The purpose of this essay is to examine philosophy, history, sociology, and rhetoric with an eye toward demonstrating that the rhetorician is at least as well equipped to deal with the concept "movement" as other writers with different training. Rhetoricians have been preoccupied with moving men and not societies. A "macrorhetoric," in other words, seems possible by abstracting to a social or cultural level the traditional principles and operations of audience-oriented "microrhetoric." There is no difficulty in deciding what moves in society and history--arguments move. Rhetoricians also are symbolists and thus can beg the ethical problem of determining what progress really is or ought to be. Speculations about movement can be documented, giving rhetoricians a clear indication of which documents produced by which advocates seem to be most important in terms of producing or accommodating social and historical movement. Rhetoricians should not be bothered by problems of meaning; the rhetorician studies events in the past only as they have already been mediated by advocates--politicians, statesmen, and other historical figures--who had the power to legislate a movement in society with the arguments they made. (RB)
OBSERVATIONS ON THE THEORY OF "MOVEMENT"

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Observations on the Theory of "Movement"

President Cohen's comment on the state of our field, published in last February's Spectra, has given impetus and excuse for a series of observations on so-called "movement theory." He didn't mention them specifically, but I suggest that Prof. Cohen might have used "movement studies," theoretical or critical, as examples to warrant his observation that "Because our theories and methods are so derivative and because of our lack of theoretical and philosophical foundations, we have difficulty in determining what is unique or different about our perspective towards communication."¹ For some reason, we have conceived that rhetoricians are late-comers to movement theory, that philosophers, historians, and sociologists know something about it that we do not, and that if we study historical or social movements we must be bound by specifically non-rhetorical meanings and intentions.² Such attitudes are encouraged by writers in sister disciplines, one of whom, Prof. Cohen reports, patronizingly calls some of us "undifferentiated social scientists." I find the sneer especially annoying because it came from a sociologist.

Philosophy, history, and sociology are wondrous studies with a potential of producing exciting, useful knowledge. But so is rhetoric, the original theory of communication. For two millenia rhetoricians have been producing a theoretical foundation which should be adequate for the needs of contemporary writers seeking to justify a study of any communication process, with little need of fashionably interdisciplinary first-aid from writers less competent than we are. I know no better example of the point I would make than the studies of "movement" done in the four sister disciplines of philosophy, history, sociology, and rhetoric. My purpose here is to survey these studies with
an eye toward demonstrating that the rhetorician is at least as well equipped to deal with the concept "movement" as other writers with different training.

The beginning is always a definition. One must understand that movement is a process and not a phenomenon. Nearly all who read history or study society recognize the sense of motion-in-time evident in the fact that today's world was built on top of yesterday's world and that there is some difference between the two. But the "movement" from 1875 to 1975 is fundamentally different from the "movement" involved in shifting couches from living-room to den. The problem is that we understand motion-in-space, and we have developed a vocabulary to describe it; but we do not understand motion-in-time, we have developed no special vocabulary to define it, and we have therefore resorted to a metaphoric transference of spatial terminology to conceptualize a temporal process. The result has been amusing: For two thousand years more than one hundred major writers in four separate traditions haven't even been able to identify what it is that "moves" in society. More absurd still, they haven't been able to decide whether that thing is mental or material! But in spite of such fundamental problems, writers persist in the attempt to determine the destination of the mental/material whatever-it-is that is supposed to "move" in a dimension of time. All but Richard Weaver at least agree to call the motion "progress."3

If the problem of conceiving motion-in-time were an argument taken up in a court of law, the issue at bar would turn on the quality of evidence adduced by advocates of some brand of idealism in a debate against advocates of some kind of materialism. Historically, the materialists would seem dominant, not because such explanations are satisfactory, but because the idealists have for a time been underwhelmed by what Lichtheim has called "on the one hand the
conservative sterility of academic positivism, and on the other, the frozen apparatus of orthodox Marxism. By reviewing this chronic argument concerning the historical or social "movement," I hope to make the rhetorician's stake in so-called "movement theory" as established and as vital for you as it is for me.

The Greeks were the first formally to address the problem of motion-in-time. In adapting so-called sophistry to his elitist argument, Plato gave direction to primitive Greek kinetic theories originally suggested by such rhetoricians as Heraclitus. He pictured man as in a constant motion, striving always for union with the One, the Harmony of the universe. "Progress" was knowledge of "truth," a nirvana described with glittering and insubstantial metaphors about caves and suns and horses and Hades. There was little solid evidence to support Plato's vision of temporal movement, so stock in his arguments was understandably low until the Christian revolution. Christians, with Plato's help, solved the problem to their satisfaction. Plato, you see, had to invent his own fairy tales to warrant an idealist's explanation of historical and social "movement." Christians had incontrovertible proof on unimpeachable authority, God's own Word. The Bible was said to be the road-map marking "the good life" and "Heaven" as the destination of man. And that mystic/idealist explanation of "movement" continues through history in a straight line from Augustine to Toynbee and DeChardin.

As Renier observes, such explanations depend exclusively on an intangible faith. If you believe that there is a Christian "motion" in history and society, then there is one. If you can't muster the faith, then there is no possibility that a Platonic/Christian theme could be persuasive. Simply, it lacks evidence.
At about the same time Plato began his soulful meanderings, an alternative approach to the problem of "movement" was being developed by writers of a type of history Cicero and Quintilian recognized as a branch of epideictic rhetoric. Thucydides stated motive in recounting the History of the Peloponnesian War, for example, was to describe what he called a "great movement" so that his readers might be persuaded of a series of moral lessons about the reality of power. The contribution to movement theory of such histories is their emphasis on the portrayal of motion-in-time as a linkage of events. The motion, in other words, is established because one event is connected to another roughly as cause to effect; the point of origin is "past" and the destination is "present." The ultimate destination of "progress" is still questionable from this perspective, but at least the assertion of a "movement" theme in human affairs is warranted by evidence more substantial than Plato's poetic flights of fancy.

As rhetoricians, it is our misfortune that we have been intimidated by Plato's venom to the point of denying or apologizing for a kinship with so-called "sophists" such as Heraclitus, Thucydides, and Isocrates. Had we been less interested in associational psychology and more involved in public address in the eighteenth century, it is possible that we would have profited as much from our heritage as did Hegel. According to Lord Russell, the Greek rhetoricians were signal influences on Hegel's landmark argument that events in history seem related, not causally, but "dialectically." Hegel suggested that there was a system of "Reason" in history, that there was a predictable and perhaps repetitive pattern in the continual competition of forces working for change and forces apparently resistant to change. Each concrete historical episode, the argument goes, represents an Idea moving from the point of its inception to the logical and inevitable conclusion called "progress." The evidence of the Idea is
the event. Because history is the objective embodiment of Reason, the destination of "progress" in Hegelian dialectic is as inevitable as a conclusion in an Aristotelian syllogism.13

Marx was by far the most influential writer to follow Hegelian historicism. But where Hegel had been an idealist, Marx was a materialist, seeking to use history as a means of explaining prevailing social dislocations. His roots are as much in political economy as in historicism.14 So Marx saw, not just a dialectical tension between past and present, but rather a dialectical materialism which explained human misery and proclaimed the inevitable approach of Utopia.15 Such argument was supported by actual examples drawn from history, whereas Hegel's argument had as warrant only his interpretation of broad swathes cut haphazardly from the undifferentiated histories of many nations. Marx's thesis is more firm, therefore. But his examples seemed to be groomed to fit together in the context of Marxism only. His critics wondered if he had founded a scientific history and thus defined motion-in-time, or if on the other hand he and all other followers of Hegel had done no more than rewrite history to accommodate social and political prejudices.16

Marxism is the last bastion of historicism in the twentieth century, surviving as an explanation of historical and social "movement" in a straight line from Marx to Sartre.17 But as Lichtheim observes, one has need of much faith to overlook what has been considered the definitive critique of historicism:

1. Events are only facts, without inherent meaning unless they are interpreted.
2. Interpreters are biased either by their lack of perspective and evidence regarding events they actually have experienced, or by their lack of evidence and experience regarding events they observe in the past.
3. So regardless of the
skill of arguments suggesting that a pattern or meaning exists in history, it
cannot be said that such themes exist in the events themselves. 18

This line of argument, known generally as "the problem of mediation," has
devilled everyone who has worked with history in this century. It is perhaps
most noticeable in the historian's hasty and thoroughly undignified retreat from
determinism. Goldwyn Smith was arguing that the history he wrote contained "pure
morality and true religion" less than a hundred years ago. This was in opposi-
tion to a school of writers following Ranke in an attempt to make a "science of
history." 19 The question was not about "movement" in history; everyone was then
agreed that there were deterministic patterns in the past. The issue was ideal-
ism versus materialism. The Platonic/Christian tradition led writers like Smith
to see a motion of ideas through history. Others believed that "social changes
are no more caused by thought than the flow of a river is caused by the bubbles
that reveal its direction to an onlooker." 20

It was almost as if the problem of mediation caught professional historians
by surprise. In the wake of Namier's intimidating essay on The Structure of Pol-
itics at the Accession of George III and Butterfield's equally influential piece
on The Whig Interpretation of History, historians ran from determinism like roach-
es from RAID. 21 Rather than attempt to solve the problem of mediation the whole
question was begged. Time for the historian has now become a frozen dimension,
for the mission of the historian is conceived to be no more than reconstruction
of the past. No longer is history supposed to be relevant in contemporary poli-
tics. The young writer is encouraged to write "good history" because he cannot
write "objective" history. 22 It is argued that "lessons" from history are to be
treated as bombast and cristic. 23 The final step is Berlin's position, that the
past is nothing more than random and sterile facts, a series of accidents ruled
by chance and exhibiting no theme at all. 24 And so that attitude Butterfield once called "the optical illusion or occupational disease of the research student" seems to have become the rule for writing histories. 25 Now it is important to know that a man named Homer really lived, that some place named Troy really existed, and that Trojans really did exhibit their stupidity by taking that hollow horse through a hole in their walls. 26

However much one may criticize their ambitions, historians are at least interested in the past as a source of knowledge. In another discipline concerned with so-called "movement theory," this is not the case. Among early twentieth-century sociologists addicted to academic positivism, the traditional concept of motion-in-time-through-history gave way to the notion of "social trends." 27

As Ogburn originally explained it, "movement" should refer not to ideas or events, but to particular phenomena, like the production of pig iron. 28 If in 1970 we produced 234 tons, and in 1975 345 tones, there has been a quantifiable "movement" in pig iron production and a "trend" which can be projected into the future. Hegel's, Ranke's, and Marx's dream of locating principles which would reveal the inevitable course of history was thus modified by the idea of "probability" and a rigid insistence on quantification. We should not think of "movement" except in terms we can prove, the argument goes. And since we can't prove that ideas "move" through history, then motion in history must involve only material things. There is nothing "inevitable" about material increases and decreases, but it is possible to speak of "probabilities" with tolerable accuracy.

This is a useful concept of motion-in-time which political pundits, pollsters, and economists have adopted in predicting the immediate future. It has not put the question to rest, however, because it represents the same sort of question-begging reaction that historians had. One set of problems is solved
with an idea of "social trends": but they are not the same problems envisioned by Plato, Thucydides, Hegel, Ranke, and Marx. To borrow Scriven's vocabulary, Ogburn and associates "have proved themselves to offer a redescriptions rather than explanation."29

Early on, speculative sociologists such as Sorel and Le Bon attempted a compromise to avoid the sterility of over-specific conceptions of motion-in-time.30 They were attracted both by the strength of evidence from which "social trends" were drawn and by the vision and significance of the problems posed by Hegel and Marx. A notion of "collective behavior" was the result, and historical movement became "mass" movement. As LaPiere described it, a mass movement is a "spontaneous uprooting of a considerable proportion of the social population to a new promised land." It is a "collective flight from reality," prompted by discontent or distress, "analogous to the movement of a sick individual to a new climate in order to regain health." Evidence of such motion was observable, potentially verifiable human behavior.31 Weber, like LaPiere, wrote in poetic terms when he discussed collective behavior, for there was an element of magic in the concept that was difficult to express in the language of empiricism.32 But still he insisted on empiricism as the method to find a description of motion-in-time. While Marx thought and wrote about the titanic struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, and Toynbee projected ideas of a conflict between Christ and anti-Christ, empirical sociologists wrote more specifically of the labor union movement in Yoknapatawpha County.33

Though the compromise has become the dominant approach to movement theory in political sociology, it has proved to be more dilemma than solution. On one hand, humanists continue to insist that neither materialism nor behaviorism can explain the feeling of motion-in-time. It is admitted that behavior patterns
among individuals are tolerably predictable. But, as Ortega suggests, the behavior of man-in-mass is totally variable in every direction. A collection of case studies, therefore, would reveal much about particular cases and little or nothing about "movement." The other horn of the dilemma develops when empirical sociologists attempt to transcend case studies and offer generalizations. The generalizations often resemble the sweeping themes taken up by humanists such as Ortega. What is called "theory," therefore, seems mere speculation because it depends for warrant more on its appealing argument than on observable human behavior. This is a decidedly unscientific appearance for a scientist to make, so of all the "behavioral sciences" empirical sociology has been the most suspect, drawing the ire particularly of inveterate empiricists who feel that their method has been somehow betrayed.

A small retreat from the humanist/scientist dilemma was attempted by Mannheim. He abandoned the collective behavior compromise and took up an argument which holds that ideas are determined by the life-condition in which each man is thrust. By studying man's perceptions of his condition (what Mannheim calls his "ideology"), it is possible to see gradually changing (or "moving") ideas. Such ideas are a "false consciousness" of sorts, not the true and pure Reason which Hegel saw in the past, nor the Laws of History which Ranke sought to isolate. Having learned from Marxism's failure to cope with the problem of mediation, Mannheim does not pretend to reduce the past to a single principle nor to project it into an inevitable and attractive future. The only claim is that ideology is determined by life-conditions, and that as life-conditions change, ideologies also change, producing an ideational "movement" through history.

The problem of mediation, however, cannot be dismissed by merely qualifying one's conclusions. How does one identify an ideology? And after identification,
how does one describe the direction or destination of an ideological movement? Heberle recognizes such problems in bemoaning the fact that "one rarely finds a well organized, systematic presentation" of an ideology. The best evidence of an ideological orientation is found in "speeches, programs, platforms, pamphlets, essays, and newspaper articles." But such rhetorical documents are unsuited to the purposes of the sociologists, so they must be rewritten to expose "the proclaimed idea content of the ideology" in a "reasonable" and "systematic" way. Having thus tampered with original documents, the sociologist must then determine what it is that he has before him. Heberle recognizes the difficulty of such interpretation, but he is undaunted:

Ultimate values of a movement may be in harmony with the value system of our own Western society or they may be opposed to it or irreconcilable with it. This we can prove by rational analysis, and on the basis of a careful rational critique, we may arrive at a value judgment, approving or rejecting the goals of the particular movement under consideration. In saying that it is theoretically possible to do this, we do not mean to say that everybody can do it, nor that the result would be entirely beyond controversy.39

I hope you recognize the full circle we have come from rigid insistence on empiricism back to the problem of mediation. Identifying a "value system of our Western society" presupposes finding a morality in Western history. Will that theme be the product of the analyst's mind, or will it be established by observation? Mannheim held that we should be skeptical of humanists such as Hegel and Marx because their interpretations lacked evidence. How, then, can we have confidence in a so-called "scientific" position arrived at in the same way? Heberle claims to be a "scientist," but then admits that the results of ideological analysis would be neither demonstrable nor replicable. Consider that absurdity. "Undifferentiated social scientists" in communication theory might at times
be writing for the Journal of Irreproducible Results, but we are none of us as foolish as those who patronize us, for we do not advertise an intention to undertake non-replicable studies before we start.

The whole history of sociology's involvement with so-called "movement theory," from uncompromising positivism to almost poetic treatments of ideology, is a tautology which has chased itself for 75 years. So too we have come full circle with the entire problem of motion-in-time. The problem was posed by rhetoricians who used the past as a warehouse of exempla from which public arguments could be manufactured. After two thousand years of mental gymnastics, we are told by sociologists that the best evidence of "movement" in history and society is contained in those self-same rhetorical documents.

Let me be as clear as possible about the position of rhetoric in the multidisciplinary effort to understand motion-in-time. A man facing the reality of social or historical movement might characterize his predicament this way: "I am persuaded of the justice of this endeavor, and I intend to join my fellows in defending the age-old principles of liberty." We understand what he says as a commitment to action. But the more we attempt to translate such a statement into testable specifics, the less we understand, for we remove ourselves from the immediate reality of the situation. A philosopher or historian, for example, would be led to the words "justice" and "age-old principles of liberty." Such phrases could imply that in thinking about the conditions of life, the speaker has developed a firm, reasoned conviction which he, out of a sense of ethical duty, seeks to implement or preserve. With such translation, the issue becomes What is justice? Or What is liberty? Or Are liberty and justice exhibited as themes in history? Similarly, a sociologist might be drawn to the words "join my fellows," or because of the predisposition of his method, to the attempt to
describe "this endeavor" with empirical precision. Such phrases could imply that the speaker is familiar with a whole range of social conditions and forces which he has verified by observation or experience, and that he intends to act with a group in defense of or in opposition to those conditions. With this translation, the issue becomes What conditions caused discomfort? or What group action can alleviate the discomfort? With either philosophical, historical, or sociological translation, the issue has only been confused, for the most important term is neither "liberty," "justice," "age-old principles," "join," nor "endeavor." It is the phrase "I am persuaded." Though such knowledge is relevant, an analyst who offers an explanation based on history, morality, or social conditions misses the fundamental, immediately real connections between persuasion, "rhetoric," and the "moving" of societies to action and histories toward "progress."

I cannot sketch the uniquely rhetorical theory of movement for you because rhetoric has never been written in those terms. Rhetoricians have been preoccupied with moving men and not societies. It does not seem farfetched, however, to suggest that the processes of moving men is different only in degree from the processes of moving societies. A "macrorhetoric," in other words, seems possible by abstracting to a social or cultural level the traditional principles and operations of audience-oriented "microrhetoric." With this possibility in mind, let me list briefly our advantages in coping with the problem of motion-in-time.

First, we have no difficulty in deciding what moves in society and history. Argumente move. The fact that in persuading real men to take action in a real situation John Kennedy quoted Lincoln (who quoted Jefferson, who quoted Burke, who quoted Locke), demonstrates a motion-in-time.
Second, we are symbolists and thus can beg the ethical problem of determining what "progress" really is or ought to be. The direction of "progress" for us can be a strictly semantic matter of finding the meaning of the word at one particular moment. If twelve rhetorical documents produced in the same society over a century are organized according to their age, and if the working meaning of "progress" apparent in document one differs from that in document twelve, we can then be confident that the working, popular notion of "progress" has "moved" by the expansion or contraction of the word's meaning in specific contexts. The symbolic movement of "progress" would be as obvious and predictive as the increase in the production of pig iron Ogburn used as an example of "social trends."\footnote{41}

Third, we can document our speculations about movement. Rhetorical critics have spent most of this century compiling a history of public address in Anglo-America which, if it does nothing else, gives us a clear indication of which documents produced by which advocates seem to be most important in terms of producing or accommodating social and historical movement.

Finally, because of the nature of our documentation, we should not be bothered by the problem of mediation. That problem develops when a writer such as Marx imposes "meaning" on the past in attempting to "prove" his pet theory concerning what human society ought to be. A rhetorical analysis would be different because the "meaning" of the past would be determined, not by the analyst, but by the rhetoric he studies. When I show that Kennedy used Lincoln's words to extend a traditional meaning of "progress," for example, it is not I who created "meaning" in the past. It was Kennedy. The reality of the rhetorical situation, in other words, is such that the problem of mediation should never come up. The rhetorician studies events in the past only as they have already been mediated by advocates who had the power to legislate a "movement" in society and history with the arguments they made.\footnote{42}
These are our advantages in dealing with so-called "movement theory." Our weaknesses will be apparent only when we have played the game longer than we have. But the ultimate strength or weakness of a rhetorical theory of movement is beyond the scope of this paper. My purpose has been to indicate that we are as well qualified as any to deal with the concept of motion in time. We are not philosophers, historians, or sociologists—and for that we can be thankful. With an emphasis strictly on the rhetorical, we have an advantage in coping with long-standing problems not enjoyed by others with different training. Perhaps Prof. Cohen is correct in observing that our theories and methods are more derivative than they should be. But this is not a necessary condition. Considering the past failures I have noted, what do we need to borrow from philosophy? Nothing, I would suggest, except good intentions, an open mind, and some interesting problems. What do we need to borrow from history? Nothing, I believe, except the past, especially the hundreds of thousands of rhetorical documents carefully preserved, then systematically ignored, by the professional historians. And what do we need to borrow from sociology? No more than a few hundred hours of computer time so that our "undifferentiated social scientists" might proceed to solve some of the problems sociologists can't even define without drawing a tautology.


Herbert W. Simons, "Dealing with Disciplinary Diversity," Spectra 11 (February 1975): 2. "As we move from the core of our field ... we should take pains to acknowledge that rhetoric and communication are merely perspectives on actions and transactions that could well be viewed from a dozen other perspectives."
ways. Our sense of identity can correspondingly be clarified if we recognize that we are not logicians, aestheticians, ethicists, literary critics, historians, sociologists of knowledge, etc."
In my opinion, several otherwise admirable studies have been flawed by wholesale acceptance particularly of sociological and social psychological definitions. See, e. g., John Waite Bowers and Donovan Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1971), esp. pp. 1-15; and Donna Feld, "The Rhetorical Implications of Social Movement Theory," Ph. D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1972. A broad cultural insistence that everything be explained in the terms of orthodox Christianity once impeded the development of the sciences because some alternatives, being "heretical," were never taken up. If there was a good thing in the world, according to Augustine, the Holy Scripture contained it; and if there was an evil thing, it was therein condemned. So in contemporary rhetorical theory such age-old notions as "social reality," "rhetorical fantasy," and "rhetorical vision" are legitimized only when an insightful writer such as Bormann draws some connection between them and recent findings in social psychology. Is there now a new "heresy," that of offering rhetorical theses which are explicitly non-sociological? See Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. J. F. Shaw, 2:42.63; and Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," QJS 58 (December 1972): 396-407.

With tongue only a little way in cheek, Weaver asserted that civilization has been in a steady decline since the fourteenth century when Occam's "fateful doctrine of nominalism" changed "the whole orientation of culture" and put us on "the road to modern empiricism." Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; Phoenix Books, 1967), p. 3.


In terms of his impact on the evolution of Bolshevism, the most influential critic of Marx's thesis was Ernst Mach, the inventor of empirio-criticism, an Hegelian and idealist's explanation of connections between events and motion-in-time. See John T. Blackmore, Ernst Mach: His Work, Life and Influence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Vladimir I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947).


Goldwyn Smith, Lectures on the Study of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1873), p. 44. For an assessment of Ranke's position, see George P. Gooch, History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century (London: Longmans-Green, 1952), pp. 96-97.

This is Lord Russell's phrase (History Philosophy, pp. 596-97) to describe the determinism of modern liberalism generally. The ideas came predominantly from Marx, Darwin, and Freud. By 1895, historian Daniel Brinton felt the call so strong that he issued the following statement of faith: "The time will come... when sound historians will adopt as their guide the principles and methods of ethnologic science, because by these alone can they assign to the isolated fact its right place in the vast structure of human development." Quoted in Kenneth E. Bock, Acceptance of Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), p. 28.


Herbert Butterfield, *George III and the Historians* (London: Collins, 1957), p. 215. There is wide recognition of the need for overview in history, but the office of the generalist is usually seen to be only the correlation of microscopic research, making the research student in effect the arbiter of fact.
of truth, and the dictator even of pattern (for could a pattern be tolerated which was inconsistent with the conclusions of specialist research, however ignorant of the gestalt the specialist may be?) It is significant that those who acknowledge the need for generalist histories also feel obliged to justify those histories as if the enterprises were a priori suspect. See, for example, Jaques Barzun and Henry Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1957), pp. 196-226.

This is Renier's point (p. 215): "A metaphoric argument . . . or an enumeration of myths -- neither leads us to truth nor to knowledge."

Those who established the theoretical framework for contemporary sociological studies were members of an elitist club professing academic positivism and directed toward ridding the world of an unseemly lot of superstitions, stereotypes, myths, and morals. The demise of symbolists was announced (I hope prematurely) by Geiger when he declared all statements of judgemental or justificatory intent to be "epistemologically illegitimate"--even such a judgement as "This rose smells good"! See Theodor Geiger, Selected Papers on Social Control and Mass Society, trans. and ed. Renate Mayntz, The Heritage of sociology Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969; Phoenix Books, 1969), pp. 132-142. See also Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3rd ed. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1966), esp. pp. 87-156.


33 The change from "historical" to "mass" movement had been underway in a few arguments for almost sixty years, but it first reached the textbook stage in 1930. Within fifteen years, the new attitude toward "movement" had become "traditional"! See, resp., Jerome Davis, Contemporary Social Movements (New York: Appleton-Century, 1930); and Harry W. Laidler, Social-Economic Movements (New York: Cromwell, 1946).


Throughout this century empirical sociologists have taken pains to argue for the scientific nature of sociology, as if the claim to science was a priori dubious — which, of course, it is. See, e. g., Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology* (New York: Holt-Rinehart, 1934); and in more contemporary times, John A. Rex, "The Spread of the Pathology of Natural Science to the Social Sciences," *The Sociological Review*, Monograph 16 (September 1970): 143-62.


38 Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), p. 25. At the time of my last detailed research into this area (1972), Heberle's text was considered a "classic" and led the market in spite of its age. It remains, to my knowledge, one of the few overview statements of an extremely complicated, micro-oriented study. See also Reinhard Bendix & Seymour M. Lipset, "The Field of Political Sociology" in *Political Sociology: Selected Essays*, ed: Lewis A. Coser (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 9-47.
Empirical sociologists have attempted both quantitative and qualitative measures of content in rhetorical documents, but even the "qualitative" methods are treated in the language of science as "abstract empiricism." See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1972). Quantitative measures called content analysis have been attempted since 1926. For the latest approach to such of which I am aware, see P. J. Stone, et al., *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966). As Rex indicates, a premise of structural analysis in empirical sociology has been that movement-in-time can be described "only as symbolic 'modes of expression' or 'embodiments' of 'meaning.' The task of the sociologist then is . . . one of seeking to 'understand' these meanings. The techniques necessary for such understanding, however, are quite distinct from those of science." John A. Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 156-57. I wonder if the "techniques" which are necessary but outside the meanings and intentions of science and sociology might be rhetorical?