Beyond Moral Reasoning and Values Analysis: Toward Affective Social Education.

The need for investigating, developing, and implementing affective social studies education programs in the classroom is stressed in this paper. Some issues are raised about moral reasoning and values analysis and their relationship to what may be termed affective social studies education. Educators currently place a heavy emphasis on the cognitive approach to values education and moral development in the classroom. However, facing a rapidly changing society, student alienation, and political dissatisfaction with many of the cognitive approaches, educators must develop instructional strategies and methodologies appropriate for affective social education. They need to engage in political effort and provide public support for social studies educators teaching affective social studies across the country. There is a need for pre- and inservice training programs that at least equal the training in cognitive education. If teachers are in need of practical experience in teaching concepts, conducting inquiry, or presenting a global perspective, they also need practice in identifying and handling emotions and feelings. Social education needs to become symbolic of an incorporative of what appears to be our individual and collective struggle for social being and meaning. Otherwise, we risk the danger of continuing to create people brilliant on the intellectual side but severely lacking on the emotional side. (Author/DE)
BEYOND "MORAL REASONING" AND "VALUES ANALYSIS":

TOWARD AFFECTIVE SOCIAL EDUCATION

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The purpose of this paper is not to critique the theoretical foundations or practical implications of moral reasoning and values analysis for social studies education; that has been amply done elsewhere at this convention, and in the literature. Similarly, its purpose is not to propose bold new ventures in affective social studies education; the literature is replete with models that could be readily implemented for constructing affective social studies education programs. Its purpose is not even to present the case for attention to affective outcomes and processes in social studies education; that case is both well-known and superbly presented elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is simply to wonder why, with all that we do know and have available as sources and resources, we ignore them in social studies education?

More specifically, the purpose of this paper is to raise some issues that appear to need our attention as social studies educators. Those issues are about moral reasoning and values analysis, and their relationship to what may be termed affective social studies education. To judge from its program, much of this 55th NCSS Convention is concerned with ways of translating moral reasoning and values analysis into practice in classrooms across the land. The same may be said about the 54th Convention. This notwithstanding, a question must be raised: what do cognitively-based approaches have to offer toward the meeting of our need for investigating and developing approaches in affective social education?
Some definitions are in order, for the sake of clarity in this paper. "Moral education" shall be taken to mean those methodologies, strategies and instructional materials based either directly or indirectly upon Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development.6 "Values analysis" shall be taken to mean those methodologies, strategies and instructional materials derived from or representative of rational standards such as those expressed in the 41st NCSS yearbook, Values Education: Rationale, Strategies, and Procedures.7 "Affective social studies," on the other hand, shall be taken to mean Social Studies "concerned with the development of educational experiences that build upon emotional involvement (since) most of what we know is a result of its having deep emotional meaning for us (and) if it doesn't have this, it is itself meaningless"8 or social studies related to "...the practical life---to the emotions, the passions, the dispositions, the motives, the moral and aesthetic sensibilities, the capacity for feeling, attachment or detachment, sympathy, empathy, and appreciation."9

I.

Some examples may help to focus on the issues.

EXAMPLE ONE. In Howard County, Maryland, a course called 'Apartment Living' is currently being taught. Briefly stated, its purpose is to teach potential residents of Columbia, Maryland---the city of the next America---those skills and attitudes necessary for living in a high-density, multi-racial, urban environment. Students go out into the community investigating and collecting data about a myriad of crucial life issues: buying and maintaining an automobile; selecting, renting and furnishing an apartment;
planning, buying and cooking nutritious meals, and the like. In addition to information collecting and processing, it is said that the students through this process will examine and achieve attitudes and values necessary for coping with life in a complex society.

EXAMPLE TWO. At Gallaudet College, in Washington, D.C., social sciences courses are taught using simultaneous communication, a communication method combining fingerspelling, pronunciation, and signed English, since the students are either deaf, or have hearing impairments of varying degrees of severity. One of the "major problems" in teaching the social sciences is that deaf students are typically quite emotional, uninhibited, and expressive of their feelings, the setting or the situation notwithstanding. Their native language---American Sign Language---is said to be non-verbal, and communicating primarily through idioms, gestures, and intuitive connections. The crux of the difficulty is that social sciences are taught verbally, with a linear English-language base, utilizing the same cognitive structures and methodologies utilized in social science courses everywhere.

EXAMPLE THREE. In a newspaper column in a leading Ellicott City, Maryland, weekly, a columnist writing under the banner "Right Side Up" stated recently that her analysis of educational events in the county suggested that values analysis, moral education, and other results of an international humanist global-society-oriented conspiracy is aiming toward producing a generation of self-actualizing, independent-thinking adults (and by implication other forms of social degeneracy), and is thusly responsible for the chaos and breakdown of traditional
values and discipline endemic in our schools today. (The same newspaper recently ran a readers' poll about open space education. It received 271 responses from a population of over 40,000 people. About 90% of the 271 responses were opposed to open space education. The papers' editorial position resulting from this finding is that the people have spoken, and open space schools must be replaced with traditional classrooms and curricula.)

EXAMPLE FOUR. In Prince George's County, Maryland, it is said that the Board of Education has "banned" the teaching of values and moral education, and that most teachers are glad because they never did feel very comfortable "teaching values to kids," which is a child-raising function that belongs to parents in the first place.

EXAMPLE FIVE. The Following were taken from a Social Education article entitled "Youth in the Seventies: Socially Conscious or Self-Obsessed?"

a. Advice to People: Generation Unknown

No matter how you try to talk
Screech, or squork, or scream or squawk
Or melt or burn or boil or smolder
You just can't talk with people that are older.
You try to talk to your parents about drinks or drugs
Or murderers, or kidnappers, or blackmailers, or thugs.
Ask them any question and the answer will be:
"Please pass the salt and don't bother me."
Life is not easy, life is rough.
If you can't communicate, tough!

Mark McCord, Grade Six
b. (untitled)

I know for sure that one day I'll wake up and discover that I am just a figment of someone's imagination and all the pain, the hate, the uncertainties were only evil dreams and once awakened I'll be safe and serenely happy in non-existence.

Kim Evans
Grand Blanc High School
Grand Blanc, Michigan

These examples offer some compelling points for us to consider. The course in "Apartment Living" could be any one of a thousand courses. In preparing students for their future lives, we tend to assume that their primary instructional needs are intellectual and rational. The preparation for life in a complex, rapidly changing society is apparently seen as one of information collecting and processing, when in fact, information overload and contemporary overchoice would seem to indicate a need for experiences in dealing with their emotional consequences. It is difficult to see how cognitively-based educational experiences can develop skills and abilities needed to cope, unless the assumption is that such cognitive approaches can substantially increase the efficiency of information processing to such degree that the threat of drowning in information is minimized. Moral reasoning and values analysis are not usually noted as efficiency increasing techniques.

The disparity between the teaching methodology and content structures and student affective styles noted in the second example is probably only most glaring when observing deaf students and their teachers. The suspicion must be held that a similar disparity exists...
in social education in many high schools, but remains hidden from
direct view by overly-familiar modes of interacting and communicating.
It is also interesting to note that the wording of the statement
of the problem places the burden of the problem and its resolution
squarely on the students. With a variety of rationales (that
might be heard in high school social studies departments anywhere),
the students must conform to the preferred thinking modes of their
instructors.

The example of the newspaper columnist illustrates the suscep-
tibility of cognitive approaches to the affective to deliberate
political misinterpretation. Someone once observed that everyone
is an "expert" in schooling, because almost everyone has gone
through schools. The danger is that we all know what teaching
something means. Our familiarity with cognitive approaches to
education breeds justifiable concern when we hear that teachers
are teaching values. We know that logic, rationality, and intell-
lectual processes can be used or misused according to the design of
the user. This concern is understandably magnified when the content
is attitudes and values. Thus, what should be the safety of using
cognitive approaches to moral reasoning and values analysis becomes,
because of political motivation, the weapon used to question it,
and pressure for its exclusion from the public education domain.

Similarly in the example of the board of education banning
values teaching and moral education it may well be the cognitive
approach that is the danger, not the content or processes themselves.
When operating on a cognitive, intellectual level, the danger may
lie in an assumed inevitable motion toward a logical conclusion--
the right, or the proven answer. This is fine, even scholarly, when the question is about an historical event, an economic trend, or a socio-psychological phenomenon. It is not fine when the question is one of the correct racial or religious attitude, or the proper allocation of resources within our society. It may well be that the cognitive basis for moral reasoning and values analysis is the very feature that makes them appear so dangerous to boards of education, and the educational consumer community.

The final example raises some issues about the group that should be receiving the most concern, our students. The examples were taken from a special thematic issue of Social Education called "Students Speak---Are Social Studies Educators Listening?". The examples of essays, poems, and other forms of expression could well have been duplicated in any classroom---at least any taught or visited by this writer. If we did listen---conscientiously and cautiously---we might be terrified at the degree of affect evident in what we hear from our students, as can be seen in the two examples presented. Our response would have to be either to respond with appropriate methodologies and strategies, or to pretend that we didn't hear and continue with (cognitive) education as usual. So the issue emerges as to the adequacy of cognitive approaches for dealing with affective needs. That adequacy would appear to be directly related to the degree to which social studies educators are NOT listening.

The reader might wish to quarrel with the examples presented here, and the interpretation given them. It might be suggested that they were not chosen from a random sample of contemporary educational...
events. It might be argued that they were not selected rationally, objectively, or even impartially. That is the case, of course. The point for the present purposes is not as debatable. These examples reflect a category of events with which the social studies at the present is either ill-prepared, or un-prepared to respond. At issue, it would seem, is whether our insistence on viewing the world cognitively---and even more so, the affective world---is at the core of our inability or unwillingness to respond.

II.

As was suggested earlier, it would appear that we know more than we practice in social studies education. We know, from the work of Ornstein and Samples that physiologically, the exclusive attention to cognitive processes belies the functioning of our brains, and that instructional strategies and methodologies are possible to correct this over-indulgence. We know, from a perspective of curriculum theory that the social studies is currently behind the mainstream of curriculum thought and practice. And yet, we seem to remain mesmerized and immobilized by the attractiveness and mystery of cognition. By examining the consequences of moving beyond moral reasoning and values analysis, the practical benefit of being mesmerized becomes clear.

The first consequence that suggests itself is that we would be forced to commit ourselves, our graduate students, and our colleagues to an aggressive program of research into questions regarding the affect in social studies education. This would mean that the era of content analysis of textbooks and curriculum
projects, and expedient investigations of handy cognitive instructional outcomes calling for ready-made experimental designs would have to give way to an era of cautiously facing difficult experimental questions without readily apparent tools. In discussing the curriculum movement of the sixties, Khan and Weiss suggest that

"with all this development activity, research or evaluation studies concerned with affective objectives or attitudes toward the programs are virtually nonexistent. This state of affairs may reflect that the professional social studies writers have failed to come to grips with the issue of affective objectives in social studies."19

Apparently, avoiding coming to grips with these questions is one professional response that needs addressing.

A second consequence is that we would have to place new energies toward the development and validation of instructional strategies and methodologies appropriate for affective social education. It would seem that we know how to do this. Our recent history as a profession has witnessed reams and volumes of strategies, materials, evaluation instruments and the like for the cognitive social studies. Apparently, these developmental products have achieved the status of ends rather than means, for applying those same energies toward affective social studies would require replacing resources in an alternative direction. We seem unwilling to do this.

Third, we would need to engage in political effort and provide on-the-line support for social studies educators engaging in work in the affective across the country. This might take the form of a nationally issued and multi-organization endorsement for affective
approaches, similar to the recent efforts on censorship of teaching materials and media. It might mean organizational support in the form of publication space in Social Education and special publications for descriptions of affective outcomes and projects from across the nation. Or, it might take commitment of NCSS executives and other nationally known educators at the battle trenches of boards of education hearings and local weekly newspapers letters-to-the-editor columns. It is curious that when boards of education ban textbooks, simulations, or approaches to affective education, only the other viewpoint is presented for public consumption. What may be needed is not whimpers after superintendents issue their edicts, but shouts of dissent when the issue is being debated prior to the issuance of edicts.

A fourth consequence would appear to be the need for pre-service and in-service training programs that at least equals the training in cognitive education. If teachers truly need to know how to write behavioral objectives, they can learn to write affective objectives as well. If they are in need of experiences aimed toward the acquisition of a prescribed set of competencies, that set can include affective modeling and affective teaching competencies as well. If teachers are in need of practical experience in teaching concepts, conducting inquiry, or presenting a global perspective, they may also need practice in identifying and handling emotions and feelings, fostering creativity and intuitive responses to real stimuli, and maintaining an affective climate in their classrooms and school buildings.
A fifth consequence may be that we need to reconsider the nature of social education for our second two-hundred years. If social studies education is to remain responsive to our culture and society, it may well need to become training for social and affective literacy, as opposed to its present nature as training ground for social science literacy. Social education may need to become symbolic of and incorporative of what appears to be our individual and collective struggle for social being and meaning, so that through students' encountering social education, the social science disciplines and social processes generate and acquire some immediate and practical meaning.

The five consequences suggested here are likely to be neither popular nor easy. Any one of them, let alone the five, would seem to require a braking of directions powerful forces have set in motion. To continue basing affective social education on well-known, attractive and convenient cognitive theories is certainly easier. At the same time, we risk the danger of continuing "to create a large number of half-men, brilliantly developed, perhaps on the intellectual end of the continuum, but severely lacking on the feeling end."20

The social studies profession appears to be currently addressing many questions about its future and that of curriculum and instruction. It is the conclusion from raising issues about affective social studies that a whole area of additional choices and alternatives has received only scant attention. We can inquire
and conceptualize with our students about social science disciplines, global perspectives and moral dilemmas, and meet our educators' instructional needs. But our students seem to have other needs, well expressed in the simple but often heard question: "Who am I?"
NOTES


4. This writer's examination of one hundred thirty presentation descriptions from this year's NCSS program showed that sixty-six (50%) are directly related to either theory or application of either moral reasoning or values analysis/clarification.

5. A similar examination of the 54th convention program showed that 32% were related. A more accurate estimate would be dependent upon an analysis of what was actually presented, of course. Some presentations may have been described as relating to moral reasoning or values analysis for acceptance under this year's values theme; on the other hand, several sessions that did not appear to be related from the title and description turned out to be discussions of moral reasoning or values analysis when presented.


7. Lawrence E. Metcalf, Ed. Values Education: Rationale, Strategies, and Procedures, 41st NCSS yearbook, Washington, D.C., NCSS, 1971, pp. 18-19. This definition is used because it similarly appears to be the "official" NCSS definition. It also most adequately represents the rational, cognitive approach to values and valuing.


10. Based upon conversations with students of the course, and newspaper reporting of its intent and content.

11. Based upon observation and discussions with faculty members.

12. Based upon synthesizing several recent columns.

13. Based upon conversations with involved teachers in methods courses at the University of Maryland, summer of 1975.


