This article contains a critical analysis of agenda-setting theory and research. In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position, thus the term agenda-setting. Agenda-setting applies to more than one area of research. To explicate the theory, four topics are considered: the general hypothesis of agenda-setting, the importance of the general hypothesis, the functional aspect of the general hypothesis, and the effects aspect of the general hypothesis. While this review indicates the potential value of agenda-setting theory, it also raises some issues concerning the theory and its research. (Rh)
DEBUT PROGRAM

THE AGENDA-SETTING

FUNCTION: A CRITICAL REVIEW

by

Johnny Murdock

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Since the publication of "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media" by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972, journal articles, convention papers, and a special convention have focused on agenda-setting. This interest warrants a critical analysis of agenda-setting theory and research.

In this article, I have attempted to explicate agenda-setting theory, and to critique its main body of research. While this review indicates the potential value of agenda-setting theory, it also raises some issues concerning the theory and its research.

AGENDA-SETTING THEORY

The term agenda-setting applies to more than one area of research. To explicate the theory, four topics are considered: (1) the general hypothesis of agenda-setting, (2) the importance of the general hypothesis, (3) the functional aspect of the general hypothesis, and (4) the effects aspect of the general hypothesis.

The editorial summary of the 1972 article by McCombs and Shaw states the general hypothesis of agenda-setting in the form of a claim: "In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position." In other words, the (1) selection or nonselection, (2) display, (3) position, (4) length, and (5) frequency of appearance (within a single medium's daily news package or among the media over several days, weeks, or months) of issues determine the public's
issue-agenda. Thus, "we judge as important what the media judge as important."

I will consider the various aspects of this general hypothesis in the next paragraph, but first the importance of the agenda-setting concept merits some comment. Two recent studies indicate that political issues appear to have a growing impact on voting behavior. W. Burham found a monotonic decline in the correlation between party identification and candidate choice for recent presidential elections. In a study of the 1968 elections, the voter's position on issues in relation to the perceived positions of the candidates was found to be a more powerful predictor than party identification. If additional data support the growing impact of political issues, and if the media determine the importance of political issues, then Theodore White, in The Making of the President 1972, specifies in different words the hypothesized media power which McCombs and his colleagues are attempting to verify:

What lay at issue in 1972 between Richard Nixon, on the one hand, and the adversary press and media of America, on the other, was simple: it was power.

The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk and think about—an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties, and mandarins.

One only has to grasp the possible link between the increasing influence of political issues on behavior and media agenda-setting power to appreciate the importance of the research.

Underlying the general hypothesis of agenda-setting is a combined function-effect hypothesis concerning the relationship between the
media and the public. The functional aspect of the hypothesis is found in the public's use of the media as primary sources of information. Among others, Jay Blumler and Dennis McQuail have found that people do use the media for information. The effects aspect of the hypothesis is that, while using the media for information, the public unconsciously learns how much importance to attach to various issues from the relative amount of media coverage. That is, the media cause the public to attach varying degrees of importance to issues solely on the basis of the relative amount of coverage accorded them.

Perhaps an illustration will help clarify the reasoning involved in the function-effect hypothesis. For centuries, people have smoked tobacco for various reasons. That is, smoking serves various functions. Within the last twenty years, we have learned that smoking also has various effects (cancer, heart disease, etc.). In a similar manner, the mass media serve various functions. One of the functions which they serve is that of an information source. While serving this function, the media also have an effect; they cause issues to be considered as important or unimportant as a result of media issue emphasis.

When considering the functional aspect of the general hypothesis, one would not expect the members of the public to be uniform in their use of the media for information. In fact, Edwin Parker and William Paisley have demonstrated that variables such as age, sex, education, organizational memberships, perception of educational value, etc. are useful in predicting media use. To account for variability in the use of the media for information, and therefore, degrees of exposure to the media's agenda, McCombs and David Weaver borrowed the concept of Need
for Orientation to account for information seeking behavior, and the relationship of information seeking to varying degrees of informational media use. Two variables, relevance and uncertainty, have been used to construct a model accounting for individual differences in need for orientation. The hypothesized relationship can be stated as: The greater the need for orientation, the greater will be the use of the media for information. (See diagram 1)

Diagram 1

Whatever the value of the need for orientation concept, considerable research will be necessary to isolate the personality variables which result in varying degrees of informational media use. In fact, the investigation of such variables is an attempt to place the functional aspect of the general hypothesis within a causal chain. The analysis can be stated as: (1) personality variables cause (2) varying degrees of functional media use for information, and (3) the use of the media for information causes (4) the media issue-agenda to be unconsciously learned to a greater or lesser extent. And the causal chain continues by suggesting (5) the extent to which the media issue-agenda is learned causes (6) issues to be interpersonally discussed more frequently if well learned or less frequently if poorly learned, and (7) the learning of the media agenda causes (8) the increased salience of the media-emphasized issues which in turn causes (9) the greater use of the media for
information. If you are now confused as to what causes what, perhaps my modification of a diagram presented by Weaver and Charles Spellman will provide some clarification. (See Diagram 2)

Diagram 2

Need for Use of the Increased salience of
Orientation Media for Unconscious media emphasized issues
Information Learning of Media issue Emphasized issues

One can immediately see that the media use-learning-salience loop indicates a weakness. As presently constructed, only some external variables could break the loop and cause the individual to stop using the media and learning its issue-agenda. While this weakness indicates an obvious need to refine the causal reasoning, one must admire the breadth of the proposal.

I want to now turn to a more detailed analysis of the effects aspect of the agenda-setting hypothesis. Within agenda-setting, the mass media are viewed as "a large stimulus package composed of multiple, competing stimuli--a conglomeration of messages." From this conglomeration of stimuli, the public is hypothesized to unconsciously learn. That is, as the public uses the media for information, their unconscious response is to learn the media's issues-agenda from the relative amount of issue emphasis.

Their position appears similar to Herbert Krugman's. In considering television advertising, he argues that repeated exposure shifts "the relative salience" of the attributes associated with a product. Situations of exposure to advertising are low in personal involvement, and
since low involvement characterizes most media situations, "one might look for gradual shifts in perceptual structure, aided by repetition, activated by behavioral-choice situations, and followed at some time by attitude change." While political issues are certainly more involving for many, and while discussions of agenda-setting have been primarily concerned with the political news content of the media, the hypothesis of unconscious learning is still advanced.

For several years, Kurt and Gladys Lang have suggested that the media tell people what to "think about, know about, have feelings about" in regard to politics. As a long-term effect, they have postulated that people learn a media-created reality. McCombs and Shaw postulate a similar process, but state that we do not know how long such unconscious learning takes. In essence, agenda-setting research is an attempt to test and refine the theoretical proposals of Krugman and the Langs.

At this point, you should realize that the general hypothesis of agenda-setting implicitly contains functional and effects hypotheses which have been further expanded into a causal chain. Since the general hypothesis really represents a broad theory which begins with individual personality variables and expands to salience and reciprocal causality, I will call it a theory in the rest of this article. The term hypothesis will be used in connection with the several hypotheses which are subsumed by the theory.

It is important to note that the entire value of agenda-setting theory largely rests on the effects hypothesis. Regardless of whether this particular theory is ultimately proven or disproven, research will no doubt continue on the relationship between personality variables and
media use. The hypotheses of discussion and salience within the theory are extensions of the effects hypothesis. In fact, unless the effects hypothesis is valid, and unless the public unconsciously learns the importance of issues from the relative amount of media coverage, the causal chain which the theory proposes has an irreparable gap.

While most agenda-setting research has attempted to test the effects hypothesis, it is precisely this hypothesis which has not been rigorously examined. Agenda-setting researchers might dispute this assertion, but the failure to test the media's power to determine the relative importance the public attaches to issues will become apparent as we consider the literature. In fact, if one accepts some recent research as methodologically sound, he can easily conclude that the effects hypothesis is false.

THE LITERATURE

Before considering the major agenda-setting studies, I want to report my reanalysis of data cited by Robert Frank from a 1972 study. He conducted a study which analyzed the news coverage of the three national television networks. At the same time, the Gallup Poll was asking American citizens a question which is almost identical to the question used in agenda-setting research. The Gallup question was, "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" Frank presents a table, with six issue categories, which contains the proportion of Gallup respondents citing issues falling within the categories and the proportion of television news time devoted by each network to the same issues.
To test the effects hypothesis as agenda-setting researchers have tested it, I collapsed Frank's network categories and computed the proportion of total network news for each category. Since the Spearman Rank-ordered Correlation has been used in agenda-setting studies, I employed it to compare the respondent and network rank-orders of the six issue categories. The $r_s$ is .54 and it is not significant ($t = 1.28, p > .10$ for 4 df). Table 1 contains the proportion of respondents citing given issues as the most important problem facing America and the proportion of network television news time devoted to those issues. The table also contains the rank-orders of the issue categories for respondents and networks.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Categories</th>
<th>Gallup Respondents*</th>
<th>Network News</th>
<th>Respondent Rank-order</th>
<th>Network Rank-order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>14.86%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>31.07%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Ethics</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages do not add to 100 because Frank did not include responses and news items which did not fall into these categories.

While Frank considered all news items in his data and agenda-setting focuses on operationally defined major news items, the question, the type of issue categories, the treatment of the data, and the statistical test all replicate agenda-setting methodology. So, why did I fail to replicate agenda-setting results? Is the effects hypothesis false?
Apparently McCombs and Shaw are beginning to believe that the effects hypothesis is false. In a recent paper, they report data from a survey of 302 Sophomore males at Syracuse University. The subjects were asked to indicate "some of the major problems and issues facing the United States today." Three issues were the number most frequently mentioned. Then two additional questions were asked: (1) "Which of these problems or issues is the most important to you, personally?" and (2) "Which of these problems or issues have you talked about most often with others during the past month?" Question one was labeled the "intra-personal" question, and question two was labeled the "inter-personal" question. Each of these two questions limited the subject to a single issue which he had previously mentioned.

The data from the intrapersonal and interpersonal questions were separately analyzed. Within each question, the data were tabulated within one of four cells based on whether the respondent read the New York Times or another paper, and based on the frequency of reading a paper. (See Figure 1) The division of the two questions yielded eight cells which were compared to the media issue-agenda by the Spearman Rho.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrapersonal or Interpersonal question</th>
<th>New York Times Readers</th>
<th>Non-New York Times Readers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the eight Spearman Rho's they report, I computed t-tests for each cell. Only two of the eight t-tests were significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test (critical level = 2.353 for 3 df).
The two significant results were in (1) the cell of infrequent readers of the New York Times within the intrapersonal questions \((r_s = .82)\), and (2) the cell of frequent readers of the New York Times within the interpersonal question \((r_s = .86)\). The failure to find a significant relationship between six of eight respondent issue-agendas and the media's issue-agenda is certainly not encouraging.

While McCombs and Shaw do not report significance tests, they are apparently aware of the problem. They suggest that perhaps only the one or two most heavily covered issues within the media "reach threshold" level and affect individual issue-agendas.\(^{19}\) Therefore, they made an additional comparison, and noted the percentages of respondents within each cell who cited the two issues, Watergate and the Middle East War, receiving the most coverage in the New York Times. The percentages varied from 48.4 percent to 97.3 percent. McCombs and Shaw claim the percentages for the readers of the New York Times "clearly" support their threshold hypothesis for agenda-setting.\(^ {20}\)

I am not quite so sure. Even though the cell sizes are not equal, I averaged the percentages for (1) the New York Times readers (74.4 percent), (2) the non-New York Times readers (61.7 percent), and (3) all eight cells (68.0 percent). These percentages represent respondent agreement with either of the two most heavily covered issues in the New York Times, but virtually all the media were then stressing Watergate and the new Middle East war. Does the 12.7 percent difference between the New York Times and non-New York Times readers support a threshold effects hypothesis? Without concurrent data on the percentage of Watergate and Middle East war coverage of other media, the question
cannot be answered. McCombs and Shaw are not justified in claiming clear support for a threshold effect when they do not even have the data to test the null hypothesis.

More importantly, if the hypothesis becomes that media issue emphasis makes no difference at any except for the top issue, how can we test whether media emphasis has any effect? The threshold hypothesis destroys the basis for a rigorous empirical test of media issue emphasis effects. Suppose we were able to demonstrate a fairly high percentage agreement on the most important issue between the media and public for several months. The cause of the agreement might be media issue emphasis, but without a range of emphasis effects, we would not be clearly certain of the cause. One could argue alternative hypotheses (e.g., common cultural values). In short, if media issue emphasis has an effect at one level, then why zero at all other levels? Unless there are differential effects, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to empirically verify any relationship between media and public issue-agendas.

Is the effects hypothesis valid? To preview my answer to this question, I will argue that the effects hypothesis has not been adequately tested in any agenda-setting study. In arguing this position, I will focus on four aspects of agenda-setting methodology: (1) issue category formation, (2) measurement of media issue-agendas, (3) measurement of personal issue-agendas, and (4) the treatment of data and statistical testing.

One methodological issue with which I have not dealt concerns the proper design and statistics to test the direction of causality asserted
by the effects hypothesis. Frank provides some information for those interested in this problem, and Leonard Tipton et al. have begun research on determining the causal direction. However, the methodological problems I will consider must be resolved before any rigorous test of causality is possible.

When one examines the issue categories used in agenda-setting studies, he finds no consistent or systematic methodology. The issue categories in the original McCombs and Shaw study were: (1) foreign policy, (2) law and order, (3) fiscal policy, (4) public welfare, and (5) civil rights. In a later study at Syracuse University, the categories were: (1) Watergate, (2) the Middle East War, (3) the new vice-president, (4) rising prices, and (5) energy-environment problems. I admit some confusion here because in another report of the same data, the vice-president category is not mentioned and was evidently replaced by the category "other." In any case, the issue categories in the 1972 study are tremendously broad while those in the Syracuse study are somewhat more specific. One must wonder what criteria are used to select such categories. He may also wonder about the various degrees of relationship among the issues which are grouped into each category. Within the literature, I have found neither the specification of criteria for determining category selection, nor criteria for determining the range of issues which are tabulated within the categories. One may further wonder if the degree of relationship found between media and public issue-agendas depends on the varying specificity of issue categories. Since the five categories in the 1972 study are so broad and really represent five topical areas into which an infinite
number of issues could be grouped, would a more specific set of categories result in a lower correlation between media and public issue-agendas? To my knowledge, the question has not been investigated, but my post hoc comparisons suggest that specific categories do result in lower correlations. The 1972 study reported a Spearman Rho of .967 between media and public issue-agendas. In the Syracuse study in which the data were divided into eight cells and where there were more specific issue categories, the highest Spearman Rho was .86 and the lowest was .38. On this post hoc basis, we can infer that the specificity of issue categories may reduce the obtained correlation between media and public issue-agendas.

I would suggest that instead of using broad issue categories, and instead of leaving the criteria for issue category selection ambiguous, a more elegant method would be the use of specific issue categories determined by the limits (preset) of intercoder reliability. An additional change in method would allow for a more rigorous test of the effects hypothesis. Since the effects hypothesis is stated in terms of issue importance, we could select a range of media emphasized issues (specific issue categories) from which to construct a media issue-agenda instead of using all media covered issues. Instead of asking respondents to cite a few issues, we could have them rate our range of media emphasized issues on an importance scale. If the effects hypothesis is valid, the two issue-agendas—one constructed from media emphasized issues and one from respondent importance ratings of the same issues—should correspond. This approach specifies issue category criteria and provides a more elegant test of the relationship suggested by the effects hypothesis.
The operational definitions used in the content analysis procedures for measuring media issue-agendas are well conceived and systematically applied. This is the one area within agenda-setting research which has been consistently sound. Major news items are defined as:

1. Television: Any story 45 seconds or more in length and/or one of the three lead stories.
2. Newspapers: Any story which appeared as the lead on the front page or on any page under a three-column headline in which at least one-third of the story (a minimum of five paragraphs) was devoted to political news coverage.
3. News Magazines: Any story more than one column or any item which appeared in the lead at the beginning of the news section of the magazine.
4. Editorial Page Coverage of Newspapers and Magazines: Any item in the lead editorial position (the top left corner of the editorial page) plus all items in which one-third (at least five paragraphs) of an editorial or columnist comment was devoted to political campaign coverage.

Using these definitions, raters have coded issues from media news coverage into each study's category system. The reliability of this procedure has been high. For example, the 1972 study reported an inter-coder reliability of above .90. In each study, the researcher selects the operational definitions which are appropriate for the medium or media being measured. If we were only content analyzing a single newspaper, we would use definitions "2" and "4."

The assumption of the procedures for measuring media issue-agendas is that major news items focus receiver attention upon their content. While I agree with this assumption, and while it has some empirical support, greater emphasis must be placed upon the specific issue content of major news items if we are to avoid topical categories. As noted previously, a preset intercoder reliability should be the criteria for determining the specificity of issue categories.
An examination of the procedures for measuring personal issue-agendas raises more questions about the adequacy of research on the effects hypothesis. According to McCombs, five data collection procedures have been used to measure personal issue-agendas. First, open-ended questions have been employed. For example, in the 1972 study, the question was: "What are you most concerned about these days? That is, regardless of what the politicians say, what are the two or three main things which you think the government should concentrate on doing something about?" Second, subjects have been asked to rank-order six issues. Third, respondents have rated issues on a seven-point scale. Fourth, issues have been rated as "very important," "somewhat important," or "not at all important." Fifth, paired-comparison scaling on issue ratings has been employed. I will initially focus on a problem created by the use of open-ended questions, and then turn to a problem inherent in all five procedures.

The open-ended question simply does not test the effects hypothesis. As it has been used, personal issue-agendas were obtained as if the hypothesis of interest was the threshold hypothesis, not the effects hypothesis. The reasoning is that the open-ended question has been used to obtain one, two, or at most three issues which respondents cite as most important. Respondent issue-agendas are not obtained, and only the top issues cited as important by respondents are used for comparisons with media issue-agendas. The effects hypothesis asserts a relationship between media and public issue-agendas, not a relationship between, for example, the single issue considered personally most important and a five category media issue-agenda. Unless individual issue-agendas
are ignored, the open-ended question cannot be considered useful for testing the effects hypothesis.

The problem inherent in all five data collection procedures is that each relies on a one-item test. Not only are one-item tests often unreliable, the most important issue is what a one-item test measures. Some recent research illuminates this problem. G. Funkhouser, using Gallup poll data, has noted that the issues cited as important by respondents depend on the personal nature of the question. He concluded that media news coverage appeared to be "strongly related to the **general importance** of issues in the public's estimation, but less so to the public's attitudes regarding the issues or their priorities in dealing with them." McCombs has also been concerned with the best question to ask. In the Syracuse study mentioned previously, five aggregate issue-agendas were tabulated from the data:

I. The intra-personal question; II. the inter-personal question; III. first response to the initial open-ended query; IV. summation of the first three responses to the initial query; and V. summation of the first three responses to the initial query **weighted** for the order in which they were listed by the respondent.

At the aggregate level, the inter-correlations among the measures were all .90 or above. However, McCombs compared the consistency of each individual's first response across the three questions. He compared the questions two at a time by Chi-square, and reported that the three resulting Chi-squares were all significant at the .001 level. While he admits that the relationship among the questions is far from perfect, he concludes that they are related. Since the use of Chi-square as a test of association depends on the independence of each observation, and since all the questions were asked at one time and refer to most impor-
tant issues, one must conclude that the data were not independent and
the Chi-square statistic was inappropriately applied. In any case, one
only has to glance at McCombs's tables to learn that the respondents
were not consistent in their answers to the three questions. So, what
does a respondent's answer to a single question about important issues
tell us?

McCombs and Shaw suggest that ultimately one type of question will
"prove empirically more fruitful."

I believe they are suggesting that one type of question will be found to yield higher correlations
with media issue-agendas. If so, they are failing to consider the more
 crucial problem. The problem is not to find a question which yields
high correlations with media issue-agendas because the meaning of the
correlation is not known. The problem is to find a series of items which
will allow us to measure the effects hypothesis in both a reliable and
meaningful manner.

Since I have raised two issues, I will explicate my reasoning. One-
item tests are usually unreliable and lacking in predictive validity.
Both problems can be attacked by research designed to construct an
issue-agenda index of personal issue importance for comparisons with
media issue-agendas. The first step would be to have respondents scale
the importance of issues in terms of several different questions. The
issues they would scale would be the specific issue categories determined
in the construction of the media's issue-agenda. The questions could
then be combined to form an issue-agenda index for comparisons with
media agendas. Once we have an issue-agenda index, and the reliability
which it should provide, we can use the index to see if it predicts
relevant behavior (e.g., voting behavior). This will provide information on the validity of the index and allow refinement. The goal of several studies would be the validation of an issue-agenda index which would isolate the effects of media issue-agendas for use in behavioral predictions.

Agenda-setting researchers treat their data as if they were not testing the effects hypothesis. That is, the degree of importance respondents attach to issues is ignored when responses are collapsed into issue categories. McCombs might respond that in the Syracuse study, the weighted responses on three issues correlated at .90 with the unweighted responses, but the argument is fallacious. When normal agenda-setting procedure is used, if a respondent cites issue X as the most important issue and issue X is part of the sixth issue category, then it will be tabulated in category six. If a respondent cites issue Z third and issue Z is part of the first issue category, it will be tabulated in category one. This procedure ignores the importance claim of the effects hypothesis. If respondent issue-agendas were obtained--not just the top issues--and if specific issue categories were used, then the correlation between collapsed and weighted responses would drop. Simply, if issue importance is asserted, it must be tested.

What statistics should be used to test the degree of relationship between media and public issue-agendas asserted by the effects hypothesis? First, it is not the Spearman Rho. Regardless of the claims of agenda-setting researchers, the Spearman Rho, when significant, only indicates that the degree of obtained relation is not likely to be due to chance alone. As the Spearman Rho has been applied, we have not
gained any information about the strength of the relationship between media and public issue-agendas. If we ask respondents to scale the media emphasized issues for importance, we can apply parametric statistics. Parametric tests (e.g., Pearson r) would allow us to determine the amount of variance accounted for by the effects hypothesis.

What is an adequate test of the effects hypothesis? Before the direction of causality asserted by the effects hypothesis is tested, we must determine the degree of relationship between media and public issue-agendas. Such a test should attempt to gather and analyze data in a manner which accepts the effects hypothesis at face value. Since the effects hypothesis asserts that the relative amount of media issue emphasis causes the public to unconsciously learn the importance it attaches to issues, issues and issue importance are the key concepts for research testing the degree of relationship between public and media issue-agendas. An adequate test of the effects hypothesis will (1) specify issues as precisely as possible within the limits of reliability when gathering data on media issue-agendas, (2) select a range of media emphasized issues and ask respondents to scale them for importance, (3) use an issue-agenda index to meaningfully tap respondent issue priorities, and (4) use parametric statistical tests to determine the amount of variance accounted for by the hypothesis.

In at least two cases, tests of the effects hypothesis which used McCombs' procedure have failed to reject the null hypothesis. The meaning of these failures is at best ambiguous until more rigorous tests of the effects hypothesis are conducted. Since the effects hypothesis is crucial to agenda-setting theory, its validity must be demonstrated.
"if the theory is to be accepted as explaining any part of mass communication processes.

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