Four models for interpreting values education strategies are provided. Six examples from curriculum projects are analyzed in light of three of these conceptual models. The first model categorizes values approaches by whether they describe, analyze, or advocate a particular value position. The second model categorizes values approaches by whether they appeal to psychological or logical precepts. The third model categorizes values approaches by whether they manifest a valuative-objective orientation or a valuative-subjective orientation. A fourth model attempts to synthesize the three other models in order to correct deficiencies in all of them. This disclosure approach suggests a new philosophical synthesis among such concepts as subjective, descriptive, psychological, and logical. It posits that values cannot be adequately explained anymore than the process of cultural function can, without a careful consideration of the individual and collective human being. Because of the metaphoric nature of language, the explanatory form of the narrative is useful to provide some form of concept definition for effective communication. Examples of the application of each model are provided. (Author/DE)
WORKING WITH VALUE AND MORAL TEACHING STRATEGIES

By

H. Michael Hartoonian

The first principle is this: people do not behave according to the facts as others see them; they behave in terms of what seems to them to be so. The psychologist expresses this technically as: Behavior is a function of perception. What affects human behavior, we are beginning to understand, is not so much the forces exerted on people from without as the meanings existing for the individual within. It is feelings, beliefs, convictions, attitudes...of the person who is behaving that constitutes the directing forces of behavior.

Arthur Combs

Value Study

In the drama of social education, the study of values becomes a pivotal issue in that it is a necessary component in the decision making that actors must do. The emphasis upon "value study" in social studies education has steadily increased during the past decade. Evidence of this increasing popularity can be found in many sections of the social studies community. The 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies is devoted entirely to value education. Many of the national project materials of the 1960's which have been published deal specifically with values.* Even areas of study such as ecology (Disch, 1970) and science emphasize value education. On the broader educational front, such popular books as Values and the Future (Baier and Rescher, 1969) and Values and Teaching (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966) are manifestations of this interest in the study of values.

These efforts in the study of values are perhaps more appropriate today than at any previous time in history, for the rapid changes in society, science and technology are having a profound influence upon our values. Societal change is related to value change and the increasing velocity of value change is one of the

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*Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Fenton Social Studies Program; American Education Publications; Harvard Project by Oliver and Newmann; Allyn and Bacon, Sociological Resources for the Social Studies; elementary level materials like the Greater Cleveland Project published by Allyn and Bacon are typical of those newer materials which place emphasis on "value study."
most dramatic developments of our culture. "What will our children value?" Indeed, "What will we value a decade or two from now?" These questions haunt us every day as we make decisions about education, science, international affairs, ecology and human relations--decisions which in turn ask, "Which values should be served by these decisions, those we hold today or those we are likely to hold at some future time?"

Man, as we know, can already obliterate the species through nuclear or biological warfare. It appears likely that he will soon be able to alter genetic structure consciously and in the direction of specified goals. He will be able to build self-replicating machines and totally unfamiliar man-machine organisms. He can already alter personality through the use of drugs. He can stimulate the pleasure centers of the brain electronically. He can create a hedonistic hell on earth or a savage totalitarianism, or any of the variety of benign utopias, and virtually anything in between. But which future he chooses will depend, at least in part, on the values fed into the decision making process. It will depend upon how clearly we come to understand and predict changes in that complex and shifting architecture of values that regulates human behavior. (Toffler, 1969, pp.2-3)

The above is representative of the rationale that points us toward a study of values. It is also, perhaps, a manifestation of a search for cultural clues upon which we might build some stability in a turbulent world. The transformations of society which is now under way, calls attention to the need to make vital choices, and the values we already have must serve as the rational determinants of our choices. The problem, then is one of understanding more fully the concept of value for in the future we will be "asked," "Which of our values, if any, should be changed and in what direction should they point?" As we learn more about human personality and its control; as we increase our technological power, we must continually probe our values and belief systems, for it may well be that not only is the unexamined life not worth living, but the unexamined belief system cannot serve our needs vis a vis the constant abrasions of change.

Values

What is value?

What is a "value" or a "value system?" How do values relate to one another? What configurations do they form? How do they change? What is the interplay of value systems within a society? Values are so inextricably woven
into our language, thought and behavior patterns that they have fascinated philosophers for millennia. Yet they have proved so "quick-silvery" and complex that, despite their decisive role in human motivation, we remain desperately ignorant of the laws* that govern them. Nearly seventy years ago Weber referred to the term "value" as "that unfortunate child of misery of our science." It is still a fair description of the place occupied by the concept of value in the social sciences. (Toffler, 1969, p. 3)

It is, for example, interesting to note the following:

"A thing has or is a value if and when people behave toward it so as to retain or increase their possession of it." (George Lundberg)

"Anything capable of being appreciated (wished for) is a value." (Robert Part and E. W. Burgess)

"Values are any object of any need." (Howard Becker)

"A desideratum or anything desired or chosen by someone, at sometime--operationally: what the respondent says he wants." (Stuart C. Dodd)

"(A value is) a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available means and ends of action." (Clyde Kluckholn)

"Values": =: 'the desirable end states which act as a guide to human endeavor or the most general statements of legitimate ends which guide social action.'" (Neil J. Smelser)

"The noun 'value' has usually been used to imply some code or standard which persists through time and provides a criterion by which people order their intensities of desiring various desiderata. To the extent that people are able to place objects, actions, ways of life, and so on, on a continuum of approval-disapproval with some reliability, it appears that their responses to a particular desideratum are functions of culturally acquired values." (William R. Catton, Jr.)

"Values": =: 'normative standards by which human beings are influenced in their choice among the alternative courses of action which they perceive.' (Philip E. Jacob and James J. Flink) (Baier and Rescher, 1969, pp. 35-36)

"Values are those actions or objects that are valued. When we say due process is a value, we mean that to us actions or procedures labeled due process are good." (Oliver and Shaver, 1966, p. 98)

*Or whether any laws do govern values.
If we are to become clear about objectives, we must begin by being clear about the terms we use in talking about value analysis, particularly the term value. Very often the term value is used in such a way as to be ambiguous. For example, in some contexts it may refer either to the things people hold to be of worth or to the standards by which people judge the worth of things. To avoid confusion, we will use the term only in the phrase "value judgments." Value judgments may be defined roughly as those judgments which rate things with respect to their worth. (Metcalf, 1971, p. 128)

There is an assumption in our value theory and the teaching strategies that grow from it that humans can arrive at values by an intelligent process of choosing, prizing and behaving. At least we assume that humans can arrive at something via that process and we prefer to call that something values. (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966, p. 28)

Rather than trying to classify statements by means of rigid distinction between fact judgments and value judgments, it is more realistic to think of statements as falling on a continuum, at one extreme of which are those having a common meaning, and at the other those expressing highly individualized and subjective preferences without shared or collective meanings. It should be remembered, however, that a statement at the preferential end of the continuum can be shifted toward the opposite end by reflection upon the problem of definition. Whether a given statement falls toward one end or the other of the continuum depends on the meaning shared by those engaged in investigation. We express our manner of describing and classifying statements as follows:

Fact-Value Continuum

| Statements with clear and agreed upon meanings. Example: This is a red necktie. | Statements whose terms do not have clear and common meanings. Example: A flared skirt is more attractive than a sheath skirt. |

Statements that fall toward the right end of the scale generally contain value terms with highly subjective meanings—attractive would probably present serious difficulties in definition. Used as hypotheses or as "factual evidence," such statements create unmanageable problems in investigation. But these problems can be solved. For example, the statement that some women have physical features which make it unwise, if not impossible, for them to wear a sheath skirt, is testable enough; and such women are probably more attractive to most people when attired in a flared skirt...
Logically, value concepts pose no problems not posed by descriptive concepts. If we could define our moral terminology, judgments of fact would tell us whether a person was engaged in a moral or an immoral course of action. These judgments are now labeled value judgments only because our value concepts do not have the same meaning for most people. This lack of agreement on what concepts mean—or their defining attributes—prevails in the value realm of modern life. It is misleading to assume that such agreement is impossible. Barriers to agreement in the moral realm are indeed great, but no more insurmountable than they are in other realms of scholarship. (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, pp. 131-132)

Values have to do with modes of conduct (instrumental values) and end-states of existence (terminal values). To say that a person has a value is to say that he has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own or others' actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others and for comparing oneself with others. Finally, a value is a standard employed to influence the values, attitudes and actions of at least some others, for example, our children's. (Rokeach, 1968, p. 16)

Value education, as can be seen from the above "definitions," is nothing clear. Yet, values and education are two things which everyone has (and has undergone) and about which people hold strong views. Some of the common attributes of the concept value (value education) seem to be: (1) a methodology (or skills) necessary to make good or reasonable moral decisions and to act on them; (2) a descriptor used to classify particular actions or beliefs; (3) a term of approval; and (4) an intrinsic awareness, purpose or meaning rather than extrinsic behaving. Beyond these attributes one should note the relationship between values and facts, which is a focal point in most decisions on the subject of value education. To argue on the one hand that facts and values are the same phenomenon is inconsistent with our western philosophical heritage. (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967, pp. 212-217) Value questions are problematic in a way in which at least some factual questions are not—that there are difficulties of principle about how to answer them. However, it does not follow that therefore values are "arbitrary" or "irrational" or "a matter of opinion" in the sense that one reason for a value is as good as another reason, or one value is as appropriate or as rational as another.
Values are conceptually (linguistically) different from facts, and it is this difference in the nature of value-fact conceptualizations that presents some definitional difficulties (for example, the problem Hunt and Metcalf make manifest with their fact-value continuum).

It is easy to produce a clear definition: we could say, for instance, that "morally educated" people are simply those who do not come before the juvenile courts, or who win medals for bravery: but to make it adequate as well as clear calls for a lot of hard work. It is here that some philosophizing is essential: for there is no way of getting an adequate definition except by examining the use and meanings of words, and the ways in which those uses and meanings are interconnected. Words are governed by rules, of which we are often unaware. Because they are governed by rules, we can speak of an "adequate" interpretation of the phrase "moral education" and because we are often unaware of them, we need to do some philosophy. How we use the phrase is not wholly a matter for decision, much less for arbitrary decision. Of course it would be nice to be able to frame one's own definition, particularly since an adequate definition may be difficult to cash out in terms of empirical tests: but it would be cheating. In the same way, we could easily enough run a research project on "Marital Happiness," and check up on how often married couples kissed each other or called each other "darling." The only trouble is that this could not tell us much about marital happiness. (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967, p. 40)

Although the concept of value carries the attributes of methodology, descriptor, term of approval and intrinsic awareness, it is critical to consider here the nature of concepts in distinguishing value from non-value statements and thus to start from the presupposition that one cannot treat these two concept categories in the same way.

What is value? An analysis of the concept of value in the social sciences calls attention to such definitions from economics as "market value," or "market price"--the quantity of resources a person must relinquish if he or she is to secure a particular commodity, and so secure the benefits its possession can yield. In welfare economics we see such phrases as "a person's value" or "society's values" and a large part of the study of welfare economics is a discussion of the resolution of value conflicts between society and individuals. (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953)

In political science the key concept with regard to values is allocation--the study of the allocation of resources, power and values. The value of something carries the meaning of evaluative property--the capacity to confer a benefit on someone; to make a favorable difference in a person's life.
In the social sciences generally, the concept of value suggests a grading or ranking, pricing and action (duty).

Given a knowledge of his tastes, of his overall life plan for the purpose of best catering to them, of the place he has reached in his journey, of the duties limiting his freedom to choose, of the priorities of claims on his resources, of the price of things (including alternative courses of action), and the value of things involved in the alternatives before him, and finally a knowledge of the resources at his disposal, he is then set to work out which of the alternatives open to him is the one on which he should enter. There are many formulae he can use. One that takes into account all the relevant considerations goes something like this: choose that course of action which will employ your resources so as to make the greatest possible difference to the excellence of your life; where this requirement takes notice of all the legitimate claims on one's resources including the avoidance of emergencies, the claims of other people, and the pinpointing of "best buys." (Baier, 1969, p. 52)

The assessment of the value of a phenomenon does not, by itself, imply action. Nor does a statement to action, necessarily, carry with it a statement of the value of anything. Ernest Nagel makes a similar observation in his categorization of characterizing and appraising value judgments. (Nagel, 1961, pp. 491-429)

What is value then? Value is a noun. Value is also a verb. It is a concept tied to culture (including language use) and central to any human study. We do not know enough about the physiological or psychological structure of the choice processes of the human nervous system to say values are x and not y, but we can say that values shape and are shaped by our methodologies, our descriptors for categorizing the physical and social environments, our means of approving and disapproving actions and beliefs, and our awareness--our ability to give or see meaning in our lives.

Value Study Approaches

Let us now consider some of the more popular approaches to value study and their modes of teaching value clarification, teaching value justification and teaching a value justification process. An analysis of these several value study approaches is presented here in order to:

1. Observe the present state of value study in social studies education using the conceptual framework of the three schema described below;
2. Consider the inadequacies of any one of the several value study approaches vis a vis the nature of the human being; and

3. Help develop a frame of reference into which one might place an alternative approach to value analysis.

The value approaches that are herein delineated will be discussed in terms of the following schema:

Scheme I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Description</th>
<th>Value Advocacy</th>
<th>Value Analysis</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Scheme II

Logical

Psychological

Scheme III

Valuative-
Objective

Valuative-
Subjective

To be sure, there will be a certain degree of overlap for the processes of value identification, clarification, justification and action cannot be neatly divided into separate and distinguishable sets relative to the above categories, but, it is argued that viewing the several value approaches from three vantage points can only help increase our overall knowledge of these approaches; their strengths and weaknesses; and provide the basis for further investigations.

*Raths, Harmin and Simon; the Harvard Project; the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies; Hunt and Metcalf, Edwin Fenton; Milton Meux.
At this point in our discussion it will be useful to take a closer look at each of the six projects, so that you will be more familiar with their specific strategies. While we can in no way present a complete picture of the various approaches to value study, the following examples should help you better understand the classification schema as well as provide some insight into popular value study strategies.

Raths, Harmin & Simon

In this book we shall be less concerned with the particular value outcomes of any one person's experiences than we will with the process that he uses to obtain his values. Because life is different through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have. We therefore cannot be certain what values, what life styles, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for obtaining values. These ideas grow from the assumption that whatever values one obtains should work as effectively as possible to relate one to his world in a satisfying and intelligent way. (p. 28)

To review this definition, we see values as based on three processes: choosing, prizing, and acting.

Choosing: freely
from alternatives
after thoughtful consideration of the consequences and alternatives

Prizing: cherishing, being happy with the choice
willing to affirm the choice publicly

Acting: doing something with the choice
repeatedly, in some pattern of life (p. 30)

The point has been made that our values tend to be a product of our experiences. They are not just a matter of true or false. One cannot go to an encyclopedia or to a textbook for values. The definition that has been given makes this clear. One has to prize for himself, choose for himself, integrate choices into the pattern of his own life. Information as such doesn't convey this quality of values. Values come out of the flux of life itself. (p. 36)

As teachers, then, we need to be clear that we cannot dictate to children what their values should be since we cannot also dictate what their environments should be and what experiences they will have... By definition and by social right, then, values are personal things. (p. 37)

1. The clarifying response avoids moralizing, criticizing, giving values, or evaluating. The adult excludes all hints of "good" or "right" or "acceptable," or their opposites, in such responses.
2. It puts the responsibility on the student to look at his behavior or his ideas and to think and decide for himself what it is he wants.
3. A clarifying response also entertains the possibility that the student will not look or decide or think. It is permissive and stimulating, but not insistent. (p. 53)

A specific kind of strategy that Raths, Harmin and Simon might suggest would be as follows:

Take the following three phrases and have your class rank order them.
(1) Working in a toll booth on a super-highway.

(2) Working in a car wash.

(3) Working for the air force in a early-warning radar station in northern Alaska.

Have the class rank order the three statements by using the question, "What would you like to do: first choice, second choice, third choice?"

After the students have rank ordered the three phrases they discuss their reasons for such ordering and in the discussions that follow, the argument is made that some self-clarification of value positions will be made manifest to the student.

The Clarifying Public Controversy, Fred M. Newmann

We see three facets to the general problem of evaluation. The first involves ethical relativism. Some claim that we should not make judgments as to whether some views are better, more rational, or more valid than others. Relativists maintain that groups and individuals harbor different standards of goodness, justice, and morality, and that there are no universal absolutes by which one man or group could legitimately judge another. This position is reflected in familiar preaching for tolerating different cultures: "Live and let live," "The natives are not inferior to us, only different--they have their values, we have ours." "You should judge a group by its values, not yours, the outside observer." Findings in psychology that demonstrate ways in which individual perceptions and attitudes are influenced by cultural surroundings; findings in anthropology demonstrating various value systems throughout the world; and the democratic value of toleration all have been used to support a relativistic view that, in an extreme form, suggests that no person or group should judge the positions or behaviors of another. "Though we Americans believe in free enterprise, the Russians do not. Their system might be right for them, but wrong for us." "According to Jimmy's values, it's all right to dodge the draft, but according to mine it's wrong. He has his life--I have mine. Nobody can say whose is "better."

Teachers who wish to be completely objective, wary of indoctrinating students with only one view, will suggest that there are good reasons for all points of view--no single one is really most valid. Existentialists can retreat from making social judgments for others by affirming that only meaningful reality is one's subjective experience. However, each represents an escape from problems that we believe must be confronted, which is why we cannot accept a relativist position. (p. 279)

Construing public controversy in America as manifestations of conflict among several values in a large and diverse American Creed, we postulate individual human dignity as the most fundamental value of all. We assume considerable disagreement and ambiguity in the definition of human dignity, but suggest two phenomena as requisite to its fulfillment: freedom of choice among diverse alternatives, and rational consent as a process by which to deal with conflicts arising out of the pluralism we advocate. The conception of citizenship education advanced in this book attempts to define and implement, for the most part, one value: rational consent. Exercising rational consent requires persons to clarify and justify their views on public issues in conversations with peers. (p. 33)
Too Old To Keep Alive

People who talk about moral issues often disagree about whether moral judgments should apply equally to people in different cultures. Should our decisions about the value of life be the same if we are talking about people living in circumstances much different from our own?

In this section we will consider questions about the value of life raised by the practices of a particular group of Eskimos.

Throughout the world, people in different cultures have developed unique ways of coping with their physical environments. The Arctic has one of the world's most rigorous and demanding physical environments, yet Eskimos have been able to survive and develop a culture in the midst of what are, to us, forbidding surroundings.

In these difficult regions the average yearly temperature is below the freezing point. In winter, which lasts nine months, temperatures can dip to 70 degrees below zero. Harsh winds and blizzards sweep the treeless ice flats.

For Eskimos living in these barren regions, the struggle to maintain life is a constant concern. Hunting and fishing, in addition to providing the entire food supply, must also provide other necessities of life such as heat, hunting weapons, and materials for clothing.

Hunting and fishing are the tasks of the men, and to survive they must succeed. The contribution of women, and their mark of status in the community, is skill at making clothing. Animal skins are tirelessly chewed to the necessary softness and painstakingly cut and sewed. Each member of the family has clothing and footwear tailored to fit him perfectly. With vital resources so scarce, each person must contribute to the survival of the family.

In his novel Top of the World Hans Ruesch describes many features of Eskimo life reported by noted anthropologists. In the following excerpt, Ernenek and his wife, Asiak, plan to migrate southward after the death of her father, Oooloolik. Her mother, Powtee, is no longer able to contribute to the survival of the family and, following a special custom, they leave her out on the ice to die:

Old Oooloolik died the following winter for no particular reason at all. He went to sleep and forgot to wake up. This was unfortunate. If his relatives had had an inkling of his impending death they could have dressed him in his burial clothes and moved him into a makeshift shelter, as the shade of the deceased contaminates an igloo and it has to be abandoned. So in the dead of the night they decamped, erasing their tracks as they went, and built fresh igloos far enough away to be safe from the dead man's vengeance; even Ernenek, who was afraid of no man living.

For a dead Eskimo is a bad Eskimo. He is enraged that he is dead while his dear ones are alive, and he will hurt them with all his power. And as the dread of Oooloolik's ghost was great, the wails of mourning were loud and plentiful in an effort to conciliate it. For further precaution everybody built sham snares and traps about their new dwellings in order to frighten away the ghost should it want to come back.

The dead made things hard for the living. But so did the living for the dead.

Anarvik and Siksik migrated to the southward at the break of day, but Asiak's mother, Powtee, felt too old to travel, and Ernenek and Asiak stayed on with her.

They were good to the old woman, who had no one left after Ooloolik had died and Imina had gone to Kidok's tribe. For a whole year they tended her with care and affection, providing her with foods and garments although her stiff fingers were unable to sew or scrape, and her teeth, used down to the gums, were incapable of softening hides any longer. They gave her choice and tender morsels, and Asiak fed her mouth to mouth, thus paying her back what she had received from her in childhood—a fair exchange. But an end would have to be set to all this, sure as winter.

And it was.

The old woman knew what it meant when she was packed on the sled and driven out over the wind-harassed ocean, luminous with stars. Nobody talked on the ride, or when a halt was called and Ernenek made the old woman sit on a dog-skin he had spread in the midst of the sea field for her, so that she might die in comfort. Embarrassed, he had then waddled back to the sled, muttering to himself and feigning to be busy with the lashings.

Asiak, to conceal her own distress, was berating the huskies more than she was wont and kicking with great accuracy at their pointed snouts when they tore at one another's pelts.

Meantime, seated composedly on the dogskin, Powtee was watching her daughter with a worried eye. Asiak was pregnant and probably had no inkling of how close to delivery she already was. She had never witnessed human birth, nor would there be anyone with her now who had, and Powtee wondered whether her daughter had learned enough about the facts of life from the husky bitches.

"Step close, little one. A useless old woman has something to tell you."

Asiak complied and respectfully listened to her mother's words.

"Now listen carefully: as soon as the child is born, look if it is a boy or girl. If it is a boy, everything is all right. Lick it clean with your tongue, then rub it with blubber. Don't be afraid to rub hard: it won't break. Only after a sleep or two may you start washing it in urine. But if it is a girl, you must strangle her at once, before you get fond of her, or set her out on the ice, filling her mouth with snow so that she'll die quickly."

"Why must somebody do that?"

"Because during the time you give suck to a child you will be barren, which means that in order to raise a girl you will delay the arrival of a boy, and it is indispensable that you raise a male quickly in your family: it is he that will bring in the food when you and your husband grow old, which happens very, but very quickly. Once you have a boy, you may raise a girl too, if you care. But you should know that many wise parents let their daughters live only if somebody has promised them already before their birth to marry them and provide for them while they grow. Is all that clear to you, little one?"

"Yes, old one."

"Somebody is glad it is." And so as to give her daughter a chance to depart she tore her gaze away from her and stared out across the lonely white reaches
and toward the distant shadows; denoting land, blurry in the gloom of the
Arctic night. She was a stickler for such old rules of "savior-vivre" as
demanded that departures should be ignored. So it would have been as im-
polite for Asiak and Ernenek to take leave as for her to take notice.

But as the young couple slipped out of her life's scene, it was only in sound.
In sight they stayed with her, so familiar was she with the pattern of life
which was unchanged since her childhood days, and unchangeable. And she was
ashamed that at the end of a full life she should not yet be satisfied with
her lot, but nurture one more desire--to see and hear and hold once more in
her gnarled old hands a newborn babe. And as she sat waiting for death her
thoughts went to the small igloo when even now the miracle of birth was taking
place. She could picture accurately everything that was happening there in
her absence.

Persisting Questions of Modern Life

1. Why did Asiak and Ernenek leave Powtee out on the ice to die? Do you
think this was right? Why or why not?

2. Would it be right for Asiak to follow her mother's advice and strangle
the baby if it turned out to be a girl? Why or why not?

3. Other Cultures, Other Standards? Some people feel that people in cultures
other than our own should not be judged by the same standards we would use
in judging people in our culture. To put it simply, someone might argue
that killing is all right in other cultures though not in ours. This
position raises a difficult definitional problem--that is, how do we de-
fine a culture as "different" enough to justify actions that might not be
acceptable in our culture?

Do you agree that different standards of justification should be applied to
actions in different cultures? The following groups might claim to be sepa-
rate cultures different from one another. Do you agree that they are
different cultures? Why or why not? If one of these groups felt that killing
was justified according to their cultural standards, would you agree that it
is justifiable? Why or why not?

a. Comanche Indians in the Great Plains during the 19th century.
b. Australian aborigines.
c. A black nationalist group in an urban ghetto.
d. Teen-agers under the age 18.
e. Members of a witchcraft cult in California.
f. Chinese Communists.
g. Millionaires.

Lockwood, Alan; Oliver, Donald; Newmann, Fred. Moral Reasoning--The Value of
Acquiring moral judgment means learning the commonly accepted standards of "right" and "wrong" passed on from preceding generations. But standards of right and wrong vary widely among societies, among groups within the same society, and from time to time. Thus we will not be talking about moral standards as if there were only one acceptable set. Rather, we will be talking about some general processes in learning moral judgments, whatever the particular rules of right and wrong happen to be.

Many people hold that parents are the chief source of moral training for the child. How often do you hear that "the trouble with today's kids is that their parents didn't teach them right from wrong"? While it is true that parents play an important part in the child's development of moral judgment, other things affect him, too. Several studies suggest that moral judgment isn't acquired all at once but develops gradually in the socialization process. Parents are especially important in early moral development—they provide rules for the young child. These rules are supported by the parents' authority, and the child eventually associates the rules with this authority. At this early stage of development, morality is simply a matter of obedience to rules which the child comes to view as absolute, almost sacred. This we can call a morality of authority.

But there are other aspects to morality besides obedience to authority-based ideas of right and wrong. What about a situation in which there is no authority? Such situations occur particularly when children are playing with their friends. Early in their development, even in play, children are very much bound by the rules of the game as they have learned them. But, after a time, children will suggest changing a rule or introducing some difference in the game. They begin to see that it's possible to set up their own rules for play as long as the group will go along. In this way they begin to learn the give-and-take necessary for getting along with one another. They learn about reciprocity—"if you'll do X, then I'll do Y." Rules begin to lose their sacred character. Instead of being justified by authority, rules are justified by group consensus or general agreement. For example, if a group of young children were playing basketball, it would be unusual for them to decide to allow three points for a field goal instead of the usual two points. However, a group of high school boys might decide among themselves to play by this rule. Thus children acquire a morality of consensus based on reciprocity and mutual agreement. Such a view of morality adds to, rather than replaces, the previously learned morality of authority.

Ideas about morality change as the child grows older. He begins to learn that one cannot judge right and wrong simply on the basis of how one's actions affect others. There are exceptions to almost all moral laws, depending on the situation. What is wrong in one instance may be right in another. Most children learn that it's wrong to lie. But later they may learn that it's tactless, if not actually wrong, not to lie under certain circumstances. For example, there are many "little white lies" that one learns to tell to save another person's feelings. You would not tell a friend in the hospital how terribly ill he looks. But you could get around the situation somewhat by saying that he is looking better.

Another important aspect of moral judgment is the intention of the actor. Intention is something that is clearly recognized in our legal code. For example, if a man plans to kill someone and then does it, he may be found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death or life imprisonment. But if two men have a fight and one accidentally kills the other, the killer may be charged...
only with manslaughter and be given a fairly brief prison sentence.

When do children start to make this rather sophisticated judgment? When does one begin to consider the intentions of the person committing an act before judging its rightness or wrongness? How can we find out?

Exercise - Gathering Data on Developing Moral Judgment

In this exercise you will try to get answers to the questions above by interviewing three children of different ages. One child should be four or five years old; the second child, seven or eight years old; the third child, ten or eleven years old. They can be either boys or girls. You can use your own brothers and sisters if they are the right ages. The interview is very simple. First, tell the child you're going to read him two stories about two little girls, Susie and Mary. Tell him that when you are finished, you're going to ask him which girl was naughtier (or "badder," if you are talking to the four-to-five year old). Read the two stories below to the child. When you have read them both, ask the child which girl was naughtier or "badder," Susie or Mary. Then ask the child why he thought so. On the interview forms given to you, record the age and sex of each child, the name of the girl (Susie or Mary) who was thought to be naughtier, and the reason given for the answer. You may not be able to write down the exact words the child uses, but be sure to get the general idea.

1

A little girl named Susie wanted to surprise her mother while her mother was out at the store. She tried to bake a cake for supper. When she was getting the things for the cake, she accidentally dropped a whole carton of eggs, and all twelve eggs broke all over the kitchen floor.

2

A little girl named Mary stayed home while her mother went to the store. She got tired of playing with her toys and decided to play with things in the kitchen. She was playing with some eggs, and one dropped and broke on the floor.


Hunt & Metcalf

The Reflective Method

Our central beliefs and values, which include what Myrdal labels the American Creed, represent the more general valuation. (p. 58)

Some people, when faced with intrapersonal conflict involving an ideal and a specific behavior, resolve the conflict by rejecting the ideal. One who favors equality and segregation and who comes to see them as inconsistent may reject equality. We assume that democratic-reflective study of such issues is more likely than unreflective procedure to resolve them in the direction of fuller commitment to democratic ideals. Our position advocates reflective reconstruction of beliefs as a means of clarifying and preserving the central ideals of democracy. (p. 58)
Although teachers may differ over whether they have a right to teach their students to value the free market, or indeed to teach students their own values, there can be no doubt that logic alone demands that we help students to realize the value and meaning of consistency. Students can be consistent in their valuing, without necessarily agreeing with a teacher. We are left with one question. Can students justify whatever criterion or criteria they use in evaluation of consequences? (p. 138)

The role of a democratic teacher in all this is not to strive to make students agree with him on all value judgments. A value judgment that is in harmony with my basic character may not be in harmony with yours, and your basic character may be as good as mine. A democratic teacher will offer to students every inducement and encouragement to accept the values implicit within reflective method. He cannot dodge this choice. But within this method a wide range of value judgments and basic characters are possible. In expressing a preference for this method over other ways of knowing, the teacher is declaring himself an adherent to democratic teaching. Ultimately, every student has to decide whether his basic character is to be democratic-reflective in its central values. Such a decision is highly personal, but teachers of social studies can help students to make it reflectively.

We want students to be consistent in their values—but we also want them to justify values by recourse to criteria derived from a philosophy to which they subscribe. Whether they choose to subscribe to a democratic philosophy is their decision to make—probably the most important decision in their lives. (pp. 141-2)

Value Analysis: A Teaching Model

The teacher may want the two groups to consider together whether a free market is always preferable to one in which buyers and sellers enter into collusion against one another. But before doing so, he may want to test both sides as to the consistency and constancy of their respective devotions. To find whether the advocates of a free market are consistent in their advocacy, he may ask them such questions as: Do you favor tariffs? Do you favor trust busting? Do you believe in subsidies of any kind? Is it right to support farm prices by restricting production? These questions are intended to find out whether the advocates of a free market are consistent in their advocacy.

We are left with one question. Can students justify whatever criterion or criteria they use in evaluation of consequences? In the case we have been considering, this means literally: Can those who use the criterion, free market, justify their preference for markets that are free over ones that are not? Or can those who prefer a nonfree market justify their preferences?

Beginning about 500 B.C., the people of Athens engaged in one of the most remarkable outbursts of cultural activity in all history. During the following 150 years, Athenians built the temples that still stand on the Acropolis. They attended the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes. They heard the poetry of Pindar and Simonides, read the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, and debated the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

What sort of people were these Athenians who made such significant contributions to western architecture, literature, history, and philosophy? They were farmers, merchants, and seamen who brought wealth to their city by exchanging the products of their rocky soil--wine and olive oil--for grain and metals. They were artisans and city dwellers. Even a great many farmers spent much of their time in Athens where they enjoyed the cultural and artistic offerings of the city. They were soldiers. When the city was threatened by invading armies, the able-bodied men of Athens took up sword and shield to protect their homeland. Finally, they were active citizens. When they reached the age of twenty-one, all native-born Athenian males who owned property participated in making political decisions in the assembly. Women, slaves, and foreigners, however, were barred from participating in the affairs of government.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the Athenians was their philosophy of humanism. Athenian values were based on the conviction that man was the master of himself and of his world. No other ancient people believed that man was capable of so much.

Ancient Greece was not a unified nation, but a collection of independent city-states. These cities were jealous of their freedom and fought many wars to protect their interests. The most famous of these outbreaks were the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta. The first Peloponnesian War lasted from 460 to 445 B.C.; the second war began in 431 and ended in 404 B.C. The Athenian historian Thucydides, who lived from about 470 to 400 B.C., wrote a history of the second Peloponnesian War. He included in his account his recollection of a speech by Pericles, the leader of Athens from 461 to 429 B.C. The reading that follows is a modern translation of Pericles' speech. As you read, think about the following questions:

1. What characteristics of Athenian citizens does Pericles praise? According to him, what are the characteristics of the good man?
2. How does Pericles describe the political and social systems of Athens? What advantages does Pericles think these systems have over others?
3. What hypothesis would you form about Athenian values from this speech? What questions would you ask to begin validating this hypothesis?
4. To what extent are your values similar to those of the Athenians? Which values do you not share with them?

Pericles in Praise of Athens

In 431 B.C., at the end of the first year of the second Peloponnesian War, Pericles delivered this oration at a ceremony to honor those who had fallen in battle. The confidence of the Athenians had been increased by their success against the Spartan invaders. Pericles used the occasion to praise the fundamental values of the Athenians and to rally the citizenry to the defense of the city.
...Before I praise the dead, I should like to point out those principles which have guided our rise to power and describe the institutions and way of life which have made our empire great. For I believe such thoughts are appropriate to the occasion and the citizens and foreigners gathered here may profit from them.

No other form of government rivals our own institutions. We have not copied the governments of our neighbors, but rather, have set an example for them. We are called a democracy because the power to make laws is given to many rather than a few. But while the law gives equal justice to everyone, it has not failed to reward excellence. While every citizen has an equal opportunity to serve the public, we reward our most distinguished citizens by asking them to make our political decisions. Nor do we discriminate against the poor. A man may serve his country no matter how low his position on the social scale. We do not allow secrecy in our public affairs, and in our private relations with our fellow citizens, we are not suspicious of one another. We do not become angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes...While we are tolerant of how our neighbor acts, we approach our public duties with reverence. We are prevented from doing wrong out of respect for the authorities and the laws. And we especially respect laws which are designed to protect those who have been injured.

We have not forgotten that we must provide for our spiritual needs and for relaxation from toil. We have regular games and ceremonies throughout the year. We pride ourselves in making beautiful and elegant homes. And the delight we feel in all these things helps to keep us happy. Because our city is so great, the fruits of the whole earth are brought to Athens so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as well as our own. Our military training is also superior to that of our enemies in many respects. Our city is thrown open to the world. We have never expelled a foreigner nor prevented him from seeing or learning anything that might help him defeat us if he became our enemy. We do not rely upon controlling the lives of our citizens and tricking our neighboring cities to assure victory. Instead, we depend on the patriotism of our hearts and the skills of our hands. And in the matter of education, while the Spartans compel their youths to live lives of hardship and labor to make them brave, we live an easy life. Yet, we are equally ready to face the perils of battle as they are. And here is the proof: The Spartans come to Athens not by themselves, but with all of their allies. At the same time we seldom have difficulty defeating them in their own country, even though they are fighting for their homes. Our enemies have never had to face our entire military force. We have had to divide our men among our navy and several separate armies on land. When our enemies defeat a part of our army, they are as proud as if they had routed all of us, and when they are defeated, they pretend that our entire army vanquished them.

If we prefer to prepare for danger with a light heart rather than with laborious training, and if we gain our courage through force of habit rather than by force of law, do we not gain much? We do not devote our entire attention to getting ready for war, but when the hour comes we are as brave as those who never rest in preparing for battle. Therefore, our city is an excellent place to live when we are at peace as well as when we are at war. For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet we have simple tastes. We cultivate the mind without losing our manliness. We use our wealth for our real needs, not for luxuries which will give us false prestige. To be poor is no disgrace; the true disgrace is doing nothing to avoid poverty.
An Athenian citizen does not put his private affairs before affairs of the state; even our merchants and businessmen know something about politics. We alone believe that a man who takes no interest in public affairs is more than harmless—he is useless. And if few of us have the imagination to develop new policies, we all are sound judges of the policies proposed by others. Though some of our enemies believe that discussing and debating a policy prevents taking action when it is necessary, we believe that the greatest barrier to action is not knowing enough about an issue before acting. Athenians have that peculiar ability to think before they act, but we do not allow thinking to interfere with acting. Other men either act without thinking or hesitate to act if they think. But Athenians will act after debating an issue, even though they realize that they may be giving up all the pleasures of life our city provides them...

We are also unlike other cities when it comes to doing good. We make our friends by doing favors for them, not by receiving favors. Now he who does a favor for someone else is the better friend. We do good to our neighbors not because we want them to repay us in our own time of need but because we are men of good will...


Milton Meux

The Evidence Card

One concrete device we have found to be quite helpful is what we have called the "Evidence Card." The main purpose of the Evidence Card is to summarize and organize for the student those aspects of the value analysis involved in clarifying the relevance of a fact: the value judgment, the point of view from which the value judgment is to be made, the criterion, reasons for believing the criterion, reasons for not believing the criterion, and particular or specific facts which serve as backing or evidence for the fact whose relevance is being clarified.

The simplest form of an Evidence Card would contain the student's value judgment, his fact about the object being evaluated, and the criterion the student has formulated to test the relevancy of the fact. This simple form of the Evidence Card is presented in the figure below. The example in the figure is the one discussed above. (The card itself can be a 3" x 5", 4" x 6", etc., although the size is not particularly important.)

Simple Form of Evidence Card

| Value judgment: Relief is morally wrong. |
| Fact: Relief gives money to people who haven't earned it. |
| Criterion: Practices which give money to people who haven't earned it are morally wrong. |
The next step is to place the specific evidence or backing for the fact on the back of the Evidence Card. (We suggest the back only because of space limitations.) Since there will often be evidence contrary to the fact, this can also be included. The figure below displays this step in the development. Note that the contrary statement brings up the question of what it means to "earn" money.

Finally, the reasons for and against believing the criterion are placed on the back of the Evidence Card, below the backing for the fact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backing (positive)</th>
<th>Contrary (negative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People on relief in Detroit receive $175 per month and have no jobs.</td>
<td>Some people on relief work hard even though they don't have a job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People on relief in Chicago get $200 a month and do not have jobs.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Back of Evidence Card, with Backing and Contrary Evidence for the Fact, and Reasons for and Against the Criterion

<table>
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<td>People on relief in Chicago get $200 a month and do not have jobs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for believing criterion</td>
<td>Reasons for not believing criterion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Such practices lower a person's dignity and self-esteem.</td>
<td>It can't be morally wrong to raise people's standard of living when they are victims of a system over which they have no control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Such practices keep a person from trying to improve himself.</td>
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</table>
Psychologically, the Evidence Card has seemed to have several advantages.
(1) It gives the student something concrete to work with and focus on. 
(2) Each card seems to be a kind of unit of effort, so that the completion 
of a card seems to give the student a definite feeling of accomplishment. 
This seems especially true with the slower students. (3) The Evidence Card 
provides an opportunity to develop a variety of interrelated capabilities 
in a meaningful context, and to understand how and why they are interrelated. 
This understanding of interrelations also helps build the student's confidence 
in a difficult task. (4) The student can spend as little or as much time as 
he wants on each card without the teacher or other students knowing how much 
time he spent. This saves embarrassment and helps build the confidence of 
the slower students. It also facilitates individualized instruction, thereby 
allowing the faster student to reach his capacity. (5) Having to put things 
into words on a card that he knows others will see and that he will have to 
defend encourages greater clarity and more justifiable statements by the 
student. (6) The completion of Evidence Cards gives the student a feeling 
of pride when he sees his work in front of his peers.

Values Education Rationale Strategies and Procedures, Lawrence E. Metcalf, 
Editor, 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, 1971. 
pp. 50-54.
Classifying Selected Social Studies Value Study Approaches

Now that we have had a brief look at six approaches to value study in the drama of social education, let us now turn our attention to the three schema and look at said approaches from different vantage points.

Scheme I (Value Description, Value Advocacy, Value Analysis)

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<tr>
<th>Value Description</th>
<th>Value Advocacy</th>
<th>Value Analysis</th>
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Value Description. The germane concern in this approach is the attempt at establishing the nature of reality. Thus, the study of what is* is focused upon while the notion of what ought to be is categorized as outside the realm of investigation. Personal and societal values are identified and study is made of the relationship between said values and social class, race, or economic levels. At the descriptive level, as an investigation is made of what is, focus is placed upon factual affairs or "collectible" data independent of norms so an understanding of the situation can be ascertained and predictions** can be made relative to the values held by individuals and/or groups. Values enter into this situation because of their descriptive power vis a vis information that tells us what is. For example, to ask "how are the values of Native Americans similar to the values of the white American majority?" is descriptive in nature since it asks for what is rather than a justification or a pronouncement of what ought to be.

Value Advocacy. While none of the value materials delineated below mention any strong relationship with value advocacy as an approach, it is argued here that all approaches are, in part, advocating values; assuming certain values--even the advocacy of valuing "process." Value advocacy is best described through such techniques*** as inspiring, persuading, moralizing and convincing students to adopt the "right"

*Empiricism and the scientific task of defining concepts, developing and testing generalizations and building theory are central tasks in this approach. Empiricism is seen in this approach as a useful tool for investigating the details of social systems. **Since generalizations about values that are formulated are also implicit predictors. Also see Theory and the International System by Charles A. McClelland, New York: Macmillan Co., 1967, pp. 13-14. ***These techniques are the tools used for justifying a value or reaching a value already defined for the student.
values. (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966, p. 11) Justification is apriori, thus, there is no need to develop decision-making skills for choices are already made for the student. Teachers are seen in this approach as example setters (Powell, 1965, pp. 448-450) and should manifest those "right" values which society has outlined for them. Choice, then, is limited in this approach as is the concomitant desire to justify said choices.

Value Analysis. Of particular importance in this approach is: (1) an emphasis upon teaching a justification process as opposed to arriving at a special or pre-established judgment or set of values; and (2) an emphasis upon logic and reflective thinking. This means, of course, that a value analysis approach posits the importance of a student's ability to justify a personal value position through rational thought.

The grounds that support any judgment of value are open to investigation and a process is necessary for examining those grounds to determine whether they do in fact support the judgment. The "process" may take a number of forms from attempts to use symbolic logic in conditional (cause, effect; if, then) situations to the justification of warrants (jurisprudential) growing out of implicit or explicit assertions. Perhaps of greatest significance to social studies educators is the emphasis of this approach upon action (to act in accordance with the justified value position).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme I Applied to Popular* Value Materials/Approaches</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value Description</strong></td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sociological</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources for the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Fenton</td>
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*Popular meaning those which are most widely reviewed and used by social studies teachers.
In placing the several (six) approaches into Scheme I (value description, value advocacy and value analysis) it is first of all important to note that all six works are placed in the value advocacy category for, as stated above, all are professing or assuming certain values and value positions. Although none of the listed value materials belong entirely in the value advocacy category, as an emphasis of the above point of assuming certain values, they are here noted as perhaps a second categorization. Thus, we will discuss only the categories of value description and value analysis still focusing on all six projects.

Under the categorization of value description are placed the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies Project and the Fenton materials. The SRSS emphasizes the teaching of key concepts and generalizations of sociology. "We want to make increasingly descriptive statements about human groups." (Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools, 1968, p. iii) Note also the following:

It may sometimes be well to point out to the student one feature of these questions (why, that is, and how are things connected?). They are concerned with the way things are, not the way they ought to be. The sociologist's task is to find out, as precisely and accurately as possible, what the social reality is. (Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools, 1968, p. iv)

... the sociologist is looking at things in a different way. He asks: what is? Not, what do I wish were so? Nor, what might the ideal be? Nor, what ought to be? (Not that "ought" and "is" questions are unrelated--it's hard to get where you ought to go if you don't know where you are.) (Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools, 1968, p. ii)

A "value description" categorization should not carry the meaning of "not very useful for value education." On the contrary, the materials of the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, as they are now called*, are pregnant with value issues, it just happens that the materials approach values in a descriptive mode.

The Fenton material is placed in the value description category because of its attention to evidence and facts and the process of describing values.

*Since being published by Allyn and Bacon.
The whole social studies curriculum presents controversial issues that challenge the student's values and encourages them to clarify their values in the light of evidence. The goal is clarification, not consensus. If a student emerges from the curriculum with the same values he held at the beginning of his study, he still will have learned how to support his values intelligently. If he finds that some of his values have failed the test of evidence he can adopt others. (Fenton, 1967, p. 4)

A manifestation of the "value description" approach is also found in some of the Fenton materials; for example, the semester course entitled "The Shaping of Western Society" approaches values in three ways. (1) They examine the value systems of man throughout European history in order to introduce students to the wide range of values from which they may pick and choose. (2) They examine the relationships of values to the societies from which these values grew, thus teaching students to examine the role of values in an entire culture. (3) They give students opportunities to reflect about whether particular values in the past are pertinent to their own lives. (Good, 1968, p. 10)

Within the "value analysis" category are placed the following: Raths, Harmin and Simon; Hunt and Metcalf; Meux; and the Harvard Social Studies Project. All of these focus on analysis, degrees of justification and degrees of action based upon analysis and justification.

The Harvard Social Studies Project is best summarized in the following statements: (1) The analysis of public controversy in terms of prescriptive, descriptive and analytic issues. (2) The use of distinct strategies for justification and clarification of one's views on such issues. (3) Systematic attention to the discussion process as one deals with a controversial issue.

The Harvard Social Studies Project identifies five strategies by which value statements can be supported or challenged. First of all, value statements can be supported with the use of value-laden language. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, p. 30) This strategy makes use of "loaded" words and these words serve as a reminder to people that they have certain value commitments. Such terms as "killing" and "law and order" would be examples of such words. Consider the statements, "It is not right to take the life of John Brown because killing is wrong," and "Laws must be
administered if we are to preserve the social order." Second, value statements can be supported by the use of a respected or venerable source. For example, killing is argued to be wrong because it says so in the Bible. Third, value statements can be supported through the prediction of value consequences. Policy positions and value judgments are often used together to show that support of a particular policy will lead to a good end. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, pp. 30-31) When a policy position is linked to valued consequences there is the additional problem of showing that the consequences will actually occur. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, p. 31) A fourth strategy of support for value statements is one of finding important values that conflict. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, p. 31) If there are two conflicting issues in a discussion, one must be violated regardless of the policy stand that is taken. If this fourth strategy is used over a period of time, it will force one to consider the consistency of his positions relative to values supported and violated. Finally, value statements can be supported with empathetic appeal. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, p. 32) Policy stands can be supported with the personal preference or feelings of another discussant. The use of emphatic appeal to arouse one's sympathy, concern or otherwise cause an individual to identify with a person caught in a value conflict clearly points out the authors' concern with persuasion and discussion techniques. The ability to listen to others, to persuade and to use these techniques of discussion is emphasized as much as other strategies for value analysis.

The Raths, Harmin and Simon approach to value analysis rests on the following hypothesis: If children are helped to use their valuing process, we assert that they will behave in ways that are less apathetic, confused and irrational and in ways that are more positive, purposeful and enthusiastic. (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966, p. 4) The authors are more concerned with a "process of valuing" than they are with establishing or choosing any set of values for students. The process of valuing which they establish must meet seven requirements or criteria in order for something to be called a value. The seven criteria, grouped into three subsets are:
choosing:
1. freely
2. from alternatives
3. after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative

prizing:
4. cherishing, being happy with the choice
5. willing to affirm the choice publicly

acting:
6. doing something with the choice
7. repeatedly, in some pattern of life

In this approach, emphasis is placed upon students choosing values freely from many alternatives, prizing their choice and then acting upon said choice. There is little attention paid to the justification of value judgments which is an important attribute of the other value analysis approaches here delineated.

To Hunt and Metcalf, value judgments take the form of policy decision and, in addition to concept analysis, a consideration of consequences is necessary. (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, p. 133) Hunt and Metcalf suggest the following four-step outline of procedures for dealing with the conceptual and empirical aspects of valuation:

1. What is the nature of an object, event or policy to be evaluated?
2. What consequences can be expected or anticipated from a policy in question?
3. Are the projected consequences desirable or not?
4. Can criteria for appraising consequences be justified? How?

Step 1, then is concerned with concept analysis while Step 2 calls attention to consequences. Step 3 determines the desirability and rank order of consequences while Step 4 calls for a value which will justify the selected criteria. As can be noted, great emphasis is placed on determining the consequences of value judgments, but, unlike the Raths, Harmin and Simon approach, no emphasis is placed on acting on values.

The Meux approach places a great deal of emphasis upon the analytic nature of syllogistic logic and is built upon the following four elements: (1) something (object, action, expression, statement, question, state of affairs, event) to be
evaluated; (2) an evaluation term such as good, bad, true, false, just, unjust; (3) a warrant to justify the evaluation; and (4) "connecting facts" which establish a linkage between the evaluated phenomenon and the warrant thereby supporting the use of the warrant. (Meux, 1963, p. 12) Meux, Combs and Payette have placed these four elements in a schematic using the following terms: value object, value term, description and the value object and criterion. (Meux, Combs and Payette, 1968; 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies)

For example, one might argue that the state has a good legislature (value object equals state legislature, value term equals good). It is thus rated because of the number of bills passed into law during its last session; an increase of 15 percent over the preceding session (description). Any state legislature that increases its bill-passing capacity by 15 percent or more is a good legislature (criterion). In syllogism (if a reversal of these statements is made) the following is appropriate: "If X, then Y; X, therefore, Y." One question remains, of course, and that is the credibility of the criterion.

Scheme II

The continuum above suggests two fundamental differences in the way which value study might be approached. A logical approach to value analysis calls attention to the presupposition of the power of generalized knowledge as manifested in scientific processes (such as those outlined in the 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies). The number of steps in these processes vary from material to material, but the following six steps are representative:
1. A value concept is identified and defined. Since the concept must be applied consistently from one issue to another, expert knowledge (established disciplines) is emphasized as the value concept is identified and defined.

2. Consequences of the policy, issue or event are considered and alternative choices are rated.

3. Criteria are established in order to rate the "N" consequences. The application of criteria in rating consequences is crucial for a value problem, since no value can be supported with facts alone. Factual consideration of consequences even in the logical approach to value study is necessary but not sufficient to value analysis.

4. Next, the criteria applied in the judgment (of say, "good" or "bad") must be justified. This means that a general value must be arrived at which supports the selected criteria for rating the consequences. The general value then supports the selected criteria, which in turn supports the specific value that is chosen.

5. The question of consistency is then raised. Are general values justified as they enter into a consistent set of principles that define the limits of an actor's behavior? If there are inconsistencies among general values preference choices will also be inconsistent.

6. Finally, there is the optional* call for action as the choice, now justified, is implemented.

A decision-making model which is built upon the "logical" steps cited above and which is becoming more popular in the area of value analysis** is that model commonly known as the cost-benefit model.

*Action is not unique to the logical approach to value study; however, it is placed here because the advocates of the logical model for value analysis seem to be moving in the direction of calling for action (see the 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies).

**See Values and the Future by Baier and Rescher.
The cost-benefit decision-making model calls attention to a particular decision point at which several options are open to the actor. The actor then considers the cost and benefit of each option and moves in that direction that offers the most benefit for the least amount of cost.

Another definition of the logical approach is presented by B. O. Smith in his five value manipulations. (Smith, 1966, pp. 52-54)

1. The object to be rated and the sort of rating to be made is indicated.
   (Smith emphasized the need to distinguish between values and likes and dislikes.)

2. A description of the characteristics of the value object is clarified (concept defining).

3. The object is rated.

4. Criteria are established by which the rating is made.

5. Evidence is given to support or to deny the criteria.

The crux of the above logical approaches and the closely related cost-benefit decision-making model is that, given the alternative choices, the capacity for rating and justifying criteria (the cost and benefit of each choice) one can logically decide on a course of action.

At the other end of the continuum, the psychological approach to value study calls attention to the need to take account of the individual's psyche. Little emphasis is placed upon group values (community, state or nation) while every consideration is given to help the individual clarify his or her value position via interaction with other individuals or intra-communications (with self) over a
period of time. The psychological approach carries no "list of procedures"* for teachers and students to follow; it instead makes much use of the verbal feedback and the establishment of a "good" or "safe" classroom climate in order for students and teachers to develop trust in one another.

Logical Psychological

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sociological Hunt &amp; Metcalf</th>
<th>Fenton</th>
<th>Harvard Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Resources for the Social Studies</td>
<td>Meux</td>
<td>Raths, Harmin &amp; Simon</td>
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The classification of the six materials on the logical-psychological continuum represent an attempt at looking at specific approaches from another point of view. The Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, Hunt and Metcalf, and Meux are all entered on the logical end of the continuum as they approach value study in a way that calls attention to a scientific process or steps in value analysis and they use social science disciplines whenever possible in value concept formation and justification. For example, in the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies materials** students are asked to define key concepts such as occupational prestige and social class. They are also asked to rank items (jobs), formulate criteria for ranking and finally justifying their choices. The "steps" in this approach are recognizable as consistent with a "logical" study of values.

Hunt and Metcalf suggest a four-step procedure for handling values which are manifested in the following questions: (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, pp. 133-134)

1. What is the nature of the object, event or policy to be evaluated?
2. What consequences can be expected or anticipated from the policy in question?
3. Are the projected consequences desirable or not desirable?
4. Can criteria for appraising consequences be justified? How?

*Although the psychological approach to value study presents long lists of techniques and procedures (some might even be labeled gimmicks) this approach carries with it no general procedure such as outlines for the logical approach to value study.

Milton Meux uses an approach very similar to this (see above). He also outlines four steps for logically evaluating preference choices.

Fenton is placed toward the middle of the continuum, although he would lean more in the direction of the logical. Fenton does pay attention to an historical inquiry mode (which is also defined here as logical) and also tries to involve the individual through selected questions. However, no strategies are provided for value clarification and little distinction is made relative to teaching-learning styles among the three types of values; behavior, procedural and substantive. (Fenton, 1966, p. 42) In terms of the Holt, Rinehart and Winston (Fenton program) materials and how they address value study, it is clear that a more logical (as opposed to psychological) approach is emphasized. Although the difference between the Fenton approach and, say, the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies approach, lies in the nature of the discipline that is emphasized—namely history versus sociology...Fenton also pays more attention (although that is mostly delineated in the rationale for the program and not necessarily made manifest in the materials) to student involvement and attention to psychological considerations of the learner, and, for this reason is placed toward the middle of the continuum leaning, however, toward the logical end of the spectrum.

The Harvard Project, as a value study approach, is also placed in the middle of the logical-psychological continuum, although it would lean in the psychological direction. The Harvard Project can be described as a jurisprudential social studies curriculum focusing upon the relationship between man and his government. The value focus is upon value analysis and value conflict. A summary of the project's objectives might be as follows: (Oliver, Newmann and Bane, 1967, p. 3)

1. The analysis of public controversy in terms of prescriptive, descriptive and analytic issues.
2. The use of distinct strategies for justification and clarification of one's views on such issues.
3. Systematic attention to the discussion process as one deals with a controversial issue.
The Harvard Project provides for both diversity and conformity in the American value system. Oliver suggests that this can be done through a dual approach, teaching the symbols of unity and cohesion at a different level from the process of inquiry associated with individualism.

The first, or symbolic, level requires only that the student be taught to verbalize the general values in the American creed and to experience a sense of identification with the nation that holds these values. There is a spontaneous projection of personal values into historical symbols, which give the Creed flesh and bones in reality. Understanding at this level is more emotional and symbolic than intellectual and literal. (Oliver, 1960, pp. 201-202)

Substantively, that is in terms of the values dealt with, the Harvard Project is not unlike other value study approaches. In the processes used, however, it combines elements of both the logical and psychological, suggesting five different strategies for supporting value statements. They are, the use of value-laden language, the use of a respected or venerable source, the use of valued consequences (prediction), the use of finding value conflicts, and empiricism. (Oliver and Newmann, 1967, pp. 29-32) These strategies seem to bridge the gap between logical and psychological approaches to value study and, thus, is the most comprehensive of the projects delineated here.

The psychological end of the continuum calls attention to instructional goals that help the student clarify his feelings, help the student feel better about his personal views, and help the student respect the rights of others to use non-rational or non-logical strategies in value explanation.

The Raths, Harmin and Simon materials are placed on the psychological end of the continuum because of their emphasis upon the feelings of the individual. The individual's perception of society is focused upon so that students develop healthier self-concepts and form better relationships with the larger community. "If children are helped to use this valuing process, we assert that they will behave in ways that are less apathetic, confused and irrational and in ways that are more positive, purposeful and enthusiastic." (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966, p. 11)
Emphasis is thus placed on free choice from many alternatives, a prizing and cherishing of said choice and a commitment to act consistently with the value choice. The three notions of choosing, prizing and acting are central to all of the techniques and strategies that are delineated in the work of Raths, Harmin and Simon.

Besides the emphasis upon the individual, this approach is labeled "psychological" because it places much importance on individual behavior. To use two different psychologies as reference points: (a) in Lewinian field theory the individual is clear about aspects of his life space, barriers are attacked rationally and with confidence and goals are pursued because they are prized either as terminal or instrumental values; (b) in associationists (S-R) theory this approach suggests that doing something with a choice (action) is the only manifestation of having a value. One must act as well as prize.

Finally, the Raths, Harmin and Simon approach makes no demand for justification of value judgments, and in so doing seal their fate as outside the logical camp.

Scheme III

Valuative-Objective

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Valuative-Subjective

Scheme III is an adaptation of the Wehlage and Anderson curricular perspective model (Wehlage and Anderson, 1972, pp. 42-48). The value objective end of the continuum calls attention to empirical testing and factual evaluations of the consequences of value choices. The underlying assumption here is that evaluative criteria can be set up, agreed upon and empirical tests can be made—thus reducing valuative problems to factual ones.

The value-subjective approach to value study points to the individual as the focus in all investigations. Students clarifying their own value position; creating their own value system; and acting in accordance to their own value hierarchy. Inquiry is "individual," unique, subjective and controlled by the investigator.
Hunt and Metcalf, the Sociological Resources for the Social Studies and Meux are placed on the valuative-objective and of the curriculum as they posit the reduction of valuative issues into factual ones. "Analysis of value concepts, as we have seen, logically resembles analysis of descriptive concepts. What we know about the testing of analytic statements applies to valuative content." (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, p. 133) "In any evaluative decision-making process the following six tasks must be carried out. (1) Identifying and clarifying value questions. (2) Assembling supportive facts. (3) Assessing the truth of supportive facts. (4) Clarifying the relevance of facts. (5) Arriving at a tentative value decision. (6) Testing the value principle implied in the decision." (41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, Chapter 2, p. 29)

If our goal is reliable knowledge--knowledge that holds up against rigorous testing--what means should we use to get it? The sociologist uses many tools: hypotheses drawn from existing theory to direct the search for information, methods of gathering data (like careful observing, interviewing, and sampling), and methods of analyzing data (including the use of indexes, rates, and systematic comparisons). By approaching the social world scientifically, the sociologist tries to establish truths about it. (Episodes in Social Inquiry Series, Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, Allyn and Bacon, 1970, p. v)

Before starting this study of social mobility you were asked to rank eighteen occupations according to what you thought to be their relative prestige. Your judgments and those of your classmates were tallied and the summary was reported during the previous class period. Your job now is to analyze these results by looking at the figures carefully. Begin by writing down the three most important things you can conclude from your examination of the data. What, in short, do the data say to you? Do your classmates agree?

Up and Down the Occupational Scale

The ranking of eighteen occupations according to their relative prestige demonstrates one way in which a society is divided into social layers. The occupations at the top have things about them that, for one reason
or another, are valued more, while those at the bottom are valued less. (Episodes in Social Inquiry Series, Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, Allyn and Bacon, 1970, p. 8)

Again, the above three approaches are objective in nature calling for a value-fact relationship which is consistent with empiricism and reductionism.

The Harvard Project is placed in the middle of the continuum because of both substantive and procedural considerations. Substantively the Harvard Project views American culture as based upon the conflict between individual and society:

The basic issue of individualism versus mass culture as it confronts the public schools is not a simple matter of whether we are to take no stand with respect to socialization problems and have an "individualistic culture" or whether we are to provide common answers and have a "mass culture." ... The issue is more complex. In what particular area of thought and behavior are we going to provide common answers, enforcing these answers with sanctions, and in what areas are we going to leave freedom of choice? ... One dilemma is basic to this issue. The more common values we accept and teach and the more often we express one accepted cultural response at a particular point of choice, the greater cohesion there probably will be within the culture. On the other hand, the greater the variety allowed in expressing answers to cultural problems, the wider will be the area for individual choice and individual freedom. (Oliver, 1960, pp. 201-202)

There is the claim for both symbolic unity and individual choice:

The first, or symbolic level, requires only that students be taught to verbalize the general values in the American Creed and to experience a sense of identification with the nation that holds these values. There is a spontaneous projection of personal values into historical symbols, which give the Creed flesh and bones reality. Understanding at this level is more emotional and symbolic than intellectual and literal. (Oliver, 1960, p. 211)

We act according to private beliefs, many of which are highly individualistic and rigid... We must preserve the myth that American ideals are translatable into a single set of concrete actions, but we must be certain that no single translation of our ideals does, in fact, crystalize. (Oliver, 1960, p. 204)

Procedurally, the Harvard Project also contains a unique combination of value-objective and valuative-subjective attributes:

The strategy for teaching such a model of American society might be to build a curriculum--call it a jurisprudential curriculum--which could focus upon the earnest use of free speech and open debate for the students to determine what is man's proper relationship to his government. The question would be: To what extent should the government protect or restrict basic rights. (Oliver, 1960, p. 16)

"At some point the teacher must make a decision concerning the areas of human behavior for which he will provide specific answers; the areas of behavior about
which he will simply raise questions; and the areas of behavior which he will deliber-
ately ignore." (Oliver, 1960, p. 203)

The types of justification methods available for student use point to the subjec-
tive nature of man while the emphasis on justification calls attention to the need for objectivism or at least "agreed upon subjectivism." Thus, for these reasons the Harvard Project clearly belongs in the middle range of the valuative-
objective valuative-subjective continuum.

The Fenton curriculum is placed on the valuative-objective valuative-subjective continuum at a point just right of center leaning in the direction of the valuative-
subjective end of the spectrum. Fenton tries to pay attention to the subjective nature of the student and also calls for "tests of evidence."

Our curriculum does accept the dignity and worth of the individual. But the curriculum does not attempt to instill a particular set of values in students or to enlist their support for particular public policies which follow logically from a predetermined value system...Teachers and the curriculum they use should consistently call upon students to clarify substantive values...Discussing a value in class without trying to arrive at consensus challenges each student to think for himself and to reflect upon the validity of values which he has learned in the home, on the playground or in the wider community. Clarifying gives each child an opportunity to develop his unique value system. (Fenton, 1967, p. 4)

The whole social studies curriculum presents controversial issues that challenge the student's value and encourages them to clarify their values in the light of evidence. The goal is clarification, not consensus. If a student emerges from the curriculum with the same values he held at the beginning of his study, he still will have learned how to support his values intelligently. If he finds that some of his values have failed to test to evidence, he can adopt others. (Fenton, 1967, p. 5)

However, Fenton fails to provide any strategies for the test of evidence. Thus, in terms of the materials themselves (not the rationale) one must place a slightly higher weight on the subjective nature of the Fenton materials as opposed to the objective nature of the Fenton materials.

At the valuative-subjective end of the continuum we see the Raths, Harmin and Simon approach. To these authors values are personal constructs which are developed, clarified and used by the individual. The phrases "your own values"--"You prize, you choose, you act" are central to this approach. Values are, thus, personally unique--subjective.
Since we see values as growing from a person's experience, we would expect that different experiences would give rise to different values and that any one person's values would be modified as his experiences accumulate and change. A person in the Antarctic would not be expected to have the same values as a person in Chicago. And a person who has an important change in patterns of experiences might be expected to modify his values. Values may not be static if one's relationships to the world are not static. As guides to behavior, values evolve and mature. (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966, p. 27)

Scheme I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Description</th>
<th>Value Advocacy</th>
<th>Value Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Resources for the Social Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociological Resources for the Social Studies</td>
<td>Hunt &amp; Metcalf</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fenton</td>
<td>Meux</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harvard Social Studies Project (Oliver)</td>
<td>Harvard Social Studies Project (Oliver)</td>
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Scheme II

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logical</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fenton</td>
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<td>Meux</td>
<td>Raths, Harmin &amp; Simon</td>
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Scheme III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Valuative-Subjective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Raths, Harmin &amp; Simon</td>
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39
In reviewing the above materials and approaches to value study you perhaps have felt more comfortable with some and less comfortable with others. This is to be expected, but it is also important to be aware of the value emphases implicit or explicit in all materials which you use. For this reason, it would be useful to take some text materials, newspaper articles, trade books, and curriculum project materials and classify them according to Schemes I, II and III above.

U.S. Households Shrink in Size

More single-parent families and more variety in living arrangements are among facts reported by Paul G. Glick, Senior Demographer in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, in Some Recent Changes in American Families.

The single-parent family is frequently a transition phase, during which a divorced parent seeks out a new marital partner, Glick reports. Four out of every five divorced persons eventually remarry.

Census figures for 1974 show that the average household size in the U.S. is shrinking and a growing number of small households consist of single-parent families, unmarried couples, or persons living entirely alone. The average household in the period from 1890 to 1910 consisted of five persons, whereas the 1974 average dipped fractionally below three persons, to 2.97.

The decrease in household size reflects mainly the longtime decline in fertility, Glick says, but also the fact that now more young adults live in apartments away from their parental home (or in apartments rather than college dormitories), and more elderly persons live apart from their adult children.

Train Young People in Selecting a Mate?

Glick offers a few suggestions for persons interested in improving American marriage and living arrangements:

1. Develop materials for training young people in how to select a marriage partner wisely and how to keep a marriage alive and healthy over a long period of time. The materials could be used in both home and school.

2. Design a scientifically tested and appealing system for bringing together young men and women so that they would have a much higher probability of establishing an enduring and satisfying marriage than can be expected through the almost universally haphazard system that now exists.

3. Encourage public acceptance of the concept of periodic marriage checkups--through visits to highly expert marriage counselors. As in the case of visits to a doctor, an urgent consultation might be sought when a seemingly dangerous marital condition is developing.
The 16-page pamphlet, which is in the Current Population Reports Special Studies Series P-23, No. 52, is the first in a series of analytical reports from the Census Bureau designed to aid in understanding statistics and in assessing their potential impact on public policy. (The Futurist, August, 1975, p. 181)

You have just read a statement from the magazine, The Futurist. You may want to get further information on the topic by sending to the Census Bureau as described in the above statement. As you reread the selection, try to place it on the three schema by asking the following questions of the author:

Does the selection describe, analyze or advocate a particular value position(s)?

Does the selection appeal to psychological or logical precepts?

Does the selection manifest a valuative-objective orientation or a valuative-subjective orientation?

Now take some issues such as amnesty, abortion, compulsory education, etc. and with peers see if you can use any of the above six approaches. As you work with value issues, and as you employ techniques taken from the six approaches delineated above try also to keep in mind the classification schema so that you have a firm conception of the direction and emphasis of the approach employed. In addressing issues, try to see "both" sides of the story even if you have to reverse roles with your colleague. Second, make sure that consequences of decision making are spelled out in as much detail as possible.

Let us now turn our attention to a complete process for developing understanding of value concepts. That is, how can we better answer questions such as . . . what is justice? . . . what is happiness? These are the kinds of concepts that are central to decision making in the drama of social education.

A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis

In a real sense, value study deals with the understanding that different people "see" the world through different "eyes," and knowledge of this phenomenon is necessary if students are to engage in meaningful decision-making, leading ultimately to a clearer conception of their own personal values. How can we
examine and understand our own value position? How do we undertake an investigation of value positions? (Can we study our own values directly or must it be done indirectly?) What kinds of explanatory models seem most appropriate to the task of value study?

In consideration of these questions, this discussion is organized in the following way. First of all, a brief delineation is made of the components needed to complement the present "state of the art" relative to value study in social studies education. These include an understanding of certain concept categories, the use of narrative explanation and the utilization of future-oriented stories for the investigation of an individual's value position. Second, an analysis is made of narrative explanation. An argument is made for the appropriateness of the narrative mode of explanation to the development of an understanding of values. In other words, narratives can give the investigator insight into the mental framework of the author and through the nature of language, which is metaphorical in construction, into the investigator's mental framework. Finally, an approach to value education will be outlined bringing into focus the use of narratives through which you can investigate value positions of the author of the narrative and/or actor(s) within the narrative. Using the value concept of justice as an example of the kinds of values that can be examined, "value profiles" of authors and/or actors described in the narratives can be constructed. It is argued that through these narratives you will be metaphorically constructing value profiles of your own mental framework vis a vis the concept of justice. The concept of justice is used because of its place of importance in western thought and its reoccurrence in utopia and dysutopia literature.

Value Approaches in Social Studies Education: Some Inadequacies

In many of the major social studies projects (Hartoonian, 1972, pp. 4-55), certain critical areas or concerns about the nature of concepts, the nature of language and the nature of people as future gazers were not adequately dealt with when values are discussed.
**Nature of Concepts.** Although this problem is discussed in more detail later, mention is here made of the overall dilemma—namely, the failure to distinguish between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts.

![Diagram showing concepts]

Concepts might be classified into the three categories depicted above: disclosure concepts, picture concepts and a third set made up of a mix between the two larger sets. The significant point in value study is that value concepts are disclosure in nature and cannot be approached in the same way one approaches a picture concept or a concept that carries the attributes of both disclosure and picture. One important difference between disclosure concepts and non-disclosure concepts is in the way one approaches or studies them. Non-disclosure concepts can be discovered. For example, the "law of gravity" can literally be discovered (created) through observation, or the "law of supply and demand" can be clearly presented to a student. Disclosure concepts, on the other hand, cannot be discovered, they must be revealed. That is, they must be brought out of "self" and displayed before any analysis or understanding can ensue.

**The Nature of Language.** Second, little attention has been given to the nature of (common) language which calls attention to metaphoric thought, narrative style and mythic constructs.

The true meaning of any philosophically significant word or phrase is disclosed by looking at the ways we habitually use it in talking about any situation in which it is naturally employed. There is no possibility of distinguishing profitably between meaning and use, and when in our philosophizing any such difference is assumed, we inevitably fall into error. It is both presumptuous and a distortion of our role to suppose that we can discover the sole proper definition of this or that fundamental concept, which will be superior to the network of meaning revealed in the ways in which it is used. (Burtt, 1967, p. 48)
One of the problems with present approaches to value study is the small amount of emphasis placed upon the use of ordinary human narrative. The dynamic character of language is such that attention to what is said can tell us a great deal. It can tell us many things about human experiences not visible to sight alone. It can draw ideas and objects together into a more consistent or logical fashion, and it can be helpful for continued intellectual growth. As we relate this phenomenon of dynamic language to the problem of concept categorization, it is noted that language usage affects values. An example of usage carrying with it certain values is the statement, "His brain is as quick and as accurate as a computer." This statement carries with it the false analogy that a computer and the human brain are similar. As a matter of fact, a whole new science has developed around this presupposition--the science known as cybernetics.

** The Nature of People as Future Gazers. Finally, the concept of people as future gazers tends to be overlooked by present approaches to value study. The point here is that our behavior is, to a large measure, a function of our scan of future alternatives. This means that although behavior may be shaped by past experiences, our view of tomorrow will also determine present actions and movements. Further, we project into the future those values which are most dear.

Thus, as we look at the present approaches to value study, there appears the need to complement these works in the areas of concept categorizations, distinguishing between the disclosure and non-disclosure sets; the nature of narrative (common language) and the nature of people as future gazers.

The Narrative in Social Science and History: Explanation Appropriate to Value Study

Traditionally, the technique of narrative has been categorized as applicable only to history, but there is no reason to limit the narrative in this manner for examples of the narrative can be found in the social sciences and the natural sciences as well as in history. Further, and of significant importance here, is
the fact that the layman uses narrative as a way of life; as a response to questions, or as he tries to "explain" his state of being. "What did you do in school today, son?" "Charlie, why are you going to invest all your savings in an unstable stock market?" "Well, John, what do you think of our President now?" Questions like these are asked everyday by citizens who in effect call upon narrative for explanation. In most cases the above questions will elicit a "story-like" response that places events in sequence and describes a change.

There seems to be a need for a mode of inquiry that can effectively pair the processes of description with the processes of explanation. Narrative is, or at least can be, unifying in that it is something in which all intelligent people indulge. It is true, of course, that intelligent people can indulge in many forms of explanation depending upon the nature of the questions asked. But, narrative seems to have a high propensity for use simply because explanation is tied to personal considerations and the narrative model seems historically to be more in keeping with human nature and human beings who are required to make more subjective decisions based upon accounts or stories or beliefs relative to the situation under consideration. Another way to put it is to suggest a continuum with scientific explanation on one end and narrative explanation on the other. This does not mean, by the way, that the one end is any better in terms of explanatory power than the other, it simply means that they are different and perform different functions in response to different questions. The argument here, however, is that in value study within social studies education a higher degree of emphasis should be placed upon the narrative end of the continuum simply because the questions raised tend to be more humanistic than scientific in nature.

The narrative is an accurate story about change. The narrative is also universal in that no one is without stories. Further, it is universal because no one is without mythic structure through which he or she "sees" the world and builds support for stories. The idea of story development through the use of some mental framework is basic to the larger concept of narrative explanation as it portrays
us as mythologizers. Thus, to come to grips with narrative explanation it is imperative that we understand the relationship between people and mythic thought. The narratives that we build are reflective of our mythic thought and it is this thought which holds promise for value study in that an understanding of mythic conceptions can lead to an understanding of value positions.

**Mythic Thought**

Throughout the study of mythic thought there appears always implicit and often explicit the notion that the mythic mentality is significantly different from and inferior to scientific thought or empirical thought. It reflects an incomplete and inaccurate view of people and their relations to the various determining elements and forces of life. Irrational in nature and simplistic in design, myth represents the baser element of our thought. Such a view itself reflects some of those same supposed inadequacies attributable to mythic thought. For instance, it fails to see in the operations of people at any time a sustaining drive for system and order and that system and order's relating to fundamental exigencies of a given context within which we must function. A contemporary science educator observed that the evolution of scientific thought is marked by stages in which one set of lies replaces another set as the theoretical framework from which scientific study operates. In a persuasive argument, T. S. Kuhn lends support to this premise with an elaboration of the nature of scientific evolvement:

...scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the explorations of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 92)

In the sense that scientific thought is often posited as the opposite of mythic, the above observation offers an interesting insight. The evolution of scientific thought as a series of tradition bound periods punctuated by occasionally serious breaks, rather than a simple piling-up of scientific knowledge is a revolutionary idea.
Symbolization is the essence of all thinking and as such knows no bounds which keeps it from pervading all cultural forms, scientific theories, social models and exemplars. Language itself is only one attribute of the mythic extensions of symbolic forms and serves to reinforce the broader and more subtle thrusts of that principle.

Before moving ahead to a delineation of a disclosure approach to value analysis, it might be useful to restate the significance of narrative explanation and mythic thought to this type of value study. First of all, it should be pointed out that mythic thought is the structure upon which one develops a narrative. And, a careful look at the narrative can make explicit certain mythic structures or value positions of the author. It is this manifestation of a value position that will provide the foundation upon which to build a value study approach that will, because of the metaphoric nature of language, ultimately allow the investigator to make manifest his or her own value position.

Components of a Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis

A disclosure approach\(^2\) to value analysis has the following six important components: The explanatory power of the narrative and concomitant mythic thought of the author, the use of metaphor, the nature of value concepts, the construction and use of value continua, the development of a value profile, and the augmentation of the personal definitions of a value concept. These components, in turn, suggest a useful process or procedure for the investigation and clarification of personal values. What is described below is a process for dealing with values that is consistent with the nature of value concepts, as well as the nature of languages. This approach will take you through certain
processes (experiences) that will allow you to augment your concept of justice. To be sure, other value concepts will also be clarified, but the primary concern is the development of an individual, personal value profile (value position) that will help you to better understand the general value concept of justice in juxtaposition to your own value profile. The processes involved in this approach include:

1. Recognition of a disclosure concept. It is imperative that teachers and students be able to recognize disclosure concepts from non-disclosure concepts. Such concepts as God, love, happiness, sportsmanship, citizenship and justice are examples of disclosure concepts that call attention to this procedure.

2. Use of Metaphor. The recognition of a disclosure concept calls for the use of metaphoric analysis, since disclosure concepts will not allow for direct personal investigation. That is, if an individual is to come to a clearer understanding of his or her own position vis a vis a disclosure concept, they will need to approach the concept metaphorically. This does not mean that disclosure concepts have no attributes that are held in common; it simply suggests that a very effective way to think about disclosures is through the use of metaphor since many attributes are not held in common.

3. Narrative explanation. Since metaphoric analysis is the appropriate mode through which the study of disclosure concepts can be facilitated, it is the narrative which can provide metaphorically rich situations for analysis; particularly narratives about the future.

4. Value continua. A series of value continua is suggested which, after being explained to students, will provide a schema for plotting the "value profile" of the person or group discussed in the narrative.
5. Constructing a value profile. You can construct a value profile from the three value continua provided in the disclosure approach to value analysis.

6. Value profiles and the concept of justice. Finally, you can consider the value profile which you constructed from the narrative using the three continua with general definitions of justice.

Disclosure Concepts

Disclosure concepts see no intrinsic positive value in reductionism—that desire to quantify all phenomena; suggesting that if "n" is quantifiable it is good; and if "n" is non-quantifiable it is bad. They also see no positive value in suggesting that social scientists are just a few years behind mathematicians and natural scientists and they will soon "catch up" if they (the social scientists) only learn to be better quantifiers. The point of difference between disclosure concepts and non-disclosure concepts is that they ask a different question about the nature of people. That question, simply stated, asks whether or not the subjective nature of the human being is appropriate to the picture model of explanation—e.g., the objectifiable, quantifiable model of reductionism. To observe people as fitting into this picture of reductionism belies many characteristics of being human and reduces explanation relative to human behavior to such levels of simplicity which ultimately renders them useless. Take, for example, the two concepts of "act" and "movement." As Ramsey suggests, by treating act and movement as synonymous (or indeed, not bringing up the distinction in the first place) we can overlook the distinction between participant and observer. "To act is to participate; but what the observer observes and all he observes is movement—more or less complex, more or less expressible in roles. But to participate and to observe are rarely equivalent—to participate in a kiss, for example, is vastly different from merely observing one." (Ramsey, 1964, p. 25)
The point of this argument is, of course, that there is a need in any approach or model that deals with people to provide insight into ourselves. This claim suggests that there is no observable data that can ever be adequate in social explanation. Ramsey suggests that this claim is justified because:

...this insight into ourselves, this self-disclosure, is the source for each of us of that subjectivity which is logically demanded by the objectivity of all the behavioralists' data. There can--and it is a logical "can"--be no objects without a subject which cannot itself be reducible to objects. (Ramsey, 1964, p. 26)

In making the point another way, it can be argued that the concept of "organism" is out of place with human explanation. Peter Winch raises the question this way: "Would it be intelligent to try to explain how Romeo's love for Juliet enters into his behavior in the same terms as we might want to apply to the rat whose sexual excitement makes him run across an electrically charged grid to reach his mate? Does not Shakespeare do this much better?"

A Disclosure Approach to Value Analysis: Operations and Procedures

Again, it should be noted that the present approach to value analysis calls attention to four kinds of considerations on the part of the teacher:

1. the nature of disclosure;
2. the utility of metaphoric thought;
3. the explanatory power of the narrative; and
4. the clarification potential of value criteria.

Let's apply the process now taking account of the fact that we are mainly interested in value concept clarification and definition--in this case the concept of justice.

The procedures for this approach can be listed as follows:

1. An explanation of the value continua is given. The teacher may want to use the five clarification questions that are listed blow. If these questions are used, the class should be divided into groups of about five members each. The teacher can then discuss each continuum (each continuum is discussed in detail below) with the students. The five questions are then passed out to the students who are now working in a small group. Each group must come to a consensus true or false answer to each question. The discussion in the small groups should help students further define the end points in each continuum.
2. Second, the narrative (metaphor) is presented and the students are asked to pay particular attention to the person or group within the narrative who is under study.

3. Next, the student is asked to place the person or group from the narrative on the three criteria, constructing a "value profile" for the actor(s).

4. Finally, the student is asked to compare the "value profile" of the actor(s) with given definitions of justice—for example: an appropriate division of social advantages or rights and responsibilities.

This approach operates, then, in four phases. Phase one presents an explanation of the three criteria and suggests the use of a series of true-false questions which are related to each of the three categories of the classification scheme for value analysis. These questions are considered and answered through consensus within small (student) groups. This exercise is carried out before the model is applied to any narrative so students can clarify any definitional problems that might subsequently interfere with the functioning of the model. The questions will also serve as discussion starters.

Phase two encompasses the application of the three continua to a narrative. The narrative reflects the mythic thought of the author and/or actor(s) described therein. In Phase three of the approach the student is asked to formulate a "value profile" (make visible a disclosure) for the author, actor or actors (and metaphorically for himself) and in Phase four the student will compare his constructed "value profile" with the general value concept of justice.

A Classification Scheme for Value Analysis Utilizing Clarification Questions for Use in Small Groups

I. self (mutual respect and trust) orientation

| self orientation toward obedience and punishment |
|orientation toward universal and logical principles or conscience|

Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself in a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-accepted
principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of mutual respect and trust?

True-False

1. An individual can behave only in accordance with personal well being.

2. There is appreciably no difference between principles of personal conscience and principles of norm conformity when decisions are made.

3. It is more just to base behavior upon principles of mutual respect and trust than on principles of obedience.

4. It is easier to live with self-condemnation than it is to live with group condemnation.

5. It is more likely that an individual will be more creative, and therefore, more human, if he adheres more closely to universal principles or conscience than to social rules or role behavior.

II.

**situational**

(honesty in a particular situation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>general</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(honesty)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself in consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or implicit set of rules, or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to modes of conduct?

True-False

1. Always adhering to a mode of conduct, for example, "always honest," is consistent with the highest values of human dignity and worth.

2. It is impossible to establish rules of conduct for future situations.

3. The behavior that is most consistent with human dignity and worth is behavior that is situational in nature—that is, following no pre-established modes of conduct.

4. If an individual's behavior is situational relative to particular modes of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that he is following the dictates of his conscience and not the dictates of the group.

5. Since we live in a society that is constantly changing, it is important that we become flexible and situational in our ethical positions.
III.

Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself toward an established (explicitly or implicitly) goal; or is the behavior more consistent with personal conduct which may or may not help in the attainment of said goal?

True-False

1. If a goal such as equality, freedom or salvation is, in reality, unobtainable, it makes little sense to pattern behavior toward the achievement of such goals.

2. Modes of personal conduct are always dependent upon goals.

3. Goals are always dependent upon modes of personal conduct.

4. Societal goals are always generalized personal goals.

5. Modes of conduct based upon principles of norm conformity are more consistent (and beneficial) to societal goals than those modes of conduct which are based upon principles of conscience.

The purpose of this series of true-false questions is, of course, to foster the kinds of discussion that will draw attention to the spectrum of intra and interpersonal values that abound within individuals and within groups of individuals. Second, they will make personally manifest various value perceptions that are held relative to the three continua. It is argued that this experience of self-searching is prerequisite to the application of the model to a narrative. It is important to place significant emphasis upon discussion for it provides the opportunity to foster clearer understandings of value positions.

As for the use of the value continua, let us now consider them individually and then as a functioning whole. First, however, the question of rationale for continuum usage needs to be discussed. We can consider the (use of) continuum as a method of analysis which calls attention to three important and related attributes. First,
there is the quality of "dynamic logic." That is, the continuum offers a logic which can handle continuous change. By suggesting that human nature is too subtle for Aristotelian logic, the claim can be made that there is a demand for a law of the included middle; e.g., a thing can be both p and not-p. Second, the continuum provides a setting for the use of metaphoric thought which helps us view the world from different vantage points. It also helps us pair different ideas, which can reflect fresh synthesis and new insights into the nature of value incongruencies that exist in our lives. Finally, there is the attribute of humanism which suggests that value (human) analysis demands a command of the whole scale (as opposed to a single value) of motives and values before a given event, person or situation can be realistically evaluated.

At any rate, humanism is an effort to place all doctrinal on an appropriate scale, to see it in relation and in degree instead of as isolate truth or vagrant error, to provide a perspective in which dualistic aspects may again be seen as aspects of a whole--the organic whole that is the included middle. The yes and no constantly asserted in daily behavior are naturally translated into right and wrong, good and bad; but we can make choices without becoming Manichaeans. (Muller, 1962, pp 36-37)

Value Profiles

An important aspect of the disclosure approach is the delineation of a value profile of an individual or group under consideration, and ultimately, to illuminate the value profile of the investigator to himself or herself. A value profile is a value position viewed by the investigator using the classification schemes of the three continua. Value profiles may be consistent as an actor moves from one situation to another, or they might be changeable or relationally inconsistent. The only claim here is that the investigator using the model should be able to locate the actor on the three continua and obtain a "view" of his or her values in situation S.

The use of the continua (seen normally as quantifying tools) might seem out of place when dealing with a disclosure concept, but there is in all disclosure concepts some degree of commonality that will allow for communication. Concept "commonalities" can be advanced through this disclosure approach and this is the only claim made relative to "operational definitions," that is, the clarification of those attributes held in common or consistent with a definition based upon an intellectual or cultural heritage.
A further consideration of this approach has to do with its ultimate usefulness relative to helping students discuss and, hopefully, come to a better understanding of the nature of justice—that ultimate virtue or moral principle upon which our present values of equality, fairness, reason, rightfulness and righteousness are derivatives. The position taken here is that acquaintance with the concept of virtue as a drawing out process calls attention to exposing value conflicts.

The first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of creating dissatisfaction in the student about his present knowledge of the good. This we do experimentally by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose him to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers. (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 82)

A disclosure approach for value analysis should ultimately, then, help the student reveal and see his or her value profile of justice. The demand for a "clear picture" of justice, thus, seems to imply that there is some conception in which all applications of the work meet like lines converging to a common center, or, in more concrete terms, that there is some principle whereby human life might be so organized that there would exist a just society composed of just people. A society so composed and organized would be ideal, in the sense that it would offer a standard of perfection by which all existing societies might be measured and appraised according to the degrees in which they fell short of it. Any proposed reform, moreover, might be judged by its tendency to bring us nearer to, or further from this ideal. Justice, of course, is at the center of most philosophical questions dealt with by western writers, and self-disclosure of the concept is important to our society. The concept of justice, then, will serve as the focal point around which this disclosure approach will be applied.

Let us now look at the individual facets of each continuum.

I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>self orientation</th>
<th>other person orientation (mutual respect and trust) orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>orientation toward obedience and punishment</td>
<td>orientation toward universal and logical principles or conscience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself in a commitment to personal wants and avoidance of punishment or in self-accepted principles and a concomitant concern with the establishment of mutual respect and trust?

Continuum #1 reflects the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who has analyzed moral conduct and has constructed the following three levels and six stages:

**Level I--Premoral**

Stage 1 - Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2 - Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally other's. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

**Level II--Conventional Role Conformity**

Stage 3 - Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior and judgment of intentions.

Stage 4 - Authority and social-order-maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.

**Level III--Self-Accepted Moral Principles**

Stage 5 - Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Stage 6 - Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust. (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 7)

In the Kohlberg schema, the individual makes decisions in terms of personal wants and avoidance of punishment. He then seeks approval by conforming to norms and authority for their own sake. If and when he matures, he develops self-accepted principles and is concerned with the establishment of mutual trust and respect.
Kohlberg's analysis of moral development suggests that the teaching of values is a matter of helping individuals grow into increasingly advanced stages of personal organization, enabling them to mediate their needs and those of others. Kohlberg sees a direct interrelationship between value education and personal development. The attractiveness of defining the goal of moral education as the stimulation of development rather than as teaching fixed virtues is that it means aiding the child to take the next step in a direction toward which he is already tending, rather than imposing an alien pattern upon him. (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 19)

No claim is made here of moving the individual toward "higher levels of moral development." Although this might, indeed, happen, the purpose of this continuum of the model is to help the investigator determine the "value position" of the actor(s) under investigation, and ultimately his or her own (the investigator's) value position with respect to Continuum #1. The hope is that through the investigation of value positions the individual will come to appreciate the various positions from which any situation can be judged and, perhaps, ultimately develop ideals that embrace alternative positions and give a basis for action. Seeing alternative value positions in the narratives under study, the individual will be less inclined to see (and adopt) value positions as rigid, simplistic rule systems. The student will, on the other hand, be better able to build concepts that accommodate different stances or provide negotiation among them. He or she will also be more willing to see himself or herself as a transactor within the complexity of situations that is the milieu of life.

In dealing with the dichotomy of self- (obedience and punishment) orientation and other person (mutual trust and respect) orientation, it is important to discuss some of the mutual influences that exist between the individual and the group. One's first impression is to suggest that all behavior is based upon principles of personal conscience, as all decisions are personal. Or, as Allport (1924) suggested, there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. This, however, belies the research of many persons such as Lewin that suggests a great deal of behavioral influence in exerted by "the group."
If recognition of the existence of an entity depends upon this entity's showing properties or constancies of its own, the judgment about what is real should be affected by changes in the possibility of demonstrating social properties. The taboo against believing in the existence of a social entity is probably most effectively broken by handling this entity experimentally... (Lewin, 1947, pp. 5-41)

One can always ask, when does personal orientation become group oriented? And, when does group oriented behavior become personal? Analysis begins, for our purposes, here when distinctions can be made between the concept of self- (obedience and punishment) orientation and the other (mutual respect and trust) orientation. First of all, we must state that an individual's ability to experience, to decide and to even control his own behavior is dependent in many subtle and involuntary ways on his or her relationships with other people. (Hare, 1962, pp. 191-265)

This means, of course, that individual behavior is a function of group involvement -- yet it is just that, and only that -- a function of group involvement. In every instance the individual must call upon innate mental faculties in response to decisions that must be made. Two factors make individual involvement significant: (1) each individual has a unique personal history and (2) unique innate mental abilities. Thus, in any action (or thought) the fact of personal uniqueness is a factor, and although behaviors of individuals can, indeed, must, be viewed against the backdrop of group norms, the ability to obtain a better or clearer view of a person's value profile depends on seeing the actor as an individual in relationship to others. As we make decisions (live from day to day) we can develop a picture of reliance on self versus reliance on the group. This knowledge will also allow us to make better predictions relative to the actor's future behavior. When this continuum is used with the other two continua of this approach, we may have more clues relative to the actor's future behavior. Ultimately, when this continuum is used with the other two continua of this approach, we may have more clues relative to the actor's conception of the moral principle of justice. Beyond this, of course, the process of studying the actor in this way (as applied in a narrative situation) will help in clarifying the investigator's value position relative to his or her orientation toward mutual respect and trust on the one hand versus orientation toward obedience and punishment.
on the other. It is suggested that this knowledge should help in illuminating the investigator’s concept of the moral principle of justice.

II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>situational</th>
<th>general</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(honesty in a particular situation)</td>
<td>(honesty)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself in consistent adherence (at all times and in all places) to a particular explicit or implicit set of rules; or is the behavior contextual or situational relative to modes of conduct?

This second continuum is related to and expands the analysis which began with Continuum #I. In the first continuum the investigator defines the point that separates an individual's commitment to principles of personal conscience from that individual's allegiance to principles of norm conformity.

Continuum #II represents analysis from another vantage point by taking the notion of personal versus group value claims and viewing these value claims from a situational versus a general position (relativism--universalism). The dichotomy suggested by Continuum #II might best be stated in two questions. What should I (the actor) do now? What, in general, are the reasons for this action now? These questions should not be seen as mutually exclusive; for as was stated above, a moral principle is not only a rule of action but also a reason for action. There is also the consideration of a middle ground (as the continuum suggests) between allegiance to general rules or principles and some kind of individual, situational choice. It can be argued, of course, that even existential "choice" is based upon some moral system which the individual accepts.

The present continuum places emphasis upon the concept of reason as an important criteria for judging an actor's preference for general versus situational commitment. That is, in placing an actor or group of actors on Continuum #II, it is imperative that problems of justification not be ignored. To argue for a particular position
means to argue toward consistency with generally held values.

It follows, however, that an actor can also opt for situational positions in his or her value choice. But, to be rational (as the term is used here) involves a willingness and the skill to weigh that value choice in the light of general societal (group) values. And, vice versa, an actor can opt for a general position in his or her value choice, but, again, is rational only when willing to examine that value choice in the light of a situational orientation.

Thus, analysis through Continuum #II can occur only when the narrative provides argument of the type that calls attention to the ethical basis of value controversy, e.g., the desire on the part of the actor(s) to persuade an audience that his or her position is consistent with the general values or principles of all people (or at least consistent with the general values of the group he or she is trying to persuade).

...important reasons exist for not abandoning the search for consistent application of general principles. First, principles used to justify action may be impossible to eradicate from memory. Whether we like it or not, principles of justice seem to remain in our nervous systems. The question becomes "How should such principles be used?" We could also argue that many situations do not differ in the most relevant or salient aspect of moral choice--both the American Revolution and Negro rebellion concern basic human rights and how best to attain them. Making explicit such commonalities among issues helps to clarify the issue over which people disagree. Comparing situations and testing whether principles of the past can be applied consistently does not necessarily make one a slave to accepting past principles. On the contrary, comparing and distinguishing among situations stimulates rejecting some principles as irrelevant, qualifying others as not sufficiently complete to deal with the new situation, and accepting others as adequate in some instances, no matter how "old" the rules or principles might be...Finally, our commitment to rationality, by definition, inevitably leads us to be concerned with consistency and general principles, but it also commits us to making qualifications and fine distinctions that often in effect totally reject many "general principles" that the situationist would evidently prefer not to consider at all. (Newmann, 1970, pp. 103-104)

Continuum #II then, allows the investigator to determine the value claim of an actor(s) in light of the actor's ability to deal rationally with said value claim, and to place the actor(s) on the scale between the end points of commitment to situational values and commitment to general values.
III.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>modes of conduct</th>
<th>goal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(major goals in a person's life which may or may not be end states of existence)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the behavior of the actor(s) (including what he or she says) manifest itself toward an established (explicitly or implicitly) goal; or is the behavior more consistent with personal conduct which may or may not help in the attainment of said goal?

With Continuum #III we expand further the disclosure approach for value analysis bringing into consideration the complex notion of goals. The concept of goals (goal oriented behavior) rests upon a consideration of alternatives--alternative and conflicting goals, as well as various modes of conduct.

Clearly, we have occasions in life when decisions have to be made not only between or among conflicting goals, but also between goals and modes of conduct (or stating it differently between instrumental and terminal values). There may be times when certain modes of conduct (honesty, cleanliness) are dysfunctional to certain goals (becoming rich, joining a hippie commune)--and to better understand the rationality or lack of rationality that is made manifest by an actor's decision is most germane to this continuum. The distinction and relationship between modes of conduct and ends or goals might best be explained in the following two examples.

Consider the building of a bird house as an expressed end of having a bird house. The ordering of activities is irrelevant as long as the end (a built bird house) is achieved. Clearly, this is a goal that stands apart from an ordering of activities. To be sure, it might be more advantageous to saw the boards before one applies paint, but this is simply technique and not a matter of construction law. Next, consider a dance. The activities related to the dance and their ordering; e.g., rhythm, steps and mood are not instrumental to the dance; they are the dance. This end-state is one with (and logically consistent) the mode of conduct or an ordering of activities.

Continuum #III should allow the investigator to determine between these two types of
ends--conduct relationships and simultaneously develop insights into the nature of goals--rational ends.

Taken together, these three continua when applied to a narrative, can provide an analytical framework which can make manifest the actor's and the investigator's value profile, and to see that value profile in relation to the moral principle of justice. No claim is made relative to changing value positions of investigators toward any predetermined goal. All that can be said is that it should help clarify value positions of actors under consideration in relationship to the three continua and through this process a clearer and more realistic view of the investigator's values should emerge.

Three final points need to be made relative to this approach. First of all, it is assumed that the three continua will not be seen to apply equally in all narrative situations. For example, in any given narrative it might be the case that only one or perhaps two of the continua are applicable. However, in those situations where all three continua can be used, it is assumed that this will be done. Second, it is again reiterated that the main function of this model is to illuminate the "value position" of the actor under investigation, and ultimately, the value position of the investigator.

Finally, there is the question: "What value profile (position on the three continua) is most consistent with the concept of justice as defined above?" The following diagram is suggested as the optimum value profile vis a vis the concept of justice.

I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>self orientation</th>
<th>other person (mutual respect and trust) orientation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>situational (honesty in a particular situation)</th>
<th>general (honesty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The reason for the above placement rests on arguments presented above. For example, the position on Continuum #I (other people oriented) calls attention to the principle of justice as an obligation (moral) to respect the right or claim of another person. The position on Continuum #II (general or universalism value position) calls attention to the principle of justice as an obligation to rationality involving the willingness and skill to weigh value choices in the light of general societal values. The location on Continuum #III (midway between terminal and instrumental values) calls attention to the principle of justice as both a reason for action (goal or terminal value) and a rule of action (mode of conduct or instrumental value). Justice implies a balance of the two notions of reason and rule.

A disclosure approach to value analysis attempts to deal with the symbolic activities of people. It attempts to illustrate a non-picture, and thus, becomes an adequate conceptual tool useful in comprehending human values in all their variety and richness. A disclosure approach to value study also suggests a new philosophical synthesis among such concepts as subjective, descriptive, psychological and logical. Above all, this new synthesis calls attention to the heterogeneity of the human organism, individually and collectively. It posits the notion that value(s) cannot be adequately explained any more than the process of cultural function can, without a careful consideration of individual and collective human being, including his and her total cultural and physical environment. Any other position will ultimately yield a study of values which is no study at all, but a sterile catalog of value forms or techniques.

One basic argument of this approach has been the contention that people are both structured and structuring animals whose concepts are developed and augmented not
only by outside stimuli, but more importantly, perhaps, by inward or mental mythic thought or paradigms that shape the outside world. A second argument has been the metaphoric nature of language and the explanatory power of the narrative for finding out about "self." In other words, through a narrative study of an actor we see not only said actor but also ourselves mirrored in the actor's words and behavior. Finally, the argument was presented that a fundamental difference exists between disclosure and non-disclosure concepts and one appropriate mode for the study of disclosure concepts is the use of value continua; developed out of a consideration for the meaning of "value." In focus, then, the point of value study vis a vis value continua, as here developed, calls attention to the need to come to some self-understanding of value (disclosure) concepts. Value concepts, such as justice, happiness or love, often mean so many different things to different individuals that they tend to leave one in that state of mind which suggests that "the concept that means everything conveys no meaning at all." Thus, the need for concept clarification through value continua is posited as consistent with the nature of disclosure concepts and the need to clarify said concepts in order to communicate more effectively and to develop self-meaning.

Now that you have had an opportunity to review some of the theoretical foundations of a disclosure approach to value study, take the following narrative by John Kennedy and place Sam Houston on the three continua. You may want to work in small groups or as individuals in developing the value profile for Sam Houston. However, it is important to discuss the several value profiles after they have been presented to the class.

Your assignment at the end of this exercise, of course, will be to assess the actor (Sam Houston) in terms of his consistency to the general value concept of justice.

Sam Houston

The first rays of dawn were streaking into the ill-lit Senate chamber of 1854 as one final speaker rose to seek recognition. Weary, haggard and unshaven Senators, slumped despondently in their chairs after the rigors
of an all-night session, muttered "Vote, Vote" in the hopes of discouraging any further oratory on a bill already certain of passage. But Senator Sam Houston of Texas, the hero of San Jacinto, was not easily discouraged by overwhelming odds; and as his deep, musical voice carried the bold if unpolished words of a powerful message to his astonished colleagues, they shook off the dull stupor which had deadened their fatigued brains and sat upright and attentive.

The bill on which bitter and exhausting debate now closed was known as the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the new "unity" device of the Democratic party and the latest concession to the South. It repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and reopened the slavery extension issue thought settled in the Compromise of 1850, by permitting the residents of that vast territory from Iowa to the Rockies to decide the slavery question for themselves, on the assumption that the northern part of the territory would be free and the southern part slave. For Democrats and Southerners, this bill had become "must" legislation.

Sam Houston was a Democrat of long standing. And Sam Houston was a Southerner by birth, residence, loyalty and philosophy. But Sam Houston was also Sam Houston, one of the most independent, unique, popular, forceful and dramatic individuals ever to enter the Senate chamber. The first Senator from Texas, his name had long before been a household word as Commander in Chief of those straggling and undermanned Texas volunteers who routed the entire Mexican Army at San Jacinto, captured its general and established the independence of Texas. He had been acclaimed as the first President of the Independent Republic of Texas, a Member of her Congress, and President again before the admission of Texas into the Union as a state. He was no easy mark at the age of sixty-four, and neither sectional nor party ties were enough to seal his lips.

Sam Houston looked upon the Missouri Compromise, which he had supported in 1820 as a youthful Congressman from Tennessee, as a solemn and sacred compact between North and South, in effect a part of the Constitution when Texas was admitted into the Union. Nor was he willing to discard the Compromise of 1850, which he had supported despite the enmity of Texas fire-eaters who called his vote "the damnest outrage yet committed upon Texas." With rugged, homely but earnest eloquence, he begged his weary colleagues in an impromptu plea not to plunge the nation into new agitations over the slavery issue.

Sam Houston must have known the bill would pass, he must have known that not a single other Southern Democrat would join him, he must have known that, as rumor of his position had spread the previous week, the Richmond Enquirer had spoken for his constituents in declaring, "Nothing can justify this treachery; nor can anything save the traitor from the deep damnation which such treason may merit." But, standing erect, his chin thrust forward, picturesque if not eccentric in his military cloak and pantherskin waistcoat (at times he appeared in a vast sombrero and Mexican blanket), Sam Houston, the "magnificent barbarian," made one of his rare speeches to a weary but attentive Senate:

This is an eminently perilous measure; and do you expect me to remain here silent, or to shrink from the discharge of my duty in admonishing the South of what I conceive the results will be? I will speak in spite of all the intimidations, or threats, or discountenances that may be thrown upon me. Sir,
the charge that I am going with the Abolitionists or Free-Soilers affects me not. The discharge of conscious duty prompts me often to confront the united array of the very section of the country in which I reside, in which my associations are, in which my affections rest...Sir, if this is a boon that is offered to propitiate the South, I, as a Southern man, repudiate it. I will have none of it...Our children are either to live in after times in the enjoyment of peace, of harmony, and prosperity, or the alternative remains for them of anarchy, discord, and civil broil. We can avert the last. I trust we shall...I adjure you to regard the contract once made to harmonize and preserve this Union. Maintain the Missouri Compromise! Stir not up agitation! Give us peace!

"It was," Houston was later to remark, "the most unpopular vote I ever gave (but) the wisest and most patriotic." Certainly it was the most unpopular. When old Sam had first journeyed to the Senate, the baby-new state of Texas was primarily concerned with railroad, land, debt and boundary questions, without particularly strong Southern ties. But now, Texas with 150,000 valuable slaves and an overwhelmingly Democratic population consisting largely of citizens from other Southern states, identified its interests with those Houston had attacked; and with near unanimity, she cried for Houston's scalp as one who had "betrayed his state in the Senate," "joined the Abolitionists" and "deserted the South." By a vote of 73 to 3 the Legislature applauded Houston's colleague for supporting the Nebraska Bill, and condemned the stand of him who was once the most glorious hero the state had ever known. The Democratic State Convention denounced the great warrior as "not in accordance with the sentiments of the Democracy of Texas." The Dallas Herald demanded that Houston resign the seat to which Texas had proudly sent him, instead of "retaining a position he has forfeited by misrepresenting them...Let him heed for once the voice of an outraged, misrepresented, and betrayed constituency, so that Texas may for once have a united voice and present an undivided front in the Senate."

To make matters worse, this was not the first offense for Senator Sam Houston, merely--as described by the indignant Clarksville Standard--"the last feather that broke the camel's back." He had tangled with John Calhoun on the Oregon question, describing himself as a Southerner for whom "the Union was his guiding star," and who had "no fear that the North would seek to destroy the South notwithstanding the papers signed by old men and women and pretty girls." "The South has been beaten by the South--if united, she would have conquered!" cried an influential Dixie paper when Calhoun rebuked Houston and Benton for providing the winning margin for his opponents. But Sam Houston would only reply: "I know neither North nor South; I know only the Union."

He would have nothing to do, moreover, with Calhoun's "hands-off" slavery resolutions and "Southern Address," attacking that revered sage of the South for his "long-cherished and ill-concealed designs against the Union," and insisting to the Senate that he, Sam Houston, was "on this floor representative of the whole American people." But the Texas Legislature adopted Calhoun's resolutions, and cast a suspicious eye on the ambitious former President of Texas whose name was being mentioned, in the North as well as the South, for the White House in 1852 or 1856.
Finally, Houston had been the first prominent Senator to attack Calhoun's opposition to the Clay Compromise of 1850, quoting the Scripture to label those threatening secession as mere "raging waves of sea, foaming out their own shame."

Think you, sir, after the difficulties Texams have encountered to get into the Union, that you can whip them out of it? No, sir... we shed our blood to get into it... We were among the last to come into the Union, and being in, we will be the last to get out... I call on the friends of the Union from every quarter to come forward like men, and to sacrifice their differences upon the common altar of their country's good, and to form a bulwark around the Constitution that cannot be shaken. It will require manly efforts, sir, and they must expect to meet with prejudices that will assail them from every quarter. They must stand firm to the Union, regardless of all personal consequences.

Thus his lonely vote against the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, on that stormy dawn in 1854, was indeed the "last straw." It was loudly whispered about the Senate that this was the last term for the colorful General. Those illustrious Senators with whom he had served, whose oratory could not attract the glory and romance which surrounded the name of Sam Houston, may have frowned upon his eccentric dress and his habit of whittling pine sticks on the Senate floor while muttering at the length of senatorial speeches. But they could not help but admire his stoical courage and rugged individualism, which his preface to a brief autobiographical sketch expressed more simply: "This book will lose me some friends. But if it lost me all and gained none, in God's name, as I am a free man, I would publish it..." (Profiles in Courage, John F. Kennedy, 1956, pp. 121-126)

Develop a value profile for Sam Houston based on the above narrative.

I.

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<th>self orientation</th>
<th>other person orientation</th>
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II.

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III.

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<tr>
<th>goal (terminal values)</th>
<th>modes of personal conduct (instrumental values)</th>
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Defend your value profile of Sam Houston in terms of your understanding of the concept of justice.

Although emphasis is placed upon the concept of justice, a disclosure approach to value analysis can also be applied to other value concepts such as happiness, success, kindness, etc. It might be interesting, for example, to develop an "optimum value profile position" for happiness similar to the one developed above for the concept of justice.

What is the optimum value profile for happiness?

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Defend your answers.

As with the value profile for justice, each of us should have an opportunity to discuss, compare and contrast our value profile with value profiles of others. Hopefully, through group processes, we will have an opportunity to come to a better understanding of the value concept under investigation.
Footnotes

1 Mythic thought and myth are separate concepts with some common but many different attributes. Our concern, here, is with mythic thought as opposed to mythical thought.

2 It is upon an expansion of the semantical model that this value analysis approach is based (see Kaplan, 1964, and Ramsey, 1964).

3 Future oriented narratives or historical novels are suggested for use with this approach.

4 Or set of principles.

5 X is good in itself.

6 X is good because it leads to Y.

7 Here again, the point of discussion is self-awareness and students must operate in an atmosphere of trust. The student must be free to "expose" his conceptions to others.

8 Socrates suggests that virtue cannot be taught—however, The Republic makes manifest the nature of virtue as a disclosure concept obtainable through analogy and questioning.

9 For a more thorough discussion of the relativism—universalism dilemma, see Clarifying Public Controversy by Fred Newmann, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970, Chapter 4.

References


Informational Notes on Projects Analyzed in This Chapter

Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools

Sociological Resources for Secondary Schools is an outgrowth of the work of the Committee on the Social Studies Curriculum in American Secondary Schools of the American Sociological Association, and was funded by the National Science Foundation in August, 1964. The initial two years of the project's work were conducted at Dartmouth College under the direction of Robert A. Feldmesser. In 1966, the headquarters were moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the directorship passed to Robert C. Angell, sociologist at the University of Michigan.

Largely because the Committee of the ASA felt that the substance and methodology of sociology were not sufficiently evident in the existing secondary school curriculum, the project was designed "...to develop instructional materials of high quality that will accurately reflect the character of sociology as a scientific discipline and that will be suitable for use in secondary school courses in sociology, history, problems of democracy, and other subjects." Initially, the project did not opt for a separate sociology course in the high school, but for the inclusion of its "episodes" in the history and problems courses which at one time or another involve most, if not all, of the pupils in the high school.

The development of the episodes constitutes the first priority of the project. Each episode package is self-contained, and encompasses approximately ten class periods. An episode treats a limited topic deemed by the project staff as important for students to learn. Other criteria utilized in the selection of episodes are interest and significance for sociology, availability of relevant data, and adaptability to the student's skill potential for utilizing problem-solving skills and modes of analysis. Approximately forty such episodes will be developed during the life of the project with field-testing and evaluation of the first twenty during the 1967-68 school year. Episodes will be published in groups of ten beginning in the fall of 1968.


A second phase of the project is the development of a model sociology course, Inquiries in Sociology, for grades eleven or twelve. The course which is now being field-tested will "...comprise a systematic cumulation of sociological principles and concepts, and will emphasize an inductive approach to teaching." Although the body of the course will be one semester, it could become a full year's course by utilizing a number of selected episodes.


3 Ibid.
Harvard Social Studies Project

The work of the Harvard Project, which commenced in 1956 under private financing, received a contract from the USOE for the five-year period 1963-68. Under the leadership of Donald W. Oliver, the project has concentrated upon the development of a social studies curriculum based upon inquiry and the analysis of public issues. Among the social studies projects, this one is unique in its emphasis upon the analysis of values and value conflicts. In 1966, selected aspects of the complete report of the project were published commercially.

...The experimental curriculum was organized in three phases: the development of a conceptual framework for handling public issues, a study of the background and principles of American Constitutionalism, and problem units to which the former two were applied. Students were taught to apply an analytic model to controversial cases implicit in broad societal issues, and to face the dilemmas with which individuals are confronted in making decisions. In the process, the student is required to compare his own solutions to "legitimate" social solutions. The authors have labeled this general interweaving of the legal, ethical, governmental, historical, and contemporary questions as jurisprudential teaching.

In the spring of 1967, instructional materials developed by the project became available on the commercial market. Units dealing with the American Revolution, the Railroad Era, Religious Freedom, the Rise of Organized Labor, and Negro Views of America were among the first released to the public. The units employ original and created narratives, games, role-playing activities, analogy cases and other devices designed to stimulate student involvement. The major objective of the materials is to help pupils talk sense to one another about persistent problems in their own and in all of man's society.


2 Ibid., p. 255.


4 Public Issues Series (American Education Publications, Education Center, Columbus, Ohio).

5 Goals of the Public Issues Series (An Announcement from American Education Publications, Columbus, Ohio, Spring, 1967).

Holt Project

The Holt Social Studies Curriculum consists of a sequential and cumulative series of courses for typical students in grades nine through twelve. Each course contains required readings for students, an audio-visual kit, a testing program, and a teacher's manual containing daily lesson plans. Although each course is self-contained and can be used independently of the others, the

*These units, which are now available from AET, are appropriate for such courses as civics, government, as well as U. S. history.
curriculum has been planned so that what students learn in one course is expanded, reinforced, and utilized in succeeding courses. The result is materials for an integrated curriculum rather than a group of uncoordinated books such as those which have so often been published as a curriculum series in the past.

The Holt Social Studies Curriculum grew out of five years of research and experimentation at the Social Studies Curriculum Center at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Supported by a grant from the Cooperative Research Branch of the United States Office of Education, the staff of the Center developed and tested a four-year social studies curriculum for able students. After the Center released the material developed by this project into the public domain, the staff contracted with Holt, Rinehart and Winston to write a new version of their materials for typical students. The Holt Social Studies Curriculum is the result. A chart outlining the courses in the curriculum appears on the opposite page.

The overall objective of the Holt Social Studies Curriculum is to help each student develop to the limit of his ability into an independent thinker and a responsible citizen of a democratic society. We have divided this general objective—far too sweeping and abstract to be a useful guide to instruction—into four major parts: attitudes, values, inquiry skills, and knowledge. These four groups of objectives cannot be divided in practice. Without knowledge of content there is nothing for students to inquire about. Without attitudes predisposing them to prefer a scientific mode of inquiry, they cannot inquire at all. Values in turn grow out of knowledge, attitudes, and inquiry skills. Yet, although these four groups of objectives are interrelated, discussing them separately helps to clarify the overall goals of the curriculum.