ABSTRACT
Forty-two secondary-level Canadian and American world history, social studies, and geography textbooks on the Middle East are examined for errors in content, oversimplification of complicated issues, and stereotyping. Areas under examination for distortion include Middle East geography and culture, economics, and maldistribution of wealth, cultural bias and ethnic stereotypes, religious bias and stereotypes, United States relations in the Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli wars. An annotated bibliography contains critical references for 62 texts as well as a list of superior textbooks by American publishers. Two course syllabuses are also included. The first syllabus provides a guide to essential features of Muslim history and culture from the seventh to the twentieth centuries. It contains evaluation questions, student objectives, and references to suggested readings. The second syllabus provides student objectives, references to suggested readings, selected readings, teaching strategies, and student activities about the four major Arab-Israeli wars from 1947 to 1973. (Author/DE)
THE IMAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN SECONDARY SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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Middle East Studies Association of North America, Inc.
THE IMAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN SECONDARY SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS

by William J. Griswold
Colorado State University

in collaboration with

Ayad al-Qazzaz - California State University
John Joseph - Franklin and Marshall College
Lorne Kenny - Toronto University
Don Peretz - State University of New York
Glenn Perry - Indiana State University
Michael W. Suleiman - Kansas State University
Farhat Ziadeh - University of Washington
(Chairman of the Image Committee)

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and the catalogues of The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern
and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, and the American
University of Beirut.
PREFACE

In forming a Committee on the Image of the Middle East in Secondary Education, the Middle East Studies Association has gone beyond its previous activities related to teaching and scholarship in colleges and universities. Yet the set of mind that students bring with them from secondary into higher education has much to do with the effectiveness and possibilities of college teaching. Thus the image of a foreign area is important for itself, in forming enlightened citizens of a country and of the world, but it is also important as a part of the continuing stream of education. It is in this spirit that the "Image Committee" has prepared this report. It feels that understanding of the Middle East is often clouded by unrepresentative connotations in common parlance and that these connotations are sometimes reinforced in education. Such evaluations will doubtless arouse further discussion and should be useful in bringing to light a more accurate appreciation of this important area of the world that is in some ways so different from ours. In this spirit too the Committee welcomes further comments on this report.

I. William Zartman
Executive Secretary
Middle East Studies Association
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Part I

North American Images of the Middle East

For some time, scholars have recognized that secondary school textbooks in the United States and Canada often convey an oversimplified, naive, and even distorted image of Middle Eastern cultures, history, and politics. At its annual meeting in 1971 the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) charged an eight-member "Committee on the Middle East Image in Secondary Schools" to review secondary school textbooks to determine whether the Middle East is being dealt with adequately, and whether such treatment is free of bias and mistaken information. Representing a wide geographical distribution in the United States and Canada, and working through local school districts, the Committee members reviewed more than eighty world history, social studies and geography textbooks. At the annual MESA Meeting in November 1972 the chairman of the "Image Committee," Professor Farhat Ziadeh of the University of Washington, summarized the work of the Committee in a brief report. 1

Although the Committee established in advance no specific criteria for its views, the members made their judgements
after critically reading secondary school texts and, in many cases, after having consulted with secondary school teachers. They found some well-written, thoroughly researched textbooks with few discernible faults. Yet the majority of books erred in content, perpetuated stereotypes in political and social description, oversimplified complicated issues, listed outcomes while ignoring causes, and often provided moral judgements on the actions of nations in the guise of factual history. Admittedly, the Committee "found what it was looking for," yet so frequent and so flagrant were the stereotypes that members felt justified in calling attention to at least some of the errors with the hope that textbook authors and their publishers might become aware of the problem.

Committee members found very few authors whose identification or reputation indicated specific training in Middle East culture. Most textbooks were written by more than one author, some with consultants, some with contributing authors. Professors of history and teachers of high school social studies predominated as authors, along with some professors of geography, anthropology and political science. Some authors had no professional identification. Generally, they worked with data at least five, in some cases ten years old, which may help to explain some of the readily-accepted misinformation. Few of the authors referred to the extraordinary changes occurring in the Middle East in industry, agriculture, and finance which vitally affect North American interests. The Committee found in interviews that only a small percentage of
classroom teachers had formally studied the Middle East, and virtually all relied on the textbooks for information, a fact which underscored the vital importance of an author's accuracy and understanding.

Based on these findings, this section describes some typical distortions of selected secondary school social studies and geography textbooks from the United States and Canada. The prevalence of error and stereotyping in textbooks demonstrates that teachers must be made aware of possible bias in their own views of the Middle East, that authors should present precise, balanced information, and that publishers should consider providing inexpensive, up-dated supplementary material for standard textbooks, relying on Middle East experts where textbook authors lack the scholarly background demanded for the specialized and often complicated subject.

I. The Geography of the Middle East

Secondary world history and social studies texts generally demonstrate high standards of geographical correctness, exhibiting general excellence and accuracy of maps. (This is especially true of Mazour and Wallbank.) One problem for geographers--and hence for students--is a satisfactory definition of the boundaries of "The Middle East." Students may be confused by a standard geography text, The Middle East and South Asia (Cleveland) which includes neither Libya nor Egypt, two countries very much in "Middle East" news in recent years. Problems may arise when students open one text which emphasizes...
the political "Middle East" encompassing only the Eastern Mediterranean (e.g., Allen, 3) and another which emphasizes "Dry World Cultures" which stretch from Mauritania in West Africa to Afghanistan (Wann, 162). One cannot argue with an author's right to emphasize different aspects of the region, but such variety points out the need for teachers to be aware of possible confusion.

Another, more important, source of confusion comes from the amount of textbook space devoted to certain unessential, if colorful, aspects of life and culture in the Middle East. For example, the deserts of the region, though wonderfully photogenic, provide an unrealistic, sometimes romanticized impression of the peoples who live there. Authors almost invariably describe Arabs as above all a nomadic people, often with photographs to support the stereotype. One seventh grade text, in which the Middle East is discussed on two-dozen pages, devotes ten pages to deserts and camels, four pages to the life of nomads and oasis towns, five pages to the study of Islam as a religion, three pages to "modern living in the dry world" (which is the author's first real analysis of the life-style of most of the people of the Middle East) and one-third of a page to "progress" in the Arab world (Wann, 158-181). Such an exaggerated emphasis distorts the reality and is likely to leave the impression in seventh grade minds that most Middle Easterners are nomads. A Canadian text asserts that the "... hot sun and large expanses of burning desert made it easy for early Arabs to
think of the gods as remote, awesome beings with little mercy" (Lavender, 281) which seems to draw unwarranted religious inferences from a very limited data supply. The result of such emphasis on the "local color" of the desert, or speculation on the early religion of nomads, and not on the almost incredible skill needed to exist there, conveys to the student the same lack of reality and appreciation of the value of the desert as the landlubber who views the ocean as bleak, forbidding, and therefore useless. The seeming impenetrability of the deserts is accentuated in a Canadian text which views the Sahara as "a far more effective barrier dividing Africa into two parts than the Atlantic was between Europe and America" (Brown, 244), an assertion which minimizes the widespread trade routes which for centuries tied the sub-Saharan African regions with the Mediterranean.

Another serious error is the implied lack of human resourcefulness and ingenuity in most of the Middle East. Again and again, by text or by photographs, one gets the strong suggestion of the "backward" or "ancient" nature of the people who live in or near the deserts, particularly Arabs, pictured living on oases, or Afghan villagers shown on their way to a town in varying states of curious dress and riding on camels (Welty, 127). Problems of water supply and aridity concern many authors (e.g., the superior analysis in Roselle, 708-721) as indeed they should, yet the Arab (or Persian or Turk) is seldom given credit either for ingenious medieval irrigation systems or for the application of western techniques in the modern period. When
modern application of science in the Middle East is described, it is almost always exemplified by the State of Israel. One cannot argue that the Israelis should be ignored; they have truly turned "... former desert areas into productive lands" (Mazour, 788) but in this process they have by no means been unique, as is implied in many textbooks. Few authors mention the enormous capital investments in this tiny new nation, or the high percentage of the population with professional skills. Few balance the Israeli "Miracle in the Desert" with the equally significant facts that the Middle East and North Africa, taken as a whole, produce almost as much wheat as the United States; that Arab states, too, have established successful distillation plants and scientifically tapped underground rivers and artesian wells to find water for desert lands; or that Egypt's cultivable area will be extended more than a million acres when the water stored behind the Aswan Dam is utilized. An implication of one-sided scientific achievement is seen in a Canadian text wherein the author mentions the "... 50,000 acres of Israeli coastal lands ... planted with orange and grapefruit trees" (Ryckman, 222) without mentioning that over half this acreage was originally planted before the 1947 Partition by Palestinian Arab growers. An important exception to such inaccuracy is the recent "Supplement" to a United States textbook in which the author tells of many economic developments in the non-Israeli Middle East, a most valuable dimension for teachers as well as students (Mazour, 891-94 and 897-98).
II. The People and the Maldistribution of Wealth

If the desert is depicted as forbidding and the land inhospitable, the people of the Middle East in many texts appear degraded, sad (unsmiling in pictures), victims of systematic or chaotic oppression, and often helpless despite the incredible wealth in oil revenues.

Arabs are repeatedly pictured either as bedouins or millionaires. The texts tend to minimize or even omit mention of the large numbers of urbanized, middle class Arabs living in huge metropolitan centers such as Cairo or Beirut (Rogers, 778). Persians appear glorious (Welty, 213), Turks are cruel (Wallbank, 561), pagan (Magenis, 178), as well as fierce and fanatical (Habberton, 137). Besides looking like nomads, Arabs are bitter (Yohe, 408; Roselle, 711) or "wild warriors of Islam" (Hardy, a Canadian text, 322). Surely it is true that instances exist in the Middle East of sadness and poverty, wealth, glory, cruelty and fanaticism. The association of such traits with a nation, or an ethnic or religious group, however, is too stereotypic in many of these textbooks, and undoubtedly leads to the establishment or reinforcement of profound, long-lasting images in the minds of young students.

The maldistribution of wealth, though a terrible problem in the Middle East as in other parts of the world, is often mentioned in texts but seldom examined carefully. Oil, the most obvious economic asset of the area, "... has changed the lives of all the people in Southwest Asia and North Africa," says one author with slight hyperbole (Allen, 250). He does
not explain how oil changes lives, to what extent the revenues have percolated to the masses, or the influence of Western governments on Middle Eastern politics through control of production and pricing mechanisms (before 1973).

Other authors emphasize the poverty of the tenant farmers (Wallbank, 704), the cities teeming with unemployed, while a few millionaires in flowing robes are chauffeured in expensive motorcars. An author describes Arab society as "... a tiny minority of extremely wealthy merchants and landowners who exist on one side and a huge mass of destitute tenant farmers on the other ..." (Wallbank, 703-704). The author might have balanced this by mentioning some of the successful land redistribution efforts in Arab states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria. These assessments of economic imbalance in the Arab portion of the Middle East are expressed in such a way as to make the Arab countries appear backward and almost comical when contrasted with Israel, with its more balanced standards of living, its higher educational attainment, and because of its Westernization, its brighter future (ibid., 704).

Many of the texts strongly imply that Middle Eastern economic problems could be resolved by wholesale Westernization. They do this by describing the inhabitants as non-Western, quiescent orientals, inevitably bound to the past. Contrasts of rich and poor in urban settings imply that Middle Easterners lack Western compassion and planning systems, and are therefore hopeless. As one text puts it: "... at the edge of
the city stand new chemical and cement plants—and slums made up of wooden shacks. Dyers plunge bundles of wood into pots of dye... within sight of a new oil refinery" (Yohe, 411).

The author makes no explanation of a possible technological unemployment in the local dyeing industry should a modern "Western" factory be established. The student assumes that if the Middle East accepts the West and its technology (in oil, agriculture, transportation) it will prosper as a matter of course.

Yet even acceptance of the West as the way of the future often provides no immediate solution to Middle East economic problems. Why have these countries remained so "backward"? Most texts describe the centuries of economic decline as part of the changes which occurred after the invasion of the Crusaders, Mongols, and Ottoman Turks (e.g. Ewing, 285-287).

One author sees the modern Middle East led astray by Soviet influence. In a section entitled "Russian Influence in the Middle East Increases," he states, "no Middle Eastern country has gone as far as the USSR in taking ownership of industry and agriculture. But many of them have nationalized certain industries and have distributed land taken from rich landlords to the landless poor. In short, such countries have introduced modified forms of socialism" (Platt, 691). The reader is not sure if the author dislikes or approves of land redistribution, but the handicap of Russian involvement in Middle Eastern economy seems quite clear. Governmental supervision and control of important segments of Turkey's economy,
possibly because the Turks have been successful, are seldom mentioned, but Gamal Abdul Nasser receives strong censure for nationalizing much Egyptian industry and the Suez Canal Company. Although in most textbooks Israel provides a useful benchmark for Western success, Israeli state-planning and close control of the economy (not to mention the communal farms) appear not as a move away from classical capitalism, but more as a pragmatic and quite successful socio-economic venture.

A comment should be made here of a pervading "tone" or "moral stance" which in many texts places Israel in a position ranked above other Middle Eastern, especially Arab, states. No authors assert Israel to be in fact morally superior, but rather they subtly convey political and religious biases which denigrate the Muslim world in general, and Arabs in particular. A Canadian text rather typically repeats the unproved assertion that Arab leaders "... in order to keep their people from looking at their own dire sufferings and problems ..." have deliberately focused hatred on Israel, and that the Arab leaders fear "... if the Israeli way of life begins to influence their downtrodden people, they will lose control of them" (Swatridge, 351). Such simplistic reasoning and biases perpetuate prejudices. Equally oversimplified is the assertion that Israel refuses Arab peace overtures in order to pacify her domestic political pressure groups. Only by explanations of these conflicting issues can understanding take place in the secondary school classroom.
III. Cultural Bias and Ethnic Stereotypes

Many North American authors display a major cultural bias involving the Arab. Texts almost always portray the Arab's colorful clothes (often labeled "costume") and habitat: flowing robes, nomadic culture, a man living in the present but representing a dim (and in some cases, noble) past. In one high school text students learn "... there are mainly two ways [that] an Arab may earn his living ... as a farmer ... or ... a nomad." (Allen, 242). Thus a textbook tends to give authoritative support to the view of many secondary school students that the modern Arabs, 135 million of them, truly exist as stereotyped in TV comedies: dull-witted, backward, kaffiyeh- clad camel drivers.

But what of the Arab's pasts glories? Few texts describe much of the Arab century of expansion under the Umayyad caliphs (e.g., the superficial accounts in Kolevzon, 522-23 and Mazour, 253-54). Many ignore this seventh century caliphate, beginning the historical account with the far more colorful Abbasids in ninth century Baghdad. In one text the author acknowledges that "Muslims conquered Palestine and held the Holy Land for many years ... " (Wann, 173). One might ask if by "many years" the author reflects the same kind of legitimacy of occupancy as would the equally correct phrase "almost a thousand years," particularly in view of present political controversy over the Palestine region. Arabs in another book actually receive more credit than justified for the expansion from France to China: "Arab warriors took one
city after another . . . " (Yohe, 129), a statement which omits the additional strength of many thousands of converts to Islam: Greeks, Jews, Berbers, Iranians and Turks. Some authors apparently have trouble visualizing the extent of the Muslim expansion to the east: in several texts medieval Islam comprised only three areas, with capitals at Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba (Mazour, 254; Platt, 148). The culture of the widespread Muslim civilization east of the Tigris River generally receives scant coverage in the texts. A Canadian author sums up stereotypically the "cultural summit" of the medieval Muslim world: "... the Arabian Nights with Sinbad, Aladdin, and Ali Baba; and the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam" (Lavender, 358).

One hero of the Middle East emerges--Saladin--whom some authors portray as representing the highest expression of Islamic social teachings ("... the humanity, mercy and generosity of the great Sultan Saladin . . . " in Welty, 203). Saladin was a "good" Muslim, thoughtful of his enemies, while other Muslims were "conquerors" (Yohe, 187). One text inaccurately calls him a "Sultan of the Turks" (Welty, 203) when in fact he was a Kurd. A Canadian text has incorrectly described him as defending Mecca against Christian armies (Lavender, 343-51). Possibly, the authors' descriptions of the "strong and gentle" Saladin (as in Yohe, 187) may reflect a religious bias, with Saladin used as a counterpoise to offset the alleged immorality and rudeness of other Muslim warriors.
Some authors explain the political manifestations of medieval Islam in very negative terms, tending to ignore the many positive aspects. In one analysis an author argues that Muslims accepted "... such Arabic customs as slavery and the inferior status of woman" (Wallbank, 185), without either qualifying this with an explanation of the changes wrought in the seventh century by Koranic injunctions on kindness to slaves and the rights of women, or comparing it with contemporary practices in Christian Europe. This author then asserts that the masters of half the known world were "... hardly more than rude conquerors--or at best, men of business and public affairs" (ibid., 190). Rejecting Islamic culture as backward, he compares the Muslim civilization of the Middle Ages with Byzantine Greeks: "Like the civilization of the Byzantine Empire, Islamic Civilization was lacking in creative genius" (ibid., 187). Yet many authorities would argue that both these civilizations were for many centuries culturally advanced when compared with Western Europe. To be sure, the author has included a section entitled, "The Moslems Created an Advanced Civilization" (ibid., 187-192) which is in many ways accurate and much longer than usual. Yet his initial statements tend to support old prejudices and may cause the student or teacher to ignore the "advancement" described in word and picture. Lengthy treatments of medieval Muslim culture, alas, prove to be exceptional; most authors reject the history of the Islamic peoples after the high Abbasid period of the tenth century, skipping or oversimplifying the civilization of a thousand years. (A conspicuous exception...
to this is Petrovich, 445-93, as well as the French language Canadian volumes by Savard which cover the period well with few errors.)

Authors stereotype other Middle East peoples besides Arabs. Texts sometimes omit or pass quickly by the history of Iran and its ancient and medieval greatness. One otherwise useful work gives only one page to ancient Persia (Wallbank, 57) and a paragraph to medieval Iran (ibid., 190). Students read of Iran in the twentieth century attempting to "nationalize" their oil by the premier Mossadegh (the word is italicized in Roselle, 714, possibly for didactic purposes). Iranians were led astray by this "fanatical extremist" who in 1953 created an economic crisis for the British-owned oil companies (Wallbank, 703). The authors do not mention that these actions were taken quite within Iranian constitutional limits. Another text speaks of Mossadegh's "socialist program" (Neill, 898) and the implicitly irresponsible nationalization of some industries by the Shah (ibid., 899).

Like the Iranian, the Turk receives proportionately little coverage, when one considers his important contribution to Middle East history and culture and the very close relationship between the Ottoman Empire and European history. Curiously, the Seljuks, responsible for the celebrated medrese (university) learning system as well as the systematizers of the unique Turkish system of land tenure, receive a bad press in most textbooks, being described by one author as "... an illiterate people" (Wallbank, 187) or as treating
Christians "with great cruelty" in the Crusades (Black, 172). Some authors still emphasize the religious calling of Christian Europe to the Crusades and pay little heed to the economic and political motives for conquest of the Holy Land. As for the Ottomans, some authors find their rule "oppressive," "crushing" (ibid., 438), "an outrage" and "brutal" (ibid., 440), but also "vigorous" (Wallbank, 187). A Canadian author labels the Janissaries "infamous" and the Christian tribute children "raised as fanatical Moslems" (Hardy, 494); another Canadian text portrays the Turk as "barbarian" and "heathen" (Earl, 200), thus adding a bit of religious prejudice to the picture. Few authors characterize the significance of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century of Suleiman the Magnificent to World War I except as it acted as an antagonist to the Western thrust toward the Dardanelles, Constantinople and the Holy Land. Save for one Canadian (Hardy), authors trace almost nothing of the history of the last centuries of the Ottoman Turks. Writers whose source of information comes essentially from histories of Europe cannot be expected to find much worth mentioning of a major Empire which existed for six hundred years somewhere southeast of Vienna.

Most authors are naturally more aware of the (more recent) history of the State of Israel, and the successful Zionist State receives consistent coverage and, quite often, commendation. Typical of the coverage is a standard text wherein Jewish skill and ingenuity have "amazed the world" (Wallbank, 609). "Its people were literate, highly skilled, and strongly united.
In the years since independence they had achieved remarkable economic progress and enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Middle East" (ibid., 704). Let us briefly analyze this juxtaposition of fact and opinion. The fact is the State of Israel has achieved remarkable progress since independence. The author interjects his opinion (and perpetuates stereotypes) when he goes on to compare Israel's progress (standard of living) with the non-Israeli states of the region. Probably the author contrasted here such things as housing, automobiles, telephones or TV sets per capita. Yet examples of great wealth, literacy, even TV sets and telephones exist in many non-Israeli Middle Eastern states (for example, parts of Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon). The student or teacher reading such an analysis may not recognize the text as a factually true but partial picture. Such analysis may obscure the realities of the rest of the Middle East when the best of Israel, omitting its problems and shortcomings, is compared with the worst of the neighboring countries. Abu Dhabi, with the highest per capita income in the Middle East (or the world, for that matter) might have been compared to Israel's disadvantage, but with what object in view? The temptation here is to identify certain kinds of progress and success in one small, highly-specialized state and at the same time ignore the social and economic perplexities of all the Middle Eastern states, including Israel. This can only lead students and teachers to an unscholarly, simplistic view of the awesome problems facing the leaders and peoples of the region.
IV. Religious Bias and Stereotypes

Authors occasionally treat Islam as a religion almost distinct from Judaism and Christianity, pointing out the strangeness and peculiarity of certain practices of Muslims rather than Islam's continuity with the two previously established Semitic religions. An exception is Rogers in which a most useful comparative analysis of Christianity and Islam is included (158-59). Fortunately, the old notion of Islam as a Christian heresy has died, and many of the textbooks appropriately name the religion "Islam" (though some still use the misleading term "The Mohammedan Religion": Hardy, 322; Brown, 254; Thralls, 163; Magenis, 163). Most authors correctly explain the basic Islamic doctrines, though occasionally they inadvertently list only four of the "Five Pillars" (Mazour, 253 and Fishwick, 225, a Canadian text). One author, explaining prayer, identifies Islam with the religion of the typical desert Arab, heedless of some four hundred million non-Arab Muslims, not to mention the one hundred million urban and sedentary Muslim Arabs: "In their desert tent homes," he rhapsodizes, "with their caravans, on the windswept sand wastes, no matter where a true follower of Allah may be, he spreads his prayer rug five times a day and faces Mecca to perform his devotions" (Rogers, 158). No author shows open hostility to Islam, yet the strange behavior of some Muslims is cited with no effort at explanation: "A Moslem priest might write a Koran verse on paper, wash off the ink, and have the patient drink the ink and water as medicine" (Ewing, 294). Aside from
defining just what the author had in mind concerning a
"Moslem priest," such a statement explains Islamic practices
with about the same clarity as a recent news story of Protes-
tant sect members drinking strychnine explains Christian belief
systems. Textbooks call to the students' attention a masculine
heaven (Platt, 145) and maintain that Muslim women have an
"inferior status" (Wallbank, 185).

Though such statements are partially true, they often
convey error and almost always perpetuate preconceived notions.
In such matters of religious belief, authors should give a
thorough, scholarly explanation, or exclude the material. We
have already mentioned the Canadian text describing the "wild
warriors of Islam" (Hardy, 322). In a United States text the
Muslim religion "... is not a gentle faith" (Carls, 81-82),
yet to imply by this that other religious faiths are gentle,
or that Muslim warriors massacred those who refused the Koran
completely fails to explain the Islamic policy toward con-
quered "People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) who were in
fact protected through the ages--an important distinction
which one author recognizes in a useful paragraph (Wallbank, 185).

Scores of minor errors in fact and interpretation of Islam
occur such as the following: Arabs united in a common religion
of Islam (Wallbank, 608) when in fact not all Arabs are Muslim
and a sizable minority are Christian; Sufis identified as a
"sect" of Islam, rather than a variety of movements (Ewing,
282-83); the caliph as "top religious authority" rather than
the successor to Muhammad's earthly political governance (ibid., 283);
and the statement that present-day Islam is led by "the caliph and other religious leaders . . ." who meet in Cairo and determine policy--when in fact the Caliphate finally disappeared in 1924 and present-day Islam has no universally accepted leadership (Durand, 287).

V. United States Interests in the Middle East

The textbooks present generally neutral information about the allies of the United States in the Middle East. The pro-Western Arab states appear to receive slightly less coverage than the anti-West states. Generalized support for "democratic regimes" (implied as America's friends) often amounts to an indirect attack on the "undemocratic regions" (America's opposition).

Israel is used as the yardstick for democracy in some texts. "Of all the nations of the [geographic] Moslem World, Israel is the most democratic" (Kolevzon, 552). Such a statement might be construed by students to mean that the Muslim religion has something to do with the lack of democracy. Moreover, the statement tends to obscure the democracy practiced in such countries as Turkey and Lebanon, and of course says nothing about the perceptions of Israel's Arab citizens concerning democratic freedoms, which differ somewhat from those of her Jewish citizens. In references to an Israeli "constitution" one author describes " . . . a bill of rights much like that in our Constitution" (Rogers, 760). Yet, in fact, Israel has not yet adopted a constitution, a symbol of democracy utilized by many Middle Eastern nations, both friends and
antagonists of America.

The textbooks find a variety of causes for tension between the United States and Middle Eastern regimes. Many texts treat only indirectly the major twentieth century economic conflicts of the United States interests in the Middle East: the oil, the rights of air space, trade relations, and American-owned institutions in the region. The causes for difficulty seem to lie elsewhere. One cause is the Arab opposition to the power of the West, represented by Israel. Egypt, according to one text, bitterly opposed the establishment of Israel in part because of "the reappearance of [the] ancient Moslem hatred of infidels, and part from the fact that to Moslems, the Jews represented a Western power" (Ewing, 308). This assertion iterates a double error for the Koran specifically recognizes the Jews as a protected people under Islam and some Muslim states accord Israel diplomatic recognition, for example Turkey and Iran.

More importantly, the author moves from an unscholarly stereotype of Muslims as having a built-in theological hatred for "Jews as infidels" to the very factual recognition of the Arabs, Christian as well as Muslim, to an influx of people they view as foreign to their lands.

Another cause for unrest as seen by the authors is the continuation of the Cold War: Soviet agents appear to be involved in Middle East politics, since the Soviets are opposed to pro-Western governments (Mazour, 788). Pictures indicate the close connection here: Nasser and Khrushchev (Rogers, 647),
Anwar Sadat and Podgorny (ibid., 777). Little is mentioned of the freedom of political action Soviet aid gives to the heretofore militarily deficient Arab states.

A third cause of unrest in the Middle East which receives a kind of censure from some authors is nationalism and the concomitant difficulties this causes the United States and its financial investments. "To understand the trouble of North Africa and the Middle East we need to understand Arab nationalism" (Yohe, 389). In fact, this author continues: the real problem is Egyptian nationalism. Under "... Nasser the people and the government of Egypt became highly nationalistic ..." and as a result "large groups of Europeans ... were encouraged and sometimes forced to leave the country" (ibid., 413). In some texts President Nasser is slighted: "Egypt is an Arab nation with a government run by a former army officer" (Lee, 70); and another text recalls the Egyptian President's famous hyperbole: "Americans, may you choke to death on your fury!" (Platt, 692). In each of the cases cited the problem relates not to the factual accuracy of the arguments so much as the impression that nationalism in the Middle East somehow maliciously affects the vested and legitimate interests of the United States, whereas, in fact, it is an Arab reaction to the earlier nationalism of Europeans manifested in imperialism, the takeover of Arab lands by Western powers, and the Mandate system. The violence, the arbitrary and illegal confiscation of property by Arab states, shocking as they may be, would
appear more understandable if balanced by what the Arabs feel to be the equally violent, arbitrary and illegal activities of the nationalist Jewish (Zionist) invasion of Palestine. Students cannot understand such words as "imperialism" and "colonial settler state" when used by Arabs against Israel, unless these issues are clearly and dispassionately outlined in their textbooks.

VI. Three Arab–Israeli Wars

Textbooks seldom present an impartial view of the 1947-1948 Arab-Zionist controversy which resulted in the establishment of Israel. They often assign blame and rarely present the neutral views of disinterested third parties. Few relate the events by which mostly European immigrants established a new state in a land populated predominantly by Arabs. No text parallels the victories of the outnumbered Zionists in 1948 with the agonies suffered by Palestinian Arabs, such as the killing at the village of Deir Yassin. The problem, to both student and teacher, is one of balance. The texts very often dwell on the atrocities committed by Palestinians (or the miseries of the Zionists who had already suffered so much in the Nazi holocaust), yet little note is made of the premeditated murder by Zionists of the United Nations ambassador, Count Bernadotte; indeed, several authors, using the passive voice, may even lead students to attribute the murder to Palestinians (e.g., Rogers, 759; Welty, 228). As for the more than one million war refugees, one author views them as a "problem [which] plagued the new state of
Israel ... " (Mazour, 788) similar, one concludes, to the other problem advanced in the paragraph, that of an adequate water supply for the new country. Few authors explain the Palestinian refugee question as fundamental to any peace settlement, observing rather, as did a Canadian author, how much wiser the Israelis have been in absorbing Jewish refugees, whereas the Arabs refuse to accept Palestinians (Swatridge, 350). How useful, at this point, would have been an explanation, that hearth and home to a displaced Palestinian happen to be the same spot on the earth as that currently occupied by a displaced Jew.

The causes for the Suez War of 1956 are confusing and varied in most of the texts. In one book Egypt suffers no attack at all; war "broke out" (Yohe, 408; all three wars "broke out" in this text). A Canadian book finds the cause for war in Israel's desire " ... to prevent the outbreaks of [Palestinian] commando-type raids, especially in the Gaza Strip area" (Swatridge, 353), but makes no mention whatever of the February 1955 attack by Israel on a Gaza military station which led to a renewed Egyptian arms buildup. In a United States text, the immediate cause of war was the seizure of the Suez Canal by President Nasser (Jackel, 121), whereas another author asserts it was rather the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company that " ... precipitated an armed attack by Israel, Britain and France" (Wallbank, 703). A Canadian text views Nasser's action as "a highhanded blow" (Reid, 477). In each case some truth appears, but with no balancing of the detailed secret planning of the three nations to put down the "Egyptian Dictator," as Eden termed.
Nasser. With such simplistic explanations the student may wonder why President Eisenhower took such an opposing point of view, even acting in consonance with the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War to force three pro-American nations out of Egyptian territory.

The Six Day War of June 1967 "broke out" in some texts (Cooper, 66-69 and Yohe, 408). One textbook specifically notes the preemptive Israeli attack on Egypt (Alweis, 648) as does the "Supplement" added recently to a new edition of an old text (Mazour, 897). Most assert the Israeli view that war began when President Nasser ordered out the UNEF troops from Egypt and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba (Roselle, 717). In one text the Soviet Union backs Nasser's desire to destroy Israel (Neill, 901), an assumption that is untrue. As in the coverage of the prior two wars, a glossing over of the role of provocative Israeli raids into Jordan and Syria makes it easy for students to overlook the complexity of the situation and lay total responsibility on the Arab states, and especially President Nasser, for the war. Authors who thus imply moral right or moral wrong on either side do an injustice to teachers and students. Rather than fix blame, textbook writers should describe the basic causes of the conflict, explain the perceptions of both sides, and let the students make up their minds as to who should go his way justified.

VI. Conclusion

The MESA "Image Committee" examined secondary textbooks in the United States and Canada because it suspected factual
errors and misinformation. In far too many texts the Committee found not only errors but also bias. This often occurs in regard to Islam and the Arab World when authors display latent prejudices abetted by careless research, poor writing and inadequate editing. Bias also occurs in the so-called "world history textbooks" where the importance of the Middle East in comparison with other parts of the world is diminished by the proportionately fewer pages devoted to the region. Cursory coverage in a text often means cursory coverage in the classroom. The Middle East becomes, for readers of these textbooks, a minor side-show instead of a major area of world history.

Despite the number of books displaying errors and prejudice, some texts furnish scholarly, impartial accounts which can provide the teacher as well as the students with accurate information conveyed in a lively style. Several of these were written or edited by scholars who have specialized in the Middle East. For junior high schools, superior readable accounts of people and cultures occur in Bucher and Randall, while Anon's The Middle East provides easily understood human interest sketches accompanied by several attractive collections of photographs expressly designed to break down erroneous images of the Middle East. For senior high schools, Peretz in two paperbacks provides factual data and well-chosen readings in an easily accessible form. Another inexpensive and completely reliable paperback (Tachau) will appeal to advanced students. Of the several fine hardback texts the
volume by Petrovich provides excellent treatment of early Islamic peoples, and Stavrianos presents a first-rate summary of the modern Middle East. Two Canadian texts appear outstanding: in the French language the three-volume work by Savard and, in English, the work by Coulthard. In a short novel, Forman tries to show young readers the dilemmas faced by two boys, a Palestinian and a Jew, closest friends in early years, yet deadly enemies during the 1948 war. A superior geography for both teachers and students is the paperback by Cleveland which also provides a balanced, annually revised survey of political and social issues. One drawback to this book is that the geographical limitations exclude the North African countries.

Though the "Image Committee" will continue to examine the problem of bias in secondary school textbooks, it has already been able to come to some conclusions. As one Committee member put it, "The overall impression one gets from these textbooks is not willful bias and prejudice, but rather the lack of thorough knowledge and understanding of the Middle East, its multifaceted civilization and the forces at work there today." The Committee also found that, like the textbooks which display lack of knowledge, many secondary school teachers, by their own admission, must interpret medieval Islamic issues or modern Middle East problems with no formal training.

If text and teacher both are weak in the area, how can students be expected to understand the complicated events which
occur in the Middle East and make headlines year after year? Certainly publishers and authors must be urged to realize the need for reliable scholarship in writing and revising, and timely up-dating of their work in inexpensive teachers' guides or supplements. For interested teachers, even those who have had no formal training in the history and culture of the Middle East, the Committee suggests several courses of action. First, choosing texts and directing classroom activities need to be undertaken in the light of a critical evaluation of textbooks such as this one, with the accompanying curriculum syllabi. Second, making an attempt to get facts and perceptions from all sides will offer students an opportunity to judge the issues for themselves, rather than rely on a textbook solution. There are no easy answers and for each "answer" one can almost always find another question. Third, teachers who wish specific information and help should write or call on Middle East scholars in the colleges or universities in their region. Members of the Middle East Studies Association can provide lists of articles, books, visual aids, and addresses for free and inexpensive materials. A secondary school teacher who writes to the MESA Secretariat will be given the name and address of "Image Committee" members or others willing to make helpful suggestions.

Finally, the responsibility for better teaching lies ultimately with the secondary school teachers themselves. They must make the effort to sharpen their own perceptions and develop a sufficient supply of scholarly materials relating
to the Middle East, just as they have collected such materials
about other geographic areas of the world, other religions,
and other periods of history which they teach. Admittedly, the
Middle East and its problems provoke controversy found almost
nowhere else on the globe. Yet North American secondary
school students hear and read about the area and its peoples;
they have opinions; they listen to arguments and are involved
in discussions. Their teachers must be equipped with an
understanding of the region as free as possible of bias and
prejudice, in order to provide a foundation for those political
decisions which will work for understanding, compassion,
and ultimately for peace.

Endnotes

1 The Committee on the Middle East Image in Secondary
Schools consisted of Professor Ziadeh, Professor William J.
Griswold, Colorado State University, Professor John Joseph,
Franklin and Marshall College, Professor Don Peretz, SUNY
in Binghamton, New York, Professor Glenn Perry, Indiana
State University, Professor Ayad al-Qazzaz, Sacramento State
University, and Professor Michael Suleiman, Kansas State
University. Also included on the Committee was Professor
Roger Savory, later replaced by Professor L.M. Kenny of
the University of Toronto, Canada.

A copy of the November 1972 "Image Committee" report
to MESA may be obtained by writing the Secretariat,
Middle East Studies Association, New York University, Washing-
ton Square, New York, New York 10003.

2 The "Image Committee" report states, in part, "Of the
forty-six books on world history, the history of the Middle
East, or social studies generally reviewed by members of
the Committee, twenty-nine were declared completely unac-
ceptable . . . . The remaining seventeen range between being
excellent, good, or tolerably acceptable even though there
were minor errors or even slight distortions on the Arab-Israeli
question."

3 The organization and synthesis of the data for this
article is the author's responsibility, derived from his personal study of each of the United States textbooks, as well as the extensive collaboration of and information supplied by members of the "Image Committee." We acknowledge also the generosity of the United States and Canadian publishers who graciously provided us with sample textbooks. Material from the Canadian textbooks was gathered by Professor Kenny and Professor J.R. Blackburn of the University of Toronto.

The names refer to the textbook authors. Full bibliographic reference is made at the conclusion of the article.

The Committee found the terms "Middle East" and "Near East" used almost interchangeably in the texts examined. For a clear understanding of these terms, see R.H. Davison, "Where is the Middle East?" Foreign Affairs, 38:4 (July 1960), pp. 665-75.

Works Cited

I. United States Textbooks


Anon, The Middle East (P. K. Hitti, consultant), Scholastic World Cultures Program, Scholastic Book Services, New York, 1972.


II. Canadian Textbooks


Part II.

Annotated Bibliography

The following book list has been annotated with two questions in mind: 1) What kind of approach has the author to the history and culture of Islam and how extensive is his coverage? 2) What kind of presentation has the author made of present-day Middle East issues, and does he present inaccurate stereotypes of Arabs, Turks, Israelis, Persians and other peoples of the Middle East? In no way does this judgement pretend to rate the texts relative to other cultures or peoples. This list is provided to help teachers assess the textbooks they are now using, and to try to explain to students, logically and factually, just what the author may have overlooked or may have intended by his assertions. On consulting El-Hi Textbooks in Print, 1974 (R. R. Bowker, Co., New York, 1974), we found several texts out-of-print (OP) but have included them in this bibliography since they are still being used by secondary schools or are on library shelves. School prices listed are subject to change. At the end of this list several outstanding books are categorized, which may be of value to teachers planning the purchase of standard texts or supplemental readings.
Numbering System. At the right of each annotation the reader will notice two numbers used to rate the book's view of Islam and the Middle East. The higher the number the more reliable the book. The left-hand number judges Islamic history and culture, the right-hand number modern problems, especially Arab and Israeli stereotypes and biases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left-hand numbers Islam in History</th>
<th>Right-hand numbers Modern Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Error-filled, generally unreliable</td>
<td>1. Error-filled, generally unreliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inadequate, scanty coverage</td>
<td>2. Scanty coverage, lacks objectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A perfunctory exposition</td>
<td>3. Adequate in some areas; flawed elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Adequate in most areas</td>
<td>4. Adequate in most areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Excellent; standard coverage</td>
<td>5. Excellent; objective coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
United States Textbooks


The authors attempt to present a fair view of Islam and aspects of Middle East economics, with a special unit on "Southwest Asia and North Africa" (pp. 193-256). On the modern issues they offer an equitable treatment.


Medieval Islam receives a scanty but fair treatment. The post-1945 presentation by Malcolm Kerr offers a standard presentation of the period.


A useful but unimaginative manual to accompany the text by Ewing, with some errors or unusual perspectives (e.g., p. 53, four fundamental beliefs of Islam, rather than five) which should be explained further. "Palestine, the ancient Jewish homeland" (p. 58) needs explanation to include the Arab position.

4. Anon, The Middle East (P. K. Hitti, consultant), Scholastic World Cultures Program, Scholastic Book Services, New York, 1972. ($1.35)

Includes a fine photographic essay to help students change their stereotyped views of Middle East peoples. This book offers a first-rate presentation for junior high school students. The issues of modern Middle East history are somewhat oversimplified.


The author offers five pages (pp. 133-137) on "The Moslem World" which are not always clear, four pages on "Ottomans, the Balkans and the Crimean War" which only briefly touch the subject. On the Arab-Israeli crisis he is quite fair, offering views of both sides.


A masterful presentation of the "Rise and Expansion of Islam" (pp. 182-199) by one of the world's leading medievalists. The modern period is scanty and (of course) out of date.


A paperback which covers the history of the Middle East through the experiences of five minorities who, the author explains, exhibit qualities and problems of Third World peoples: the Copts, the Shi'a Muslims, the Jews, the Armenians, and the Palestinians. The major controversies are presented with great skill in this first-rate, well-balanced, reliable volume.

A fairly standard junior high presentation, with some assertions in need of explanation (p.82, "the laws of Islam were written down... in the Koran"—not all were in the Koran). The Middle East unit (pp. 81-134) includes North Africa and treats the modern problem effectively. (4-4)


This geography, revised annually, presents a brief (11 pages) yet effective view of the ancient Middle East and Islamic world to the present time. The author presents a country-by-country social and political sketch with factual accuracy. One caveat: Egypt, the Sudan and other North African Muslim nations are not included. (5-5)


A fair presentation of the Middle East (pp. 14-77) which includes but three pages on Islam. In this junior high text the authors avoid over-simplification, but sometimes omit explanations of details. In the case of the Arab-Israeli issue students may, for example, not understand Arab anger when this author relates that Jews began to "... return to the land of their ancestors" without a complementary Arab view. (2-4)


A geography with an excellent section of 110 pp. on "The Southwest Asian Realm" in which modern political problems are briefly and very fairly mentioned. Nothing on Islam. (X-5)


Most of the content of this very useful paperback is taken from Petrovich and Curtin's Human Achievement (see below, no. 35). The author explains early Islamic history to the 19th century with great care and reliability. (Alas, his choice of some illustrations emphasizes such stereotypes as the "militancy" of Islam, p. 14, where the Prophet Muhammad waves a scimitar, and the Arabs are camel drivers, p. 47). The modern period is fair but very limited. (5-4)


A very poor text, replete with errors (p. 375, "Egyptians are not Arabs"), oversimplifications (p. 269, Muslim women "had no rights or privileges"). Moreover, the authors completely omit the Arab occupation of Palestine from 637 to 1948, leaving the impression the land was empty until the Jews returned. (1-1)

The author covers much of "The Middle East and Moslem Culture" (pp. 271-317) with excellent pictures and maps. (This section is also issued as a separate pamphlet.) Much emphasis has been placed on the social customs and traditional life of the area, yet the Islamic section lapses into historical error (e.g., p. 285, the Seljuk Turks did not replace the Abbasid caliphs, but rather the Buvid emirs). The section dealing with Israel is laudatory, but the Arab point of view is often badly obscured.


In this presentation of readings, the author raises questions which are answered by experts. For the most part, well done, with some omissions of detail. A useful book.

16. Forman, James, My Enemy, My Brother, Scholastic Book Services (TK 1733), New York, 1969. ($0.75)

A short novel for young readers sketching the lives of two friends, a Jew and a Palestinian Arab. The story centers on the Jew's escape from a concentration camp, his flight to safety in Israel, his friendship with the Palestinian, and the inexorable severing of all former ties as each eventually fights the other.


One of a series, with excellent photographs, written for young readers. Nicely arranged, leans strongly toward an Israeli view, ignoring many basic facts concerning the Palestinian Arabs.


The chapter on "Spread of Islam" meets the generally accepted norms for coverage of the history of the Muslim empires. Accompanied by excellent photographs; aimed at early junior high level.


An insufficient presentation of Islam. The book treats the West almost entirely, with little depth given to the Muslim world.


A good example of stereotyped presentation. The authors even include a picture of Muhammad (!) captioned "... with aquiline features and flaming eyes." (p. 134) Many erroneous interpretations of Islam are included. The section on the modern Arabs and Israel is scanty, omits many details, but seems fair.

A good brief supply of very useful source materials. Some of the generalized statements need clearing up (p. 199: "Nasser emerged as a military dictator"). The teacher's bibliography for the modern period tends to show the Israeli view (M. Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign) without a complementary Arab view. The author provides no teacher's bibliography for the section on Islam.


In this geography, the authors give a marginal presentation which perpetuates old errors (e.g., p. 284, "Mohammadan Pilgrims"). The section on the modern period follows suit (p. 287, "The USSR looks with covetous eyes on the Middle East for oil and an outlet to the Mediterranean"), an oversimplification needing much more explanation.


The authors arrange "The Middle East and North Africa" by country. A good geography, yet the information on the modern political problems often appear oversimplified (e.g., "One of Israel's most serious problems is the hostility of her Arab neighbors. . . .") Virtually nothing on Islam.


An excellent, standard coverage (despite some careless errors), both topically and country-by-country. The first section on Islamic history presents the events and cultural patterns clearly; the latter sections survey the issues with fairness to all sides.


A fair presentation. Relies on Daniel Lerner's Passing of Traditional Society for vignettes to explain cultural issues. Weak on some aspects of Shi'a Islam, but fair on political issues, particularly the Ottoman Empire as well as the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War.


A geography with a scanty, yet quite accurate, treatment of Islam. The authors totally ignore the political issues of Arabs and Israelis, as they affect the peoples and cultures of the Middle East.

The book covers the area from ancient times to the present and is a good example of seeing "divine guidance" in the affairs of nations (p. 326, "Believing in its divinely-inspired destiny, Israel has amazed the world...") with little or no explanation of financial help Israel has received from the West. This biased approach requires much corrective explanation. (1-3)


The author tends to exhibit a strong bias connecting the ancient Hebrews with the modern Israelis (p. 93) without explaining the Arab position. The section on Islam seems a bit more balanced. (2-1)


The author presents a fair but sketchy picture of Islam, yet stereotypes creep in: on p. 556 a picture of "a Muslim at prayer": desert, camel and beduin on his prayer rug. In the modern period even more important errors occur. On p. 549 the author states that the Tripartite Powers in 1956 would have been successful in their invasion had not the UN sent troops to Egypt to restore peace, a statement which needs much explaining. (4-3)


In a very short presentation of Islam, "A New Religion Arises in Arabia" (pp. 163-166), the authors insist on using the term "Mohammadan," even though later Syria is termed a "Moslem" nation. "Troubles in Southwest Asia" (pp. 588-593) presents issues fairly, but the scope is quite limited and, of course, dated. (1-3)


The section on Islam is scanty, error-filled (p. 253, the Koran "is a collection of Mohammad's teachings.") Though the Taj Mahal is mentioned, not a word about the Moghul Emperor Akbar the Great (d. 1605). The treatment of the Arab-Israeli issues is somewhat less laden with errors. (1-3)


Typical of many histories, Islam is treated here as a peripheral matter, with many of the important Muslim cultures omitted. Yet the author exaggerated by declaring that Medieval Islam was "...the high-point in intellectual and cultural development of the human race up to that time." (p. 91) Brief treatment of the modern period unfortunately is accompanied by incomplete or unexplained statements (e.g., p. 799, Turkey's Ataturk "...not practically no opposition") (3-3)

One of the best treatments, in a very convenient format for text or supplemental use. The author treats the Arab-Israeli conflict fairly, covers the important parts of Islamic history in an easily assimilable way, adding useful "Check Up" questions with a brief annotated bibliography. (5-5)


These excellent readings may accompany the author's Middle East or be used separately, for they follow the spectrum of Islamic history. A fine collection, arranged chronologically, of serious and light, historical and poetical literature. (5-5)


In one of the best surveys of Islamic culture, the authors give 68 pages to a well-written, generally accurate presentation, including the usually left-out period from 1250 to 1800 AD. On the modern issues too the authors remain quite unbiased. (5-5)


The authors confirm to usual practice in the section on Islam (pp. 144-151), giving superficial information along with assertions which need explaining (p. 145, where the Muslim heaven "... is a man's heaven, where women are mainly servants"). The modern period, too, presents a standard account, with strong support for Israel. An explanation of motives and aspirations of the Palestinians is not as clear. (2-2)


The authors consider quite fairly the political issues of the modern world, while leaning somewhat toward Israel. Despite the continued unwillingness to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel by both the United States and the United Nations, the authors depict the Holy City as Israel's capital, without explanation, and include a picture, the center focus of which is the Muslim Dome of the Rock (p. 569). (X-2)


A part of the publisher's series, this volume presents a very fair straightforward clearly understood view of the modern Middle East with a fair proportion on Islam. Good pictures, good maps, presented with obvious care by both the author and the editor. A useful tool for teacher and student. (4-5)

Using Muslim and "Mohammadan" interchangeably, the author presents a very oversimplified view of many of the ancient and modern problems of the Middle East. Many minor errors indicate the need for better editing (e.g., the Turks failed to take Vienna in 1683, not 1682).


Though one of the most popular texts in the U.S., this book does not live up to its reputation in regard to the Middle East. The statement that Islam "... is sometimes referred to /as/ Mohammadism" (p. 156) needs explanation. The 1948 period lacks impartiality giving a long section to Weizmann and even Ralph Bunche, but nothing relevant on Arab leaders like Abdullah of Transjordan (pp. 759-60). At the end of the excellent section on ancient Egypt is the puzzling statement that the British bought control of Egypt in the nineteenth century from the Muslim ruler (p. 41).


A superficial treatment of Islam (4 pp.) is curiously followed by an excellent short statement on Islamic culture (p. 180). Much of the Arab-Israeli presentation gives a fair account of what happened, but often omits explanation of why it happened. Statements like "... 2.7 million Israelis surrounded by 100 million hostile Arabs..." (p. 717) skew the issues of the Six Day War.


A very satisfactory geography in which Ch. 4, "Resources of Southwest Asia and North Africa" by J. F. Kolars, presents a good overview of modern problems as they stem from the environment of the Middle East. Virtually nothing on Islamic history.


This slow-learner text includes a mixture of fine social history (e.g., p. 333 where the authors explain clearly the nature of nomads), assertions which need more explanation in context ("Muslims believe that theirs is the only true religion..."), to an evident anti-Arab bias (p. 352, where the author talks about authoritarian Arabs and democratic Israelis: "... only in Turkey, Israel and Lebanon are elections held..." The rest, we might assume, are monarchies.)


Even with minor errors, this stands as one of the standard texts explaining the modern Middle East. Well balanced, explains clearly many of the difficulties both sides have in coming together to live in peace.

The best general single handbook for advanced high school students and teachers. Written in a straightforward, lively style, the book describes with a minimum of irrelevancy the cultures and major problems of the area.


For grades 6-9. The authors show their religious biases. Using the term "Mohammadanism" they spend 11 pages (pp. 127-138) on "Lands of the Wandering Bedouins," implying strongly that the millions of people who live in the Nile Delta are all nomads. Concerning modern problems, they assert that "... Mohammadans do not get along well with different religious groups living along their borders..." (p. 163-164) which certainly needs some explanation.


Generally, this very popular text presents an unbalanced view of Arab culture, almost always seeing the Arab behaving badly or declining rapidly, with only a very skimpy explanation, if any, of the greatness from which they so rapidly declined. In the modern period, the Arab fares even worse: Arabs have a strong hatred for the West (p. 704) and, without explaining the Arab side, the authors assert the present Israeli state is the reestablishment of the ancient Hebrew kingdom (p. 54).


One of the inferior presentations of the Arab-Israeli issue, this book tends to distort the cultures and people of the Middle East. Giving almost a dozen pages to camels, four pages to nomads, three pages on the life of the Prophet Mohammad, and very little on the life and culture of villages and cities, the authors laud the progress of Israel, ruling out information on the Arab or Muslim world.


The author devotes much space to presenting a sympathetic treatment of Islam, taking special pains to point out and contradict popular misconceptions. He presents a fair treatment of the modern political issues, though some biases are indicated, e.g., the Viet Cong are a "guerrilla" organization on p. 66, yet al-Fatah are termed "terrorists" on p. 657.


Here appears a rather typical text: it is not what the author includes, but what he omits that makes the problem. The presentation portrays the Jew and his heritage with great faithfulness; the complement of the Arab heritage is not easily seen. Included are beautiful pictures, excellent maps.
Canadian Textbooks


   Very little on Islam. This book is quite out of date, though the authors cover the modern period quite well. Terms like "Mohammadan" indicate a lack of sophistication. (3-4)


   This text is superior to many in the small number of its errors and the soundness of its historical perspective of Islamic Civilization. The modern period seems quite well-balanced. (5-4)


   The author presents a generally biased and unscholarly view of Islam (which nets only 3 pages) with the addition of many errors. Moreover, the portion dealing with Zionism (up to 1945) demonstrates a very biased viewpoint which puts Arab countries in a very dim light, e.g., in a list of "World's Great Religious Books" the author even omits the Koran! (1-1)


   Included here is a brief but useful chapter, "The Moslem Empire" which makes the book quite creditable. It seems devoid of deliberate bias, is reasonably accurate and balanced. There is no section dealing with modern problems. (4-X)


   Covering a very short period (1789 to 1920), this book treats Islam and the Middle East only very superficially, mostly from a Western point of view. Not a strong text for the Muslim world. (X-1)


   The book covers world history to the Reformation, therefore eliminating modern Middle East issues. Islam, however, does not come off well. Factual errors abound, yet the chapter is more extensive than usually found, even telling of the Turks, an almost unique occurrence, though sadly flawed by the obvious prejudice of the authors. (3-X)


   This mediocre, simplistic presentation often borders on the naive. Yet the authors acknowledge the Islamic legacy to the West, and make an attempt to see Islam in a culturally unbiased manner. The book ends with the Reformation, hence no coverage of the modern period. (2-X)

Deals mainly with the modern period, perpetuating many of the common stereotypes and biases; better on the pre-twentieth century period, though not free from errors. (X-2)


An overly Zionist point of view, almost sounding like a propaganda piece. Islam is not included. (X-1)


These three volumes give a balanced, objective, impressively accurate account of Islamic history and modern problems. Although obviously Francocentric, the presentation is lively, with excellent illustrations and apposite quotations from documents, with some exceptionally fine maps that complement the text throughout. The third volume, surprisingly, makes but one laconic statement about the Arab-Israeli problem. (5-3)


The text concerns itself primarily with the modern world, so there is little on Islamic history. Nevertheless, the book is well-constructed and more detailed than usual (e.g., the complete text of the Balfour Declaration is included). (X-4)


The Chapter on "The Middle East" (pp. 327-356) takes a strongly partisan view of Israel, making the section so weak as to be unworthy of inclusion. The geographic interest concerns only the modern world, so virtually nothing is said about Islam. (X-1)
Suggested List of Superior Books
for the United States

World History Texts

1. L.S. Stavrianos, et. al., A Global History of Man (Allyn and Bacon, Inc.) ($8.85)

2. M.B. Petrovich and P.D. Curtin, Human Achievement, Culture Area Approach to World History (Silver Burdett) ($6.99)

Culture and Geography

1. Ray L. Cleveland, The Middle East and South Asia (Stryker-Post Publications, Inc.) ($1.95)

2. R.N. Saveland, et. al., World Resources, The Eastern Hemisphere (Ginn and Co.) ($6.57)

Middle East: General use for junior and senior high schools

1. Anon, The Middle East (Scholastic World Cultures Program) ($1.35)

2. H. Bucher, Jr., The Third World, The Middle East (Pendulum Press) ($1.45)

3. T.G. Kavunedus, The Middle East, History, Culture, People (Cambridge Book Co., Inc.) ($.95)

4. D. Peretz, The Middle East, rev. ed. (Houghton Mifflin Co.) ($2.22)

5. D. Peretz, The Middle East, Selected Readings, rev. ed. (Houghton Mifflin Co.) ($2.22)

6. J.R. Randall, Today's World in Focus: The Middle East (Ginn and Co.) ($1.59)

Middle East: For advanced high school and teachers' use

1. F. Tachau, The Middle East (Macmillan Co.) ($2.44)

Novel

1. James Forman, My Enemy, My Brother (Scholastic Book Services) ($.75)
Part III

History and Culture of Islam: A Syllabus
(For Secondary School World History Classes)

Introduction

The syllabus which follows provides a secondary school teacher with a guide to the essential features of Muslim history and culture from the seventh to the twentieth century. Though emphasizing the Muslim peoples of the Middle East, the Islam of historic India and Southeast Asia is also included. With this syllabus, the teacher may approach the subject by focusing on the vital issues concerning the rise, greatness, and decline of the medieval Muslim empires, and of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, as well as the rise of nationalism among the Islamic peoples and their neighbors.

The syllabus is designed for eleven daily lessons, covering the period 550-1950 A.D. (Asterisks identify five sections which, taking up the essential issues, can be completed in a week.) Three kinds of readings include: selected standard secondary school Text Readings, a supplemental Historical Readings of literature of and about each period, and Teacher Readings, a list of advanced material which may be used as background, not only for the teacher but also for interested
students. No single textbook was found completely satisfactory. Those listed in the bibliography include inexpensive paperbacks as well as two standard hardback texts. A section on Items of Importance, listing terms, dates and locations, will guide the teacher and the student and may be used in evaluating student understanding. Finally, the Suggested Evaluation indicates possible achievement for good students, and may be used as a guide for evaluation questions.

**Suggested Evaluation**

At the end of eleven lessons, a good student should be able to identify all the underlined Terms, Dates, and Locations, all found in the Suggested Items of Importance. He should also be able to:

I. identify the major Powers in the Middle East in the seventh century;

II. explain the Five Pillars of Islam, and write a paragraph describing the life of the Prophet Muhammad;

III. trace the antagonism between the followers of the Umayyad House and those of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law; explain briefly the position of non-Muslims in the Muslim State;

IV. trace the geographical scope (using important locations) of the Muslim world a century after the Prophet's death;

V. explain the important cultural aspects of the Abbasid caliphate, including the name of a philosopher, a scientist, an important caliph, and explain some Arab contributions to Western civilization;

VI. identify the major Turkic and Mongol invaders of the 11th and 13th c., and the location and importance of the Moghul Emperors in the 16th c.;

VII. explain very briefly how the Crusades in Spain and in the Holy Land affected the Islamic peoples;
VIII. trace the geographical scope (using important locations) of the Ottoman Empire and describe the importance of the two opposing Powers, Habsburgs and Safavids; suggest reasons why the Muslim world fell behind the West in technology;

IX. identify two or three nation-states which were formed from the declining Ottoman Empire, and explain why European Powers were interested in Ottoman lands; describe some Muslim attempts to modernize;

X. explain briefly the growth of Arab States after World War I, and identify the reasons Arabs feared Jewish immigration in the inter-war period;

XI. explain briefly the growth of Zionism and the reason Jews wanted a national homeland.

Bibliography

Teachers should choose one of these books for the use of each student. Each book listed presents material on all the subjects and periods identified, although no one book covers the material completely. Books listed include some inexpensive ones which might be purchased in small numbers for supplemental reading in addition to the chosen text. (Prices may be subject to change.)

Text Readings

(Bucher) Bucher, Jr., H., The Third World, The Middle East (Pendulum Press, West Haven, Conn., 1973) ($1.45)


1. Pre-Islamic Middle East (550-650 CE)

Student Objective: To demonstrate the political weakness of the Byzantine and Persian Empires in the seventh century; to describe the quiescent but potential commercial and political energy of Arabia.

Text Readings

1. Curtin, 7-13
2. Peretz I, 56-58
3. Tachau, 68-69

Historical Readings

1. Ullah, 4-16
Teacher Readings

1. Armajani, 23-30
2. Bishai, 43-68
3. Lewis, 21-35

Suggested Items of Importance (Underlined items are minimum requirements)

1. Terms: Heraclius, Byzantines, Eastern Roman Empire, Sassanid Persians, Jerusalem, Zoroastrian, Arab, Semite
2. Dates: Seventh century CE (common era)
3. Locations: Mecca, Constantinople, Damascus, Alexandria, Ctesiphon, Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Nile River

II. Rise of Islam (600-632) (*) indicates essential for one-week program

Student Objective: To describe the life of the Prophet Muhammad; to explain the Five Pillars of Islam; to trace the movement of Islam from a call to repentance to the establishment of a Muslim community in Medina.

Text Readings

1. Curtin, 13-15
2. Kavunedus, 51-57
3. Peretz I, 181-182
4. Petrovich, 446-449
5. Tachau, 69-86

Historical Readings

1. Peretz II, 34-45
2. Ullah, 17-36

Teacher Readings

1. Armajani, 23-48
2. Bishai, 69-135
3. Lewis, 36-48

Suggested Items of Importance

1. Terms: Allah, Muhammad, Ali, Khadija, Abu Bakr, Battle of Badr, mosque, muezzin, Koran, Hegira, Five Pillars of Islam, Farewell Pilgrimage
2. Dates: 622, 632
3. Locations: Mecca, Medina, Red Sea, Sinai Peninsula, Damascus, Alexandria, Constantinople

III. The "Rightly-Guided" Caliphs (632-661)

Student Objective: To trace the success of the first three decades of Muslim expansion; to note the ancient Arab antagonisms and new political ambitions; to trace the major aspects of the First Civil War; to understand the development of the Party of Ali (Shi'at Ali)
Text Readings
1. Peretz I, 70-74
2. Tachau, 87-94

Teacher Readings
1. Armajani, 48-62
2. Bishai, 135-166
3. Lewis, 49-63

Suggested Items of Importance
1. Terms: caliphate, Abu Bakr, Ali, Mu'awiyah, Shi'ites, Battle of the Yarmuk River, Fall of Damascus, Fall of Alexandria, Fall of Ctesiphon, Yazdigerd III, Hasan and Hussein
2. Dates: 656, 661
3. Locations: Alexandria, Damascus, Ctesiphon, Kufa, Kerbela

IV. The Umayyad Caliphate (661-750)

Student Objective: To trace the political expansion of Islam across North Africa, the conquest of Spain, and expansion over the Pyrenees into France; to trace Islamic expansion across Persia and Central Asia to Western China; to trace the expansion of Islam to the Indus River (Sind); to understand the inner contradictions of the Arab Caliphate which led to revolt by eastern Muslims against the House of Umayya.

Text Readings
1. Curtin, 15-21
2. Peretz I, 74-79
3. Petrovich, 449-451

Historical Readings
1. Peretz II, 50-58
2. Uliah, 37-44

Teacher Readings
1. Armajani, 64-77
2. Bishai, 167-216
3. Lewis, 64-79

Suggested Items of Importance
1. Terms: Mu'awiyah, Damascus Caliphate, Abdulmalik, Umayyad, Siege of Constantinople, Gibraltar, Conquest of Spain, Battle of Tours, Conquest of Sind, Dome of the Rock, Zab River Battle, Kadi, emir, People of the Book
2. Dates: 661, 714, 733 (732), 749-750
3. Locations: Qayrawan, Gibraltar, Cordoba, Tours, Jerusalem, Damascus, Constantinople, Basra, Oxus River, Transoxiana, Sind, Indus River, Zab River
V. Abbasid Caliphate (750-950)

**Student Objective:** To demonstrate the success of the Abbasid revolt and the establishment of a stable, eastern capital in Baghdad; to identify great advances in Abbasid commerce, to describe some differences between the Abbasid and the earlier Umayyad caliphate, agriculture, industry, intellectual achievement and culture; to trace the stabilization of orthodox Islam; to note the ever-growing weakness of the Caliphate.

**Text Readings**

1. Curtin, 21-30
2. Kavunedus, 76-85
3. Peretz I, 80-94
4. Petrovich, 452-455
5. Tachau, 95-98

**Historical Readings**

1. Peretz II, 65-77
2. Ullah, 45-63; 77-111

**Teacher Readings**

1. Armajani, 78-88; 108-119
2. Bishai, 217-324
3. Lewis, 80-114; 131-143

**Suggested Items of Importance**

2. **Dates:** 750; 762, 813
3. **Locations:** Baghdad, Basra, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, Mecca

VI. Eastern Empires (950-1550)

**Student Objective:** To identify the important Muslim civilizations east of Baghdad; to identify the great Turkic states, especially the Seljuks; to trace the Mongol invasions of the Islamic east; to trace the spread of Islam in India through the reign of the Great Moghuls; to note the commercial and religious expansion of Islam into the regions of Southeast Asia.

**Text Readings**

1. Curtin, 37-48
2. Kavunedus, 85-87
3. Peretz I, 95-98; 99-102
4. Petrovich, 458-461; 556-560
5. Tachau, 99-102

**Historical Readings**

1. Ullah, 149-171; 238-320
Teacher Readings
1. Armajani, 92-95; 96-107
2. Lewis, 144-163

Suggested Items of Importance
1. Terms: Ghaznawids, Turks, sultan, Seljuks, Mongols, Moghuls, Nizam al-Mulk, Alp Arslan, Manzikert, Chingiz Khan, Hulagu Khan, Fall of Baghdad, Tamurlane, Babur, Akbar, Taj Mahal, Omar Khayyam, Ismaillis, Assassins
2. Dates: 999, 1055, 1071, 1258, 1526
3. Locations: Ghazna, Baghdad, Manzikert, Ankara, New Delhi, Khyber Pass

VII. Western Empires (950-1300)

Student Objective: To identify the great Muslim Empires which competed with the West for 500 years; the Umayyads of Spain, the Fatimids in Cairo, the Seljuks of Syria-Palestine, the Ayyubids and Mamluks of Egypt; to view the Crusades from an Arab point of view.

Text Readings
1. Curtin, 30-43
2. Kaynundus, 85-87
3. Peretz I, 95-104
4. Petrovich, 456-458
5. Tachau, 99-102

Teacher Readings
1. Armajani, 125-129
2. Hitti, 493-616; 633-693
3. Lewis, 115-130

Suggested Items of Importance
1. Terms: Cordoba, Granada, Reconquista, Fatimids, Seljuk Turks, Fall of Jerusalem, Saladin, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ayn Jalut, Hulagu Khan, Baybars, feudalism, Fall of Acre
2. Dates: 969, 1085, 1099, 1187, 1260, 1291
3. Locations: Cordoba, Toledo, Granada, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Cairo, Acre, Ayn Jalut, Venice, Baghdad, Antioch

VIII. The Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Persians (1300-1850)

Student Objective: To describe the geographical sweep of the Ottoman State to its highest point of power; to identify the Habsburg and Safavid hostility; to describe the deterioration and decline of Ottoman power; to trace the rise of movements toward national self-determination among non-Muslim subjects; to identify attempts to regain power by Ottoman reform movements.
Text Readings

1. Curtin, 48-66
2. Kavunedus, 92-110
3. Peretz I, 104-132
4. Petrovich, 458-472
5. Tachau, 103-112

Historical Readings

1. Peretz II, 78-93
2. Ullah, 370-398

Teacher Readings

1. Armajani, 136-197
2. Davison, 15-90
3. Fisher, 149-324
4. Peretz, 50-97

Suggested Items of Importance

1. Terms: gazis, Osman, Tamurlane, Battle of Ankara, Mehmed II the Conqueror, millet, sultan, ulema, vizier, Janissary, Suleiman the Magnificent, Lawgiver, Fall of Cairo, March on Vienna, Battle of Lepanto, Safavid Persians, Shah Abbas, Habsburgs, capitulations, Napoleon, Muhammad Ali of Egypt, Khedive, Greek Revolt, Hatt-i Humayun
2. Dates: 1453, 1821
3. Locations: Istanbul, Cairo, Algiers, Lepanto, Vienna, Tabriz, Isfahan, Baghdad, Athens

IX. Nation States in Ottoman and Persian Lands (1850-1950)

Student Objective: To trace specific examples of the intrusion of Europeans into Ottoman and Persian lands (especially the Holy Land); to identify Western political support of non-Muslim nationalist movements; Greek, Slav, Armenian, Christian Arab of Lebanon, Jewish; to identify the successor states to the Ottoman Empire after World War I; to describe the reforms of modern Turkey and modern Iran.

Text Readings

1. Curtin, 66-85
2. Kavunedus, 111-117; 120-122
3. Peretz I, 126-153
4. Petrovich, 472-481
5. Tachau, 108-114

Historical Readings

1. Peretz II, 98-153

Teacher Readings

1. Armajani, 198-210; 179-185; 220-241; 267-278
2. Fisher, 295-349; 376-447; 464-475
3. Davison, 91-128
4. Peretz, 83-128
Suggested Items of Importance

1. Terms: Eastern Question, Sick Man of Europe, nationalism, Mahmud II, Holy Places, Pan Slavism, Greater Greece, the Armenian Nation, czar, Tanzimat, Crimean War, Abdulhamid II, Young Turk Revolution, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, World War I, Dardanelles Campaign, Zionism, Balfour Declaration, Fall of Jerusalem, Treaty of Sevres, mandate, Iran, Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Aramco, Florence Nightingale, end of the sultanate, end of the caliphate

2. Dates: 1853-1856, 1908, 1914, 1918, 1923

3. Locations: Cairo, Suez Canal, Black Sea, Crimean Peninsula, Sebastopol, Palestine, Bethlehem, Ankara, Saudi Arabia, Abadan, Tehran, TAP Line

Arab Nationalism (1850–1950)

Student Objective: To identify the aspirations of Arab nationalists against both their Ottoman sovereigns and Western imperialists; to describe Arab support of the Allies in World War I; to cite the frustrations of the Arab peoples after the War; to understand Arab fears of Jewish immigration into Palestine; to recognize Arab anger at the United Nations decision to establish a Jewish State in Palestine.

Text Readings

1. Curtin, 85-98
2. Kavunedus, 117-120, 122-126, 134-138
3. Peretz I, 154-181, 210-233
4. Petrovich, 480-481, 741-747
5. Stavrianos, 457-478

Historical Readings

1. Peretz II, 154-164, 172-197
2. Ullah, 172-212
3. Armajani, 210-219; 242-250; 279-301; 381-403
5. Nutting, 274-333
6. Peretz, 129-150

Suggested Items of Importance

XI. Jewish Nationalism (1898-1950)

Student Objective: To describe the rise of Zionism; to identify Zionism, to show how the Nazi Holocaust led eventually to the U.N. Declaration of 1947; to describe the founding of the State of Israel and the 1947-48 Arab-Israeli War.

Text Readings

1. Curtin, 98-106
2. Kavunedus, 149-160
3. Peretz I, 182-197
4. Potrovich, 33; 743-747
5. Stavrianos, 490-495

Historical Readings

1. Peretz II, 210-224

Teacher Readings

1. Armajani, 320-323; 337-346; 369-380
2. Fisher, 640-686
3. Peretz, 244-298

Suggested Items of Importance

1. Terms: Anti-Semitism, Diaspora, Théodore Herzl, Zionism, David Ben-Gurion, kibbutz, aliyah, Tel Aviv, British mandate, Chaim Weizmann, Nazi Holocaust, U.N., Balfour Declaration, State of Israel
3. Locations: Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Jordan River, Syria, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Gaza, West Bank
Part IV

Four Major Arab-Israeli Wars: A Syllabus
(A Short Course for Secondary School Classes)

The syllabus which follows presents junior and senior high school students with an opportunity to learn about the four major Arab-Israeli confrontations from 1947 to 1973. However, the syllabus does not cover in detail the entire quarter century Arab-Israeli struggle, or the many related political and diplomatic problems of the modern Middle East. It is rather a tool for the teacher who wishes to draw students away from old stereotypes and images and to have them look at the Arab and the Israeli from new perspectives. Each lesson studies the Arab-Israeli problem using a slightly different objective: the student looks at the perceptions of the participants in the first war (1947-1948); he studies basic preparations for war in the 1956 war; he considers opposing views of the crisis prior to the Six Day War in 1967; and he analyzes changes in American stereotypes which have resulted from the most recent (1973) war. Although in each lesson the teacher must rely on information gained from standard source and text material, he will use the Selected Readings included in this syllabus to guide students in attaining the

Each lesson is a unity in itself, and may be taught in approximately one or two days. Each contains an Overview, which explains the issue involved, and two generalized Objectives for the teaching of the lesson: first, the Knowledge and Comprehension students are expected to gain, and second, specific Application of Skills (generally map skills) they should develop. The Teacher Strategy provides the teacher with specific activities for students to work through, individually or in groups, based on the accompanying Selected Readings in this Syllabus. The evaluation of each objective through questions provides teachers with feedback to check on whether students have acquired the general knowledge.

The following four inexpensive General Reading paperbacks provide both student and teacher excellent information about the totality of Middle East history and culture. (Prices stated may have risen slightly.) Teachers are urged to buy one or more of these for their own use and for enrichment reading for their students.
1. H. Bucher, Jr., *The Third World, The Middle East* (Pendulum Press, West Haven, Conn., 1973), $1.45


An acceptable geography of the Middle East (with the exception that it does not include Egypt and North Africa) is:

R.L. Cleveland, *The Middle East and South Asia* (Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., Washington, D.C., revised annually), $1.95
1. The 1947-1948 War: Perceptions of the Participants

A. Overview

This lesson promotes student understanding of the feelings of Jews as they face the task of establishing a Zionist State in a land inhabited for the most part by Palestinian Arabs, with the experience of the Nazi Holocaust not more than three years behind them. It also involves understanding of the frustrations and degradation felt by those Palestinians who, for whatever reason, fled from their ancestral homes and found themselves in refugee camps. The student, trying to understand his own pre-judgements, as to who was "right" or "wrong," will analyze the frustrations which have led to attacks and counterattacks and the foundations for the hatred and suspicions which thwart attempts at making true peace in the region today.

B. Brief Chronology


1897: The first Zionist Congress

1917: The Balfour Declaration

1920: British Mandate over Palestine begins (to 1948)

1921: Palestinian attacks on Jewish settlements; Hagana fights against Palestinians in Jerusalem

1929: Palestinian and Jewish attacks and counter-attacks; in August, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs dead

1933: Hitler to power; persecution of Jews in Germany

1936: Arab Higher Committee to unite Palestinian and other Arabs against Zionists

1939: World War II begins

1944: Assassination of Lord Moyne, British Resident Minister in the Middle East, in Cairo, by Zionist terrorists
1945: League of Arab States organized
End of World War II (during which approximately six million Jews were killed)

1946: Escalation of extremism by Palestinian Arabs and Zionists

1947: November 29: UN votes to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish sections in a federal state with Jerusalem as an international city; Arab peoples, Arab States refuse to accept

1948: January: Arab and Jewish attacks and counter-attacks on cities and villages
April 9: Massacre of Deir Yassin by Zionists (245 killed)
April 14: Massacre of Jewish nurses and doctors on Mt. Scopus by Arabs
May 14: British pull out of Palestine
May 15: State of Israel proclaimed: beginning of first major Arab-Israeli War
September 17: murder of Count Bernadotte, UN mediator, by Israelis

1949: Israel accepted in the United Nations after accepting armistice signed on Island of Rhodes with Ralph Bunche, U.N. mediator. Continuation of terrorism and counter-terrorism by both sides

C. Objectives

1. Knowledge and Comprehension
   a. To know some reasons why many Jews for centuries, but particularly after the agonies suffered in the Nazi Holocaust, desired to build an all-Jewish State in Palestine;
   b. To identify the reason why Palestinian Arabs were angered by the loss of their homes and the establishment of a Jewish State, as well as terror-stricken by the armed attacks and massacre of the people of at least one Arab village by Jewish irregular troops;
   c. To understand the frustration and anger generated on both sides by citing examples of Palestinian and Jewish terror

2. Application of Skills
   a. To be able to locate, given a map of Egypt and the Levant, the following places: Egypt, Israel,
Transjordan, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Cairo, Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Deir Yassin, the Jordan River, Gaza, Nablus, Jaffa, Safad, Ramleh, Hebron, the Sharon, the Negev, Beersheba, Lydda, Amman, Damascus, the West Bank, Dead Sea, Sea of Galilee, Galilee. (Use Denoyer-Geppert #18034, "Egypt and Levant")


D. General Reading

1. Bucher, pp. 82-103; 121-134
2. Forman, J., My Enemy, My Brother (read the entire novel)
3. Kavundus, Chapters 6, 7, 8, especially pp. 111-126; 134-146; 157-160
4. Peretz, pp. 190-194
5. Tachau, the section "International Relations," especially pp. 149-162

E. Teaching Strategy

1. Selected Reading: Cohen, A., Israel and the Arab World (below, p.64). After students have read this, they should discuss the following questions:

   a. Why did the Jews feel justified in fighting the Arabs in Palestine after November 29, 1947? (The U.N. Partition plan allotted them part of Palestine under a federal structure.) On what grounds did the Arabs oppose this? (They felt no power or people could take away their traditional homeland, no matter how good the reason.)

   b. After January 1948, how did the Hagana react toward the Palestinian Arabs? (Like the armed forces of any nation.) Why did the Arab press tell their people not to panic? (If they fled, the Hagana might take even more territory than the United Nations had voted.)

   c. What is the importance of the city of Jerusalem to the Zionists? (It is considered since King David's time to be the capital and center of Zionist hopes.) To Arab Muslims? (It is the third most holy city in Islam.) To Christian Arabs? (It is to Christians everywhere the place where was acted out the central drama of the Christian faith.)
2. **Individual Activity.** It is the year 1948. Assuming you are an Israeli, write a letter to a brother in the United States who is studying at a university. Tell of the battles and the sound of war you have heard and experienced as you have lived in the city of Tel Aviv since the U.N. vote to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab State. In your letter include your feelings about what the new Zionist State wants, what it hopes to become. Include also what the Arab States (Syria, Transjordan, Egypt) are going to defeat and frustrate these aims; and tell what feelings you have when close friends or relatives are caught in the terrible fighting going on in the cities, on the highways, and in the villages. Mention also what action you feel you and your people must take: fight, remain as a minority under Arab rule, run away, emigrate to a new land.

3. **Selected Reading:** *Journal of Palestine Studies.*
(Below, p. 65) After students have read this portion they should discuss the following questions:

   a. Why do you think Jewish soldiers proposed a massacre of the inhabitants of a Palestinian village?

   b. Why do you think the commanders would not listen to the request of the author to stop the massacre of Deir Yassin? Do fighting and bloodshed develop a kind of unstoppable momentum? Should soldiers and officers be held responsible for violence done in the heat of battle? Does the end of establishing and maintaining a nation-state justify the means needed, even if these means include the massacre of women and children?

   c. What effect do you suppose this massacre at Deir Yassin had on the other Palestinian villagers or city-dwellers in the region? What would they do to avoid the same fate? What might you have done under the same circumstances?
d. Are there political reasons why Deir Yassin, a small village in the environs of Jerusalem, might have been treated the way it was?

4. Individual Activity. Assuming you are a Palestinian who heard about the massacre at Deir Yassin, write a letter to a brother who is in the United States studying at a university. It is the month of May 1948, and you have just heard of the proclaiming of the new Zionist State of Israel. You and your family lived in Jerusalem near Deir Yassin, but fled in terror when you heard what happened. In your letter tell why your father and mother decided to leave. Give a description of the feelings of your family as they left their home, what you left behind, and what you thought as you entered Transjordan and a refugee camp. Tell your brother in the United States what your plans are, when you hope to return, and how you plan to do this. (Remember: you have no idea that, for whatever reasons, you will be in this refugee camp for the rest of your childhood.)

5. Group Activity. After writing the letters, students should gather into two groups and discuss among themselves the reasons they, as Israelis or Palestinians, wrote supporting the action in their letters. Students should exchange their letters, read them aloud, and discuss the concerns raised by the writers: what issues seemed important, what feelings they had about the enemy soldiers firing at (or near) them, what hopes the Arab Palestinians and Israelis had for the future.

After the two sets of letters have been discussed, students
should make two lists on the blackboard under the subjects:

1. Attitudes of Palestinian Arabs. 2. Attitudes of Israelis.

The teacher can then use these lists to examine the foundations of the mutual hatred and violence which has continued on without any apparent end.

F. Useful Reading Sources


Selected Reading

Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1970)

The Jewish Community Defends Itself

The Mufti Haj Amin al-Hussaini wanted an immediate full-scale attack on the Jewish community [after the U.N. partition vote of November 29, 1947], but the leaders of the Arab states believed that outside military intervention was impossible so long as the British and their army were in Palestine. Meanwhile, the Higher Arab Committee decided to take action with their own forces. Although there was no Arab enthusiasm for a new war, they rapidly organized intermittent attacks on rural Jewish settlements, on the outskirts of mixed cities, and on the roads. This strategy was intended to “raise morale” in the Palestinian Arab community and to force the neighboring Arab states to come to its aid.

The day after the United Nations Assembly vote [i.e., November 30], [a Palestinian] attack was made on a Jewish passenger bus *en route* to Jerusalem, the first step in a general assault on Jewish communications. On December 2, [1947], the Jewish commercial center of Jerusalem was set on fire. According to eye-witness reports, the arsonists obtained gasoline from British police cars . . . This was the start of a series of attacks on Jewish sections of the large towns (such as the Hatikva

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quarter near Tel Aviv, and Ramat Rahel in Jerusalem) and on remote agricultural settlements: Kfar Szold, Kfar Uriya, the Etzion bloc. On January 15-16, 1948, an entire company of thirty-five, most of them Hebrew University students who had rushed to defend the Etzion bloc, was wiped out in a fight to the finish. On January 20, Kibbutz Yehiam in western Galilee was fiercely attacked. A pickup truck scouting the Mikve-Israel-Jerusalem road was attacked near Yazur and its seven special police-guard occupants killed (January 21). From December to January, nearly 400 Jews were killed by Arab bullets, and many others were wounded. But attacks on Jewish settlements were repelled, and Jewish communications—one of the main targets of Arab assault—were not cut off. At this stage, the relations between the two peoples in the country had not yet been entirely severed; and here and there efforts were made to stop the situation from deteriorating still further, and to prevent wholesale bloodshed ... (pp. 405-406)

The Hagana [Jewish underground army of self defense] which at first only returned fire, later embarked on counter-attacks such as ambushes, infiltrations, and retaliatory actions. Arab houses serving as headquarters and arms stores for Arab gangs were blown up. The number of Arabs killed in these months [after January 1948] was much larger than that of Jewish victims. Panic set in among the Arabs. Those of means in the mixed cities (especially Haifa) began to leave for quieter Arab parts in Palestine itself, or fled to Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria. The Arab press began to publish appeals saying "Don't panic!" (pp. 407-408)

Selected Reading 2

Journal of Palestine Studies, I, 4 (Beirut: Summer 1972)
"Anniversary of Deir Yassin," pp. 142-146.

On the twenty-fourth anniversary of the massacre of Deir Yassin, Yediot Aharonot [an Israeli newspaper] (April 4, 1972) published a report written 24 years ago by "a young Palmach fighter ..." called Meir Philipski, who is today Colonel (Res.) Meir Pa'el. According to Yediot Aharonot, "he is probably the only eye-witness outside the ranks of ETZEL (Irgun—the National Military Organization) and LEHI (The Stern Gang—Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) who investigated the secret operation at Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948, and set down what he saw with his own eyes and what he heard with his own ears in the report which he sent at the time to Israel Galili, the head of the Haganah command." (p. 142)

"In the night of April 8-9, while Palmach units were fighting a battle of 'life and death' in Qastal, LEHI and ETZEL units
approached the village. Before the operation, a number of irregulars had proposed a massacre of the inhabitants of the village [of Deir Yassin] but the senior officers had rejected the proposal." (p. 143)

"It was noon [April 9, 1948] when the battle ended and the shooting stopped. Things had become quiet, but the village had not surrendered. The ETZEL and LEHI irregulars left the places in which they had been hiding and started carrying out cleaning up operations in the houses. They fired with all the arms they had, and threw explosives into the houses. They also shot everyone they saw in the houses, including women and children—indeed the commanders made no attempt to check the disgraceful acts of slaughter.

"I myself and a number of inhabitants of Jerusalem begged the commanders to give orders to their men to stop shooting, but our efforts were unsuccessful. In the meantime some 25 men had been brought out of the houses; they were loaded onto a freight truck and led in a 'victory parade,' like a Roman triumph, through the Mahaneh Yahuda and Zakhron Yosef quarters [in Jerusalem]. At the end of the parade they were taken to a stone quarry between Giv'at Sha'ul and Deir Yassin and shot in cold blood. The fighters then put the women and children who were still alive on a truck and took them to the Mandelbaum Gate."

"The commanders of the secret organizations refused to comply with the request that their men should bury the 245 Arab victims whose bodies were lying all over the village. This unhappy task was performed by two companies of the Gadna' who were brought to the village from Jerusalem for the purpose." (p. 144)
A. Overview

In this lesson the student should understand the preparations for war on both sides of the borders which resulted from the "teeter-totter" effect of reciprocal actions. The crossing of Palestinian guerrillas into their former homelands (now the State of Israel) was answered by Israeli raids on various villages in Jordan and Syria, which in turn led Arabs to respond by attacks in Israel, and which in turn led to the military attacks of Israel in February 1955 on an Egyptian military establishment in Gaza and in December of that year on a Syrian outpost near Lake Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee). The size and audacity of these raids caused such severe Arab reaction and Egyptian national shame, that President Nasser, denied arms by the United States and Western Europe, asked the Soviet Union for military defense aid. This action brought Communist bloc nations (and the "Cold War") into direct involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. What had been a relatively neutral area now became polarized, with the United States and its allies supporting Israel, and the Soviets and Communist bloc giving encouragement to some Arab States. (Teachers will note this lesson does not involve the closely related issue of the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the financing of the Aswan High Dam.) The syllabus emphasizes the willingness of both sides, in their preparations for war, to resort to positions and programs not anticipated by their own people as well as the rest of the world: President Nasser,
an avowed anti-Communist Muslim, accepting military aid from the Soviet bloc; General Moshe Dayan, in alliance with Britain and France, demonstrating a cynical view of his own Western allies as well as of the President of the United States, as the Israelis prepared the surprise attack on Egypt in order to strengthen their position.

B. Brief Chronology

1950: Korean War (to 1953)

1951: King Abdullah of Jordan assassinated by an Arab Palestinian; constant Palestinian-Israeli border incidents

1952: Col. Abd al-Nasser and fellow officers overthrow King Farouk of Egypt; establish a Republic in 1953

1953: Israelis attack Gaza refugee camp after Palestinian attacks on Israeli farms and communities; Hussein the new king of Jordan; Israel attacks Jordanian village of Qibiya

1954: Israeli saboteurs blow up U.S. and British "libraries in Cairo and put the blame on Egypt, later known as the "Lavon Affair".

1955: Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain); Gaza Incident and Czech arms deal

1956: Soviets proclaim support for Arabs against Israel's "threatening position against its neighbors" October 29: Suez War, Second Arab-Israeli War November: President Eisenhower re-elected in U.S.

1957: Eisenhower Doctrine (against Communism in Middle East)

1958: Union of Syria and Egypt in a United Arab Republic (UAR); monarchy of Iraq overthrown; revolution in Lebanon; U.S. Marines land

C. Objectives

1. Knowledge and Comprehension

a. To be able to explain how growing Arab and Israeli anger from the escalation of raid and counter-raid pushed both sides toward war in 1956;
b. To be able to explain why, after the Gaza "Incident" of 1955, Egypt turned to the Soviet Bloc for arms in defense against Israeli attacks;

c. To understand why the possible upset in "the arms balance" after 1955 led Israel to fear an Arab attack on itself;

d. To know how Israeli officials planned, along with Britain and France, a surprise attack on Egypt, an attack which surprised even the United States.

2. Application of Skills

a. To locate, given a map of Egypt and the Levant, the following places: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Cairo, Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee). (Use Denoyer-Geppert #18034, "Egypt and Levant");


D. General Readings

1. Bucher, pp. 134-135
2. Kavunudos, pp. 137-140; 160-161
3. Peretz, pp. 194-195
4. Tachau, pp. 153-154

E. Teaching Strategy

1. Selected Reading: A. Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (below, p. 70). After reading this portion, students will discuss the following questions:

a. Mention some Israeli arguments used against their own raids against the Arabs. (That the aims of the Jewish State should be non-military, that the raids were proportionately too great in comparison with the Arab incursions, if the purpose was to achieve secure boundaries with the Arabs the raids were neither correct nor effective, that the raids should not have been carried out when it appeared Israel was a tool of the West to punish Egypt for not participating in the Baghdad Pact against Communism.)
b. What reasons does the author give to show that the Gaza Raid was a "fateful event" in Middle East history? (Israel made of Egypt, then a moderate Arab State, a strong enemy, degraded and defeated.)

c. How did the Gaza attack affect Egyptian President Nasser politically? (He now had to become leader and spokesman of anti-Israeli forces in the Arab world.)

d. Do you think that without the attack at Gaza President Nasser might have tried to make a political settlement with Israel?

e. Do you think degrading the Arabs bothered them more than a military defeat? How would you react?

Selected Reading 1

Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1970)

Acts of Retaliation: "The Gaza Incident"

International public opinion was not particularly shocked at the news of small-scale infiltration into Israel and the accompanying terror and murder, even though, since the 1949 armistice, tens and hundreds of unarmed Israelis had fallen victim to these activities. On the other hand, there were generally angry reactions to Israeli acts of retaliation.

These reprisal operations were often the cause of bitter controversy within Israel itself. It was asked to what extent the purity of Jewish arms [sic] was preserved, to what extent the acts of retaliation stood in proportion to the provocations that had caused them, how correct and effective they were in light of the purpose that they had set out to serve, and whether the timing was correct.

For example, the "Gaza incident" of February 28, 1955, in which thirty-eight Egyptian and eight Israeli soldiers were killed (apart from those killed and wounded among the civilian population of Gaza), came after various provocations by the Egyptians. Even so, there were those who did not see the Israeli action solely as a reaction to the sabotage, espionage, and murder by soldiers who came from the Gaza strip, as was claimed by the official Israeli announcement. These people saw the incident as connected with a different and extraneous matter--pressure put on Egypt at that time, because of her refusal to join the Baghdad Pact, which had been signed a few days before. It is
true that the Egyptian leaders who threatened the destruction of Israel had no moral right to complain when the Israeli leaders exploited Egypt's hour of political isolation to strike back at her. However, from an Israeli point of view, it is still questionable if long-term political considerations should have permitted the striking of such a blow, precisely when, in the political circumstances of the time, it would look as if the blow were connected to the pressure being exerted, for their own reasons, by foreign powers against Egypt.

Something similar happened in the "Kinneret incident" of December 12, 1955, in which an Israeli force attacked the Syrian positions on the northeast shore of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret), blowing them up and killing fifty six Syrians, wounding nine, and taking thirty prisoner[s], along with a booty of arms and military equipment. The official Israeli version linked the incident with Syrian attacks on Israeli fishing vessels in the Kinneret, and there were indeed provocations of this nature before and after the incident. But fate would have it that the response was timed for exactly the moment when the Western powers were putting pressure on Syria, where a fierce internal struggle was taking place in order to determine whether she would join the Baghdad Pact or the neutralist policy of Egypt.

In any event, the Gaza incident aroused strong reactions in the countries within the immediate area and around the world. On March 29, 1955, the Security Council unanimously condemned Israel. But the principal influence of the incident was on the Egyptian leadership. In a talk with American newsmen some weeks afterward, Abd-ul-Nasser said, "Before the Gaza incident, I thought we could live side by side without trouble, but I was surprised by this attack." When he was asked if the state of Israel and its government had not expressed their desire for peace and the coexistence of the two states before the Gaza incident, Nasser replied, "I think that in Israel there are two different outlooks on this matter. One is for an end to the incidents, and hopes for peace and coexistence, while the other, and this is Ben-Gurion's outlook, sees the solution in force. Now, Ben-Gurion has taken his outlook from theory into practice."

Before the Gaza incident, sober voices had also been heard from time to time in the neighboring countries. In a debate in the Lebanese Parliament on January 6, 1955, Kamal Junbalat, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and later a Lebanese government minister said that no danger was threatening the Arab world from Israel: "It has been in existence for six years, and the danger seen by those preaching rearmament has not emerged." Voices like this were no longer heard after the Gaza incident.

Two writers well known in Britain for their political articles—Gay [sic] Wint, of the editorial board of the liberal Manchester Guardian and Peter Calvacoressi [sic], one of the scientific
workers of Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International Affairs—summed up political developments in the Middle East concerning what is called in Britain the Suez campaign, and the events that had gone before it. In their view, the Gaza incident was "One of the most fateful events in recent Middle Eastern history. Until then, Egypt was less active against Israel than other Arab states, there were fewer clashes between Israel and Egypt than between Israel and Syria or Jordan. Egypt maintained only small armed forces in the border area. In their attack, the Jews surprised the Egyptians, degrading as well as defeating them."

They wrote that Abd-ul-Nasser's character was still a matter of controversy; he was either a realist trying to appear as an extreme nationalist in order to consolidate his power, or an emotional man capable of harmful acts of madness. At any rate, among all the Arab leaders, he was the only one who was perhaps ready to come to some arrangement with Israel. But February 1955 brought about a turning point in his position. Ever since then, he had seen Israel as his principal enemy, and he started then to seek arms everywhere in order to strengthen his country against future attack. Since the United States, Britain, and France wanted to preserve a state of military equilibrium in the Middle East—in accordance with their declaration of 1950—and thought of using Israel against the Arab states after the letter's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact, which had just then been set up and had failed to respond to the Egyptian request, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. From here, the story is known. (pp. 512-515)

2. Small Group Activity. Students will present a news story for an American TV station, interviewing "an important Egyptian statesman" (perhaps President Nasser), concerning the events of the "Gaza Incident" of February 1955. Questions suggested below might be asked. The answers (in parentheses) are not student opinions but rather suggest what an Egyptian probably would have said in 1956:

Q: When did the Egyptians become aware of their weakness toward Israel? (As far back as 1948 army officers like Nasser had lost military battles to the Israelis.)

Q: Why didn't Egypt ask for military help earlier? (The borders with Israel were very quiet compared with the Syrian and Jordanian borders, where attacks had been carried out for years.)
Q: What were the losses sustained by Egypt? (38 soldiers killed, much property damage.)

Q: Do you believe Israel attacked in retaliation against Egyptian murderers and saboteurs, as they say publicly? (No, rather Israel's Western allies used her to punish Egypt for non-participation in the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact.)

Q: Why would a Muslim Egyptian purchase arms from a Communist nation? (Feelings of fear and shame; Western countries had been asked for arms first, but did not respond; Western democracies also worked with Communist Russia when they needed help during World War II.)

Q: Once the Communists begin to help, can you continue to control them? (Only time will tell; Egypt first must strengthen itself in preparation for any future Israeli attacks.)

Q: Why do you call them "attacks"? Don't the Arabs make murderous infiltrations into Israel? (It's Palestinian land which was taken illegally by Israel in the first place.)

Q: Why don't you want to make peace with Israel? (Why make peace with a country which is constantly trying to expand at your expense?)

3. Selected Reading. M. Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (below, p. 74). After reading this portion, students will answer the following questions:

a. Give specific reasons why Dayan felt threatened by the Arab States. (Iraqi troops had crossed into Jordan, probably on their way to attack Israel.) Do you feel he had other objectives, like the expansion of Israel into the Sinai? Why?

b. Give specific reasons why Dayan didn't trust the British even though they were his allies. (They were playing a double game, allied with Israel, but also supportive of both the monarchies of Jordan and Iraq.) What does this say about wartime truthfulness?

c. Why did Israel want to deceive the U.S., yet not lose its friendship? (It valued American support but saw its best interests in a policy of military strength.)

d. Point out how Dayan was struck by the "sterility of America's approaches to Israel." Do you agree with him?
Today we learned that on 14 October 1956, less than forty-eight hours ago, advance units of the Iraqi Army entered Jordan. If we intend to react by military operations, we should do this soon, before their presence in Jordan becomes a recognized and accepted fact. It will be very difficult for us to allocate the required forces and perhaps fight a simultaneous war on two fronts, the Jordanian and the Egyptian. But I see no escape. What is happening now beyond each of these borders, the east and the west, is likely to determine our future, and with all the hardship it will entail, we must deal with both.

The British, of course, can spare us this second front; but they are happy at the opportunity—and are perhaps creating it—to show the Arabs that their being with us on the same side of one political front, the Egyptian, is not due to their love of Israel, and does not mean their abandonment of the Arabs on the other fronts of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Even though we do not know whether the campaign over Suez will indeed be launched, we must make all the necessary preparations... (p. 58)

I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree. At the very moment when they are preparing to topple Nasser, who is a common enemy of theirs and Israel's, they insist on getting the Iraqi Army into Jordan, even if such action leads to war between Israel and Jordan in which they, the British, will take part against Israel. The result will be that instead of bringing down Nasser and safeguarding Britain's position in the Middle East as a power that stands firmly on her rights in the Suez Canal, they will leave Nasser gobbling his prey while they rush off to start a new Israel-Britain-Jordan conflict. I doubt whether anyone can explain why Britain does not hold off her Iraqi plan until after the Suez campaign. (p. 59)

[28 October 1956]

As the reason for their call-up, [Israeli] reservists were told that a clash was likely with Jordan because of the entry into its territory of Iraqi forces, and because of its joining the Egypt-Syria Command. This deceptive explanation ties in with the news and articles which have been appearing in the press in the last few days, and the prospects are good that we may succeed in camouflaging the true purpose of the mobilization. (p. 70)

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In the meantime we have received another cabled message from the President of the United States. In this as in the previous one (on 27 October 1956), Eisenhower expresses his anxiety over our mobilization. In both messages he links our call-up with the entry of the Iraqi Army into Jordan, and he explains that, in fact, according to his information, no Iraqi units have crossed into Jordan. Ben Gurion, in his reply, put the emphasis on the aggressive aims of Egypt, and he did not promise to satisfy the President's request to stop the mobilization of the reservists. When Ben Gurion was notified that a second cable was on its way, he was very apprehensive about its contents; but when it came in, and after he had studied it with great care, he felt easier. The terms of both messages were general, and could be 'swallowed.' In the second there was a stronger repetition of the warning contained in the first, urging 'that there be no forceable initiative on the part of your government which would endanger the peace and the growing friendship between our two countries.' (pp. 71-73)

The absurdity of the United States situation in these current Middle Eastern events is due also to her isolation from her allies, Britain and France, who have hidden from her their intention to attack Egypt . . . .

It seems to me, however, that this is not only a question of ignorance of the facts. The prime reason for the sterility in America's approaches to Israel is that she has no specific solutions to the problems which face us so acutely. I do not know whether this stems from political detachment, or what, but I was struck by the hollowness of the President's words in both cables that 'only a peaceful and moderate approach will genuinely improve the situation' . . . . What content of reality is there to such well-worn phrases, and what is their practical impact on the terror acts of the fedayun, or the blockade of Israel shipping in Suez and the Gulf of Akaba, or the Egypt-Syria-Jordan military pact? (p. 74)

4. Small Group Activity. Students will present a news story for an American TV station, interviewing General Dayan about his preparations for the 1956 War. Questions suggested below might be asked. The answers (in parentheses) are not student opinions but rather what General Dayan probably would have said in 1956, stemming from his Diary.
Q: What kind of attacks has Israel sustained from Arab infiltrations since 1948? (Scores of people killed or wounded every year, acts of sabotage from Syria and Jordan, especially, but also Egypt.)

Q: Why do you prepare for war? (Israel is small, surrounded by giant Arab states who aim to eradicate her.)

Q: What if you are attacked by Jordan and Egypt at the same time? (Catastrophe for Israel; if necessary we must therefore attack first, in concert with British and French allies.)

Q: Why do you not really trust the British? (They have worked closely with Jordan and Iraq, have many other Arab allies, and don't love Israel.)

Q: What do you think of President Eisenhower's warnings that you should not mobilize for war? (Israel is a sovereign state and will do whatever necessary to preserve its freedom.)

Q: Do you think President Eisenhower might be angered if Israel attacks? (That's a chance we have to take. Besides, the American election comes in November; possibly he will be too busy to bother with us.)

Q: What do you think of the U.S. position in the Middle East? (It's absurd, sterile, with no solutions which Israel can or will accept.)

Q: You mean you don't agree with "a peaceful and moderate approach"? (Not when our enemies plan terrorism, blockade our shipping, and prepare military invasion of our land.)

5. Entire Class Activity. After the two "TV Interviews" (Nasser and Dayan) the class will discuss the feelings they now have:

   a. for President Nasser, caught between massive Israeli raids and the need for military aid;

   b. for General Dayan, caught between constant Arab attacks on three sides and the need for secure boundaries.

F. Useful Reading Sources

1. Alweis, loc cit.

3. The 1967 or Six Day War: Two Views of the Crisis

A. Overview

In this lesson students will study two views of the months and days which preceded the Six Day War in 1967, one pro-Arab account, and one pro-Israeli. They will read of the internal politics, particularly of Syria, and the public reactions of Syrians and Israelis toward the acts of each other. They will read of the very real threat the refugees pose for Israel and the misery of the refugees in camps. They will evaluate the results of an Israeli attack which killed eighteen Jordanian villagers, the reactions to which led eventually to the 1967 war. They will finally consider some of the preparations and the reasons why the Israeli leaders determined on an attack on Egypt, as well as noting the escalation and de-escalation of Egypt's foreign policy at a very critical time. They will then discuss their own feelings as to how people and national leaders react in times of crisis.

B. Brief Chronology

1961: UAR dissolved, split between Egypt and Syria

1962: Revolution in Yemen, Egypt sends troops
Increasing artillery and air strikes by Israel against Syria

1964: Faisal replaces brother Saud as king in Saudi Arabia; Cairo summit of Arab leaders; PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) established

1965: Fatah or Palestinian Movement for Liberation begins military operations against Israel

1956: Palestinian Arab bombings in Israel; raid on Samu in western Jordan by Israel

1967: May: President Nasser demands UNEF forces removed from Egyptian territory; President Nasser affirms
a naval blockade of the Straits of Tiran to all ships heading for Israel.

June: Six Day War begins 5 June: Third Arab-Israeli War
August: Khartoum Conference of Arabs; defiance against Israel and the United States
November: Yemen Republic and Republic of South Yemen proclaimed Resolution 242 of U.N.; demands Israel withdraw from occupied territories (taken during the Six Day War)

1968: Palestine National Council established (quasi-legislative body of 100 representatives)
Battle of Karamah, PLO army withstands Israeli attack

1969: Yasir Arafat elected chairman of the Palestine National Council; Libyan military officers (Col. Qaddafi) overthrow monarchy; Israeli raid on Beirut International Airport; civilian aircraft destroyed; UAR strikes against Israeli at Suez; heavy casualties

C. Objectives

1. Knowledge and Comprehension
   a. To understand how both sides came on a collision course for war as they sought national security;
   b. To empathize with Arab refugees in their miserable camps, as well as with Zionists in Israel who sought a Jewish state, safe from persecution, for all Jews;
   c. To explain the political significance of Israeli attacks in general, and specifically the Samu Raid of 1966;
   d. To cite some reasons why, for a second time, Israeli leaders felt it necessary to attack their Arab neighbor states, while the Egyptian president played a dangerous game of brinkmanship.

2. Application of Skills
   a. To locate the following areas on a map of Egypt and the Levant: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, Homs, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Samu (village in west Jordan), Straits of Tiran, Sea of Galilee, Jordan River, Sinai Peninsula, Eilat, Gulf of Aqaba, Suez Canal (Denoyer-Geppert #18034, "Egypt and Levant");

D. General Readings

1. Bucher, 97-103; 134-139; 141-147
2. Kavunedus, 141-146; 161-164.
4. Tachau, 154-156.

E. Teaching Strategy

1. Selected Reading. The class will read both selections, W. Laqueur, The Road to War, and H. Sharabi, Palestine and Israel, and answer the questions below, pp. 88-89.

Selected Reading 1


It was not the strength of the Syrian regime which frightened outside observers but its weakness. For it was clear from the beginning that this very weakness would impel the regime to take a militant line on the one issue that was universally popular--Palestine. Syrian politicians had traditionally been the most bellicose towards Israel; they had always been in the forefront of those clamouring for immediate war against the Jewish State. At the time of the first Arab summit in January 1964 they had called Nasser a traitor because he said the Arabs were not yet ready to attack Israel. To appear 'more anti-Israel than thou,' as one observer put it, had been a familiar game among Arab politicians for a long time; it had almost become a conditioned reflex. However revolutionary their manifestoes, in this respect the new Syrian leaders followed a time-honoured tradition. But there were new elements: Maoism, Algeria, Cuba. The Syrian leaders had read Mao and Che Guevara on revolutionary war and decided to apply their principles (as they understood them) to the Middle East. Israel was to become Vietnam, the Fedayeen.

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Palestine guerrillas) were to be the Viet Cong, who would strike terror into the hearts of the usurpers. The Palestine Viet Cong would eventually be joined by 'China' (i.e. Syria, Egypt and the other Arab revolutionary peoples) would would give the dwarf gangster state the coup de grâce. America would try to intervene but its intention would be as ineffectual as in Vietnam. The Viet Cong has shot down half of America's airforce, we shall finish off the rest, Damascus radio announced. 'The Ba'ath party has advanced the slogan of the popular liberation war,' Prime Minister Zuayen said in his May Day speech (1967): 'through such a war the Arabs can expel the Zionists from Palestine... We should take the Algerian liberation war as an example.' Later on that month he said: 'The situation in Israel is deteriorating. Eshkol and his government are at their last gasp and are in a state of confusion and division.' (Damascus Radio, 17 May, address to officers at the front.) A week later there was an open call for war: 'Arab masses, this is your day. Rush to the battlefield. The time has come to fight. Fight, Arabs. Let them know that we shall hang the last imperialist soldier with the entrails of the last Zionist...' (Damascus Radio, 23 May 1967). The violence in these Syrian outbursts was great, the confusion even greater. (pp. 58-59)

II

The Arab governments were, of course, aware of the fact that Israel was a small country; the return of a million refugees would totally upset its balance. 'If the Arabs return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist,' Nasser told a Swiss correspondent (Zürcher Woche, 1 September 1961). More recently the Lebanese Prime Minister Abdullah al Yaffi had said: 'The day of the realization of the Arab hope for the return of the refugees to Palestine means the liquidation of Israel.' (Al Hayat, 29 April 1966). As an Arab refugee conference at Homs in Syria put it in July 1957: 'Any discussion aimed at a solution of the Palestine problem which is not based on ensuring the refugees' right to annihilate Israel will be regarded as an act of treason.' 'Let us try to make the refugees our fifth column for the day of revenge and reckoning,' a Lebanese paper, Al Sayad, wrote in April 1950. And so the Arab leaders went on, adamant in their refusal to rehabilitate the refugees and to undertake large-scale development projects. They rejected all absorption and employment, they prevented any integration, because their aim was to maintain an irredeemable, to have an effective political weapon against Israel. Not everyone in the Arab world agreed with this policy: King Hussain, whose country suffered most from the mass influx, said on 17 January 1960 that the Arab leaders had approached the Palestine problem in an irresponsible manner: 'They have not looked into the future. They have no plan or approach. They have used the Palestine people for selfish political purposes. This is ridiculous, and I could say, even criminal.'
The West, through the United Nations, continued to pay for the upkeep of the refugees—$580 million on relief alone. UNRWA was involved in delicate political problems, even though it tried to stay out of politics. Since 1964 there had been a Palestine Liberation Army in the Gaza strip, forming an integral part of the Egyptian army command. This army drew United Nations rations, and the U.N. thus, indirectly, contributed to the Egyptian war effort. (pp. 65-66)

III

. . . . The Fidayeen raids, despite their limited effect, created a sense of insecurity in Israel, especially among the settlers of the more remote settlements in the north. Eshkol, on a visit to Galilee Kibbutzim, was told that 'we want to be as safe as the inhabitants of Tel Aviv.' This was an unrealistic demand; the Israeli Government and the army could not provide absolute security. Israeli policy was to retaliate every now and then, when warnings had been of no avail, attacking Fidayeen bases, as well as public property in Arab villages and towns across the border. The wisdom of such actions was sometimes doubtful; the targets were sometimes ill chosen and the raids yielded diminishing returns. In October 1965, for instance, Israeli forces had attacked two Lebanese villages, and Israeli army units had crossed into Jordan in May and September of that year, and again in one of the biggest raids, at Samu in November 1966. The Samu raid had been planned as a punitive action of limited scale against a local terrorist base. It developed against all planning into a full-scale battle with the Arab Legion which lasted four hours and which caused many deaths. These retaliatory actions were criticized not only at the U.N. but also within Israel. Neither Lebanon nor Jordan had collaborated with the guerrillas. The Beirut government had in fact apologized for their raids. The Israelis thought, no doubt, that both Amman and Beirut should have taken stricter measures against the terrorists, but the governments were, in all probability, not strong enough to do this. The Samu raid provoked violent demonstrations against King Hussain and his relatively moderate government. For a while his regime was in real danger, and the possibility of a Syria-style coup in Jordan became greater. The Israeli raid had been a mistake; the impression was created that Israel was afraid to strike at Syria, the real base of the Fidayeen operations (perhaps because it had Soviet backing), and chose instead a less risky target. Many thought that this was not the way to deter the guerrillas; it was the misguided action of a weak government under constant pressure from public opinion to do something against the growing menace. Samu, at any rate, was one of the turning points on the road to war in 1967. (pp. 71-72)
During the month of May 1967, two important events took place which directly affected the plans of the Israeli government: first, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was ordered removed from Egyptian territory by President Nasser; and second, the Egyptian president ordered the closing of the Straits of Tiran to all ships bound for Israel. Israel, upon learning the U.S. government would not itself guarantee rights of passage, considered the action of Egypt tantamount to a declaration of war.

The Israeli cabinet meanwhile continued in session. On Saturday evening [June 3, 1967] Gen. Moshe Dayan reported on the military preparations. The army had plans for all contingencies, but final decisions had to be made. Dayan was convinced that the Straits of Tiran could not be reopened short of occupying the whole Sinai peninsula. At the same time the army command felt that no decisive result could be attained unless the core of the Egyptian forces massed in Sinai were destroyed. Accordingly, Israeli units in the south were regrouped for a three-pronged attack... The main blow was to be directed against the Egyptians.

On Sunday, 4 June, the cabinet approved these plans. There was no formal vote: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense were from now on entitled to give the order to attack at any time they chose. By now all ministers had reached the conclusion, some of them reluctantly, that war was inevitable, and that any further waiting would tip the balance against Israel. Eban, as he later said, became a hawk around 1 June; the other ministers came round at the same time. The Mapam ministers wanted to consult their party colleagues; later on they made their approval of military action retroactive. The declarations of the Arab leaders had become more and more menacing: they were now talking about an immediate invasion: 'Meet you in Tel Aviv....' There were not only verbal threats: Egyptian planes had repeatedly violated Israeli airspace in the previous few days, Egyptian patrols had crossed into Israeli territory, settlements in the south had been shelled. More threatening still, the Jordanian troops had been put under the command of the Egyptian General Riadh. An Iraqi division with more than 150 tanks began to cross the Jordan into the West Bank on Sunday. It was clear that President Lyndon Johnson's plan for an international flotilla had come to nothing; no effective action would be taken by the United States or any other power. Israel was on its own. (pp. 177-178)
In early May 1967, certain indications led many observers to believe that Israel was preparing for a massive military strike against Syria. In the previous month (on April 7), retaliatory action against Syria had brought Israeli planes to only a few miles from Damascus (where seven Syrian Migs were reportedly shot down). On November 3, 1966, a massive land strike had been made against the Jordanian village of al-Samu, in which a number of Jordanian civilians and soldiers had been killed and a large part of the village leveled. The cause of these attacks, according to official Israeli statements, was increasing guerilla activity on the Israeli side of the armistice line.

The crisis took shape as intelligence reports began to come in about Israeli troop deployment along the Syrian-Israeli border. On May 8, two Syrian intelligence officials arrived in Cairo and informed President Nasser of an impending Israeli attack against Damascus. Information concerning troop movements was corroborated by Lebanese sources. By May 10, according to Eric Rouleau, Le Monde's Cairo correspondent, President Nasser had become convinced that Israel was in fact making preparations to attack Damascus and overthrow the Baath [Socialist] regime. His view was confirmed when the Russians informed him that the Israeli had timed for the latter part of May a swift strike at the Syrian regime "in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the UAR." In Tel-Aviv, Israeli leaders (including General I. Rabin) spoke publicly of attacking Damascus, demanding the immediate cessation of guerilla activity. The New York Times correspondent in Tel-Aviv reported (May 12) that the Israeli authorities had already decided that the use of force against Syria "may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism." President Nasser believed (according to Rouleau) that the Israeli attack would take place within the next few days, on or about May 17. (pp. 106-107)

II

"This section added to parallel Laqueur's account of the treatment of the Palestinian refugees."

The report of P. Dodd and H. Barakat, The Refugees:
Uprooting and Exile, in Arabic closes with a description of Palestinians in a typical refugee camp on the East Bank of the Jordan.

The life of the refugees "is not a life." Although the Ziziya camp (where the study was made) is considered one of the best on the East Bank from the standpoint of administration, organization, and the basic amenities of life, it is a brutal place, humiliating and degrading to any human being. This is how the refugees feel about it, not only the visitors. Their feelings go beyond this; they hate themselves and detest being dependent on others for food, clothing, and shelter. They are helpless and can do nothing to change their lives; they are constantly waiting. What adds to their misery and to the slow-moving passage of time is their inability to work. Only a few men work in the camp's administration, and some have found work in Amman.

Our stay in the camp enabled us to experience the difficulties the refugees experience daily. Days consist of long hours of heat and dust; cleanliness is almost impossible, especially as far as children are concerned. Nights are long hours of unbelievably bitter cold. Many nights we found it impossible to sleep, although each of us had four or five thick blankets. We wondered how the refugees, especially the children, could stand the cold when most of them had only one blanket each . . . " (pp. 179-180)

In retrospect, it is ironic to note how Israel's actions in May 1967 served to intensify precisely those conditions which they were supposed to alleviate. Israel was determined to put an end to the nascent Palestinian guerilla movement. The Israeli leaders had begun to realize that the long dormant Palestinian Arabs were engaged in a serious effort at organizing themselves as an independent force, and that a Palestinian revolutionary movement was afoot. Fatah, the Palestine Movement of National Liberation, now appeared to be more than a mere handful of "infiltrators" and "terrorists." Israel, by persistence in attributing resistance activity to Syrians; Egyptians, and Jordanians, had succeeded in obscuring the real nature of this activity as an autonomous Palestinian revolutionary activity, but not in eliminating it. Israel's policy was always to refuse to recognize the existence of the Palestinian Arabs, constantly referring to them simply as "the Arab refugees." This has enabled Israel to fight the guerillas by means of retaliatory action against its neighbors, in accordance with its basic strategic principle of always waging war on Arab soil, never on its own.

It is probably largely because of the new dimension which the Palestinian guerilla movement represented—as an internal
movement of resistance it violated the fundamental principles upon which the concept of Israeli "defense" was based—that the reaction to increasing activity by Fatah was so strong in early 1967. Israel's theory of "punitive retaliation" underwent radical transformation in both structure and goal; no longer sufficient to "teach" its neighbors a lesson, it was necessary to impose on them its explicit will. Thus the retaliatory raid would give way to military strikes aimed at repressing or overthrowing recalcitrant and undesirable regimes. With this new policy, Israel could kill two birds with one stone: it could destroy the Palestinian resistance movement in embryo and maintain "peace" and "stability" in the surrounding region. In May 1967 the crisis gathered as a direct result of Israel's intention to "do something" about the Baath regime in Damascus. This marked not only an escalation of Israel's political and military aggressiveness, but also a self-conscious expansion of its role in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. (pp. 107-108)

On the following day (May 19), Israel conveyed to the Western powers that it would fight any move to close [the gulf of] Aqaba and cut off Eilat. It maintained that former President Eisenhower had agreed that such an event would entitle Israel to rectify the situation with U.N. support. On May 22, in a speech given at UAR air force headquarters in Sinai, President Nasser announced closing the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying the Israeli flag or carrying strategic materials to Israel . . . .

On May 30, Jordan (followed later by Iraq) concluded a mutual defense pact with the UAR.

It was probably at this point, or perhaps a day or two earlier, that the Egyptian President decided that the Israeli threat to attack Syria had abated sufficiently to allow him to de-escalate Egyptian military pressure. At a press conference attended by representatives of the world's major newspapers and news agencies on May 30, he declared that Egypt did not want war, but that if attacked it would have to repel aggression. He suggested that the Palestine Mixed Armistice Commission be revived to supervise the phased withdrawal of UAR and Israeli forces from the armistice lines; and he offered to take the question of the Straits of Tiran to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. In an interview on June 3 with former British Cabinet Minister Anthony Nutting, he emphasized that as far as the UAR was concerned the Middle East crisis had eased and that no further escalation was planned. He was reported to have given the impression that he shared the Soviet and French view that war should definitely be avoided.
At the time that Nasser, along with the USSR, was seeking a way to avoid war, Israel had apparently opted to go to war. In Amman, on June 4, King Hussein warned Britain and the United States that they stood to lose their friends in the Arab world ‘forever’ if they fell into the “Zionist trap.” And in Tel-Aviv the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Defense Minister was welcomed by the Israeli army with relief. (“Now we may see some action.”) In Washington, on a warm Sunday afternoon (June 4), the atmosphere was alive with rumors of an impending explosion in the Middle East.

Sufficient intelligence was available to Tel-Aviv (as well as to Washington) to show with certainty that a pre-emptive strike by Israel would result in a swift Israeli victory which within days could bring about the collapse, not only of the Baath regime in Damascus but also that of Nasser in Egypt. When the Israeli planes attacked shortly after sunrise on Monday, June 5, a new chapter was being written in the political life of the Arab world. (Sharabi, pp. 109-110)

2. **Group Activities.** The class will now be divided into four groups. Group I will re-read portion I of both selections, concerning the reaction of people to threats on their national security. Group II will re-read portion II of both selections, concerning refugees. Group III will re-read portion III of both selections, concerning the use of retaliation. Group IV will re-read both selections of portion IV, concerning the planning for war by the leaders of both sides.

3. **Class Activities.** After discussing the selections, each group will select two spokespersons for a Panel Discussion, one person representing the pro-Arab view of Sharabi (S) and one person representing the pro-Israeli view of Laqueur (L). The groups will address themselves for 3-5 minutes to the specific questions below. (The "Ans." [answers] indicates ideas taken from the readings, but should only be considered as guidelines for the teacher’s benefit.) After each presentation the class should be allowed to question the participants.
Group I: Q - How do people react to threats against their national security?

Ans. L:  
- Syria really wanted war  
- Bellicose attitude toward Israel  
- "More anti-Israeli than thou" attitude of Syria  
- New elements of Maoism, Algeria, Cuba  
- Angry Syrian radio attacks on U.S., Israel

Ans. S:  
- Syria really feared war  
- Massing of Israeli troops was taken seriously  
- Israeli planes over Syria, near Damascus  
- Information of Israeli plans to hit Syria, then Egypt  
- Prominent Israelis (Rabin) threatened Syria  
- Even Egypt feared attack on May 17

Group II: Q - Should refugees be settled anywhere, at low cost, or should they be allowed to wait, at any cost, until they can return to their homes?

Ans. L:  
- One million Palestinian refugees would upset Israeli balance  
- Arab use of refugee "problem" as a weapon against Israel  
- Even some Arabs thought refugees were treated badly by Arab States (e.g., King Hussein of Jordan)

Ans. S:  
- Attachment of Palestinians to their ancestral lands  
- The right of the Palestinians to self-determination  
- The Palestinian sense of "peoplehood"

Group III: Q - What are the reasons for retaliation? What are its benefits and drawbacks?

Ans. L:  
- Sense of insecurity in Israel due to Fedayeens (guerrilla) attacks  
- Unhappiness in Israel at U.N. censure and criticism when scores of citizens were being killed  
- Some Israelis did question the value of large retaliation strikes  
- Many strikes hit Arab States which were not responsible for the Fedayeens  
- Unless a show of strength was made, Israel would look weak, perhaps afraid to fight Syria, vulnerable

Ans. S:  
- Israel made raids because of fear of guerrilla attacks  
- Israel really was trying to stop a Palestinian movement toward independent statehood (Fatah)  
- The Israelis refused to see these people as Palestinians, but only as "Arab refugees"
Samu Raid marked a change from "teaching a lesson" to imposing Israeli will by military force.

Group IV: Q - How did 1967 Arab and Israeli leaders react in time of crisis?

Ans. L:
- Israel had to fight when Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and moved a large army into Sinai.
- Israeli cabinet took no vote; doves became hawks out of fear for national survival.
- Pre-emptive strike necessary because of specific threats: threatening Arab broadcasts, violation of Israeli airspace by Egyptian planes and land by Egyptian patrols, and the assignment of an Egyptian general over Jordanian troops.
- It was obvious that the U.S. could and would do nothing to stop Egypt or help Israel.

Ans. S:
- Egypt did escalate the danger by closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
- Egypt also made a mutual defense pact with Jordan and Iraq.
- About May 29 or 30 President Nasser decided to de-escalate by offering the U.N. to oversee the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops from the boundary lines and to turn the Tiran Straits Question over to the International Court of Justice.
- When Israel appointed Moshe Dayan as Defense Minister, war became inevitable.
- Both Israel and the U.S. knew that a pre-emptive strike would give Israel a quick victory.

F. Useful Outside Reading


4. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Changes in American Stereotypes

A. Overview

The October 1973 war shocked Americans almost as much as it surprised the Israelis. The cleverness of the preparations, the well-kept secrecy of the attack, the capacity of the Egyptians and Syrians to coordinate some of the largest tank movements in history, the break-through of the so-called "impenetrable" Bar-Lev Line on the Suez Canal, showed the Arab States fighting forces to be an alert and capable army, well-supplied by the Soviets with sophisticated weapons which they used with considerable ability. When the war was over, both the U.S. and Israel began to recognize the Arabs as important powers, not because Israel had lost--she had actually recrossed the Suez and also had encircled an important portion of the Egyptian army--but because she had not, as in 1956 and 1967, won handily. Moreover, the Arab oil-producing States successfully cooperated in an international cut-back of oil production which stunned the major industrial economies.

Arab statesmen used both the stick as well as the carrot to achieve a greater American awareness of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The oil cutback directly affected individual Americans and made them aware not only of Arab economic power but of the bitterness of the Arabs regarding Palestine. At the same time the Egyptians and Syrians made commitments to peace in talks with Israel which implicitly acknowledged Israel's right to exist--within the May 1967 borders. The U.S. normalized diplomatic relations with both Egypt and Syria.
President Nixon journeyed to the major Arab capitals after Secretary of State Kissinger had brought the warring sides together. The U.S. had pushed Israel hard in the negotiations for cease-fire, while continuing to support Israel financially, allotting almost half its entire 1974 foreign aid budget to the government in Jerusalem. The American people in the months after October 1973 began to reconsider former stereotypes of the Arabs for, as Newsweek asserted, "times have changed."

B. Brief Chronology

1970: Israel's "deep penetration" raids into Cairo, Nile Delta; Sec. of State Rogers' plan for peace, accepted by Egypt; Nasser to Moscow for more military aid, gets SAM-3 missiles; U.S. decides to give total support to Israel: $500 million sent; Palestinians blow up civilian airplanes in Jordan and Egypt

September: Jordan strikes against PLO in "Black September"; Death of Pres. Nasser; Sadat new president of Egypt

1971: Sadat accepts U.N. mediation role; Israel rejects indirect negotiations with the Arabs; Israel begins making permanent settlements in Golan Heights captured in 1967; "Year of Decision" announced by Pres. Sadat; increase of Soviet military aid to Egypt; Libya joins Egypt and Syria in Federation of Arab Republics; USSR-Egyptian Fifteen Year Treaty of Friendship signed

1972: January to May: diminishing attacks by Arabs on Israelis

May: "Black September" group hijacks Belgian aircraft; Lod (Israel) Airport killings by three Japanese acting for PLO; subsequent Israeli raid into Lebanon; U.S. to sell 120 jets to Israel

July: A.R.E (Arab Republic of Egypt) dismisses nearly 40,000 Russian military advisors and their dependents

September: Israeli athletes killed in Munich Olympiad by Arab group; Subsequent Israeli raid into Lebanon and Syria

December: Nine hour air battle between Israel and Syria
1973: January: Israeli air attacks on Syria; El Al Airways offices attacked by Arab group in Paris and Nicosia, Cyprus; Galili plan for permanent Israeli settlements in lands occupied in the 1967 War
February: ARE students riot against "no war, no peace" situation
March: Libyan civilian airplane shot down by Israeli jets; 113 dead; three Western diplomats murdered in Sudan by Arab group
April: Israeli commandos attack PLO offices in Beirut
May: Israel mobilizes for attack from Syria which did not materialize
August: Israel hijacks Lebanese airplane to capture PLO leaders; all passengers arrive safely in Beirut; U.S. vetoes Security Council resolution to force Israel to return to the 1967 borders
October: Egypt and Syria attack Israeli positions; Fourth Arab-Israeli War; oil cutback imposed on the U.S., Western Europe, Japan

C. Objectives

1. Knowledge and Comprehension

a. To be able to cite instances where Americans are now taking the Arab States seriously;

b. To identify the minimum requirements of both the Arab States and Israel for peace in the Middle East and how these conflict;

c. To identify the minimum demands of the U.S. and the USSR for peace in the Middle East, and how these conflict;

d. To consider the students' own conception of the Israeli position, their images of the Arab position, and evaluate how these images may have changed in the course of this study.

2. Application of Skills

a. To locate on a map of Egypt and the Levant the following places: Bar-Lev Line, Suez Canal, Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Sharm al-Sheikh, Jordan River (use Denoyer-Geppert #18034, "Egypt and the Levant");

b. To identify: Golda Meir, President Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin, King Hussein, the West Bank, "creeping annexation," oil boycott, Resolution 242, Secretary Kissinger, SAM-3 missiles, October War (also Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War), detente, escalation.
D. General Reading

Because textbooks do not yet include these materials, the student may find useful information in post-October 1973 copies of such newsmagazines as Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report, as well as journal analyses.

E. Selected Readings

Students will wish to refer to the following Selected Readings which relate directly to the activities in which they will be involved:

1. United Nations Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 (p. 96 below)

2. "Open Letter to the American People" (p. 96 below)

3. "Israeli Government Coalition Party Platform" (p. 98 below)

4. "Heykal: Kissinger Told Me" (p. 99 below)

5. "Arab Pride and Power" (p. 100 below)

F. Teaching Strategy: Mock U.N. Debate

1. Students will participate in a mock United Nations gathering to seek a just and lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States and the Palestinians. Eight delegations will be selected (consisting of four or five students each) to represent the following countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian National Council, Syria, the United States and the USSR. One student should be assigned as Secretary General to guide discussion and debate.

After a suitable period of study of the Selected Readings (below, pp. 96-101) and a review of activities of previous lessons in this Syllabus, each group will select a spokesperson
to present his basic demands, answering (in 2-3 minutes) the general question "What are the minimum requirements for peace for my country?" The U.S. and USSR delegates will answer the question "What minimum demands must be met in the Middle East to ensure world peace?"

The following are suggested statements (often contradictory) of the various countries, extracted in general from the Selected Readings. Teachers should urge their students to read other sources as time permits.

**Egypt:** Israel must return all territories occupied in 1967; she must recognize the Palestinian State; she must return the Arab portion of Jerusalem. Egypt will then recognize Israel.

**Israel:** The Arab States must recognize Israel as a Jewish State, must guarantee her ships the right of passage on the high seas and in the Suez Canal, must guarantee borders with all Arab States. Israel must have portions of the Sinai, the Gaza Strip of the West Bank, and of the Golan Heights as a military buffer zone, will not recognize a West Bank Palestinian State, and will never give up any portion of the City of Jerusalem.

**Jordan:** Jordan demands back the Arab part of Jerusalem. She will accept Israel as a State and guarantee its borders if Israel returns all lands taken in 1967 and allows the establishment of a Palestinian State.

**Lebanon:** Israel must return all lands taken in 1967, and stop all retaliation raids against Palestinians in Lebanese territory. Lebanon will accept Israel as a State and endeavor to control all resident Arabs so as not to endanger the peace.

**Palestinian National Council:** A Palestinian secular democratic State must be established on all West Bank territories taken in 1967, including (and connecting with) the Gaza Strip. Its capital must be Arab (East) Jerusalem. Demands indemnities from Israel for all refugees displaced from pre-1967 Israel. All lands occupied in 1967 must be returned.

**Syria:** Syria demands all the Golan Heights to the 1967 borders. It will recognize the Israeli State only when Israel carries out Resolution 242, returning all occupied territory. East Jerusalem must be under a Palestinian State and the Palestinians recognized as a people in their own nation.
U.S.: Peace can only come with the acceptance of Israel as a State. Israel must follow the directions of Resolution 242 except for a few insubstantial changes on the Golan Heights and Sharm al-Sheikh in the Sinai. Jerusalem should be internationalized, as the U.N. directed in 1947, or under Israeli rule but with some arrangement for freedom of access to all Holy Places.

USSR: Peace can only come when Israel ceases to be an expansionist power and withdraws from all occupied territories, as directed by Resolution 242. She must allow Jerusalem to be internationalized or give back East Jerusalem to Arab rule. The rights of the Palestinian people must be protected and a Palestinian State established.

2. After brief introductory remarks, a debate will be led by the Secretary General. Obviously, the views of the various nations completely opposed to one another should be registered, especially in regard to (a) the status of Jerusalem; (b) the amount of territory to be returned according to the various interpretations of Resolution 242; and (c) the establishment of a Palestinian State, its place, and its status.

3. Since no solution can be expected in such a debate, the teacher should also aim at pointing out the stereotypes and images which students portray. Students should stop, therefore, when about ten minutes remain in the class period and analyze "their positions," that is, what they now think about the views of the Arab States, the Palestinians, the Americans, the Israelis, and the Russians. Teachers may at this time assign the same people to different roles for another debate, in order to make sure that the point of view of the various peoples is understood by all students.
Selected Reading 1

United Nations Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East . . .

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones . . .


Selected Reading 2


We, the Arabs, wish you a Happy New Year. Your holiday season may have been marred by the hardships of the energy crisis. Ours is haunted by the threat of death and continued aggression. But it is not in bitterness that we address this message to you

and it is our hope that there will be no bitterness in you as you read it.

We have been under continuous attack from the American Press—with notable exceptions—for two decades, and we must confess we are unable to understand the reasoning behind this overwhelming hostility. We lived in Palestine for two thousand years, and when we resisted displacement by a foreign state, the Americans branded us aggressors.

But let that pass.

In the past year, we have made considerable concessions, given up much of what is rightfully ours, for the sole purpose of promoting peace in the Middle East and the world in general. These concessions appear to have had no effect whatsoever on the American attitude. Indeed, wild accusations against the Arabs are increasing in volume and intensity, and all of them are so baseless that we have begun to wonder whether the American people really know what the Arabs want.

Do the American people know what we are asking for?

The United Nations Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967, which has been officially approved by the United States, calls for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on "withdrawal of Israel Armed Forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "termination of all claims or states of belligerency."

This is what we are asking for.

President Lyndon Johnson stated in September, 1968 that "boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

This is what we are asking for, and we want nothing more.

Israel says it wants peace. So do we. Israel says it wants security. So do we. And we are prepared to discuss any variety of means to guarantee both peace and security.

But along with peace and security, Israel wants the Arab lands it occupied by force in 1967. Israel has said that, regardless of Arab concessions, it will not give back the Golan Heights, the Jordan River, Sharm El-Sheikh of Sinai, and—most significantly—Arab Jerusalem. Israel wants peace and lebensraum, security and Arab land, and Israel cannot have both.

In October of this year, we imposed an oil boycott on the United States, and this was no pioneering action. The United States itself has on more than one occasion resorted to economic boycott when it was provoked into it and when its national interests demanded it.
We have been provoked into it, and our national interests demanded it.

We cut oil supplies after the United States, which had repeatedly assured us of our rights to our lands, made massive arms deliveries to the Israelis to help them remain in our lands. We did so not to impose a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East but to demand the implementation of U.S. policy in the Middle East, as it has been repeatedly defined. We did so not to "blackmail" the American people, but to put our case to them as effectively as we knew how.

This is our case:

We are offering Israel peace and security, but we cannot and will not offer Israel our lands, nor would any just people anywhere in the world expect us to do so.

We are asking the American people, especially the American friends of Israel, to understand this and to help us attain the peace we are after.

Omar Sakkaf
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Government of Saudi Arabia


"Israeli Government Coalition Party Platform," Jerusalem Post (December 30, 1973).*

In the spirit of the main goal of seeking peace, since the out-break of the Yom Kippur War, the government has adopted the following important resolutions:

a. To accept the initiative of a cease-fire and its maintenance on a basis of mutuality.

b. To sign the six point agreement with the Egyptians, and to seek an agreement covering separation of forces, in order to consolidate the cease-fire.

c. To express willingness to participate in the Geneva Peace Conference . . .

*Reprinted by courtesy of The Jerusalem Post.
At the Peace Conference, Israel will seek a peace agreement that will assure:

a. The cessation of all manifestations of hostility, blockade and embargo.

b. Defensible borders which will ensure for Israel the possibility of efficient defense against military attack and blockade, and which will be delineated with a willingness for territorial compromise. Peaceable borders will replace cease-fire lines. Demilitarization and political arrangements will be included in peace agreements, and will be in addition to, and not as a substitute for, agreed recognized security borders. Israel will not return to the borders of June 4, 1967, which were an invitation to aggression.

c. United Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. As in the past, the rights of the residents will be respected, regardless of religion and race. Peace agreements will include sections ensuring the special religious nature of Islamic and Christian holy places, under administrative independence.

d. Guarding the Jewish character of the State of Israel, to allow the fulfillment of Zionist objectives, and the absorption of immigration and gathering of the exiles.

e. The opening of a period of good relations between Israel and neighboring states in the political, economic, social and cultural fields.

The Peace agreement with Jordan will be between two sovereign states--Israel, capital united Jerusalem, and an Arab State to the east of Israel. Israel rejects the setting up of another, separate, Arab-Palestinian state west of Jordan. The independent identity of the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs can find expression in a Jordanian-Palestinian state bordering Israel, under conditions of peace and good relations with Israel.


Selected Reading 4


[According to Mr. Heykal (an Egyptian journalist), the following are the foundations of American policy as outlined to him by Mr. Kissinger.]

[Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger:
1. The United States has strategic interests in this area.

2. The Soviet Union, the world's second super power, also has interests here.

3. The United States is attempting to create a new international order based on detente with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cold War. But detente must not lead us to abandon this area to the sole influence of the second super power.

4. We do not want to see the escalation of a crisis that could block the detente because that would be so grave it would affect all humanity.

5. The United States has particular ties with Israel whose security we have undertaken to protect. Nonetheless, we consider that Israel's security cannot be realized unless your [Egypt's] sovereignty is respected.

6. The United States does not believe that her special ties with Israel preclude her maintaining and deepening the bonds of friendship with you [Egypt].

7. We do not wish to be, either singly or jointly with others, the guardians of this area. On the contrary, the United States wishes to see the people of the Middle East attain the level of existence and security that they desire and which are in accord with world realities. These are the basic tenets of our policy as defined by President Richard Nixon and as I conceive them myself without being either a partisan as you suggest or a mediator.


Selected Reading 5

Richard Steele and Tom Mathews, "Arab Pride and Power," Newsweek, LXXIII, No. 7 (February 18, 1974)*

Times have changed. A people once maligned as "wogs" and nations long dismissed as backward deserts are now treated by the rest of the world with deadly seriousness. And just as significantly, the Arabs have begun to see themselves in a new light. They have hardly had time to savor their new eminence, but among all the Arab peoples today there is a billowing conviction that their world has been transformed. Thanks to two sudden and surprising successes—the October war and the oil boycott--

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an entire people has begun to feel a new sense of power, im-
portance, and pride . . . .

. . . Arab pride knows no bounds. In the weeks after the war,
shops along Cairo’s major thoroughfares were festooned with
martial decorations depicting the cross-canal assault that led
to Egypt’s October victory. The Egyptian Government issued a
new stamp emblazoned “October 6, 1973.” And a vast display of
captured Israeli military equipment was unveiled at the Cairo
fairgrounds—an exhibit that drew thousands of delighted
Cairenes day after day . . . . (p. 40)

If war comes again, there are many who fear that it would not
be as limited as the October flareup. The Arabs’ Soviet-built
Scud missiles—which could be supplied with atomic warheads--
are targeted for strategic points in Israel. And Jerusalem,
if it thought the Jewish state’s very existence were in peril,
might be tempted to use nuclear weapons of its own. The
superpowers might find it difficult to stay out of such a
conflagration.

As bleak as it sounds, that is not a far-out Doomsday scenario,
but one that could very well happen. And because it concerns
such a vital and strategic area, it is a paramount concern of
the West. This is what [President] Sadat is telling Washington--
that he needs American help to keep the hotheads from testing
their belief that Israel can now be taken by Arab force. The
Arabs and the U.S., which is still basically committed to
Israel, do not hold identical views, of course, but one must
wonder and worry about whether they know enough about each
other to know how to listen. (p. 46)