Military Training Time and Cost Should Be Reduced Through Improved Management.

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Recruits

The report on the management of recruit and initial skill training identifies delays in training cycles, their causes, and resultant costs. In visits to four recruit training centers, eight initial skill training schools, and various headquarters offices, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified 1,979,000 man-days per year that new members of the Armed Forces and Reserve components spent unnecessarily in training status at a cost of about $48.1 million. Described are: delays in Army and Marine Corps recruit training systems due to inflexible starting times; the immediate start of training in the Navy and Air Force; management of initial skill training and resulting delays in all the armed services; and delays due to orientation of new members and use of them in work crews. Costs of these delays are reported for each of the services in terms of dollars and man-days. Five recommendations are presented for the Secretary of Defense and each service Secretary to use in reviewing and improving training operations. Appended is a chart showing annual economic costs for E-1 military personnel and a list of Department of Defense officials responsible for administering activities discussed in the report. (Author/MS)
Military Training Time And Cost Should Be Reduced Through Improved Management

Department of Defense

The military services are increasing costs by delaying recruit and initial skill training of new members. This report identifies reasons for the delays and recommends measures to reduce them.
The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report on the management of recruit and initial skill training identifies delays in training cycles, their causes, and resultant costs. It sets forth alternative policies and practices and contains recommendations which would increase the efficiency and reduce the costs of these training systems. (See p. 20.)

As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on action taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Government Operations, and to the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of the military services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Sincerely yours,

David P. Sorando
Acting Director
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DIGEST

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD  Department of Defense
GAO  General Accounting Office
DIGEST

In visits to 4 recruit training centers, 8 initial skill training schools, and various headquarters offices, GAO identified 1,979,000 man-days per year that new members of the Armed Forces and Reserve components spent unnecessarily in training status at a cost of about $48.1 million.

GAO identified weaknesses in the services' systems which resulted in training delays of:

-- 731,000 man-days costing $17.8 million because the Army and the Marine Corps delayed starting new members into recruit training. (See pp. 4 and 6.)

-- 1,007,000 man-days costing $24.7 million because the services delayed starting new members into skill training. (See p. 9.)

-- 241,000 man-days costing $5.6 million because some centers delayed training to provide time for orientation of new members or use of them in work crews. (See p. 16.)

Accordingly, to provide the means to reduce military manpower requirements, realize substantial savings, and improve training operations, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense have each service Secretary review this situation and:

-- Reduce the emphasis on yearend strength in favor of recruiting only those new members who can qualify for needed occupational specialties.

-- Curtail seasonal recruiting or schedule later entry dates for new members if their immediate entry would overload
training centers' capacities and generate lengthy delays in training starts.

--Provide temporary adjustments in training resources to handle temporary, unavoidable training center overloads.

--Instruct training officials that delay in the training of new members should not be planned to make scheduling easier or to provide work crews for base maintenance and operations.

--Improve information systems and coordination between recruiting and training managers to assure that training centers are promptly and accurately informed on needed skills and training load adjustments.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"For the past decade, the United States has been moving toward a higher priced defense structure. One of the most important contributing factors has been the marked increase in the cost of defense manpower; indeed manpower costs absorb over half of the total defense budget, a situation brought on both by increases in the price of personnel as well as by the more intensive use of manpower.

"A sizable part of the cost of manpower is determined by policy issues that are related to efficiency rather than to foreign policy or defense strategy. The fact that these policies were developed when military manpower, under conscription, was plentiful and relatively cheap underscores the need for reassessment." 1/

All new members of the Armed Forces undergo recruit training and most undergo skill training before they receive assignments to operating units. Recruit training introduces them to military life to develop basic military attributes. Initial skill training prepares them for duty in a military occupational specialty. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimated fiscal year 1975 costs for such training at $4.4 billion.

To maintain enlisted strength DOD estimated the following recruiting requirements for fiscal year 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>207,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>99,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>50,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>74,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>431,350</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these new members, each of the services must train new members of the Reserve components. DOD estimated this training input at about 69,000 for fiscal year 1975.

The major management and operational organizations involved in the training systems of each service are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps Headquarters</th>
<th>Air Force Air Training Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>Recruiting Command</td>
<td>Recruiting Command</td>
<td>Personnel Management Division</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff/ Recruiting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Military Personnel Center</td>
<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel</td>
<td>Personnel Management Division</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff/ Recruiting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
<td>Training and Naval Education Command</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff/ Technical Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOD estimated that as of June 30, 1975, its enlisted personnel would total approximately 1,827,000. Included in that number were an estimated 210,000 new members, or about 11.5 percent, who would be in training status. By service, the total distributes as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted strength (thousands)</th>
<th>In training</th>
<th>Percent in training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In budget requests DOD does not include new members as part of required force structures until they qualify for occupational specialties and are assigned to operational units. DOD could reduce enlisted strengths, therefore, if the services reduced the number of personnel in training status by shortening training time.
The causes and costs of training time losses, expressed in man-days, identified in selected tests and discussed in this report are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes:</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training delays:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>663,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>731,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>1,007,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversion from training</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>241,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total man-days</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>1,979,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalent man-years</td>
<td>2,397</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>5,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs (millions)</td>
<td>$21.5</td>
<td>$3.5</td>
<td>$17.4</td>
<td>$5.7</td>
<td>$48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See appendix I for cost details.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review focused on determining how effectively the services were managing their training systems in terms of expeditiously completing required training and providing trained manpower to the operating forces. We conducted the review at the headquarters of each military service, at four recruit training centers, and at eight initial skill training schools. At each headquarters we reviewed the policies, practices, procedures, and regulations applied to the management of the systems. At each school we reviewed data and actual operations to identify delays in the training cycles, causes, and estimated costs. In doing so, we were able to arrive at alternative policies and practices, discussed in chapter 5, which would increase the efficiency and reduce the costs of recruit and initial skill training.
CHAPTER 2
COSTLY BUILT-IN DELAYS
IN ARMY AND MARINE CORPS
RECRUIT TRAINING SYSTEMS

ARMY INFLEXIBLE RECRUIT TRAINING STARTING TIME

The Army starts recruit training of its new members only on Fridays. On the basis of our analysis of recruit training loads, we estimate that this inflexibility resulted in the loss of about 663,000 man-days of training in 1974, which cost about $16.3 million.

To illustrate, the system used at Fort Leonard Wood assigns up to 200 men to each of up to 5 companies (constituting a battalion) during the week before the start of recruit training. Recruits in the first companies to fill wait until all of the other companies are also filled, and then all companies begin their training together on each Friday. They graduate together after 7 weeks. During 1974 the inflexibility of this system at Fort Leonard Wood resulted in a loss of about 115,000 man-days of training costing $2.8 million.

In August 1973 the Training and Doctrine Command requested information from various Army activities, including Fort Leonard Wood, on the feasibility of adopting a daily start for recruit training. Based on responses, Command officials decided not to use a daily start for recruit training in the Army for these reasons:

1. Initial skill courses would have to start more frequently than once a week to realize the savings because, without this change, some trainees would be delayed between completion of recruit training and start of initial skill training.

2. To process trainees through recruit training and skill training in less than 112 days would be counterproductive if the trainee had to be held over to meet the minimum training requirement for overseas assignment under 50 U.S. App. 454(a).

3. The 120-day minimum training requirement for the Reserve component would have to be changed to take full advantage of a daily start concept.
4. Daily rather than weekly shipment of recruit graduates at other bases could increase the cost of transportation due to the reduced size of groups requiring movement.

5. Formal battalion graduation ceremonies would be eliminated due to daily graduation of recruit training companies.

Although these reasons may have merit, we believe they are outweighed by the advantages of more frequent starts. The Army has self-paced skill courses which can start on a daily basis. Fort Leonard Wood officials acknowledged that if the daily start concept were introduced the start of some large skill courses, such as combat engineers, would not be delayed. The said, however, that delays could not be avoided for some of the smaller courses. They also said that more frequent starts would simplify processing at the reception station and eliminate the nonproductive status of trainees. They stated further that all recruits could be trained under a single training schedule showing the day-to-day training to be provided for each company; this would make the most economical use of training facilities, possibly reducing the required number of firing ranges, etc.

In addition:

--Delays to meet statutory time requirements for overseas assignees and for Reserve and National Guard personnel will no longer be required upon enactment of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976.

--The increased cost for transportation under the fill-and-train concept would be offset, according to Fort Leonard Wood officials, by reduced local transportation costs caused by an even flow of students through the center.

--The battalion graduation ceremonies are for an interim phase of training, and, according to some Army officials, their possible elimination should not be considered a constraint.

**MARINE CORPS INFLEXIBLE RECRUIT TRAINING STARTING TIME**

Although recruits arrive daily, the Marine Corps starts recruit training on only 3 days of the week at the San Diego Marine Corps Recruit Depot. Four platoons consisting of 60 to 90 men, grouped together as a "series," begin training
together on each Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday and complete training on the same days 11 weeks later. Any platoon that is ready to begin training before any of the others in the series waits until the others are ready to begin on one of the three starting days. This type of scheduling resulted in trainee delays of about 68,000 man-days during 1974, at a cost of $1.5 million. This delay time could have been avoided, for example, by starting two platoons rather than waiting to start a series of four and by starting training 5 days a week rather than just 3.

Marine Corps officials agreed that delays could have been reduced with these methods. They stated, however, that some of the training requires the presence of the series commander and that it would be difficult for him to attend the training if platoons within a series were on different schedules. They also said that scheduling problems would be created if training began 5 days a week or if platoons within a series started on different days.

Most recruit training, however, is conducted on the platoon level and does not require all platoons to train on the same schedule. The training that must be administered on the series level could be accomplished by bringing all four platoons together when necessary.

NAVY AND AIR FORCE QUICK RECRUIT TRAINING STARTING TIME

The Navy and Air Force start or complete recruit training on any day from Monday through Friday. New members are received daily from Armed Forces entrance and examining stations. The recruits are assigned to training units and generally begin processing and training on the day of their arrival or the day after. There is no delay, essentially, before Navy and Air Force recruits start training.
CHAPTER 3
DELAYS IN STARTING SKILL TRAINING

MANAGEMENT OF RECRUIT INPUT

Recruiting management has not supplied an even flow of new members into the training system. The following chart demonstrates that unevenness during 1974. An uneven flow was also experienced in 1973.

SEASONAL VARIATION IN ENLISTMENTS,
CALENDAR YEAR 1974 (note a)
(Percent Above or Below Monthly Average)


b/ Mean equals 35,469 average enlistments for all services per month.
The skill training centers plan resources for each course based on projected average student loads. These loads are the service's estimated annual requirements for each occupational specialty divided by course length. Such averages represent the skill training centers' plan for an even flow of students throughout the year.

Although recruiting commands are provided with such requirements, they have not been able to manage an even flow of new members for each occupational specialty. Recruiting ability is affected by such factors as graduation time from high schools or colleges and the availability of jobs in the civilian economy.

The services seem to have placed more importance on meeting total manpower requirements than on management needs for coordinating the number of new members with skill training center capability. The recruiting services have, therefore, recruited people when they could, even though the numbers recruited at times have been below and at other times above the capability of the skill training centers. The Army has added to the uneven flow by increasing recruiting in June to meet congressionally authorized strengths for the last day of the fiscal year. This practice enables the Army to meet yearend strengths with significantly more trainees than it has at other times.

Although student loads are known to be uneven, military personnel offices seldom have provided the skill training centers with reliable advance information on the number of students arriving. The centers have, therefore, been unable to prearrange extra classes when necessary to avoid backlogs and delays in initial skill training starts. When backlogs developed, officials at some centers did not take effective management action to eliminate them.

IMPACT OF DELAYS

Although recruit training centers have dealt somewhat effectively with uneven recruit flow, skill training schools have generally not been able to do so. As a result, many new members who have completed recruit training have had to wait for initial skill training. During such waiting periods, which in 1974 were as long as 10 weeks, the new members do little that is productive.

Except for the Air Force, the services did not have aggregate 1974 data on waiting time. From aggregate Air Force data and from data obtained at selected recruit and skill training centers, we have identified over 1 million man-days of waiting time in 1974, which cost about $25 million. The following table shows this data by training center.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training center</th>
<th>Waiting time</th>
<th>Costs (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Signal School, Fort Gordon, Georgia</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Training Center (Engineer), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Air Technical Training Center, Memphis, Tennessee</td>
<td>241,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Training Center, San Diego, California</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Technical Training Center, Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Military Training Recruit Center, Lackland AFB, Texas</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Technical Training Center, Lackland AFB, Texas</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Air Force training centers</td>
<td>357,000</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,007,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$24.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a/Waiting time at the Army Training Center (Engineer), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Army Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, was not significant.*

**ARMY MANAGEMENT OF INITIAL SKILL TRAINING**

The Army coordinates its recruiting quotas and skill training capabilities at the beginning of each fiscal year. Skill training capabilities, such as number of classes by occupational specialty and start dates, are recorded in a computer to enable recruiters to match new members recruited and their reporting dates to fill the skill training capability. Under this system the Army guarantees most new members an occupational specialty when they enlist. But recruiting capabilities fluctuate, quotas change, and recruiters enlist new members even though upon graduation from recruit training their numbers will exceed the recorded capabilities of the skill training centers.

The Army Personnel Center directs the movement of graduates from recruit training to the skill training centers. Although recruit centers inform the Center of new members and their occupational specialties within 1 week after they report for duty, the Center does not inform skill training
centers of pending changes in trainee loads until 2 weeks before the trainees are to arrive. Even then the skill training centers consider this information too inaccurate to use in planning for fluctuating trainee loads.

Some Army initial skill training schools can react to increases in trainee load by increasing class sizes. In others, classroom size and individual trainee equipment requirements limit class size. Such schools can use their available facilities for two or more shifts but may need to acquire additional instructors to avoid backlogs.

The three Army skill training centers we visited received substantially more trainees than scheduled during the last 6 months of 1974. As a result, new members were delayed in starting initial skill training at the Army Signal School, Ft. Gordon, Georgia. The Army Military Police School and the Army Training Center (Engineer), expanded class sizes and avoided such delays.

**Army Signal School, Fort Gordon, Georgia**

During 1974 the signal school enrolled about 17,000 new members in skill training. During this period, students waited about 76,000 man-days to enter classes. This represents about 208 man-years and costs of $1.9 million. Thirty-five percent of the waiting time resulted because students arrived before their classes were scheduled to begin. The other 65 percent resulted because classes were filled and students had to wait for later classes.

Signal school officials generally adhered to established maximum class sizes until the Training and Doctrine Command requested in June 1974 that they accept 120 percent of the maximum class sizes. Although the courses with significant backlogs increased classes to 120 percent of the maximums, the school received up to 200 percent during some weeks from July through November 1974. This resulted in a large population of students awaiting enrollment and, according to school officials, caused morale and disciplinary problems as well as loss in Army manpower.

For example, although the school planned to enroll 1,725 students in three radio operator courses from August 5 through December 2, 1974, 2,446 arrived. The school enrolled an average of 122 students each week during this period, but an average of 117 had to wait for enrollment. The waiting time amounted to 14,798 man-days.
A study prepared by the signal school shows that training capacities for these courses could be increased by using two or more shifts. However, this would require additional instructors, who according to school officials could not be obtained in less than 2 months.

School officials said they did not receive adequate advance information that the school would receive so many students and did not plan additional training resources. But the backlog started in August, and the school officials did not request additional instructors until November.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MANAGEMENT OF INITIAL SKILL TRAINING

The Navy allocates its available training spaces among the Navy, Marine Corps, and other users at the beginning of the fiscal year. Training spaces to be used for guaranteed enlistments are recorded manually, and Navy recruiters use this information to guarantee occupational specialties to new members and schedule their enrollment in initial skill training. Recruit centers classify other new members and assign them either to vacant initial skill training spaces or to a 2-week apprenticeship program. Some new members are returned from the fleet at a later date for training at the schools. The Navy can, therefore, avoid backlogs by sending some of its new members to apprenticeship training instead of to skill training centers during peak recruiting periods.

The Marine Corps guarantees new members a field, such as aviation, and assigns them to an occupational specialty after verifying their qualifications during recruit training. The Corps has a weekly allotment of training spaces by specialty in Navy schools. These spaces are based on an even flow of students, but recruiting capabilities fluctuate and sufficient numbers of new members do not always qualify for the more demanding skills.

We visited two Navy training centers. The Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, experienced backlogs generating unproductive waiting time in only one course during 1974. This backlog resulted from a lack of instructors. The Naval Air Technical Training Center, Memphis, Tennessee, however, did experience several management and delay problems as described below.

Memphis Naval Air Technical Training Center

This center provides both Navy and Marine personnel technical training in avionics, aircraft mechanics, and other
aircraft skills. During 1974 students were delayed about 241,000 man-days awaiting the start of initial skill training. This represents about 659 man-years and a cost of $5.2 million. Navy and foreign students were delayed about 93,000 man-days usually because they arrived before the start of their scheduled class. Marine students waited about 148,000 man-days to enter classes primarily because their number exceeded the planned training load.

Two-thirds of the Marine Corps' delays were experienced during July through December 1974. The Marine students totaled 162 percent of the training quota for July through October. Only 103 percent of the Marines' quota was enrolled during these 4 months. On the other hand the school enrolled almost all of the Navy students during this period.

By November 1974 the Marine students in two specialties exceeded the fiscal year 1975 training quota. For example, in the jet engine mechanic course, 546 Marines had entered or were waiting to enter training by November 30, although the fiscal year quota was only 398. Marine Corps officials said the overfill in the less technical courses, such as the mechanic course, was compounded because retesting and classification during recruit training showed fewer new members than planned could qualify for the more technical skills.

Under a training quota agreement, 15 Marine and 55 Navy personnel a day were entered in an air fundamentals course, which is a prerequisite to all other initial skill training courses at the school. The Navy held rigidly to this quota during the first 22 weeks of fiscal year 1975, entering an average of 15 Marines a day although many more were available to start class during this period. On December 2, 1974, the resulting backlog included 797 Marines, some of whom at the enrollment rate of 15 a day would have had to wait at least 10 weeks to start the course. On the same date only 64 Navy personnel, or less than a 2-day backlog, awaited training in air fundamentals. Since the Navy normally receives new personnel in sufficient numbers to fill its spaces in this course, there were usually no extra spaces available for additional Marines.

Training officials consider the quota system to be an equitable method of assuring that both the Navy and the Marine Corps meet their training objectives. School officials said that the training capacity in air fundamentals could be increased with additional instructors but that they had added none because this would increase the backlogs at the next level of instruction. We noted, however, that some additional skill courses had been started and that
others could be started with additional instructors. Also, some skill courses had few or no backlogs and could have accepted those backlogged students who had completed the prerequisite course.

Marine Corps officials at the Memphis center said that they receive a monthly report from recruit training centers advising them of the assignment of new members to skill training, but that it is incomplete and accurate data is not available until the trainees arrive. But the center waited several months to take action after the backlog existed. In December 1974, about 4 months after the backlogs became a significant problem, the Chief of Naval Technical Training advised the Chief of Naval Personnel that capacities were being increased in some courses and instructors being shifted between courses to accommodate the increases. However, he stated that these measures could not eliminate the problem on a timely basis, and suggested the diversion of significant numbers of students to fleet units for possible later return to school when space was available.

AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT OF INITIAL SKILL TRAINING

During 1974, new members of the Air Force completed recruit training and waited 682,000 man-days to start skill training courses. The cost of the waiting periods was about $17.4 million.

These waiting periods are largely attributable to an Air Force policy which requires a backlog of recruit graduates to insure an even flow of students through skill training courses. Under this policy, fluctuations in recruiting capability cause fluctuations in the size of the backlog rather than in the number of students receiving skill training. Thus, the Air Force emphasizes enrolling the same number of students in each class at the expense of delaying the skill training of its new members.

The Air Force has an automated system designed to match new members by occupational specialty with skill training center capability. Air Force recruiters attempt to enlist new members 7 to 8 weeks before their scheduled skill training. Since Air Force recruit training requires only 6 weeks, this policy would create a backlog at the skill training centers even if the recruiters could provide an even flow of new members.

Under the Air Force system, recruiters guarantee occupational specialties to about 50 percent of the new members when they enlist and at the same time schedule their enrollment in skill training courses. The recruit training center
at Lackland Air Force Base classifies the remaining 50 percent by occupational specialty and schedules their enrollment in skill training. The center transfers its graduates to skill training centers during the week preceding their scheduled enrollment in skill training classes. However, the skill training centers enroll the students on a first-come-first-served basis. 1/

The student populations at the Air Force School of Health Care Services and the School of Applied Aerospace Sciences, Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, and the School of Applied Aerospace Sciences, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, fluctuated according to high and low recruiting periods. But due to enrolling the same number of students into each course, the centers had backlogs throughout 1974. Students at Sheppard Air Force Base waited 149,000 man-days for enrollment at a cost of $3.8 million, and those at Lackland Air Force Base waited 70,000 man-days, which cost $1.8 million.

Since the recruit training center does not transfer students to skill training centers until the week preceding scheduled start of skill training, populations at the skill training centers do not include all of the backlogs. During 1974, recruit graduates waited 106,000 man-days—costing $2.7 million—at Lackland Air Force Base for transfer to skill training centers.

The effect of this rigid Air Force policy is demonstrated in the following comparison. The Army military police courses at Fort Gordon, Georgia, experienced no student backlogs because Army officials increased class sizes when recruit graduates exceeded scheduled enrollments by 30 percent over a 5-month period. On the other hand, the Air Force security specialist course at Lackland Air Force Base, which trains air police, enrolled the same number in each class and had a backlog of students throughout 1974. The backlogged students waited 47,000 man-days for enrollment.

The two skill training schools at Sheppard Air Force Base offer technically oriented courses such as medical equipment repairman and radiology specialist which have class-size restrictions due to the limited availability of required training equipment. They also offer other less technical courses without these restrictions. But all courses have prescribed maximum class sizes which are generally not exceeded. Students not enrolled must wait 1 week or more for the next convening class.

1/Except for reservists, trainees from other services, and foreign trainees who are given priority.
Starting April 1, 1975, the Air Force began to monitor pretraining delays by including class start dates on the students' assignment orders. The skill training centers must report to the Student Resources Directorate of the Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, those students not entered in class by their assigned start date. An Air Force official said they are attempting to reduce, but not eliminate, delays. The backlog is still considered necessary for an even training load.
CHAPTER 4
DIVERSION OF TRAINING FOR ORIENTATION AND WORK CREWS

Some training centers plan from 1 to 5 days of delay in training for the orientation of new members or for their use in work crews to maintain and operate the post. At two Army training centers and one Navy training center, we identified delays for these reasons of about 241,000 man-days, which cost the Government about $5.6 million in 1974.

DOD Directive 1100.4 states that training time, costs, and overhead will be held as low as is consistent with training requirements. It further provides that military services should employ civilians in positions which

--- do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness;

--- do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved; and

--- do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment.

DOD Directive 1315.10 prohibits assignment of military personnel to athletic, recreation, or resale activities except when civilians are not available.

ARMY

Recruit training diversion

The Fort Leonard Wood Army Recruit Training Center includes 1 day in recruit training for work details to support post and headquarters activities. Since about five companies a week start recruit training, a company is generally available each day for work details. Out of each 200-man training company, 110 trainees are assigned to post-level work details. A typical day's assignment sample is 10 trainees for moving furniture in the enlisted men's and officers' quarters, 6 for outside maintenance of these quarters, 10 for work in the commissary, 26 for unloading freight at the supply and transportation divisions, and 58 for outside maintenance of headquarters buildings and work on the firing range. We also observed some trainees performing
janitorial work in headquarters buildings. The other 90 trainees are used for work crews at the school.

Such a scheduled post operation and maintenance day accounts for an estimated 42,000 man-days of recruit training a year at a cost of $1.0 million. Fort Leonard Wood officials said trainees are needed to perform operation and maintenance functions because permanent civilian staffing is not adequate. Since the assignment of trainees to work in the commissaries is prohibited by DOD regulation, after our visit in January 1975 Fort Leonard Wood officials stopped assigning trainees to this duty.

Initial skill training diversion

The Military Police School and the Signal School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, set aside 2 and 4 days, respectively, for students to perform work details before entering initial skill training. Students in a delay status also perform work details. The military police school used each trainee for 2 days in work crews of about 240 trainees. The signal school generally had sufficient students backlogged during 1974 to meet its requirement for work crews and therefore assigned new students to a 4-day orientation program. Fort Gordon used 40 trainees to work in the commissary and two at a recreation center even though DOD Directive 1315.10 prohibits such assignments.

During 1974, about 18,000 students were enrolled at the signal school and about 11,000 at the military police school. Delays of 4 days for each signal school student and 2 days for each military police school student would total about 94,000 man-days at a cost of about $2.3 million.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

Initial skill training diversion

At the Memphis Naval Air Technical Training Center, the Marine Corps sets aside 4-1/2 days for orientation, work details, or free time. With an annual input of about 3,800 students, the delay accounts for 17,000 man-days costing $368,000. Navy students undergo a similar 3-1/2-day orientation, which the center initiated in October 1974 after backlogs became a problem.

In addition to time set aside for orientation, the center assigns some Marine and Navy students to 3 weeks of mess cooking duty without regard to whether they could start training or would be delayed. The number of students performing
this duty during 1974 averaged 168 Navy men and 72 Marines, who spent a total of about 88,000 man-days in kitchen duty at a cost of $1.9 million. Training officials said they assign the first personnel arriving during the weekend to the 3-week kitchen duty. Other skill training centers we visited did not use students for these duties.

AIR FORCE

We did not observe diversion of training time to work in base operations and maintenance or other support activities at Air Force training facilities.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

We believe that the services have unnecessarily delayed the recruit and initial skill training of their new members. As a result, the number of members included in military manpower budgets has been overstated at considerable cost to the Government.

Some delay may be unavoidable because of complex scheduling problems. However, improved management and coordination of recruiting and training systems could reduce those problems greatly.

It is apparent to us that many delays result because the services emphasize recruiting to meet authorized manpower requirements regardless of training capability. The problem is compounded because training centers are not provided with accurate and timely management information, or with the flexibility of resources required to react to uneven student loads.

Many delays in training do not appear to us to be uncontrollable, but rather planned so that

- training can routinely start from once to three times a week;

- training centers can schedule even flows of students although the number of new members recruited varies significantly from month to month; or

- new members can be used in work crews to augment the work force used to maintain and operate training center facilities.

DOD has directed the services to keep training time and costs as low as is consistent with training requirements and to employ civilians where practical in lieu of military personnel for support activities. We believe that the services have not fully implemented the directive and continue to use trainee personnel for support activities, thereby unnecessarily prolonging their training status.

Finally, we believe that unnecessary delays and diversions of new members of the services from active and productive training generate morale and disciplinary problems.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense have each service Secretary review the management of his recruiting and training systems to reduce avoidable nonproductive training status time of new members. The service Secretaries should:

--- Reduce the emphasis on yearend strength in favor of recruiting only those new members who can qualify for needed occupational specialties.

--- Reasonably curtail seasonal recruiting or schedule later entry dates for new members if their immediate entry would overload training centers' capacities and generate lengthy delays in training starts.

--- Provide temporary adjustments in training resources to handle temporary, unavoidable training center overloads.

--- Instruct training officials that delay in the training of new members should not be planned to make scheduling easier or to provide work crews for base maintenance and operations.

--- Improve information systems and coordination between recruiting and training managers to assure that training centers are promptly and accurately informed on needed skills and training load adjustments.

The recommendations should provide the Secretaries with the means to reduce military manpower requirements, realize substantial savings, and improve training operations.
### Annual Economic Costs for E-1 Military Personnel (note a)

**DOD costs:**

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted standard rates</td>
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<td>Quarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,516</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,553</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,874</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,317</strong></td>
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**Non-DOD costs:**

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<tr>
<td>Dependence and indemnity compensation</td>
<td>$7</td>
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<td>Employment compensation</td>
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<td>Educational benefits</td>
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<td>2,076</td>
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<td>Income tax adjustment</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2,463</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,399</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,507</strong></td>
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**Total economic costs**

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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,986</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,016</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,273</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,824</strong></td>
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*a/As determined by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Controller) and shown in a memorandum dated Mar. 22, 1974.*
APPENDIX II

PRINCIPAL DOD OFFICIALS

RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING

ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official(s)</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:</td>
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<tr>
<td>William P. Clements</td>
<td>Jan. 1973</td>
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<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>William K. Brehm</td>
<td>Sept. 1973</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin R. Hoffmann</td>
<td>Aug. 1975</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norman R. Augustine (acting)</td>
<td>July 1975</td>
<td>Aug. 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard H. Callaway</td>
<td>May 1973</td>
<td>July 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M. David Lowe</td>
<td>Feb. 1974</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHIEF OF STAFF:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Fred C. Weyand</td>
<td>Sept. 1974</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J. William Middendorf II</td>
<td>Apr. 1974</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John W. Warner</td>
<td>May 1972</td>
<td>Apr. 1974</td>
</tr>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
### APPENDIX II

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Tenure of office</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>From</strong></td>
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#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (cont.)

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY** *(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):*
- Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.  
  Sept. 1973  |  Present  
- James E. Johnson  
  June 1971  |  Sept. 1973  

**CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:**
- Adm. James L. Holloway III  
  July 1974  |  Present  
- Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.  
  July 1970  |  July 1974  

**COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:**
  Jan. 1972  |  Present  

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

**SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:**
- John L. McLucas  
  May 1973  |  Present  

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE** *(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):*
- David P. Taylor  
  June 1974  |  Present  
- James P. Goode (acting)  
  June 1973  |  June 1974  

**CHIEF OF STAFF:**
- Gen. David Jones  
  Aug. 1974  |  Present  
- Gen. George S. Brown  
  Aug. 1973  |  July 1974  
- Gen. John D. Ryan  
  Aug. 1969  |  July 1973  

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