence within the Democratic Party, not how to work with the Republicans.

Morey: Our time has run out. Our thanks to Don Druther, John Reynolds and Walter Dudd for being with us and we'll see you next week on Meet the Newsmen.
Salt in the Colorado River

Announcer: This is radio station KWKW with another in-depth news analysis. Today we continue our series on US-Mexican relations in the 1960s as Horatio Lozano reports on the Colorado River crisis.

Lozano: Farmers in the rich farm land of northern Baja California are angry. For decades they have relied on water from the Colorado River for irrigation. A 1944 treaty between the United States and Mexico guarantees them this water, but the treaty apparently does not guarantee the quality of that water. This has been the crux of the dispute between the two countries since 1961.

The problem is salt. Since the summer of 1961, the irrigation water taken from the Colorado River has been too saline. It was especially bad during the winter of 1961-1962. The Governor of Baja California reported that over 100,000 acres of wheat, alfalfa and oats were destroyed by the salt river water that year. Cotton crops were also heavily damaged.

Most of the salt originates in an irrigation project in the Wellton-Mohawk Valley along the Gila River in Arizona. American farmers in the valley have been flushing out salt-laden underground reservoirs with fresh water pumped in from the Colorado River. The salty water is then drained back into the Colorado River before it flows into Mexico.
I am reporting today from a farm outside of Mexicali. Several local farmers have agreed to talk with me about their situation.

Senior Díaz, how has the salt in the Colorado affected you?

Díaz: A couple of years ago the salty water wrecked my whole cotton crop. Last year we did not use Colorado water because of the salt, but then the land was too dry and the crop was ruined anyway. The United States government has to stop those farmers in Arizona from dumping the salty water into the river.

Lozano: Senior Alvarez, what have the farmers of Baja California done to improve the situation?

Alvarez: We have had to ask our government in Mexico City to force the United States to clean up the Colorado. This has not been easy. In 1961 and 1962 there were many anti-American demonstrations, and many farmers supported Alfanso Garzón when he challenged the Mexican government. Our government finally acted mainly because farmers all over the country were becoming agitated. The government party, PRI, can't afford to lose the support of the farmers.
Lozano: Senior Orantes, you have been active in politics. How was the Mexican government able to convince the United States to cooperate?

Orantes: The U.S. State Department claims that the United States does not have to keep the Colorado River water useable. But, at the same time, the U.S. cannot afford to ignore Mexican protests. It wants to keep relations with Mexico friendly, and several areas in the southwest United States need Mexican trade for their economic survival. Besides, the U.S. likes to see a stable government in Mexico. Farmer unrest which was multiplied by the dispute over the Colorado River was a threat to stability. There has been a good deal of radical and even communist agitation over the issue. The United States government didn't want that to continue. So it has tried to compromise with Mexican authorities by promising to build a canal to carry the salty water past the Mexican irrigation system. We will have to wait and see if that works.
Thank you, gentlemen. That is the current status of the dispute over the water of the Colorado River. We will all have to wait and see if the promised canal solves the problem or if the dispute continues to disrupt friendly relations between Mexico and the United States.
Discussion Questions

1. Which individuals or groups are major actors in these cases?

2. In what ways are the major actors interdependent?

3. How does interdependence seem to affect political maintenance in these cases?

4. What generalizations can you draw from the UMWA case and these cases about the relationship between interdependence and political maintenance?

5. What hypotheses can you make based on these cases?
The Future of the United Mine Workers

It is difficult to tell what the future of the United Mine Workers will be. For years during the time of John L. Lewis, it was an elite organization run at the top with very few people in power except those appointed by John L. Lewis. The tremors that ran through the organization during the Boyle-Yablonski period shook it at its core. Arnold Miller's union democracy stands on very spindly legs. People are not used to taking leadership positions. The union has always been run by the international. Whether or not the new democracy will survive or the organization will become elite or more participant depends greatly on the union members themselves.

One indication of the prediction of the future of the union is indicated by a strike that began on August 11, 1975. It was a wildcat strike which went virtually uncontrolled by union officials. The strike began in District 17 in West Virginia. The Logan County miners went out on that strike over the delay of the grievance process and the number of court injunctions that were being fined against them. They wanted the right to strike written back into the union contract. They refused to go to work until such amends were made. Before the strike was over, 60,000 coal miners in eight states were absent from work.

On August 21, U.S. District Court Judge K.K. Hall issued a restraining order to bring the miners back to work. He asked that the United Mine Workers pay $100,000 a day fine for each day the miners were out on strike. By the end of August the United Mine Workers owed the court 1.9 million dollars because of the refusal to work by the miners.
From the beginning, the United Mine Workers officials thought it was an impossible strike with impossible demands. They wanted to talk about the grievance process with the BCOA and the courts to explore the issue. The miners were tired of exploring the issue. They wanted the right to strike and they wanted it now. Nothing that Miller or local officials could do would stop the strike. It wasn't until many weeks after August 11 that the strike drew to a close and the miners went back to work. They went back without a right to strike, with more court injunctions than ever, and with a continued delay of the grievance process.

The future of the union is at stake. Clearly, the union leaders cannot control the mine workers, and clearly the mine workers are dissatisfied. How this process will end is a question for the future.

Think about the case of the August wildcat strike and read the newspaper article on the following page. Then answer the questions which follow the case.

Discussion Questions

1. What do the trends seem to be in the United Mine Workers as far as its political organization?

2. What do you think are alternative futures which the United Mine Workers might take?
3. What do you think is the most likely future? Why do you take this position?

4. If you were a miner in West Virginia would you strike over the issue of the delay of the grievance process?
**Strikes:**

Miners agree to ‘talk’

CHARLESTON, W. Va. (UPI) — Coal operators have agreed to an industry-union panel to hear the grievances of wildcatting southern West Virginia coal miners, prompting United Mine Workers President Arnold Miller to predict the 24-day-old strike will end in a few days.

About 20,000 miners in southern West Virginia, however, held steadfastly today to a demand for the right to strike without federal court intervention.

There were scattered reports of violence to keep miners from going back to their jobs. While no injuries were reported, some miners reporting for work Wednesday said shotgun pellets were fired into their cars outside coal mines in southern counties.

Strike leaders flooded the coalfields with new pamphlets urging the men not to relent because “the companies are vicious and will stop at nothing.”

As the strike approached the end of a full month, a fine against the international United Mine Workers union climbed to $1 million. U.S. District Judge KK Hall has threatened to let the fine rise to $1.5 million with a daily increase of $100,000 each day the strike continues.

In Washington Wednesday, UMWr President Arnold Miller announced the union and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, by mutual agreement, plan to set up a special panel to hear miners’ complaints in Charleston-based District 17, where the wildcat flared Aug. 11.

But Miller said the commission would not be activated until the illegal work stoppage ends, and he criticized forces who have kept it going in defiance of his and Hall’s order to return to work.

“Those who seek to keep this strike going forever with promises that are impossible to keep clearly care little about rank-and-file miners who will suffer as a result of the real threat of bankrupting the UMWA,” Miller said.

Miners in half a dozen states who joined the walkout launched a back-to-work trend after the Labor Day holiday, but holdouts in southern West Virginia coalfields refused to call it quits.

The strike that caused hundreds of furloughs in the rail industry and brought tension to other coal-dependent segments of the economy has left a number of miners openly critical of their leaders.

“I have been hearing the same old things from a bunch of hotheads who don’t really know what they’re striking for,” said one veteran Kentucky miner who joined his coworkers in the mine after pickets disappeared.

There were reports late Wednesday that roving picketers from southern West Virginia had closed some mines in the northern part of the state, idling about 5,000 miners.

UMW District 31 President Lawrence Floyd said all of the affected mines had resumed production Tuesday.
Political Participation and the UMWA

As you have seen in this unit, union politics often involves bargaining among political groups. Miners bargain with management over contracts. They also bargain among themselves over internal union issues when they try to convince others of their position. In this activity, you will learn about the skill of bargaining as it applies to many political groups. Your teacher will conduct an in-class activity. Then you will think of ways to apply your skills to school and community settings. For now, think about common bargaining situations in your own everyday life. List some of these situations in the space below.