ABSTRACT

Three curriculum materials which draw upon the social disciplines are examined to understand the manner in which individual responsibility and authority are defined. The three include American Political Behavior, Holt Secondary Social Studies Curriculum, and Investigating Man's World. Curriculum content in each is found to contain dispositions which make social relationships seem unamenable to individual control. The discipline-centered curriculum focuses upon a knowledge that moves students away from the particular and local. The "scientific structural" nature of the knowledge serves the latent function of socializing students into a knowledge which discourages connections with everyday realities. This detachment from social relationships can make those relationships less amenable to individual control and gives more power and legitimacy to those experts who interpret reality. The scientific concepts are by their nature secondary abstractions which move people away from face-to-face contacts, value dilemmas, and conflict situations. Further development of social science discipline curriculum must take into consideration these latent value orientations. (Author/DE)
LATENT VALUES IN DISCIPLINE-CENTERED CURRICULUM

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Abstract

Three curriculum materials which draw upon the social disciplines are examined to understand the manner in which individual responsibility and authority are defined. Curriculum content is found to contain dispositions which make social relationships seem unamenable to individual control. Social theory in curriculum serves to legitimize existing social institutions. This disposition is made psychologically compelling by the treatment of ideas as detached and certain. It is suggested that the conception of social inquiry in curriculum distorts this process and reifies the values embedded in social theory.
Introduction

One of the legacies of the 1960's educational reform movement is the organization of social studies curriculum around the social disciplines. Projects focus on ways children can learn the subject matter and methods of the various social sciences, such as anthropology, history, and political science. The intent of these projects was noble: The social disciplines, educators felt, are important dimensions of our Western heritage and powerful modes of analysis for understanding human conditions. In learning how to approach social issues in a disciplined manner, educators believe children could become responsible, to some extent, for their own ideas.

The significance of the new curriculum needs to be considered beneath its ethical intent. The new curriculum can be viewed as providing comprehensive frames of reference for thinking about sectors of institutional actions. Social theory has encompassing ideas to describe social relationships. This knowledge, however, also has the possibility of directing action. The classification and naming devices explain, justify and give cognitive validity to institutional processes. Theory provides definitions to problems and contains implicit strategies for change. Thus, the social disciplines provide not only certain standardized ways to interpret social affairs, but directions as to how people are to act and to challenge those affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the implications to individual responsibility and authority posited by use of knowledge in three discipline-centered curriculum: American Political Behavior, (Mehleringer and Patrick, 1972), Holt Secondary Social Studies Curriculum (Fenton, 1967), and Investigating Man's World (Hanna, et.al., 1970).
The curriculum analysis focuses upon questions about: (1) individual responsibility in social affairs; (2) the manner in which knowledge is certified; and (3) connection between everyday events and educational knowledge. The task here is not to impute motive but to explore the constructions of meaning found in the curriculum materials. This work is undertaken in the hope of stimulating curriculum dialogue about social organization of knowledge in curriculum.

Normative Functions of Social Theory in Curriculum

Americans tend to believe (and act upon) a notion of social science as a neutral endeavor to explain and predict. The idea of the objectivity and concomitant removal of social science from political pressures was expressed in the 1960's by Daniel Bell's optimistic article about the end of ideology in social research. As late as 1970, Easton and Dennis (1970) proclaimed that behavioral political research was purely descriptive, entailing no normative structure excepting that of the methodology of research. The knowledge of study, they argued, is neutral and could be used either in defense of the status quo or by revolutionaries. This use of social theory is seen as a different order of business than the scientist's concern for objective explanation. Research, it is believed, tells us only what we are doing, not what we ought to do.

A major premise of this paper is that social theories are socially constructed from and become a part of our symbolic and interpretative world. A sociological function of the conceptual machinery of the social disciplines is not "just" descriptions of reality from which people can choose or not choose to act. A purpose of theory is to provide a fairly comprehensive frame of reference by which people can judge the plausibility and integration of disparate institutional practices. Theories help us transcend specific practices to locate ourselves within a larger cultural world. In the process, theories help to determine the significance
of our everyday reality. In giving definition to the world, Alfred Shutz (1973) accurately observed, social theory directs how we are to act and challenge that world. Theory provides meaning through its naming and classification systems. The linguistic schemes of theory provide status and rules to social action. The problem of poverty can provide an example (Edelman, 1975). Two different scenarios can be provided, with its own facts, values, judgments and emotions. One is to define the problem of poverty as welfare. This is to see those who suffer as responsible for their own plight, to accept authorities and professionals as helping while protecting the rest of society against irresponsible and dangerous people, and to view social structure as basically sound. To define the problem of poverty as related to economic institutions is to provide an alternative scenario. The poor are seen as victims of elites. Authorities and professionals help to extend privilege and deprivation. Social structure within this perspective is basically exploitive. In each interpretation of poverty the ordering nature of the descriptions give direction both on how institutional arrangements are to be conceived and challenged. The naming and defining in theory has a moral quality about what ought to be as well as having statements about what is.

The normative function of social theory becomes important in curriculum. The purpose of the discipline-centered curriculum is to make social theory a part of children's interpretative thought and a guide to their making choices. A curriculum problem, therefore, is to understand the dispositions towards social action embedded in curriculum knowledge.

A major orientation of much American social theory is a "systems" view of social events. At the risk of oversimplification, the social world is viewed as a system in which all structures and practices fit into some conceptual or intellectual place that contribute to its harmony. Individuals are to be arranged and socialized
into existing institutions to maintain an orderly and stable system. Much modern political socialization theory, for example, focuses upon the manner in which children come to accept the legitimacy of political symbols and thus ensure the continuation of the existing governmental structure. It is important to note that although a "systems" perspective does dominate the work of social science there are competing and alternative ways for understanding social phenomena. However, curriculum workers have tended to ignore the conflict within the social disciplines and, instead, abstract its dominant modes of analysis as the content of curriculum. Incorporated into the metaphors of curriculum, social theory assumes a function distinct and separate from that of the social disciplines.

Apple (1971) has argued cogently that much of the organized knowledge in curriculum accepts this "systems" view. Children are provided with a consensual frame of reference in which individuals are expected to adjust to established authority and to officially defined interpretations of reality. The curriculum emphasis on cooperation and harmony functions as a constitutive rule for acting in society. That is, the consensual view of social interaction becomes part of the basic rules of the game or rules of trust by which we organize our daily lives. Unquestioned and hidden, the vision of society in curriculum is one in which individuals are functionally related to maintaining the ongoing system and its institutional arrangements. The social function of conflict in preventing stagnation of existing social institutions by exerting pressure on individuals to be creative and innovative is eliminated. The fact that these consensual orientations remain tacit in curriculum makes them psychologically compelling in the construction of meaning.

Of the three curriculum materials, Investigating Man's World's Metropolitan Studies section on political science gives no attention to conflict. This is curious because many political scientists view conflict as a major aspect of the political process. Instead, the emphasis is upon establishing the legitimacy and benevolence of leaders and rules. A unit on government begins, for example, by
children reading "The people in a local community choose leaders to work on big problems. Because everyone can't work on every problem, the people choose some men or women to represent them" (p.110). It matters little, it would seem, that under 1% of the people are involved in nominating public officials. Nor does it seem to matter that the classical purpose of democracy is to involve all people in the responsibility for making decisions about public affairs. Rather the statements tend to establish a legitimacy of expert leaders in society with no alternative forms necessary for consideration.

The role of individuals becomes clearer when the section on rules is examined.

"Rules are needed .... Rules help everyone to have a good time. Because rules help people, people should follow the rules. Rules tell people what they should do, what they should not do" (p.116).

"Sometimes all the people do not like all the laws. But after laws are made, everyone must follow or obey them" (p.118).

Once we go beyond the aesthetic feeling of the material and the formal statements of intent, there occurs under the banner of science a heavily moralistic tone concerning consensus and social life. Societal and institutional arrangements have laws and rules that seem to reside outside of human interactions and purposes. Statements of "fact" inundate children with definitions of people as primarily recipients of values. The ethical, political, and moral considerations inherent in the acceptance of rules are ignored. One thinks when reading this section of the Watergate conspirator who said, "When the President says you do something, you assume it's right."

We find a similar orientation to social institutions in Comparative Political System: An Inquiry Approach (Holt Social Studies Secondary Series). The purpose of this text is to foster inquiry through the use of political science concepts. However, investigation of the text reveals that interpretations are already made by the authors. The "analytical" work is to respond to structured materials so
as to make the teachers' answers plausible. Let's look somewhat closer into this.

The major comparison is between the United States, "democratic political system" and the Soviet Union, a "totalitarian state." These labels are suggestive not for their analytical qualities but for their ideology. It has been suggested that "totalitarian" social theory arose during the cold war of the 1950's to create a way to distinguish between those countries who are our new friends and our "new" enemies. The words totalitarian or democratic in the context of the text have no "scientific" quality.

The comparative dichotomy is maintained in the text. For example, the concept of "leadership" is used to establish differences between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The personal characteristics of U.S. political leaders are "energy, tact, ability to tend to many things at once, ability to operate effectively under tension and so on" (p.40). On the other hand, a Soviet politician is described as "a man not given to resistance, who is a little above average in energy and intelligence, below average in imagination" (p.54). Under the guise of "scientific inquiry" and "social theory" the discussion established the normalcy and legitimacy of existing social structures and leadership patterns.

Where conflict does appear as a dimension of this curriculum its utility seems to be in asserting the reasonableness and good of the existing social system. Some emphasis is given to the right of dissent and disagreement in society in Comparative Political Systems: An Inquiry Approach (Holt, Secondary Series). The purpose of the lesson on conflict seems to be to have children learn that our political system permits individuals the exercise of dissent: "Children should know that in the United States individuals have considerable freedom to express dissent" (p.110).

As one continues reading the Teacher's Guide, the restrictions on the meaning of dissent become clearer in their relationship to the status quo. The determining
The criterion for appropriate dissent is the decorum of the group. "Views which are expressed quietly at an orderly forum which is designed to explore all the possible views on the subject cannot be equated with the same views shouted at an angry mob on the point of violence" (p.111T). While I am not arguing for violence and force, dissent should be examined beyond the superficial criterion of group decorum. The civil rights movement during the 1950's and 1960's was considered violent at that time because demonstrators broke basic rules of society, especially those concerned with personal property. Judging dissent upon its procedural consequences rather than on both the nature of and the means of expressing grievances would make reasonable the repression of the civil rights movement. At the time of the protests, civil rights groups did confront commonly held procedures about redressing grievances.

The third curriculum, *American Political Behavior*, also establishes certain norms through a discussion of social theory. The course of study is designed to have students learn the descriptive manner in which behavioral political scientists explain the operation of political systems. Its materials are fairly accurate, reflecting much of the current work in behavioral political science. There is also an attempt to direct attention to social injustices and inequalities such as racism. However, descriptions of what does occur often become in the curriculum valuative models for judging human action.

An example of both the integrating and moral force of theory is illustrated by the use of voting theory. Behavioral political scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to voting behavior in this and other countries. It is reasonable, therefore, that a major section in *American Political Behavior* is "Elections and the Behavior of Voters." The text discussion, though, not only describes various variables influencing voting but uses the "ballot" theory to describe the good and potency of the existing American political system. Voting becomes a criterion for
students to judge good citizenship and the worth of individuals and political institutions.

"A society's methods of choosing government leaders has crucial consequences. The extent to which a society enjoys political stability, peace, order and justice is related to its methods of selecting its rulers. The surest way to determine the extent to which a society is democratic or anti-democratic is to examine its methods of selecting rulers. A democratic society selects its governmental leaders through majority vote of the people and protects the rights of those in the minority. A democratic society offers regular opportunities to vote new individuals to ruling positions" (p.164).

"People who believe in democracy stress that voting in public elections is a means to influence public officials. Through the vote citizens can defeat unsatisfactory public officials and support those who are suitable. Abraham Lincoln's famous phrase, 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' only has meaning in our country if the vote is an important political resource" (p. 234).

The normative characteristics of voting should be considered as problematic. Although it is unclear what is meant by democracy, it seems questionable that its major distinction lies with voting habits. Yet, to maintain this distinction would, for example, make a comparison between the United States and the Soviet Union difficult. Over 90% of the people in the Soviet Union vote. The implications of focusing upon voting behavior as a significant dimension of democracy, though, are manifest. As we said earlier, to define situations as real through the acceptance of theory is to establish the status of that situation. In this case, to describe democracy through voting theory is to make the two seem synonymous. The emphasis on voting helps to maintain a system of belief that permits individuals to believe participation as voting is possibly the sole, if not major, condition for good citizenship. The political responsibility for types of participation other than voting may then be shifted to elites as the masses are asked to accept their own passivity in the more direct activities to influence public discourse.
Discussion of socioeconomic class suggests similar implications for the use of political theory. The purpose of instruction is to have students inquire into the relationships between socioeconomic status and political involvement. Students are asked to generalize "that individuals of high educational attainment, nonmanual occupations, high income are more likely than those of lower educational attainment, manual occupations, and lower incomes to be active in local politics." This generalization is used in the context of the text to guide, among other things: (1) a discussion of the relationship of an individual's position in the social stratification system and individual behavior (the man "with clout" is wealthy and "the apathetic citizen" is poor); (2) the failure of a group of poor Blacks to influence a state legislature. The stories or teacher's guide suggest no questions about why differences in social location produce differences in social action.

No question is posed about the social, political, or economic arrangements that produce stratification. Schattschneider (1960), for example, suggests that our very modes of participation has its origin in the business world. It is plausible that if the organizational bias of participation favors the wealthy, they would participate and control. However, a different question is whether it is desirable. The dialogue of the text leaves one with the impression, unintentionally I believe, that social stratification is an integral and necessary part of the political system. It might be further argued that fragmentation of social problems into discipline subjects may prevent students from dealing with the interrelations—i.e., the economic problems are addressed as distinct from political questions. The first is the province of economists, the latter, political scientists.

American Political Behavior, on the other hand, does give direct attention to conflict in social life. For example, students are asked to read how different groups (Phillipine mountain people, Yugoslavian serbs, and U.S. citizens)
solve personal conflict. Discussion also focuses upon people who are politically alienated such as Black rioters, bomb makers, and imprisoned Japanese Americans during World War II. The politically alienated are juxtaposed to patriots who can also be extremists, emphasizing conformity and unthinking obedience. However, the very notion of political socialization upon which the case studies are based tend to treat conflict as a form of deviance rather than as an integral and creative aspect of political life.

We might ask at this point whether the value bias is related to the social disciplines or the manner in which social knowledge is used in curriculum. The debates of the 1960's within the social disciplines suggest that dominant paradigms often have value positions supportive of existing social arrangements. However, the continuous dialogue and debate among competing social science perspectives tends to provide a self-correcting mechanism. Curriculum planners have ignored these social dimensions by which social science proceeds. Instead, curriculum workers abstract the dominant ideas outside of the self-correcting contexts of the disciplines. Thus, while learning discipline modes of analysis is an important educational task, the manner in which curriculum is constructed distorts that rationality. Curriculum reifies the values embedded in social ideas. The psychological force of the normative structure becomes apparent when examined in relation to the degree of detachment required of students in dealing with social events and the manner in which the ideas in curriculum are to be warranted.

Detachment From Social Affairs

The use of the social disciplines languages in curriculum can direct individual definitions of authority and responsibility. The discipline-centered curriculum focuses upon a knowledge that moves students from the particular, local. Students are directed to replace their commonsense
languages with a more epistemic "science" knowledge. The explicit purpose of this approach is to provide different ways of talking about social realities which make possible the discovery of new perspectives. However, a possible latent function is to socialize students into a knowledge which discourages connections with everyday realities (for further discussion see Akenson, 1975). This detachment from social relationships can make those relationships less amenable to individual control. Further, the esoteric language poses a highly selective screening of the connections between everyday affairs. This gives special significance to those experts who are responsible for explaining and interpreting social affairs. Students are asked to accept unquestioningly those individuals who present themselves as knowledgeable and who are willing to make decisions.

The making of social affairs more anonymous might seem, at first glance, uncontroversial. A feature of the discipline-centered reform movement is to have children learn the basic ideas of the social disciplines. "Structure," a commonly used word in education, generally referred to the basic or underlying generalizations and concepts of social science upon which curriculum is to be organized. Educators view these words and statements as helping students gain different perspectives and analytic insights into social events. By their very nature, scientific concepts are secondary abstractions which move people away from face-to-face contacts from which intention and purpose are expressed. To engage in study, therefore, compels one to deal with abstractions.

The authoritative dimension occurs when students are asked to move solely within a world that is detached from fact-to-face contact, from which the validity of ideas are tested. The interchange in the social disciplines contains interactions with people and events being studied to provide tests
of validity not available to students in current curriculum models. The formal scientific language in curriculum serves to integrate everyday experiences without going back to the here and now of everyday life. The lack of ability to synchronize conversation with ongoing intentions, Edelman (1964) argues, makes social situations more amendable to manipulation.

The unit of economics in "Metropolitan Studies" of Investigating Man's World can illustrate how students are asked to detach themselves from everyday realities. The text directs attention to "an economic process" as having components of labor, technology, capital, and resources. Each of these factors are in turn referred to in abstract, impersonal ways. Labor concerns "the work it takes to get a job done" (p. 113). Technology "means the way men get a job done" (p. 122). The task of instruction is to have children replace commonsense words with the specialized words of economics. For example, "division of labor" is to be used to describe working in a clothing factory in which there are many different jobs to make a pair of blue jeans. A later discussion of technology focuses on a drawing of a bicycle and a car and shows students responding to the question, "which kind of transportation needs the most technology to produce?" (p. 122). The text underlining emphasizes the importance of students to accept correct words for talking about social phenomena.

The text discussion moves the conception of work from the realm of personal experience or control. Students are not to see themselves as working with other men and women who have interests, commitments or conflicts. Labor and technology are made to seem independent of each other and of people's hopes, desires, and struggles. Each is defined as a distinct and technical problem. The very fact these terms are defined as discrete and unrelated may make it more difficult for people to make the interconnections necessary to relate personal troubles to institutional arrangements.
American Political Behavior also gives attention to the specialized language of social science. The purpose of the course of study is to have students use the words of political science to talk about social experiences. The concept of political socialization, for example, directs students to think about political beliefs and customs as a product of living in a particular culture and having certain social location. Measures of the success of instruction are often related to students' ability to talk in the words of political science. Students are "to demonstrate what (they) have learned about relationships of socializations to political beliefs and behaviors."

Among these demonstrations of achievement are responding to pictures of political symbols in such a way that "reflects knowledge of political socialization as a process of learning political belief and behavior patterns" (p. 45 T).

The symbols of political science though are not brought back to test everyday realities. Rather children are asked to move away from their direct experiences to provide new, and more abstract ways of integrating elements of everyday life. This is done increasingly through the quantification of data. Voting behavior and political socialization units, for example, extensively use frequency counts from surveys or interviews to make interpretation. One of the earliest activities in the curriculum is to have students learn how to read statistics in tables and on graphs. Later in the text students are asked to work with a variety of quantified data, such as organizing their responses to an anti-democratic orientation question into frequencies.

The use of mathematics in social science does tend to eliminate certain ambiguities in that there is a seemingly certainty to a percent. However, numbers are devoid of any values except those in the numbers themselves.
They dehumanize in the sense of providing a form of abstraction which ignores the diversity, irregularity, contingencies and values inherent in the social contexts in which people act. In the curriculum, people become classes of respondents who have low, medium or high scores on a scale. Personal options and responsibilities become obscured.

Gouldner (1970), in a critique of social science, suggests that the very methodological stance of detachment insulates and alienates people from the world being studied. The social scientist is typically warned of over-rapport and involvement with his subjects. The detachment "strives to free him from disgust, pity, anger, from egotism or moral outrage, from his passion, on the supposition that it is a bloodless and disembodied mind that works best" (P. 496 Gouldner, 1970). A consequence of this position, Gouldner suggests, is to insulate a scholar from the values and interests of his other roles and commitments. He ignores that doing research is to enter into social contexts with social relationships. Detachment enables a person not to attend to the ramifications of the range of influences or to question in whose interest research serves.

A study into the social uses of a discipline-centered curriculum in an English high school provides a concrete form for understanding social functions of the social science language in school (Keddie 1971). The school was organized around three tracks: high ability students in (A) middle range (B) and the lowest ability (C). Teachers had different expectations and demands for each track. Teachers of the low ability tracks tended to reject the common everyday experiences students offered for understanding the social phenomena being studied. In a lesson about a nuclear family, for example, a student suggested a nuclear family is an extended family including grandparents living outside the house. The teacher wanted the students to accept
a definition that included common residence as a deciding factor. Through teacher questions and cues (such as responding to a discrepant answer by saying, "Does anyone disagree?" or "The answer is not as obvious as you might think."), the teacher attempted to have the "C" student learn the concept as the teacher thought it should be defined. When students did not accept the teacher's definition, the students were thought deficient. The deficiency, it might be added, was self-fulfilling. Teachers did not expect students to learn the concepts and disregarded answers even when they had the meanings the teacher wanted.

Keddie goes on to suggest the students' acceptance of a teacher's definition is what actually distinguishes the performance of A & C tracks. The "high ability" students accepted on trust the teacher's system of thought and abstraction. The "A" students took over the teacher's definition of what is to constitute the problem and what is to count as knowledge. This knowledge of "social science" was to make them regard as irrelevant and inappropriate what the students might see as problems in the context of everyday meanings. That is, problems become those officially defined by specialists of the disciplines. "A" students were less autonomous as they were uncritically accepting of what the teacher perceived as the correct meanings of the words of social science.

The discipline-centered curriculum seems to legitimate the "expert" organized society. The intent of each of the three courses of study is to have students define social problems in the manner of the social disciplines. It is not considered that social problems are not defined into the neat packages provided by disciplines, or that the focus of discipline are historical accidents. Students are to accept professional knowledge as reasonable and plausible interpretations of social reality.
The dominance of the "expert" is most clearly stated in "Metropolitan Studies" (Investigating Man's World). Its purpose is to have children understand the economist as an interpretator and explainer of human work. The instructional sequence begins by identifying the economist as a person who interprets the "best ways" in which a society can make resources care for human wants and needs. "Economics is 'the study of the ways that people use resources to come to human wants.' Economists try to find the best ways to changing resources to take care of human wants." (p. 102). Since there are not enough resources for everyone, the economist makes choices about "the best ways that produce the most goods and services to take care of the most human wants for the least costs" (p. 102).

The description leaves us with certain conclusions. First, human work is a seemingly neutral dimension of production. Second, students are to understand the economists as the person who transforms people's wants and needs into the best way of using resources for production. Any person working at the Vega plant in Lordstown would have the right to ask how does the economist determine their needs and wants? And in whose interests are the "best ways" devised? These questions, though, become irrelevant or inappropriate by the text dialogue. The problem of work, labor, and production becomes definitional and technical. That definition is supplied by an expert. It should be noted that the very notion of economists here distorts the conflict and multi-perspectives this occupation uses to engage in study.

Knowledge As Certain

Upon viewing social ideas as having dispositions towards social action, we need to ask further how students are to establish the validity of these ideas. Following arguments in the social disciplines, I am assuming no social theory can be neutral as it is socially constructed from our everyday knowledge
and commitments. Any content of curriculum will contain dispositions towards social action. Answering what that disposition is, though, I must then proceed to the manner in what students are to certify whether those ideas are warranted.

The manner in which children are asked to work with ideas is important to understanding curriculum. That is, the content is distributed with a social context or process from which meaning is derived. If children learn how to test and use organized knowledge to further their own understanding and curiosities, then we can argue the design of instruction is to give individuals autonomy and responsibility. On the other hand, if learning of specified knowledge becomes the end point, the design of instruction becomes an imposition upon students of a closed system. Ideas appear fixed, unchanging and unyielding. That system of thought seems independent of human action and intervention. The interests implicit in the naming and classifications remain hidden.

The purpose of *A New History of the United States: An Inquiry Approach* (Holt, Secondary Series) is "to help students develop into independent thinkers and good citizens" and "to learn concepts and analytical questions and use them to develop hypotheses." The actual tasks of instruction, though, provide a different notion of individual responsibility in constructing and understanding the social world. Instructional sequence in the teachers' manual is: (1) to identify a knowledge objective for children to learn (e.g., to know in 1800 primitive land and water transportation contributed to sectional isolation and national disunity in the United States); (2) to have children do "inquiry," that is, to read prescribed materials in the textbook, look at filmstrips, and respond to questions posed by the teacher or text; (3) to warn teachers to refrain during lessons from "pushing" any generalization; and (4) to define
the specific outcomes of the lesson ("The students should understand that because Calhoun believed national strength, security, and unity were at stake, he thought the federal government should build roads and canals," p. 58). For a Now United States

The language of the instructional objectives is itself revealing: "Students are to know . . ." "Students can identify . . ." The tacit function of inquiry is to have children learn the generalizations of a social science as an accepted "truth" rather than propositions in need of continual testing and recreating. Whereas social scientists conceive of their findings as tentative and maintain a stance of skepticism, the work children are called upon to do posits knowledge as fixed, unchanging, and unyielding.

American Political Behavior does give attention to the limitations of political ideas. The introduction to the study of politics focuses upon the nature of political science as a human adventure. For example, the students consider the scope of political knowledge as dependent upon the types of questions people deem important to ask or that inquiry is a form of testing hunches. Further, the introductory lessons point to the difficulties of dealing with the complexity and variabilities of human affairs. Social theory is defined as tendency statements to describe how people are likely to do things. The work of political science is viewed as tentative and on "an accepted until further" basis. This would seem a realistic understanding of the human nature of social inquiry.

As we move into the lessons concerned with the study of political behavior, though, a different orientation to knowledge is suggested. As with the Holt materials, students typically read preselected stories and are to identify certain author-defined conclusions. For example, generalizations about the relationship of socioeconomics status and political behavior are developed by reading a case study of an attempt to restore legislative cuts in aid to
dependent children and a boycott of Montgomery bus system by Blacks. The objectives of the lesson (one class period) are "students can infer the following conclusions" about the case studies:

"The campers (in legislative story) had low socioeconomic status which meant they had, as individuals, relatively less political bargaining power than individuals of high economic status . . ." (p. 53)

"The following factors contributed to the successful outcome of (Montgomery's Blacks) political activity: good leadership and organizations, availability of financial resources, economic pressure on the bus company . . ." (p. 53)

The suggested procedure of the lesson includes directing the teacher to the parts of the prepared text that provides the answers to the objectives:

"The answer to Question 3, page 131, should be in terms of Objective 1 above. Students should respond that the following factors contributed to the campers' lack of success in achieving their political goals . . ." (p. 54)

The statement of intent in the third curriculum, Investigating Man's World is "to help young people develop patterns of thought and inquiry that will be useful to them in new situations." Again, a contrast is found between the stated intent and the actual instructional sequence. In Metropolitan Studies," for example, lessons contain: a generalization to learn, pictures to promote class discussion, a short reading section and a discussion question which is "carefully structured to the inductive approach." That is, "pupils will automatically interpret the pictures first, then the text, then return to discussion of ideas that will lead to the unit understanding or a related understanding." (p. 14 T).

As one goes further into the text, the lessons must be understood as legitimating what Jules Henry called education for stupidity. Children are asked to assume they are knowledgeable as a result of reading over generalizations and simplifications of social problems. For example, "reading" 6 photographs or an urban area and 3 written pages (p. 200-208), children are
to answer, "Why do children drop out of schools?" "Why do slum dwellers need to help as well as outsiders in solving the slum problem?" (p. 73-74 T).

Knowledge of the social disciplines seems to exist independently of human thought, action, or valuing. The purpose of instruction is to have children master the statements and ideas as one would fill a hat with items. The certainty projected in curriculum makes it difficult for children to understand the limitations inherent in the knowledge of social science. This becomes crucial as we consider social knowledge as having normative implications. The use of the social disciplines in these curricula seems not so much a change from emphasis on content to process but how that content is organized. The authority of teacher as knower remains.

Friere (1970) has called this approach to education the "banking approach." It assumes knowledge is a gift, education as an act of depositing. Students in the guise of inquiry are to receive, memorize, and repeat. Curiosity exists and extends only as far as one can collect and catalog knowledge as one does with things. The notion of education becomes a pseudo-inquiry, bound up in the predefined questions and data posited in textbooks and worked out in advance by educators and social scientists. Actions and reflections are based upon passive entities. The capability of banking education, Friere argues, "to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate theircredulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed." (Friere, 1970, p. 60).

Conclusion

There has been optimism concerning the use of the social disciplines as a way to develop disciplined thought among children. While I believe in children learning rational approaches, the analysis suggests a contradiction between the intent and actual materials for planning children's work. Social
theory assumes a normative function which denies individual autonomy and responsibility. This stance is made more compelling by the treatment of knowledge as certain and detached. The discipline-centered curriculum may, in fact, serve to legitimate the knowledge and power of existing professionals. This becomes critical in light of critiques which suggest relationships between professional groups and the social-political authority structures in society.

This paper does not seek to argue that educators should not use the methods and bodies of knowledge of the social disciplines in planning curriculum. For example, I do think educators can gain insight into curriculum designing by focusing upon the nature and character of the social disciplines. To choose that direction, though, requires educators to develop new metaphors for thinking about curriculum planning. Social inquiry as practices in the social disciplines is a communal and dialectical phenomena. Thomas Kuhn (1970), for example, discusses the growth of scientific knowledge as occurring from the conflict between people who practice normal and revolutionary paradigms. Focusing upon a solely formal logic (reconstructions of what scientists ideally should follow) or behavioral fragments distorts the interactive processes that give science its imagination and self-correction. Curriculum seems to maintain a determinism which takes control and responsibility from individuals. It might be argued further that the communal nature of social disciplines makes it impossible to lift its methods out of that contact and still maintain the integrity of these inquiry actions in school.
References


