This issue of "Journalism Monographs" is devoted to a discussion of the Policies and problems of the international broadcasting operation "The Voice of America" (VOA). The monograph begins with an examination of the origins of America's entry into international broadcasting and the creation of the Office of War Information in 1942. The VOA's activities during the Second World War are discussed, as are postwar activities, the International Broadcasting Foundation Proposal, and the Smith-Mundt Bill passed in 1948. The next section of this monograph discusses the activities of the VOA during the "cold war" years. The next section discusses the activities of the VOA from 1961 to the present. The final section makes conclusions about the VOA: it appears to possess the necessary flexibility to cope with the changes that are likely to take place in world broadcasting over the next ten or twenty years; and VOA will continue to serve a useful role as a conveyor of life in America to the rest of the world. The appendix discusses the audience for VOA broadcasts. (TS)
DONALD R. BROWNE

The Voice of America:
Policies and Problems

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Preface

THE VOICE OF AMERICA has been in operation for more than 30 years, has held for most of that period a leading position among international broadcasting operations, has been the subject of many Congressional inquiries, newspaper and magazine articles, book chapters and one very thorough dissertation covering its first 20 years,* but has not yet received a comprehensive, up-to-date historical treatment. I have discussed this matter with a number of individuals who would be in a position, thanks to their long association with the Voice, to write such a book, but only one individual—Henry Loomis—has indicated that he is at work on such a project, and his present position as Director of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is unlikely to allow him time for its early completion.

A detailed account of the Voice of America in its many facets—program content, evidence of effectiveness, administrative structure** and engineering—would necessitate a rather lengthy book, as well as access to a good deal of data that are at present classified (although the VOA archives are open to scholars and contain much useful material). Therefore, working with data readily available to me, and drawing upon my own experiences with the Voice of America (chiefly through my service with USIA from 1960 to 1963, but also through visits to VOA and USIA in 1965, 1967, 1968, 1970 and 1972), I have chosen to concentrate on three aspects of the Voice: the influence that its own directors and directors of USIA have had upon it, its relations with Congress, and some of its major shifts in program policies, primarily in its English language broadcasts, over the years. I have also attempted to place the creation of VOA in a historical perspective by furnishing a brief account of the development of American international broadcasting prior to 1942 to help to explain why, even today, there are many “Voices of America” on the air.
I do not, however, attempt to deal with these additional voices in any detail. It can be argued that VOA assumes its proper perspective only when these other voices—Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio of Free Asia, Radio Americas, Radio New York Worldwide, WINB, KGEI, various overseas “missionary” stations supported largely by Americans (FEBC, Trans World Radio, ELWA) and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network—are taken into account. A case can be made for considering Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Armed Forces Network in this light, since each is financed by the U.S. government. Yet in my visits to these operations, I have detected no evidence of day-to-day policy coordination between them and the Voice and only occasional evidence of any VOA influence over their programming. VOA and USIA officials have opposed suggestions that VOA, RFE and RL be united when Congress discussed the future of RFE and RL in 1971 and 1972.

I am deeply indebted to many officials of VOA and USIA for their assistance, particularly Fritz Littlejohn, Hal Banks and Leonard Reed of VOA’s Worldwide English Division and to Peter Janicki and Wendell Thompson of USIA’s Office of Research. Full responsibility for the contents of this monograph, of course, rests with me. I also wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Office of International Programs and the McMillan Fund, both of the University of Minnesota, whose aid in the form of travel and research grants supported much of the field research.

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Origins

AMERICAN entry into international broadcasting was both little and late for a country that had done so much to develop radio. Yet most international broadcasting systems that arose in the late 1920s and early 1930s were intended to communicate with colonists across the globe and/or to proselytize on behalf of a specific ideology (Communism, National Socialism, Fascism, Christianity). The United States had few colonies and little missionary zeal for capitalism or free enterprise.

Private enterprise had dominated the development of broadcasting in America and this was also the case with American efforts in international broadcasting. Frank Conrad of Westinghouse had experimented with long-distance transmission of voice broadcasts via short wave as early as 1921. At a radio engineering conference in London in 1924, a number of engineers agreed that to span the Atlantic with a voice radio signal would require 10,000 to 20,000-meter waves, and hundreds of kilowatts, a receiver as large as a truck and antennas a mile long. Conrad demonstrated a small receiver from which London was able to hear the voices of his assistants broadcasting from Pittsburgh using ten kilowatts and a hotel curtain rod as an antenna. Short waves had made the difference.¹

The discovery should have brought international broadcasting within financial and physical reach. It did lead to the development of full-fledged systems within three years in Holland and in the USSR but in the United States nothing happened.

The first non-experimental American international broadcast operation appears to have been Station WIXAL in Boston, licensed to Walter Lemmon.² Lemmon saw WIXAL as a sort of “international correspondence school of the air.” His own philanthropy, coupled with contributions from foundations, kept him on the air from 1933 until the late 1950s, when the station was purchased by Metromedia.
Other American-based international short-wave stations came on the air in the mid to late 1930s. Most were offshoots of national radio networks (NBC and CBS) or equipment manufacturers (Westinghouse, Crosley, General Electric). The networks' stations broadcast first to Latin America and later to Europe, but most of their programs were standard network offerings (Charlie McCarthy, Amos n' Andy, Dr. I.Q.), carried in English. True, the CBS station, W3XAU, broadcast several Spanish language newscasts each week, but Hans Kaltenborn's commentaries were carried in English. Most of these operations lacked "personnel with an intimate knowledge of foreign audiences and conditions" and transmitters "were so defective in power that reception was inferior to that of most European services." Why were American firms interested in international broadcasting? First, the radio equipment manufacturers including RCA (NBC's parent) were anxious to experiment with short wave transmission under "realistic" conditions, since technological improvements might be marketable. Second, some network officials hoped "to develop markets to a point where the [international] programs will have definite value to an advertiser." Third, some network officials were becoming alarmed at the increasing amount of Fascist radio propaganda directed at South America in particular, since it both attacked the United States and promoted the sale of German and Italian goods.

Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York was sufficiently concerned to propose, in November, 1937, a bill calling for the Navy to establish a short-wave station to "promote better understanding among the republics of the American continents." When hearings were held on his proposal in May, 1938, Celler stated: "Subtle, damnable, designing programs destroy liberty and undermine democracy. . . . The world is poisoned by propaganda." But opposition from the National Association of Broadcasters, General Electric, Westinghouse and CBS soon surfaced. Mark Ethridge, president of NAB, told the House Naval Affairs Committee that the Celler bill "suggested the Nazi philosophy," and pointed out that "the Administration would always have access to the privately owned facilities." The proposal died, reflecting a strong American distaste for having the government undertake anything being done by private enterprise.
By 1939, with the situation in Europe worsening, various American international broadcasting organizations began to put more effort into broadcasts to South America and Europe. News broadcasts were the first to be translated into foreign languages—principally Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, German and French—but, by 1941, music programs with continuity in local languages were added and NBC was presenting an original “comic” feature in Spanish and Portuguese. By 1942, U.S. international broadcasters were sending roughly 100 hours of programs per day to Europe, 500 newscasts per week to South America. An increasing flow of emigres from Europe aided staff recruiting. By 1942 NBC was taking pride in the relative professionalism of its international staff.

Still, the international services of the private firms made little attempt to adapt their broadcasts to particular audiences, to discover the best times of day for transmission or to follow a consistent political line. In any case, they did not regard international broadcasting primarily as an instrument of diplomacy or propaganda and entertainment programs predominated.

When the United States entered the war the situation changed, but not at once. The U.S. government's Defense Communications Board had appointed a subcommittee on international radio earlier in 1941 comprising representatives of both government and the radio industry. Its task was to draw up a “contingency plan” for the use of America's short-wave facilities in the event of American involvement.

When the United States declared war on the Axis powers in December, 1941, however, there was still no comprehensive plan, and it was not until June of 1942 that President Roosevelt established a government department—the Office of War Information—to meet the task. The FCC, for its part, was still on a “peacetime” basis; it licensed a West Coast private international broadcasting operation, Associated Broadcasters, Inc., which came on the air early in 1942.
The Voice on the Air

ONCE THE OWI was created, it took over the Foreign Information Service and moved to place all private international broadcasting stations under government supervision. This was not achieved until November, 1942. Some broadcasters—Walter Lemmon of WRUL in particular—were reluctant to hand over control of their facilities until given assurances that these would be restored to them when the war was over. This gave the government 13 transmitters, most of them along the East Coast, to which it soon added several more. By the end of the war it had 36 transmitters, 26 on the East Coast or in Ohio serving Europe and Latin America and 10 on the West Coast serving the Far East and Latin America. The staffs established by the private broadcasting organizations continued, for the most part, to broadcast for the government, partly because many were well qualified, partly to reassure the organizations that the take-over was temporary.

OWI later added transmitter power and languages, but the operational philosophy of the combined organizations, now known as the Voice of America, remained the same: to tell the truth, limited only by requirements of military security. At times, more than 75 per cent of the Voice’s programming was news, the rest made up of features and music. Features concentrated on showing some specific “human” aspect of life in America, for example, the working day of a typical American laborer. Some of these broadcasts, and the newscasts as well, were criticized for emphasizing America’s prosperity in a largely hungry, luxury-deprived world. Up to late 1942, certain broadcasts sought to encourage the overthrow of Hitler, but by November of that year the emphasis shifted to a “defeatist mentality,” stressing enemy battlefield setbacks and shortages.

Earlier in the War, the Voice attempted to serve U.S. troops abroad, but it was relieved of this assignment upon the creation of the Armed Forces Radio Service in late 1942. However, VOA and
AFRS maintained liaison during the rest of the war, in part to permit the placement over AFRS of items that might confuse the enemy. [See Erik Barnouw, *The Golden Web* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 160.] It was assisted by relay bases in Honolulu, on Saipan, in Algiers and by the American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE), established by OWI in London in 1944. ABSIE was intended to give VOA a more favorable transmission capability for Europe. It created many of its own programs, further supplementing the VOA effort.

Strategy sometimes dictated that misleading information be broadcast, but this was left to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) lest OWI broadcasts lose credibility. There were many ingenious schemes for accomplishing this, including special radio broadcasts to German U-boats and to German troops along the Western front. These broadcasts originated from stations claiming to be clandestine operations manned by Germans and concealed somewhere within Germany, but the vast majority of them came from England, later in the war, from Allied-occupied Luxembourg.

The management and coordination of the OWI enterprise was an enormous undertaking, and generated considerable controversy. With foreign operations headquartered in New York and the domestic branch, as well as Elmer Davis and his OWI staff in Washington, this was bound to happen. The director of foreign operations, Robert Sherwood, was given a relatively free hand in selecting his staff, which later led to charges by Davis, members of Congress and others that certain staff members were too individualistic or not in sympathy with Allied policy. Among the most notable changes were these:

1) In July, 1943, Mussolini resigned and King Victor Immanuel and Marshall Badoglio assumed command of military forces in Italy. Great Britain officially cheered but some Americans, including OWI foreign operations staff members, were skeptical that this meant any real change in Fascist philosophy. OWI officials were waiting for some American personality to comment on the situation "in a more realistic fashion" (Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 108), and finally, one did. VOA broadcast this in English only, "as notice to the British that America did not share the excessive optimism of the early BBC broadcasts." (Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 109). The com-
mentary in question referred to Victor Immanuel as a "moronic little king." The American government was involved in delicate negotiations with Italy at the time, and President Roosevelt denounced the broadcast. Warburg claims that American policy with respect to the Italian leadership had in fact changed shortly before, but that Davis "wasn't in on the change." (Warburg, op. cit., p. 111).

2) In November, 1943, the U.S. House of Representatives took up the presence and influence of aliens in OWI. The "moronic little king" incident surfaced again, and OWI was criticized for allowing German language broadcasts to be done by some German Social Democrats who belonged to the New Beginnen group. OWI was accused of laxity and told to "shape up." (See Robert Spivack, "The New Anti-Alien Drive," New Republic, Nov. 29, 1943, pp. 740-1).

Perhaps as a result of these two incidents Davis moved in 1944 to discharge certain top OWI foreign operations staff members, James Warburg among them, on the grounds that they were acting too independently. Sherwood and Davis argued over Davis' right to do this, and the dispute finally reached President Roosevelt, who told the two men to work things out between themselves. This was done, but OWI lost prestige in the eyes of Congress and journalists, and this did not help the Voice and other overseas information and cultural programs in the difficult years after the war.22

Well before the end of the war, President Roosevelt asked the FCC to look ahead to the post-war period and make recommendations on government policy regarding international broadcast operations; a 1943 letter to the chairman of the FCC urged that "we lay the proper foundations now for an effective system of international broadcasting for the future years."23 The FCC held a hearing on international short-wave broadcasting in October, 1944. Testimony favoring the continuation of such activities predominated, and a special committee of government radio engineers was appointed to draw up plans for postwar international broadcasting from the United States.24 The State Department's Committee on Communications supported the idea and assigned Arthur MacMahon, a Columbia University political science professor, to study the government's international information activities.
MacMahon's report, circulated in the State Department in July, 1945, opened with the premise that "The United States Government and specifically the State Department cannot be indifferent to the ways in which our society is portrayed in other countries." It recommended that international radio be continued after the war, but made no specific recommendation as to how it should be administered except that, on the grounds of the frequency shortage and the scarcity of skilled talent, it should be under one centralized administration. The report questioned whether the widespread pre-war practice of accepting advertising would be helpful to United States foreign relations. McMahan enumerated and commented at length on alternative forms of ownership and organization, among them 1) a private, limited dividend corporation, 2) government ownership and operation, 3) a mixed private-government operation (programs to be contributed by both sides), and 4) split private ownership, much as before the war. MacMahon seemed to favor the first two.

Some months earlier, the State Department had created an Office of Public Affairs, within which was included an international information division to provide liaison with the government's war information agencies and private international information organizations. When the war ended in August, 1945, President Truman announced creation of an "Interim International Information Service" within the State Department, including the Voice, to function until December 31, 1945. Thereafter the Secretary of State was authorized to terminate any or all of its functions, or to assign them to State.

Truman simultaneously released a statement which reaffirmed that private industry should be left to do the job as far as possible.

To the fullest possible extent, American private organizations and individuals in such fields as news, motion pictures, and communications will, as in the past, be the primary means of informing foreign peoples about this country. The Government's international information program will not compete with them.

Instead it will be designed to assist American private enterprises engaged in the dissemination of information abroad, and to supplement them in those specialized informational activities in which commercial or other limitations make it difficult for private concerns to carry on all necessary information work.
This Government will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government.

The Post-War 'System'

On December 31, 1945, the State Department created an International Broadcasting Division (IBD) within its Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (IIA) to assume control of a by then much more modest Voice of America, the only U.S. international broadcasting station in operation. The OWI had held contracts with all seven private licensees, and, since these contracts did not expire until June 30, 1946, IBD simply assumed possession of the private facilities. This gave it a "grace" period within which to formulate more clearly an international broadcasting policy—a period which it was to need badly.

President Truman's original order had allowed the State Department to assume functions in the field of international information, but in order to obtain authorization to continue this activity, the House of Representatives had to pass a bill establishing its right to do so. Until such a bill was passed it was unlikely that financing would be approved. Chiefly through the work of Assistant Secretary of State for Information William S. Benton, the State Department began to prepare its case. The initial House hearings began in October, 1945, and the measure (H.R. 4368, introduced by Representative Sol Bloom of New York) was debated in committee, but so modified by the time it was reported out on December 17, 1945, that it was introduced as a new bill (H.R. 4982). The key statement regarding international broadcasting ran as follows:

The Secretary (of State) is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media.... For this purpose, the Secretary is authorized to purchase, rent, construct, improve, maintain and operate facilities for radio transmission and reception, including the leasing of real property both within and without the continental limits of the United States for periods not to exceed ten years.

Under these terms, it would have been possible for the State Department to renew the contracts it held with private broadcast-
ers. Unfortunately for State, H.R. 4982 was never acted upon, due in part to a controversy surrounding the supplying of news to the Voice of America by the two principal wire services, Associated Press and United Press. The two agencies withdrew their services from the VOA in early 1946, declining to be associated with a government-sponsored service which in their view would always be suspected of spreading propaganda. To them this was the antithesis of what their own news-gathering apparatus stood for. The issue was debated in and out of government over the next year, but neither AP nor UP would relent.30

This controversy would not itself have killed the Bloom Bill (H.R. 4982) but the issue between the wire services and the State Department (Could a government-run international broadcasting organization present the news fairly?) also concerned many Congressmen, who watched with particular interest an investigation of State Department news dissemination undertaken by a special committee appointed by the American Society of Newspaper Editors in March, 1946. The committee report, released in December, 1946, did not pass judgment on the “fairness” issue but did regard the Voice of America’s efforts as necessary.

The State Department had submitted an appropriation request to Congress in early 1946 and it included a budget proposal for the International Broadcasting Division. Thus when the 79th Congress convened for its second session in January, 1946, it had two bills to consider, the Bloom Bill, which was before the House, and the State Department appropriations bill, which was before the Senate. The Bloom Bill eventually died without vote in the Senate after the House had passed it on July 20, 1946, by a two-thirds vote. The appropriation bill passed after the House and Senate had reconciled their differences, providing the full $19 million that the State Department had asked for its international information and education activities. This allowed the International Broadcasting Division to continue its operations for one more year (to June 30, 1947) but did not put IBD on a permanent basis.

Accordingly, in January, 1947, the State Department again sought both authorization and an appropriation for IBD. Rep. Karl Mundt (R—S.D.) proposed H.R. 3342, which resembled the Bloom bill except that it failed to provide for international broadcasting, which was to be included in an international broadcasting
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foundation bill introduced to Congress in March, 1947. The appropriation measure passed both houses, again with strong opposition, and with a reduced amount for broadcasting activities. The Mundt Bill passed the House but became stalled in the Senate. It eventually passed as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The debates surrounding this legislation involved hundreds of pages of testimony, and would require several dozen pages even to summarize, but the principal points introduced by opponents of the program were: 1) the government should not disseminate news abroad, 2) the State Department should not have a monopoly of shortwave broadcasting and 3) the State Department, and the international information and cultural staff in particular, including IBD, employed many untrustworthy persons who could not be relied upon to project a fair image of the United States to foreign countries. The first argument did not prove to be a major stumbling block, especially as U.S. relations with the Soviet Union grew worse, but the other two did.

To answer the anti-monopoly argument, Assistant Secretary of State Benton produced letters (which he had solicited) from five of the seven private firms which had been active in international broadcasting before the war. The five—RCA/NBC, CBS, Westinghouse, Crosley and General Electric—were agreeable to continuing the status quo, under which they received compensation. All agreed on the necessity for government support, at least for the immediate future, but they differed as to what should eventually be done with international broadcasting. RCA/NBC wanted a foundation, GE a return to the private system and the other three gave no opinion. Associated Broadcasters, Inc., did not reply to the State Department’s request for a statement. WRUL (Lemmon’s station) did register a strong objection to the State Department’s original request, contained in the Bloom Bill, for what amounted to a monopoly on international broadcasting.

It cannot be said that there was strong sentiment on the part of the private broadcasters to increase their activities in this field, and at least four, possibly five, appeared quite ready to drop their international operations. Only CBS and WRUL seemed anxious to continue. CBS still saw the possibility of advertising support for broadcasts to Latin America. WRUL felt that its educational mission was not likely to be assumed by anyone else. Among the
others there was a feeling that international broadcasting could never become profitable and most of them were by now deeply engaged in the development of television, frequency modulation and other electronic systems and devices with greater financial promise. Hence most of the private broadcasters supported the State Department's efforts to establish a permanent IBD.

Still, private broadcasters (principally NBC and CBS) continued to provide a substantial share of VOA's programing: about 40% of the program schedule in fiscal 1946-47, and about 70% in fiscal 1947-48, all of which, to be sure, was subject to IBD supervision. Most of these privately prepared programs were in English, the major European languages, and Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America. Much of the English language output consisted of popular and classical music. VOA-produced material ran more to news and commentary, round-table discussions of current topics, answers to listeners' questions, and even, for the Russian service, a modest amount of "hot jazz." There was also a modest amount of documentary, mostly dramatizations of typical American lifestyles and some drama, some of which was produced by VOA, some by the private stations. VOA went out in 22 languages at this time, most of them European. Arabic and the languages of the Indian sub-continent were absent from the schedule, whether in deference to spheres of colonial influence in these areas, chiefly British, or to lack of broadcast talent capable of handling of these languages, or to show Congress that VOA broadcasts were being directed to areas where they would do the most good. It was not always easy to convince some Congressmen of VOA's worth, however; Representative John Taber (R, N.Y.) told a 1947 House hearing, "These broadcasts are doing more harm than good. They are not checking the spread of Communism. Propaganda that ostensibly is intended to build new respect for the United States is being used to criticize private enterprise, to express partisan opinions, and to distort the picture of life in the United States." (This sentiment has found expression in virtually every Congressional hearing on the Voice since that time). Under the prevailing program arrangements, Taber could have been criticizing either VOA's own programing or that produced by private stations. And, even though IBD was supposed to supervise the content of privately produced programs, the modest size of its staff placed limits on
this supervision. Within a year, an incident involving one of these programs brought an end to all attempts on the part of Congress to compel IBD to use the services of private broadcasters.

The ‘Know North America’ Incident

In the course of hearings concerning international information activities in February of 1948, some sample scripts from a randomly selected day of Voice of America broadcasts were submitted to members of the House appropriations committee at the request of committee member John Taber. One of the broadcasts was an episode from a travelogue series entitled “Know North America,” a Spanish-language program written and produced by NBC for the Voice of America. The series, intended to give “an informative and interesting picture of history and current life in various American cities and states,” had first come on the air in June of 1947. The International Broadcasting Division had never found it necessary to modify or delete any of the programs, although IBD’s contract with NBC explicitly gave it such powers.

The sample broadcast from the series dealt with Wyoming, and what the committee found in it led to a fuller examination of the series by both House and Senate. At one point, the script stated that at a given moment in history, “all the inhabitants of Cheyenne were outlaws, including the mayor,” while mention was also made of Frontier Day celebrations with foot races between “magnificent Indian girls, feathered and naked.” Little publicity about the series appeared in the press at the time, but the House appropriations committee hearings a month later took up these broadcasts in detail in a closed hearing with State Department officials. The affair came out in the open on May 26, 1948 (by which time the series had been cancelled), when Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana read excerpts to the U.S. Senate. The program on Nevada had described that state as “a vast expanse of white” with “no interest in itself.” Dissenters from the Mormon faith in Utah were said to have been assailed with “convincing arguments . . . made of rubber or wood.” A program on Texas contained the statement that “New England was founded by hypocrisy and Texas . . . by sin.”

Much of the offensive material had come from John Gunther’s Inside U.S.A. and from Works Progress Administration guide
books, but the fact that it was being carried over an official instrument of the United States government gave rise to serious concern over both the “private contractor” arrangement and the basic management of the International Broadcasting Division. Three House and Senate committees conducted a full investigation in late May and early June and it became evident that the IBD and NBC, while admitting that each had some responsibility for what had happened, had neither the time nor the inclination to oversee the preparation of these broadcasts. NBC felt it was up to IBD to make the purpose of these broadcasts clear, while IBD replied that NBC officials repelled any suggestion of governmental “censorship.” As a consequence, no responsible officials of either NBC or IBD had read a single “Know North America” script.

State Department officials blamed Congress for insisting that IBD contract for programs with the private operations and for budget cuts, which reduced personnel to supervise the broadcast output of the Voice. Congress was not entirely convinced. Committee members saw no reason why the “private contractor” arrangement could not continue, provided the State Department and the networks were more diligent in exercising their responsibilities. But the two principal suppliers, NBC and CBS (WRUL had requested a contract arrangement with IBD, but had never procured one) decided to go out of the business of shortwave broadcasting altogether.38

The International Broadcasting Foundation Proposal

NBC did suggest at this time, albeit lukewarmly, that the concept of an “international broadcasting foundation,” first proposed by RCA President David Sarnoff in 1943, might be reconsidered as a means of improving content control while leaving some power in the hands of private broadcasters and the public. A corporation would be established by Congress to be financed by government and private industry and managed by a Board of Directors whose members would be chosen from the broadcasting industry, the public and government departments directly concerned with international informational activities. The board would select the foundation’s managerial and operating staffs.

This concept had been resurrected in March, 1947, when a bill proposing the establishment of an international broadcasting
foundation was presented to Congress. The State Department supported it, and so did a number of Congressmen, who saw it as a way of broadcasting to other nations with an “authentic” (i.e., not patently government-run) voice. The bill never came up for a hearing, much less a vote, partly because the private broadcasters were cool to further activity in this field (although all except WRUL supported the measure) and partly because the growing intensity of the Cold War convinced Congress of the need for more direct governmental control over international broadcasts. By the fall of 1947, it was evident that the bill would die; thus, NBC’s suggestion that Congress reexamine the “foundation” concept was virtually foredoomed to failure.39

Smith-Mundt and Its Aftermath

A further reason for the failure of Congress to deal with the international broadcasting foundation bill was undoubtedly the final passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in January, 1948. This act, which continues to serve as the legal foundation for the U.S. government’s conduct of informational and educational activities overseas, originated as the Mundt Bill in January, 1947. As was noted earlier, the Mundt Bill did not include any provision for international broadcasting activities, which were to have been covered in the foundation bill. Once the Mundt Bill had been approved by the House, then by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was to be reported out for debate by the Senate in late July, 1947, under the guidance of Senator Smith (R, New Jersey). Senator Robert Taft (R, Ohio) blocked the attempt, but agreed to a joint House-Senate committee study of the need for increased informational and educational activity on the part of the State Department. Committee members visited Western and Eastern Europe in September and October of 1947, were appalled by the nature and extent of Communist anti-American propaganda, and returned with a set of recommendations which found their way into the Mundt Bill. The modified bill, now known as the Smith-Mundt Bill, was passed by the Senate January 16, 1948, by the House several days later, and was signed into law by the President on January 28.

When the Mundt Bill had originally appeared one year earlier, its chances of passage had been considered slim. When the House
and Senate acted on the Smith-Mundt Bill in January, 1948, it passed easily. The principal reason for this change of heart on the part of so many members of Congress was undoubtedly the growing intensity of the Cold War. More than 200 Congressmen had travelled to Europe in the summer and fall of 1947, and had seen at firsthand how the Soviet Union and her satellites were vilifying and castigating the United States. They had also seen how small the American counter-effort was, and had been told by private firms (broadcasters among them) that private enterprise alone could not begin to cope with such a situation. The solution lay in an increasing reliance on government agencies.

By late 1947, Congress was willing to consider amendments to the Mundt Bill that would provide a firmer foundation for international broadcasting. It was not yet convinced that this activity should be left entirely in the hands of the State Department, although the onset of the Cold War argued strongly for the need for a substantial increase in IBD activity. Neither was the international broadcasting foundation proposal completely out of the question, notwithstanding the fact that almost nine months had passed since its introduction.

However, when the Smith-Mundt Bill was signed into law in January, 1948, there was still no specific provision for an administrative entity for international broadcasting; this was to be left up to the discretion of the State Department, for the time being at least. The only substantial change pulled apart the informational and educational tasks of the State Department’s former international information and education program with the creation of the aforementioned Advisory Commission on Information and an Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange. These commissions, staffed by distinguished businessmen, educators and the like, meet annually to review the government’s international activities in the two fields.

The State Department was apparently convinced that, however much the Cold War might have changed things, Congress was still not prepared to grant the International Broadcasting Division a monopoly of international broadcasting activities. The department continued to favor such a monopoly but was willing to let matters rest for the moment.
Following the “Know North America” incident, virtually all private international broadcasting activity ceased, and the State Department was left with a virtual monopoly, although the World Wide Broadcasting Foundation was still in operation. The International Broadcasting Division continued to function under State, but with a substantial increase in budget, staff and transmitting power.
VOA and the 'Cold War'

By mid-1948, the "Cold War" was a tangible entity. In June of that year, the Soviet Union placed a blockade on surface traffic entering and leaving Berlin. The American government responded by airlifting supplies to the city, and defended its actions through, among other means, Voice of America broadcasts. This brought the Voice into direct conflict with broadcasts from the Soviet Union and its satellites, which charged that it was the Allies (the United States, Great Britain and France) who were responsible for the situation that had made the blockade necessary in the first place. The VOA was not yet, however, an anti-Soviet instrument; its broadcasts concerning the blockade emphasized the positive aspects of the event (e.g., how well the airlift was working). Still, this development helped vindicate Congressmen who saw in the VOA a potential weapon in the rapidly intensifying confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Subsequent appropriation bills concerning the Voice of America had an easier time clearing the Senate, and by 1949 the Voice was firmly reestablished as an integral element in American foreign policy.

Not all of those in high government positions agreed. Many of the more traditional foreign service officers within the State Department found it hard to accept broadcasting as an instrument of diplomacy. The then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, is reported to have said, "... world opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us." But Congressmen were undoubtedly pleased to be able to examine tangible evidence of American attempts to gain world understanding.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, all formal attempts to limit criticism of the Soviet Union and Communism were dropped. President Truman had launched a "Campaign of Truth" on April 19 of that year; in it he called upon the information media (including, of course, the VOA) to promote the truth about America in order to combat the Communist campaign.
against the United States. This had been done by the Voice since 1947, but it now received formal sanction. In September, 1950, Truman issued a classified message to American missions overseas and to the State Department to take the offensive against Communism and Communist propaganda "... by exposing its lies ... and subjecting it to ridicule." This began the era of the "hard line" which featured specific criticism of the Communist ideology. The prose used by VOA commentators (themselves sometimes refugees from countries occupied by Russia, or from the Soviet Union itself) was often strongly dramatic, as the following examples show:

Marching in the columns were soldiers and sailors whose bodies supplied the bridge over which enemies of the people, hiding behind the red cloak of Communism, climbed to power. Following them walked countless victims of famine in the Volga region and the Ukraine. Then came columns of peasants who died facing firing squads when they dared to bring up the promise of "Land to the People." There were marching columns of workers turned into state slaves; of idealists thrown into the dungeon of the Secret Police, who lost their lives in inexpert struggle with the careerists surrounding the throne of Stalin; columns of city dwellers whom the Communist local satraps left to the tender mercies of the invading Nazis.

Oh, tender Communists in all lands: If the milk of human kindness has not suddenly soured in your veins, if you would save Lavrenti Beria, you had better move fast, otherwise he is going to be a dead duck.

Just a word of caution: If you stage any "Save Beria" rallies in the Iron Curtain countries, you are also going to be dead ducks.

Broadcasts of this nature were inevitable, given the climate of the times and the close scrutiny to which the Voice of America was subjected by Congress. The Voice itself recognized the situation in its 1950 statement of program policies, when it announced that broadcasts should help roll back Soviet influence by all means short of war. This means, the statement read,

... making the captive peoples realize they still belong with us. This means weakening the will of the Red Army officers and Red officials at home and abroad. It means keeping the Soviet Bear so busy scratching his own fleas, that he has little time for molesting others.
The program schedule of the Voice of America at this time was not in most respects much different from what it had been just before passage of the Smith-Mundt Act. News and commentary predominated and the chief emphasis was on broadcasts to Europe. The content of individual programs was somewhat different: Martin Block’s “Make Believe Ballroom” and rebroadcasts of Arturo Toscanini’s NBC orchestra concerts were regular features. Dramatic documentaries might present situations of individuals behind the Iron Curtain (one program entitled “Where Are They Now?” dealt with individuals such as Jan Masaryk who thought they could collaborate with Communists.) Yet VOA continued to broadcast features about such matters as Central Park, a new American edition of the works of Marcel Proust, etc.; it continued to run programs in which questions from listeners would be answered; and it continued to offer dramatizations of the works of noted American authors. Thus it chiefly fell to news and commentary to carry out the new “Campaign of Truth.”

Another major difference between the VOA of 1947 and the VOA of 1950 was in transmitter power and location. The 1947 Voice had the vast array of transmitters that had been established or commandeered in World War II; this included outlets in Honolulu and an agreement with the BBC in England to lease transmitter time there and the use of “United Nations Radio” in Algiers (although this was to be phased out when the Munich transmitter went into operation). By 1950, VOA had further transmitters in Tangier, near Manila and near Salonika (Greece). Most of these overseas transmitters, furthermore, broadcast in medium wave, which gave VOA an obvious advantage in reaching listeners who had only inexpensive, single-band receivers.

As the intensity of the Cold War increased, particularly in Korea, the Voice of America budget did likewise. In Fiscal 1951, Congress approved over $7½ million for programming, $41 million for new facilities. By 1953 the programming budget was $22 million. But intensification of the Cold War also brought with it even closer Congressional scrutiny of VOA operations. Senator Joseph McCarthy made the Voice a special focus of attention in early 1953. In immediate reaction to this, the International Information Agency of the State Department (under which VOA still functioned) issued a directive which stated, “... no material by
any controversial persons, Communists, fellow travellers, etc., will be used under any circumstances."\(^52\) Alfred H. Morton, then head of VOA, told his staff not to take the policy literally until it had been clarified. He was suspended immediately by the State Department, reinstated one day later, but shortly thereafter resigned.

McCarthy's investigations into the presence of Communists in the U.S. government had a particularly damaging effect on VOA. His allegations that the Voice contained many Communists and fellow travellers were not new: Rep. Fred Busbey (R-111.) had made similar charges nearly ten years earlier.\(^53\) Busbey, however, had been unable to generate a formal inquiry; McCarthy not only held one, he did so with maximum publicity. A number of Voice of America staff members resigned as a result of his accusations, some under pressure from their superiors, some in fear, some in disgust. As was often the case with McCarthy's investigations, innuendo replaced direct and specific accusation; one of the rare instances of the latter saw McCarthy accuse the VOA of "negligence favoring Communism" when he discovered that the Voice had dropped its Hebrew language broadcasts in part because, so VOA officials believed, "the Jerusalem Jews were safely anti-Communist."\(^54\)

Several things resulted from the so-called "McCarthy Era": many of the senior VOA officials who stayed on with the Voice did so, according to one United States Information Agency official, because they either believed in, or were willing to accommodate themselves to, a "hard-line" attack on Communism. The same official feels that this made VOA one of the last major strongholds of the "hard-line psychological warriors," which in turn meant strong anti-Communist broadcasts which lost the Voice many neutral and pro-Western listeners in the mid-1950s.\(^55\) The VOA also suffered a major budget cut in FY 1954, from $22 million to $16 million, although this was probably due as much to the end of the Korean War as to McCarthy's attacks. The cut meant a reduction in daily program output from 33 to 28 hours and in languages from 41 to 34; 42 percent of the output was intended for the Communist world. There was a decreased emphasis on American culture and programming in English had been cut to about ten percent of the broadcast day, whereas almost one-third of the VOA broadcast schedule had consisted of English language programming in 1950.
In the first year of his administration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed a special committee to study the role and organization of international information activities. This committee, known as the Jackson Committee, reported to the President on June 30, 1953. It argued for a separation of these informational activities from the State Department, and recommended the creation of a new government agency—the United States Information Agency—to handle them. The then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who was supposedly uninterested in propaganda activities and uncomfortable with large bureaucratic structures, gave his blessing to the separation. Two specific recommendations of the Jackson Committee directly affected VOA: first, that Voice headquarters be moved from New York to Washington, and second, that the name “Voice of America” be dropped and another title found, because VOA programs “… have been widely criticized and discredited.” VOA officials agreed to the first, and moved in 1954; they fought the second, and won.

Since the new government information agency was to absorb all of the old functions of the IIA, the Voice of America was little affected by the shift. It remained the most expensive of the media services (press, film and broadcasting), and also remained more visible—to the public and Congress. The burden of broadcasting to the “Iron Curtain” countries was being shared more and more by RIAS; Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia and Radio Liberation (which after 1960 was called Radio Liberty), but Congress continued to evaluate the overall effectiveness of VOA chiefly in terms of its particular effectiveness in the struggle against Communism. Criteria were lacking, however; as Edward Barrett put it, “No one could prove last year’s funds had been well-spent by producing a cage filled with 7,000 Russians who had deserted Communism.”

The fact that a new agency had been created to carry out the functions of IIA caused no marked change in the attitudes of individual Congressmen toward USIA in general or VOA in particular.

During the next four years (1954-1957), the Voice of America experienced a mild growth in terms of languages and broadcast hours, and by the close of this period had become considerably less strident in its attacks on Communism.
been due to the failure of the United States to intervene militarily
in the Hungarian uprising in late 1956. It was also an era in which
there were increasing signs of “peaceful co-existence” between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet jamming of VOA
broadcasts—present since the late 1940s—nevertheless continued
full-scale.59

In 1957, the U.S. Information Agency and the Voice of
America came under strong attack by Congress, precipitated when
the Agency’s new director, Arthur Larson, antagonized several
Congressmen (chief among them Senator Lyndon Johnson) by
what they saw as arrogance and lack of purpose. The Agency
asked an FY 1958 appropriation of $144 million, and in its search
for ways to cut this budget, both houses raised the old question of
whether private industry couldn’t do some of the things the
Agency was doing, the wire services in particular. Private interna-
tional broadcasting was barely mentioned, however, perhaps be-
cause only Lemmon’s WRUL and the old General Elect... facility
near San Francisco, KGEI (then being run as a “good will station”
for Latin America by a Stanford University group) were on the air.
Congress cut the 1958 budget to $96,517,000 (from 1957’s $113
million), and Larson departed less than a year after taking office.
One of Larson’s hopes had been to free the agency from a
“propagandistic” approach; but where this meant making full
disclosure of some more unpleasant aspect of American life, he
was sure to be challenged.60

Larson’s successor, George V. Allen, had served as head of the
IIA several years earlier, and thus brought a measure of experience
to the position.61 One of his earliest major decisions—and the one
to have the greatest long-term effect on the Voice of America—was
to give increased emphasis to English language output.

We should broadcast primarily in our own language, English, in worldwide
programs not specially tailored for this country or that.

Programs to every area of the world obviously cannot be exactly alike, but
when we design a program solely for one country—the U.S.S.R., for
example—and voice it in Russian, listeners in that country promptly discount
it as propaganda.

Even though relatively few people in Russia understand English, those who
do give more credence to the news and comment they hear on our worldwide
programs than they do to the same news and comment if they think we have
specially selected it for them. Moreover, in all countries under dictatorship, the grapevine is the most effective means of news dissemination.

If one person in a town or village knows English, he is likely to be held in special regard and his words carry particular weight.62

Allen had a host of problems to deal with, and most of them had to do with policy made by others in government. The Middle East crisis,63 the demands of Soviet Premier Khrushchev for a reunited Berlin, Soviet space launches, the Little Rock school desegregation problem, the U-2 incident, all were of a magnitude to demand attention to potentially unpleasant information. Allen's basic modus operandi was to place the unpleasant incident in a wider perspective, covering it fully but also supplying the reasons it had come about and what would be likely to happen next. This approach caused a certain amount of criticism from Congress, but Allen's personal diplomacy, plus the judicious presentation of a number of "success stories" (the agency's treatment of the American space program, the 1960 presidential election, the great variety of broadcasts beamed to Russia unjammed during Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States), won for the agency some small increases in budgetary support, and the Voice of America shared in this.

VOA Director Henry Loomis took office at about the same time as did Allen, and remained in the position far longer than had any of his predecessors. His background was in physics, but he had been with the agency since 1954, mainly with the Office of Research and Intelligence. Perhaps because of a lack of experience with radio, he did something that ingratiated him with VOA staff members: he held informal "bull sessions" at his home, in which he discussed various policy and production problems with them, later putting some of the suggestions that resulted into practice. He also prepared carefully for his "testimonials" before committees of Congress on behalf of the Voice, and proved to be an effective spokesman. He also fought within the Agency for more thorough research on the effectiveness of VOA programming, and even at one time proposed that the VOA could only be fully effective if it were largely divorced from Government control, much in the manner of the BBC's External Services.64
The 'Murrow Era’ and Beyond

On January 29, 1961, President John F. Kennedy named Edward R. Murrow, formerly of the Columbia Broadcasting System, to be director of the United States Information Agency. Murrow was the second agency director with professional experience in broadcasting. Because of his foreign correspondent background, there was speculation within (and, to a lesser extent, outside) the agency as to whether the Voice of America would enjoy increased prestige and budgetary support or whether it should be subjected to closer scrutiny. While there is some evidence that the VOA did in fact enjoy greater prestige and support from Murrow than it had under previous directors, this did not become a general pattern—nor did Murrow appear to single out the Voice for personal scrutiny, as some feared or hoped he might.

There were no radical reforms of the VOA during Murrow’s administration, but the Voice did make one truly significant improvement: a massive increase in transmitter power and, thus, signal strength, particularly for the audiences in Africa and South America. The largest single increase came in the dedication of the 4,800,000-watt short-wave transmitter complex in Greenville, North Carolina, in February, 1963. By mid 1964, a permanent VOA transmitter station (replacing a slightly earlier and less powerful temporary station) was on the air in Liberia, with a total signal strength of 1,600,000 watts. The six 50,000-watt transmitters leased by VOA from the BBC in Woolferton, England, were increased to 250,000 watts each. A land-based transmitting station erected on the island of Rhodes, in Greece, replaced an earlier ship-board transmitter.

None of the proposals which led to these increases in transmitter power originated with Murrow. VOA engineers had long been dissatisfied with signal quality in many parts of the world, notably Africa and Latin America, and had often argued the
futility of spending money and time on broadcasts that could seldom be heard clearly. Murrow benefitted from the first real increase in VOA transmission power since the Korean War with the support of the Kennedy administration, which felt that public opinion in Latin America and Africa in particular was of increasing importance to the United States, and of a Congress alarmed at Soviet and Communist Chinese efforts to exert influence in these two areas.

Murrow “borrowed” one particular device from his predecessor, George V. Allen: “saturation” transmission. Allen had mustered all the transmission time and facilities he could for broadcasts to the Soviet Union while Khrushchev was in the United States; Murrow did likewise in the Cuban “missile crisis” in October, 1962, with saturation broadcasting to Latin America in both English and Spanish. Murrow enlisted the services of eight medium-wave and two short-wave American “private” stations to supplement VOA facilities. The saturation helped underscore the seriousness with which the United States viewed the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

Finally, it was in the Murrow era that the VOA initiated a program format that was at the time considered revolutionary. In 1962, the VOA Worldwide English service began “The Breakfast Show,” a two-hour program featuring popular and semi-classical music (usually American), but also containing news reports, features, interviews, excerpts from upcoming programs, etc. “The Breakfast Show” closely resembled NBC’s weekend “Monitor” radio program. Popular music was known to attract listeners who would not ordinarily tune to a “straight” fifteen minutes of news and commentary. VOA officials were not at all sure that it would prove successful but surveys have revealed that “The Breakfast Show” has a devoted audience.

Otherwise VOA programming during the “Murrow Era” was little changed from what it had been in the late 1950s. “Hard-line” attacks on Communism had virtually disappeared; special English broadcasts were being expanded to include more and more features, as well as news; the various regional reports (to Africa, South Asia, Latin America, etc.) gave greater attention and prominence to news about events taking place within these areas, in line with President Kennedy’s desire to display greater U.S. interest in
the "Third World" nations; and the numbers of languages and amounts of broadcast time for Asia, Africa and Latin America were increased, in some cases quite radically (e.g., Africa). But VOA continued to place heavy reliance on such fare as "Music USA," which included both a popular music and a jazz segment, and which was begun in 1954; "Forum," a series of lectures on various topics, many of them quite specialized and often quite difficult to comprehend; and numerous programs designed to portray American culture from various perspectives ("Religion in America," "The Arts in the United States," "American Short Stories," "Musical Life in the United States," "American Theater of the Air"). As much as one-third of the broadcast day in English (less in other languages) might be devoted to portraying the culture of the United States to foreign audiences, which accorded well with the policy developed by Allen and furthered by Murrow of concentrating on longer-range effects and decreasing the emphasis on tactical, short-range effects that had characterized many of the broadcasts of the Korean War period.71

Murrow was largely unable to overcome the one problem that most agency directors have faced: providing meaningful influence on the government's top-level policy decisions. He was not, for example, given the opportunity to convince other members of the National Security Council (of which he was a full member) to consider the psychological aspects of the imminent invasion of Cuba (the "Bay of Pigs" incident), particularly with regard to public opinion on a broader scale.72 As his predecessor George Allen once said, "The better the policy, the easier it is to sell,"73 but part of what makes many policies at least potentially "better" is advance consideration of how various individuals and organizations are likely to react to them. Political scientist Robert Holt has examined the abortive 1961 Cuban invasion in the light of this factor:

It also appears likely that the kind of preparation for the landings [Bay of Pigs, 1961] that could have been provided by Voice of America broadcasts was absent. It would not be at all surprising if the people responsible for broadcasts to Cuba in the months preceding the landings did not even know of the proposed invasion. . . . It seems clear that those responsible did not view the psychological instrument as a major instrument of statecraft.74
Murrow's role in policy-making at the highest levels of Government, then, seems to have been minimal. The effect of this on the Voice of America was perhaps particularly acute, inasmuch as the increased transmitter strength, together with the high popularity of President Kennedy (particularly among two “target” VOA audiences, the young and the opinion leaders in the developing nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America), had given VOA staff members the feeling that they were to play an increasingly significant role in Agency output. Still, the VOA role probably did increase in significance between 1961 and 1964, but it was accompanied, according to some VOA staff members, by increased interference from top agency and other government officials. One VOA official, tracing this interference back to the “Bay of Pigs” incident, told a New York Times reporter, “Policy took over and objectivity and credibility were pushed aside. And we just never have gotten back in balance.” It was of little consolation to VOA officials that Murrow had fought the Columbia Broadcasting System over the same basic issue when he was its news director. Murrow's own attempt in 1961 to keep the BBC from showing his CBS documentary “Harvest of Shame” (which depicted the plight of migrant workers in the United States) may have in fact caused VOA staff members to question his commitment to the Voice's struggle to gain a reputation for objectivity.

Struggle for Objectivity

Edward R. Murrow resigned as director of USIA in February, 1964, and President Johnson appointed Carl Rowan, a former newspaperman and Ambassador to Finland, to succeed him. Rowan was in this position for approximately fifteen months, during which time unrest on the part of the Voice of America staff continued to mount. Several specific instances were cited, including alleged displeasure on the part of USIA because VOA had carried a report on the death of Malcolm X (then a spokesman for “black separatism” in America) in its newscasts to Africa and the outright deletion of VOA coverage of a New York Times editorial on Vietnam on the grounds that it “... gave too much weight to the opposition side.” Henry Loomis, who had been director of the Voice of America since 1958, resigned in March, 1965, and in
his farewell address referred to the basic problem faced by VOA in its relations with other levels and branches of government:

I believe that VOA serves the national interest poorly if its output is equated with diplomatic communications. It does not follow automatically that if the Department of State or the White House do not comment on a development VOA must also shut up. Our job is as much to prepare foreign attitudes to be receptive to our message as it is to disseminate this message.

I believe VOA serves the national interest poorly if its very stance belies the essence of the society it speaks for—it serves it poorly if it is asked to mold its news, editorial and feature output to serve tactical policy interests. In doing this, it becomes a propaganda instrument in the bad sense of the word. The image of America it will spread will be that of a kind of totalitarian society—"Monolith USA." Conversely, I believe VOA serves the national interest well if it reflects responsibly, affirmatively, and without self-consciousness, that ours is a society of free men who practice what they preach. To do this effectively, we must do it at all times—freedom is not a part-time thing. If we want to make the world safe for diversity, if we believe that the good and strong society is based on free choice, we must by our very stance communicate to our audiences the fact that diversity is preferable to uniformity. To sweep under the rug what we don't like, what does not serve our tactical purpose, is a sign of weakness. To acknowledge the existence of forces and views in disagreement with those of the policy makers, to take these specially into account in the formulation of our output, is a sign of strength and furthermore is good, persuasive propaganda. We must show that the United States derives strength—not weakness—from its diversity.

Our problem in the past, as it will be in the future, is how to persuade those struggling and sweating in a tough tactical fight that we serve them best by talking to the audience in calm, dispassionate tones and viewing the struggle in perspective.79

Although Carl Rowan was mentioned and quoted favorably in Loomis' speech, the impression arose among some VOA staff members that he was the chief cause of their frustration regarding objectivity. In June, 1965, shortly before resigning, Rowan told a New York Times reporter that he felt that objectivity had its limits, particularly with regard to VOA commentaries on the news (which occasionally quoted the Times and other newspapers). Rowan held that "They (the commentaries) express opinion, and it is the official opinion of the United States Government.... When there is a crisis, or when we are militarily engaged as we are now in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, we simply cannot afford to have the intentions and objectives of the United States misunderstood by other governments."80
Perhaps as a result of this controversy, President Lyndon Johnson took a particular interest in the selection of a new Director for VOA. When the President discussed the matter of a possible appointment with John Chancellor of NBC News, Chancellor is said to have sought assurances of “freedom to report both the good and the bad,” which the President supposedly gave. Chancellor took office in September, 1965. His chief impact was not in the area of “objectivity,” however, but in broad program reform. In November, 1966, following extensive consultation with Voice of America personnel and executives from private communication enterprises Chancellor initiated what he called the “new sound” of the VOA. Hardly new, it consisted chiefly of extended blocks of music, short features and interviews and brief news reports, thus resembling the NBC weekend radio show “Monitor” and the VOA’s own Breakfast Show. One chief difference was that the “new sound” would be used at various intervals throughout the day; another was that it would carry weather reports for various parts of the world, based on information gathered by U.S. weather satellites.

Whatever its ancestry, the “new sound” was hailed by Jack Gould of the New York Times as a unique service in international broadcasting, an indication that the Voice of America was attempting to sound less propagandistic. He noted that an “impish version” of “Yankee Doodle” had replaced the older, more “imperialist-flavored” VOA theme, “Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean,” and praised VOA for reporting conflicting opinions regarding both racial issues and U.S. involvement in Viet Nam.

Chancellor’s “new sound” dominated the afternoon and evening five days a week (five hours of slightly more than ten), but Special English news and features retained their prominence (1¾ hours) as did Music USA, both jazz and popular. The Forum lectures still ran four times a week, but many cultural features were dropped or shifted to the weekends. The weekends themselves more closely resembled the former VOA format of individual programs in 15- and 30-minute packages. Specific features on space exploration, which had begun in Loomis’ tenure, continued under Chancellor. A number of dramatic documentaries also dealt with America’s space program.
Despite the praise he received from the press and his own staff for his attempts to "informalize" the sound of the Voice of America, and despite still further increases in transmitting power (chiefly in the Far East), Chancellor resigned in May, 1967, less than two years after he had accepted the directorship. He had been very well paid at NBC, but his VOA salary was $21,000. Administrative burdens must have irked a "working newsman": VOA directors must spend hours preparing reports and testimony for Congressional Committees, agency "activity reports" and budgets, leaving little time for the day-to-day supervision of such a vast, complex enterprise, let alone for the initiation of programming reforms. Finally, the recurring "objectivity" problem, concerning which Chancellor had sought and received assurances, remained at issue. Four months after his resignation, Chancellor wrote in a letter to *The Nation* that there were battles over policy in the coverage of "hard" news during his time with the Voice, but that "...only once or twice in a couple of years" did this directly involve USIA Director Leonard Marks, nor did it ever directly involve President Johnson. Chancellor pronounced himself generally satisfied with VOA's objectivity: "VOA is decidedly not WLBJ, and when I knew it, the VOA told the truth about our society and the world...; it was critical of LBJ when necessary, and honest about the things which happen in this country."85

But because there can be much disagreement over what constitutes truth, and because these disputes often must be resolved quickly at lower executive levels, the problems of objectivity which so concerned Henry Loomis as he left office and John Chanbellor as he took it had not necessarily disappeared. Given the dual mission of the Voice enunciated in 1961 to "represent America, not any single segment of American society" but also to "present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively"—one could not expect the Voice to achieve a balance in reporting that would always please government officials on the one hand and critics of government policies and actions on the other.85 Chancellor spoke of the Voice of America as "...a place where journalism and diplomacy meet,"86 but defended the compromises that this entailed. Richard Walton, who had served as a staff member under Chancellor, has intimated that Chancellor...
probably didn’t realize that most of the day-to-day disputes regarding what should or should not be broadcast, in what manner, or with what balance and placement, never reached his desk. What he didn’t see was a determined effort by a supersensitive administration to minimize controversy regarding its policies.87

John Chancellor left his post in May, 1967, apparently satisfied that he had operated a Voice of America reasonably free of censorship. His successor, John Daly (for several years a newsmen with the American Broadcasting Company) was formally nominated late the same month, and sworn into office in September.88 It was quickly apparent that Congress was still ready to question VOA’s autonomy, whatever Chancellor felt he had accomplished along these lines. Rep. Charles Joelson (D., N.J.) read to the House of Representatives a magazine interview in which Daly said that he intended to have VOA report “... fully and fairly the division in the country.” Joelson then told the House, “The Voice of America is to promulgate our Government policy. If that policy is wrong, we ought to change it here, not broadcast statements opposing that policy.” Rep. John Rooney (D., N.Y.) added, “he (Daly) should realize that his job is to promote our way of thinking.”89

There was further criticism of Daly’s appropriateness for the post, due largely to his role as “quizmaster” for the CBS panel show “What’s My Line?” Many had forgotten that Daly had an extensive background in news reporting, was, indeed, a radio news pioneer. He started immediately to learn as much as possible about the agency and in the spring of 1968 went overseas on a six-week inspection tour to learn how the Voice was regarded in principal areas to which it broadcast, and to visit VOA installations abroad. He returned to Washington to learn that, in his absence, a member of USIA Director Leonard Marks’ staff had tried to shift Leonard Reed from head of the Worldwide English staff to USIA’s Press and Publications staff. Daly saw this as an attempt by Marks to bring the Voice more directly under the control of the agency’s main office; Marks was seen as an unabashed supporter of President Johnson, whose communication interests he had handled as a lawyer. Daly resigned in June, 1968, in part “... because he felt he could no longer serve as an effective shield for the career news employees against pressures from self-interested policymakers.”90
With Daly's resignation and the resultant bad publicity, the Johnson administration left the office of VOA director vacant. Marks resigned not long after Daly, and both the USIA and the VOA went without "permanent" directors for extended periods—in the case of the Voice, over a year. In 1969, Henry Loomis, who had held the VOA directorship longer than any other man, returned to USIA as its deputy director, and in April of that year told the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that he had resigned in 1965 because of attempts by the Johnson administration to censor broadcasts about domestic opposition to the Vietnam war. This prompted the New York Times to editorialize on the need for honesty and objectivity in VOA broadcasts; the Times saw Loomis' appointment as a step in that direction.91

The Nixon Administration finally filled the position in August, 1969, naming Henry Giddens, an Alabama businessman who owned a radio-television station in Mobile, but had little else to qualify him.92

Back to the Cold War?

Giddens' appointment was preceded by the appointment of Frank Shakespeare as director of the U.S. Information Agency. Both men were felt to be politically conservative and strongly anti-Communist.93 Within a year there were indications of major differences of opinion between the Department of State and USIA/VOA with respect to "anti-Soviet" broadcasts. VOA's John Albert, in a commentary broadcast September 11, 1970, on the introduction of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles into Egypt, said "It is clear that once again, just as they did during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets are attempting deception." On September 12, a VOA news analysis contained a reference to Soviet "duplicity" in this matter. At a time when the State Department was engaged in delicate negotiations with the Russians over the Suez cease fire, these broadcasts were not considered helpful. On September 21, Secretary of State William Rogers sent Shakespeare a memo emphasizing that, under law, USIA must receive formal policy guidance from State. Shakespeare responded that he considered general foreign policy guidance sufficient, adding that he had dropped the practice of clearing specific news items with State shortly after
coming to the agency in 1969. He told Rogers that he reported
directly to the President.94

When the USIA 1972 budget request was examined by the
Senate Committee on Appropriations in June, 1971, the agency
was questioned closely about its policy with respect to VOA
broadcasts to the Soviet Union, and in particular its broadcasts to
the various nationality groups there. The agency's response listed
two goals: "...to reach the widest possible audience in the Soviet
Union," and "...to enhance the national cultural identity of
minorities in the USSR which are contained in specific geographic
areas and have political identity."95 During this same period, the
Agency's semi-annual reports to Congress also emphasized VOA
broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.96 The U.S.
Advisory Commission on Information had debated the relative
merits of "aggressive" broadcasts to the USSR in 1970, and,
although coming to no firm conclusion on the subject, did raise
the possibility "...that such talk irritates the international situation
and that it is more moralistic than an information agency
ought to be."97

In September, 1971, the Voice of America became involved in a
"news censorship" controversy. The broadcasts in dispute were
roundups of U.S. newspaper editorials on the decision by a House
of Representatives committee and by the House itself to suspend
military aid to Greece. Two editorial roundups were prepared by
VOA staff members, but neither was broadcast. The first (in July,
1971) was cancelled by VOA Deputy Director William Miller on
the grounds that it was a week old, the second by VOA Director
Kenneth Giddens either because the story had been sufficiently
covered already or that the editorials, most of which supported
the House actions, "... might not be understood by everyone."98

This incident may or may not have caused other Congressional
committees to consider conducting further investigations of the
Voice of America, but one committee soon did. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, acting under authority granted it by
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, opened hearings on the
USIA's 1973 appropriations request on March 20, 1972. Commit-
tee Chairman Fulbright was apparently upset over a proposal by
the Nixon administration to create an independent commission to
supervise Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, to be financed
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through annual appropriation. Since President Nixon had recently completed a trip to the People’s Republic of China and was soon to visit the USSR, Fulbright had difficulty understanding how the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America to the Communist nations could be justified at their present magnitude and “aggressive” content. Nixon had declared his respect for the sovereignty of these countries, had proclaimed his desire for peace, and had seemed to indicate that the United States would avoid “meddling” in their internal affairs.

Fulbright could look back over the past two years for evidence of VOA’s occasional “aggressive” content in its broadcasts to the USSR, and his committee soon uncovered fresh evidence of this nature. In mid-March of 1972, Frank Shakespeare, Henry Loomis and others from the agency visited Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard University. Pipes had been commissioned to listen to some VOA broadcasts in Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Polish and English, in order to make an evaluation of the likely effectiveness of these broadcasts on listeners in the “target” areas. Pipes apparently recommended that the broadcasts might do more to stress the differences among the various nationality groups in the USSR, because Shakespeare soon sent a memo to Ken Towery, head of the agency’s planning office, in which it was stressed that the term “the Soviets” should not be used, but that people living in the USSR should be referred to by their nationality, i.e., Ukrainians, Georgians, etc. The memo went on: “There is no ‘Soviet Union’ and never will be. . . . To call it so, apart from being grammatically incorrect, is to foster the illusion of one happy family rather than an imperialist state increasingly beset with national problems, which is what it is.” Kenneth Giddens was sent a copy of this memo; he had not yet received it, he told the committee, but Henry Loomis affirmed, and Giddens did not deny, that the Voice would seek to implement it.

The committee soon issued its report, which recommended a cut in USIA’s 1973 appropriation of slightly under 25 per cent and in VOA’s portion of the budget of 30 per cent, from $52 million to $36 million. When Shakespeare went before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, he spelled out what this would mean for VOA: a cutback from 790 to 454 hours per week, and in language services from 35 to 11. (As it turned out, the foreign
language broadcasts to the USSR and China were retained.) However the Committee on Appropriations, then the Senate itself, ignored the Foreign Relations Committee and passed an appropriation measure closely resembling the original House appropriations bill.\(^{104}\)

Despite the controversy over VOA's role in a possible new “cold war” and despite the problems of editorial control raised in the “Greek situation,” VOA's basic program schedule itself changed little under the Shakespeare-Giddens administration. In the late 1960s, VOA had extended the “new sound” concept to include program blocks intended specifically for African listeners, bearing such titles as African Safari, African Panorama, Africana and Bonjour l’Afrique. Hosts, hostesses and announcers were often identifiably African, African music was played, African events featured, music requests from African listeners encouraged. The Breakfast Show format was itself extended to include versions in Russian and, in 1972, Ukrainian. The Forum series was reduced to weekly broadcasts, and not all of the regional services of the Voice carried it (Africa, for example, did not). If one compared 1963 and 1973 English schedules, the differences would be striking. The 1963 schedule consisted largely of rigid 15- and 30-minute blocks, the then-new Breakfast Show being the only exception. The 1973 schedule would consist largely of “Breakfast Show” formats, with the 15- and 30-minute shows confined almost entirely to weekends. Many of the “old” features (The American Scene, Science Notebook), which had once had their own slots in the schedule, were now incorporated into hour-long broadcasts bearing umbrella titles such as Report to Europe, Report to the Middle East, etc., and were as long or short as the subject required. Yet the changes in VOA programming that caused difficulties internally and with Congress were largely changes in the content of newcasts, commentaries and editorial roundups.\(^{105}\) Many of the changes also represented conscious attempts to reach certain segments of the audience, among them young Africans, with programming designed to appeal particularly to them. Yet the VOA of 1973 continued to place a good deal of emphasis on programming about American culture and society, as it always had, with the full realization that this programming would never attract the sizes or types of audience attracted by the Breakfast Show or African Panorama. In so doing,
it was carrying out the mandate of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, under the terms of which it was to present a well-rounded picture of life in America to the rest of the world.
Conclusions

As one looks back over the 30-year history of the Voice of America, several observations seem to be worth noting: First, VOA has been willing to experiment with program formats to a degree that is unusual in the field of international broadcasting. Music USA (1954), Special English (1959) and The Breakfast Show (1962) were departures from the “norm” when they were introduced, and the Breakfast Show appears to have had considerable influence on the programming policies of several other international broadcasters, who in recent years have introduced programs closely resembling it. However, the total VOA schedule has changed slowly. The present schedule still includes programs carried since the McCarthy era. (Religion Today, American Music Theater, Concert Hall). At the same time, certain old standbys, such as Forum, have been dropped or drastically reduced. No director of either VOA or USIA has introduced any radical changes in the VOA schedule, and when innovative formats were introduced, they were watched carefully at first, and retained or expanded only when mail response appeared to prove their worth and popularity.

VOA has been criticized over the years by some of its own staff members, particularly those who have served overseas, for failing to take into account reception quality and level of difficulty when many listeners possess a limited command of English. They argue that it does little good to spend time, money and effort on poetic narrative styles, sound effects, “mood” music and multiple-voice productions with varying accents unless you have a special target audience, can obtain a good local placement, and feel strongly that these productions will offer a truly unique and effective means of getting your points across.

Secondly VOA, often with the political encouragement of USIA, has maintained a flexible policy with respect to the languages in which it broadcasts. It has added and dropped languages, increased and decreased broadcast hours. The most recent “casual-
ties” have been Tamil and Japanese, dropped in 1970; Cambodian, Vietnamese and Burmese, cut back sharply in 1972 and 1973. Russian and Ukrainian were increased and Uzbek added in 1973. In the early 1960s, African languages (Hausa, Swahili, Somali) were introduced, and broadcasts to Latin America in Portuguese and Spanish increased substantially. In the late 1950s, direct broadcasts in the Western European languages were sharply cut back or dropped altogether. In times of perceived “crisis,” broadcasts to affected areas have been increased, as to Latin America in 1962 (the Cuban missile crisis) and to Eastern Europe in 1970 (the Polish “food riots”), then decreased as the occasion subsided.

Third, VOA, which has always been faced with problems of poor signal quality and poor shortwave reception, has placed increasing reliance on foreign transmitter sites, principally for medium-wave operations. This has made the agency dependent on the good will of a number of countries—Greece, England, West Germany, Japan, Thailand, Ceylon, Morocco, South Viet Nam, Liberia and the Philippines) to maintain these locations. As in the 1971 “Greek crisis” VOA sometimes pays more than a monetary price for these arrangements. Yet Voice officials feel that, without them, the ability of VOA to reach sizable audiences would be seriously hampered. The price in terms of VOA’s credibility could become too high.

Fourth, both the Voice and USIA continually reassure Congress that a major share of VOA’s effort is directed toward Soviet listeners. The effort has varied over the years, from a growing, then waning, intensity of direct attack on personalities and institutions in the USSR. Between 1947 and 1956 it waxed, then waned in the period 1956 to 1970, only to return to a “harder” line since 1970. These variations have not always seemed to occur in concert with what appears to be official U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. This might be explained by the personal views of officials within VOA and USIA, but more likely by their perceptions of what certain influential members of Congress expect of them.

Fifth, it has not always been clear whether or not the Voice regards itself as an official spokesman for the U.S. government. There has been considerable disagreement over the years as to what freedom VOA has to broadcast material critical of the
policies of any administration, governmental official or unit. The Voice seems to have been much more uninhibited in its coverage of domestic events (e.g., civil rights problems) than in its coverage of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Both categories of coverage have drawn frequent criticism from Congress. (For example, Senator John McClellan told the Senate Appropriations Committee hearings on USIA appropriation requests for 1970: “At times, I thought they gave out more information calculated to impair the esteem of other people for our country than there was to enhance it.” However, VOA and USIA appear to have had a far firmer policy of “truthfulness, honesty and balance” with respect to domestic events, despite Congressional criticisms, than they have with respect to U.S. foreign policy.

Sixth, programming policies seem to be little influenced by the VOA director himself. Most VOA directors have had to concern themselves chiefly with budgets, reports, Congressional testimony, public speeches, and the like. No VOA director has had extensive international broadcasting experience prior to his appointment and few have had any such experience at all. In the virtual absence of direction from the top, initiative with respect to program changes often comes from divisions within VOA: News, Worldwide English, etc.—and from the deputy director for programming, who usually has had international broadcasting experience, either with the agency’s international broadcasting services (VOA, RIAS, the Television Service) or with Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty. Little of this initiative seems to come from the heads of the various language services, perhaps in part because they usually hold these positions only two or three years before returning to overseas posts.

Finally, relations between the Voice of America and other branches of government seem for the most part to have been either non-existent or antagonistic. VOA’s self-perceived need for immediacy in broadcasting news about certain events which the State Department has held to be “delicate” (the Berlin Blockade, the Suez Canal fighting in 1970) have sometimes brought it into direct conflict with State, where there is a body of opinion that the Voice should be under the department’s direct and specific guidance. Few agencies other than Congress and State have had direct clashes with the Voice, but individuals within the Depart-
ment of Defense have expressed misgivings about the wisdom of VOA's broadcasting criticism of government policies, especially when they concern the armed services. Presidents have acknowledged the existence of the Voice of America and have even singled it out for praise; a few have criticized it for specific "errors." None appears to have taken serious account of the role it might play in any specific situation where the government was in a position to plan for its use (e.g., the Cuban invasion in 1961).

The Voice of America faces one major problem as it enters its fourth decade. Can it continue to attract sizable numbers of the "right" kinds of listeners, such as opinion leaders and future opinion leaders? This task is complicated by the growth of television, the growth of relatively sophisticated domestic radio services in the developing nations and the growth of "super-powered" international broadcast transmissions from many nations. There is little that can be done about the first two, except following their growth closely and attempting to provide audiences with fare that domestic broadcasting cannot furnish. This sort of monitoring and examination of program schedules is at present receiving rather little attention, however.

The power problem is another matter. The Voice has added many new high-power (more than 200 KW) transmitters over the past ten years, going from two in 1961 to 45 in 1972. But so have other nations. The worldwide totals for "more than 200 KW" transmitters for the same dates were 16 and 185. One can only assume that there are limits to this expansion, it being both financially burdensome and technically self-defeating. More and more broadcast signals are brought into conflict with each other, to the detriment of general listening quality. Increased placement of VOA broadcasts with domestic stations in other countries would relieve the situation, but this tends to assign foreign governments a large measure of control over these broadcasts. Nevertheless, VOA continues to place considerable emphasis on local placement, where possible.106

In sum, the Voice of America appears to possess the necessary flexibility to cope with the changes that are likely to take place in world broadcasting over the next 10 or 20 years; and it is quite likely that, despite the faults that Congress, the Administration,
and even its own parent agency, might find with it, the Voice of America will continue to serve a useful role as a conveyor of life in America to the rest of the world.
APPENDIX

The Audience for Voice of America Broadcasts

For a variety of reasons, no international broadcasting organization knows a great deal about the audiences it reaches. It is easy to imagine the difficulties attendant upon conducting audience research on a worldwide scale: many of the countries such organizations attempt to reach possess no indigenous survey research firms, and many do not care to see such activities undertaken within their borders, feeling as they do that much research borders on espionage or constitutes a possible starting point for public discontent with the national broadcasting service. There are other ways of gaining knowledge of audience characteristics and reactions—analyses of listener mail and of the reactions of special listener panels are two fairly common ways of doing so—but neither method allows the international broadcaster to determine with any accuracy just how typical such characteristics and reactions are of the audience as a whole.

Despite these difficulties, the Voice of America has undertaken various kinds of audience research almost since its creation, and can now with some confidence claim to possess a reasonably clear profile of the physical characteristics of its audience. In a period reaching from 1958 to 1966, VOA’s parent organization, the U.S. Information Agency, conducted a series of ‘World Opinion’ surveys in which random samples of the citizenry of several developed countries (e.g. Great Britain, France, Italy, West Germany) were asked a number of questions about their opinions on various public issues, but about their media habits, as well; although the questions relating to media usage varied from one ‘World Opinion’ survey to the next, most of the surveys included at least one question about the extent of VOA (and other national and international station) listening on the part of each respondent. In most cases, fewer than five per cent of the respondents of any nation reported listening to VOA once a week or more: this audience was
itself likely to be well-educated, male, urban and between 21 and 50 years of age. Respondants were not asked what particular VOA broadcasts they listened to or what they thought of VOA programing.

During the period 1960-1970, USIA began to conduct a number of survey research projects in the developing countries, usually by working through research firms in London, Paris, Nairobi, Beirut, Mexico City, New Delhi, Bangkok, etc. Many of these surveys dealt with the specific topic of listening to international broadcasting, and VOA began to gain a clearer impression of its audiences in these areas. The overall profile did not differ markedly from that revealed in the 'World Opinion' surveys, but frequency of listening to VOA often did: surveys taken in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (1966), in Colombia (1962), in the Ivory Coast (1970), in India (1968) and in Seoul and Manila (1965) revealed that 8 to 33 per cent of the respondants in these countries or cities claimed to listen to VOA once a week or more. Most of these surveys, however (and most surveys taken by USIA in the developing countries during that decade) were not taken on a nationwide random sample basis; they were limited to urban areas, in most cases, and sometimes to males, as well. Certain other countries and cities showed less favorable figures: Japan (1968), Mexico City (1964 and 1965), Northeast Thailand (1964 and 1968) and Singapore and Kuala Lumpur (1965) showed figures only slightly higher than those registered in the 'World Opinion' surveys. In all of these surveys, the claims of individual respondents as to their listening habits were taken at face value, but USIA/VOA involvement in the survey was not revealed, and respondents were asked about their listening habits with respect to several stations, and not just VOA.

A few VOA studies undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970s went more deeply into the matters of program preference and relative ease of comprehension on the part of VOA listeners. Surveys undertaken among urban listeners and/or ‘target’ audiences in Saigon (1966), East Africa (1966) India (1968) and Nigeria (1972) appeared to indicate that VOA’s music programs were generally popular (especially in Nigeria, where listeners can receive different VOA popular music programs intended especially for African listeners); that news broadcasts are widely listened to by the better educated respondents; that Special En-
lish news and features have a strong following among the better educated respondents, as well; but that, where comparisons can easily be made, VOA is likely to be seen as slightly to considerably less credible than BBC, although VOA outranks its other foreign competitors in each case. Comprehension of program content was surveyed in a 1960 mail survey of Forum listeners and in the 1968 India survey. High degrees of comprehension were reported in each case, but one should bear in mind that a) these were most likely to be well-educated listeners in the first place; and b) there was no “test” applied to see whether what the listeners thought they understood coincided with what the VOA thought it was getting across.

USIA/VOA research—both survey and solicited listener mail—has also probed such matters as preferred listening times, preferred languages of broadcast (English usually comes out ahead of ‘local’ languages such as Hausa, Swahili and Hindi for the better-educated listeners, while the less well-educated, less well-off listeners show some preference for the ‘local’ language), preferred broadcast frequencies, etc., and, since 1972, has been directed toward gathering data through the use of a rather brief survey form that would be used over time to give some ‘trend’ data on the composition of the VOA audience and the amounts (but not types) of listening it does in several countries around the world. Surveys in this series, called the ‘Continuous Audience Analysis Profile’, have already been undertaken in Great Britain, Mexico, Ivory Coast, The Philippines, Colombia, Lebanon and Thailand; all but Great Britain and Lebanon were urban samples, and only in Ivory Coast (33.7%), Colombia (7.8%) and Lebanon (9.4%) was VOA listening reported to be in excess of 5% at the ‘once a week or more’ level. Virtually all of these surveys seem to confirm the sort of listener profile reported earlier, although the large amounts of music readily available to, and specifically tailored for, African audiences probably helped to account for the large number (40% of the total number of weekly listeners) of young (18-24) people who claimed to listen to VOA in French once a week or more in the Ivory Coast.

Certain more specialized aspects of likely or actual program impact have been examined through such means as specialized listener panels (see Footnote 100 below; see also my ERIC report,
pp. 28-33; cited in Footnote 1 of this Appendix); periodic internal review; and review by individual experts (see p. 64). Most of these devices are intended to provide answers to the basic question of effectiveness: what is likely to be understood and accepted, or misunderstood and rejected, in these broadcasts? This process of review is sporadic, however, and, in the final analysis, produces only educated guesses instead of unambiguous answers. More such answers may occasionally come through reports from USIA and State Department field personnel who have happened to hear a government official 'use' a point broadcast by VOA, with or without attribution, or have received a request for further information based on something heard over VOA, but such evidence of effectiveness is not common.

In the absence of firm evidence, it could be contended that those who listen to VOA are 'friends' of the United States to begin with, and hardly need convincing. It may, however, be well to keep them convinced and to provide them with fresh information to use in conversations with their friends. It could also be contended that large numbers of VOA listeners tune to the station only for music, of which there is undeniably a great deal. Whether these listeners also pay attention to the brief news reports and features that are sandwiched in among the musical selections on many of these programs is a question that VOA hasn't really probed, but that sort of reaction is certainly its hope. It may also be that listeners attracted to VOA through its music will become listeners to more serious fare in time, but again, this assumption has not been specifically tested.

What VOA does know about its audience with some degree of certainty is that it compares favorably in size and composition with the worldwide audience for the BBC, even if VOA comes off second best in terms of credibility. It also knows that its audience is not often numerically large in comparison with the overall radio audience in most countries, but that it seems able to attract a higher proportion of better-educated, more affluent, potentially more influential (in terms of occupation) listeners than it attracts of their opposites. This audience is also quite 'mature' in terms of age, but hardly 'old' (60+) and not as predominantly 'young' (21 or less) as many of the listener mail contests held during the 1960s had led some officials to believe. In sum, while there are many
important things that VOA does not know about its audience (principally in terms of comprehension and credibility, but also in terms of the sort of audience it has in non-urban areas, especially in the developing nations), the size and composition of the audience—and, to some extent, its program preferences—are by now fairly clear.

USIA Research studies are available at various repositories in American Universities (e.g., the University of Minnesota). A complete list of these repositories is available from the Agency’s Office of Research and Assessment, USIA, Washington, D.C., 20547. The chief studies cited in the Appendix are listed below:


*Use of the Mass Media by University Students in Saigon*, Report R-128-66, December, 1966


*VOA Target Group Contestants and Listeners in India: A Comparison*, Report R-6-71, April, 1971

*Listening to the Voice of America and Other External Broadcasters in Nigeria*, Report M-81-72, October, 1972


*1972 VOA Audience Estimate for Colombia*, Report E-12-73, May, 1973

*VOA Audience Estimate for Lebanon*, Report E-14-73, August, 1973

NOTES


2. Rolo says General Electric had been active in international broadcasting since 1926; the author has found neither confirmation nor denial of this. (Rolo, *op. cit.*, p. 239.) NBC and CBS were both experimenting with short-wave transmissions as early as 1929, but did not transmit regular broadcasts until the late 1930s.

3. As of early 1939, the NBC and CBS international stations were carrying 10 to 25 percent specially prepared material, not all of it in Spanish and Portuguese; the remainder of the time was devoted to regular network shows in English. Thomas Grandin, *The Political Use of Radio*, Geneva Studies, Vol. X, No. 3 (August 1939), p. 63.


5. Quoted in Whitton and Herz, *loc. cit.* This was long-range speculation in several senses. The statement, made in 1938, predated by a year the FCC decision to permit American international broadcasting organizations to carry advertisements. Furthermore, the FCC regulation limited such advertising to "no more than the name of the sponsor of the program and the name and general character of the commodity, utility or service, or attraction advertised." (Cited in Grandin, *op. cit.*, p. 67.) In the period 1939-1942 none of the American stations came close to showing a profit. NBC did better than the other operations, with $150,000 for 1941. All of the operations save Lemmon's WIXAL and possibly CBS tried various schemes to attract American advertisers, however; see Rolo, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-45, for an account of their activities.

6. A brief account of the Celler bill and the debate surrounding it, including the passages quoted, will be found in Grandin, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5. In the late 1940s, Ethridge became chairman of the Advisory Commission on Information, which reported on the activities of the informational programs of the State Department; these included the Voice of America, which by that time had a virtual monopoly on American international broadcasting.

7. As did two other proposals along the same line. A bill introduced in the Senate, and on which hearings were also held in May, 1938, is covered in *Variety*, CXXX (May 25, 1938), p. 27, under the title "Culture's Weak Case—Can't Show Much on Propaganda."

8. They were aided in their efforts *vis-à-vis* South America by a special division, established in August, 1940, by the State Department, whose mission it was to encourage better cultural relations between the two continents. This division eventually became the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and, nearly a year before the United States entered the war, it was given the responsibility of coordinating radio broadcasts and other information activities for Latin America. CIAA remained in existence
throughout World War II, and had jurisdiction over Voice of America broadcasts to Latin America. The Foreign Information Service, a division of the Office of Coordinator of Information, was organized in August, 1941, and, like CIAA, attempted to enlist the cooperation of the private broadcasters in telling the "official" American story to the rest of the world (excluding Latin America). The private stations were under no obligation to accept CIAA or FIS newsfiles or broadcasts, and sometimes criticized the latter on the grounds of their clumsiness, which in one case consisted of including a funeral dirge in a broadcast of music to occupied Norway; see "U.S. Takes Over Short Waves . . .," Newsweek Vol. 20, Oct. 19, 1942, p. 31, and John K. Hutchins, "This Is America Speaking," New York Times Magazine, May 10, 1942, p. 10ff. Even as of September, 1942, there were problems of coordination between the various U.S. stations which allowed the Germans to point out certain discrepancies in their accounts of the news. See Stefan U. Rundt, "Short Wave Artillery," The Nation, Sept. 12, 1942, p. 212. The "pre-war" heads of CIAA and FIS, Nelson Rockefeller and Robert Sherwood, remained in these positions until late in World War II. See James Warburg, Unwritten Treaty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), Ch. 8, for an account of this period and some of these problems. Certain private stations, notably WRUL and KGEI, were effectively "infiltrated" by British intelligence, supported financially, used to send out material directed against the Axis partners and broadcast in numerous languages. See H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), pp. 157-62, and Corey Ford, Donovan of O.S.S. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970) p. 113. A most thorough account of CIAA and FIS activities can be found in Pirsein (cited in Preface), Chs. 1 and 2.

9. More precise figures are lacking, and the figures cited are somewhat deceptive; not all of the 100 hours broadcast to Europe was in European languages or even prepared expressly for European listeners, and only a little over half of the 500 newscasts for South America were in Spanish and Portuguese. See Rolo, op. cit., pp. 240 and 249, and Grandin, op. cit., pp. 63 and 67.

10. See Rolo, op. cit., pp. 249-53, for a brief description of the NBC international division.

11. Whitton and Herz, op. cit., p. 48. CIAA officials were disturbed enough about this lack of coordination that they developed a plan for leasing air time from these firms, rather than relying upon them for whatever air time the firms themselves might decide to make available for CIAA-prepared material. The plan failed, chiefly because other government officials could not accept the principle of paying for air time in this manner and at this time (1941). See Pirsein, op. cit.


13. An OWI official, Wallace Carroll, attributes this delay to Roosevelt's distaste for propaganda: "He had been opposed to the creation of a propa-
ganda service and had established OWI with considerable reluctance. . . . Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered about it."

Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 7. Carroll also contended that Roosevelt" . . . never knew what (the OWI) was doing and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship." (Carroll, *ibid.*.) One could of course contend that the Foreign Information Service was charged with the same responsibilities, but it was not a formal governmental department and its powers of control over private international broadcasting stations were somewhat limited. The head of FIS' "parent" organization, Col. William Donovan, was more concerned with information gathering and with strategic aspects of psychological warfare than with information dissemination of the sort that would be done by the Voice of America. The task of OWI and of its head, Elmer Davis, was clearly to be in the field of information dissemination.

14. Some of these stations were already under FIS supervision, and OWI simply took over. Still more stations would have been under FIS, according to James Warburg, had it not been for competition from CIAA. (Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 80.) Elmer Davis pronounced himself satisfied with OWI-CIAA cooperation. [Elmer Davis, "Report to the President," *Journalism Monographs* No. 7 (1968), p. 55.]

15. The name "Voice of America" was apparently first used for the coordinated international broadcasting services in February, 1942. However, it was not used consistently in all language services and for all types of programs, and there is some question as to whether the overall broadcast service ever during World War II bore an official designation of "Voice of America." Many magazine articles and newspaper reports used that title, but William Benton claims to be the "father" of its official use, which, he states, did not come until 1946. See Sydney Hyman, *The Lives of William Benton* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 331-2. Interestingly, the VOA's signature tune in this early period was "Yankee Doodle," which was later dropped in favor of "Columbia the Gem of the Ocean," but restored in 1967.

16. Elmer Davis, "OWI Has a Job" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, VII (Spring 1943), 8-10. One of Davis' deputies, James Warburg, has said that Davis hedged on this matter, however, and cites as evidence Davis' June, 1945, testimony to the House of Representatives, in which he said "We tell a true story to every area but to each one we tell the kind of true story that will best suit our interests." (Warburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-13). Warburg criticized Davis severely for failing to press for consideration of the psychological aspects of warfare before the makers of U.S. foreign policy. Davis' own wartime writings and his 1945 "Report to the President" give the impression that he was far more interested in the domestic side of OWI than its foreign aspects. ("Report to the President," *op. cit.*, p. 12).

17. For further details on programing during this period, see "U.S. Arsenal of Words," *Fortune*, March, 1943, pp. 82-85ff; "The Voice of America Speaks," *Popular Mechanics*, June 1944, pp. 1-5ff; Harold Callender,

18. From over two years earlier, FIS, then OWI, had had access to a limited amount of transmitting time over BBC facilities, chiefly for medium wave broadcasts in French, German and English. See "U.S. Arsenal of Words," Fortune, loc. cit. p. 174. A similar arrangement existed with Australia.

19. Daniel Lerner, who worked with OWI, has asserted that OSS and other "disguised" broadcast operations harmed the OWI effort, since most reasonably intelligent listeners were not often misled as to the point of origin of these broadcasts, and thus may have had doubts regarding the truth of OWI broadcasts from the same source. See Daniel Lerner, Sykewar (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949), passim.

20. The most famous of these "black" (disguised origin) American broadcast stations was "Operation Annie." The British and Americans were jointly involved in a number of these enterprises, including Gustav Siegfried Eins, Soldatensender Calais, Atlantiksender and several others. Some of these are described in Lerner, op. cit., and in Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang (New York: The Viking Press, 1962).

21. Sherwood developed a reputation as a very poor administrator soon after he was chosen to head the Foreign Information Service in 1941. His prestige as a playwright enabled him to enlist many distinguished American men of letters. He was apparently chosen for this position at the express wish of President Roosevelt, who does not appear to have given much thought to either Sherwood's duties or his suitability for the job. See Ford, op. cit., pp. 125-6; Walter J. Meserve, Robert Sherwood—Reluctant Moralist (New York: Pegasus, 1970), pp. 171-80 and Roger Burlingame, Don't Let Them Scare You (Cornwall, N.Y.: Cornwall Press, 1961), pp. 221-50, for further information on Sherwood's work with FIS and OWI. Davis praised him for developing a program for handling political campaign news in overseas information "to which the bitterest partisans could take no exception." Davis, "Report to the President," op. cit., p. 78. In 1944, however, Rep. Clarence Brown (R., Ohio) claimed that OWI broadcasts failed to report opposition to Roosevelt, or did so with insufficient detail; see "Says High Officials Block OWI Inquiry," New York Times March 15, 1944, p. 21.

22. Davis, too, soon acquired a reputation for being a poor administrator. His reputation as a journalist was well established, however, and it may have been that President Roosevelt—who again took a personal interest in the appointment—hoped that Davis would be able to deal effectively with his fellow journalists in releasing or not releasing information. There is nothing to suggest that Roosevelt and his advisors ever considered the foreign aspects of OWI operations or Davis' suitability for the position from this angle. The Meserve and Burlingame books cited in the previous footnote are useful for background on Davis' work with OWI, as is Warburg, op. cit., and "Once More, Where's Elmer?" Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1944, pp. 53-4. Davis himself
claimed to be satisfied with his ability to maintain liaison with most government departments, although State sometimes gave him problems. Various structures existed to bring OWI in on policy coordination. The Overseas Branch of OWI, for example, had an Overseas Planning Board, which Sherwood chaired and which contained representatives from the Departments of State, Navy and War. ("U.S. Arsenal of Words," op. cit., Elmer Davis, "Report to the President," op. cit., pp. 32-4, 43-4, 73-4.) Warburg, however, asserts that, while Davis might have been present for such meetings, he regarded his position as a publicity job, and thus "deprived the United States psychological warfare agency of having a voice in the shaping of foreign policy." (Warburg, op. cit., p. 89.)


24. MacMahon, ibid., pp. 48 and 54.


28. Benton's biographer, Sydney Hyman, [The Lives of William Benton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970)] asserts that Benton had to carry on the task almost singlehandedly. Secretary of State James Byrnes supported him, but was occupied with other matters; Byrnes allegedly told Benton that no one in the State Department was likely to help him get the legislative and budgetary programs through (Hyman, p. 349). Throughout the chapters dealing with Benton's period of service as Assistant Secretary for Information, in fact, Hyman introduces evidence—some documented, much not—that the State Department was indifferent if not hostile to the idea of operating a "propaganda program." Dean Acheson and George Marshall are particularly singled out in this respect (Hyman, 339, 364, 385). At one point, Hyman says, certain State Department officials actually "planted" stories about problems in the information program with key Congressmen, so that Benton would have difficulty winning Congressional approval for the program (Hyman, p. 375). Newsweek corroborates Benton's difficulties with his State Department colleagues to some degree ("U.S. to the World," Newsweek, Aug. 16, 1948, pp. 50-2.) Hyman claims that President Truman gave Benton advice as to how to approach key members of Congress, but Truman's own attitude toward overseas information activities in general and the Voice of America in particular is never disclosed in his Memoirs. Truman did speak strongly in VOA's favor when an elaborate plan to construct a "ring" of transmitters around the U.S.S.R. was seriously jeopardized by a budget-minded Congress in 1951.


31. Principally from economy-minded Republicans, who controlled the 80th Congress, some of whom very nearly succeeded in removing all financial support for international broadcasting. See Paulu, op. cit., p. 111.

32. But see Paulu, op. cit., for a thorough presentation of these debates.


36. Cited in Marjorie Foulkrod, "Short Wave of the Future," Current History, 13 (July 1947), p. 13. This article gives a good capsule of VOA programing at this time, as does testimony of Kenneth Fry, then head of the International Broadcasting Division of the State Department, cited in hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 1st Session, on the Department of State Appropriations Bill for 1948. See especially pp. 494-505.

36a. Congressional Record: 94:2, pp. 2165-6.

37. Further excerpts from these broadcasts may be found in the Congressional Record: 94:5, pp. 6462-66.


39. Again, Paulu, op. cit., pp. 159-72 provides the most detailed account. Sarnoff resurrected his proposal once again in 1951, but it awakened little interest.

40. The annual report of the Advisory Commission on Information is available through the United States Information Agency in Washington, D.C.

41. See W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). Newsweek reported that VOA was told by the State Department to "lay off" broadcasts on the blockade when it was first imposed, until "Washington could make up its mind." See "U.S. to the World," Newsweek, Aug. 16, 1948, p. 51.


43. A joint Congressional committee studying the Mundt bill in late 1947 had made a bold "anti-Communist" statement about VOA programing: "The Voice of America should, with the aim of discomfiting the local government and encouraging the resistance of the people in totalitarian and satellite countries, broadcast back to the country concerned news items and commentaries on events, the publicity of which the local authorities seek to suppress" (italics added). The Committee's emphasis, however, was on the VOA as an instrument of truth about America. See U.S. Senate Report No. 855, 80th Congress, Second Session, p. 7.
VOA broadcasts in Russian to the Soviet Union began in February, 1947; when the State Department, in December, 1946, publicly announced its intention of initiating these broadcasts, it stated that they would probably be used "... to answer charges sometimes contained in the Russian press and radio." (New York Times, December 17, 1946, p. 11, col. 1.) Assistant Secretary of State William Benton directly challenged the authority of the U.S. commander in Germany, Lucius Clay, in order to obtain the "right" to use a powerful long-wave transmitter located in Munich, which Benton saw as the key element in the effective transmission of broadcasts to Russia. (Hyman, op. cit., pp. 340, 347-8.)


See "The Voice of America: What It Tells the World," Time, May 1, 1950, pp. 22-3. One particular VOA broadcast showed that Congress, although pleased with VOA's activities in combatting Communism, still kept a sharp eye on the operation: a German announcer, broadcasting for the Voice from Frankfurt just after a crucial German national election, developed the thesis that the U.S. was no longer a true capitalistic state, but had acquired some strong elements of socialism. Predictably, this upset many Congressmen, who called for VOA to exert stricter internal control. By this time, the head of the Voice was stationed in Washington, and he or his deputy travelled to the VOA production center in New York three times a week, a situation which cannot have helped policy coordination. See U.S. House of Rep., 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Dept. of State Appropriations Hearings for FY 1951, Part 1, pp. 1085-93.

VOA had begun its quest for more medium wave transmitters in World War II. Elmer Davis realized the difficulties inherent in reaching listeners with shortwave broadcasts only, and had developed plans for a fairly comprehensive network of medium wave transmitters by 1943; many of these transmitters were never built, but the intent was clear. See Elmer Davis, War Information and Censorship (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), p. 20. For details on increases in transmitting power, see "State Department is Due for a Louder Voice," Business Week, August 5, 1950, pp. 89-90.

Many of the proposed new transmitters, particularly some of those to be located on the West Coast, were never built; Senator McCarthy, in his investigation of VOA in 1953, turned up "evidence" that the design and/or
location of certain transmitters was faulty, blamed Communist influence in part and the expansion program came to a halt. This program, commonly known as the “ring” plan (see Note 28), had already been set in motion, and some transmitters were under construction. Congress had given preliminary approval to the program in 1950, but when the State Department, at President Truman’s request, asked Congress for nearly 90 million dollars in 1951, so that the program might be completed in one year instead of three, both Houses attempted to slash the appropriation request, and it required strong pressure by Truman and a number of “key” Congressmen to get the cut restored. Several years later, the Voice of America developed a five year facilities plan, designed to replace some of the old shortwave transmitters (a few dating from the late 1930s) and to “reactivate” certain elements of the “ring” plan, notably the construction of a powerful transmitter complex in North Carolina. See Pirsein, op. cit., Ch. 6.


53. Busbey was particularly concerned about VOA broadcasts discussing the possibility of a “second front” in Europe. This, he argued, was not U.S. military policy, but was that of the Russians. See “Asks House Inquiry on Aliens in OWI,” New York Times, December 11, 1943, p. 8. Senator Pat McCarran held hearings on possible Communist and fellow traveler infiltration of the Voice in July, 1951; see “McCarran Charges ‘Slanting’ of Voice,” New York Times, July 10, 1951, p. 7. McCarthy himself had challenged the loyalty of certain VOA staff members earlier that year; see New York Times, April 29, 1951, p. 29. Consult Pirsein, op. cit., Chs. 7-10, for a thorough review of VOA’s problems during the McCarthy era.

54. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 34. McCarthy also questioned one former and one present employee of VOA’s French service, whose testimony disclosed four or five minor instances of VOA-broadcast material that reflected unfavorably upon the United States, plus a rebroadcast by VOA of a speech by Russian Ambassador Jakob Malik to the United Nations; this testimony prompted McCarthy to ask rhetorically, “Would you not say that instead of calling this the Voice of America, so far as the desk (French) you described is concerned, a more appropriate title would be the Voice of Moscow?” (U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, p. 185.) Elmer Davis observed that “In the spring of 1953 the Veterans of Foreign Wars extracted a promise from VOA that it would not put on its programs any of the music of Roy Harris, who in 1943 had composed a symphony which he dedicated to the Soviet Union.” Elmer Davis, But We Were Born Free (London: Andre Deutsch, 1955), p. 41.

55. Dizard, The Strategy of Truth, op. cit., pp. 74, 87. As of mid-1953, VOA Director Erikson was still arguing for hard-hitting, forceful, emotional presentations for audiences behind the Iron Curtain, although he favored more dispassionate broadcasts elsewhere. (Sorensen, op. cit., p. 43.) But one of his predecessors, Foy Kohler, mistrusted the negativism of such a policy,
feeling that, if the Communists began to "open some of the doors" that both we and they had so resolutely blocked, we would "fall flat on our faces." (Edwin Kretzmann, "McCarthy and the Voice of America," Foreign Service Journal, February, 1967, pp. 26ff.) Kretzmann's article contains much interesting information about the climate of suspicion and resentment at the Voice which, he believes, made it easier for McCarthy to obtain much of his "evidence."

56. The Voice of America had originally been established in New York City because the main foreign language commercial broadcasting operations with which it worked (CBS, NBC) were located there, and because of New York's relative abundance of potential talent for such other foreign language services as VOA might require.

57. Barrett, op. cit., p. 85. However, individual Congressmen continued to think of VOA in this way for some time to come. In the Senate hearings on the Appropriations Bill for FY 1958, Senator Allan Ellender—a frequent critic of the U.S. Information Agency—said, "After all, the reason why the Voice of America was created, as I understood it, was to extol the virtues of democracy to our potential enemies, to people behind the Iron Curtain who did not understand our way of life." Agency Director Arthur Larson then stated that 75 to 80 percent of VOA broadcasts were directed behind the Iron Curtain. See U.S. Senate, Hearings on H.R. 6871 (U.S.I.A. Appropriations for FY 1958), p. 489.


59. Poland, however, stopped jamming VOA and BBC broadcasts shortly after its 1956 revolution. VOA's possible role in encouraging the 1956 Hungarian and Polish uprisings received brief attention in the House Appropriations Committee hearings for FY 1958, and no attention in the Senate Appropriations Committee hearings that same year. Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, was subjected to three investigations in this matter.

60. Larson has continued his crusade in private life. The full title of his most recent book is Propaganda: Toward Disarmament in the War of Words. His idealism in this regard bears some resemblance to the "truth above all else" spirit of the BBC External (International) Broadcasting Service, but has also been repeated by most agency directors, most notably George Allen and Edward Murrow. It should be noted, however, that Larson had begun to temper his statements shortly before leaving office, as witness this excerpt from a late 1957 USIA basic guidance paper: "... our standards may on occasion require us to relate facts which are unfavorable to us, when failure to do so would damage our believability" (italics added). Cited in Sorensen, op. cit., p. 99.

61. He may also have brought a measure of "old habit." Sorensen says that Allen seriously considered recommending the establishment of a nonpar-
artisan board of distinguished Americans to govern VOA and putting the rest of USIA back in the State Department, but adds that Allen never pressed the proposal with Eisenhower. (Sorensen, op. cit. p. 105). Hyman (op. cit., p. 388) states that Allen was replaced as head of IIA in 1950 because he was “unsuited to its special demands.” A special panel (the so-called Stanton committee, after its chairman, Frank Stanton of CBS) is studying the possible reorganization of USIA. Its report is scheduled to be released in late 1974 or early 1975, but several VOA and USIA acquaintances have learned that the panel is very likely to submit a recommendation much like Allen’s, at least to the extent of separating VOA from USIA and returning the latter to the State Department.

62. George Allen, “U.S. Propaganda a Big mistake,” Boston Globe, Aug. 11, 1963, Section 1, p. 2. “Special English,” the VOA’s 1,200-word vocabulary, 90-word-per-minute version of the language, also came into being during the Allen era—in 1959.

63. The Middle East crisis led to one of the rare instances in which a President publicly criticized a specific VOA program (or, in this case, attempt at programming). In his memoirs, President Eisenhower says, “I had been told that a representative of the Voice of America had tried to obtain from a senator a statement opposing our landing of troops in Lebanon. In a state of some pique I informed Secretary Dulles that this was carrying the policy of ‘free broadcasting’ too far. The Voice of America should, I said, employ truth as a weapon in support of free world objectives, but it had no mandate or license to seek evidence of lack of domestic support of America’s foreign policies and actions.” See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years; Waging Peace, 1956-61 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp 278-9.

64. Interview with VOA European correspondant Bill McCrory, Beirut, Lebanon, December 4, 1973.

65. The first was Theodore Streibert, whose experience was at the executive level. Streibert headed USIA from 1954 to 1956.

66. A number of VOA and USIA staff members who served in the Murrow era have corroborated this impression and a few VOA staff members have expressed a sense of disappointment that Murrow seemed particularly reluctant to let his expert judgment in broadcasting overrule the judgment of officials in charge of VOA. Murrow did work with VOA staff members on stylistic matters and once spent about ten days at the VOA dealing with them. (Interview with Louis T. Olum, staff director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, conducted by Robert Joy, July 22, 1968. Cited in Joy’s “The Influence of Edward R. Murrow on the U.S.I.A.,” unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, 1968, p. 98.) But one VOA senior reporter derived great comfort from the feeling that, in a “pressure” situation, Murrow would oppose efforts of other Government officials to get VOA to distort or suppress news. (Interview with William McCrory, Beirut, Lebanon, December 4, 1973.)

67. Murrow’s professional background also caused general elation in agency ranks. One USIA employee said, “Our morale... shot up 2,000 per
cent when it became official that Murrow was accepting President Kennedy’s request.” Cited in the New York Post, February 5, 1961, p. 2.

68. The Greenville project was actually approved by Congress before Murrow took office. Construction started in March, 1960. Murrow in turn initiated action on the construction of some high-power medium-wave facilities in the Far East, which started up under the subsequent administrations of USIA Directors Carl Rowan and Leonard Marks. The Liberia project had been discussed at least as early as 1947; see Foulkrod, op. cit. Murrow also attempted to negotiate the construction of a VOA relay station in India to replace the old Ceylon facility, but the plan fell apart shortly before the final agreement was to be signed. U.S. Ambassador to India Chester Bowles attributes this failure to the opposition of powerful individuals in India (newspaper editors prominent among them) on grounds of India’s neutrality in the East-West conflict. See Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 466.

69. The stations turned over their entire broadcast schedule to VOA programming during the crisis. This was not the first time that the government had enlisted the aid of private stations for such purposes. WRUL, for example, was employed in much the same manner in the 1954 Guatemalan crisis. One source has said that Murrow later regretted the “saturation” technique but I have been unable to confirm this. VOA Director Henry Loomis reportedly deplored the “monolithic tone” the Voice was “compelled to adopt” and carried his protest to Murrow. See Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 484.

70. See VOA Memorandum “Analysis of Breakfast Show Contest Mail,” August 16, 1967.


72. Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 189-41. Schlesinger believes Murrow in fact knew nothing of the proposed Bay of Pigs invasion. See Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 259, 272. Kendrick states that Murrow was qualified to attend the crucial National Security Council meeting at which the final decision to launch the invasion was taken, but that he was not invited. (Kendrick, op. cit., p. 462.)


75. Sorensen disagrees, claiming that Murrow had considerable influence at the highest levels: “Other directors of USIA sat in high councils of Government; but none had the influence Mr. Murrow had. He spoke little, but when he spoke he had something to say and the President and his colleagues in the Executive Branch listened.” Sorensen, letter to the editor, Washington Post, May 5, 1965, p. 14. Sorensen’s The Word War lavishes praise on Murrow. Most of my USIA colleagues who served in the Murrow era
and who had occasion to deal with him felt that he was not exceptional as an administrator or policy maker, and that he felt hampered by the layers of Civil Service bureaucracy which often slowed the carrying out of policy and even distorted it. When, in May, 1963, Murrow was interviewed in London by John Morgan of the BBC, he answered Morgan’s question regarding what advice he would have for the American government in terms of helping the image of America by saying, “Well, now I must give you a bureaucratic answer. It is no part of my function to give advice to the American government.” Schlesinger says Murrow played an important part in a National Security Council discussion of possible American responses to a Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, but he also indicates that Murrow remained silent at most Council meetings. (Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 448-9; 456; 460.) Many, however, regarded him as a highly effective spokesman for USIA vis-à-vis Congress and the general public, and there seems little doubt that he brought greater prestige to USIA where public and Congressional opinion were concerned. He was not, however, entirely able to avoid problems in dealing with Congress. In 1962, VOA failed to broadcast reports on hearings held by the Subcommittee on Europe of the House of Representatives regarding the “captive nations” of Eastern Europe until the hearings were nearly over. Murrow was “astonished and distressed” to hear of this when the House subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements somewhat angrily brought it to his attention. See “Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive,” Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, March 28, 1963, p. 28.


77. See Kendrick, op. cit., p. 458, for further details of the “Harvest of Shame” episode. There was also a very confused situation regarding the possible role of the Kennedy Administration in “using” the VOA to weaken the authority of Vietnamese President Ngo Dien Diem in 1963. Roger Hilsman, a member of the Kennedy administration, gives an account of this complex episode in To Move A Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), Ch. 31, passim, but especially p. 289.


81. Lloyd Garrison, “John Chancellor of NBC Named Director of the
Voice of America," New York Times; July 29, 1965, p. 1f. Chancellor has the distinction of being the only VOA director whose appointment was announced by the President in the course of a statement to the press. Hugh Sidey feels that this had much to do with President Johnson’s desire to include a “mixture” of news in his statement, part of which dealt with an escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Hugh Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 234-5.


83. Dramatic documentaries, which have been on the air since the earliest days of VOA, are among its more controversial program formats. Even today, many of them make prominent use of music, sound effects, multiple voices, and complex, even poetical narrative styles, all of which are quite ill-suited to transmission by short wave and can cause comprehension difficulty by foreign audiences.


85. The full text of the directive:
   “The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern VOA broadcasts:
   “1. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.
   “2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.
   “3. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.”

86. “And fie on you,” op. cit.

87. Richard Walton, “Memorandum to John Daly,” The Nation, 205 (August 28, 1967), pp. 135-8; also letter to the editor of The Nation, 205 (September 25, 1967), pp. 258f. Various VOA staff members agree. Earlier in 1967, one of the editors of The Nation had accused the Voice of employing a false historical analogy in a VOA analysis of the April 15, 1967, anti-war demonstrations in New York, an analogy which argued that many well-intentioned people had let themselves be duped into making common cause with Communists by taking part in the demonstration. See “The VOA Technique,” The Nation, 204 (June 5, 1967), p. 709.

88. VOA staff members told me in July, 1967, that President Johnson had also suggested the name of Nancy Dickerson, then an NBC correspondent, as a possible nominee for the post. Sentiment in VOA itself seemed to be heavily against Miss Dickerson.

89. “Daly View of ‘Voice’ Criticized in House,” New York Times, June 1, 1967, p. 15. John Rooney has been one of the severest Congressional critics of the United States Information Agency and of VOA.

91. "Voice of Truth?" loc. cit.

92. Giddens himself told the Senate in 1972 that he "... didn't know anything about it (VOA)" when appointed other than being aware of its existence. ("USIA Appropriations Authorization, FY 1973," Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd session, p. 274.) Giddens was the subject of an attack by Pravda in August, 1972, which accused VOA of attempting to "inject bourgeois propaganda into the minds of young people under the narcotic effect of music and entertainment," and called Giddens an Alabama millionaire who "maintains the closest relations with the chieftains of the Fascist-acting John Birch Society." (Hedrick Smith, "The Soviet Press Steps Up Attack on U.S. After Lull," New York Times, September 3, 1972, p. 11.)

93. Shakespeare was interviewed by William Buckley for the PBS program "Firing Line" on February 1, 1973. After stating that, during his tenure as USIA Director, the organization had been attacked more heavily by the Soviet press and leadership than it had been under previous directors, Shakespeare went on to explain why: "I think that probably stems from the fact that we have tried in the last four years to make a basic issue of what we consider to be the philosophical differences between the two societies, namely, the Judaic-Christian tradition in the United States and the Marxist-Leninist-atheistic tradition there. A real clash was involved."


96. USIA's 35th Semi-Annual Report to Congress (July-December, 1970) singles out VOA broadcasts on Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "dissent" within the USSR, the formation by three Soviet scientists of a "Human Rights Committee" (to promote individual freedom within the USSR), the Khrushchev Memoirs (especially his "admission that it was the Soviet Union that attacked Finland in 1940"), and the statements of several prominent Soviet defectors or dissidents, in which "... listeners could hear them describe the repression in their own Russian language." The report also mentions the increased broadcasts to Poland at the time of the food riots in Northern Poland (December, 1970); VOA broadcasts in Polish were temporarily increased by 300%, in Czech and Slovak by 20%, and in Hungarian by 25%. The 36th Semi-Annual Report (January-June, 1971), calls attention to the initiation of a two-hour long Russian language version of the Breakfast Show, as well as a one-hour long Ukrainian version (which also meant a doubling of the broadcast time for Ukrainian, from seven to fourteen hours per week).


98. Frank Shakespeare had advanced the "sufficient coverage" argument in testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Giddens himself had allegedly made the latter statement to reporters Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, and had tied it in with the necessity for restraint when dealing with a subject likely to antagonize government leaders in a nation (Greece) upon which VOA relied for two transmitter locations. Giddens was concerned that VOA broadcast of these editorials might be taken by foreign listeners as an indication that the U.S. Government itself approved of the action taken by the House. Secretary of State Rogers had utilized a similar line of reasoning on the occasion of VOA's broadcasts concerning Soviet missiles in Egypt (see footnote 94), but USIA Director Shakespeare appeared to reject this contention, although he later affirmed it in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (see footnote 99: p. 56 contains a statement referring to VOA as "the official spokesman of the U.S. Government."). For further information on the "Greek" broadcasts, see "U.S. Coverage on Aid Defended," New York Times, Sept. 14, 1971, p. 8, and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "VOA's Broadcasts to Greece," Washington Post, August 11, 1971, p. A-15.

In the summer of 1972, reports began to appear in Japan regarding the use of VOA's Okinawa facilities for U.S. propaganda attacks against North Vietnam. Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido denied these reports, and added that these broadcasts were routinely monitored in Tokyo. This incident would seem to indicate that VOA was not completely free to use its Okinawa facility for such broadcasts, even if it had wished to do so. (BBC Monitoring Report, Far East, 22 August, 1972.) Fear of actual foreign government "interference" with VOA broadcasts beamed from transmitters located in their countries is not baseless. In June, 1952, for example, the South Korean government suspended the rebroadcast of programs from South Korean transmitters because of alleged anti-Korean government criti-
cism contained in certain VOA broadcasts. The ban ran from June 12 to June 27, 1952. (New York Times, June 28, 1952, p. 2.)

99. One form of “aggression” had to do with transmission, rather than content. VOA’s long-wave transmitter near Munich broadcast on 173 kcs. The same frequency had been assigned to the U.S.S.R. for domestic broadcasting by the Copenhagen Agreement on broadcast frequencies in Europe (1948), and the U.S.S.R. had claimed interference from the VOA signal. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1972, USIA Deputy Director Henry Loomis acknowledged that “our right” to broadcast on this frequency was questionable, but Shakespeare claimed the U.S. had made “a flat and unequivocal offer” to cease broadcasts from the Munich transmitter immediately upon a cessation of jamming of VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union. See “USIA Appropriations Authorization, FY 1973,” Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, p. 293 (Loomis), p. 28 (Shakespeare).

100. A similar evaluation had been conducted by the VOA in 1961, when a group of American professors, each of whom had visited Russia, knew the country well and spoke Russian, was asked to assess the likely effectiveness of some Russian language VOA broadcasts.


103. Ibid., p. 285. Several VOA staff members have told me that they virtually disregarded the memo, in part because its implementation would have led to very clumsy phraseology in many cases, in part because VOA, like many bureaucratic organizations, resists such changes, realizing that, in most cases, there will be no effort to see whether the directive has been implemented.

104. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on HR 14989, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1973, pt. 2, p. 2418. USIA personnel laid particular stress in their testimony to this committee on the need for increased broadcasts to the Soviet Union over the new $28.5 million transmitter in Kavala, Greece, and proposed to introduce broadcasts in Uzbek, which is spoken in Soviet Asia.

105. A detailed analysis of a sample week of VOA English language news broadcasts to Europe and the Middle East (June 30-July 6, 1972, 1900 GMT) conducted by one of my graduate students and myself revealed that VOA covered virtually every major story of international importance that appeared in the New York Times and Time magazine for that week. Furthermore, coverage was generally both thorough and balanced; such controversial items as the presidential campaign, Bobby Fischer’s hesitant participation in the world chess championship, the Viet Nam conflict and the world “money crisis” (in which the dollar fared quite poorly) were handled very fairly. VOA did, however, avoid reporting on the alleged flight of a Watergate break-in suspect to Europe, and it did not carry a direct report on alleged rainmaking activities by the U.S. in South Vietnam, although it did broadcast a statement
by Defense Secretary Laird to the effect that such reports were false. A few items that could be potentially embarrassing to Communist nations in Eastern Europe were carried: a trial of Yugoslav students; an election in Turkey where the Turkish prime minister stressed that he was attempting to see that the election take place under peaceful conditions "in spite of the underground efforts of Communists against democracy:" a visit by Mrs. Nixon to a Lithuanian dance festival. Counterbalancing these were several neutral reports on trade, scientific and cultural agreements reached by the USSR, North Korea and Czechoslovakia with various nations, including the USA, the Netherlands and West Germany, and Castro's visit to Moscow.

106. Figures for local placement are frequently dated; local placement figures for 1967 appeared in a statement on "Local Placement Activity" issued by VOA in 1971. The figures then totalled an estimated 12,000 hours weekly, about 60 per cent of it in Latin America and another 30 per cent of it in the Far East. Some of this material was in the form of already broadcast VOA programs, some was specially prepared by VOA for local placement, and some was prepared by individual USIS posts for placement over stations in the countries they served. My own experiences in attempting to secure local placement of VOA programs in Tunisia in the early 1960s make me skeptical of hard and fast figures, however; Tunisian Radio and Television accepted almost everything they were offered, and said they used most of it, but there was no concrete proof of this, and random monitoring produced relatively few instances of actual use.

APPENDIX

1. I have dealt at some length with problems of research in international broadcasting in "International Broadcasting—Who Listens?" ERIC Document ED 050 581, September, 1971. A further problem of research is that top agency officials have generally failed to give the Office of Research a position of high importance and priority, a fact the U.S. Advisory Commission dealt with in its 21st Report to Congress (1966, pp. 24-5):

"Unlike most private practitioners in foreign communications, USIA managers are not disposed to organize and develop their programs and their budgets around facts as established by research. Although the process of international political communication is complex, there appears to be little desire to utilize the facts that research has made available. The use of research has been seriously neglected in USIA to the detriment of the program . . .

"The Commission recommends that managers of USIA strategy and tactics increase their use of research and its results. If the program is to be improved, those who direct it must welcome the kind of information that reliable research can provide."

2. Most of these surveys were conducted with respondents of 21 years of age or more, but listener mail and surveys conducted in other countries and/or in more recent times reveal relatively strong VOA listenerships among males aged 16 to 21.