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ABSTRACT

The United States Office of Education (USOE) policy in funding purposive television programing for children was investigated. Information and policy recommendations were gathered from existing sources in the general literature, USOE file materials, 10 single-topic commissioned papers, a 10-member advisory board, a Federal advisory group, and interviews. Over 90 interviews were conducted in six locations, including Washington, D.C., with personnel directly involved in or knowledgeable about the dispensing or utilization of Federal dollars in support of children's television programing. This final report provides a descriptive map of the various components essential to an integrated system of broadcasting; gives a side-by-side comparison of USOE's two major investments in children's programing (Children's Television Workshop and series and spot announcements funded under the Emergency School Aid Act); and summarizes major policy issues, alternatives, and recommendations. (Author/PF)
The Federal Role in Funding Children's Television Programming

Volume I: Final Report

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The Federal Role in Funding Children's Television Programming

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Volume I: Final Report

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The Federal Role in Funding Children's Television Programming

Volume I: Final Report

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The Federal Role in Funding Children’s Television Programming

Executive Summary

Scope and Methodology of the Study

USOE’s Office of Planning, Budgeting, and Evaluation contracted this policy investigation to the Institute for Communication Research, Indiana University, and specified its scope, which focuses ultimately on USOE policy in funding national purposive television programming for children. Information and policy recommendations were gathered from existing sources in the general literature, USOE file materials, ten single-topic commissioned papers, a ten-member advisory board, a Federal advisory group, and interviews. Over ninety interviews were conducted in six locations, including Washington, D.C., with personnel directly involved in or knowledgeable about the dispensing and/or utilization of Federal dollars in support of children’s television programming. Children’s programs examined primarily from a funding viewpoint included BIG BLUE MARBLE, CARRASCOLENDAS, INSIDE/OUT, SESAME STREET, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, VILLA ALEGRE, and ZOOM.

The Final Report provides a descriptive map of the various components essential to an integrated system of broadcasting; gives a side-by-side comparison of USOE’s two major investments, totaling over $50 million, in children’s programming ([1] Children’s Television Workshop and [2] series and spot announcements funded under the Emergency School Aid Act); and summarizes major policy issues, alternatives, and recommendations.

Compatibility with Requirements of Broadcasting

A fundamental decision for USOE to make or reaffirm is whether or not it wants to participate in purposive national television programming in the first place. If the answer is yes, then a host of systemic requirements
and constraints for national programming must be accounted for and dealt with compatibly. Television operates as an enormously complex system, and cannot be dealt with simplistically by the Government or any other institution with expectation of success. Elements of needs assessment, funding, creativity, production, utilization, promotion, evaluation, distribution, and audience sociology, including numerous subdivisions in each of these categories, must operate together as an internally consistent system. For the voluntary, in-home audience, administrative control is possible only up to the point of distribution, whereupon the target audience either is or is not attracted over all competing options to watch voluntarily in desired quantities, and either is or is not affected in the desired ways and degrees. Purposive programming, therefore, must first succeed in television terms before it can succeed in any other terms. The risks of failure are high; the expenses of commercially-competitive programming are high; but the potential pay-off of successful purposive programming is also high.

Need for Federal Support

Another fundamental policy decision for USOE is whether it wants to play a role similar to that of foundations—to launch projects which are then to wean themselves and go to other forms of support or somehow become self-sustaining—or whether there is also a long-term service role to play, with sustained funding available to successful television projects that have developed consumer loyalty and demand. We have found the options and probabilities for maintaining successful series without Federal support to be unpromising. In truncated form, the major reasons are as follows:

1. Foundation support is short-term, and, in today's economy, dissipating.

2. Commercial television is neither organized nor administered
to absorb the extra costs of curriculum development and evaluation; it is primarily interested in entertaining its audience.

3. Private corporate support can be a valuable supplement to purposive programming, but this resource will be tied to furthering corporate interests, and, in any case, is limited to an estimated average of five percent of the corporate advertising budget.

4. Revenue-generating ancillary materials can, with appropriate arrangements for licensing and disposal of income, provide partial support for some series. With many purposive series directed to disadvantaged youngsters, however, unfettered hucksterism is generally perceived to be inappropriate and responsible administrators do not gear their non-broadcast sales operations to maximum profit. Even if they did, it is doubtful that this form of revenue could amount to more than partial support.

5. Public broadcasting is underfinanced at present, and long-term financing is also uncertain. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) has unmet needs in many categories other than children's programming, and has no plans for the development of additional children's programming or additional sustaining of existing series. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) is already spending 35% of the total dollars available to its Station Program Cooperative (SPC), which represents funds from CPB, local station budgets, and foundations, just for partial support of SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY.
While partial support can be anticipated from some of the sources above, the Federal government appears to be the funder of last resort, if quality purposive programs are to be developed and sustained.

Sustaining Successful Television Series

It can be very wasteful to pay the tremendous start-up costs of a high-quality purposive television series for a single broadcast season, and then withdraw support to go on to other objects. A fair market trial can take four to five years. Experience at the Children's Television Workshop (CTW) indicates that it takes one to two years just to prepare a major purposive series for national distribution, and then it takes two to three years of promotion and remake to determine how well it can do in the marketplace, and whether or not it can develop convincing levels of consumer demand for continued services. A limited-channel distribution system can only accept a limited number of series; these few should be well-funded in the first place, and funded for a sufficient length of time to provide a fair market trial. In USOE policy, there is no apparent answer to the question of what should be done in case an experimental series succeeds; policy orientations and expectations seem more geared to failure than to success. A policy is sorely needed to determine the means by which "survivors" of a fair market trial can be funded for the duration of demonstrable consumer demand for a children's series. In the Final Report, three alternatives are presented as suggestions:

1. use of the USOE Commissioner's discretionary funds through the Special Projects Act;
2. a matching dollar principle between a Congressional line item and the Station Program Cooperative of PBS; and
3. new legislation specifically addressed to the "service"
function for series with high public demand and need, in
contradistinction to the "experimental" function now
identified with discretionary funds at USOE.

Policy and Administrative Needs

In interviews both inside and outside USOE, there was a generally
recognized urgent need for an improved administrative structure that could
generate, coordinate, and administer short-term and long-term policy in
the area of television. Important to the success of any restructuring would
be personnel qualified with the necessary dual expertise in broadcasting
and areas of program content. Repeated estimates are that such personnel
are now in very short supply within USOE and within DHEW as a whole. Also
important to the success of any restructuring would be far more direct lines
of communication between project officers and policy coordinators. Admin-
istration of an important $7 million line item for television, for example,
is not only understaffed as a two-person unit, it is so many levels removed
from top management, with communication filtering through offices with min-
imal understanding of broadcasting, that effective communication is fre-
quently blocked entirely. In the Final Report, some alternatives for re-
organization are presented and discussed:

1. an integrated grouping of inter-agency and intra-agency
   panels: within USOE, across all television-related units;
   within DHEW, across all DHEW agencies; plus a panel of
   representatives of the professional broadcasting community
   interacting with DHEW at the Secretary's level;
   2. formulation of a DHEW-wide single Office of Television
      to fund and oversee all on-air projects; and
   3. reinstatement of an organizational structure along the
Federal Control of Television Programming

There is a trend within USOE toward greater control and in-process monitoring of television projects involving USOE funding. Part of this is due to legislative directive (as in the change from grants in the Cooperative Research Act to contracts in the Special Projects Act) and legislative interpretation (as in the evolution from grants to contracts with ESAA-TV series). In addition, the motivational proclivities expressed among USOE personnel were also favoring greater specificity of requirements up front, and increased specificity in the control and accountability mechanisms employed throughout television projects. Few USOE persons advocated greater delegation of flexibility and responsibility to the contractee/grantee. Reactions from the field site visits among professional broadcasters with the responsibility of producing programs opposed this trend, and their reasoning and experiences were persuasive. By a number of measures, the record to date suggests that the more freedom and responsibility given to a production agency within the professional broadcasting community after the basic commitment has been made, the greater the likelihood of a successful program, and hence, the better the Federal investment. The producers would prefer prior careful scrutiny of the qualifications and worthiness of a proposal and of the proposing organization, advance specification of procedural "rules of the game," and then maximum freedom to produce programs which should then be evaluated on a promise vs. performance basis. Producers represented the presumed adversary relationship invoked by some Federal project officers and its implication that responsible production agencies were somehow trying to cheat the government. Federal monitoring has now extended
into areas that intrude upon the aesthetic and management decisions of the producer, such as casting and shooting locations. At one point, prior script approvals by Federal personnel were required. Some Federal requirements, especially in the ESAA-TV projects, have been incompatible with standard and traditional broadcasting requirements. USOE officials point out that much of this was seen as being mandated in the ESAA legislation. Other prohibitions, under-emphasizes or omissions, such as attention to promotion, distribution, and utilization place series at a severe disadvantage in a system that requires these components. The dysfunctional consequences of increased Federal monitoring and involvements in television management processes were widely evident. This has jeopardized the acceptability of series for distribution over PBS, and it is possible that some ESAA-TV series may not be carried over that national interconnection at all. There is both a legal and a philosophic commitment that public broadcasting not become, and not be perceived as becoming, a government information distribution agency. The need is great for policy that is more knowledgeable about and sensitive to the requirements of broadcasting. In dealing with the Government or any other funder, public broadcasting representatives at CPB and PBS have advocated the use of a standardized contract that would spell out in detail the required conditions to be met before a program or series could be accepted for national distribution.

CTW and ESAA-TV

The major part of an entire chapter in the Final Report is devoted to a 12-category side-by-side comparison of the two major USOE investments in children's programming: CTW's SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, and the ESAA-TV projects. Although the differences in amounts USOE has invested in the two categories are not dramatic, the many points of dissimilarity do
not yield readily to either comparison or brief summary. The success of
the two CTW programs is now a matter of record. The record of the ESAA-TV
projects is still being written, but its early history has been plagued
with many problems, some of them traceable to the legislation itself, others
traceable to USOE guidelines and USOE administrative practices. While CTW
has operated under discretionary funding in an environment of minimal in-
terference from USOE, the ESAA-TV projects covered in this investigation
were funded under legislation with rather specific language and administered
in a far more restrictive manner. Given past efforts and continued deter-
mination within USOE to discontinue funding for both CTW and ESAA-TV, the
policy importance of what is desired for future funding increases. After
funding of CTW in FY 75, subsequent to Congressional urging, there remained
$1.5 million in discretionary funds. After a planned terminal year of fund-
ing of CTW in FY 76, there will remain $3 million in discretionary funds.
Thereafter, there could be $7 million or even more in discretionary funds.
There are few indications of a firm plan or general policy for spending the
remaining discretionary funds in FY 75 or FY 76.

Alternative Models of Program Development

In addition to the standard contract or grant with a production agency,
the following might be considered for the development of national program-
ing for children in the home:

1. There are at least two or three variations in USOE-CPB
agreements, discussed in the Final Report, wherein CPB would
administer the R & D, piloting, and production of new series.
All offer the advantages of insulation of the producer from
Federal content control, and assurances that professional
broadcasters would be making the broadcasting-related decisions.
2. USOE could fund a series of pilots that could both stand as single programs and be expandable into full series. After airing all on PBS, proposals for the full series would be entered into the SPC catalog, and USOE would transfer funds to the SPC, earmarked for the proposed series. The marketing mechanisms of the SPC could determine if the series was to come into being, and, if so, how long it should be sustained.

3. Through the administrative vehicle of an external advisory group, a multi-stage process could be employed wherein the following sequence of screening and elimination could take place: (a) a large number of preliminary proposals; (b) a smaller number of full-blown proposals; (c) commissioning of, say, three pilots; (d) commissioning of one full-blown series.

Program Inserts for Specialized Content and Audiences

Some goals for children's programming are excellent from a content point of view, in the sense that the need is great, but the probable audience draw of programming on that sole topic would not be sufficient to justify the expense or use of the limited channel capacity of national television. In such cases, the use of inserts into other programming that already attracts the target audience is an attractive option. Some series already implement this principle in content dealing with handicapped children, but the principle should be more broadly applicable to include a variety of special content, minority audiences, and even the localizing of national programs through the use of inserted material. There is precedent for the use of Federally-sponsored inserts in national commercial television as well, utilizing the CAPTAIN KANGAROO series, but our analysis indicates that this was a rare event developed under unusual circumstances,
and unlikely to be generally replicable.

**Commercial Television**

USOE's interests in commercial television extend beyond inserts into complete programming, spot announcements, and perhaps other arrangements with commercial broadcasters. The ESAA-TV series are being offered free to commercial broadcasters, but some controversy is being generated over two now allowable conditions: placement of regular commercials before and after programs, and the ability of a sponsor to purchase air time for the program itself for a single credit identification at the end of the program. Somewhat less controversy has been raised over the free commercial airing of spots, produced under ESAA funding, as public service announcements, although these spots were rejected by PBS because of the Federal requirement of prior script approval. Greater guaranteed circulation could be obtained by actually purchasing time for airing Federally produced spots, but that strategy is also controversial. Commercial broadcasters themselves have suggested the exploration of a Federally sponsored formative research service in children's programming development, available to any broadcaster, commercial or public, to enhance the appeal and impact of purposive programming consistent with USOE goals. There may also be a way to develop a system of Federal loans to support the commercial development of purposive programming, with mechanisms for repayment. Direct Federal involvements in commercial television, both highly attractive and potentially, highly controversial, should be explored with great caution. All things considered, the most receptive and realistic medium for national distribution of Federally supported purposive programming for children continues to be PBS.
Evaluation

Evaluation is important in program development and production, where pretesting can provide corrective feedback to the production staff before the product is finalized. This function of formative evaluation is most appropriately conducted by in-house evaluation staff communicating directly with in-house producers. Summative evaluation compares goals with achievement, and is used by out-of-house decision makers for decisions such as re-funding, distribution, and adoption. Dysfunctional pressures are brought to bear on the formative evaluation process when in-house formative data are utilized by out-of-house decision makers for summative-type decisions, such as in the review of pilot-testing data for go/no go decisions on an entire series. We recommend that summative evaluation procedures be utilized for summative types of decisions. The summative procedures we recommend include employment of external evaluation agencies that work in cooperation with the production agency, subject to third-party review.

The In-School Audience

Some of the previous issues apply to in-school as well as in-home programming, but the in-school setting is sufficiently distinctive to warrant separate analysis. Nearly all children of school age go to school, which is one of the two major settings where children can learn from purposive television programming. Whether the school uses programs originally intended for the in-home audience or programs designed exclusively for in-school use, the organizational/sociological setting of the in-school audience offers far greater control over the learning environment than is possible for the in-home setting.

The concept of a national curriculum for schools developed at the
Federal level is contrary to the traditional/philosophic commitment to maintain control of formal education at the local and state level. Economies of scale emerge in television with high-quality, nationally-distributed programming. The Agency for Instructional Television (AIT) has developed a model that reconciles those two propositions wherein local and state agencies join in a consortium to fund purposive television programming responsive to curriculum needs held in common. Local/state distribution of these programs to local/state in-school audiences comprise, in a broadly-based-consortium, the functional equivalent of a centralized-national distribution system. The funding, control, and consumer accountability, however, reside firmly at the state and local level. The advance funding by the consuming state and local agencies virtually assures relevance and utilization of the television materials.

When restricted to state and local funding sources, however, the model cannot generate enough programming to meet the needs, which are estimated to be about thirty series (ten content areas at three levels each). Current funding for learning resources available at the state and local level will permit cooperative production (whether through AIT or another consortium) of only one major series per year. Given a maximum life-span of seven years for an in-school series, the theoretical maximum for the system as a whole is seven series, far short of the need. The limiting factor is funding available for learning resources at the state level, and this is where the Federal dollar can play a constructive role. Reinterpretations of the Educational Amendments of 1974 are needed to allow three things:

1. the states need to be able to retain some of the Federal allocations for state-wide services, instead of having it all flow to the local level;
2. the states need to be able to develop the learning materials, including television programming, instead of being restricted to "off the shelf" materials; they need to address the priorities they determine; and

3. the states need to be permitted to join in cooperative funding efforts for development of learning materials, including television materials; addressed to mutual needs.

These three conditions would allow television to compete with all other learning resources for funding. The AIT experience so far is that problems of scheduling and reception equipment are resolved after high-quality and desired programming is available.

The Final Report

Volume I of the Final Report contains more detailed discussion of the issues summarized above, as well as covering several areas of content for which no summary was attempted here. Volume II contains the ten commissioned papers in their entirety. These papers, which provided valuable input to Volume I, address the areas of self-concept development, economically disadvantaged children, minority children, geographically isolated children, handicapped children, sexism in television, diversity in a mass medium, Federal involvements in commercial television, copyright issues, and distribution systems.

Keith W. Mielke, Principal Investigator
Rolland C. Johnson
Barry G. Cole

April 30, 1975
Chapter One: Introduction

Background

Both common observations and considerable research attest that children from all strata of society spend a considerable proportion of their lives watching television. This fact of modern life has given rise both to concern about possible harmful effects of this viewing, and also the belief that this ubiquitous medium of television can and should be harnessed more effectively to serve constructive ends for children. This is sometimes called "purposive" programming, that is, programming that can be evaluated in terms of objectives beyond those of attracting and entertaining an audience.

Although a variety of Federal agencies have been involved in funding purposive television programming for children, the major funder is the U. S. Office of Education (USOE), which has invested more than $30 million in various series to date. It was the need for review of these past USOE involvements and recommendations for possible alternative future involvements that generated the investigation reported here.

The funding arrangements between USOE and the production agencies have varied widely, and the strengths and weaknesses of each type of arrangement have not been analyzed collectively. USOE gets its mandate or its authority to support children's television programming from various pieces of legislation. The major USOE investments in children's television programming to date have been authorized by the Cooperative Research.
Act and the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), and these two pieces of legislation have not been analyzed comparatively. Over the last decade USOE support for children's television programming has increased; even so, requests for additional funding exceed the current and projected budget allotments, and criteria are needed on which to base funding decisions. Sometimes there is legislative authority to initiate a children's television project without legislative guidelines as to how long it should be supported. A rationale is needed for priorities between supporting ongoing projects and starting new projects. Television can be produced at many levels of sophistication and distributed/received in a variety of ways. Criteria are needed on what is appropriate for what purposes. USOE's Office of Planning, Budgeting, and Evaluation (OPBE) determined that these and other issues should be reviewed, and that policy recommendations and alternatives were needed for the future Federal role in funding children's television programming.

The Investigation Strategy

To address such a broad spectrum of interrelated policy issues, there was an obvious need for breadth of expertise. In addition to the various specializations of the Indiana University investigation team, the contributions of a distinguished ten-member advisory board were utilized, early in the project to give advice and help set priorities, and again near the end of the project when a draft of the final report was submitted.

Members of the advisory board were:

James A. Fellows, Program Officer, National Association of Educational Broadcasters;

Fay Fondiller, Early Childhood Supervisor, Board of Education of the City of New York;
Hyman Goldin, Professor of Communication, Boston University;
Robert Heinich, Professor of Education, Indiana University;
Joseph Klapper, Director, Office of Social Research, CBS, Inc.;
Gerald Lesser, Bigelow Professor of Education and Developmental Psychology, Harvard University;
Harold Mendelsohn, Professor and Chairman, Department of Mass Communications, Denver University;
Frank Norwood, Executive Secretary, Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications;
Edward Pfister, Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Board of Governors, the Public Broadcasting Service;
Eddie Smardan, Vice President, Broadcast Services, Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., Los Angeles.

Also, specialized, single-topic papers were commissioned in ten areas to assist in developing the policy recommendations. These papers have provided input to this final report, and, as valuable contributions in their own right, are included in a separate volume. The authors and topics for the commissioned papers are as follows:

Bradley S. Greenberg, "Children's Television and the Economically Disadvantaged Child: Research Findings and Policy Implications."
Lionel C. Barrow, Jr., "The We Nobody Knows: Minority Children and Television."
Louis A. Bransford, "Impact of Television on Children and Youth in Geographically Isolated Areas."
Carolyn J. Nygren and Frank B. Wtihow, "Handicapped Children and Television."
Muriel G. Cantor, "Children's Television: Sex-role Portrayals and Employment Discrimination."
Harold Mendelsohn, "The Mythic Functions of Television and the Pressures for 'Reality'."
Herman W. Land, "Federal Government Involvement in Commercial Television for Children."


The first seven papers form an audience-oriented cluster, and the last three form an administratively-oriented cluster. The first paper deals with self-concept development and is intended to serve as a theoretical introduction to the next four papers, each of which deals with a different specialized audience group, and each of which is related to self-concept development. The final paper in the audience cluster is again broad and theoretical, dealing with the limits of diversity in a mass medium. The final three papers, the administratively-oriented cluster, deal with commercial television/Federal relationships, copyright issues, and alternative distribution systems.

The Project Officer responsible for monitoring the present investigation for USOE coordinated a series of meetings with various USOE officials throughout the project to help keep it oriented toward areas of genuine need for policy input. As will be discussed in more detail later, the task has evolved from a rather general one to a more sharply focused set of issues, based on continuing feedback from these very useful meetings.

As part of our investigation, we have conducted over ninety interviews with professionals involved in various ways with children's television. Interviewees are listed in Appendix A.

Finally, we invited feedback to a draft of this report from a variety
of organizations involved with children's television: the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Public Broadcasting Service, the National Association of Broadcasters, the Children's Television Workshop, the Agency for Instructional Television, Bilingual Children's Television, the CARRASCOLENDAS project at KLRN-TV, Austin, Texas, and Action for Children's Television.

Limitations on the Scope of the Investigation

Several tasks that were described in the USOE Request for Proposal are useful in understanding the scope and limitations of this study. These tasks were presented not as inflexible prescriptions, but as illustrations of the kinds of analyses expected in the investigations that would ultimately generate the desired policy recommendations.

The following kinds of questions were included in the USOE Request for Proposal:

1. How has children's television programming been supported by Federal and non-Federal funds?
2. How appropriate and useful have been the various evaluations of impact for purposive children's television?
3. What production factors and delivery system factors are associated with the most successful purposive children's television programs?
4. What are the capacities of various delivery systems for children's television programming, and what audiences are associated with each?

The list of questions above is not intended to reproduce the original USOE Request for Proposal, but to give an idea of the lines along which
USOE was thinking when it funded this investigation. An essentially endless list of questions can be addressed to the children's television area. USOE's purposes were clearly targeted to a certain subset of those questions, as stated in the original Request for Proposal, and as subsequently firmed up in discussions with USOE personnel. The focus of the "who, what, when, where, why, and how" questions is to be primarily on issues that come under the manipulable domain of USOE in the area of children's television programming, and this ultimately boils down to funding decisions.

Many issues of great social significance in children's television are not included in that assignment, and their exploration could not be included in this investigation. The major USOE involvement in children's television is, in one manner or another, in funding production or other support of purposive programming. This is in contrast to the regulatory functions outside USOE and outside the scope of this project.

There is ample cause for concern and policy investigation into the area of televised violence, and extensive inquiry both with and without Federal funding has been conducted here (e.g., Baker & Ball, 1969; Surgeon General's report, 1972; Liebert, Neale, & Davidson, 1973). The issue of violence as it pertains to children's television programming is not taken up here.

Research has been devoted to the issue of the effects on children of advertising through television commercials (e.g., Ward, 1971; Ward & Wackman, 1973). There is the increasingly powerful voice of citizen action groups such as Action for Children's Television, which exert pressure for more and better children's programming, with less commercialization, on regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal
Communications Commission. These, too, are outside the domain of this project.

Other significant areas relate only moderately and indirectly to this project: for example, theoretical or policy research being conducted through Federal agencies outside USOE, such as the National Institute of Mental Health (e.g., Gerbner, "Cultural Indicators"; Zanna, "The Causes and Consequences of Credibility in TV News"; Collins, "Social Inferences and Television Effects on Children") or the Office of Child Development (e.g., Henderson, "Television Model Effects on Cognitive Skills"; Bolz, "Television Content and Children's Social Attitudes"; Liefer, "Children's Critical Evaluation of Television Content"). The USOE perspective of this investigation also minimized inputs from agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Education.

Other limitations were imposed by the Original USOE Request for Proposal or were determined in subsequent consultation.

1. **Time.** The project was to start July 1, 1974 and terminate about nine months later. The assignments became focused in late September, 1974, after meetings with the advisory board and a Federal advisory group. This meant that about seven productive months were available for the investigation.

2. **Site Visits.** The Request for Proposal stipulated a maximum of five site visits to interview a variety of personnel related to children's television. As discussed later, this posed some very difficult choices, and led to the exclusion of some series and personnel which would have been
3. **Personnel Time.** The Request for Proposal estimated that the scope of the study envisioned "should require an expenditure of about one professional man year."

4. **Funding.** Based on the limitations above, the proposal for this project was funded by USOE at a rather modest level in the full realization that the scope of the investigation would necessarily be commensurate.

5. **Methodology.** The Request for Proposal stated that "...it is the intent of USOE that existing information be used in this study." That is, no acquisition of new data, other than that which could be gathered in the site visit interviews, was to be proposed.

6. **Types of Series.** Given the limitations on the number of site visits, it was determined in consultation that only current and nationally distributed television series especially designed for children would be subject to consideration. This immediately eliminated regional programs such as those produced by the Appalachian Educational Laboratory, demonstration projects such as the Denver Satellite Technology Demonstration, and formal purposive use of adult programming by children, such as is encouraged by the Prime Time School Television organization in Chicago. This limitation to nationally distributed series did not rule out series with no direct USOE support, however, nor did it necessarily rule out commercial children's series considered...
Selection of Sites and Program Series

Selection of sites and program series was made in consultation between the investigators and the Federal advisors. At various times in those discussions, the following series were considered: CARRASCOLENDAS, VILLA ALEGRE, CAPTAIN KANGAROO, ROMPER ROOM, INSIDE/OUT, RIPPLES, FAT ALBERT AND THE COSBY KIDS, SESAME STREET, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, MISTER-ROGER'S NEIGHBORHOOD, NEW ZOO REVUE, BIG BLUE MARBLE, and ZOOM. If not all "purposive" series in the sense of having formal objectives, they at least were considered to be designed for other than purely entertainment purposes. Other series, particularly from commercial television, could have been added to the list. The choices were very difficult to make. What follows is a brief summary of the rationales employed and the decisions made.

Because existing literature, rather than original data, was to be the basis for the study, the two series of the Children's Television Workshop (CTW), SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, were almost mandatory choices, because of their unique blend of funding sources, and because far more in the way of history and research has been written about these than for any other children's series. As a site visit location for field interviews, New York also provided access to the three commercial networks and a major non-Federal funder, the Ford Foundation. New York became one of the five sites visited and the CTW programs became two of the six programs investigated. Additionally, a less extensive investigation was made of BIG BLUE MARBLE, a series funded by IT & T and aired over commercial and public stations without commercials. This allowed an exploration of the
generalizability of BIG BLUE MARBLE's funding model; and the producers' interests in Federal involvements with this series.

Among the group of television series under consideration, INSIDE/OUT, produced by the Agency for Instructional Television (AIT), Bloomington, Indiana, was the only series distributed nationally, mostly over public broadcasting stations, that was designed exclusively for in-school use. Also, the funding arrangements for INSIDE/OUT were unique, coming from the state level in a consortium of cooperating state school systems. Bloomington, Indiana as a site and INSIDE/OUT as a series were selected.

The unique aspect of ZOOM, in terms of our desired financial analyses, was that it had developed entirely within the system of public broadcasting, which represents a different chain of decision-making from that in which USOE would typically be involved. After a few years, a lessening of funds made it necessary to supplement the public broadcasting funds with non-Government funds, and this aspect of financing was also desired for review. ZOOM is produced at station WGBH in Boston, which was also attractive as a site visit location because of the accessibility to the Center for Research in Children's Television at Harvard University, Action for Children's Television, and the Education Development Center, which was in the early stages of production of a series in mathematics funded under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), and administered by USOE. The decision was made to include ZOOM as a series and Boston as a site visit.

Only two series funded under ESAA had been completed and were on the air at the time of our investigation: CARRASCOLENDAS and VILLA ALEGRE, both Spanish-English bilingual series for children, but targeted for different age groups. These two series were funded totally and directly by
USOE, the only series on the list of possible programs to be so funded. The CARRASCOLENDAS programs were produced by KLRN, Austin, Texas, and the VILLA ALEGRE programs were produced by Bilingual Children's Television, Inc. (BC/TV), Oakland, California. Because of the major Federal investment in several ESAA series (about $19-23 million, depending on definition) inclusion of these two completed ESAA series was almost mandatory. Thus, sites four and five (Austin and Oakland) were selected, and the options were consumed.

One of the things USOE wanted to consider was the accessibility of Federally-funded program materials to commercial television. CAPTAIN KANGAROO had the interesting history of combining at one time some Federally-funded inserts in the CBS commercial series. Current and former CBS officials were interviewed to explore, among other things, the generalizability of this kind of association between the Federal Government and commercial television. Chicago's public television station WTTW produced spot announcements under a contract from USOE for distribution on commercial television. Rather than include Chicago as a site visit, however, it was decided to include an analysis of this experience in Herman Land's commissioned paper entitled "Federal Government Involvement in Commercial Television for Children."

The five series below were considered but not included. ROMPER ROOM is not truly a national series, but a locally-adapted syndicated series, hence not falling within the limits of the requirement for inclusion in this study. RIPPLES, produced by the Agency for Instructional Television, was considered in many ways the forerunner of INSIDE/OUT, hence redundant for purposes of our review. MISTERROGER'S NEIGHBORHOOD was closing down...
production of new programs, and offering the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) a five-year package of reruns. NEW ZOO REVUE and FAT ALBERT AND THE COSBY KIDS were finally excluded, because the limited resources to cover site visits and series had been committed.

Types of Information Gathered

In addition to the rather limited library sources of information on funding-related issues, both USOE and site visit personnel were very cooperative in sharing memoranda and reports.

There was no standardized set of questions for the site visit interviews; we sought from each interviewee his or her experiences that would shed light on the major USOE issues in children's television. Many of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, yielding more detail than can be included in this report. From the representatives of the six television series studied (CARRASCOLENDAS, SESAME STREET, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, INSIDE/OUT, VILLA ALEGRE, and ZOOM) we tried in each case to get a report from the "receiving end" of the funder-production agency relationship, whether the funder was Federal, non-Federal or both. This "view of the real world" from the perspective of the production agencies is critical to the analysis of what the Federal role in children's television has been and should be.

The commissioned papers are another important source of information and policy recommendations. Each author was given background information on the nature of the investigation, as well as a suggested list of questions and issues to cover in the paper. The authors, all content experts in the area of their paper, were given free reign to incorporate the
data they felt relevant, to interpret the data according to their best judgment, and to go beyond the data with professional opinions and recommendations. The ten commissioned papers are not edited into a common style, and they do not reflect a uniform point of view. The commissioned papers will be referred to in the body of this report; they are also presented separately in their entirety in Volume II. Together, they can be seen as ten, independent "snapshots" of children's television, each from the viewpoint of a specialized problem area.

**Organization for the Remainder of the Report**

Chapter Two examines briefly the relationships among audience, hardware, and software factors in an attempt to set up a framework for examining children's television programs in some type of a logical framework. Included here will be sociological/organizational features of (a) the voluntary, in-home audience; (b) the in-school audience; and (c) the specialized interest group audience. The hardware segments will examine broadcast (i.e., open-circuit, over-the-air) and non-broadcast distribution systems. Software segments will incorporate the organizational arrangements for producing programs, as illustrated in the six children's series selected for study.

Chapter Three traces the Federal involvement in children's television through the channels of its two largest investments: Children's Television Workshop, and money set aside for television in the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA). The organizational principle in this chapter is to examine both investments side by side within various issues, categories, or features, such as the legislation itself, monies allocated, proposal processes, and so forth. The four USOE-funded children's series in this study are in-
cluded in this section, major documentation for which came from USOE files.

Chapter Four examines specific policy issues. This includes identifying the issue, stating the major arguments that have been gathered vis-à-vis that issue, and either concluding with a policy recommendation or a set of policy alternatives. Some of the issues will have been introduced in Chapters Two and Three; others will come up for the first time in Chapter Four.

Appendix A is the list of interviewees, and Appendix B is a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in the report.
Chapter Two: Understanding Television: Audience, Hardware, and Software Factors

The Systemic Nature of Television

In linear analysis, a television program is a middle link in a long chain, and can only be understood in policy analysis terms by examining the chain as a whole. In process analysis, a television program is one component in a highly interrelated system, and can only be understood by examining the system as a whole. To a sociologist, or psychologist, the analysis of the audience may be paramount, with little concern given to a particular program and how it came into being. To a technologist, the distribution system may be paramount, with little concern given to subtleties of program production; who, if anyone is watching; and what effects, if any, are resulting. Script writers, producers, funders, union negotiators, promotion specialists, station managers, evaluators, curriculum specialists, utilization specialists, and the like, may identify with one or more components of the system without necessarily taking into account the system as a whole. Advocates and pressure groups may push for change in one part of the system without thinking through the consequences for the system as a whole. Without examining the entire system, the limitations may not be apparent on the number and location of entry points in the system that can be influenced properly and effectively by funders such as the Federal government. The attempt will be made in this chapter to describe some of the major features of television as an interrelated system, so that the reverberations and implications of a particular action can be better estimated.
The In-Home Audience for Television

Television is looked on with favor by the in-home audience, both in absolute terms, and relative to the media of magazines, newspapers, and books (Bower, 1973). Why do they watch? The predominance of the entertainment motive is suggested by Bower's data (1973, p. 62) on the 1970 audience, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Percent saying this reason for watching television usually applies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;To see specific program I enjoy very much&quot;</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;To see a special program I've heard a lot about&quot;</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Because I feel like watching television&quot;</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Because it's a pleasant way to spend an evening&quot;</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Because I think I can learn something&quot;</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Because there is nothing else to do at the time&quot;</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The emphases were not in the original, but were added. In a list of 15, the six reasons above were the only ones to be chosen by more than 25% of the respondents, all adults.

Wright (1959) brings out other important features of the audience as they relate to the distribution system and the source of programming in his characterization of mass communication:
...it is directed toward relatively large, heterogeneous, and anonymous audiences; messages are transmitted publicly, often timed to reach most audience members simultaneously, and are transient in character; the communicator tends to be, or to operate within, a complex organization that may involve great expense. (p. 15)

The in-home audience is voluntary; it is an audience with viewing alternatives; and non-viewing alternatives or distractions as well. It must be attracted to watch; the programmer can exert little if any pressure on the child to view in the form of encouragement to view, external rewards for viewing, or "punishments" for not viewing. By being in-home, the child viewers are essentially anonymous—to the programmer, and to each other. Conditions of viewing on a case-by-case basis are unknown to any central person. For the most part, viewing cannot be reliably prepared for in the home, controlled, sequenced across programs, individualized, related to ancillary materials, or followed up.

The parental role in children's television viewing at home is, of course, critical. Bower (1973) found 76% of the respondents in his 1970 survey reporting that, all things considered, children are better off with television than without television (p. 153). There were three perceived advantages for children that received more than 4% mentions: education (80%), entertainment (23%), and baby-sitting (16%) (p. 157). "Parents perceive of television for children as primarily an educator, with some entertainment and a small amount of baby-sitting thrown in" (p. 159; emphasis in the original). Even in those periods where the child is part of a larger family viewing group, the children "come pretty close to being equal partners with their parents" in deciding which program(s) to watch (p. 183). Greenberg (1975, commissioned paper, p. 20) notes that child control of the set is greater in lower-income families than in middle-income families.
For the in-home audience, the program must succeed in television terms before it can succeed on any other terms. This fundamental and self-evident point, still not universally appreciated, simply means that the program must attract an audience before it can be effective at all. Kincaid, McEachron, & McKinney (1974) state:

There is no consistent evidence that making the media more sophisticated enhances effectiveness. For instance, for televised instruction, there is no consistent evidence that color, animation, humor, or dramatic rather than expository presentation improves effectiveness, although it does attract a larger audience—Sesame Street is a prime illustration of this. (p. 8)

Getting an in-home audience to watch a purposive program voluntarily in the first place is no small part of the problem. Purposive television must go where the children are and where the television receivers are. For preschoolers, the children and the television receivers are in the home, and this implies a host of environmental and sociological realities that must be dealt with compatibly in the programming strategy.

According to estimates of the A. C. Nielsen Company, more than 68 million households, or slightly more than 97 percent of all U. S. households, own a working television set (Nielsen Newscast, #3, 1974), which is, in effect, the near-saturation point.

The American Research Bureau (ARB) estimates that of the homes with television receivers, 68 percent have color sets, and 44 percent of the homes have multiple sets (ARB, Winter, 1974). ARB further estimates that 86 percent of the households with television are capable of receiving UHF signals.

A. C. Nielsen Company estimates that average daily television usage per household is six hours and fourteen minutes (Nielsen Newscast, #1, 1974;
Broadcasting, March 3, 1975). Approximately two-thirds of the television sets are in use during prime time (7:30 to 11 p.m.); more than a third in fringe time (5 to 7:30 p.m. and 11 to 11:30 p.m.); 28 percent in the afternoons; and about 18 percent in the mornings.

Of importance to the present examination is the use of television by non-adults. Television audience research firms break down the audience on certain characteristics such as age and sex, which is useful to advertisers who wish to target their messages to particular audiences. Non-adults are typically defined as those between 2 and 17 years of age, inclusive. There are about 61 million people in the United States who fall into this age category, or about 30 percent of all persons in television households. A more specific breakdown of non-adults is shown in Table 2 (Ogilvy & Mather, letter to Mielke, April 11, 1975):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male teens (12-17)</td>
<td>12,590,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female teens (12-17)</td>
<td>12,210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children (2-5)</td>
<td>13,520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children (6-11)</td>
<td>22,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Children (2-5) are among the heavier viewers of television; male teens view the least of any group. Table 3 shows the rank order, most to least, of groups using television in mid-winter, 1973 (Nielsen Newscast, #1, 1974):
Table 3
Rank Order of Groups Using Television

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>35-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>6-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>35-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Female teens</td>
<td>12-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Male teens</td>
<td>12-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Nielsen, "this ranking of non-adults is historically typical."

In February, 1974, the month of the year in which typically there is the most television viewing, non-adults in 1974 watched on the average about three and a half hours of television each day. Specifically, each age category watched the amounts of television during the average week indicated in Table 4 (Nielsen Newscast, #2, 1974):

Table 4
Average Weekly Viewing for Non-Adults in February, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average Weekly Viewing (hours:minutes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children 2-5</td>
<td>30:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 6-11</td>
<td>26:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 12-17</td>
<td>21:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 12-17</td>
<td>20:55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given these figures as averages, it can be calculated that when the average person graduates from high school, that person will have spent more hours watching television than being in the classroom.
Prime-time television (7:30 to 11:00 p.m. E.S.T.) attracts the largest non-adult audience; typically 27 percent of the prime-time audience is non-adult. In February, 1975, the top ten child-appeal programs were aired on commercial television, and eight of the top ten were in prime time; the most popular, EMERGENCY, attracted almost 9 million children aged 2-11 during the average minute (Broadcasting, March 3, 1975). The two non-prime-time programs among the top ten were LAND OF THE LOST and THE NEW ADVENTURES OF GILLIGAN. Weekday early fringe (5:00 to 7:30 p.m. E.S.T.) is proportionately the highest of all dayparts for children 2-11.

Saturday morning, normally thought of as the "children's time," makes up a small percentage of the average weekly viewing—about 15 percent for all non-adult viewing and only about "eight percent of the viewing done by children 2-11" (Nielsen Newscast, #1, 1974).

Instead, non-adult viewing is spread throughout the weekday and the weekend. As of February, 1975, the percentage of audience made up of non-adults (age 2-11) during the various dayparts is presented in Table 5 (Ogilvy & Mather, letter to Mielke, April 11, 1975):

Table 5
Non-Adult Percentages of Audience for Various Dayparts in February, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M-F 10-4:30</th>
<th>M-F 4:30-7:30</th>
<th>M-Sn 8-11</th>
<th>M-Sn 11pm-1am</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children 2-5</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 6-11</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 12-17</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It also should be clear that television, particularly network television, is an inexpensive means of reaching a lot of children simultaneously in terms of cost per thousand exposures to commercials. Simplistically, the bigger the audience in broadcasting, the higher the advertising rates, and the greater the opportunity for profit. Similarly, the larger the audience, the more money which can be invested in program development and experimentation. As a result, prime-time programming is typically the most expensive, fringe time the next most expensive, and so on. Saturday morning children's programming is among the least expensive programming produced on network television because the audience is small and not the "ideal" audience for most advertisers. "The budget for the average Saturday morning half-hour cartoon is probably in the region of $50,000 to $55,000 a half-hour..., as against $250,000 to $300,000 for a half-hour for prime-time children's specials like How the Grinch Stole Christmas, or the [other] Dr. Seuss and Winnie the Pooh shows" (Pearce, 1974, p. 17).

It is difficult to estimate a "typical" cost of a minute of programming, and simple comparisons of costs-per-minute can be deceptive. Some companies do and some do not include overhead and administrative expenses in per-minute costs. The quality of production desired can affect costs a great deal: for example, animation costs may vary from $2,000 to $30,000 per minute, depending on what is desired. A Shakespeare production in street clothes would presumably be less expensive than the same Shakespeare production in full costume. The use of union vs. non-union shops can make a difference in production costs. Interpretability demands, therefore, that cost-per-minute comparisons take into consideration (a) the accounting methods used by the production agency; (b) the production in sophistica-
tion desired; and (c) whether the production agency is unionized.

Even if calculable on a strictly standardized basis, the program with the lowest cost-per-minute may not be the best investment. The value received from production investments depends, not so much on program attributes as on the size of audience attracted, and on audience impact. Cost per target audience exposure is critical. For illustrative purposes only, assume that the typical purposive children's show will cost in the neighborhood of $1,000 to $2,000 per minute, or $30,000 to $60,000 per half hour. If that program reaches only 1,000 children, the per-show cost of $60 per viewer suggests that alternatives to television would probably be more cost-efficient. On the other hand, if that program reaches 6,000,000 children, the cost per person reached is one cent. An even more responsive measure, if calculable, would be cost per unit of desired audience impact.

Once the basic programming and distribution costs are covered, anyone in the coverage area of a station is capable of receiving the program. Such is not the case with books or newspapers, where, excepting multiple readership, the addition of one user means an additional unit cost of producing one more book or newspaper. Television, therefore, is most efficient with large audiences.

The "economies of scale" appeal of television is attractive not only to broadcasters attempting to reach the in-home audience, but also to broadcasters serving the in-school audience.

The In-School Audience for Television

There are only two major places where children can watch television: in homes and schools, and the schools may well be the more underdevel-
oped opportunity. Sociological/organizational features of the in-school audience are quite different from those of the in-home audience discussed earlier.

In the abstract, the in-school audience is perhaps the most promising of all settings for high-impact use of purposive television. The audience is grouped more homogeneously than would be the case in almost any other setting. Competing activities can be controlled, and the pupils are in that setting for the purpose of learning in the first place. The viewing can be supervised and controlled, meaning that there can be pre-viewing preparation, integration of non-broadcast materials, and follow-up activities which can be individualized to needs of particular pupils.

To the extent that programming designed for the in-home audience must devote significant resources to overcoming the limitations of the in-home audience setting, the in-school program can in principle be more direct, compact, incrementally sequenced, and, by implication, more efficient. However, when this reduces to a televised version of a classroom teacher, the record of the last two decades allows little optimism for in-school television. The "master teacher" concept of the fifties (low budget, talking face) is essentially moribund.

Where one could expect less acceptance of a program designed especially for in-school use among the voluntary in-home audience, a program that has overcome the obstacles to attracting an in-home audience will probably be attractive to an in-school audience as well. This is evidenced, for example, by the in-school use of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, which was largely targeted to children at home; but, as discussed later, has reached substantial numbers of children in the schools.
The pupils are not autonomous as to whether they will view and what they will view in the classroom setting, of course, because of the intervening organizational mechanisms of the school. The classroom teacher, the principal, the local and state education organizations all mediate between the programmer and the audience, and these mediations can be facilitative or restrictive. At a logistical level, the complex scheduling of classes must be compatible with the complex scheduling of broadcasts, when the open-circuit broadcast mode is employed, and open-circuit broadcasting is by far the predominant distribution system for in-school programming at this time. This is ameliorated somewhat by the willingness of many public broadcasters to repeat the programs and the willingness of the teachers to adopt their schedules, particularly to highly desirable programs. Also, at the logistical level is the systemic requirement of a sufficient number of television sets to receive the programming, an issue discussed later. At the attitudinal level, there must be a commitment to the concept of in-school television programming, essentially at all points in the hierarchy of the school system. It is argued that if quality in-school programming is made available, this will be followed by (a) attitudinal commitment to in-school television; (b) adequate technology to receive such programming; and (c) adaptive logistical arrangements to utilize such programming.

School curriculum is traditionally a local and state affair, not a Federal affair, and this tradition can work against the economies of scale achievable in nationally-produced and distributed programming. However, as demonstrated by the Agency for Instructional Television, local and state interests can voluntarily cooperate in programming that meets mutual needs. This maintains the traditional state and local control of curriculum while concurrently achieving the economies of scale of national programming.
While in-home reception capability is almost universal, the technical capabilities of schools for television reception is less clear. The problem is that while marketing and audience research firms pay a lot of attention to the in-home audience and in-home reception capability, no one knows exactly what the reception capability is for schools, and ratings do not reflect the in-school audience.

USOE has released announcements for FY 75, requesting proposals for television programming under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA). The announcements contain a pessimistic assessment of the potential of in-school utilization for ESAA programs: "Because of the paucity of classroom video receivers throughout the nation, and the reluctance of many teachers to use television even where there is access to a TV set, the potential for any given student to be exposed to an ESAA-TV series while seated in a classroom is minimal." Without disagreeing at all with the continuing specification—that the series should not be designed to be dependent on classroom logistical support—one can still question whether the opening assumption should be pessimistic in that degree for the in-school audience.

The availability to the class of a working TV receiver at the right time is a necessary but not sufficient condition for viewing. Set availability statistics therefore state the maximum possible audience, not the actual audience or the probable audience. The maximum possible audience for a commercial program would include almost everyone in the country. The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) has sketchy and obsolescent data on reception capability from a 1970 survey, the latest Federal compilation of such information (NCES, February 9, 1971): there were 81,000 public schools, and 75% had one or more TV receivers. Some of these could
have been for teacher rather than student use, however. A better question is, what proportion of schools owning one or more receivers report actually using educational telecasts in the schools? Of 61,000 schools owning one or more receivers, 71% reported educational usage; this went up to 75% for elementary schools and down to 59% for secondary schools. "Educational usage" is too general a concept to give much guidance, however. An index of the level of commitment to in-class viewing may be inferred from the number of receivers available for classroom use. NCES (1971) data are reported in Table 6.

Table 6

Percent of All Public Schools and of All Pupils in Public Schools by Number of Television Receivers for Classroom Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Television Receivers</th>
<th>Total Schools (81,000)</th>
<th>Total Pupils (44 million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (all numbers)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None:</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4:</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9:</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 or more:</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one would define a "committed" school as one that made available five or more sets, then 23% of the schools had made the commitment, and they encompassed 30% of the pupils as of 1970. This is consistent with an estimate made by Edwin Cohen, Executive Director, Agency for Instructional Television (AIT), that approximately one-third of all U.S. schools utilize over-the-air transmissions at least once per week (Cohen, 1975, interview). Systematic data on how many pupils are reached regularly are
difficult to find. The in-school audience for VILLA ALEGRE and CARRASCOLENDAS is greater than zero, but unknown. AIT estimates, on the basis of such things as the enrollments in schools that pay to receive the program, and the number of teacher guides requested, that approximately 5 million children were viewing its program INSIDE/OUT in schools during the 1974-75 school year (Fox, 1975, interview). If that estimate is accurate, that is, by most standards for purposive children's programming, a substantial audience.

More detailed data on school utilization of a purposive children's program are available from summative evaluations conducted on THE ELECTRIC COMPANY (TEC) (Liebert, 1973). Among the population of private and public schools containing grades 2, 3, or 4 (plus a few ungraded elementary schools), an estimated 35% were using TEC in the Fall of the 72-73 school year, which covered TEC's second season; 25% were in the "bullseye" of the target audience (second grade), and 10% were in some other grade between 1 and 6. About 40% of the schools were unable to receive TEC because of no sets, or technical problems in reception. The remaining 25% could have received TEC but did not. A composite table, drawn from Liebert's data (1973), shows (Table 7) the extent of utilization of TEC by schools, teachers, and pupils, across grades 1-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Percent of Schools Using TEC**</th>
<th>Percent of Teachers Using TEC***</th>
<th>Percent of Pupils Viewing TEC****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* based on all U. S. schools containing at least one of grades 2, 3, or 4.
To the extent that a school was identified as a "user" school, even though only a fraction of the classroom teachers within that school might actually have used TEC, the percentage of "utilizing teachers" should be much smaller than the percentage of "user schools." To the extent that "utilizing teachers" engaged proportionately fewer numbers of pupils than "non-utilizing teachers" the percentage of "viewing pupils" should be smaller than the percentage of "utilizing teachers." As shown in Table 7, the slippage was not dramatic, particularly in light of Liebert's subsequent comment (telephone call to Mielke, April 14, 1975) that the principals' estimates of TEC viewership were conservative.

Another issue in interpreting such utilization data is the frequency or regularity with which the pupils viewed the series. In a second-phase survey of utilizing teachers that had previously been identified by principals, teachers were asked to indicate the number of days per week that their pupils generally watched the show. For the Fall of 1972, the average across teachers was 3.6 days per week out of the 5 days per week that it was in theory available (Liebert, 1973, p. A92).

The intended audience, of course, is not schools, principals, teachers, or classrooms, but pupils. An estimated 3.7 million pupils in grades 1-6 viewed TEC in school during the Fall of 1972 (Liebert, 1973, p. A93). In addition to the in-school audience, TEC also reaches a substantial in-home audience. In a four-week period in January-February, 1974, TEC was viewed at least once in 9,599,000 households, which was 14.5% of all U.S. Households. The average number of telecasts seen during the period was 4.8
The in-school audience for national programming is quantitatively large enough already to be taken quite seriously by USOE, and, with about a quarter of the U.S. population in school, this audience can probably be increased significantly.

**Distribution Systems**

**Broadcast Television: Commercial.** The television stations provide the backbone of broadcasting in the U.S. As of February 28, 1975, there were 512 VHF and 197 UHF commercial and 95 VHF and 147 UHF noncommercial broadcast stations on the air. Approximately 85 percent of the commercial stations are affiliated with one of the three major networks: CBS, NBC or ABC. Most of the noncommercial stations are interconnected via the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).

Commercial television is a business which is interested in attracting audiences in order to sell time to advertisers (Owen, Beebe, & Manning, 1974, p. 4). "However, in a commercial broadcast system, the paying customer to whom the market responds is not the viewing audience but rather the advertiser" (Melody, 1972, p. 10). Advertisers are interested not only in the size of the audience but also in its characteristics or "demographics" such as age, sex and income. The larger the demographically ideal audience, the higher the rates a station can charge an advertiser. Advertisers are most interested in adults who spend money in the marketplace. As a consequence, much of the programming on commercial television is and will remain oriented towards adults (see Pearce, 1972; Melody, 1972; Owen et al., 1974; Noll, Peck, & McGowan, 1973; Land, 1975, commissioned paper).
There has been pressure to eliminate advertising from children's programming (ACT Petition for Rulemaking, February 5, 1970) which resulted in a "voluntary" suggestion of a decrease of commercial time in children's programming by the National Association of Broadcasters. Simultaneously, the FCC urged an increase in the amount of time devoted to children's programming (FCC Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, October 24, 1974). The FCC urged that programming for children be presented throughout the week and that a "reasonable" amount be designed to educate and inform and not simply entertain. The FCC expressed a feeling that, for the present time, the industry's new commercial standards were appropriate.

There is little likelihood that advertising on children's programming will be eliminated entirely, although clustering commercials before and/or after the program is a possibility. If there is an increase in the amount of programming, as long as the commercial broadcasters have to be concerned with ratings and satisfy their stockholders, the types of programs are still likely to be heavily entertainment-oriented and designed to appeal to the largest possible audience. One network executive said that a way out of this dilemma would be to drop ratings in children's television (see Duffy, 1974). This seems highly unlikely, for now even public television seems to be interested in ratings (Broadcasting, August 26, 1974, p. 24).

There may be some advertisers interested in image advertising via institutional spots or underwriting a program series. As Land points out, corporate support of programming would be considered if it "would enhance the corporation's own ultimate marketing welfare—that is, [if] the medium was conceived as a political-public relations instrument" (Land, 1975, p. 55). Such an effort would be a small part of a company's overall market-
Although image advertising, like underwriting, is part of an increasing trend, normally no more than 5 percent of a company's total advertising budget is devoted to the promotion of a company image. Because of this, and lacking any encouragement, institutional advertising and/or underwriting seem to provide no easy or simple answers to the problem of paying for children's television programs that have fewer commercials or are commercial-free. (Pearce, 1972, p. 62)

Two years later, Pearce contended that:

If institutional advertising or underwriting were imposed on the networks and television stations in the area of children's programming, commercial support for such programming would be seriously reduced resulting in the cancellation of most children's programming. In addition, any children's programming that remained would have smaller budgets. Consequently, it is felt that any dramatic shift from commercial advertising to underwriting or institutional advertising would result in the elimination of children's television as we know it today. (Pearce, 1974, p. 48)

It would appear that it is unlikely to expect the development of purposive television in commercial broadcasting on any large scale. This is not to condemn the orientation of commercial broadcasting towards advertisers or profits but rather is a recognition that they are in a profit-making business and make decisions accordingly.

Although there may be ways in which commercial stations and networks can be encouraged or assisted in providing purposive children's programming (see, for example, Land's commissioned paper, 1975), it is assumed that other distribution systems are more likely outlets for purposive children's programming, especially when the target audiences are small.

It should be pointed out that commercial television is an extremely complex business, a thorough explanation of which is not appropriate for this study. Such explanations are already detailed elsewhere (see Head, 1972; Brown, 1971; Noll et al., 1973; Beebe et al., 1974).
Broadcast Television: Public. The other major distribution system utilized today is the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which interconnects the nation's public television stations. Public stations are operated by non-profit organizations supported by local, State, and Federal funds, grants from corporations and non-profit organizations, and contributions from the general public. Their licenses prohibit them from carrying commercial messages although certain underwriting and money-raising activities are permitted by the FCC.

Although 97 percent of the homes in the U. S. are television equipped, not all are capable of receiving all of the networks. The three commercial networks cover most of the country. The areas not covered by commercial over-the-air network-affiliated broadcasting stations have relied on other technologies such as cable television or translators to get these signals. The cost of reaching people in sparsely-populated regions is enormous, and has generally resulted in those persons not being served by broadcast television.

Estimates vary on the number of people capable of receiving a signal from a public station—but it is generally agreed that somewhere between 70 to 80 percent of this nation's population resides within the predicted Grade B contour of a public television signal. Coverage maps of noncommercial and commercial stations were prepared by Battelle under a USOE contract (see Tressel, 1975).

Nearly two-thirds of the public stations are UHF. Although about 86 percent of the receivers today are UHF-equipped, the frequency still suffers as a "poor cousin" to VHF and is largely made up of public and independent stations. The UHF signal is more difficult to tune with the typical receiver,
and the coverage area is smaller than VHF.

National networking was considered a viable alternative to local programming in commercial broadcasting as early as 1923 and was institutionalized with the formation of the National Broadcasting Company in 1927. Interconnection of stations is considered the lifeblood of television broadcasting—the costs of programming and the amount demanded on a daily basis generally mediate against quality as well as quantity in local programming. Economies of scale are probably no better illustrated than when a network or producer can produce a program for several hundred thousand dollars and recoup the investment because a large number of stations use the program and thereby the "cost" is spread among several hundred outlets with millions of potential viewers.

The need for live interconnection in public broadcasting was not seriously addressed on a national basis until passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. That Act, which was the result of recommendations by the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, resulted in the establishment of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) to provide broad-range financial assistance to public television. CPB formed the Public Broadcasting Service in 1970 to manage the interconnection and distribute national programs. The interconnection system is shown on the following page.

In 1973, PBS merged with the Coordinating Committee of Governing Board Chairman, the Education Television Stations Division of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters... [and] is now a non-profit membership corporation. PBS activities include operation of a national interconnection service; distribution of a national program service to public television licensees; representation before Congress, the Executive Branch, the CPB and the public; and operation of a
central revenue service that provides professional services and up-to-date information for its member stations. (Lee & Pedone, 1974, p. 57)

PBS also operates the Public Television Library (PTL), a tape exchange and distribution center for recorded programming.

PBS is governed by a dual board: a Board of Governors, consisting of elected lay representatives from stations' boards; and an elected Board of Managers. PBS per se does not produce programs, but most of the PBS programs are produced by member stations.

The staff and services of PBS (with the exception of the technical operation of the interconnection system, which is sustained by a contract with CPB) are supported entirely by dues from PBS's member stations.

Production costs of programs distributed by PBS are underwritten through three major sources: (1) the federal government through funds administered by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, (2) foundations and corporations through grants, and (3) public television stations through contributions of local productions for national distribution and through a station program cooperative, a system which began in fiscal 1975 whereby each station participates in the funding of those national programs it wishes to carry. (PBS Factsheet)

One of the more intriguing aspects of PBS is their implementation in FY 75 of the station program cooperative (SPC), a plan which allows the stations to act as consumers and decide which programs they are willing to support by sharing in the programs' cost as well as the distribution cost's (see "Inside the Program Cooperative," PTK, 1974). Even before the SPC, and certainly after it, "American public broadcasting is the most decentralized national telecommunications structure in the world" (Witherspoon, 1974).

Like it or not, public broadcasting must compete with other media for audience attention. Lyle (1974) writes:
of a competitive broadcasting market. The vast majority of the population of the United States live in markets where they have simultaneous availability of the three major television networks and one or more "independent" (non-network) commercial stations, a public television station, plus a considerable number of AM and FM radio signals which may include a public station. Commercial viability is based on numbers. Programming which can attract a large number of viewers and listeners has commercial viability. The unpleasant implication of this truism for public broadcasters is that the probabilities are quite high that the "alternatives" for which it provides will attract minority audiences. Indeed, since large minorities can be commercially viable for the independent stations, the probability is that the audiences of individual programs on public broadcasting will be not just a minority, but a small minority at that. (Lyle, 1974)

Still, an "A. C. Nielsen Company study showed PBS evening programs were viewed in 27 million (40.7%) of U. S. television households over an eight week period, October 25-November 21, 1974" (PBS Factsheet). CPB reports that another 7% regularly use public television during the day, which brings the audience estimate during the eight-week period to 47.7 percent. These are cumulative figures across an entire battery of programs, however, as opposed to the commercial standard of program rating. In a February, 1974 ratings sweep, 118 public stations had audiences so small they could not be estimated reliably (Cooper, 1974, interview).

In 1973, a total of 3,340 hours of educational, cultural and public affairs programming was supplied by PBS to member stations. During fiscal year 1973, public television stations devoted 32.1 percent of their time to classroom programming; the remaining 67.9 percent was devoted to general audience programming (Witherspoon, 1974, p. II-5). This percentage has been consistent for the past four years.

PBS provided 39.2 percent of all programs broadcast and the majority of general audience programming on public stations; locally produced pro-
grams was the second largest source of all programming: 21.1 percent in 1973. Other major sources were regional interconnection; the National Instructional Television Center (now AIT) at Bloomington, Indiana (4.9%); National Educational Television at Ann Arbor, Michigan (4.1%); Great Plains National Instructional Television Library at Lincoln, Nebraska (3.4%); and PBS's Public Television Library (2.9%) (figures from Lee & Pedone, 1974).

Beyond the three national commercial networks and the PBS interconnection distribution of programs on a national basis becomes extremely cumbersome and costly, and the number of potential viewers diminishes substantially. One option is to "bicycle" the program from station to station in tape form for broadcast locally, or to make a copy of the tape for each station agreeing to broadcast the program. This process is more costly, and can only have the potential audience reach of a nationally-supplied network program if enough stations are enlisted. Also, stations will typically be reluctant to schedule such bicycled programs at times when a network feed is available.

There are three major agencies which could be classified as national "syndicators" in public television: The Agency for Instructional Television (AIT); the Great Plains National Instructional Television Library (GPNITL); and PBS's Public Television Library (PTL). All three distribute tape or film to groups or organizations, not necessarily limited to public television stations, on request. Only AIT is involved in producing its own programs.

PTL offers series which, in most instances, have been carried on PBS; GPNITL takes many different kinds of programs from various sources; AIT considers the likely audience use before committing to a series. The series which go into the PTL and GPNITL libraries are marketed by those libraries.
but major use tends to focus on a few of the popular series of programs. As such, they supplement but cannot supplant a national interconnection.

AIT develops series which have been determined as needed by the eventual users of the program. Therefore, series now entering the AIT library are series for which demand is built in. Because these series are designed for use in-school, the schools make contact with the public stations in their area to obtain the desired broadcast times for the chosen series. Collectively, these contacts can amount to a "national" broadcast schedule on the public stations separately. As a consequence, the national interconnection is approximated.

Other Technologies

Cable television. Cable television has existed longer than educational or public television--cable began in 1949; the first ETV station began in 1953. Cable television amassed a large amount of intellectual and social support during the 1960s. People were discussing two-way interactive possibilities; there would be a wired nation with almost unlimited channels for everyone; a large part of the nation would be wired by 1975, etc, but it has hardly lived up to its most modest supporters' dreams. In 1975 only around 12.5 percent of the population in the U. S. was reachable via cable television; 6,000 communities--most of them very small and in rural areas--have cable systems. Slightly more than 8,100,000 homes or 26,000,000 people in the U. S. are reachable through a cable system. Given present economics and governmental restrictions, it is unlikely that cable television is going to increase penetration substantially in the near future.

Even utilizing every cable system, one could still only reach about
one home in ten now reachable via over-the-air broadcasting. Very few of
the systems are interconnected to allow even that capability, and only about
20 percent are capable of local live origination. This is not to say that
cable television should be ignored, but for the near future it does not ap-
pear to be a viable alternative to the use of public television for national
mass audience purposive programming.

Satellites. Although more than a decade has gone past in satellite
development, technical, economic, political and cultural as well as national
and international regulatory restraints are likely to preclude direct broad-
cast to home from satellites—the ultimate telecommunications ideal today—in the near future. Satellites are likely to be used in the next ten years
to interconnect public stations, cable systems, schools and hospitals, but
are "unlikely to replace conventional broadcasting, cable television or other
established terrestrial services, at least in the developed nations" (see
Norwood's paper, "The Next Ten Years in Satellite Development," in Witherspoon,
1974, p. V-48). In the foreseeable future in the U. S., satellites will not
replace public television as the major means of distribution of purposive
programming.*

Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS). Public television
broadcasting (i.e., "over the air") is advantageous to schools because it
is economical in that it covers a broad geographic area and a variety of
school systems can share in the costs of a given program. Its disadvantage
is that the limited broadcast spectrum usually only allows one or at the

*Louis Bransford, Director of Utilization at the Satellite Technology
Demonstration Project, Denver, Colorado, believes that satellites might be
a major means of distribution in the near future, perhaps within a couple
of years (Bransford, letter to Mielke, April 7, 1975).
most two public stations in a given area. ITFS was established in 1963 as one means of overcoming this obstacle. ITFS allows several programs to be "narrowcasted" simultaneously, point-to-point, to different "fixed" locations. One disadvantage is that it is not inexpensive. Although in principle ITFS is not inferior technically to regular over-the-air broadcasting, in practice it frequently performs less well than regular broadcasting. The channels which were set aside by the FCC for ITFS remain largely unused today in many areas of the U. S. (see Noll et al., Appendix C, 1973; Witherspoon, 1974).

The technology exists for distributing television programs to individual classes and even individual viewers by way of video cassettes or other forms of recording. A variation is to use normal off-hours of television stations to broadcast material for recording at the utilization site, for subsequent use in recorded form. The values of such consumer-controlled access to television, including consumer choice of when to view, ability to stop the tape, replay all or part of the program, etc., were noted by the U. S. Commissioner of Education (Bell, 1975, interview). The barriers here are economic rather than technological. Some estimate that the price of recording and playback materials will have to go down dramatically before the advantages of such a distribution system will become widespread (Cohen, 1974, interview). Multiple recordings of materials, especially materials originally prepared for broadcast use, also pose problems of copyright (see Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper).

One mission of this report was to examine the distribution system in the U. S. from a realistic viewpoint. It can only be concluded that for the near future, even for in-school use, over-the-air public broadcasting
is the most reasonable distribution system for national purposive children's programs.

For the immediate future, the Federal government's most likely delivery system will remain public television. Other systems should not be ignored, and cable is likely to become very important, but public television combines substantial reach with basic commitment to service programming. (Witherspoon, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 33)

It should also be concluded that over-the-air broadcasting should only be used if the potential target audience justifies the expense on an efficiency comparison to other methods. There are more cost efficient and, probably, more cost effective ways of reaching small target audiences. In those systems with historically demonstrated economic viability, television broadcasting is a mass medium, and its limited schedule will include only those programs which reach the largest acceptable target audiences. Public television need not go for the mass audience or the advertisers' "ideal" audience, but given limited spectrum space, resources and broadcast time, station management will still select those programs which benefit the greatest number of people.

A potential problem, however, is that in most communities there is only one public station.

At least for the foreseeable future, public television can be thought of as a set of one-channel transmitters, usually one to a city. Programs arrive at the transmitter by one of a number of routes, but each transmitter is programmed separately and there are only so many hours available each week. (Witherspoon, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 14)

As more sources begin supplying programs, the demand for time increases, but its availability remains constant. The result is that the competition for national distribution among programs and series will increase, and only the best programs will have access to the national distribution systems.
As the single channel distribution network continues and as more and more investment is made from [the government] sector and other sectors as well, you find out that you've got an eye-dropper that you're trying to put a fire hose stream through. (Dale, 1974, interview)

Although there is room for additional programming in the PBS broadcast schedule, and on most public stations, the point of saturation is quickly being reached. Any project anticipating distribution via public broadcasting would do well to consider scheduling probabilities before much development work is undertaken.

Alternative Media

Depending on the size, geographic dispersion, sociological setting, and the motivation of the audience, as well as the media characteristics needed to meet the objectives, one might consider not only alternative distribution systems for television, but also consider alternative media formats to television itself. For example, a taxonomy of alternative media formats, based essentially on signal processing capacities and characteristics, has been developed by Bretz (1969). The vast array of media characteristics and potential uses of those characteristics appear on the surface to open up the options enormously when considering the basic question of how might television best be used in the service of the needs of children, and what alternatives to television might accomplish the same ends.

The extraordinary versatility of the television medium makes it possible for television to incorporate most other media. Television can carry radio, movies, slides, print, graphs, computer displays, telephone conversations, digital and analogic codes—in fact anything that can be conveyed in the sensory modalities of sight and sound. Television can be used as sensory extensions for deep sea explorations, crime detection, airline
schedules, interplanetary probes, psychiatric interviews, business conferences, and reading water meters.

It is theoretically possible for television to serve the same functions as other media, and it is theoretically possible for other media to serve the same functions as television. If an analysis of a proposal to produce a television series should indicate that comparable effectiveness could be obtained in a non-television media format, it is estimated that the economics of the two options would nearly always favor the non-television alternative. If other things were equal, and the video channel were not essential, it would obviously be much less expensive to use radio. If a mission could be accomplished with a filmstrip, it is almost inconceivable that television could weigh in as a more cost effective medium. These are big "ifs" however. It is the reversal of these questions that indicates their limited applicability to the task at hand: would a version of SESAME STREET in slide/audio tape format be as effective as the television version? Could VILLA ALEGRE work as a radio program? Could ZOOM be mimeographed? Could INSIDE/OUT be computerized? These questions are not intuitively attractive on at least two counts: theoretically valid cross-media comparisons are extremely difficult to make; the questions obfuscate critical differences in the sociology of the audiences for different media.

Just within the medium of television itself, there is great diversity in the elements (such as level of funding, specialization of content, mode of distribution, program promotion, size, type and sociological audience setting desired and attained, and program evaluation) that will cluster to form one or another viable "system" of television. Examination of these various systems is more relevant to the task at hand than examination of
alternative media formats, and, as a result, is the focus of the present study.

**Specialized Audiences**

One can consider a special interest group, such as devotees of barbershop quartets, or whatever, to comprise a specialized audience. Such "devotee" groups are typically motivated to seek information; they enjoy communication with similarly inclined people, and are serviced by special organizations and specialized print media (newsletters, magazines). These interests are rarely served by broadcast television, and it is by no means clear yet that they can even support specialized programming over alternative distribution systems such as cable. One would refer to this as a relatively small "market."

Another form of specialized audience is based on special needs, such as the needs of especially gifted children, needs identified with a subgroup of American Indians, or minorities of children with particular kinds of physical or mental handicaps. Instead of a small "market," this would be a relatively small "target audience." These specialized audiences are less likely to be organized and serviced by specialized media. They are likely to be ignored by the commercial television programmer, with limited channel capacity to satisfy all demands. Even on systems, such as cable, where channel capacity is not the major problem, the economics of television programming are such that channels are not likely to be used to satisfy very small audiences unless they—or some agency on their behalf—pay the cost of the program. Adding more channels does nothing to lower program costs, rather it fractionalizes the audience so that there are fewer people to share the "costs" of the program.
There are several problems to be considered in conceptualizing a broadcasting system for meeting the needs of a special (i.e., non-general) group: audience size, dispersion, and target audience motivation to view ameliorative programming. Another critical factor is whether or not the programming designed for the special group would also have general appeal so that larger audiences (hence access to limited and powerful distribution systems, justification for higher funding, etc.) would be attracted. Considering the worst possibility of each problem area—a very small total group, geographically dispersed over the country, with little self-motivation to view special programming designed to assist their needs, and content that would, if it addressed their needs, not be competitively appealing to persons not having those needs—a television system of any form would not seem to be a viable method for reaching this group.

If the motivation to view is present or can be developed, if the total numbers are small, but geographically concentrated, a local or regional broadcasting or narrowcasting effort might well be justified, even if the appeal is restricted to the special group. Ethnic programming is an illustrative category here. Geographic dispersion of a small audience will always present a problem of access, especially to limited channel systems, such as national interconnection of single-transmitter public television communities.

The four conceptual issues addressed (target audience size, dispersion, motivation, and exclusivity of interests) are all continua; they cannot be reduced to a formula that determines in advance the wisdom of approaching the special need category by means of television; they all represent value judgments, and the value judgments should take into account what the non-
For example, if television is a poor prospect, but still the most promising option available, that requires a value judgment on whether to proceed or not.

Needs of the Disadvantaged Child that Might Be Addressed by Television

This section will present a brief summary of needs in five categories of children: ethnic minorities, economically disadvantaged, geographically isolated, handicapped, and female (sexism in media), as presented in commissioned papers by Barrow (1975); Greenberg (1975); Bransford (1975); Nygren and Withrow (1975); and Cantor (1975). All of these papers are included in their entirety in Volume II, and each paper contains data, where appropriate, on the frequency and location of children in that particular category. These descriptive data, therefore, are not repeated here.

Among children in ethnic minorities, Barrow's main point on needs is the need for more positive models in television programming, along with more attention to the cultural heritage of minorities.

Greenberg notes a high incidence of serious emotional problems among children living in poverty. These children also have lesser communication skills, and are more likely to use non-standard English; they also have lesser skills in obtaining and evaluating information. Their self-esteem is lower. In their interpersonal contacts, exposure to aspiration-raising models is quite limited.

Bransford summarizes: "The major problems in geographically isolated areas can be compressed into one: limited access to services" (p. 20). Basic schooling is often not available to geographically isolated children. Migrant children especially have difficulty in traditional school systems.
Dropout rates are very high. Health information is lacking. Remedial reading instruction is needed. Geographic isolation is frequently compounded by problems of poverty, unemployment, and bilingualism.

Nygren and Withrow note that utility of television in meeting the needs of the handicapped child is promising but not firmly established at this time. Areas in which television might be helpful include language development, and aiding concept development among hearing impaired children. Because their opportunities to participate socially are frequently limited, vicarious participation via television can be important. With special adaptation of programming, such as captioning to accommodate needs of the hearing-impaired, television should be more useful, and without decreasing its appeal to the wider audience.

Cantor, in the main, urges more frequent and positive role models for girls, with television serving as a socializing agent, to meet needs of self-concept development. In fact, all five papers on child needs stress the importance of television as a socializing agent.

**Specialized/General Needs, Programming, Distribution Systems, and Audiences**

A repeated theme throughout this report is the need for consistency among several elements that comprise a "system" of television. Not just one, but many systems can be devised to serve various purposes. When any given system as a whole is tuned to optimum efficiency, there will be consistency among its several elements. To be sure, inconsistent systems can operate on a short-term basis with enough underwriting, but the inevitable "strain toward consistency" of the system will, through one or another method of adaptation, force the system into consistency or make its continuance a
a non-viable option. The general principle is that stable, long-term systems will be internally consistent.

This section will discuss selected problems of systemic consistency as it pertains to specificity/generality of needs, programming, distribution systems, and audiences. The entry point will be the position taken by Mendelsohn (1970, commissioned paper) on the extent to which content for the general audience can reflect the needs, interests, and value structures of specialized interest groups. In vast oversimplification, Mendelsohn's position might be summarized like this: any special interest group that causes mass media content to conform to versions of realism and value structures approved by that special interest group will eventually cause the loss of the mass audience, and consequently, the fractionation of a mass medium into specialized media, each serving specialized audiences.

There is no doubt that special interest groups are in fact attempting to influence television content. Broadcasting magazine reported the following in the February 17, 1975 issue:

Loretta Lotman, media director of the National Gay Task Force, told NATPE, delegates last week that television must treat homosexuals as it would any other minority: with respect. Ms. Lotman said that gays had gone from no mention in the media to abusive mention, and that homosexuals were being shown almost exclusively "as clowns or as psychopaths." TV is the most unfair of the media, she said, because it is the most powerful. (p. 36)

Cablelines contained the following notice in the January, 1975 issue:

Chapters of the National Black Feminist Organization recently made simultaneous statements of complaint to their local media, demanding an end to racism and sexism in broadcast television programming. According to the statement, the worst type of role models exist for black women and children. "Television has been too reluctant to reflect the growing numbers of black female attorneys, physicians, and paraprofessionals." (p. 2)
The two citations above are interpreted to mean a desire on the part of special interest groups to change media content intended for the mass audience, rather than for specialized audiences demographically or psychologically similar to the composition of the special interest group.

In another context, Mac Norwood (1974, interview) was interested not only in programs for handicapped children, but also in programs for the mass audience about handicapped children.

Cantor (1975, commissioned paper) writes: "... roles given to females and males should be expanded so that more role models are provided to all children in order that individual growth is not dependent on outmoded definitions of masculinity and femininity" (p. 36). This is interpreted to mean a desire, not for special programs addressed to girls or boys, but to all children.

Bilingual Children's Television (BC/TV), producers of VILLA ALEGRE, could have programmed solely for the Hispanic child, and aimed only for the five top Spanish-speaking markets. Philosophically, the BC/TV key personnel rejected this "easier" assignment, and determined to try to be competitive in the national marketplace of children's programming, to be accepted and viewed in communities with and without sizable Spanish-speaking minorities (Rector & DeAvila, 1974, interviews). Similarly CTW recognized that, in programming to the needs of the disadvantaged child, the appeal and acceptance of SESAME STREET would have to be general if they were to have access to national distribution on anything other than a short-term demonstration project basis.

In other commissioned papers, it is less clear whether general or specialized audiences are sought for special-content programming. Barrow (1975,
commissioned paper) writes:

... most films deal with the harshness and hopelessness of ghetto life. There is a need for more films "dealing with positive experiences." (pp. 11-12)

There is a need... for programs dealing with the actual Indian heritage and with modern-day Indian life—in the cities and on the reservations. (p. 13)

Greenberg (1975, commissioned paper) writes:

The clear-cut fact that there are geographic pockets of the poor suggests that television content needs should in part be accommodated by emphasis on local and/or regional content availability in the areas where the poor are most likely to be living. (p. 30)

Bransford (1975, commissioned paper) writes:

Overall, the current CTV [children's television] programming is not adequately meeting the needs of rural populations, but has the potential... to serve children and youth in geographically isolated areas. (addendum, p. 1)

Nygren and Withrow (1975, commissioned paper) write:

[The Federal program for the handicapped should]... provide support to children's television programming... in the form of initial advisory input to include, where feasible, the interests of handicapped children. (p. 27)

The nine citations above are all seen as various facets of essentially the same issue: the desirability and feasibility of two intertwined factors: special interest vs. general interest content, and homogeneous, special-interest group audiences vs. heterogeneous, general-interest audience groups.

Mendelsohn has made a theoretical statement about the limits of diversity of special interest group portrayals in mass entertainment, particularly in response to demands for "realistic" and "favorable" portrayals, based on his assumptions of the functions served by mass media for mass audiences. Some of the others have made statements about the need for more
representation of special interests in content and, for purposes of image and modeling for the young, more "realistic" and favorable portrayals of special interest group members. At least it should be clear at this point (1) that the question of type of content desired in television should not be separated conceptually from the question of the desired type and amount of audience; and (2) that these issues are a critical part of one or another integrated system of television, with financial, pedagogical, production, distribution, and sociological components.

There is no apparent problem of reconciliation between the two points of view when specialized content is intended for specialized audiences. Nygren and Withrow (1975, commissioned paper) agree that some programming needed for the handicapped is so specialized that even adaptations of existing programs would not suffice; they suggest distribution of this highly specialized content to the target audience by means of cable. Bransford (1975, commissioned paper) agrees that special programming, and special utilization of existing materials, could be very useful to geographically isolated children in schools, with the material distributed by cassettes, satellites, and terrestrial delivery systems. Greenberg (1975, commissioned paper) suggests regional programming as a "supplement" to more mass-appeal national programming. His proposal for development of interactive television calls for the large channel capacity of cable distribution. Barrow (1975, commissioned paper) feels that low minority representation within the broadcasting industry is itself an obstacle to the airing of minority-oriented programming; he suggests that school and community minority audiences might be served by programming in video tape or 16 mm film formats. These uses of television engage different systems from national, real-time, over-the-air broadcasts via commercial or public television.
In broadcast television, channel capacity restrictions and the tremendous expense of quality production are the two main factors that demand large audiences for justifying the use of the medium in the first place. With cable, cassettes, or any other non-broadcast means of distribution, the channel capacity obstacle is removed, but the financial obstacle of costs for quality production is not. Both Barrow (1975, commissioned paper) and Nygren and Withrow (1975, commissioned paper) urge minority programming for non-broadcast distribution, but with budgets or technical quality comparable to that exhibited by the Children's Television Workshop programs, SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. This appears to be unrealistic, unless the unlikely outcome of reaching similar audience levels could be persuasively argued.

This is not to place any value judgments whatsoever on the relative merits of (1) programming about minorities and to minorities versus (2) programming about minorities and/or majorities to majorities. It is simply recognition of the fundamental fact that the size of the actual target audience is traditionally the major determinant of (1) the distribution system that can be justified; and (2) the amount of funding for production that can be justified. Large audiences, general-appeal programs, national distribution, and very expensive, professional production all go together. It is unlikely that one element will be realized in the absence of the others. In this fiercely competitive arena, high funding levels and access to national distribution systems are necessary but not sufficient conditions for good programming and large audiences. The key is good programming. In separate commissioned papers, both Ambrosino and Land (1975) state their belief that only a few centers of excellence can produce such national programming successfully.
Programs designed for limited audiences are likely to attract only limited audiences; they are also likely to be funded at modest levels (although it wouldn't take many of them to exceed the cost of a successful national program), not to have access to national distribution systems, and not to attract the limited top levels of creative writing and production talent.

USOE has been less directly involved in the remaining aspect of the issue—special interest group influences or control over the style and content of national, general appeal television programming—than have been the FCC, FTC, CPB and PBS policy groups, the NAB Code Board, and the Office of Civil Rights.

**Purposive Children's Television Funding: Some Examples**

There were 244 public television stations in the United States at the close of 1973 falling into four different station categories: State authorities/State commissions (71 stations); Community (68); University (65); and School (40). Historically, state authorities/commissions have received support from state legislatures; community stations from principally two sources: instructional television and gifts or grants from individuals, corporations and foundations; university stations are in large part affiliated with state universities and get their funds via university-type appropriations; and school stations depend on school board allocations. Historically, the stations have been programmed to serve the interests of the primary source of funding, but in the past five years, there has been a trend to find dollars wherever possible (Fenz, in *The People's Business*, 1975, p. 39).

Public television receives its funding from a variety of sources. That variety was noted by Fenz (1974, pp. 39-43), and the sources, the amounts,
and the percentages they represent and the variety of recipients for fiscal year 1972 were as shown in Table 8.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Federal Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. to CTW</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. to CPB</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. to facilities</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. to special projects</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corporate Underwriting of Specific Projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. to CPB</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. to PTV production centers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. to other PTV licensees and organizations</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National Foundations Support for Public Television</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. to CTW</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. to CPB</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. to PTV production centers</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. to other PTV licensees and organizations</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. State Government and University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. to PTV licensees and organizations</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. to Libraries and distribution centers</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Local government, School Board, etc., Support to PTV</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. to PTV licensees and organizations</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. to Libraries and distribution centers</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lee and Pedone's compilation (1973, p. 29) indicates that for fiscal year 1973, the funding sources for public television were quite similar to those in 1972. The following were the sources, amounts and percentages:

Table 9
Sources and Amounts of Funding for Public Television, FY 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>$48.4</td>
<td>22.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State government, state school boards, institutions of higher education</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>35.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government, school boards, etc.</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>11.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscriptions and Auctions</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>10.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unduplicated FY 73</strong></td>
<td><strong>$216.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The compilers did not give a breakdown on where the dollars were spent.
One of the advantages to the present, almost haphazard, system of funding for public television is that it has a great advantage of insulation through diversity. By having national programming funded by corporations, foundations, CPB and, now, the stations through the SPC, as well as government agencies, we have diversified to some extent the funding arrangement so that no single funder can dominate the national programming. (Gunn, 1975, interview)

Funding sources for specialized programming, such as children's television, though, may not be as diverse. They tend to be concentrated at HEW/USOE.

Investments in purposive children's television for programming on a national basis vary on a continuum from programs totally Federally supported to programs totally supported with non-Federal dollars. The bulk of the funds invested, however, tends to fall into four discrete categories of support: (1) direct total Federal; (2) direct Federal mixed with non-Federal; (3) indirect Federal (mixed or not mixed); and (4) totally non-Federal. Most of the Federal dollars in children's television have been in the first two areas, and the Office of Education support has made up the bulk of that money.

As explained in Chapter One, the research team, with the advice of its board of advisors and after consultation with a USOE advisory group, chose programs which would be representative of each of the above four categories of funding. Table 10 shows the programs selected.

Table 10
Programs Chosen for Analysis by Major Funding Mode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Direct</th>
<th>Federal Direct (mixed)</th>
<th>Federal Indirect (mixed)</th>
<th>Non-Federal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VILLA ALEGRE</td>
<td>SESAME STREET ELECTRIC CO.</td>
<td>INSIDE/OUT* ZOOM</td>
<td>BIG BLUE MARBLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cohen (1975, interview) estimates that most of the money for INSIDE/OUT came directly from states. Such Federal dollars as were passed on by the states were categoric aids such as funds for drug education. AIT is now urging greater input of indirect Federal funding for in-school programming.
Direct Federal Funding: VILLA ALEGRE

One of the programs included in the site visits was VILLA ALEGRE, which is produced by Bilingual Children's Television, Inc. (BC/TV) of Oakland, California. Rene Cardenas is the Executive Director of BC/TV and originated the idea for the program.

The funding for Cardenas' VILLA ALEGRE began on April 6, 1972, when the Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD) received $889,980 under Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to do research and feasibility studies on Cardenas' proposal for a national Spanish and English language educational series for young children. BUSD subcontracted with BC/TV to carry out the study. On October 6, 1972, BUSD received an additional $1,500,000 from ESEA as a pre-implementation grant to staff BC/TV, design the show, and develop delivery capabilities. Two half-hour pilot programs were produced under this funding.

On June 30, 1973, BC/TV was awarded a $3,500,000 grant under Title VII of the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) for the production of 65 half-hour programs; $191,600 was returned to USOE upon completion of the series. BC/TV has since received funds from the Exxon U. S. A. Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

VILLA ALEGRE is aimed at children ages 4 through 8 with special emphasis on the needs of the Spanish-speaking. The series uses a magazine format that blends live video segments with film and animation. The educational content is presented in entertaining segments—stories, games, dances, and songs, reinforced by visual effects. The series uses Spanish and English languages, divided about evenly for each show, and the Latin American cultures as a context for the educational content.
The show is set in "Villa Alegre," and idyllic "Happy Village" located in no particular place. There is a cast of eight adults and a changing group of some eight children. The goals of VILLA ALEGRE were:

1. To promote cultural pluralism through an understanding and appreciation of Latin American culture, heritage, values and mores.

2. To provide the Hispanic child with an experience in which his home language and culture predominate, for the purpose of enhancing his self-image, encouraging his continued or renewed pride in his background, and bridging the linguistic and cultural gaps that may exist between home and school.

3. To provide non-Spanish speakers with an opportunity to become familiar with the Spanish language, and to help all viewers recognize the advantages of speaking more than one language.

4. To aid the viewer in developing the communication and problem-solving skills necessary to function successfully in his environment.

5. To present selected information designed to lead to the development of concepts in the areas of human relations, nutrition and food, natural environment, energy and man-made objects.

During the 1974-75 broadcast season, VILLA ALEGRE was offered free to all public television stations. In some markets where there was no public station or the public station did not carry the program, it was available to commercial stations. The program was also made available to Spanish-language stations.

Although BC/TV received some non-Federal funds, these came after the programs were produced. The major funding was clearly "direct Federal support." Table 11 gives a breakdown of the funds received, the sources and the programs produced by BC/TV.
### Table 11

Funding for VILLA ALEGRE, Produced by Bilingual Children’s Television, Inc. (BC/TV)
Oakland, California

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 6, 1972</td>
<td>$889,890</td>
<td>2 pilots</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>Title VII, ESEA to Berkeley Unified School District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 6, 1972</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Title VII, ESEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1973</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>ESAA to BC/TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>(191,600)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Funds returned to USOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75</td>
<td>(Unknown amounts of non-Federal fundings have been received from EXXON and others for promotion and utilization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Direct Federal Funding: CARRASCOLENDAS**

CARRASCOLENDAS is produced at television station KLRN in Austin, Texas. Aida Barrera is the Executive Producer, Project Director and creator of the program.

CARRASCOLENDAS initially was a program series intended primarily for Mexican-American children in central and southern Texas which has developed into a bilingual/multicultural national television series over the past five years.

Its initial funding came for fiscal year 1970 under Title VII, ESEA in the amount of $215,000 for which thirty black and white programs were produced and shown on stations in San Antonio and Austin during and after school. The first format of the program was a segmented approach where
subjects were made parts of the program as riddles, games and songs. The segments were not necessarily related to each other.

The series received two more years of funding under Title VII, ESAA: $260,350 in FY 71; and $537,200 in FY 72. Thirty color programs were produced each year and were shown on 45 public stations in the 1972-73 broadcast season and 99 stations in 1973-74. The aim and format of the series remained basically the same although the non-Hispanic child also became a part of the intended audience.

In the fourth year, FY 73, the series received funding under Title VII, ESAA in the amount of $1,268,730 for 30 programs which were carried on 151 public stations in 1974-75. The program format for this series evolved into situation-musical-comedy complete with a plot in each program. It was still aimed at 6 to 10 year olds but the producers were also interested in appealing to various Hispanic cultures: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban, as well as Anglos and Blacks. The flexible storyline reflected a confluence of cultures—some scenes in Spanish, some in English and some a blend of these languages. The programs produced under the first-year ESAA grant were described as lively and light-hearted, with a stock company of real and fantasy characters. In order to include various geographic areas, on-location filming was done in New York, Miami, California, New Mexico and Puerto Rico.

ESAA funding was again obtained for FY 74 in the amount of $1,852,271 for 48 programs (nine of which would be a part of the FY 73 package, to be aired in the 74-75 broadcast season). In these programs, which will be available for airing in the 1975-76 season, the goal was to make the best possible contribution by television to the effective learning of the children in the target audience (still 6-9 year olds) in a dramatic style con-
sonant with the way the child's imagination takes form. The primary focus is on feelings or "affective" learning. The programs' major commitment is to emotional states, attitudes toward one's self, others and the world around one as well as the relationships involved in emotions and values. The programs will be half-hour dramas, designed to be entertaining.

CARRASCOLENDAS was originally intended for an in-school audience. During the first year the station repeated the programs after school and feedback indicated that a number of the target audience watched at home. To date, there is no information available on the number of children reached in-school or at home. CARRASCOLENDAS has been made available free of charge to any station wishing to carry the program.

The source and the amount of funds plus the number of CARRASCOLENDAS programs produced are shown in Table 12.

Table 12
Funding for CARRASCOLENDAS, Produced by KLRN Television, Austin, Texas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 70</td>
<td>$215,000</td>
<td>30 B&amp;W</td>
<td>1/2 hr</td>
<td>Title VII, ESEA to Education Service Center, Region XIII, Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 71</td>
<td>260,350</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1/2 hr</td>
<td>Title VII, ESEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>537,200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1/2 hr</td>
<td>Title VII, ESEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 73</td>
<td>1,268,730</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1/2 hr</td>
<td>ESAA to KLRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>1,852,271</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1/2 hr</td>
<td>ESAA to KLRN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Direct Federal Funding Mixed with Indirect Federal and Non-Federal: SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY

SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY are produced by the Children's Television Workshop (CTW) in New York City. Joan Ganz Cooney, now President of CTW, a non-profit organization, had the idea and the perseverance to create what has developed into an important element in purposeful children's television.

Because SESAME STREET was the first program produced of those examined in this study, some of the underlying philosophy of CTW is important to understand before a discussion of the goals of either SESAME STREET or THE ELECTRIC COMPANY can be appreciated. One of the underlying notions was that good educational/informational programming was enormously expensive, that funds for its development are not likely to come from the private sector, that educational programming could be presented in an entertaining way and successfully compete for attention of viewers at home against alternative attractions, that research and production could be combined to create an effective program, that insulation of production and other creative people from funding politics was critical to the success of a program, and that only the best talent could produce a successful series. These notions tended to evolve from the basic idea for a program which was to be directed at a previously neglected audience—the preschooler, particularly those disadvantaged children of the inner city ghettos and in the remote rural areas.

SESAME STREET is a daily one-hour show which uses a segmented approach—sometimes referred to as a LAUGH-IN for children—which emphasized cognitive skills during its first years and more recently has increased attention to the social and emotional aspects of child development. A working list of
I. Symbolic Representation
   A. Letters
   B. Numbers
   C. Geometric Forms

II. Cognitive Processes
   A. Perceptual Discrimination
   B. Relational Concepts
   C. Classification
   D. Ordering

III. Reasoning and Problem-Solving
   A. Problem Sensitivity
   B. Inferences and Causality
   C. Generating and Evaluating Explanations and Solutions

IV. The Child and His World
   A. Self
   B. Social Units
   C. Social Interaction
   D. Man-made Environment
   E. Natural Environment

The curriculum does not unfold through time in the conventional school room manner, through a logical progression from the elementary to the more complex, building directly on what has gone before. Instead, major goals are incorporated into each program, with the specific curriculum assignments spread throughout the series. The show is made up of many short segments which may have no overt connection with each other.

The show began as an experiment to see if children could be attracted to an entertaining educational program in the free marketplace. It continues both as a service and as an experiment, introducing new goals each year. For the 1975-76 SPC offering, for example, CTW states it will add to the curriculum social and historical material especially appropriate during the Bicentennial Year and, for the first time, produce instructional segments designed to help educate mentally retarded children.

SESAME STREET has been credited with putting public broadcasting on
the map. Nearly one out of four viewers of all public television are viewers of SESAME STREET. In a four-week period in Winter, 1974, SESAME STREET reached 23.3 percent of all television-equipped households, or 15,425,000 homes. Of 20 shows telecast during that period, viewing households saw an average of 5.5 shows (Statistical Research, Inc., 1974, p. 7). SESAME STREET "had an average rating of 4.3 in 1974, as against a 5.7 average for all [commercial] network children's programs" (Broadcasting, March 3, 1975, p. 23). It has brought into the public viewing audience households which never before turned to public stations—particularly Blacks and lower income children. In the first year of the SPC, it was chosen by 145 of the 152 licensees for broadcast in their areas at a high cost, the most requests for any educational program. CTW produces 130 SESAME STREET programs each year.

THE ELECTRIC COMPANY was the second program originated by CTW. It is a half-hour daily program aimed mostly for second, third and fourth graders to assist them in learning to read. The approach to the show, as outlined by Ball and Bogatz, (1973, p. 191) was:

Implicit throughout the show will be an attitude toward the written code which stresses its reasonableness and learnability. The following principles will be emphasized:

1. The left-to-right sequence of print corresponds to the temporal sequence of speech.
2. Written symbols stand for speech sounds.
3. This relationship [between written symbols and speech sounds] is sufficiently reliable to produce successful decoding most of the time.
4. Reading is facilitated by learning a set of strategies for figuring out this symbol-to-sound relationship.
5. However, the goal of decoding is to extract meaning from written messages; the reader's job is not completed with the sounding-out of a word or sentence.

There were two primary goals in producing THE ELECTRIC COMPANY: symbol/sound analysis and to read for meaning. The objective of the symbol/sound
analysis was to teach the child some of the most essential pieces of the written code, relating these to the processes of decoding. The objective of the reading for meaning goal was to convey to the child that the ultimate goal of decoding is to reconstruct the intended meaning; his job is not completed with phonic analysis alone.

The same underlying principles of SESAME STREET apply; that is, that the program should be entertaining, and employ a segmented approach. CTW produces 130 episodes of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY each year.

THE ELECTRIC COMPANY has also been one of the few public television shows to generate a substantial audience on a regular basis—it is used in-school and at home (see the earlier section of Chapter Two entitled "The In-School Audience for Television"). In the first year of the SPC, 143 licensees of the 152 possible purchased THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, again at a rather high cost compared to other available programs which should indicate acceptance by station managers.

A breakdown of the sources and the amounts of funding for the various years is shown in Table 13.

Table 13

Funding for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Produced by The Children's Television Workshop, New York, New York

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Carnegie Corporation of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>3M Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 Total</td>
<td>$1,194,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$3,167,000</td>
<td>DHEW, USOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>Corporation for Public Broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>Carnegie Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,288,000</td>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Markle Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>3M Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Learning Resources Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Meredith Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total $7,042,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1971 | $2,900,000 | DHEW, USOE                                  |
|      | 500,000    | Corporation for Public Broadcasting          |
|      | 600,000    | Carnegie Corporation                         |
|      | 1,000,000  | Ford Foundation                             |
|      | 5,000      | The Scherman Foundation                      |
|      | 10,000     | Rogers Foundation                            |
|      | 1,000      | Michigan State University                    |
|      | 115,000    | Commercial Stations (gross)                  |
|      | Total $5,131,000 |                                              |

1972 | $7,000,000 | DHEW, USOE                                  |
|      | 2,000,000  | Corporation for Public Broadcasting          |
|      | 1,000,000  | Carnegie Corporation                         |
|      | 1,000,000  | Ford Foundation                             |
|      | 250,000    | Mobil Oil Corporation                        |
|      | 25,000     | Quaker Oats Company                          |
|      | 23,000     | S. C. Johnson Company                        |
|      | 5,000      | Scherman Foundation                         |
|      | 241,000    | Commercial Stations (gross)                  |
|      | Total $11,544,000 |                                              |

1973 | $6,000,000 | DHEW, USOE                                  |
|      | 5,000,000  | Corporation for Public Broadcasting          |
|      | 500,000    | Carnegie Corporation                         |
|      | 304,000    | Commercial Stations (gross)                  |
|      | 8,000      | Other                                       |
|      | Total $11,812,000 |                                              |

1974 | $4,000,000 | DHEW, USOE                                  |
|      | 5,000,000  | Corporation for Public Broadcasting          |
|      | 100,000    | Mobil Oil Corporation                        |
|      | 50,000     | GT & E                                      |
|      | 187,000    | Commercial Stations (gross)                  |
|      | 36,000     | Other                                       |
|      | Total $9,373,000 |                                              |

Because there was a variety of sources of direct Federal funds involved, a separate listing, indicating the amounts and sources, is presented below.
in Table 14.

Table 14
Sources of Direct Federal Dollars to CTW for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>USOE</th>
<th>OEO-OCD</th>
<th>NICHHD</th>
<th>NFAH</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 68</td>
<td>$1,340,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>$1,415,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 69</td>
<td>1,330,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 70</td>
<td>655,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 71</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 73</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL Direct Federal Funds in SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY = $29,400,000

Indirect Federal Funding Mixed with Non-Federal: ZOOM

ZOOM has been produced at WGBH television in Boston, Massachusetts.
Christopher Sarson was the creator and, eventually, the executive producer of the program. He is no longer responsible for the program.

ZOOM is a series which isn't self-consciously educational; that is, there is no curriculum per se, but the programs encourage the young viewers to be active and creative. The show is designed for 8 to 12 year olds and its objectives are basically that: (1) children should participate and not be passive viewers; (2) children are people with ideas; and (3) there is dignity to being an 8 to 12 year old, that is, the children could do television for other children.

The only Federal money in ZOOM is indirect in that it came from Federal funds through CPB. The creator of the program, Chris Sarson, originally proposed the idea to public station WGBH, where he was employed. WGBH believed it was too expensive for them to do on a national scale, so Sarson took the idea to WBZ, a commercial Westinghouse station in Boston. WBZ produced a pilot called ZOOM IN which Sarson found unacceptable because the cast included adults and his evolving feeling was that the program should be children talking to children. The WBZ pilot was never aired.

WGBH officials then took the idea to CPB which provided $30,000 in the summer, 1971, for the production of a different pilot. This show was aired on five successive days in Boston. The viewer response, which was favorable, and the pilot were taken to Washington. CPB agreed to support thirteen programs for $340,000 to be aired on PBS beginning in January, 1972 (the Ford Foundation had a matching dollar arrangement with CPB at this time).

The programs have been written and performed by children from 7 to 12 years of age. It basically is a magazine format. Viewers are invited to
contribute jokes, paintings, cartoons, stories, plays, recipes, etc. Seven young persons appear on the show—they're changed every 10-13 weeks so that they don't become "stars." "When a child signs on as a Zoomer his parents sign an agreement promising he or she won't appear on TV for three years after leaving 'Zoom' or make commercials for five years after 'Zoom'" (Levin, 1974, p. 24). The objective is to present kids as kids, not kids as stars.

In order to stress the relationship of ZOOM to all American children, youthful guests have been filmed on location across the U.S. The largest viewer response, though, remains Northeastern in origin.

CPB funded the show again for the 1972-73 season—this time asking for 30 shows for $750,000.

From the beginning, ZOOM's mail response has been very high—averaging 2,000 letters a day during the first year and up to 4,000 to 5,000 a day more recently. "Zoom viewers dispatch more mail to their show in a week than the fans of Sanford and Son, The Waltons, All in the Family, and Marcus Welby, M.D. combined send to their shows in a month" (Levin, 1974, p. 22). ZOOM viewers, of course, are solicited to write in, while viewers of the other shows are not.

In February, 1973, CPB decided not to refund ZOOM for the following season. The response was the "Zoom Alarm" which told viewers that the program might not be refunded and asked the viewers to mail pictures of themselves. More than 190,000 letters were received in six weeks, and two full sacks were taken to CPB and spread out on the floor so that CPB executives had "40,000 faces staring up at them." CPB decided they could underwrite half of the expense of ZOOM; McDonald's underwrote the other half—$1,130,000 in all for 26 new and 13 partly new programs. In FY 75, McDonald's again
paid for half the cost of the program; the rest came from the SPC—$1,362,585 total for 32 new programs.

ZOOM became the second most popular show on public television that was produced by public television. In Winter, 1974, in a four-week period, ZOOM reached an average audience of 1,390,000 households, or 2.1 percent of all television homes, second only to MASTERPIECE THEATRE for prime time public television. Total reach during this period was 5.7 percent of all U. S. television-equipped households. (Statistical Research, Inc., 1974, p. 3).

Table 15 gives a breakdown of the amounts and sources of funds and the number of programs produced.

Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>1 pilot</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>CPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>13'</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>CPB/Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 73</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>CPB/Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>565,000</td>
<td>26 new</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>McDonald's CPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>565,000</td>
<td>13 partly new</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>CPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75</td>
<td>681,292*</td>
<td>32 new</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>McDonald's Public Stations (SPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>681,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Plus one half of 6% SPC surcharge to stations

Indirect State/Federal Funding Mixed with Non-Federal: INSIDE/OUT

INSIDE/OUT was created through a consortium effort initiated by the National Instructional Television Center (NIT, now a division of the Agency for Instructional Television) at Bloomington, Indiana. Edwin Cohen is the
Executive Director of AIT.

INSIDE/OUT is a health series of thirty fifteen-minute color programs designed to help eight- to ten-year olds achieve and maintain well-being. It provides a "feelings" approach to health education with emphasis on helping the child develop a personally effective life style. The programs are used to initiate discussion and are mainly intended for in-school use.

The series was the result of a unique consortium effort coordinated by NIT and was their third such effort. In all, $779,000 went into the planning and development of INSIDE/OUT. Thirty-four different state and provincial agencies from throughout the United States and Canada contributed $480,000. The agencies are as follows:

- Alaska Educational Broadcasting Commission
- California Health Education Television Consortium
- Florida State Department of Education
- Georgia Department of Education, Educational Media Services Division
- Hawaii Department of Education
- Idaho Department of Education, Migrant Education Resource Center
- Illinois Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, ETV/ITV Section, and Blue Cross-Blue Shield
- Iowa Departments of Educational Broadcasting and Public Instruction
- Kansas State Department of Education
- Kentucky ETV Network
- KETC-TV, St. Louis, Missouri
- Maine Health Education Resources Utilization Consortium
- Massachusetts Executive Committee for Education Television, Department of Education
- Michigan Departments of Education and Public Health and The Mott Foundation
- Mississippi Authority for Educational Television
- Nebraska Department of Education, ITV Services
- Nevada Educational Communications Commission
- New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority
- New Orleans Public Schools
- New York State Education Department
- North Carolina State Department of Education
- Ohio State Department of Education
- Oregon Board of Education and Oregon Association of Intermediate and County Superintendents
- Pennsylvania Department of Education
- South Carolina Department of Education
Exxon provided $197,940 for printing and distributing 350,000 teachers guides, preparation of a promotional film and help in planning and development of utilization materials: NIT contributed $101,060 to the project.

The AIT cooperative effort represents a unique approach to the development of purposive children's television. The cooperative effort means that NIT works closely with educational administrators, teachers, curriculum supervisors, educational broadcasters, authorities in various subject matter fields, and with professional organizations in the U. S. and Canada. Needs are expressed by representatives of states and provinces at periodic regional meetings. Expressed needs are reviewed by an Advisory Committee on Priorities and then the AIT Board of Directors (who are appointed by the Council of Chief State School Officers and the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada) establishes the priorities. Study teams are then organized to investigate the needs to determine how and to what extent television can make a contribution. A prospectus for a program is then prepared and funding participants are then solicited. The consortium has input into the production, plans information for proper introduction of the series, and plans effective utilization programs. As a rule, only those who fund the program use it. Production is done by selected agencies under the supervision of NIT.
NIT was absorbed by the Agency for Instructional Television (AIT), a newly created non-profit permanent American-Canadian organization, in 1973.* AIT has worked to expand and improve the cooperative effort begun by NIT by working closely with states and provinces.

INSIDE/OUT was shown on 205 public stations in 1973-74 and on 223 public stations in 1974-75 and reached, according to NIT estimates, approximately five million children each year.

Table 16 presents the amounts and sources of funds for INSIDE/OUT as well as the number of shows produced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 71 through FY 74</td>
<td>$480,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1/4 hr.</td>
<td>Consortium of 34 agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101,060</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Instructional Television Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>197,940 for printing and distributing 350,000 teachers guides, preparation of a promotional film and help in planning and development of utilization materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exxon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NIT was started as the National Instructional Television Library in 1962 with funds from USOE administered by National Educational Television (NET) in New York. In 1965 it became the National Center for School and College Télévision and began operation under the Indiana University Foundation in Bloomington, Indiana. NIT became the official name in 1968 and became self-supporting in 1970. It remained a project of the Indiana University Foundation until its transfer to AIT on July 1, 1973.
Non-Federal Funding: BIG BLUE MARBLE

BIG BLUE MARBLE is produced by Alphaventure of New York City. Robert Garrison is the producer and one of three partners in Alphaventure, a profit-making organization.

BIG BLUE MARBLE is a half-hour program without formal curriculum, devoted to fostering international awareness among children aged 8-12. It attempts to show how youngsters play, work and grow up all over the world. Each show has a feature on three different young people from around the world. The show is underwritten by International Telephone and Telegraph and is offered free to commercial and noncommercial stations with the stipulation that there be no interruption for commercials or public service messages. Commercials or public service announcements, of course, can be clustered at either end of the program.

This past year the program was offered free to stations throughout the U. S. and was carried on more than 115 stations.

One of the biggest goals was to communicate to children the interdependence of people around the world. At the same time, instilling in them an appreciation for the diversity of cultures, not to look at the world as a melting pot, you know, to think about people in terms of the things that make them special, but also to think about all of us collectively in terms of the things that we share in common. (O'Brien, 1974, interview)

The shows' producers claim not to be "promoting or preaching" anything but rather showing children as they exist around the world.

The show encourages participation through a segment called Pen-Pals. In December, more than 4000 letters a week were being exchanged by viewers of the program. The ratings for the show have not been outstanding, but exceed the audience for a typical PBS program.
As noted, the ratings for the show have not been outstanding. However it should not be taken as an indictment of the program series, but rather as a corroboration of points made by others relating to the lack of good time periods in the current television spectrum. From recent experience it appears that no matter how good or exciting a once-weekly half hour television program may be, when distributed via syndication, it is almost automatically relegated to early morning weekend time periods. Time periods that follow the kid programs on the network stations on Saturday mornings generally move into network sports, and sadly enough a key part of Sunday morning is now taken up by commercial religion, a most profitable program type for the stations. In these early morning time periods, generally prior to 8:00 on Saturday and 9:00 on Sunday, the available sets in use are so low that regardless of the program quality or appeal, it is virtually impossible to achieve higher than a three rating. (Smardan, letter to Mielke, April 11, 1975).

Table 17 gives a breakdown of the amount, source of funds, and the number of programs produced.

Table 17
Funding for BIG BLUE MARBLE, Produced by Alphaventure, New York, New York

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1/2 hr.</td>
<td>International Telephone and Telegraph</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

Of the more than 50 million dollars for children's television administered by USOE, most of the money has gone to either various projects administered under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) or to CTW from the Cooperative Research Act. A total of $19,851,685 has been authorized for projects under ESAA in fiscal years 73 and 74; a total of $29,400,000 in federal funds have gone to CTW to support SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY from FY 68 through FY 75.
The grant/contract recipient, the series title, the number (to be) produced, their length, the date available for airing, and the amount of ESAA dollars allocated are shown in Table 18.

### Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Series</th>
<th>No. to be Produced</th>
<th>Length in minutes</th>
<th>Date Available</th>
<th>Amount of funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KLRN Austin, Tex.</td>
<td>CARRASCOLENDAS</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>74-75(39)</td>
<td>$3,120,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75-76(39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC/TV Oakland, Cal.</td>
<td>VILLA ALEGRE</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>74-75</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVETA Springfield, Va.</td>
<td>GETTING OVER</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>1,762,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC Newton, Mass.</td>
<td>PROJECT ONE</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>4,023,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYSDE New York</td>
<td>VEGETABLE SOUP</td>
<td>39 or 78</td>
<td>30 or 15</td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>1,584,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGBH Boston</td>
<td>RÉBOP</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>2,042,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTTW Chicago</td>
<td>Tension and Conflict Reduction</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>1,772,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut Public TV Hartford</td>
<td>MUNDO REAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWSU Pullman, Wash.</td>
<td>SOUTH BY NORTHWEST</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>242,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSPS Spokane, Wash.</td>
<td>PLATEAU INDIANS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>242,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine Public Broadcasting Orono, Mne.</td>
<td>Franco-American</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>249,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Filmakers New York</td>
<td>Caribbean Latinos</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76-77</td>
<td>249,996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**
- 12 program series
- 435 programs
- 199.5 hours
- $19,039,807

*plus $811,878 to WTTW, Chicago for production of spot announcements, or $19,851,685 total.*
Because both VILLA ALEGRE and CARRASCOLENDEAS each received prior support under Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)—VILLA ALEGRE received $2,389,890; CARRASCOLENDEAS received $1,012,850—it could be logically argued that the ESAA "television package" actually totals $23,254,125. When this is combined with the $29,400,000 of direct Federal funds to CTW, the total expenditure is $52,654,125. This represents the vast majority of funds expended by USOE for purposive children's television programming (for other expenditures on other projects, see Ogilvie, 1971). Examples of other expenditures include:

3-4-5 Club, University of Houston $300,000 FY 72
Captain Kangaroo, Sutherland Associates 214,000 FY 72
Division of Vocational Education,
UCLA, Evaluate Objectives
(Captain Kangaroo) 29,360 FY 72
OCD: Sutherland Learning Associates (Captain Kangaroo) 250,000 FY 72
Early Childhood Component of Rocky Mountain Satellites 250,000 FY 73
Misterrogers Neighborhood, Bureau of Education for the Handicapped 1,223,652 FY 73

Because of the large proportion of direct Federal funds going to two areas—ESAA and CTW—an analysis of how those funds came into being, how they've been administered, and what problems were encountered in their administration is largely the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter Three: The Federal Involvement in Children's Television

There are numerous agencies, Congressional committees, corporations, regulatory agencies and citizen groups which attempt to influence the use of television for children in the United States. Most are outside the mainstream of the present examination but need to be briefly discussed.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established in 1914 as an independent regulatory agency (an amendment in 1935 extended its responsibility to consumer protection). While the FTC is concerned, as is the FCC, with the nature of advertising on television, including that which appears in conjunction with children's television programming, it is not concerned with television programs, children's or otherwise.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established in 1934. It renews educational and commercial broadcast station licenses every three years and licenses all new broadcast stations. The general standard mandated by the Communications Act of 1934 which the Commission applies in making its decisions is whether the "public interest, convenience and necessity" will be served.

In 1960 the Commission cited programs for children as one of 14 "major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community." In 1973, for the first time, the FCC included a separate question on children's programs on its renewal form for commercial television licensees and in 1974 the Commission issued a policy statement on children's television programming and advertising. In that statement the Commission declared it expected stations "to make a meaningful effort . . . to develop and present programs which will serve the unique needs
of the child audience." Moreover, "a reasonable part of this programming should be educational in nature [because] the use of television to further the educational and cultural development of America's children bears a direct relationship to the licensee's obligations under the Communications Act to operate in the 'public interest'." The Commission also said "we do not believe it is a reasonable scheduling practice to relegate all of the programming for this important audience to one or two days...[of the week and] do expect to see considerable improvement in scheduling practices in the future."

The possible ramifications of the FCC's recent actions in highlighting the necessity of televising children's programs to meet the public interest standard is discussed in a commissioned paper by Herman Land for this research project and in Chapter Four.

The Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) was established in 1970 and is located in the Executive Branch. OTP advises the President on general communication policies, spectrum management, international agreements, and field research and development activities. It also directs assignments of government spectrum allocations.

While OTP has been active (i.e., formulating policies, submitting recommendations to the President, Congress and the FCC) in some broadcast matters such as broadcast license renewals, allocation of Very High Frequencies (VHF) to television, in matters affecting cable television, and in pursuing long-range funding for public broadcasting, it has not expressed any specific position or concerns, or made any reports or recommendations on children's television. The OTP has recently undertaken a survey of the amounts of Federal dollars going directly into the production of shows for
public television. How they will use that information is not known at the time of this writing.

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is far more involved in promoting children's television than any of the previous agencies. CPB was established by the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 to provide national leadership in the development of a public broadcasting system while insuring the medium protection from outside interference and control.

The Act was the result of a report by the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television which concluded that "a well-financed and well-directed system, substantially larger and far more persuasive and effective than that which now exists in the United States, must be brought into being if the full needs of the American public are to be served." Section 306 of the Act includes among the purposes and activities of the Corporation the facilitating of the "full development of educational broadcasting in which programs of high quality, obtained from diverse sources, will be made available to non-commercial educational television and radio broadcast stations ...." There are 15 persons on the Board of the Corporation, appointed by the President of the United States. CPB is not a federal agency, but a private non-profit corporation.

CPB provides funds to stations and agencies throughout the public broadcasting industry; it established PBS and pays the costs of interconnection; it provides direct financial support to television and radio licensees through community service grants. CPB does not produce programs but does give financial support through either program production grants or program development grants.

It has helped fund national children's television programs such as...
The Corporation receives most of its funding from a direct appropriation from the Congress. For fiscal year 1975, the Congressional appropriation for CPB was $62 million with the stipulation that $5 million had to come from non-Federal sources. The Station Program Cooperative (SPC), the Community Service Grants to individual stations, and the interconnection services take up the major portion of CPB funds. Although new children's programs—particularly for adolescents—might be considered for development, CPB's Don Quayle (1975, interview) says that requests for such programs would have to compete with other programming needs, such as programming for women or the aged. It is unlikely that CPB will be a major source of money for new children's programs in the near future because CPB believes there are many other areas which are in equal or greater need of development or continued funding.

Major Federal Sources for Television Programming Funds

In a Congressional committee report more than ten years ago entitled "The Federal Government and Education," it was pointed out that "42 departments, agencies and bureaus of the Government are involved in education to some degree"; the report also noted that "nearly every committee of the Congress has jurisdiction over some type of education legislation" (House Committee on Education and Labor, 88th Congress, 1st Session, June, 1963, pp. 1 and 4).

The number of Federal programs which have funds available for television is large indeed. Periodically, the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) publishes a listing of Federal programs under which funding for public broadcasting and educational technology is possible (see
Lubart, 1974). The most recent guide listed 63 different Federal assistance programs with special relevance to education telecommunications with a total allocation for fiscal year 1974 in excess of one billion dollars. Even this list is not exhaustive; in legislation, it did not include the Cooperative Research Act, which has been the major source of Federal funding for CTW; the list of agencies did not include the National Institute of Education, which administers funds for television programming.

Although some twelve different agencies were listed as administering the various programs, the USOE-administered programs accounted for over 90 percent of the total funds available. The agencies and the programs listed as potential sources of funds in FY 74 were as follows:

**Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare**

- Adult Education - Grants to States
- Adult Education - Special Projects
- Adult Education - Teacher Education
- Bilingual Education
- Civil Rights Technical Assistance and Training
- Dropout Prevention
- Educational Broadcasting Facilities
- Educational Personnel Development - Urban/Rural School Development
- Educational Personnel Training Grants - Career Opportunities
- Educationally Deprived Children - Handicapped
- Educationally Deprived Children in State Administered Institutions Serving Neglected or Delinquent Children
- Educationally Deprived Children - Local Educational Agencies
- Educationally Deprived Children - Migrants
- Educationally Deprived Children - Special Grants for Urban and Rural Schools
- Educationally Deprived Children - Special Incentive Grants
- Educationally Deprived Children - State Administration
- Emergency School Aid Act - Basic Grants to Local Educational Agencies
- Emergency School Aid Act - Educational Television
- Emergency School Aid Act - Pilot Programs
- Emergency School Aid Act - Special Programs
- Follow Through
- Fulbright-Hays Training Grants - Foreign Curriculum Consultants
- Handicapped Media Services and Captioned Films
- Handicapped Physical Education and Recreation Research
- Handicapped Preschool and School Programs
- Handicapped Teacher Education
Handicapped Teacher Recruitment and Information
Higher Education - Cooperative Education
Higher Education - Strengthening Developing Instruction
Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education - Special Programs and Projects
Right to Read - Elimination of Illiteracy
Special Programs for Children with Specific Learning Disabilities
Supplementary Educational Centers and Services, Guidance, Counseling, and Testing
Talent Search
Teacher Corps - Operations and Training
Upward Bound
Vocational Education - Basic Grants to States
Vocational Education - Consumer and Homemaking
Vocational Education - Curriculum Development
Vocational Education - Innovation
Vocational Education - Research
Vocational Education - Special Needs
Vocational Education - State Advisory Councils
Vocational Education - Work Study

National Science Foundation

Instructional Improvement Implementation - Pre-College
Public Understanding of Science Programs
Science Education Materials and Methods Development - Pre-College

National Endowment for the Humanities, National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities

Promotion of the Humanities - Education Planning, Program, and Development
Promotion of the Humanities - Education Projects
Promotion of the Humanities - Film/TV Grants
Promotion of the Humanities - Museum Personnel Development

National Endowment for the Arts, National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities

Promotion of the Arts - Public Media

Library of Congress

Books for the Blind and Physically Handicapped

Office of Water Resources Research, Department of the Interior

Water Resources Scientific Information Center
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
- Public Education on Drug Abuse - Technical Assistance

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Space Science Education Project

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice
- Law Enforcement Assistance - Educational Development
- Law Enforcement Assistance - Training

Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
- Public Assistance - State and Local Training

Agency for International Development, Department of State
- Technology Applications for Less-Developed Countries

Civil Service Commission
- Training Assistance to State and Local Governments

Obviously, not all of the funds in the various programs are available only or even primarily intended for television, but a proposal for development of telecommunications materials could justifiably be considered under each of the programs above. It is clear, however, that the Office of Education is the dominant agency which administers funds for support of television programming.

This research team could detect almost no coordination among the various agencies which administer telecommunications funds, or even within the Office of Education. An internal memo at USOE showed recognition of the problem:

Support for educational technology can currently be
derived under more than 40 legislative acts and titles and is administered through approximately 50 different programs. Virtually every major unit of OE can and does support educational technology activities, some under several authorities. There is no balanced, unified approach and there is little coordination. (Filep, memo to Davies, undated)

A study conducted for USOE by Daniel Ogilvie in 1971 concluded:

We were unable to identify any comprehensive theme or strategy for the use of ETV in the Office of Education. Each bureau, and frequently each division, develops its own plans independently of other OE programs. There is no strategic plan to insure comprehensive analysis of the potential of educational television. (Ogilvie, 1971, p. 19)

The problem persists, as of now:

The current state of government funding in this area [CTV] is the antithesis of orderly development. There is little cooperation between departments (who barely know what the other is doing); there is little continuity of television policy within a given agency; there is little understanding of the impact or significance of a given project; there is little thought given to continued development of professionals in children's television; and there are few individuals in the government capable of advocating the cause of good children's television. (Ambrosino, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 15)

The two to four people within USOE who were described in interviews as knowledgeable about telecommunications do not have input into funding decisions on most projects, but USOE funds continue to funnel into television programming.

Focus on CTW and ESAA-TV

More than $52 million of USOE-administered funds—the lion's share of the Federal dollars in purposive children's television—have to date gone to two areas: (1) CTW for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY; and (2) projects under ESAA for the support of 13 projects. The remainder of this chapter will review the process by which USOE has funded and administered
those grants and contracts. The review will use a chronological approach, beginning with the enabling legislation which permitted USOE to undertake funding of the projects and ending with the matter of the final submission to USOE of a report regarding the project's completion. Matters relating to promotion, distribution, utilization and continued funding following completion of the project will be discussed in Chapter Four.

The review will cover these following stages: (1) Enabling legislation; (2) Money allocated; (3) Administrative location of the project; (4) Selection of the program content areas to be considered; (5) The method of announcing the proposal solicitation; (6) The method of applying for funding; (7) Qualification requirements for applying for funding; (8) Length of time for applying for funding; (9) The method of evaluating proposals; (10) Negotiations with the producer; (11) Monitoring during production; and (12) Final product submission.

While not all of these stages will receive equal treatment, they have all been included to provide the reader information regarding each important sequence by which the funding of money is funneled through the administrative agency to the producer, the means by which the agency imposes accountability for these funds, and, on occasion, our interpretation of the "reaction from the field."

Enabling Legislation: CTW

The $29,400,000 CTW has obtained from USOE since FY 68 (see Table 14) has come from research and demonstration funds provided by the Cooperative Research Act. Section 2 of the Act authorized the Commissioner of Education to make grants to universities and colleges, other public or private agencies, institutions and organizations, and to individuals "for research,
surveys, and demonstrations in the field of education... and for the dissemination of information derived from educational research."

After being persuaded by late 1966 that an educational television series for pre-schoolers was a good idea, a Carnegie representative submitted to USOE and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) a feasibility study prepared by Joan Cooney and asked for their comments. Neither agency responded (Polsky, 1974, p. 27). It is unknown whether the Carnegie request was ever given any consideration, but it does indicate that what obviously was a good idea, coming from a prestigious source, didn't even get an acknowledgement from USOE or OEO.

Lloyd Morrisett, who was then a vice-president of Carnegie, was a friend of Harold (Doc) Howe, then U. S. Commissioner of Education. In June, 1967, Howe became interested in Morrisett's and Cooney's ideas and decided to commit USOE funds to the project and to actively solicit funding support from other Federal agencies. Howe's special assistant, Louis Hausman, was put in charge of coordinating the project at USOE. Morrisett and Cooney also sought funds from non-Federal sources. The story of CTW funding is one of a continuous search for funds inside and outside of USOE, but the focus of this report is on the process of obtaining Federal dollars.

When USOE funds had to be provided to get CTW started, Howe searched for legislation which would authorize expenditures on such a project. Consideration was given to providing Commissioner's discretionary funds granted by Section 701 of Title VII of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-864), but the Cooperative Research Act was instead chosen largely because of the greater discretion it provided. The Cooperative Research Act provided the Commissioner with considerable flexibility regarding the nature
of the project he chose to fund, the means by which it would be selected, the process by which it would be monitored, and the nature and extent to which it would be evaluated.

As will be indicated in other sections of this chapter, an examination of USOE files and interviews with key personnel suggests that the discretion given to the Commissioner by the Cooperative Research Act was, at times, used by various Commissioners and their aides to facilitate or even bypass normal USOE procedures (see, for example, the later section in this chapter entitled "Negotiations with the Producer: CTW"), reduce USOE staff interference and give CTW maximum freedom to pursue its mission. The special importance in this regard of Commissioner Howe and, later, Sidney Marland, Jr., as well as Louis Hausman cannot be over-emphasized.

CTW received funds initially from a variety of sources—the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, as well as research and demonstration funds from USOE, OEO-OCD, NICHD, and NFAH—as an experiment which would attempt to demonstrate whether entertaining television competing in the open marketplace could attract and teach pre-school children, particularly those disadvantaged in ghetto or rural areas. The first SESAME STREET programs were broadcast in 1969-70 and resulted in critical acclaim with supporting evaluation that demonstrated effectiveness. SESAME STREET was an immediate success.

By the fall of 1970, discussions were already taking place within USOE to find alternative appropriations to the Cooperative Research Act so that funding of CTW could be continued without using large amounts of Research and Demonstration (R&D) monies which could be used to foster new projects. The remainder of this section traces highlights since 1970 of this attempt,
which has continued to the present.

As early as October 19, 1970, with SESAME STREET just beginning its second season, Acting Commissioner T. H. Bell (who later was to become Commissioner of Education) stated that "because of the limited funds appropriated, the increasing demands for R & D funds and the legislative requirements, funds for CTW should not and cannot be supplied under our general research allocations," claiming that USOE's original intent was to fund only the R & D for the first SESAME STREET series. Bell indicated USOE was considering the possibility of using funds from other parts of USOE, but was uncertain under which program such an expenditure might legitimately fall. Bell suggested the possibility of new legislation (Bell to Butler, memo, October 19, 1970).

One solution to the dilemma of whether to treat CTW as R & D or as a service, was creation of a line item for CTW support. This approach was incorporated in USOE's '74 budget request tendered by Commissioner John Ottina. In the budget presentation to the House Appropriations Subcommittee, USOE stated:

Originally, support for the two CTW programs was considered as "demonstration grants." It is now proposed to continue funding under a "service" concept, i.e. service to and for preschool and early elementary disadvantaged children and others with reading problems in cognitive, affective and psychomotor development areas. (House Appropriations Subcommittee, Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, April, 1974, Part 5, p. 219)

Although Commissioner Ottina proposed to continue funding "under a 'service' concept," the funds for that support would continue to come from the Cooperative Research Act. This led to the following interchange between Ottina, his assistant, and Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, Subcommittee Chairman:
Mr. Flood. . . You indicate in your justifications that these programs were originally considered as demonstration grants but now will be considered as service programs. If these are no longer demonstrations, then how are you going to continue them under the Cooperative Research Act? How do you do that? You can't have it both ways, can you? Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

Mr. Wheeler. The fact that these programs may now be considered as service programs—

Mr. Flood. This is what I say.

Mr. Wheeler. Yes, and the main reason for that is because of the wide coverage that they have.

Mr. Flood. I know, but you understand my question. You say they are one thing and now they are going to be something else. You refer to a law. How are you going to do that under that law?

Dr. Ottina. Your observation is, I think, a very good one.

Mr. Flood. That is why I made it.

Dr. Ottina. We have historically funded this under the Cooperative Research Act, and it is getting to the point where in actual fact this is becoming more and more service rather than demonstration. We have a pending set of legislation which is being proposed to the Congress under which authority we could fund programs such as this.

Mr. Flood. You told me you were going to do this under the Cooperative Research Act.

Dr. Ottina. We do not have in place other than the Cooperative Research Act an act that we believe we could fund these programs with. We believe they are important and they should be continued. (House Appropriations Subcommittee, Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, April 1974, Part 5, pp. 161-162)

The difficulty of continuing to justify SESAME STREET and, later, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY as research and demonstration programs was not only a concern of USOE officials but was also reflected in CTW's formal proposals for annual funding. One the one hand the Workshop cited the outstanding continued success of both programs; on the other hand, references to the continued experimental nature of the program were also made (indicating that it should still fall under R & D funds).

Funding for CTW for fiscal year 1976 will be under the new Special Projects Act (created under Title IV of the Education Amendments of 1974,
P. L. 93-380), which replaces the Cooperative Research Act, and which consolidates a number of education programs by the Commissioner under certain discretionary authorities. The purpose of the Act is "to authorize the Commissioner to carry out special projects to experiment with new educational and administrative methods, techniques and practices; to meet special or unique education needs or problems; and to place special emphasis on national educational priorities." The Commissioner will be authorized to enter into contracts under the Act during the period fiscal years 1976 through 1978 with $200 million authorized to be appropriated for each year. Not later than February 1 of each year the Commissioner has to submit to the authorizing Committees of the Congress a plan showing how he intends to expend those funds.

The conference committee which finalized the Special Projects Act stated the following in its report relating to CTW funding:

The conferees intend that successful on-going projects conducted under authorities which are repealed by the Special Projects Act be continued by the Commissioner under his discretionary share of the appropriations. The conferees expect that the Special Projects Act will be used to provide adequate financial support for the educational television series, Sesame Street and The Electric Company. These programs are among the most creative innovations of federal support for education, and their continued production and development should be an on-going priority of the Commissioner. (Education Amendments of 1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Report 93-1026 Conference Report)

The expenditure plan for FY 76 was sent to the Congress by February 1, 1975, as required by the Special Projects Act. In that plan, however, Commissioner Bell indicated USOE's intention "To fund the Children's Television Workshop (CTW), producer of Sesame Street and The Electric Company, as the terminal year in the development and demonstration projects." Bell then added the following note: "The development and demonstration activities..."
regarding this approach in working with pre-adolescent children have been concluded, and therefore I would recommend that a different appropriation arrangement be designed if the Congress desires continued support for this activity. One possibility would be to include a line item in the budget for the Public Broadcasting Corporation" (emphasis added).

Enabling Legislation: ESAA

Funds for ESAA television projects are mandated in Sections 704 and 711 of the Emergency School Aid Act (Education Amendments of 1972, Title VII, P. L. 92-318). These sections set aside a minimum of three percent of the amount funded under ESAA (Section 704, (b)(2)(B)) for the "development and production of integrated children's programs of cognitive and affective education value" which further the purposes of the Act. The purposes of ESAA are: "to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools"; "to encourage the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation in elementary and secondary schools"; and "to aid school children in overcoming the educational disadvantages of minority group isolation" (Section 702 (b)(1)(2)(3)).

Section 711(b) of ESAA reads:

(b)(1) The Assistant Secretary shall carry out a program of making grants to, or contracts with, not more than ten public or private non-profit agencies, institutions, or organizations with the capability of providing expertise in the development of television programming, in sufficient number to assure diversity; to pay the cost of development and production of integrated children's television programs of cognitive and
effective educational value.*

(2) Television programs developed in whole or in part with assistance provided under this Title shall be made reasonably available for transmission, free of charge, and shall not be transmitted under commercial sponsorship.

(3) The Assistant Secretary may approve an application under this Section only if he determines that the applicant--
(A) will employ members of minority groups in responsible positions in development, production, and administrative staffs;
(B) will use modern television techniques of research and production; and
(C) has adopted effective procedures for evaluating education and other change achieved by children viewing the program.

ESAA is the only major piece of legislation to specifically set aside monies for television. The reason for inclusion of Section 711 in ESAA was stated in a Senate Report as follows:

The Committee is most impressed with the success of the Sesame Street television series. A recent report by the Educational Testing Service indicates that such programs can play an important part in the development of crucial academic and social skills for children from all racial and economic backgrounds. Sesame Street proved highly successful with children from 3 to 5 years old. This section looks to the funding of additional programming for preschool children and of programs to serve older children, suitable for home reception, with appropriate emphasis placed on all minority groups.**

*It is interesting to note that due to a proofing error, Section (b)(1) referred to programs of cognitive and "effective" rather than "affective" educational value. While members of the staff of the Senate Committee informed the Office of Education that the correct word is "affective," the word "effective" continues to appear in the printed versions of the Emergency School Aid Act. See, for example, page 505 of Senate Report 93-763 "Educational Amendments of 1974."

**The Senate had formed a Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity to study the effectiveness of existing laws and policies. The Committee was chaired by Senator Walter Mondale who was primarily responsible for inclusion of a specific set-aside for educational television in ESAA. Section 711 was not included in the House (the Administration) bill but was inserted by the Committee of Conference (Conference Report on the Education Amendments of 1972, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report 92-798, May, 1972, p. 218).
While ESAA prescribes money for television and some restrictions on the use of that money, ESAA still gives USOE great discretionary authority. In interpreting the provisions of the Act, the staff of USOE has exercised far more discretionary authority than it has with respect to the (far more discretionary) provision of the Cooperative Research Act particularly because of the lesser involvement of the Commissioner's office.

USOE's Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity (BEEO) administers the ESAA-TV projects. Some of BEEO's interpretations of the legislation have been very significant. The references in Section 711 to "integrated children's television programming" and employment of members of minority groups "in responsible positions in development, production, and administrative staffs" have, as will be indicated, resulted in USOE officials forcing grantees/contractees to make personnel changes. USOE staff judgments regarding the meaning of "reasonably available for transmission" have determined the length of a station's or network's exclusivity; interpretations of the requirement of "effective procedures for evaluating education and other changes achieved by children viewing the program" have determined both the amount and importance of research-related activities; conclusions reached regarding "the ESAA intended audience" have resulted in in-school viewing and materials receiving little attention and budget. Much of this "discretion" has been at the middle staff levels at USOE.

On occasion, BEEO was overruled or pre-empted in its discretion by a higher authority. Programs relating to parental involvement and in-service teacher training were, for example, never included as being eligible for the ESAA-TV (Section 711) set-aside. Representatives of HEW's General Counsel's Office did not interpret Section 711 to permit such expenditures. While a different interpretation existed among several USOE staffers assigned to
ESAA-TV projects, they never appealed the General Counsel's Office decision to a higher authority and thus the decision stood (Hertzler, 1975, interview).

USOE interpretations of Section 711 are included in some of the regulations governing the ESAA competition and outlined in the Sections "Methods of Announcing the Proposal Solicitation" and "Qualification Requirements for Applying for Funding." While it is common and often considered advisable for laws to be written in a manner in which discretion and flexibility are given to the person administering the law, some of USOE's interpretations of ESAA-TV set-asides have caused concern, even within USOE. Moreover, several parties interviewed believed that USOE has failed to bring to the attention of Congress the generally accepted weaknesses of the law, such as failure to take account of the problems of residuals and the cost of distribution.*

In addition to and as a result of the lack of involvement by the Commissioner's office and greater involvement of the USOE staff, the implementation of the ESAA-TV projects have, unlike the CTW projects, much more closely followed normal USOE procedures governing grants and contracts. Less direct involvement of the Commissioner's office in ESAA-TV projects has also resulted in involvement by seemingly unrelated offices in USOE and HEW, including the Office of Public Affairs in both agencies. The impor-

*USOE officials contend that no professional or technical expertise had input into the drafting of Section 711 and that Congress, the unions, and CPB all got "caught with their pants down" regarding the problem of residuals. One official stated that a BEOO proposal for dealing with problems of buy-outs and residuals was sent to Senator Harrison Williams, who determined that the BEOO procedure was consistent with legislative intent (Berkman, 1975, interview). Nevertheless, grantees/contractees have had to take program funds and use them to hire attorneys to determine the correct interpretation of the Act.
tant role of HEW's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs (OASPA) in approving ESAA-TV contracts will be discussed.

**Field Reactions.** Most agree that the legislation should have had input from the broadcast professionals and USOE before it was passed—especially in regard to product deliverables and ownership—and most feel it was USOE's responsibility to make sure the legislation, once passed, was workable from a television standpoint.

The producers feel USOE should have done what was necessary, perhaps ask for a technical amendment to the Act, and then established guidelines prior to solicitation of proposals. Then the television production process may have been able to function more effectively without continuous different interpretations from USOE of what the legislation "meant."

What should be learned from this experience is the importance of having industry input into legislation regarding television prior to passage. Once passed, if there are still problems, the administrative agency should either obtain legislative amendments or establish clear guidelines prior to announcing availability of funds.

**Monies Allocated: CTW**

A chronological analysis of files relating to USOE's funding of CTW reveals: (1) yearly uncertainties on the part of both USOE and CTW concerning the amounts of money that would be requested and needed; (2) periodic variations in the tone of the CTW request reflecting CTW's level of confidence regarding adequate funding; (3) periodic variations in USOE's attitude toward CTW funding; (4) the current desire of USOE to either phase out CTW funding or to at least have Congress handle CTW funding in a dif-
different way, thereby freeing the current television line for more new projects; and (5) the current favorable attitude of Congress towards CTW.

Lloyd Morrisett, Chairman of the Board of CTW, and then Vice President of Carnegie was credited with bringing the key people together to form CTW. Morrisett has described Carnegie's thinking regarding initial funding for CTW as follows:

We did not rule out any source of funding. We thought it might be possible for it to become a commercial production. We thought it might be possible to get the money from foundations. We thought it might be possible to enlist the aid of the government. And we pursued all of them simultaneously. (Polsky, 1974, p. 26)

Morrisett later suggested that the most likely long-term source of support for the project was probably the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He added, however, "At this point I think it is important that Washington agencies be brought into the project as partners even though they may be able to invest only limited amounts of money this year, so that they will begin programming future funds into their budgets." Morrisett suggested that if the project were a success, in two or three years, funding should continue to be assumed by Federal sources, whether the CPB or a Federal agency (Polsky, 1974, p. 35).

On January 3, 1968, Commissioner of Education Howe wrote several agencies, including NIH, the Children's Bureau of OEO, and the NICHD urging their support of the project. Howe said:

It strikes me that this project represents a fine opportunity for government-foundation cooperation to solve a major human problem. My current thinking is that the Federal agencies should be prepared to fund at least half, and I would hope nearer two-thirds of the cost, with Carnegie and other interested foundations funding the balance. We, at OE plan to pay
at least one-third of the cost.*

A year-by-year analysis of USOE's funding of CTW reveals the importance of Louis Hausman during the early years. Hausman, who had initial reservations about the project and who said, "I was very skeptical about being able to involve youngsters in this kind of program," told Commissioner Howe that it was absolutely impossible for CTW to do anything like the kind of program which was being visualized with a two million-dollar budget. Hausman thought a budget of about six million was much more realistic, with about two to three million for research, and with still more money needed for promotion.

It was largely Hausman's responsibility to make sure that the commitment was fulfilled. When, for example, in November, 1968, USOE's commitment to the project was still not budgeted, Hausman sent the following terse memo to the Bureau of Research:

As you know, we have committed $4 million as our half of the Children's Television Workshop for FY 68, 69, 70. As you also know, you cut back the FY 1969 support of this project. Question: have you increased the FY 1970 support to assure our $4 million commitment? (Hausman, letter to Boyan, November 6, 1968)

By May, 1970, OCD was already asking when plans would be made for CTW to become self-supporting. The following month, with $3.2 million of Fed-

*The fear of an imbalance of governmental funding and a resulting too great governmental involvement in the actual product or production was a matter of concern, particularly at the Carnegie Corporation, who wanted to keep government funding at a maximum of 50 percent of the total cost. That concern continues today from CTW's standpoint (Kennedy, 1975, interview). CTW has searched for a variety of funding sources in the hopes that such diversity insulates the organization from any one funder attempting to exercise undue influence.
eral funds expected by CTW for FY 71, (CTW wanted $3.5 million out of a total budget of $6.1 million) and with only $2.3 million allocated, four USOE officials understood Joan Cooney to say that no major R & D request would be needed in FY 72 (Hjelm, memo to the file, June 17, 1970). By September, 1970, however, with CTW having received $2.9 million from USOE for FY 71 and with another $300,000 from OED almost assured, USOE learned that CTW might need $5 million in FY 72. This latter estimate was verified in a letter from Lloyd Morrisett to HEW's Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation.*

When Acting Commissioner of Education T. H. Bell got a copy of Morrisett's letter, Bell said in an internal memo that it was "urgent" to gather precise data on CTW fiscal 1972 financial requirements and anticipated income. In doing so, however, Bell thought USOE should keep in mind that (1) Mrs. Cooney at one time expressed a view that she expected CTW to become self-supporting; (2) CTW was exempted from USOE's ordinary copyright policy (i.e., receiving 50 percent royalties) and was allowed to retain 100 percent of royalties if used for the CTW series continuations and extensions thereof or research and activities related thereto, and/or any other educational purposes within the CTW corporate powers approved by USOE; (3) a tax-exempt publishing subsidiary was being set up to help carry out CTW purposes; and (4) sale of SESAME STREET shows abroad, for which there had been requests from some 79 countries, would yield additional income. According to Bell, these

*Morrisett referred to USOE's "paradoxical situation of having supported a useful educational innovation but not having the funds to see it survive" due to the fact the research budget of USOE was not intended to support the continuation of successful developments. Morrisett suggested that "if there were an item in the USOE budget for the continuation, application, and further development of the results of successful research efforts, this paradox could be resolved" (Morrisett, letter to Butler, September 17, 1970).
considerations, taken in toto, suggested that CTW might not need such a large request (Bell, memo to Butler, October 19, 1970).

Before those issues were settled, however, Sidney Marland, Jr. became Commissioner of Education and CTW again found a Commissioner who was not only very supportive and was willing to personally become very actively involved in promoting the Workshop, but who was also willing to continue funding CTW from Cooperative Research Act R & D monies. In a meeting with Lloyd Morrisett in May, 1971, Morrisett referred to CTW's "whittling down" its FY 72 budget to $14 million and Marland indicated his desire to fund half that amount (Marland, memo to Deputy Commissioners, May 13, 1971).

CTW's request for funding in FY 73 again illustrated the uncertainty regarding the amount of funding needed. Through early 1972, CTW had been telling USOE it was going to ask for $5 million for FY 73. On May 4, 1972, however, CTW's Vice President for Finance, Thomas Kennedy, called the USOE project officer to inform him that CTW was drafting a letter to Commissioner Marland requesting $6 million for FY 73. Later that month, CTW officially submitted its proposal for FY 73 which reflected great confidence. CTW noted that SESAME STREET had been nominated for a television Emmy award for outstanding achievement in children's programming in 1971-72. Several other awards, including nominations for a Presidential Prize for Innovation, were also being given to the series. Moreover, CTW cited research support for the effectiveness of SESAME STREET. USOE then granted $6 million to CTW in FY 73.

Obtaining sufficient USOE funding in FY 74 was not as easy. By March, 1973, Marland had moved up to Assistant Secretary of HEW and was no longer as directly involved in CTW matters. CTW still had not officially received
its grant for FY 73, and needed cash to pay bills. Meanwhile, USOE was considering reducing the amount of funding for CTW for FY 74 by 50 percent, from $6 million to $3 million.

One of CTW's principal supporters within USOE at that time was Robert Filep, Associate Commissioner for Educational Technology and Director of the National Center for Educational Technology (NCET) which was then the location of the CTW Project Monitor. On March 12, 1973, Filep wrote Acting Commissioner John Ottina outlining six "dilemmas" regarding CTW's FY 74 and long-range fiscal planning, which had been "revealed" in recent discussions with USOE personnel. Filep noted that (1) USOE was scheduled to reduce its support for FY 74 by 50 percent, to $3 million; (2) general operating support grants to CTW from Carnegie and Ford were scheduled to terminate in June; (3) hoped-for income from CTW non-broadcast materials, activities, and other fund raising endeavors were not developing as rapidly as CTW (or USOE) had anticipated; (4) although CPB would continue with the same level of support to CTW in FY 74 ($5 million), it planned to reduce that amount considerably in FY 75 since its board felt that too large a percentage of program dollars was being allocated to children's programs; (5) CTW was felt to be aggressively exploring all areas of potential revenue, including state contributions, but these "fields" would take time to bear "fruit"; and (6) USOE's current position was that it was reducing the fiscal year allocations based on CTW's finding new monies.

Filep recommended that the FY 74 allocation be increased by $1.2 million to a total of $4.2 million. He referred to SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY as "real winners for OE" and "the most effective and creative activities in teaching children funded by this office in ten years."
Despite Filev's recommendation, USOE's grant to CTW was for $3 million. In addition, however, $1 million of previously-impounded FY 73 funds were released.

For FY 75, CTW submitted a proposal to USOE for $5.5 million in funding for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. The tone of this proposal differed from previous proposals. As CTW stated, "This proposal is in the nature of a plea for the millions of children who are demonstrably helped by Sesame Street and The Electric Company." The introduction to the proposal outlined the financial crisis facing CTW: according to CTW, for a variety of reasons not related to the effectiveness of SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, financial support from public broadcasting sources had been cut and in some cases eliminated. Neither the Ford Foundation nor the Carnegie Corporation, both major initial funders of the programs, were expected to continue regular support. Moreover, funds available from public television were expected to drop from $5 million to $4.4 million in the coming year, and even the latter amount was not completely assured.

CTW maintained that "In the long run, a decrease in the level of government and foundation support is both expected and can be accommodated." On the other hand, however, "a precipitous withdrawal of support by the Office of Education or by public television would threaten the Workshop's efforts to equip low-income children with the skills, attitudes and abilities they require to extract from formal education its promises."

CTW's plea was more successful in Congress than at USOE. While USOE was willing to go as high as $4.5 million it was not willing to commit $5.5
million until instructed to do so by Congress.* Even then, USOE waited until February, 1975, to finally commit the $5.5 million.

A memo of February 11, 1975, summarizing the February 7 meeting in Commissioner Bell's office reads:

After considerable discussion, the Commissioner indicated $5.5 million should go to CTW in support of Sesame Street and Electric Company as a grant in FY 75. He also stated that USOE would make a strong pitch on the Hill to phase down, out, or institutionalize its future support [emphasis added]. CTW is to be informed that next year's support will by by contract.

A later USOE internal memo suggests that Commissioner Bell may wish to be involved in the final negotiations with CTW on the additional two and one half million (beyond the $3 million authorized in November, 1974) and had requested the Project Officer to make arrangements with Joan Cooney to be present for the final negotiations. A notation to a memo which revealed this fact stated, "This may change as the Commissioner may not be involved in a personal meeting with Joan Cooney."

The Future. The expenditure plan for FY 75 mandated by the Special Projects Act was sent to the Congress by February 1, 1975. In that plan Commissioner Bell indicated USOE's intention "To fund the Children's Television Workshop (CTW), producers of Sesame Street and The Electric Company, as the terminal year in the development and demonstration projects" at a

*There were differences in what the House and the Senate wanted to spend on educational programming (the House wanted $7 million; the Senate $8.5 million). The Conference Committee then voted a compromising appropriation of $7 million for educational programming and indicated it expected $5.5 million would be allocated to CTW. Such a specific set-aside is highly unusual. It was not until February 7, 1975 at a meeting held in Commissioner Bell's office, regarding instructional television programming support in FY 75 that the decision to release the total $5.5 million to CTW was made. $3 had been released in November, 1974, after all of the CTW progress reports that were outstanding had been submitted.
level of $4 million.* As has been mentioned, Bell recommended that a different appropriation arrangement be designed, perhaps the inclusion of a line item in the budget for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

In its budget proposal for fiscal year 1976, which was later submitted to Congress, USOE repeated its intention to make FY 76 the terminal year for funding SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. In its presentation USOE stated, "Since Fiscal Year 1976 is proposed as a terminal year of funding under an Office of Education appropriation, we will be providing Children's Television Workshop with additional funds to document their experience and approaches through the life of the development and demonstration project so they can be shared with the educational community."

Monies Allocated: ESAA

While the minimum ESAA-TV set-aside is fixed at three percent, the amount of money which ESAA will spend on TV production has not, at least for the first three years of the TV competition, been known until almost the last day of the fiscal year.

In the first year of the competition, FY 73, several levels of funding had been determined and then discarded—partly due to negotiations and work completed by the Grants Officers and partly due to the further auditing of Bilingual Children's Television's (BC/TV) earlier grant under Title

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*Bell indicated the remaining $3 million, of the $7 million line item requested, would be used to provide (1) supplementary education to adolescents in patterns similar to SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY; (2) begin to acquaint the general population with the ability to use the metric system of weights and measures; (3) consumers' education programs; and (4) a program on the performing arts.
In May 1973, following the ratings of the projects by the panels, prescribed negotiations were held with the applicant which had received the highest score in each of four categories. A recommendation to fund these four applicants for a total of $9,117,315 was made on May 8, 1973, by Associate Commissioners Robert Filep and Herman Goldberg (who then had joint responsibility for administering ESAA-TV, as will be discussed). By June, when it was apparent that more monies would be available, further negotiations took place involving the five applicants receiving the highest scores, including Station KLRN, Austin, Texas, whose CARRASCOLENDAS had earlier received a Title VII ESEA grant and had finished second to BC/TV's proposed continuation of VILLA ALEGRE in ESAA's Bilingual/Bicultural competition.

On June 13, 1973, with an award to BC/TV still being held up pending further information on fiscal and management data connected with an earlier ESEA grant, Filep and Goldberg recommended the other four winners be funded for a total figure of $7,865,943. It was not until June 30, the last day of the fiscal year that a decision was made to make the award to BC/TV. On July 3, the list of winners for the first ESAA-TV competition was finally released. The five winners received $11,365,943, or roughly five percent of total ESAA appropriations for FY 73.

*BC/TV has been investigated by the Government Accounting Office (Comptroller General's Report to the Honorable Edith Green, House of Representatives, B-164031(1), 1974) and audited by HEW (Report on the Review of Office of Education Grant No. OEG-0-72-1877 for the Period April 6, 1972 through April 30, 1973, September, 1973). Both of these reports are lengthy and complicated. Furthermore, the site visit to BC/TV resulted in the belief that the issues may even be more complex than were reported formally in the two documents. Rather than deal superficially with either the investigation or the audit, which we would consider irresponsible, we have chosen not to comment, one way or the other, on these two investigations at all.
In the second ESAA-TV competition, for FY 74, a total of eight projects, five of them regional, were funded for a total of $6,893,678. Part of the decrease in the total amount of funding resulted from a review of the proposed budgets of the winning applicants by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (OASPA) in HEW, a review which had not taken place in FY 73. According to officials in the Service Support Division of OASPA a combined total of approximately $4 million was eliminated from the budgets of the eight winners. Lewis M. Helm, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs indicated in an interview in April, 1975, that this savings was only a part of the estimated $25 million in cost reductions resulting from contract budget reviews by OASPA in FY 74. While Assistant Secretary Helm claimed that OASPA only "recommended" the budget cuts and that the ultimate decision regarding budget levels during final contract negotiations rested with the program people, an OASPA official suggested the OASPA "recommendations" were resisted unsuccessfully by the program people, with the matter only being resolved at the Secretary's level.

USOE officials have expressed opposition to the continuation of ESAA**

*BEEO officials claim, however, that the great bulk of the "savings" related to a program series which was not funded because neither BEEO nor OASPA thought the proposed budget was justified, and negotiations with the producer of that project broke down. These officials maintain that the remaining "savings" were small in amount and were merely allocated to other non-television projects funded by BEEO's Special Projects Branch.

**In summarizing USOE's opposition to the continuation of ESAA, Commissioner John Ottina stated in April 1974:

The Federal Government through its desegregation programs has played an important role in assisting desegregating school districts to correct the inequities of a century of dual school systems. After nearly 4 years of Federal emergency assistance, changing circumstances require an approach different from State apportionments and special set-asides. We are therefore proposing new legislation under which it would be possible to target aid more directly on those school districts still in need of special desegregation assistance. The need for such assistance continues, but it seems fairly clear that the period of massive desegregation activity has passed. (House Appropriations Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 5; Office of Education, April 1974, p. 11)
as has the White House. USOE asked Congress, however, that if ESAA (which has been authorized by the Educational Amendments of 1974 to continue until June, 1976) did receive funds for FY 75, Congress not require USOE to allocate any specific set-aside percentage for television, but rather to grant the Assistant Secretary full allocation discretion for the entire ESAA appropriation. If that happened, many USOE officials believe that no money would go to funding television programs, but would instead go to funding other types of projects of more immediate interest to the Administration.

The amount of funds for ESAA (and thus for Section 711 and the ESAA-TV set-aside) for FY 75 (which, by law must be spent by June 30, 1975) was still not known as of April 21, 1975. As of that date the House had passed appropriations for ESAA of $125 million for FY 75 and $200 million for FY 76. Some USOE officials expect the Senate to approve figures at least that high, possibly even higher. As will be described, the delay in Congressional appropriations will cause significant problems in allocating ESAA-TV monies.

Administrative Location of the Project: CTW

The early USOE administrating of the CTW project was under the direct supervision of Commissioner Howe's Special Assistant, Louis Hausman, who, along with Lloyd Morrisett of Carnegie, Edward Meade of the Ford Foundation, and the President and Chairman of NET—John White and Everett Case, respectively—sat on the CTW Project Policy Committee. USOE's project monitor for CTW was officially located in the Division of Elementary and Secondary Research (DESR), but as indicated in a memo to the file by CTW's second monitor, "As one of the directors of the CTW group and the OE officer centrally involved in the project, Hausman apparently bears central responsibility for the project as far as OE is concerned" (Norris, memo, September 9, 1968).
In December, 1968, a Report of the Commission on Technology was delivered to the White House. The report led to the establishment of the Bureau of Libraries and Educational Technology (BLET) within USOE which assumed the CTW monitoring function. In Fall, 1971, the Bureau was divided, and the Division of Educational Technology became Educational Technology staff until February, 1972, when the National Center for Educational Technology (NCET) was established by the Secretary's approval. NCET then assumed administrative responsibility for CTW.

The National Center for Educational Technology was one of five National Centers which were established in a major re-organization of USOE in early 1972 under Commissioner Marland. In addition to NCET, Centers for Educational Statistics, for Educational Communications, for Educational Research and Development, and for Educational Systems were created as both "think tanks" and as centralized locations of policy-related concerns and expertise.

Following the demise of NCET, which is reviewed in the discussion of ESAA which follows, the question of administrative location of the CTW project within USOE has been of low priority. Main responsibility presently lies in the Division of Technology and Environmental Education. The Environmental Education portion of that Division consists of ten full-time people who presently administer $1.8 million of grants for pilots and demonstration projects to assist the development of formal and non-formal environmental education programs. The Broadcast Facilities branch of that Division has ten full-time people who currently administer a budget of $12 million for acquisition and installation of equipment for educational broadcast stations. That portion of the Division which administers the $7 million educational television programming line item in the FY 75 budget (including...
the $5.5 million for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY) consisted, un-
til several weeks ago, of only two full-time persons. Moreover, the two
project officers assigned to television projects did not even have a part-
time secretary.* Their office, identified by the Project Officers as the
ETV Programming Support Unit, neither appears on the USOE organizational
chart nor in USOE's telephone directory. The office is five levels removed
from both the Commissioner's Office and the Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau of School Systems, to which the Division of Technology and Environ-
mental Education reports (Neben, 1975, interview).

The future location of CTW monitoring will probably be within USOE's
Office of Libraries and Learning Resources, established by Section 519 of
the Educational Amendments of 1974 (P. L. 93-380). That office, which is
just being established, is expected to have an educational technology com-
ponent at the time of this report and is to be the office through which
"the Commissioner shall administer all programs in the Office of Education
related to assistance for, and encouragement of, libraries and information
centers and educational technology." Whether this relocation of offices
for television administration will signal a higher priority within USOE re-
 mains to be seen.

Administrative Location of the Project: ESAA

When ESAA-type legislation was pending in Congress, in 1971, it was
presumed that the administering of ESAA-TV projects would be the responsi-
bility of NCET. NCET staff members had assumed leadership in a task force

*As of April 25, 1975, a part-time Branch secretary and a part-time as-
sistant obtained through the Women's Corps program were assigned to the of-

HCE
which had already been established to determine the implementation of the probable TV set-aside, and NCET was administering USOE's other major television projects, including SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY.

When ESAA became law in June 1972, NCET was designated administrator of television programs authorized by Section 711. In July, preparations were being made to increase NCET's staff for this purpose, with the estimates of the number of staff members which would be required ranging as high as 20, including 10 senior-level positions. These figures were based upon an appropriation of $30 million for TV set-asides in FY 73.

NCET never did receive those new positions. In fact, by early 1973 NCET was going out of existence due to the establishment by Congress of the National Institute of Education (NIE). NIE was to incorporate the National Center for Educational Communications and the National Center for Educational Research and Development, as well as NCET. During January and February, 1973, (when final decisions regarding funding of the first ESAA-TV projects for FY 73 were still pending) discussions took place within USOE regarding the re-location of ESAA-TV administration. While some concern was expressed that the monitoring of ESAA projects by a component of NIE might suggest a research rather than an operational orientation which would be contrary to Congressional intent, support for such a move came from the Director of NCET, Robert Filep, and Sidney Marland, who had moved up from Commissioner of Education to Assistant Secretary for Education in HEW. In February, Filep, who expected to transfer himself and his staff to NIE, requested formal assignment of ESAA-TV administration to NIE, citing the following three rationales for his requests: (1) personnel undergoing transfer of functions to NIE to oversee the technology demonstration projects were the same individuals who
have developed the ESAA-TV program and were most qualified to monitor the specific projects; (2) the potential for examining projects to learn more about the impact of Open Learning Systems using ETV would be aided by the climate and resources within NIE; and (3) the project was of a very experimental nature since little is known about the potential of television for dealing with desegregation programs and since the Act mandates that applicants will use modern television techniques of research and production (Filep, memo to Marland through Ottina, February 28, 1973).

By July, 1973, Filep wished to remain in USOE and have USOE retain the ESAA-TV set-aside projects as well as SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. At the same time Herman Goldberg, Associate Commissioner for Equal Educational Opportunity and a former Rochester, New York superintendent who was very interested in television, was supporting the retention of ESAA-TV projects within his division of USOE. Commissioner Goldberg's division (BEEO) was, of course, actively involved in problems of integration in the public schools and would presumably have experts in the content areas of the ESAA-TV programming.

By the time the first ESAA-TV grantees had been selected, BEEO was sharing the responsibility for the selection process; by the time actual production of ESAA-TV programs had begun, BEEO's Special Projects Branch assumed total responsibility for ESAA-TV set-asides.

Responsibility for ESAA-TV set-asides has remained in BEEO.* Some of

*The Equal Educational Opportunity component of USOE is technically no longer a separate Bureau, but is part of the Bureau of Secondary School Systems. It includes a Division of Equal Educational Opportunity Program Operations and a Division of Equal Educational Opportunity Program Development which report to Dr. Goldberg who is Associate Commissioner for Equal Educational Opportunity Programs. Since, for all practical purposes, the change has not affected the administration of ESAA-TV projects (either in personnel or policy), references will continue to be made to a Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity (BEEO) for the convenience of the reader.
that responsibility, however, has had to be shared with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (DASPA), as has been indicated.

Selection of the Program Content Areas: CTW

SESAME STREET and later THE ELECTRIC COMPANY were conceived without major concerns being given to the specific desires of USOE. Periodically, there were movements within USOE to become involved in the programming and conceptual decision-making. The early objections of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), for example, were handled by Louis Hausman, Commissioner Howe's Special Assistant. In January, 1968, the Director of the BESE wrote to the Associate Commissioner, Elementary and Secondary Education echoing the sentiments of some of his key personnel that the CTW proposal was seen in the context of television, not education. He raised a number of questions and stated that:

> An educational context would lead to concerns for a comprehensive approach better suited to making some meaningful changes in children; to the creation of materials which are seen as developmental variables; and to the involvement of all who can play meaningful roles in changing the environment. In the existing context, we end up with a series of pre-school television materials—but in one they are the "end" and in the other, the "means." (Rhodes, memo to Estes, January 25, 1968)

Hausman responded with a terse memo to the Associate Commissioner indicating that these questions that had been raised about the CTW project had already been answered and that "If you or any of your people would like a more complete set of answers, call me" (Hausman, memo to Estes, February 1, 1968).

With the later success of SESAME STREET, (then) Acting Commissioner T. H. Bell may have thought about getting involved in the programming plan.
ning process. In a memo to HEW's Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Bell wondered if a "much broader source of input to [CTW] program decisions" should exist, given the fact that SESAME STREET seemed to be reaching about half of the total of 12 million preschoolers and was, in a sense, becoming "a national curriculum" (Bell memo to Butler, October 19, 1970). Thus far, however, movements for greater involvement in CTW program decision-making have usually been contained or have dissipated before they directly involved CTW.

Selection of the Program Content Areas: ESAA

Unlike the CTW example, proposals for national program series submitted under ESAA-TV set-asides are submitted within specified content areas. These areas, which have varied from year to year, are selected by BEEO staff members. Apparently the amount of outside advice solicited regarding the categories has never been really substantial, although Elam Hertzler, Special Assistant to Commissioner Bell and former project officer in BEEO's Special Projects Branch, indicated (despite personal misgivings concerning specific subject categories) he did undertake to discover through travels and conversation, advice in category selection (Hertzler, 1975, interview). Present BEEO officials suggest, however, that the outside advice was not especially useful. One official cited "the usual problems of getting outside advice," including the danger of going to one group as opposed to another since everyone has a special area of interest they wish to promote. Another official claimed that outside advice was of almost no benefit since people had never thought of what they really would do if they had millions of dollars to spend on television.

*A complete list of all awardees and dollar amounts is shown in Table 18 in Chapter Two.
According to various USOE officials, some of the content categories originally drafted for inclusion in the first ESAA-TV competition (FY 73) were "set-ups" to permit selected parties to win the competition. The set-ups, however, didn't necessarily work. In one case, the "set-up" didn't work because HEW's General Counsel's Office ruled that the proposed category was not contemplated by Section 711. The pre-selected winner was then forced to revise the proposal and to compete unsuccessfully in a more general, more competitive category.

In addition to categories for regular program series designed for national distribution, ESAA-TV competitions have solicited two other types of program materials. In the first ESAA-TV competition (FY'73) proposals for one-minute spot announcements, with thirty-second lift-out versions, were eligible in all six content categories. Three of the categories, "coping skills for drop-outs," "cultural enrichment," and "inter-racial and inter-ethnic tensions and conflict reductions" were limited to spot announcements proposals.

The one-minute spot announcement competition resulted from the realization by several key USOE officials and Herman Land, a consultant, that many youngsters can only be reached via television in non-school hours while they are viewing such programs as cartoon shows and re-runs of network situation comedy series on commercial channels. One-minute ESAA-TV spots would be made available for inclusion as public service announcements within such programming when broadcast by local commercial stations and/or by networks. The concept to be addressed in each single spot was to be complete in and of itself.

The other type of non-regular national program series material that
has been submitted in the ESAA-TV competition is the "regional series grant." This category was initiated in the second ESAA competition (FY 74) in order to meet needs unique to a smaller minority group or a sub-group population (e.g., Alaskan natives, specific Native American tribes), or to meet certain needs of a larger minority group which are unique to a particular regional area, or to make it possible for an applicant with a limited production capability to have a greater potential of qualifying for a grant proposal for a series intended for less than nation-wide utilization. As with all TV efforts under ESAA, regional series applications were to address themselves to the content areas and needs related to reduction, elimination, or prevention of minority group isolations; those resulting from desegregation, or helping students overcome deficiencies resulting from minority group isolation. Regional Series Grants were not to exceed $250,000.

The possibility of regional grants was specifically mentioned in a Senate Committee Report:

This section (Section 711) looks to the funding of additional programming for preschool children and programs to serve older children, suitable for home reception, with appropriate emphasis placed on all minority groups. Programming with regional emphasis may be appropriate in this regard, for example, as series of programs might be addressed specifically toward the Southwest with appropriate emphasis on its unique historical ties to Mexico (Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1st Session, April, 1971).

BEEO representatives indicated they did not "pick this up" until after the first year of funding had been completed. One official stated that during the first year a project for programming for Eskimos had been received, and it was realized that a special, separate category needed to be established for those who could not compete with proposals from a major public television production center. A further reason for inclusion of regional
grants was the belief the grants would further develop the television production capabilities of minorities, especially those living away from the major production centers.

The regional grant competition has again been included in the third ESAA competition (FY 75). In fact, it is anticipated that of the seven projects that will probably be funded, four will be regional series. The public service spot announcement category has not, however, been re-introduced since the first competition. A fear of over-saturation of spots seems to have dictated this decision. The WTTW spots are running on a number of stations at the present time.*

In addition to the open-ended regional category the FY 75 ESAA-TV competition was expected to include two "national" categories. The first was "Expression Skills." The announcement of this category states:

The proposals submitted under this category should speak to the development of video programming designed specifically to deal with the major areas of linguistic and grammatical deficiencies which are frequently found to exist in the written and oral expression of high school age children from so-called "disadvantaged" populations. A major issue which surrounds instruction in this area is the degree to which recognition, acceptance or approval should be granted those expression patterns and practices currently employed by members of the target population which may be judged substandard by generally accepted standards. It is suggested that applicants, in addressing this issue in their proposals, pursue an approach which recognizes that while certain presently employed patterns of expression are acceptable in certain social and other informal settings, in other contexts, such as in school or in employment situations, an ability to meet what are judged as acceptable standards may be necessary for success.

* A Broadcast Advertising Report (BAR) study commissioned by USOE showed that during a January, 1975 week, 112 of the 268 stations monitored carried one or more ESAA-TV spots. The 268 stations were located in 75 television markets. In the same week at least one station in 59 of those 75 markets carried the spots (Berkman, memo to Jordan, February 27, 1975).
The expression skills category was included in the 1974 ESAA competition. Five applications were received, but none were judged to warrant funding. How many applications will be received in this category in the 1975 competition remains to be seen. On the one hand, it is one of only three national services categories and thus may attract some applicants. On the other hand, (1) the perceived difficulty of producing an expression skills series (which apparently discouraged applicants in 1974), coupled with (2) the short period of time (see Length of Time for Applying for Funding) given the applicant to prepare a proposal and (3) the existence of a specific "suggested" approach (cited above) which further restricts the applicant, may all combine to discourage applications in this category.

A national category had been scheduled for inclusion in the FY 75 ESAA announcements called a "National Continuation" category. The producers of the seven national television series previously funded by ESAA were to be eligible, including the VEGETABLE SOUP series funded by the New York State Department of Education with "special projects" discretionary funds provided by Section 708 of ESAA. In late March, however, for reasons still unclear, the Office of the Secretary of HEW decided not to approve inclusion of the "National Continuation" category in the official ESAA-TV announcements.*

With the deletion of a continuation competition (which may well have involved a large percentage of the set-aside funds), BEEO added two other national categories: a program series dealing with one or more cognitive

*In April, 1975, a House Appropriations Committee Supplemental Report for FY 75 urged USOE to provide sufficient funds under Section 711 for the continued production of VILLA ALEGRE. It remains to be seen what effect, if any, this will have on the decision not to provide continuation monies.
skills (including mathematics, science, social studies or language skills) intended for viewing by elementary school-age children (which would include series intended for children from non-English dominant backgrounds) and a series aimed at fostering inter-racial and ethnic understanding on a bi-racial/ethnic or multi-racial/ethnic basis for elementary school-age children.

The Method of Announcing the Proposal Solicitation: CTW

CTW announces its proposal solicitation when it officially submits a yearly proposal to USOE. "Unofficially," in most past years, key officials of CTW have come to Washington (as well as made phone calls from New York) to remind the USOE hierarchy that the written proposal is forthcoming or has just been filed.

The Method of Announcing the Proposal Solicitation: ESAA

Announcements regarding the ESAA competitions for each fiscal year are sent to all public television station licensees, all superintendents of schools, a number of public and private non-profit organizations, USOE Regional Commissioners, and selected periodicals. In addition, beginning in 1974, key members of BEEO's Special Projects Branch travel to USOE's regional offices and make themselves available for answering questions regarding the ESAA-TV competition and for counseling in the preparation of proposals.

The announcements for the 1975 ESAA competition are more detailed and more informative than in earlier years, reflecting the learning which has taken place at USOE since 1972. BEEO officials confirm that the new announcements reflect provisions which were incorporated during the first year of ESAA grants and which were written into the second year ESAA contracts.
The Method of Applying for Funding: CTW

Each year CTW submits a written proposal to USOE for funding for the following year. In some years separate proposals were submitted for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. In other years one proposal was tendered for both. There are no requirements regarding the length or contents of the proposal.

The CTW proposals have varied, sometimes substantially, in length and tone, partly depending upon CTW's level of confidence in obtaining the required amount of USOE funding. The proposal for 1972-73, for example, reflected the fact that it was being submitted after CTW had received a television Emmy Award for outstanding achievement in children's programming in 1971-72 and about the same time as Commissioner Sidney Marland, a strong advocate for CTW activities, was nominating SESAME STREET for a Presidential Prize for Innovation (Marland, letter to the Executive Office of Science and Technology, June 19, 1971). As has been described, two years later in April, 1974, the situation had changed, and so had the tone of the CTW proposal which was now "in the nature of a plea for the millions of children who are demonstrably helped by Sesame Street and The Electric Company."

The Method of Applying for Funding: ESAA

Applicants for ESAA-TV funds respond to announcements which are very specific in indicating what materials must be included in the submission and what categories of program content are open for proposals. The announcements for the ESAA-TV competitions have even included the following statement:

It should be noted that the intrinsic quality of the proposal—not elaborate or expensive art work, illustrations, specifically prepared and printed brochures, etc.—will be
the major concern in the evaluation of proposals. Indeed, it would be expected that a proposal should itself communicate the cost-consciousness of the applicant.

Qualification Requirements for Applying for Funding: CTW

CTW's only requirement for qualification as a potential grantee/contractee is the submission of the required reports from the previous year. Even then, however, as will be included in the discussion concerning monitoring, the funding decision machinery is often in progress and monies sometimes are granted prior to these reports being submitted.

Qualification Requirements for Applying for Funding: ESAA

In addition to a submission of a copy of the proposer's Charter on Incorporation or other documents to prove non-profit status and access to a production facility capable of recording video in two inch high band color tape, ESAA-TV proposers must form advisory committees "at the onset of the proposal." Members of the advisory committee must be given at least ten days to comment on the proposal. These comments must accompany the submission to USOE.

As acknowledged in the FY 75 ESAA-TV announcements, "Regulations governing the composition of advisory committees are quite explicit." Somewhat different requirements are imposed upon local education agencies as well as those whose intended target audience includes secondary school students. In general, all committees must be composed of equal numbers of non-minority

*If the proposer wins the competition and negotiations are entered into, a final determination of eligibility could be deferred until an on-site confirmation of the facilities were made by a USOE staff member. According to BEEO officials, this would only occur if some specific and major doubts concerning the adequacy of the facilities were manifested.
persons and each minority group substantially represented in the target audience. An advisory committee for a project directed at non-minority, Black and Spanish-surname children would be made up of one-third members from each of three groups: non-minority, Black and Spanish-surnamed.

One-half the adult members of the advisory committee must be parents of target aged children. In forming the committee, the proposer must select five civic organizations and ask that each designate one member. During the project period contractors must consult at least four times a year with their advisory committee. Travel and living expenses to cover the cost of advisory committee meetings should be included in the proposal. However, advisory committee members may not be paid for their services.

In the latest ESAA-TV announcement (FY 75) the involvement of minority personnel is allotted nine points out of 100 in the proposal evaluation criteria to be used in reviews procedures. Unlike the previous year, however, such involvement is not included as a separate requirement in the main body of the announcement.

Length of Time for Applying for Funding: CTW

The deadline for CTW proposals has been firmer and earlier in the past two years. During FY 74 some minor changes were made in the processing of CTW requests in consultation with Contracts and Grants, the Program Monitor and CTW. The FY 75 proposal was requested by April 1, 1974 instead of June 1 as in previous years. With FY 76 funding to come from the Special Projects Act and with the February 1 deadline for the Commissioner to indicate to Congress his plans regarding the major (over $100,000) contracts to come from discretionary funds during the upcoming fiscal year, USOE asked CTW to submit its 1975-76 proposal by January 13, 1975.
CTW, of course, knows its deadline far in advance and theoretically can submit proposals far ahead of that deadline. One reason CTW has not done so is the uncertainty of its funding needs.

Length of Time for Applying for Funding: ESAA

The deadlines for the first three ESAA competitions have varied as has the length of time applicants have had to prepare their applications. Despite the fact that ESAA was passed in June, 1972, the announcement for the first competition (which included the program categories, evaluation criteria, etc.) was not released until January 19, 1973. In fact, the first announcement was in the form of "Proposed Regulations for Educational Television," since the actual regulations, although basically completed were not yet published.*

The second ESAA competition was announced in early December, 1973, with a submission deadline of February 15, 1974. The deadline for the cultural program category was later extended for reasons which will be explained in the next section.

When various USOE officials were asked in the fall of 1974 whether they believed the two schedules reviewed above provided the applicant with sufficient time to prepare the application, the officials gave a negative answer. One thought there should be a minimum of twelve weeks for proposal writing; a second suggested a plan in which the first-round proposals would simply be a brief (e.g., five pages) outline and only those proposals which seemed to have merit would be prepared in greater detail, or funded for a pilot program. The officials cited the problem of delay in Congressional

*These Regulations were finally published on April 24, 1973, in the Federal Register (38 FR 10101).
appropriations which they claim had prevented the early release of the prepared announcement.

The delay in the Congressional appropriations for ESAA in 1975 has resulted in a schedule of dates governing the ESAA-TV competition which has been described as "something next to impossible." The announcements were mailed in early April, and, in order to give the applicants six weeks in which to prepare their proposals, the following schedule was prepared by BEEO: deadline for submission, May 19; panels meet beginning May 23; write-up of panel results, May 27; BEEO staff decision on winning applicants, May 28; write-off by superiors, May 29; negotiations begin with applicants, June 2; approval of contracts (including approval of the Public Affairs Offices of both HEW and USOE) by June 30. Indications are that this schedule will not be met and that USOE's Public Affairs Office does not expect to receive the proposed contracts much before June 10 (Jordan, 1975, interview).

According to a BEEO Special Project Officer, the announcement for the 1975 competition was ready for release in the fall of 1974. In March, 1975, with time running out in FY 75, a decision to send out the announcements, even though appropriations had not yet been made, seemed critical. As has been indicated, HEW Secretary Weinberger's office did not approve the continuation category in the draft announcement and thus, late in March, the announcement needed to be revised. The fact that the Secretary's office waited so long before making that decision may have been partly the result of a lack of urgency being attached to the decision. If this is so, the delay might have been avoided if HEW's Office of the Secretary for Public Affairs had been involved in processing the draft announcement through the Secretary's office. OASPA was not involved, however, perhaps because of
apparent differences of opinion between OASPA and BEEO regarding the proper role of OASPA in ESAA-TV funding decisions.

The Method of Evaluating Proposals: CTW

Under Section 2(2) of the Cooperative Research Act, before being able to use his discretionary funds to support CTW, Commissioner Howe had to obtain "the advice and recommendation of the Advisory Council on Research and Development." The Council gave what Louis Hausman later characterized as "full and enthusiastic approval" of the project (Hausman, memo to Lilly White, August 9, 1968).

Hausman made that characterization in a memo to the Deputy Associate Commissioner for BESO in response to an inter-agency memo suggesting, "All major officials of the Bureau expressed concern with the project, but to no avail." Hausman, whose importance in ensuring that the CTW funding continued smoothly without USOE interference as has been described, contended in that same memo that Duane Mattheis, Minnesota CSSO, had said, "This is the best project the Bureau of Research has ever supported."

By 1970, CTW's yearly format proposals were being sent to field readers, as well as internal reviewers.* The past field readers, apparently realizing that the CTW projects would almost certainly be funded, regardless of their opinions, often recommended subjects for inclusion in the negotiations with CTW concerning the specific terms of the grant. In 1970, for example, recommendations by field readers included the retention of an on-going consultant in language and reading for the reading project (as SESAME STREET retained a consultant for its programs), the making of systematic efforts

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*These field readers have included former USOE officials as well as internal reviewers. In 1970, Raymond Norris, former USOE Project Officer for CTW, was one of the field readers.
to research various audience-building techniques, the broadening of the strategies for self-support when funds from Federal and other outside sources must necessarily be cut off.

CTW's proposal to USOE for FY 73 funding resulted in the following suggested negotiation discussion items: (1) add representatives of poverty groups to the Board of Advisors and consultants; (2) provide better nationwide representation on the Board of Advisors and consultants (the Boards seemed to be dominated by Eastern contingencies); (3) add people to a bilingual subcommittee who are known linguists trained in the field rather than community figures; (4) explain more clearly how SESAME STREET was a laboratory.

In 1974, for the first time the evaluations of reviewers were later forwarded to CTW for its review and consideration in providing new program segments. Prior to this time the reviews were utilised by USOE in its negotiations with CTW but were never fully shared with Workshop personnel.

There has never been, however, a formal published procedure by which CTW proposals are evaluated by USOE. In fact, except for the Advisory Council's initial 1969 recommendations (mandated by the Cooperative Research Act) there has been no formal CTW evaluation by USOE.* The USOE process of evaluating CTW proposals can differ from year to year and is not really intended for a go/no go decision; rather it ratifies policy decisions made by USOE, HEW, and Congress. Its major value is in suggesting points which USOE may wish to raise in negotiations. It remains to be seen, however, whether reviewers will be as frank in their comments now that they know

*Since 1969, USOE has treated CTW projects as continuation projects and thus the recommendations of the Advisory Council was neither considered necessary nor solicited.
their comments are being forwarded to CTW for first hand examination, and/or whether the reviewing process would be changed if future funding is by contract rather than grant, as the Special Projects Act seems to mandate.

One final point should be made regarding the evaluation process of CTW projects. The attitude of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations was important in setting the tone for the independence of the Workshop. In March, 1970, with discussions at USOE regarding future funding of CTW taking place in earnest, USOE checked with the Ford and Carnegie Foundations to determine their intentions regarding continued funding of CTW. USOE's Project Officer indicated she was asking the Workshop for more detailed proposals for the continuation of SESAME STREET since government funding required such details. Ford and Carnegie were then asked how closely they wished to cooperate with USOE in getting the final proposal from the Workshop for the continuation and the funding of the new reading project (THE ELECTRIC COMPANY). Neither Ford nor Carnegie showed particular interest in meeting with USOE on this question. Ford simply asked USOE to keep it informed. Barbara Finberg of Carnegie told USOE she would be "happy to talk" with USOE at any time, but that Carnegie did not have the governmental constraints faced by USOE. Finberg stated that when Carnegie wished to talk with Joan Cooney it simply could just lift up the phone and talk to her directly. Finberg did say, however, that if USOE representatives were coming to New York and would not mind having foundations in on the discussions, Carnegie would be glad to participate (Schult, memo to the file, February 26 and 27, 1970).

The Method of Evaluating Proposals: ESAA

Unlike the CTW evaluation process, ESAA-TV proposals are evaluated by a codified procedure. Moreover, positive recommendations of the evaluators

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(versus merely USOE or Congressional officials) is necessary before the project is funded, and even then, depending upon the financial resources available for ESAA-TV programs, the proposal may not be approved.

A. The Panel. In January, 1973, a Management Manual for TV Grants Administered under Section 711 was issued to serve as the permanent authoritative reference for policy and procedures, information, standards and direction for all USOE supervisors and staff personnel charged with implementing the Educational TV section of ESAA and for all non-USOE review and evaluation panels.

Section 2 of the Manual outlines the process by which ESAA-TV projects would be evaluated. Grant proposals would be reviewed and rated in accordance with a specific set of criteria and point award systems by a panel composed of three NCET representatives assigned by the Associate Commissioner for Educational Technology; one BEEO representative assigned by the Associate Commissioner for BEEO; and six non-USOE persons representative of those minority groups which constitute the target population. At least two of the six persons had to be Black, at least two Spanish surname, one of whom should be bilingual, and at least two females. Two of the non-USOE panelists would be recruited from the ranks of public television; and one would be a person employed in a school capacity (local or state) where the duties focused on minority education and/or inter-group relations. The non-USOE panelists would be selected by the Associate Commissioner of Educational Technology. In selecting them, he would consult with such organizations as the Office of Minority Affairs and the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, Black Efforts for Soul in Television, the Chicano Public TV Producers Associations, ASPIRA, the Chinese Media Committee, American Indian Audio-Visual Institute, etc.
In March, 1973, panelists were convened to evaluate 52 of the proposals that had been submitted. The six non-government panelists included three Blacks, one Chicano, one Puerto Rican, and one American Indian. Two of the six were women. All had worked in television and/or minority education and most had, at one time or another, worked in both.

The panelists which ranked 41 proposals in the second ESAA-TV competition generally resembled those of the previous year. In fact, several panelists had also served in judging the FY 73 competition. When asked if having repeated panelists was a good thing, BEEO officials indicated that it was permissible to have panelists serve for two consecutive years, but would not be permissible for them to serve three years.

There were actually three panels for one of the 1974 program categories—"Cultural Programming." The program announcement for the second competition released in early December, 1973, discussed the category as follows:

This category calls for the creation of materials designed to foster knowledge, understanding, and appreciation by upper elementary and middle school youngsters (grades 4-8) from the dominant culture and from each of the minority groups of their own culture and the culture of the other groups which are found in America.

It was assumed by KLRN that neither CARRASCOLENDAS nor VILLA ALEGRE would be eligible for funding during FY 74. KLRN, therefore, submitted a

*A total of over 500 proposals was received, many of which were judged to be incomplete. An internal USOE review reduced the number of proposals to be evaluated by the panelists to 52.

**For the second ESAA competition (FY 74), the number of proposals submitted was down considerably, but the proportion of these considered eligible for panel review was higher than in FY 73. BEEO officials were surprised that regional grants drew only 19 proposals.
proposal for a new show. BC/TV, however, applied for the continuation of VILLA ALEGRE. When KLRN learned that fact it objected strenuously. The KLRN objection came after the cultural panel had met and had ranked the applicants (VILLA ALEGRE did not rank one or two in the category and thus would not have been funded), but before any decision had been made.

On April 11, 1974, USOE Associate Commissioner Herman Goldberg, BEEO, sent a telegram to those persons and organizations which had received the ESAA-TV announcements—"to clarify and correct the concerns expressed by some applicants regarding information contained in the ESAA-TV announcement and the proposed regulations relative to the cultural programming category."

The telegram went on to state that no special consideration would be given to the particular grade levels to be addressed by the television program for which applications were made, nor would restriction or limitation be made concerning grades 4-8. The closing date for receipt of applications, previously announced in the Federal Register as February 15, 1974; was extended to April 29 by a new notice in the Federal Register which would permit additional time for applicants in the cultural programming category to revise their proposal, if necessary, or to submit new proposals. Applications in the cultural program category which had already been received were to be considered in their present form unless withdrawn or revised by the applicant.

After KLRN submitted a proposal for continuing CARRASCOLENDAS, a second, new panel had to be convened to evaluate the proposals in the cultural program category. The second panel again failed to give VILLA ALEGRE a high ranking, but did recommend that KLRN's other show (not CARRASCOLENDAS) be funded. As that recommendation was being made, however, BC/TV notified USOE
that BC/TV had revised its proposal (as permitted in the extension of the deadline for the competition), but the revised version had not been shown to the second panel. BC/TV raised the possibility that its revised version must have been lost in the USOE processing room.

As a result of the BC/TV communication, a third panel was convened to evaluate the cultural program category. The third panel recommended KLRN receive a grant, but this time for CARRASCOLENDAS rather than the other KLRN program which was one of the winners selected by the previous (second) panel.

The role of the USOE panelists vis-à-vis the outside panelists was somewhat less active during the second year, partly because of the investigation of BC/TV by the Government Accounting Office (GAO). One of the questions which GAO had asked the non-government panelists was whether the government panelists had attempted to influence their decision. Another reason USOE panelists took a lower profile in the second competition was partly the fear of the controversy that might accrue if BC/TV were or were not funded. During the FY 74 competition, BEEO officials claimed they did not participate on the panels or even read the proposals until after the competition. Moreover, these officials claimed the only proposals which they did read were the winning proposals and those for which a de-briefing had been requested.

The panelist breakdown scheduled for the third ESAA-TV competition closely resembles that of the first two. The only difference is the inclusion of one Asian-American in the non-Federal review panel and the specification that rather than having two Spanish-surname, one of whom should be bilingual (the requirement in the first competition), there shall be one
B. Criteria Used. During the first two ESAA competitions the following proposal evaluation criteria (which were printed in the regulations and the announcements) were used: (a) needs assessment--10 points; (b) statements of objectives--13 points (up to nine points for the extent to which the objectives met the needs identified, and up to four points for the mix of expertise and involvement of relevant personnel used to derive the objectives); (c) program content and design--10 points; (d) staffing--12 points (six points for a plan that realistically maximized the staff capabilities, two points for those staffing patterns that employed use of on-the-job training as it relates to the ESAA-TV initiative, and four points for involvement of minority group personnel in key positions); (e) facilities capability--10 points; (f) supplementary material--2 points (two points for proposals demonstrating the awareness of what constituted varied, realistic and effective ancillary classroom activity); (g) parent and community involvement--3 points; (h) resource management--6 points (two points for a flow chart and four points for proposals in which budgeted costs are judged as reasonable in relation to the staffing facilities usage and services purchased); (i) formative evaluation--five points (up to three points for appropriateness of techniques and up to two points for size and representativeness of the population on which the pilot testing would be conducted). The total maximum points for the first two years of competition was 71.

In the third ESAA competition (1975) the proposal evaluation criteria have been modified. The new criteria are as follows: (a) needs assessment--10 points; (b) objectives--15 points (articulation with needs--5 points, realism of objectives--5 points, and personnel involved in objectives and
needs determination -- 5 points); (c) program content and design -- 33 points (high points will be awarded only where there is shown to be a significant address to content concerns and where "the presentation formats and production values give promise of attracting and holding the target population");

(d) staffing -- 22 points (overall staffing plan -- 9 points, minority personnel involvement -- 9 points, on-the-job training -- 4 points); (3) supplementary material -- 2 points; (f) project advisory committee -- 6 points; (g) management -- 7 points; and (h) formative evaluation -- 5 points, for a total of 100 points.

Field reactions. The major concerns that emerged from the field site visits were with the ESAA proposals, and these related to the ability of a selection panel whose members did not uniformly have experience in broadcasting to judge the prospects of a television series from a written document.

Negotiations with the Producer: 

When it became apparent that USOE (i.e., Commissioner Howe) was committed to funding the preschool project which was to become SESAME STREET, an internal staff memo was prepared listing items for possible inclusion in a contract which was being drafted. Indications are that these items were considered "standard" in terms of general USOE contractual procedures:

1. Approval of advisory committee members by USOE.
2. USOE support contingent upon availability of support from other sources.
3. Approval of overall director of project by USOE.
4. Approval of research director by USOE.
5. Approval of executive producer by USOE.
6. Approval of promotion/publicity director by USOE.
7. Ex-officio membership of USOE on Advisory Committee.

The direct involvement of the Commissioner's office insured that these
"standard" items were not included in the first USOE commitment. It also established the pattern of treating CTW much like a foundation would and has—"at arms length," giving it great latitude and flexibility. Unlike foundations, USOE must conduct formal negotiations each year with CTW. The meetings, however, seem to more closely resemble discussions than negotiations. The meetings are limited and perfunctory. The important decisions regarding funding and management of the projects have already been made in the Commissioner's office, sometimes albeit reluctantly, as was the case most recently in giving CTW the full $5.5 million mandated by Congress.

The decision-making processes within USOE have been described by a former Associate Commissioner of the National Center for Educational Research and Development (NCERD) as follows:

One of the most perplexing problems of managing a large scale project (such as SESAME STREET) which is highly visible is that of keeping communications lines open with other Bureaus and with administrative levels above the program management levels. Frequently, we find that some decision concerning funding CTW has been made with little or no consultation with the program managers. Normally, such decisions have been made ad hoc in nature with little or no attention given to long-term policy considerations for support of educational TV and for national audiences. (Boerrigter, memo to Hjelm, February 9, 1971)

A number of items which would normally be included by USOE in a contract or a grant to a production house such as CTW were never included. For example, with respect to the topic of copyright, Morton Bachrach, Copyright Program Officer, wrote a memo to the file on October 7, 1969, outlining his understandings of the USOE-CTW copyright arrangements. Among his understandings were the following: (1) the usual USOE copyright regulations did not apply; and (2) USOE would appear to have nothing to do with things done by organizations outside CTW at private expense. This would be the province
of the CTW Policy Board. Bachrach indicated he recognized this might result in a "windfall" to the Workshop, but this was not his responsibility. Hausman, according to the memo, had indicated he could see nothing wrong with leaving the matter to the CTW Policy Board and felt he would be on that Board to protect USOE and the public interest.

One year later Bachrach responded to the CTW project officer's request for his reaction to CTW's establishing a division of non-broadcast materials. Bachrach told the officer:

> As I predicted CTW is using money derived from our support to expand into the book, etc., business over which we have no control—or even say. We receive not one red cent from the sale of products—even from the foreign sale of Sesame Street itself. I hope it is for the good. Anyhow it is now too late, in my view, to close the barn door. (Bachrach to Schult, memo, October 28, 1970)

Despite their limited nature, annual, formal negotiation sessions take place between USOE and CTW before the funding arrangements for another year become official. The negotiations for FY 72 and FY 73 are illustrative of the kinds of matters which have been discussed.

During 1971, allegations of CTW discrimination against Spanish-speaking people were receiving some publicity, the kind of publicity neither USOE nor CTW wanted.* It is not surprising, therefore, that a list of points for negotiation or discussion prepared by USOE staffers before negotiations for the 1971-72 funding agreement included the following items: (1) a clear statement of goals and objectives in relation to (a) the bilingual program and (b) the development of an Hispanic character for SESAME STREET; (2) the

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*Various letters concerning these allegations are located in USOE's files. Letters from Justicia and the National Mexican-American Anti-Defamation Committee written in January and February, 1971 were the first letters found in the USOE files.
encouragement of CTW to add to the consultant list linguists and other experts in Spanish language and culture and geography; and (3) discussions of the value of teaching dialect English and Spanish (see the monitoring section which follows).

There are values in the CTW-USOE staff "negotiations" each year, even though the big decisions have already been made. For example, the negotiations in 1971 helped USOE communicate the depth of their concern to CTW regarding the allegations of discrimination and reinforced CTW's willingness and desire to attempt to rectify the situation. Another value of the negotiations is to give USOE and/or CTW the opportunity of putting something (an idea, request, problem, etc.) on the record, and to look ahead and try and anticipate difficulties and opportunities.

As had been indicated, in 1975 Commissioner Bell may attend the CTW negotiations and may personally ask Joan Cooney to attend as well. What impact this may have (including the setting of an important precedent for future years when funding would come from the Special Projects Act and would be by contract rather than grant) and what may result from such a meeting, should it take place, remains to be seen. There is nothing unusual about a Commissioner meeting with either Cooney or Morrisett to arrange agreements concerning financing for the next year. To have that "unofficial" negotiation become the "official" negotiation would, however, be "a first."

**Negotiations with the Producer: ESAA**

In the first ESAA competition (FY 73) go/no go approval did not require a submission of a finished pilot and formative research based on that pilot. In the second and third years, the formative research and a pilot will be
required* which will probably mean an additional eight months between ini-
tial negotiations and the final go/no go decision (Berkman, 1975, interview).

Many people outside USOE, (and some "off the record" within USOE) be-
lieve the go/no go pilot decision will be pro forma since the political and
practical difficulties of completely "canning" a series after the pilot has
been made and funds from the previous year have been allocated would be im-
mense. Much of the negotiation is completed before the end of the fiscal
year in which the competition is held. Thus, between the time the appli-
cant is notified that he has won the competition and June 30, the applicant
comes to Washington and discusses the budget and other relevant aspects of
the project in some detail with BEEO and USOE officials. During the first
two competitions the process was done hurriedly. In FY 74, nine contracts
with worth of $7 million were negotiated in ten days.** The 1975 negotia-
tions may be even more hurried due to the long delay in announcing the third
ESAA competition (caused by the long delay in Congressional appropriations
for ESAA).

The two most significant components of HEW involved in the negotia-
tions are BEEO in USOE and OASPA in HEW. USOE's Office of Public Affairs is also
involved in the process, but at least thus far has been willing to support
BEEO's decisions.

BEEO's efforts in pre-go/no go negotiations have affected both the num-
ber of programs to be produced by a winning applicant and the length of the

*The requirement of a pilot is in keeping with the desire of HEW's OASPA
to have "market research" conducted with every public affairs-related project.

**According to BEEO Project Officer Dave Berkman, some of these negoti-
atations lasted as long as 14-16 hours, and only one as short as six hours.
contract, i.e., the production schedule and the amount of money awarded. OASPA's efforts in the Spring of 1974 affected the amount of money awarded for FY 74, as has been discussed. In one instance, the combined efforts of BEEO and OASPA resulted in a breakdown of negotiations, and an applicant selected by the review panel did not receive an award. Some USOE representatives believe that had there been more time to negotiate, things could have been resolved. Others, including OASPA officials, contend, however, that the extra time would not have made any difference and that a $400,000 impasse was caused by the project director's inefficiency in not budgeting enough programs to accomplish its objectives. One BEEO representative suggested that it was an example of not having enough good competition in a programming category. He recommended that if this happens in the future, USOE should not even try to fund an applicant from such a poor competition.

The regulations governing ESAA-TV set-asides (which were written by representatives of BEEO) state that funding will be based on "order of ranking until sums run out." In the first ESAA competition negotiations took place with five winners. The amount of funds requested by BC/TV was reduced by over 40 percent (from $6 million to $3.5 million) "to eliminate excessive and unsubstantiated costs." At the same time at the suggestion of USOE, the length of the project was increased from eight months to one year.* The amount awarded to the Education Development Center, Inc., (for production of PROJECT ONE, a math show) was increased from $3,087,539 to

*BC/TV had established an eight month schedule because it wished to have its series ready by February, 1974, when the PBS schedule was expected to be determined. USOE believed the eight month time table was too ambitious. BC/TV finished the series in ten months, and between April and June USOE had the power of cutting off staff at any time on the grounds that the show had been completed (Rector and DeAvila, 1974, interview).
$4,023,037 in the negotiation process to allow for the expansion of the series to 65 one-half hour programs. The amount given to WTTW for public service spot announcements was increased from $646,527 requested to $811,878 to enable the production of an additional 10 one-minute spots and 10 thirty-second lift-outs, thereby increasing the number of spots by 50 percent. The amount of funds given to the Northern Virginia Educational Television Association was reduced from $1,822,249 to $1,762,208 (Filep and Goldberg, memo to the file, April 30, 1973).

Thus as a result of the negotiations in the first ESAA competition, four of the five projects that received grants either had the amounts of money and/or number of programs and production schedules altered. The fifth series, KLRN's CARRASCOLENDAS ultimately underwent similar changes. When KLRN won the second ESAA-TV competition, USOE suggested that rather than ceasing production during the summer months of 1974 simply because the first grant was for 48 programs and the second for 30 programs not yet begun, KLRN should think in terms of two 39-week series and the first grant should be extended to 15 months rather than 12. This is what was done (Berkman, 1975, interview).

CARRASCOLENDAS was not the only program in the first competition to undergo changes after the go/no go decision had been made. After producing segments of its series GETTIN' OVER (a series for adolescents which stresses coping skills) the Northern Virginia Educational Television Association asked to reduce the number of programs from 65 to 45. After negotiations with USOE, the number of programs was set at 52 (Berkman, 1975, interview).

In the second competition all four winners of regional grants requested and received three-month extensions of time for completion. According to
one BEEO official, the requests for extensions had been anticipated because BEEO knew that it would take about three months to "gear up." Either the applicants hadn't anticipated that or decided it would be more prudent not to mention it in their applications. USOE did not think it appropriate to mention it in their announcement and decided rather to wait for requests for extensions and then routinely grant them.

Besides negotiations of budget and schedules, USOE has negotiated in some areas which some people feel are content areas and should be outside the stream of proper negotiation topics. USOE's response to that criticism was summarized in the following manner:

The content concerns—if they can be called that—that we do exercise are those that we feel are clearly into the legislation. For example, when you get into the area of casting, well, we want to be sure it's an integrated cast. The legislation specifically talks about integrated children's television programming. So we did feel concern, for example, that in the initial pilots of Carrascolendas there was no Black presence. We felt that could have been and should have been included... When we made the grant to Carrascolendas we were making a grant for a bilingual show. That was supposed to be around half English, half Spanish. A number of the shows began to show 70 to 80 percent English, and only 20 to 30 percent Spanish. We expressed our concern on this, that it didn't have to be 50/50, but something in the 60/40 realm at least... Now that has been really the level of our content concern. (Berkman, 1975, interview)

According to Lewis Helm, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, HEW, all HEW public affairs products, now being funded at about $150 million annually, must be cleared by OASPA, as directly mandated by HEW Secretary Weinberger (Helm, 1975, interview). According to Helm, OASPA involvement in USOE television projects* will promote cost effectiveness; ensure policy

*Although all USOE television projects are required to be approved by OASPA, and the ESAA-TV projects have been processed through OASPA, the CTW programs, SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, have not been cleared by this office, even though these two series represent USOE's major investment in children's television to date. Assistant Secretary Helm offered no explanation for the apparent discrepancy, but said he would look into the matter.
consistency with (a) the purposes of the enabling legislation, (b) the mission of USOE, and (c) the philosophy of DHEW; avoid unnecessary embarrassment to the Department; prevent propagandizing with Federal funds; and enable projects to be examined with greater objectivity than can be expected at the project level from personnel whose future jobs may depend on project funding.

A draft of a Chapter "Criteria of Review," which is scheduled to be inserted in HEW's General Administrative Manual (as Chapter 3-05-50), states "Proposed audiovisuals will be carefully evaluated by the Service Support Division, OASPA, to assure adherence to statute, regulation, policy, technical effectiveness, economy and efficiency in production and distribution."

The draft indicates the review process "will entail the expertise and professional judgment of the reviewing officer examining the concept clearance request" who will use the following "criteria of evaluation":

1. Adherence to and support of Secretarial and Departmental policy.
2. Incorporation of Secretarial programmatic emphasis.
3. Demonstration of high quality standards.
4. Maintenance of overall cost efficiency in production and distribution with careful review of specific and individual costs relating to all phases of the audiovisual product.
5. Support of public affairs plans reviewed with and approved by OASPA.

Assistant Secretary Helm acknowledged that this function which is to be performed by OASPA is "unique in Government."* According to Helm, it exists in DHEW because:

1. The Secretary is interested in this function;
2. The people should have access to objective facts instead of "a proliferation of puffery, or unneeded, unused and

*Even the existence of an Office of Public Affairs at the Assistant Secretary level is found only at HEW, HUD, and the State Department.
unprofessional public affairs outpourings";
3. Helm can implement Secretary Weinberger's concepts; and.
4. The Support Services Division has a very experienced, capable staff.

The potential involvement of OASPA was recognized within USOE before ESAA was even passed. When emergency school legislation was pending before Congress in 1971, an internal task force was established in USOE to develop criteria and guidelines for the expenditures of funds and to prepare for some of the problems of implementing the specifics of the integration legislation. USOE files reveal that the task force quickly recognized the importance of the issue of script clearance.

The existing HEW rules prescribing that all audio-video materials be screened before release caused the task force considerable concern on several grounds. First, the responsibility of having to monitor a great number of presentations (perhaps as many as 300 if ten producers produced an average of 30 programs) would impose a great administrative burden which would only serve to significantly impede the progress towards completion of these materials. Second, since many or perhaps most of the presentations would not be totally scripted in advance, script clearances, if required for every utterance included in the presentation, would mean transcripts of completed productions could only be approved after a program was produced. This meant that each such program would find itself potentially in danger of having to be re-done in part or in whole at tremendous expense. Finally, there was the potential danger of government censorship over materials intended for public consumption. This could become a particularly difficult problem when it involved programming created by and/or intended for minority groups. (Berkman, memo to Hertzler, July 20, 1972).
Members of the task force believed that instead of a procedure which mandated a formal script-by-script approval, a more informal procedure be adapted in which personnel charged with ESAA-TV responsibilities would assume a general content monitorship responsibility. The absence of script-by-script clearance procedure with respect to THE ELECTRIC COMPANY and SESAME STREET was cited by the task force as an independent precedent for such an approach.

With 282 programs scheduled for production under the first ESAA-TV grants, draft approval documents issued by USOE had the following procedure:

1. **Review Procedures**

   All shooting scripts must be submitted for approval by the OE Project Office, the OE Office of Public Affairs, and the HEW Office of Public Affairs before any production of materials can begin.

   All completed program materials must be submitted in 3/4" color video-tape cartridge format for the above-mentioned approvals before they can be released for airing (Notification of Grant Award, Special Conditions, p. 4).

In August, 1973, representatives of PBS, believing that script approval would violate both the First Amendment and Section 398 of the Public Broadcasting Act, began negotiations with representatives of HEW. In late September, after several weeks of negotiations, an agreement was reached. The following disclaimer (prominently displayed in the end credits of the films) was to be used:

   This presentation was produced by (grantee) under Grant #________, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education. The content of this program is the responsibility of the grantee, and no official endorsement by the Office of Education or the Department should be inferred.

In a September 24, 1973 memo from Patricia Cahn, Assistant Commissioner for Public Affairs to Robert Filep, reviewing the progress of what she termed
"delicate negotiations," Cahn stated, "Please understand that while the approved disclaimer does not preclude our continuing responsibility for occasional spot checking of films and other A-V products during their production process at any point, it will, however, eliminate any necessity for checking each film at each point." Cahn also indicated she understood that while the disclaimer might be used in slides or filmstrip presentations as well as in films and videotapes, "it would clearly not be appropriate" for spot announcements, since there was no way to make room in such announcements for such a disclaimer, nor would it be good production practice. The scripts of such announcements would, therefore, still be cleared at the Offices of Public Affairs at both USOE and HEW.

Thus far the role of HEW's OASPA has been largely limited in the case of ESAA-TV to reviewing contracts. With regards to the ESAA-TV spot announcements, however, Assistant Secretary Helm has already determined that one spot performed by Bill Cosby was not suitable for broadcast "on grounds of taste" (Helm, 1975, interview).* In the spot, Cosby is in a small circular area with doors leading out in all directions. He looks out through each door one by one (the doors facing the camera). He indicates his hatred for Afro-Americans because they are stupid, and they stink; he looks out another door and expresses hatred for WASPs; hatred is also expressed for Italians, Poles, and so forth. Each time he expresses his hatred he slams the door in front of him, and by the end of the spot all doors have been slammed, and Cosby has completely isolated himself.

*One OASPA official expressed concern that the "punch line" would be "missed" or "misinterpreted." Another official remarked that broadcasting the spot "wasn't worth the risk." Secretary Helm said that as a Presidential appointee and a person confirmed by the Senate, hence representative of the public, he was a more appropriate person to make the decision than was a career person.
Although the spot was never broadcast, it was seen at different times by representatives of the three major commercial television networks. One network official who had seen the spot said it was the best of the spots he had seen, and if any one spot were to be broadcast on his network, that was the spot he would carry. OASPA officials state that representatives of the other two networks indicated they would not have run the Cosby spot.

While OASPA has not, at least until the present time, undertaken the "occasional spot checking" referred to by Ms. Cahn, it has, as has been discussed, taken a very active role in reviewing the results of the negotiations between BEEO representatives and the winners of the ESAA-TV competition. In the first ESAA-TV competition, OASPA believed that because HEW procurement requirements dealing with film and other related purchases prescribed that a contract mode be employed, the use of the grant procurement procedure had been improper.

Continual pressure from OASPA to switch from grants to contracts (coupled with pressure resulting from some bad publicity relating to BC/TV) resulted in a compromise being used in the second ESAA-TV competition. A grant procurement procedure was used to get proposals, but then a contract procedure was used to bind the successful applicants. This procedure has been termed by USOE administrators as "assistance type contracts." It has the advantage of eliminating both the need for a Request for Proposal (RFP) as well as the need for negotiations with all contestants (rather than just the winners) which would be required by procurement by the grant mode. There*

*Another ESAA-TV spot which had already been broadcast was removed from distribution upon the urging of OASPA following protests by military personnel and others who objected to the uniforms being worn by some of the on-screen talent.
is some disagreement as to the legality and appropriateness of the "assistance type contract," and whether it will be continued is still somewhat unclear. Goldberg says HEW is "asking us" to switch to contracts to get a closer hold on the grantee who might "skimp on quality or quantity." Proponents of the contract approach maintain that past experience has shown greater USOE administrative control is needed. One USOE representative believes the problems with VILLA ALEGRE would not have occurred if BC/TV had been a contractee versus a grantee. He also cited the example of a project in which the designated project director wasn't really a full-time project director, and the project took many months to really get on track. On the other hand, some USOE representatives believe that switching from grants to contracts is unwise because flexibility is required after production has begun, as, for example, the decision to switch from puppets to muppets on SESAME STREET.

With the second year of ESAA-TV competition falling under the "assistance type contracts" scheme, OASPA carefully reviewed the contracts BEEO had recommended be approved. Sometimes the OASPA questioning led to changes by BEEO, and sometimes BEEO resisted. Here are examples of both cases:

1. Why do we have to pay $14,800 for "VTR headwear"?

Thank you for spotting an oversight. The cost of videotape recorder headwear is subsumed under the $1/minute VTR use charge. Therefore this headwear figure was to have been eliminated in the final, negotiated budget.

2. Why do we have to buy an additional lion costume for $1,200 and other lead costumes for $4,500 when the costumes already exist from the past series?

Assuming the Lion character is needed an average of 3/5ths of the studio time (or 144 eight-hour days), and allowing for normal wear and tear—and especially the damage done by the profuse sweating on the part of the actor who is "encased" in the outfit—there is simply no question that a second costume is needed. The $4,500 allows for new costumes for new characters, and any replacements needed.
OASPA will only have a few days to examine the proposed contracts for the third ESAA-TV competition (FY 75). OASPA officials indicated, however, they would examine those contracts as carefully as possible and would compare cost estimates against the costs of professional commercial production.

**Monitoring During Production: CTW**

In addition to representation by Louis Hausman on the five member "Project Policy Committee"* for the preschool project, USOE assigned a full-time staff member to be a project monitor of the Workshop's broadcast activities. Each agency involved (including OEO, NICHHD, National Endowment for the Humanities) which was scheduled to provide funds to the Workshop had a single representative to monitor the project. As has been indicated, USOE's chief liaison man was Hausman and the project monitor really reported directly to him. As has also been mentioned, at one point USOE's Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education attempted to assign its own monitor to the project, a move Hausman successfully resisted.

Hausman was influential in establishing the role of the project officer in monitoring CTW and determining the nature of the paperwork which would be required to be submitted by the Workshop to USOE. In November, 1968, Eugene Aleinikoff, then CTW's attorney, Joan Cooney and Edward Palmer, CTW's Director of Research, met with Raymond Norris (then Project Officer), a representative of USOE's Contracts Office, and later with Hausman at his office. As a result of those meetings, the following was decided: (1) the CTW group was not obligated to obtain competitive bids or provide sole source justification.

*The "Project Policy Committee" consisted of Hausman, Morrisett, Meade (of Ford) and White and Case (President and Chairman of NET). This group met on only one occasion.*
cation since this was not written into the original grant language; (2) it was USOE's understanding that in grants of this type the grantees were not required to meet any approval of specific portions of their work by the project officer in order to qualify for continued support; (3) quarterly reports would be submitted to USOE (Norris, memo to the file, November 12, 1968). It is significant that Norris had originally merely requested reports at "different phases"; however, Joan Cooney suggested that quarterly reports be submitted because they "would be good for us" (Schult, memo to the file, December 12, 1969).

When Hausman had left USOE and Howe was no longer Commissioner, movements strengthened to get other portions of USOE involved in overseeing and making input into CTW's programming decisions. In October, 1970, Acting Commissioner Bell wrote Lewis Butler, HEW Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, raising the issue of the need for a much broader source of input in SESAME STREET programming decisions since the program was becoming "a national curriculum." At about the same time, Gilbert Austin from the Office of the Secretary of HEW indicated he had written to his superiors suggesting there be a high level governmental group established to deal with policies relating to SESAME STREET.

The need for more effective communication between CTW and USOE was also a matter of some concern following the departure of Hausman. Meetings between "appropriate OE personnel" and "key members of the CTW staff" to discuss "present and potential problems" were suggested by several USOE officials as a means for effectuating such communication. One of those meetings was held on January 14, 1971. At that meeting items discussed included new staff, subcontracting, foreign broadcasting, non-broadcasting agreements,
information booklets, and clearance of forms. In February, 1971, a further meeting was held to discuss the potential problems posed by commercial exploitation of the SESAME STREET name. During the preceding several months many discussions had apparently been held with Cooney and other CTW personnel regarding ways and means of handling this situation.*

In August, 1971, a draft of the USOE budget submission to Congress for FY 73 listed (under Federal Administration of CTW) actual employment (monitors of CTW) as three full-time permanent and .5 "other" man year equivalent. The estimate for FY 72 was the same and the "high" budget and "low" budget and "actual request" for FY 73 were identical.

If the FY 75 budget for Federal Administration had specified positions in USOE devoted to administering the CTW project (which it did not) the actual employment would have been less than one full-time permanent and zero "other" man-year equivalent. There is no person at USOE whose full-time position is to monitor CTW activities. As had been indicated, until very recently two professionals, with no secretarial staff, monitored all of USOE's non-ESAA TV projects. Even at this writing there are only two full-time, permanent people involved. While the current CTW Project Officer has been able to make some field trips to New York City in the past two years to visit CTW, these have occurred only after repeated efforts to obtain necessary ap-

*An example of how USOE's monitoring responsibilities can be used by third parties to effectuate change in CTW activities is illustrated by the allegations of CTW discrimination lodged by representatives of the Spanish-speaking community. Letters and telegrams sent to USOE as well as to Congress and CTW helped "keep the heat on" until suggested changes had been made. Moreover, as has been indicated, at the early USOE-CTW negotiations in 1971 and 1972 and in the quarterly and final reports from CTW to USOE in those years, discussions concerning this issue were given considerable attention.
approval and funds for such trips. Moreover, he was not able to obtain approval and funds to visit any of the utilization centers across the country until the Spring of 1975.

Thus far, most of the CTW-USOE communication and activity has revolved around either funding requests and appropriations (discussed under "Monies Allocated: CTW) or submission of CTW's quarterly and final reports. The problem of prompt submission of quarterly reports has long plagued CTW. As early as June 27, 1972, Elam Hertzler (then CTW Project Officer and now Special Assistant to Commissioner Bell) wrote Bob Davidson of CTW to "confirm many telephone conversations we have had over the last several months concerning quarterly reports and the proposal for the coming fiscal year."

Hertzler noted the proposal for THE ELECTRIC COMPANY and the budget for the entire operation of CTW had arrived, but the proposal for SESAME STREET and the "long overdue quarterly reports which were promised in late April or early May have not arrived." Hertzler continued, "I put this in writing only to emphasize that we cannot proceed with processing next year's grant until these things arrive."

On September 30, 1974, CTW had submitted its progress report for the period April 1, 1974 through June 30, 1974. At that time, however, the progress report for the period April 1, 1973 through June 30, 1973 had not been submitted.

On October 21, 1974, two weeks after the last progress report had been filed, CTW project monitor, Clarence Fogelstrom, reminded CTW that the first quarterly report for fiscal year 1975 was now due for the period July 1 through September 30, 1974. Fogelstrom suggested, "Now that you have fulfilled your reporting requirements for FY 73 and FY 74 reference quarterly
reports, do keep the FY 75 reports coming in on time so you avoid having to add writers/editors in order to fulfill the obligations of your OE grant."

Review of USOE files indicates that by the end of each fiscal year, at least one quarterly report is still outstanding, and that quarterly reports are rarely filed on time.

In July, 1973, USOE began its first and only comprehensive audit of CTW. Strong support for the audit came from the USOE contract officer for CTW, Al Riskin. Riskin was also a contract officer for BC/TV which had recently been audited. This CTW audit came five years after USOE funding had begun and after $18 million of USOE support had been tendered. When asked by House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Representative Daniel Flood why USOE had waited so long before conducting such an audit, Commissioner Ottina responded:

> Audit actions by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare are determined on a priority need basis. The priority of the need for a special audit during the first few years of the period was lessened by the fact that there was an obvious and high quality product and one which was cost-beneficial. (House Appropriations Subcommittee, Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, April, 1974, Part 6, p. 108).

As of this writing, the results of the CTW audit have not been released, even though the originally scheduled completion date was September 30, 1973. At the time the audit began in the summer of 1973 there was some confusion over its scope. CTW believed that the audit was to be a fiscal audit rather than a program evaluation. The audit agency informed CTW in August that the scope of the auditing would include "not only financial and compliance auditing, but also auditing for economy, efficiency and achievement of desired results" (Kennedy, letter to Felipi, August 24, 1973). Thomas Kennedy, CTW
Vice President and Treasurer, wrote the USOE Chief of Contracts and Grants expressing concern that "the extension of the audit beyond the fiscal areas into program evaluation could unduly prolong the audit." Kennedy added, "We would expect that the progress reports which we have submitted to the proper staff of the Office of Education would permit a more comprehensive and effective evaluation of our program results" (Kennedy, letter to Felipi, August 24, 1973).

Monitoring During Production: ESAA

Section III of USOE's Management Manual for ESAA-TV projects is titled "Grant Management Procedure." That section lists the following eight items which would normally be included in USOE's grant management:

1. Site visits.
2. Oral and written reports from the project director.
3. Script and completed show clearances as specified in the grant document.
4. Clearance of formative evaluation documents to be used.
5. Go/no go check points specified in the grant.
6. Attendance at advisory committee meetings.
7. Active knowledge of circumstances leading to major decisions in the project.
8. Other involvement necessary to insure that USOE maintains a complete working knowledge of the project.

The manual made it clear that this list was not necessarily all inclusive.

With respect to project winners in the 1974 competition which are now in the process of producing programs, Dave Berkman, Project Officer for many of the ESAA-TV projects, said, "We're making site visits every three months. We talk with the people once a week, but a minimum of every other week. They must all submit monthly reports--this is under the contracts--and they must all submit a large quarterly report" (Berkman, 1975, interview).

Monitoring procedures with respect to the winners of the first ESAA
competition have varied from applicant to applicant. In the case of BC/TV, because of problems cited in an HEW audit and a GAO report, there was for a period an on-site Project monitor. With respect to WTTW, winner of ESAA awards in both the first year (Public Service spots) and the second year (an as yet untitled series of 13 one hour programs designed to reduce tension and conflict resulting from desegregation), BEEO Associate Commissioner Goldberg accompanied his project officer on a two-day field visit to "share ideas and review progress" regarding the spot announcements. This close review of the spots relates to the fact that they are the only ESAA-TV programs to which clearance of script (story board) and final tape is being imposed.

**Final Product Submission: CTW**

CTW does not submit a final report to USOE. The quarterly reports discussed above, combined with relevant portions (those discussing the current year activities) in the proposal for the upcoming year are considered sufficient. At one time, however, CTW did submit an annual report. Moreover, in January, 1971, when CTW's proposal for a new reading show, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, was under consideration by USOE, CTW and USOE officials discussed the possibility of a formal presentation of the report by Cooney and some of the CTW staff to USOE and perhaps HEW personnel. It was agreed that the matter would be explored further at USOE and then discussed with Joan Cooney (Schult, memo to the file, January 14, 1971).

CTW got USOE funding for its reading show. It also got a strong advocate, Sidney Marland, as Commissioner of Education in the Spring of 1971. Thereafter, references in USOE files to CTW final reports seemed to be nonexistent. Whether or not Commissioner Marland intervened in the discussion.
of final report requirements is unknown.

Final Product Submission: ESAA

Five copies (one master and four first-generation) of the completed program series (plus other tapes and scripts and a one-page teachers guide for each individual program) constitute the final report from ESAA-TV project directors. There is no requirement for summative evaluation or a final written summary (evaluative or not) of the conduct of the project.

The possibility of funds in FY 75 for summative research on ESAA-TV projects was discussed in interviews with some USOE officials. However, Michael Wargo, ESAA Evaluation Program Officer, indicated in January, 1975, that the probabilities were slim because "no one was really pushing for it." BEOE, which makes recommendations to the Assistant Secretary regarding the use of the one percent discretionary set-aside for evaluation of ESAA projects, and/or the Office of Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation (OPBE), which has some discretionary research funds, would be the two most likely units within USOE to "push" for such research.

If the Senate retains (or raises) the $200 million appropriated by the House for ESAA in FY 76, $2 million (one percent) would be available for research. There is hope that some of that money might go to evaluation research on ESAA-TV Projects in FY 76.

*For a full list of "deliverables" see the ESAA-TV announcements for FY 75.
Funding Prospects for FY 75 and FY 76: The Special Projects Act

USOE seems determined not to continue funding for either CTW's children's programming, whose success is a matter of record, or the ESAA-TV series, whose record is still being written, but whose early history has been plagued with many problems. It is appropriate in that context to ask what is the plan and the policy for USOE involvement in children's television programming under the funding flexibilities permitted by the Special Projects Act.

Under the new Special Projects Act, the Commissioner of Education "will be authorized to make contracts for almost any area of educational demonstration and innovation" (Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Report on the Educational Amendments of 1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March, 1974, p. 5). In the Act, Congress has not attempted to restrict the Commissioner's options regarding television funding decisions. On the contrary, the Congressional intent was "to give the Commissioner latitude to fund those contracts and grants he feels of major importance, without the limitations and requirements imposed by narrow categorical authorities" and to provide "a broad authority with minimal strings attached" (Senate Report cited above, p. 69). The Act specifies that the Commissioner's plan must be submitted annually to the appropriate Congressional Committee (Committee on Education and Labor of the House, and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate), and these Committees have the authority to adopt a resolution within sixty days to disapprove the plans. However, the Senate report stated, "It is not anticipated that the committees will make extensive use of the disapproval authority" (p. 69).

In addition to the far greater discretionary authority available for
funding television projects, the Commissioner has two other important advantages with the Special Projects Act. First, the total appropriations ($200 million per year)* have been established for the next three fiscal years (FY 76, FY 77, FY 78) thus eliminating the need for trying to estimate how much funding will be provided by Congress. Second, the time schedule is fixed, and basic decisions (for instance, probable subject areas of funding) must be made by February 1 of each year. Presumably, any time after February 1, RFPs can be announced as long as they include a caveat regarding the possibility, however remote, that Congress could disapprove the spending of any funds in that subject area. This means USOE has from February 1 of one year until June 30 of the following year (17 months in all) in which to announce, receive, evaluate, negotiate and fund proposals.

Recently, USOE has attempted to reduce or eliminate CTW funding in order to "open up" more of the educational television programming line item for new projects. In FY 75, after delaying until February, 1975, USOE allocated $5.5 million of the $7 million to CTW, as had been urged by Congress. There were remaining, therefore, $1.5 million in discretionary funds for FY 75.

Commissioner Bell has indicated USOE's intention, under the Special Projects Act, to allocate in FY 76 a total of $4 million to CTW, and $3 million to discretionary spending; for FY 77, no provision for CTW has been

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*$100 million of these amounts must be applied to the following priorities established by Congress: Education for use of the metric system; education for the gifted and talented; community schools; career education; consumer education; women's equity in education; and arts in education (Section 402 of the Act). Television can be used to achieve these purposes, and, in fact, the Commissioner's FY 76 plan includes the possibility of programs relating to consumer education, the performing arts and use of the metric system.
indicated. If television support remains at $7 million through FY 77, therefore, there will be significant increments in discretionary spending: $1.5 million in FY 75; $3 million in FY 76, and $7 million in FY 77. With such increments in discretionary funds for television, the funding decisions become more significant, and probably more complex and more numerous. In that context, it is important to note that there is no indication of a firm policy or operational plan for deciding how the $1.5 million for FY 75 or the $3 million for FY 76 will be spent.

On November 11, 1974, Acting Associate Commissioner for State and Local Educational Programs* Thomas Burns wrote Commissioner Bell that the suggestions being received from the Commissioner, taken with existing planned use of the funds, cumulatively represented more dollars and flexibility than could be expected. Burns outlined a series of options available to the Commissioner, but, before doing so, suggested that the following "reference criteria" should pertain to all pilot/utilization projects accepted for funding under the remaining $1.5 million in FY 75: need; applicability of the subject matter to television; innovative, carefully researched practices; absence of extant superior television programming; educational impact; and cost per viewer. With approximately 60 days remaining in FY 75 as of this writing, it is still uncertain how the remaining FY 75 discretionary funds will be allocated. Drafted RFPs have still not been released. Such time pressure does not facilitate the planning and composition of thoughtful proposals for television series.

The prognosis for FY 76 is not encouraging either, in terms of firm

*This is the administrative "home" of the ETV Programming Support Unit.
policy and operational plans for television. With the Special Projects Act not taking effect until FY 76, there was, in theory, a considerable lead time for determining how the increased discretionary authority was to be used. It appears, however, that this lead time has not been used to full advantage. On the contrary, in the middle of February, 1975 (after the February plan had already been submitted to the appropriate committees), internal USOE memos suggest that basic decisions regarding how the $3 million should be spent had not been made: e.g., should continued support of existing ESAA-TV projects be considered under the "service" concept? Should good but unsuccessful past ESAA-TV proposals be considered? Should pilots or series be the goal? Should there be a new "open" competition for new subject areas or should competitions be "closed" and grants be sole-source? (Colby, memo to Bogan, February 15, 1975)

Repeatedly, the need for coherent policy, and the need for appropriate administrative mechanisms to implement that policy, are indicated. The broad discretionary authority provided by the Special Projects Act only emphasizes this need. It is recognized that the funds available for television are small indeed compared to the total USOE budget, and that the Commissioner's office has much to consider other than television programming. Because of television's visibility and potential impact, however, a good case could be made for giving disproportionate attention to the USOE involvement in television programming. Some of the issues that need attention are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter Four: Policy Issues, Alternatives, and Recommendations

Introduction and General Point of View

This chapter will present a summary of policy issues that have been presented in previous chapters, and will introduce or elaborate more fully on other relevant issues. The focus of this chapter will be primarily on national purposive children's programming directed mainly to the in-home audience. Because of the systemic differences engaged with in-school programming, as discussed in Chapter Two, a final section in this chapter will be devoted to in-school programming. In this final section many of the topics discussed in Chapter Four will be reassessed in summary fashion on those points that seem to us to differ for the in-school system.

It will be helpful to first state certain general value positions that have been developed, modified, and/or reinforced during the course of this investigation, because they are the "goggles" through which more specific issues are seen and analyzed. These generic value positions relate to:

1. the need and value of Federal funding support for purposive children's television programming;
2. the need and value of a Federal administrative structure that understands the systemic nature of television and can operate compatibly within that system to get maximum public good from the Federal dollar; and
3. the dysfunctional nature of Federal interference and control beyond selection and funding of grantees/contractees.

Need for Federal Funding. For a number of reasons, USOE is, should be, and should continue to be involved financially in support of national, purposive children's programming directed primarily to the in-home audience.
Foundation support is short-term and, in today's economy, dissipating. Revenue-generating ancillary materials, if handled most responsibly, will not generate self-sustaining levels of revenue to support the high caliber research and production necessary to produce programming that will be competitive with alternative offerings. Commercial television is not organized or administered to absorb the extra costs of curriculum development and evaluation, and is primarily interested in entertaining its audience.

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting can be expected to be a partner, but not a sole source of support, for expensive, goal-directed programming. Besides, CPB has limited resources for the development of any programming to meet a need, whether it be for adults, minorities, or a variety of specialized audiences. PBS is not organized to be a producer of programs. Its member stations can produce programming, but only a few stations are actually equipped, staffed, and financed to do so. The Station Program Cooperative at PBS, a mechanism for individual stations to collectively finance programming of their choice, is vastly underfinanced to carry the full load of development and sustenance of all programming, especially purposeful programming for children. PBS has many audiences besides children to whom it must program. Private corporate support can be a valuable supplement to purposeful programming, but insulation from the reality, appearance, or possibility of corporate control of content must be reasonably assured before the program will be aired. Corporate support will most likely be a part of the advertising or public relations budget. As a consequence, corporations will most likely be interested in underwriting programs for their desired target audience. At any rate, the amount of money here is believed to be important, but small. Total advertising budgets vary from company to company, but on the average amount to about five percent of total retail sales. Typically, institutional advertising or corporate advertising,
if it exists at all, will only be about five percent of the advertising budget. The Government, therefore, would appear to be the funder of last resort, and USOE, because of its educational mission, is the primary agency under which funds for educational programming are administered.

**Federal Need to Understand Television.** "Buying" the development of a television series is vastly different from buying the development of other types of products, and HEW/USOE is not set up administratively to handle development of broadcast programs with either uniformity or efficiency. A dual expertise is required to develop what has earlier been defined as purposeful children's television: (1) content expertise to develop objectives and (2) professional broadcasting expertise to translate those objectives into programs that can compete successfully for audiences. USOE may have the former, or certainly has access to it, but is entirely inadequate in the latter—a repeatedly affirmed estimate is that within HEW, as a whole, there are perhaps no more than four people with extensive knowledge about television, and fewer than that with supporting professional experience in broadcasting at the national level.

The lack of either an adequate administrative structure or broadcasting expertise in the administration of television programs is a root cause of a host of problems and inefficiencies in Federal television involvements that have emerged in the course of this investigation, including major categories of:

1. lack of short-term or long-term policy;
2. lack of coordination among television projects;
3. lack of coordination among agencies within and outside of USOE;
4. dysfunctional incompatibility and interference with essential
requirements for quality television production, distribution, promotion, utilization, and evaluation;

5. procedures which hinder creativity and organizational effectiveness through restrictions or lack of incentives; and

6. lack of governmental trust in professionals to do a good job which leads to a counter-productive adversary relationship between funder and fundee rather than a cooperative relationship to try to solve a social problem.

Dysfunctional Nature of Federal Interference. By a number of measures, the record suggests that the more freedom and responsibility given to a production agency within the professional broadcasting community after the basic commitment has been made, the greater the likelihood of a successful program, and, therefore, the better the Federal investment. The relationship seems to hold for such criteria as:

1. quality of the product
2. numbers of target audience reached
3. cost per child exposure
4. professional and public acceptance
5. synergistic blending with non-Federal dollars
6. demonstrable impact
7. ability to attract and retain top professional personnel
8. efficiency of administration
9. cost of the product
10. freedom from fears of Government propaganda and/or control.

In general, the best time for careful scrutiny of a proposal, the reputation, record, and qualifications of the proposing organization, the adequacy of the administrative structure, the budget, the expected processes and outputs, and the like, is before the commitment is made. Once made, the effect of accountability assessments should apply primarily in terms
of continued funding for the same or different projects, based on the evaluation of the product delivered from the earlier commitment. Between initial commitment and product delivery (or other interim points of accountability established before the fact) the more "hands off" the Government can be, the better. That is a general conclusion and value position. Experience indicates that the trade-off of risks between trusting a responsible production agency that has been carefully screened and approved to deliver a product, and attempting point-by-point continued monitoring and interference in the name of protecting the public interest, favors the former. Anecdotes about instances of waste and inefficiency that have resulted under conditions of greater freedom to a grantee seem to us to be a consequence of ineffective advance screening of the awardee.

It is realized that USOE does not have complete freedom in administering investments, but the general principle of minimal interference and supervision once the funds are committed holds, in our judgment, to whatever extent it can be applied. If there are policy guidelines or legislation which mandate this interference, those guidelines and legislation should be changed.

The remainder of the chapter will present issues in five general categories which form a likely chronology of activities which need to be considered within the system of television:

1. Assessing the needs of the audience;
2. Federal funding/administration of projects to meet the needs;
3. Production of the series;
4. Distribution, utilization, and promotion of the completed product; and
5. Evaluation of the effort.

These categories are necessarily imprecise and non-exclusive due to the
highly interdependent nature among all elements. A final section summarizes the issues closely identified with in-school programming.

Assessing Audience Needs

There is a variety of ways in which needs are now being assessed. None of them appears to be sufficient alone in identifying the needs of the children in the U.S. There is no Federal agency which has recently or is now systematically ascertaining the children's needs which could be ameliorated by television programming. It is impossible to prioritize projects, if national needs are not assessed. Without any ordering of priorities, a number of agencies within and outside DHEW have used or are contemplating using television as a means of satisfying a narrow problem the agencies have identified. As a result, program development is haphazard.

As Lillian Ambrosino, a former consultant to OCD, contends in her commissioned paper for the present examination:

Projects are not part of an overall design; they rarely flow in an orderly sequence so that one program is preparation for the next, or the findings of research are integrated with the next stage. They are most usually one-shot packages commissioned to implement an agency priority for a given year.

This is not really an oversight, but a manifestation of government operations. (Ambrosino, 1975, p. 12)

Various means of ascertaining needs are discussed in this section.

Licensee Ascertainment. Commercial broadcasters are now required to conduct community "ascertainment surveys" of local needs, to help determine programming content they might originate to help meet their responsibilities as licensees. It is anticipated that similar requirements may soon apply to public broadcast licensees as well. Unless local ascertainment
efforts are somehow aggregated, they will not serve as a useful guideline for national needs assessment. Additionally, there is a real question, given the way the ascertainments are conducted, as to whether they reflect actual "needs" in any case. For example, typical responses to local ascertainment surveys are that there is a need for less potholes in the streets, more housing, lower taxes, better traffic flow, etc.; that is, they tend to generate issues which can often be handled by local governments. It would be rare that this procedure would discover the needs of the children which could be served by purposive television.

ACNO. The CPB has employed an alternate mechanism for needs assessment in its Advisory Council of National Organizations (ACNO). ACNO established four task forces, two of which dealt with early childhood education and elementary-secondary education. Their job was "to conduct a study of the present status and perceived needs of public broadcasting and education, and to make recommendations for Corporation [for Public Broadcasting] actions in this area" (Witherspoon, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 13). Just how this information will be used and whether this will be a continuous process is unknown.

ESAA. The ESAA legislation has generated another mode of needs assessment. The general need was recognized in the legislation itself; i.e., the general intent of funded television programs was mandated: "to meet special needs incident to the desegregation of schools or the elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation, and to aid school children in overcoming the educational disadvantages of such isolation."* The

*Language drawn from Section 702 (b) of the Emergency School Aid Act (P. L. 92-318).
specific needs assessments within specific categories, however, were/are the responsibility of the applicants for ESAA funding. Federal priorities on the specific needs assessment can be inferred from the scoring system used to evaluate proposals. Needs assessment accounts for up to 25 out of a maximum of 100 points in proposal evaluation, when needs and objectives are considered together. Below is a summary of the criteria and the number of points allowed:

1. Needs assessment: 10 points. Criteria are breadth, depth, and appropriateness of the data used for the assessment.
2. Articulation with needs: 5 points. The criterion here is the extent to which the objectives address and meet the needs.
3. Realism of objectives: 5 points. The criterion here is the judged capability of attaining the objective through the proposed television series.
4. Personnel involved in objectives and needs determination: 5 points. The criteria here are the professional credentials of the personnel as well as their representativeness of the target population to be served with the proposed series.

CPB. A 1972 document from CPB, "Guidelines and Formats for Submitting Program Production Proposals" reflects a less formalized approach to needs assessment. The general purpose of the Guide is "to establish formats for Submitting Program Production proposals to CPB for funding and PBS for distribution." A "narrative" is to cover the items of the subject matter, approach, importance, participants, and distribution intent:

1. **Subject:** What field or area will be covered; indicate the parameters of the project.
2. **Approach:** What is your reason for presenting this
subject? What new approaches or techniques will be used in handling the subject matter? Will this differ from existing or previous treatments?

3. **Importance:** Why is this subject important? Where does the importance lie? Local? Regional? National?

4. **Participants:** Who will the principal participants be and what are their qualifications? It is not necessary to include the entire staff--only those individuals whose background and qualifications add particular expertise to the project.

5. **Distribution Intent:** Is the program designed for national, regional, or local distribution?

"Needs assessment" here is apparently a far more informal concept.

**Producer Generated.** Some needs may be so self-evident as to not demand a formal assessment through surveys and other research. This was the case with the "needs assessment" for ZOOM. As an observer of the human condition and a father, Chris Sarson, originator of ZOOM, perceived a need among children at a certain state of their social development, when they become especially peer conscious at ages 8 to 12, to have a vehicle for creative expression, in a direct, participatory sense, and in an environment of dignity and respect for the child's ideas. We have little confidence that a national sociological survey of this age group to verify the need, followed by a nationally distributed Request for Proposal for an appropriate, responsive television series, would have resulted in a better series than ZOOM.

The perceived need, the idea for the format, the talent, and the drive.
to make it come into being successfully, all resided in the same person.

Even the two ESAA programs studied were brought into being by individuals personally and creatively committed to the concept—in advance of the ESAA guidelines. Recognition that more than one successful children's program has come about this way or similar ways should cause one to question the inviolability of the more formal, and organizationally separable, sequence of needs assessment, specification of objectives, selection of media, message design, evaluation, and so forth.

Sarson (1975, interview) believes that professional broadcasters are more in touch with people, as potential television viewers, than anyone else, and that good ideas should come up to Government from creative producers, rather than in response to Governmentally-specified topics. While there is no doubt that the existence of funding for certain topics will generate proposals, these might not generate the best ideas a producer is capable of, and the targeting of money may divert the better ideas from coming to fruition.

Perhaps because of similar experiences, Hartford Gunn, President, PBS (1975, interview), urged an openness to creative ideas that emerge without a lot of advance formal planning and forethought. PBS is related to education, but it is in the broadcasting business, which is different from being just in education. Gunn believes, and we concur, that it is not possible to mandate or create by fiat a quality program in all problem areas. Program origination with the creative spark, where all the elements come together in someone's mind, characterizes the conception of many successful programs. Gunn explained in illustration how THE FRENCH CHEF program with Julia Child started, not by careful design based on needs assessment, but
by accident. Julia Child was invited to review her cookbook on a WGBH book review show, and it was during this performance that the "spark of an idea" for a cooking show emerged. Nobody had given previous thought to a cooking show; it was not on any priority list, yet it ran successfully for many years. Gunn concludes, "... as long as we are broadcasters in this particular medium today, we can't do programming by prescription. There's got to be the opportunity for the program to come in." For USOE concerns, this position might be adapted to urge an openness to funding program ideas that come up from the television field, and appear relevant to USOE concerns, without necessarily having been generated in deductive fashion from formal needs assessment.

A more formalized needs assessment than the ZOOM example was the manner in which SESAME STREET was proposed. Needs assessments and feasibility studies were presented in the proposal, but the original spark of the idea did not filter down from USOE guidelines or suggestions; it started with an insightful and persistent person, Joan Cooney, who had an idea, and got the right mix of people similarly interested in the idea. From there, the idea went up to Government, rather than the reverse process where Government priorities were stated first, followed by someone trying to "second guess" what the Government really wanted.

AIT: Assessment of Needs for In-School Television Programming. In some senses, the most credible needs assessments are conducted by the Agency for Instructional Television, because the articulators of the needs are also the funders of the AIT consortium programs. The Council of Chief State School Officers have a "grass roots" feel for both the curriculum needs in general, and also for the needs for which television might best be used.
Ideas for programs based on in-school needs are first generated at regional meetings of school administrators and teachers. Usually a group of content experts, television people, teachers and administrators develop a prospectus for a program. Through a great amount of personal contact and travel, the prospectus is shown and discussed among the various state agencies that will eventually form a consortium of funders, producers and users. The state agencies (as well as Canadian provinces) must be satisfied that their area and local needs will be met by the proposed series sufficiently to commit to consortium agreements. The number of participants must be sufficient to justify going on to production before the production commitment is made. In effect, the consumers of the product are "sold" on the notion of the series before the investment is made and the consumer pays for the product.

A national review committee does not have to ascertain that state and local needs would be addressed with the program, because provincial, state and local representatives, who have official responsibility for the formal education needs of the ultimate benefactor, the children, must collectively agree in advance, and in sufficient numbers, that the concept is meritorious. The AIT model is not only consumer-accountable, it is also an excellent example of how national programming for in-school use can be generated from a decentralized, non-Federal base, in which the integrity of state and local control of curriculum is maintained.

Conclusions/Recommendations on Needs Assessments. There is a major conceptual break between national needs to be addressed by national programming and local, regional, or specialized needs to be addressed by some means other than national programming. The main thrust of this investigation has been in terms of nationally distributed programming to children which ad-
addresses national needs of children. The systemic requirements of national programming, whether the audience is at-home or in-school, are the most constraining, as discussed in Chapter Two.

Public television producers are perpetually in need of funds, and almost any fundable topic will draw a proposal from someone, but the record is still being written as to whether this procedure can generate quality television programming in an absolute sense, or programming competitive with producer-generated ideas, in a comparative sense. USOE's thrust seems to be toward greater front-end specificity on the Government's part, while the producers' wish is for greater creative and administrative freedom. If USOE is to fund programming at all, we recommend that it always be receptive to a good (and relevant) programming idea that comes up from the professional broadcasting community, whether or not it fits precisely the administrative mechanisms for program generation originally envisioned.

The position taken by this research team is that it is entirely appropriate and necessary for the Federal Government to conduct needs analyses. When the needs are identified as needs for television programming, however, it presupposes a second analysis of feasibility for television treatment, and requires the dual expertise (content plus television) that Ambrosino (1975, commissioned paper) notes as being scarce in Government. A later segment in this chapter, on research and evaluation, will pose the question: "Who has what needs that might be addressed by television with likelihood of success?" It would appear to us that USOE is equipped to ascertain "who has what needs," but could effectively use the input of the professional broadcasting community for the other part, "that might be addressed by television with likelihood of success." We recommend that USOE, with considerable input from the education community, ascertain needs of children, and
prioritize goals, without regard to the potential of television treatment for any specific need. We recommend further that USOE then consult with CPB and PBS (or other representatives of the professional broadcasting community) on judgments of feasibility for television, or better yet, on how to set up special studies for determining matches between needs and television feasibility.

Funding and Administrative Issues

Attitudes. It is very difficult to mandate attitudes in a set of guidelines or encompass them in policy recommendations, but attitudes of government representatives play a very important role in the administrative efficiency of the Federal/production agency relationship. Two comments from different persons, which we will leave unattributed, convey the resentment engendered by an assumed adversary relationship between a Federal project officer and a production agency.

The first:

What are the program officers being told by the people ultimately responsible for that program? Are they being told, "Watch out for those bastards; they'll rip you off for every cent they can get?"

Or are they being told, "Look, we're in this because we're supposed to be investing in worthwhile social activity; and we went through a competitive process to identify the people to receive these grants; and our success is in large part dependent upon their success; and we should see ourselves in a facilitative role?"

The second:

I'm so tired of the government thinking you're trying to rip them off. If they're giving you the dollars to produce the show, let the show be the answer to it. If you don't deliver then, alright, let them really rip you. Don't make it so impossible that you can't deliver. They treat me as though I'm trying to cheat them. I have no intention of doing that and I hate the implication of it. Why should I? I want the show to be as good as my reputation, not theirs!
We recommend that only those production agencies deemed responsible and trustworthy be granted Federal funds for programming in the first place. Once selected, they should then be treated as responsible and trustworthy.

Consistency/Inconsistency Among Legislative Requirements, Interpretations of Legislation, and the Systemic Requirement of Television. As Chapter Three indicated, the ESAA legislation, and the subsequent USOE interpretations of that legislation, have placed unintended obstacles in the path of the broadcaster. There was little or no industry or agency input to the legislation. Although recommended by staff (Neben, 1975, interview), USOE did not take the bill back to Congress for technical amendments. The ESAA legislation has been difficult to administer from USOE's point of view, and very difficult to comply with from the broadcaster's point of view. Early grantees had to absorb the disruptions of fighting red tape, ambiguities, and inconsistencies with standard requirements of broadcasting with funds from their program allocations, creating waste and inefficiency.

One phrase in the ESAA legislation, "made reasonably available for transmission, free of charge," has alone taken up countless man hours of trying to interpret what that statement means. Bob Reed of PTL, for example, says that section has kept people busy trying to interpret if "reasonably available for transmission, free of charge" means no charges for overhead, duplication, royalties, shipping, handling, order taking, negotiation of rights, etc. He says PTL has spent more time trying to establish the mechanics of distributing VILLA ALEGRE through PTL than for any previous program (Reed, 1975, interview). ESAA-TV Program Officer Berman states that an agreement between BCTV and PTL was being held up because of two unresolved issues: (1) the ownership of the five sets of tapes required
for submission; and (2) the presence or absence of any restrictions on spot announcements to be aired adjacent to the Villa Alegre programs (Berkman, memo to Mielke et al., April 1, 1975). We recommend that legislation authorizing or mandating the production of purposed children's television programming reflect the consultative input of both USOE (for administrative feasibility) and the professional broadcasting community (for compatibility with the requirements of broadcasting).

It is difficult enough for professional broadcasters to create a successful purposed television program for children; it is virtually impossible for Congress or USOE to specify the conditions under which successful programs (i.e., programs competitively successful in the national marketplace) will be created. Political sensitivities rather than sensitivities to the realities of television can generate what Ambrosino calls "prevailing myths." For example:

- That geographic or ethnic producers per se are the guarantee for diversity or that the persuasive power of objective research is the best harbinger of improvement. Anyone who is familiar with local children's programs throughout the country or the situation of children's television in general knows neither to be true. (Ambrosino, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 14-15)

Thousands of dollars are not expended as wisely as they might be because of the inherent conflicts that bedevil most government agencies: (1) the desire to fund effectively versus the desire to spread the funds, (2) the desire to reward the competent versus the desire to be open, fair, and democratic, (3) the desire to renew successful ongoing programs versus the desire to innovate, and (4) the desire to serve a public (e.g., social service agencies) versus the public (the children they serve). These are real conflicts, not always of the agencies' own making. Agencies know their mission, but they are also well aware of political pressures that can interfere with otherwise sound judgment. (Ambrosino, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 13-14)

The key to serving the needs of children is a television program that is sufficiently outstanding among competitive programs to attract the target
audience to view in the first place. Talent, experience, and professionalism, not demographic and geographic quotas, are the requirements for outstanding television programming. The ESAA legislation specified that eligible applicants must "employ members of minority groups in responsible positions in development, production, and administrative staffs" (Section 711). In the site visit interviews, this legislative intent was not perceived to be a problem. What have been criticized are the more restrictive USOE interpretations of this legislation wherein various quota system approaches to selection of talent, production locations, and composition of advisory boards and review panels were specified. Minority producers interviewed in the site visits were among the most critical of an ethnic quota approach to casting, advisory boards, proposal review panels, and the like, certainly not because of lack of commitment to minority involvements in television, but because quota systems put the wrong criterion on how to make successful programs to serve either minorities or majorities. Herman Land writes:

Government should direct itself to that small pool of creative talent that is responsible for the best in our television system, at least to begin with. If there are policy restrictions that, for political or other considerations, favor secondary talent, the effort should be made to change the policy. Agencies should be free to seek out the best production and creative organizations and individuals who can bring imagination and originality to the task. If this means finding ways to overcome the limitations of contract bidding through legislation or administrative policy, those ways should be found. (Land, commissioned paper, pp. 19-20)

Ultimately the programming must be conceived and created and produced by the available talent and skills that alone can make it mean anything. While this should not, of course, rule out grants and contracts to local institutions scattered about the country, it should not make such localism a matter of policy—certainly not, in so far as commercial television is concerned! The rule is simple; in a world dependent entirely on talent, go where the talent is. (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 45-46)
Contracts vs. Grants. The most common forms of foundation or governmental support of a project are through grants or contracts. If it is a contract, the request for proposal (RFP) is usually quite specific and if it is a grant, the RFP—if there is one—is more general. A grant usually gives more freedom to the recipient. A contract generally indicates closer supervision and tighter control. Communications lawyer Eugene N. Aleinikoff has served or is serving as counsel for AIT, BC/TV, CTW, EDC, Educational Network (EEN), Television Arts Project, National Educational Television (NET), CPB, and PBS, among others. He writes:

Needless to say, equally detailed and restrictive permissions may be attached to grants or included in contracts. But "contracts" tend to be viewed like government purchase orders, while "grants" are usually thought of in the context of government contributions to independent projects. A "contract" implies production for the government, with the resulting product shaped in accordance with strict specifications, and upon completion, owned lock-stock-and-barrel by the government. A "grant" implies production by the grantee through government assistance, with the resulting product planned and executed, owned and controlled [emphasis added] by the grantee. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 52-53)

In contracts, the more specific the RFP in television programming, the more knowledgeable the writer of the RFP should be about television. Obviously, the respondent's flexibility is more constrained in specific proposal solicitations. Such constraints may be necessary when the funder is looking for a specific item, such as construction of a brass screw, but may be inhibiting and dysfunctional when the goal is something creative such as a television program. The more specific the RFP, the more knowledgeable proposal reviewers, negotiators, and eventual monitors must be also.

Given a training that inculcates caution and criticism and a particular regard for the written word, the tendency [of agency staffers] is to be more impressed by the form of a proposal (Does it review the research? Does it have an adequate design?) than by its substance. The same is true...
of the review panels, who are composed of similar kinds of people. Lacking experience in the field of television, few are able to assess a proposer's technical and artistic [emphasis added] ability to execute an otherwise reasonable proposal. (Ambrosino, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 13)

There are indications within USOE that the Federal administrators are increasingly committed to contracting for television programs rather than offering grants. Their argument is that a contract gives tighter fiscal control as well as greater input into the basic concept of the program, its development, its production quality and so on. The first year ESAA projects were grants; the second year projects were offered as grants and then negotiated to contracts; the third year projects are contracts. CTW has received grants in each year of their funding to date, but next year because of requirements of the Special Projects Act, CTW will receive a contract. Some USOE officials were pleased with that authorization because they felt it gave them greater control. To paraphrase the words of one, "If Big Bird said something we didn't like, under a contract we could suggest a change."

Chapter Three cites numerous examples of the attempts by USOE, almost from the beginning, to impose greater day-to-day control of CTW.

Most Federal people who want more control come to the programs as content experts, and their influence, they feel, is only to improve the program. Both commercial and public television personnel may interpret this desire for involvement as a threat of government influence, however.

What is seen by a Federal institution or agency as information or education tends to be perceived by the medium as propaganda . . . . It may be difficult for the dedicated public servant to see himself in this unflattering light, since he knows his cause is good and his mandate congruous with accepted national goals. Nevertheless, it is a factor that should not be forgotten when attempting to work with, and within, the commercial system. (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 13-14)
Public television, which traditionally has sought to encourage Federal program investments as an alternative to commercial influence, is becoming increasingly concerned about the prospect of governmental influence. Some government-funded programs may find themselves without an effective means of distribution. (Witherspoon, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 32)

It would be naive to suggest that funders cannot have an interest in the project they are supporting. The greater the attempt to influence or control the development of the program, however, the greater the risk that the program will not be distributed on a national network. The Public Broadcasting Act prohibits PBS from being the voice of government, foundation or corporate underwriters. As a result, PBS may refuse to carry any program in which (a) the funder has had definite influence on the content; (b) there may be perceived funder influence or control of the content; or (c) there may be inferred funder influence. PBS has already refused to recommend some series for distribution because of perceived Federal involvement in content; PBS also refused to recommend BIG BLUE MARBLE unless editorial control of the program could be vested in one of their member stations, with the producer insulated from the funder.

Producers of the series examined in this study were unanimous that the production activity must be insulated from the funders. Aleinikoff agrees:

- "There are good reasons for funding educational television projects as "grants" rather than "contracts." A "contract" must inevitably imply—both to USOE officials and to the outside world—USOE control and ownership much beyond what is desirable for educational television projects. Not only is it standard USOE policy to restrain itself from educational content interference; it is also the policy of both the broadcasting and educational communities to be extremely wary of any television material which is subject to governmental direction." (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 53) 

Needless to say, the professional broadcast community prefers grants.
It is the spirit of the agreement, in terms of flexibility and trust, between funder and fundee which is most important, however. To a grant may be attached detailed restrictions, giving it all the restraints of a contract. Excessive content control under grants can also occur by writing a very detailed RFP. Several USOE officials commented that from their perspective there was no significant difference between a contract and a grant.

We recommend the use of grants, administered in the traditional spirit of grants, for Federal funding of purposeful children's television programming.

Subcontracting—Competitive Bidding vs. Sole-Sourcing. One rationale behind competitive bidding is that it allows the producer to choose the best offering at the lowest price and, as a result, saves the government dollars. Competition is prudent when the product or service being bid upon is quantifiable. When the bid is for a creative idea, however, competitive bidding presents problems.

[The Office of Education has begun to take the position that creative components must also be subcontracted for under the same competitive bid procedures as have been developed for more usual government procurement. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 54)]

It is submitted that competitive bidding is simply not a realistic procedure for USOE television projects. The endless efforts, debilitating delays and inevitable complications involved in advertising notices, bid invitations, supplier selection, etc. more than overbalance any slight possibility that such an open search procedure will result in the uncovering of new talent or even reduction in cost. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 55)

Educational conceptualization and realization does not seem compatible with normal procurement methodology. No matter what objective criteria are artificially devised, the real decision about program elements must ultimately be subjectively made by those responsible for series design and execution. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 55)
One of the persons involved in the development of the inserts, which were sole-sourced by OCD and carried on CAPTAIN KANGAROO, stated that the sole-sourcing was essential not only for that instance, but would be essential for similar future instances as well. Otherwise, the contractee would be unwilling to divulge creative ideas, and unable to confer to others any special relationships developed over time with certain talent and organizations. Unless the government is willing to allow sole-sourcing, he doubts that it would be possible to replicate the CAPTAIN KANGAROO insert experience (Sloan, 1975, interview).

... when it comes to actors and musicians, writers and directors, animation artists and film makers, more normal television procedures and patterns must be followed, irrespective of public funding, for successful results. (Aleinkoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 56)

They [USOE] didn't understand why you can't take a writer's material and give it to some other writer to rewrite and not pay the one who gives it to you. (Rector, 1974, interview)

We recommend that competitive bidding for subcontracting not be required beyond technical facilities used in television production. These can be specified in quantified form. While advertising or other forms of a good faith effort to find new talent could be encouraged or required, the selection of subcontractees for non-quantifiable products or services should be left to the producer.

Copyrights. The U. S. Copyright Law of 1909 established the guidelines for authors and publishers and has been amended in a hodgepodge fashion over the years. In the last decade, partly because of questions raised by the telecommunications-media, particularly cable television, Congress has debated
a thorough revision of the Law. Although some expect revision in 1975, the 1909 Law is still the one under which copyright decisions are made.

The issue, simplistically, is the right which an individual has to his creative piece vs. the right of the public to use that material. There are no easy answers to the dilemma, which may be part of the reason why Congress has not chosen to adopt a new law concerning copyright.

Of importance to the present study is an analysis of USOE procedures on copyright so that some suggestions might be made as to what would facilitate the development of better purpative children's programs.

Aleinikoff feels that at USOE there is...

an unfortunate lack of continuing, considered and consistent policy in the area of television rights, residuals and royalties. And there is no doubt that this has created serious problems for television grantees [emphasis added] in the production, distribution and utilization of television series funded by the Office of Education. (commissioned paper, p. 1)

Television, particularly educational/instructional television, takes much preparation and planning as well as a great deal of research and development time and effort; production is enormously expensive, infinitely complex and an extremely difficult undertaking requiring a wide variety of skilled talents, large-scale facilities and services, as well as educational experts and consultants. The product produced is likely quite creative and, hopefully, useful. Copyrights of the material are necessary so that it is not used for unintended purposes.

Aleinikoff cites a number of reasons why copyrights are important and states that USOE, CPB, and other Federal funding agencies have in the past provided full copyright to the program producer. This gives rise to the
question as to whether the recent

USOE's general "Copyright Policy Guidelines"—with its clear prejudice against producer's copyrights and varied preference for limiting exceptionally approved copyright to five years—should be applicable at all to television projects. (p. 31)

He feels strongly that:

... Copyright is not necessarily a restrictive concept—but instead can enable proper utilization in planned directions in place of aimless diffusion. Copyright should therefore be viewed much more as an aid rather than a hindrance to television dissemination—however long the life or wide the interest in a funded series.

He suggests the USOE should reverse its present copyright posture for television:

Rather than requiring all producers to apply in detail for copyright permission, the "Copyright Guidelines" might well be amended to automatically permit copyright registration for all television series as is currently provided in the ESAA Regulations, subject only to whatever copyright limitations may be specified in the Project Authorization—and, of course, to the Government's own royalty-free license (whatever its exact scope may be). (pp. 34-35)

USOE Commissioner Bell expressed to us the desire that copyright arrangements allow televised materials, supported by USOE, to be kept on videotape in school libraries or classrooms. This would allow teachers use of the material at the optimum time, as well as permitting pauses for discussion, "instant replays," and multiple showings. Aleinikoff implies that such an arrangement could be feasible under full copyright protection to the production agency (1975, commissioned paper, see pp. 32-33). Copyright assures that the program will be used for its intended goal rather than exploited by unauthorized parties. USOE should develop a consistent policy in regards to television copyrights, and do so with significant input from the broadcast industry.
Residuals. "Repeated talent residuals . . . have long been indigenous to television production" (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 37). When BC/TV began, the legislation was interpreted to call for six years of unlimited rights which, alone, would have cost BC/TV half of their budget for 15 actors. Typically, residuals are paid to talent on a per-play basis.

The result is that continuing exposure over both commercial and non-commercial television usually requires talent and copyright payments long after series production has been completed and distribution arrangements established. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 38)

Given the fiscal year nature of government funding, union members have to be paid up front for all intended use. This presents a cost problem in that it is difficult to project the ultimate use of a series—if at all—and, therefore, payment in advance may be more costly than a payment per showing. Unions are not necessarily interested in buy-outs either. "[O]ne fact of life is certain: while future usage payments can usually be made in advance, both talent unions and copyright holders will strongly resist 'buy-outs' even for educational material of determinable utility" (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 38). Up to now, talent unions have been very cooperative in assisting producers of educational shows in keeping costs at a minimum. "How far unions and talent are willing to go in this direction [cutting costs], is an open question, but these groups tend to be responsive to calls to serve. They are justly concerned, however, that their responsiveness not be used to mask opportunistic exploitation" (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 48).

Aleinikoff recommends the following guidelines for USOE:

First, initial production budgets must include advance payments for predictable future use (which must, of course,
be balanced between talent desirability and budget allowances. Second, some provision must be made for whatever further use later turns out to be desirable (either through provision at the beginning or thereafter of a contingency fund or by passing the residual payments in some way over to the subsequent distributors and users). Third, residual fee amounts and possible use options must be established uniformly by the various USOE producers to the maximum extent and at the earliest time possible. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 39)

Aleinikoff’s further recommendation on this matter is one we endorse completely:

It may well be a propitious time for the Office of Education, together with whatever commercial and non-commercial broadcasting agencies may be interested, to assemble an advisory group or consultative conference of talent union and copyright proprietor representatives to help work out residual payment practices of benefit both to series producers and program participants. This inter-discussion should, however, not be in the nature of union-management labor negotiations or proprietor-licensee copyright clearances, but rather a mutual attempt to ease the financial difficulties and administrative burdens presently inherent on both sides in wide-scale and long-lived use of USOE-funded projects. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 42)

Disposal of Income. Several television projects funded by USOE had hoped to become self-sustaining or, at least, help support themselves by becoming involved in revenue-generating activities. Although such activity may never generate enough revenue to totally support the series’ research and development, as well as production, it is assumed that any money raised through such activities would be helpful.

There are five different USOE regulations which apply to how earned money from funded projects will be handled (see Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 46-68). The regulations are inconsistent and not necessarily geared to assisting the development of better television. "If there is some logical thread to all of these various regulations, one or more of
which may be concurrently applicable according to its or their terms—it is difficult to find or justify" (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 48). Some suggest 100% payment to government; some suggest a 50-50 split between the government and the producers; others suggest the producers keep the funds.

Neither 100% payment to the government, 100% retention by the grantee, nor 50%-50% sharing can really logically or morally be defended on any ground other than expediency—and the vacillations in USOE policy from time to time, program to program and project to project are prime evidence to that effect. (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 49)

It is unfortunate that producers of purposeful children's television may be restricted from pursuing activities which will generate revenues because of governmental rules. When CTW's Treasurer, Tom Kennedy, talked about setting up revenue-generating activities, he felt their development had to come from non-governmental funds.

I didn't dare touch the government funds because I didn't want the complications involved. I didn't think, first of all, that that was what they were given to us for and I didn't see any way in the long run to convince them that it would be an advantage to them. There wouldn't be any way through that maze to use government funds to do that, (Kennedy, 1974, interview)

Instead, CTW turned to private sources.

Restrictions which won't allow generated revenue to be put back into the improvement of the series seem not to be in the interest of developing better television. Furthermore, such restrictions may result in the government needing to support the series longer and/or in higher amounts than would otherwise be necessary. Aleinikoff recommends that "all project income should be maintained in a special fund for furthering the distribution and use of the television series from which derived" (Aleinikoff, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 50). That seems not only logical, but fair.
USOE Priorities Between Starting and Sustaining Children's Television Projects. The difficult questions of assigning criteria and priorities to starting, sustaining, and terminating television projects arose in early discussions with USOE personnel. In particular, reference was made to the USOE dilemma of "what to do" with the Children's Television Workshop requests for sustained funding, but the issue is generic as well.

These questions are not like mathematical puzzles that have a correct answer. They are judgmental issues that result in one decision or another depending on what facts, values, and assumptions are brought into the analysis. It is overly simplistic to look solely for guidance to the legislation that puts funds, responsibilities, and authority in USOE's hands in the first place. As indicated in Chapter Three, there has been considerable variation over the years in how USOE officials have interpreted their role under the same legislation.

What is not clear in the concept of short-term funding is what is supposed to happen if a demonstration or experiment in television is successful. In principle, the failures pose no problem in terms of refunding with short-term money, but what about the successes? That fact that this is now a very important question is an indication of the lack of USOE policy, and there is no clear data base on which to make a policy recommendation. As an attitudinal observation, it is interesting that from the field site visits came the repeated opinion that USOE policy and practice seem more adapted and oriented to putting out brush fires on a short-term basis than to continuation of support for successful projects that deliver needed services. It is clear that the question of "what do we do if it succeeds" needs careful thought right from the beginning. This applies to the ESAA programs as
well as the CTW programs, as does Polsky's observation (1974) that lack of fiscal planning leads to a "handout mentality" that "tends to cripple the recipients" and "promotes poor planning and inefficient management" (p. 110).

Consider CTW, which has been funded through foundations, sale of related products, CPB and the SPC, and USOE. CTW's support from foundations for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY has decreased over time, because the role of foundations traditionally is to provide seed money in high-risk ventures on a short-term basis. Doc Howe told us at the Ford Foundation (1974, interview) that private philanthropic organizations should initiate programs with the assistance of the government, but the government should continue support for effective programs once private support is withdrawn.

CTW's Tom Kennedy (1975, interview) explained that the revenue-generating parts of CTW, through merchandising of spin-off products, are, as a matter of principle, not geared to maximum profit in either the types of products selected or in the manner of merchandising them. It would take far more "hucksterism" to push sales up to the point of netting $10 million annually after taxes than CTW is willing to do, according to Kennedy.

Another category of support for CTW has been through the CPB, and, more recently, through the Station Program Cooperative of PBS. This source of support is stretched to the maximum already, given the present low funding of CPB and the SPC. There were just slightly over 13 million dollars in the first SPC (1974-75 season); the total represents money from CPB, from foundations, and from local station budgets. For partial funding of SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, the SPC paid about 4.7 million dollars to CTW—35% of the total SPC dollars. The SPC gives local PBS stations the option of "buying" programs which are listed in a catalog. Because of audience de-
mands for the services provided by the two CTW programs, most of the individual stations bought the two CTW programs (145 of 152 licensees bought SESAME STREET; 143 of 152 licensees bought THE ELECTRIC COMPANY) which takes more than a third of the total funds available and, thereby, severely restricts what other programs the stations can afford, regardless of how badly they want these other programs in their schedules. The children's block draws good audiences for PBS stations, but it has not been a revenue-generating audience for those stations depending on community contributions. The contributions through 1974 tended to come more from older, middle- and upper-income families, with no children at home (Lyle, 1975, interview). Those families tend to watch programs such as FIRING LINE and THE ADVOCATES. Indications from the second SFC, which is in process as this is being written, indicate much the same pattern for the selection of programs for 1975-76.

As detailed in Chapter Three, USOE is strongly inclined to terminate funding for SESAME STREET and THE ELECTRIC COMPANY. The Ford Foundation, a major supporter of CTW, has announced its intention of terminating support because of its desire to initiate new projects. As a termination gift, Ford gave CTW $6 million to be used to develop revenue-generating activities. If CTW could not get funding from the Government, the "funder of last resort," it may have to consider turning to commercial broadcasting. "For the management of CTW to accept advertising involvement would require an immense emotional and intellectual wrench, a shift of perspective and value that some within it do not, at this time, feel capable of making...." (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 21).

The problem, but not the solution, is summarized by Douglass Cater, Director of the Program on Communication and Society of the Aspen Institute, who wrote the following in 1974:
"Sesame Street" is now four and a half years old. On a cost per child basis, it has been a fantastic bargain. Yet its sources of funding—both government and foundation—appear to be drying up. As Richard Polsky suggests, the most critical question of all may be whether a society like ours is willing to continue to pay for its successes. (Polsky, 1974, p. xiv)

Are reruns the answer? Difficulty in obtaining long-term funding has no doubt been a factor in CTW's recent decision to enter a two-year plan that will terminate with a group of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY programs to be offered subsequently as a package for reruns. As Hartford Gunn pointed out (1975, interview), rerunning THE ELECTRIC COMPANY makes more sense than rerunning SESAME STREET, because of the narrower scope of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY's objectives, and the great evolutionary potential of SESAME STREET. Stuart Sucherman, Ford Foundation (1974, interview), also noted the value of continuing SESAME STREET as a flexible vehicle for future high priority items in HEW's agenda; in particular, he stressed that the CTW unit should be preserved because it is a proven and unique combination of creative talent and management systems that cannot, by formula, be exported and reconstituted elsewhere.

Peggy Charren, President, Action for Children's Television (1975, interview), stressed the administrative and financial utility of reruns, including reruns for SESAME STREET. The rerun alternative offers another means of providing more diversity in children's programming, a high ACT priority. Given a good collection of programs, she believes that children, and new "generations" of children, will continue to watch. Rather than continue to perfect a single series, it would be a better alternative in her view to terminate new production, accept the imperfections in that particular collection of programs, recycle them on the merits of their good points, and go on to other series that will both improve on those imperfections and
simultaneously offer a different kind of program. MISTER ROGER'S NEIGHBOURHOOD is doing precisely that (stopping production and going into reruns), and all indications are, that by offering a five-year package of programs at an extremely low per-program cost, more stations will take MISTERROGERS in the 75-76 SPC than any other program. Cost is a very important ingredient for managerial acceptance, of a program; hopefully, programs will not be chosen on cost alone but on how well they satisfy audience needs.

Eddie Smardan, Vice President, Broadcast Services, Ogilvie & Mather, Inc., states:

I feel that in the absence of a substantial number of quality children's television programs, and with the dearth of funds and talent to produce them, that CTW is being very shortsighted by insisting on continuing to build a larger SESAME STREET library. While I'm certain that vast improvements have been made over the years and that there are many more improvements that could be made in the future, there is no question in my mind that the existing inventory would have virtually the same impact in reruns as it had during its original runs. The targeted audience has completely turned over since SESAME STREET's origins and for that reason alone would find the reruns to be originals. If the enormously talented group who produced CTW would direct their time and energy to developing a new children's format, the same money that would otherwise go to make new SESAME STREETs could go toward making a whole new series, thereby doubling the amount of quality children's programming available through this excellent production source. (Smardan, letter to Mielke, April 11, 1975)

CTW's Dave Connell (1974, interview) feels strongly that SESAME STREET should continue to be developed. He suggested that a comparison of a 1969 show with a 1974 show would indicate the significant degree of change that has already been incorporated. New goals have been incorporated through the years, and new goals can continue to be incorporated. Connell feels that the fundamental requirement of in-home, open-circuit television to attract a voluntary audience also demands that materials be continuously updated, because the competition is not remaining static. There is also the
argument of building on past experience. Connell said that CTW has gained a lot of experience in cognitive programming, but is still learning in the more difficult areas of affective programming. A similar argument was presented by SESAME STREET's producer Jon Stone in Land's (1972) review of CTW.

Other relevant components of the rerun vs. new production issue are such questions as:

1. Have the potential goals for a vehicle with proven audience draw been exhausted?

2. Can the existing programs covering present goals be improved significantly? Will new productions promise sufficient improvements to be a good investment?

3. Can the production organization be restarted if now terminated?

4. Are there other programs that the existing organization should be making that have higher promise of pay-off than the present program?

On the matter of the impact on the audience size if SESAME STREET were to go to reruns, there is, in the absence of research specifically directed to this question, little in the way of conclusive evidence that can be offered in advance of actually doing it. If done and then determined that it was a bad decision, the process is not necessarily reversible to reconstitute the talent, staff, management team, reputation, and audience. One opinion is offered by Broadcasting magazine (March 3, 1975) relating to the greater use of SESAME STREET repeat segments in 1974:

"Sesame Street," public broadcasting's best known success, had an average rating of 4.3 in 1974, as against a 5.7 average for all network children's programs. "Sesame Street's" average was down slightly in 1974, with the dip probably traceable to a greater use of repeat programming. In a week,
"Sesame Street's" audience builds to a level of almost 14% of all TV households. (p. 23)

Given conflicting professional opinions on the issue of rerunning SESAME STREET, the issue, if considered a high-priority decision, could be subjected to an empirical market test for two to three year period, thus enabling a data-based decision. Even so, the issue is entwined with other issues, such as the viability of the PBS children's block as a whole, the availability of funding for children's programming in the first place, and the identification of alternatives that would yield higher pay-offs per dollar spent.

CTW sees SESAME STREET in two lights: as a continuing experiment, and as a service (Davidson and Britt, 1974, interviews). An experiment and a service have different funding implications. USOE's investment was and is through research and demonstration funds, which is appropriate for the experimental aspect, less so for the continuing service aspect. That is the basis for the USOE dilemma at present. The dilemma is inherently unsolvable unless and until certain policy decisions are made.

The first fundamental decision that USOE must make is whether or not it wants to participate in purposive national television programming in the first place. If the answer is yes, then a host of systemic requirements and constraints for national programming, as discussed in Chapter Two, must be incorporated, accounted for, and dealt with compatibly. Many of these are outside the manipulable domain of USOE. The value system of the national broadcaster must be placed alongside the value system of USOE. Continuance or termination, in the national broadcaster's perspective, is ultimately determined by audience behavior: the type and amount of audience attracted,
and the impact on that attracted audience. It is a process of survival of the fittest, with accountability ultimately placed in the hands of the audience.

A second fundamental decision for USOE to make in the realm of national purposive TV programming is whether it wants to duplicate the function of a foundation, assisting exclusively to get things started, with sustenance for successful "take-offs" to come from someplace else. Foundations turn their successful projects primarily to government or free enterprise for the sustained funding. If USOE would, by residual option, turn their successful projects to free enterprise, the realism and feasibility of such a plan needs far greater support than can now be garnered, but it may be possible (see Land, 1975; commissioned paper).

It is unrealistic and inefficient to consider major national purposive programming as a short-term venture in any case. The CTW experience indicates that it takes one to two years just to prepare a major, purposive series for national distribution, and it takes two to three years of promotion and remake to determine how well it can do in the marketplace.

If the success is judged adequate in the first season, it is reasonable to expect greater success in the second season if corrective feedback continues to be incorporated in new production efforts. By the third season, the production agency truly understands the parameters of its program, and up to five years will have elapsed since initial funding. It is at this point, four to five years in, that decision-making on the future of the program will be best informed for such questions as should it terminate, go into reruns, continue new production, change course, expand, contract, or what.
A four- to five-year commitment raises the stakes in a risky business well beyond the levels encountered in small, one-shot projects, and it encourages spreading the risks through multiple funding. By the end of four or five years, a program either will or will not have found consumer market loyalty and support, at which time it is reasonable for continuation to be determined by the degree of consumer demand. The general principle seems, on balance, to be reasonable:

1. Don't go into national purposive television programming at all unless prepared to participate for a four- to five-year period. A variety of checkpoints can be built in which could make the funding duration less than five years, of course, but the point is that USOE should be able to specify the conditions under which it is willing to participate for a complete market trial, which we estimate at four to five years.

2. The earlier it is in the five-year period, the more the decision-making is vested in sponsor/producer/distributor interests. The later it is in the five-year period, the more the decision-making is vested in consumer acceptance and demand. It should be emphasized that this goes counter to natural inclinations cited by some USOE officials to increase Federal control more and more over time.

The mechanism for translating consumer demand into continued support may or may not rest most appropriately within USOE, but it would seem to be an appropriate use of discretionary funds to be responsive to palpable consumer demand for educational services via television for the duration of that consumer demand.
No modal pattern of thought has emerged in our investigation on who should pay for long-term support or through what mechanism this support should come. There has been more input about what will not work (e.g., reliance on sale of ancillary materials, reliance on foundations, problems in being "picked up" by commercial television) than about what would work. In addition to use of USOE discretionary funds for sustained funding, at least two other options might be considered:

1. A matching dollar principle, in which the Congress would allocate earmarked money to CPB for the purpose of matching every dollar that the SPC is willing to invest in the series. (The "match" could be 1 to 1, 1.5 to 1, 2 to 1, or whatever is appropriate.) The Congressional allocation would continue for as long as the SPC is willing to support the series on this basis. Subvariations include Congressional supplements earmarked for particular series versus earmarking for the generic category of children's programming. An important feature of this option is that the mechanism for terminating funding is to reside in the marketplace. The desire is to minimize fears that line items, once established, tend to go on in perpetuity. We recognize the argument that going to Congress to request line item support inevitably politicizes the decision-making process. If USOE fails to provide a mechanism for long-term funding, however, requests to Congress may be the only alternative.

2. New legislation could be written that addresses specifically the issue of sustained funding, as a "service" concept, for demonstrably effective programs. This might be administered by any one of several Federal agencies. The principle would be
that "R & D" and "service" would each have appropriate and specific legislative authorizations.

The analysis of long-term funding applies not only to CTW, but to ESAA projects as well (and for similar future projects). USOE necessarily makes a significant investment when it funds a series for national distribution in the first place. It seems almost definitionally wasteful to pay the tremendous start-up costs for a single broadcast season, and then withdraw support to go on to other projects. Had VILLA ALEGRE been dealt with in the manner recommended earlier in this chapter (prior careful scrutiny for worthiness of the organization and of the proposal; advance specification of procedural "rules of the game" and then maximum freedom), and had VILLA ALEGRE then been supported not only for 1-2 years research, development, and first season start-up, but also for two to three seasons on the air, as recommended above, USOE would at least know what its national audience could be; the BC/TV staff would know fairly well what its program vehicle could and could not do; evaluations could be in the literature so something could be learned from its successes and failures; and a fair market trial either would or would not have generated sufficient consumer demand for continuance. Instead, we've been given a costly production, with little information as to its effect or how it could have developed into a valuable national experience.

To continually fire-up and terminate, which appears to be USOE's common practice, without allowing sufficient time to develop or sufficient time to determine success, would appear to be an inefficient use of Federal dollars, so far as national television programming is concerned. A limited-channel national distribution system will only accept a relatively few chil-
Children's programs, in any case. These few should be well-funded in the first place, and funded for a sufficient time for a fair market trial. A policy is sorely needed to determine the means by which "survivors" of the fair market trial can be funded for the duration of demonstrable consumer demand for the program.


a. Production Agency Model of Program Development. Commercial television uses many program suppliers who are not themselves broadcast licensees or network owned—e.g., Mary Tyler Moore Productions, Chuck Barris, etc. Public broadcasting has also engaged several such agencies: Bilingual Children's Television, Children's Television Workshop, Education Development Center, to name a few. Here, in public broadcasting, the management of the independent production agency coordinates the entire linkage in the system: funding, production, distribution, and so forth. Being neither a funder nor a distributor, it must satisfy the requirements of both. The agency could be primarily a management team, subcontracting all production. By virtue of being neither an institutional funder nor distributor, the production agency has the widest latitude of entrepreneurial freedom in developing and producing programs.

b. PBS Model of Program Development. PBS, per se, does not produce programs. Individual station members of PBS propose programs for PBS to carry, programs which can be funded by a variety of sources: CPB, foundation, corporate underwriting, or government funds. Last year, PBS developed the Station Program Cooperative (SPC) which allows stations to choose the programs they wish to carry but demands that the stations help pay for the development and production of the program. Because of the limited funds
available to the SPC, however, it is unlikely that the individual stations will collectively pay for the development of new purposive programs for children, when they can use the same dollars to buy programs with a known track record. It would seem logical that partial underwriting of a new program by the government, a foundation or a corporation, which would lower the actual price of the program to each participating station, would increase the likelihood of the stations investing in new program development.

c. CPB Model of Program Development. CPB has a plan for national needs assessment, for commissioning and production of responsive pilots, and for distribution of resultant series over PBS for two years. If PBS's SPC then picks up the series, it would continue with PBS money; otherwise new production ceases. USOE could participate in this system in various ways. USOE could come to CPB with its priority list, and try to persuade CPB to address the problem area with CPB's own money. USOE could ascertain CPB's interest in a problem area and then transfer funds for CPB production and management throughout the rest of the system. USOE could join CPB in a joint request to Congress that the CPB appropriation be expanded by X dollars to permit R & D in a particular problem area, thus bypassing direct USOE administrative responsibility. Advantages of utilizing CPB's management are that (1) it capitalizes on one of CPB's reasons for being: insulation of the program producer from Federal content control and, therefore, provides greater assurance of distribution; (2) the professional community, not a Federal monitor of that community, is making the management and aesthetic decisions and, presumably, is better prepared to make broadcasting decisions; (3) CPB can offer a "package deal" to USOE at a single price.

Representatives of both CPB and PBS cautioned, however, about going
exclusively to funding through CPB (Gunn, 1975; Quayle, 1975, interviews), the general principle being that if all the eggs were put in the CPB basket, and if CPB should fail in some way or weaken its insulation from government control, then the consequences could be dire. Both favored the maintenance of funding diversity for public broadcasting. In particular instances, however, funding through CPB might be an excellent alternative.

d. Providing Alternatives and Letting the Marketplace Decide. As step one, this variant model would have USOE funding several different pilots in a problem area high on USOE's agenda. Arrangements would be made to show all pilots on PBS. The pilots should be designed to stand alone as single programs, yet be capable of expansion into a full series. USOE then would put earmarked money into the SPC (i.e., those SPC funds could only apply to one or more of the USOE-sponsored programs). The various series proposals would be entered into the SPC, after all pilots had been aired. If the SPC does not pick up any of the proposed series, the project dies, but much money would have been saved in the long run. If more than one series is picked up, with a fixed SPC supplement by USOE, that means the stations were sufficiently enthusiastic about them and thought they would satisfy a real need to the extent that they put up their "own" money to receive them.

As a possible example of how this mechanism might work, the early choices made by stations in the second year SPC might prove helpful. Each station was given a catalog of all programs available through the SPC and was asked to state their "first-round" preferences for programs they would like to carry. Both CARRASCOLENDAS and VILLA ALEGRE were in the catalog for funding of productions. Of the 136 programs offered, 44 of the 154 licensees showed
a preference for VILLA ALEGRE, while 19 showed a preference for CARRASCOLENDAS—VILLA ALEGRE ranked 60th of the 136 programs offered; CARRASCOLENDAS ranked 107th. The comparison may not be fair because CARRASCOLENDAS was offering programs for the 1976-77 season, while VILLA ALEGRE was offering programs for the 1975-76 season and the CARRASCOLENDAS package was being offered at a higher cost per program. It does lead to the interesting observation, however, that the station managers—the persons legally responsible to serve community needs—made the opposite preference between the two programs than the Federal advisory panel the previous year, which rated CARRASCOLENDAS higher than VILLA ALEGRE. As a result, CARRASCOLENDAS was funded and VILLA ALEGRE was not. It lends credence to the notion that the public station managers, who ought to be better equipped to know the needs of their communities, can have useful input into program funding decisions and that those decisions may differ significantly from national proposal review panels made up largely of non-broadcasting people. Unfortunately, neither of the programs survived the 1975-76 SPC.

Stations under the SPC plan are encouraged to obtain audience participation in the selection process, but even if the decision is made by station managers alone, it is probably a more valid reflection of the marketplace than a smaller, centralized review panel with minimal expertise in broadcasting. SPC endorsement would carry with it the guarantee of distribution, which a USOE panel endorsement would not. Once into the SPC, the question of sustaining versus terminating support could be determined for USOE by the marketplace itself. USOE could have many gradations other than "all or none" funding; access to the distribution system would be handled in a reasonable way; and, importantly, decisions to continue or terminate would at least partially be determined by marketplace mechanisms.
e. **USOE Use of an "External" National Professional Advisory Group.**

This model has two distinctive features: (1) the minimization of USOE administrative investment by using non-governmental advisors drawn from professional broadcasting; and (2) inclusion of input from commercial broadcasting at several levels: proposal writing, review, pilot production/review, series production, and series distribution. The Educational Amendments of 1974, Title IV, Section 402, authorize contracts with public and private agencies, organizations, etc., and this is interpreted as permitting the participation of commercial broadcasters in utilizing discretionary funds under the Special Projects Act.

Commercial broadcasting would be represented in a distinguished advisory board, as would public broadcasting, and USOE. This board would be involved directly, or through delegation with advisory board review, in the following sequence, outlined here only in broad brush-stroke form:

1. USOE solicitation of brief (e.g., five-page) preliminary proposals from all qualified organizations, profit or non-profit. The announcements should include the minimum amount of restrictions necessary to guide the thinking into areas relevant to USOE.

2. The advisory board (or its delegations) would pick the six (or so) that showed highest promise according to both USOE criteria and broadcasting criteria.

3. The selected six organizations would prepare full-blown proposals for a pilot, as well as a preliminary outline for an entire series. Partial funding for this proposal development should be considered.

4. The advisory board (or its delegations) would, according to
the same criteria used previously, select three of the six for pilot production. Deliverables would include not only the pilot, but a detailed proposal for an entire series.

5. Upon submission of the three pilots and accompanying materials, the advisory board would select one for full series production.

6. In a manner similar to the offerings of the ESAA programs, the completed series would be offered to all stations and cable systems, commercial and public, free of charge (assuming that this concept has now been "de-bugged"), with appropriate restrictions on use, commercials, etc. If two or more stations in the same market would bid for the program, USOE, or some delegate of USOE, would decide which bidder's service would best serve the public interest.

No attempt is made to present this or other models as developed in enough detail to be functional in their present form. This particular model was developed in the belief that commercial distribution of purposive programming would, in many cases, be in USOE's and the public's interest. It is further believed that the probabilities of commercial distribution might be enhanced by the participation of commercial broadcasters in the decision-making process, and in the use of a broader pool of talent in the competitive selection sequences. Multi-stage models will undoubtedly cover more than one fiscal year, and such models could be more rationally administered under legislation that allowed "carry-over" funding from one year to the next within some reasonable interval.

f. Cooperative Funding for Different Parts of the Television Process.
This model was presented by a USOE official. In it, USOE would fund activities such as needs assessment and curriculum development up to the point of actual production activities (scripting, casting, producing). Non-Federal funding would then be engaged for the entire production phase, totally without Federal interference or control. Federal funding could then re-engage at subsequent phases of utilization and evaluation (Neben, 1975, interview).

**g. Multiple vs. Single Funders.** There are several advantages to multiple funding for television series. Risk capital is spread around. No single funder has autonomy in the control of program development or content. There is reason to believe that an idea has merit if several organizations are willing to put money into it. Collectively, it is possible to afford higher quality production than the single funder could provide, as demonstrated by AIT and CTW. An outside funder can "save" a program that would otherwise be terminated, as demonstrated by ZOOM. (The "rescue" function could also be applied by USOE to save outside-funded programs marked for termination.) In general, there is considerable value in multiple funding.

**h. Value to USOE of "One-stop Shopping."** Discussion has been made in Chapter Two of the complex sub-systems that must coordinate before a program is on the air nationally. The professional public broadcasting community encompasses these subsystems, and can give the highest assurance (that can be given at all) that the system as a whole will function. It would be duplicative, wasteful, and inefficient for USOE to attempt an internal 'replication or administrative microcosm of "the system,"' for USOE to get involved administratively in such specializations as scripting, production, union negotiations, clearances and copyrights, casting, editing, promotion,
distribution, utilization, formative and summative evaluations, and so forth.

It is a significant service to USOE to be able to tap a responsible management system, within the professional broadcasting community, that can deliver the coordinated package to USOE for one price.

**USOE Funding and USOE Control.** There is an increasing concern in the public broadcasting community about Federal control of the content in television programs offered for national distribution. This is based on a legal and philosophical commitment that public broadcasting not become, and not be perceived as becoming, a government information distribution agency. PBS and CPB are currently developing more formal policy on the issue of the amount of real or perceived governmental control that can be accommodated within the national distribution system. PBS is now operating under interim criteria and guidelines on government underwriting; these include questions designed to determine if the funder has or could influence the program directly in such areas as casting, scripting, production, or program review. The concerns are real, and, at one time or another, Federal officials have reportedly: (a) required prior script approval; (b) insisted on cast changes; (c) required pilot approval; (d) required content changes; (e) required projects officer and funder-head approval at five separate stages throughout the production process; (f) repeatedly denied funding because one or more proposed advisory board members were judged "not acceptable"; and (h) requested personnel changes. The categories above are based on anecdotal reports gathered in various interviews, and not all of these reports have been validated independently by us. The anecdotes did not derive entirely from series studied in this report, and not necessarily even within USOE, but came from general dealings with the Federal government. Comments from HEW officials that they saw no difference between the sponsor-production rela-
tionship in commercial television and the Federal government-production rela-
ship in public broadcasting, and that Federal control "comes with the territory" were not reassuring.

Another fear expressed was that two offices, both within HEW, and hence both ultimately under the same administrative direction, could advertently or inadvertently coincide to bring great pressure on a public station to broadcast Federally-sponsored programming. The hypothetical instance imagined by one public broadcaster was that someday a representative from the HEW Office of Civil Rights might charge that a station was not giving minority group X enough coverage, and that if this were not corrected quickly, certain bad consequences could be expected—like termination of funding for their new facilities. Immediately afterward, a representative from the USOE ESAA programs for minorities might say to the station manager: "We have this free program on minority group X. If you run it, it will take care of the problem uncovered by the Office of Civil Rights representative." In such combination, the pressure from the government on the station to run the program would be considerable.

There is concern in the public broadcasting community that contract or even grant specifications could be written so precisely as to function as content control because of the lack of options. There is concern that the Federal definition of responsibility in administering public funds goes beyond the responsible selection of grantees/contractees into monitoring at all stages of the project, where most of the issues of governmental control and influence come about.

There is a strong desire to keep the integrity of the television producer for national programming intact, and free from interference from the
funder. This applies equally to non-governmental funders, such as corporations and foundations, as well as to governmental funders. To achieve this and still retain the desired diversity of funding, representatives of CPB and PBS have suggested the workability of a standardized contract which would spell out in detail the required conditions to be met before a program or series could be accepted for national distribution. Such a contract could serve an educative function in the sense that it could spell out the internal decision-making within PBS prerequisite to distribution. It could specify technical requirements, timetables, and it could specify operationally what is meant by insulating the producer from the funder. This could even be so specific as to require that the funder deal only with production agency management, never directly with the producer. There is general belief at CPB and PBS that such a carefully-considered contract made generally available to typical funding agencies would help avoid in the future some of the problems being faced currently with the actuality or the perception of funder control over content. Such a standardized contract is seen both as an aid to the funder and as a protection for the broadcaster, and, by extension, for the public. Adherence to such a standardized contract would keep the door open for a diversity of funders as well.

Administrative Alternatives for USOE. In the course of the investigation, there was near-unanimity among Federal personnel and among site visit interviewees that the DHEW administrative structure for handling television projects was problem-ridden. Stronger statements were that a complete over-haul was necessary; the mildest statements were that improvements could certainly be made.

What might be the fundamental paradigm of the problem? It seems that
most problems are in one way or another traceable to the vast heterogeneity of Federal interests funneling into a broadcasting community that is more homogeneous. The broadcasting community, which has relatively good internal cohesion and communication, is the outlet for a wide variety of Federal projects that suffer high turnover of personnel and that cannot be characterized as having good internal cohesion and communication.

With the ubiquity of television, it is sometimes erroneously assumed that the television community—writers, producers, directors, technical staff, evaluators, station managers, etc.—is accordingly large; it is not, particularly in public television. Essentially the same system, even the same people in the same components of the system, deal with a tremendous variety of program material, some of which is funded by the Federal government. The same laws, regulations, traditions, opportunities and constraints generally apply across the board. The tip of the funnel can be made larger or smaller by adding or removing alternatives to PBS as a distribution system; however, the essential process of funneling remains unchanged. The more DHEW and USOE can join their own and the public's interests, work compatibly with the broadcasting community at the tip of the funnel, the better.

It is assumed that the systemic requirements of national broadcasting will continue to maintain this relative homogeneity. Therefore, to deal effectively with that community, the DHEW should "homogenize" (i.e., bring into a consistent, coordinated, compatible form) its television interests through an organizational unit that can relate DHEW's interests to the broadcasting community in an effective manner, which would be a significant service not only to the broadcaster, but even more so to DHEW.

There is a generally perceived need for improvement of communication
within DHEW and USOE about telecommunications projects and a need for improved communication between Federal funders and the professional broadcasting community. Several suggestions for administrative improvements within DHEW/USOE seem to be worth considering.

a. Inter-agency and Intra-agency Advisory Panels. One suggestion is to formally establish panels which would facilitate internal communication and coordination of various telecommunications projects. Better communication within DHEW should result from establishment of an inter-agency panel, such as has been employed previously in the broad area of early childhood research and development, which met occasionally with representatives from USOE, NIMH, OCD and so forth. There might be value in formalizing a similar panel of an advisory nature which would deal with telecommunications projects. This advisory panel could be headed by a person in the DHEW Secretary's office, primarily assigned to telecommunications, who would coordinate regular meetings to discuss telecommunications ideas and problems with representatives from USOE, NIMH, and so on. The assignment of a person to telecommunications and the creation of an inter-agency panel should encourage better communication and coordination of all television projects contemplated by DHEW within a common and consistent policy.

The representative on the DHEW inter-agency panel from USOE should probably be someone from the office of the Commissioner of Education, and could be a person designated as an Assistant to the Commissioner on Telecommunications. One of the functions of this person would be to keep the Commissioner informed about the extent and nature of past, present and planned television efforts within USOE and DHEW generally. This person could also establish an intra-agency advisory panel within USOE and coor-
ordinate that panel's activity. This person and the intra-agency panel should result in improved coordination within USOE of all telecommunications projects; representation on the inter-agency panel should facilitate coordination and communication of television activities with DHEW also.

The communication outside DHEW/USOE might be improved if the person assigned to telecommunications by the Secretary would meet with people from PBS, CPB, NAB and representatives of other Federal and non-Federal organizations. Such meetings probably ought to be formalized and could be coordinated by some group, the NAEB for example, and should provide for improved communication between the organizations likely to fund television projects and the organizations important to the implementation of program ideas. It is anticipated that additional staff and expense involved, if any, would be minimal, and could be a good investment indeed.

Three levels of coordinating activities are thus envisioned:

1. DHEW (Special Assistant to the Secretary) with representatives of the professional broadcasting community. The purpose here would be to develop and maintain long-range policy, and to have this entered at a high level in DHEW so that consistency throughout the many subdivisions could be feasibly administered and monitored.

2. DHEW with the representatives of all DHEW agencies, such as USOE. The USOE representative would be an Assistant to the Commissioner on Telecommunications.

3. USOE (Assistant to the Commissioner on Telecommunications) with representatives of all USOE subdivisions using or planning the use of television.
b. **HEW Office of Television.** A more extensive change was recommended by Ambrosino (1975, commissioned paper), who urged formulation of an HEW-wide, single Office of Television to oversee all on-air television projects, to control all HEW monies allocated to the use of television, to solicit, evaluate, and fund all proposals for on-air television projects, to stimulate research and evaluation, to function as HEW advocate in the cause of purposive uses of television, and to work out a short-term and long-term policy for consistent application within HEW. Personnel in such an Office of Television would need experience and credentials in both broadcasting and content, so that they could guide early planning along channels that would eventually find acceptance and distribution in the broadcasting community.

Reactions to date on this "complete overhaul" approach have indicated the following concerns:

1. Such an Office of Television would generate a great concentration of power, which, in turn, has other potential consequences:
   a. the danger of even greater Federal involvement/control in content areas;
   b. the possibility of stifling creative suggestions on the use of television that might emerge from more diverse administrative units; and
   c. the difficulty in attracting and retaining the "super-qualified" people that such a powerful office would require.

2. At a pragmatic level, it would be extremely difficult to effect such an extensive reorganization.
c. USOE Office of Telecommunications. There are a number of people at USOE who feel that the National Center for Educational Technology (NCET) was a good idea and, if given a fair chance, might be a valuable alternative to consider now. NCET was established by Commissioner Marland in early 1972 as one of five "think tanks" which would provide a centralized location within USOE for discussion of policy-related concerns and expertise. As detailed in Chapter Three, because of personalities, personnel turn-over, and Congressional action, NCET dissipated by mid 1973. It would appear that there is now justification to giving consideration of establishment of a unit similar to NCET within USOE.

There are strengths and weaknesses in each of the organizational options described above, and we urge consideration of all of them to find the optimum mix of effectiveness and feasibility.

Federal Use of Commercial TV.
a. The Case for Using Commercial Television. As discussed in Chapter Two, the economics of television are such that the more people reached with a program, the cheaper the cost per exposure. As such, the system which provides the largest audience potential is the system which should be used. There are several reasons organizations supporting purposeful children's television should consider distribution on commercial television as one possible alternative: more people are potentially reachable with commercial TV (97 percent via commercial television vs. 75-80 percent via public television); the majority of commercial stations are VHF while the majority of public stations are UHF (VHF is usually a clearer signal, covers a wider area and is easier to tune on most sets); and people are accustomed (habituated) to watching commercial television--more than 60 percent of the U. S. households with television sets watch commercial television each night--
but the typical public station reaches only about one percent of the audience on the average.

It has been said that the best quality television, on the average, is aired by PBS, yet it reaches and influences far fewer people than its counterpart, the world of commercial television. Any activity or support in which the federal government is involved should certainly include coverage of the commercial area, since that's where most television is logged and is viewed.

As valuable and as appreciated as PBS and CPB are, they represent the tip of the iceberg; and although federal government support is enjoyed by us all, far more could be accomplished with an imaginative and pragmatic approach to the battles being waged in the major arena. (Garrison, letter to Mielke and Johnson, 1974).

The truly cost-conscious program producer is going to hope for the maximum potential exposure at the lowest cost. For television programs in the U.S., commercial television offers that alternative. It can also be assumed that the more people reached with a well-designed purposive program, the greater the potential effect or benefit. As a consequence, federally supported purposive children's programming should examine the pros and cons of commercial television as a distribution vehicle.

b. Some Reasons for Caution. There are several reasons commercial television stations object to carrying federally sponsored purposive children's shows, which need to be pointed out. While the government may provide the program free to the station, it will most likely not allow the station to carry advertisements within the program. Most persons producing purposive shows feel that the programs which are trying to improve the well-being of children should not "exploit" them at the same time by directing advertising at them during the program.

Virtually all persons responsible for producing programs examined in this report would resist strongly any attempt to place commercials within
their programs. There is also resistance to clustering commercials before or after the program. The program people feel that a "clever" advertiser could make it appear as if he or she sponsored the program; the "stars" from the program could be used in commercials (especially if the program is in reruns). They feel that the government would be leading to commercial exploitation of children by supporting a program and, in effect, leading the child to the commercial.

Speaking for myself, I don't want to sell Wheaties, I don't want to sell GM, I don't want to sell Mattel toys; I want to talk to kids about growing up. (DeAvila, 1975, interview)

Some programmers interviewed in this study feel a public service announcement or a station promotion should be the only announcements before or after the program and thereby insulate the program from commercial appeals.

USOE officials, however, have offered the ESAA series to all commercial television stations. In a letter mailed to each television station manager, the following statement was made:

"Commercial stations airing ESAA-TV programs may not insert commercial spots within shows. However, a station may sell the broadcast time to a sponsor willing to limit itself to a single credit identification at the end of the program. (You are, of course, free to cluster spots around an ESAA-TV program.)" (Goldberg, letter, 1975; emphasis added)

This offer has been objected to by BC/TV principals on grounds that the freedom to "sponsor" ESAA programs violates the intent of the legislation:

Dr. Goldberg is now offering such programs as VILLA ALEGRE to the broadcasting industry free of charge. While this munificent gesture is laudable in that it provides greater accessibility of good programs to all children, we must take exception to the license being given to broadcasters to sell commercials and/or to cluster sponsorship messages at the opening and closing of each show. Clustering of commercials will allow sponsors one minute, forty seconds of commercial input into each of 65 shows - generally broadcast twice daily, six days a week.
If we assess viewing patterns of minorities in this country we know they develop strong allegiances to companies that provide them with entertaining programs. I fear that singular or cluster spots will develop those harmful allegiances by parents and children toward products that really do not deserve these loyalties. The principal target audience of ESAA television programs are ideal consumers whose level of sophistication in questioning value and effect of products is limited.

... I have protested this move by Office of Education, feeling the commercialization of federally sponsored projects is inconsistent with ESAA legislative intent, incompatible to guidelines published in the Federal Register last year... (Cardenas, letter to Charren, April 15, 1975)

The offer has been criticized by ACT on grounds that the commercials are not only a form of profiting from Federally-provided programming, but that many of the commercials directed to children result in actual detriments to their well being (Charren, 1975, interview). The offer has been defended by ESAA-TV Program Officer Dave Berkman on grounds that the USOE legal counsel had interpreted the offer to be within Congressional intent, and that restrictions on allowing commercials before and after an ESAA-TV program would effectively kill chances of distribution at desirable times on commercial stations (Berkman, memo to Mielke et al., April 1, 1975). The issue at this writing is unresolved.

From a commercial broadcaster’s point of view, the most attractive offer would be to allow commercials both within and around a free program. Next would be permission to cluster commercials before and after a free program. Least attractive of all would be a requirement of public service announcements (or their equivalent) before and after the free program. The order of preferability is reversed for the program producers interviewed.

A genuine dilemma of trade-offs is presented between greater exposure of a socially desirable series and perceived greater risk of exploiting the very target population the series is designed to help.
The "free" program, even if accepted by the commercial broadcaster with the stipulation that there be no advertising, cannot serve to dissipate the audience flow of the station or the operator loses money. Additionally, broadcasters need to be concerned with the demographics of the audience. Even a highly rated "kids" show may give the broadcaster trouble in attracting more valuable audience demographics following the program.

One other related consideration is that even if the stations accept purposive children's programs, those programs must appeal to a large audience of children. There is little chance of accepting programming designed to serve small selective audiences, such as the handicapped, or even the economically disadvantaged. The recognition that commercial mass television cannot serve the small specialized audiences was one of the reasons public television was established, and even public television is limited in how small the potential audience can be. The programs need relatively broad appeal before stations can justify broadcasting them (see Mendelsohn, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 24).

Another consideration which needs some discussion is generally labeled as a First Amendment concern on the part of commercial broadcasters. Their concern is that Federal dollars lead to Federal control and some suggest that the government has no business being in commercial television at all.

'The medium, it is argued, must not be beholden to government for any portion of its financing; otherwise, there is danger of a loss of control, albeit subtly. The fear of a government-managed medium whose ultimate function is that of national 'brainwashing' may or may not be justly grounded--it is quite real, a condition of mind that calls for continuing sensitivity and understanding on the part of funding agencies. (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 11)

The concern exists and is particularly strong at one network we visited;
the others were no less concerned but were open to discussing the possibility of government involvement. CBS executives expressed some doubt that even acceptance of government sponsored/produced segments was a good policy. OCD had given money to a packager for production of information segments which appeared on CAPTAIN KANGAROO. There was a great deal of publicity about the segments and CBS received some criticism in the press for accepting government funds to do what the press felt a broadcaster or network should feel obligated to do with their own funds. A second series of segments was produced and carried about a year later without publicity and with little press criticism. Even so, the experience was labeled by network personnel as an "unusual situation" which may have happened without full executive consideration and in any event was not likely to be repeated. Furthermore, the person who was involved in developing some of the segments felt that such development could only take place under a sole-source contract and be the result of unique personal relationships: (1) between funder and developer; and (2) among developer, talent and the network (Sloan, 1975, interview). Because of these factors, the likelihood of replicating the CAPTAIN KANGAROO segment experience seems small.

Individual station operators appear to be less concerned about First Amendment arguments—many have carried governmentally funded programs as a public service. Suffice to say, however, First Amendment concerns exist, and although they don't preclude discussion of Federal participation, awareness of their existence may result in better communication during discussion.

A final concern in Federal involvement in commercial television needs brief mention. Unions have been very cooperative in production of programs for non-profit educative purposes. Once purposive programs are offered
to commercial stations, and the stations stand to profit from them in some measure (e.g., by clustering commercials), the unions have the right and the likelihood to ask for a fair share of the revenue generated by the program. In essence, offering the programs to commercial television may mean a totally different union arrangement. This is not to suggest that the offering presents an impossible dilemma, but prudence dictates that such negotiations take place long before a decision is made to use the program commercially.

c. The Reason Use of Commercial Television May Be Possible Today.

One should not conclude that the Federal government has no role to play in commercial television, but the role is limited. "To do so most effectively, it must work within the structure, and in tune with the dynamics of the commercial system, appreciating the constraints which bind it and its built-in limitations" (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 1). The commercial networks have expanded their children's program offering in the past few years. "This expanded activity leaves little room for additional programming for which government might be responsible" (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 3).

Efforts to schedule educational programs for children tend to run against the commercial grain of the affiliate system. This is not to say children's programming in the afternoon or early evening is ruled out, as the networks' success in clearing the needed time for their afternoon specials demonstrates. The stations may be irritated by the breaks in their own schedules, and the loss of advertising revenue; they appear to be willing to accept the network program, however, as part of the overall public service that is a condition of their licenses. (Land, 1975, commissioned paper, p. 5)

The stations may also feel more compelled to accept purposive programming, whether Federally funded or not, due to pressures from the public interest groups and the FCC. Public interest groups have contended that the
broadcaster owes the public for the right to broadcast; profit concerns cannot be paramount at all times.

The FCC adopted a policy statement on children, largely as the result of interest group pressure, on October 24, 1974, which, in effect, said that stations should devote a "meaningful" amount of time to children's programming, at various times throughout the week and that a "reasonable" amount of the programming should be informational/educational in nature and not purely entertainment. The FCC used the example of WILD KINGDOM as a kind of program which typically is defined as instructional. This may result in creating a greater demand for children's programs.

Additionally, the recent "family viewing" code adopted by the National Association of Broadcasters may also mean that television station operators will be more receptive to new programs directed at children. The code suggests that programs broadcast during the first hour of prime time and the preceding hour should be programs with a minimum of sex and violence so that "family viewing" can take place.

There is little likelihood that the FCC policy statement or the revised NAB code will result in a great increment in purposive high-cost instructional programming of the type that has been the focus of this report. Nonetheless, commercial stations may be more receptive to that type of program than they previously have been.

There are those in the commercial field who would welcome government assistance, at least in the development of a pilot. Robert Garrison, producer of BIG BLUE MARBLE, feels that government support of pilots for purposive programming would be very helpful. He feels a pilot is most neces-
sary in order to really determine whether an idea on paper can become a successful television program, but pilots cost money.

Alphaventure as a production company was extremely fortunate to meet with ITT at the precise moment in time that the corporation wanted to expand its activities in areas of social responsibility to encompass the entire world and Alphaventure wanted to develop "Big Blue Marble." But before this concept could be presented for ITT top management consideration, funds were required to make the pilot ITT provided them, but it should be appreciated that this is not the usual way things happen [emphasis added]. Very few corporations, you could count them on one hand; would make such a bold move. Others would rather buy into existing, known programming or give money to groups like PBS to make up a show and solve the problem for them. (Garrison, letter to Mielke and Johnson, 1974)

Garrison feels the government should open up grants to commercial firms to produce pilots and that the successful shows would soon recoup the original investment for the government, and perhaps allow them to make more money to be used in the development of other purposive pilots or program series.

Eddie Smarden, who has developed NEW ZOO REVUE, also feels that there is a role the government could play in allowing new ideas to develop from paper to production:

... Rather than making "grants" to producers for programs that would appear on television and risk the criticism of propaganda dissemination, the government could become a lender. Specifically, a producer could qualify for a government loan (or guarantee) by meeting some difficult but clear-cut criteria:

1. Through a simple statement of program objectives he can demonstrate that his intended series is purposive in nature.

2. By producing letters of intent to purchase the program series, from either advertisers or broadcasters or both, should it become available, he can demonstrate that his program series can satisfy the requirements of distribution, perceived mass audience acceptance and financial responsibility.
3. The producer should submit a production and distribution budget that reasonably demonstrates he can get the series on TV for less than the amount of money specified by the letters of intent.

4. Based on submission of the above, the producer should be granted a non-recourse loan to provide interim production financing for his project. Chances are that the typical television series, be it half hours, short segments for drop-ins to existing programming, or whatever, would end up in syndication. Chances are that the producer will break even or come close to it in his first year of distribution, or during the first rerun cycle. With conditions of the government loan to include a "first money payback provision," the funds would be relatively secure.

Industry observers who have never been involved in attempting to secure privately obtained interim financing loans for syndicated series, have no idea of the difficulty and the expense involved. By way of illustration let me point out that after producing 195 NEW ZOO REVUE programs, with an on-budget record throughout, this venture still finds it impossible to obtain short term, interim financing for less than 40 percent of the profits plus high interest rates. A new venture, with no previous production record, would probably find the money unavailable from any source. Availability of government loans would be a tremendous motivator for producers who are at the moment ignoring the children's medium because of the negative financial implications of the current system. (Smardon, letter to Mielke, April 11, 1975).

It seems clear that the utilization of commercial producers to develop programs and the discussion with commercial stations and networks about carrying programs should be explored more thoroughly by USOE. Programs on commercial stations might reach more people and have a far greater chance of returning the government's investment.

The intention in this study was to discuss how to facilitate purposive programming for children, but one final alternative for Federal support of purposive materials on commercial television is in the area of "spot" announcements. A recent offering of spots by WTTW, under an ESAA-TV contract from USOE, has received fairly wide acceptance. The WTTW "spots" are simi-
lar to public service announcements carried by all stations, except that perhaps more research and money went into their production. The stations carry them at their convenience at no charge and label them as public service announcements.

A more effective alternative might be to prepare regular "commercial" spot announcements and purchase the desired time for the target audience (see Land, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 25-37). Such an experience represents substantially different problems. The U.S. Army set a precedent for such activity with their purchase of time for spot announcements. It should be noted that the controversy continues over the Army spots. The Army's $45 million advertising budget for FY 76 (which is close to the total USOE investment in all of the CTW and ESAA programs for the past six years) will be spent exclusively on non-broadcast media. The termination of purchased broadcast time reportedly resulted from the belief of a highly-placed public official that broadcasters, as government licensees, have the obligation to carry government spots free of charge as public service announcements (Broadcasting, April 7, 1975, p. 114). The criticisms, problems, as well as the advantages created by the Army spots should be carefully examined before purchase of time on commercial stations by the Federal government for purposive children's television is seriously pursued.

Making Maximum Use of USOE Children's Programming. There is much that purposive television strategists can learn from commercial television (Land, 1975, commissioned paper). One thing worthy of note is that a commercial sponsor does not attempt a thirty-minute commercial within a thirty-minute program, nor would the sponsor likely do so even if it were permissible. The sponsor searches out that program that attracts a voluntary audience
that is demographically within the marketing target audience framework, and inserts the advertising message for the audience that was attracted for purposes other than watching the commercial.

A different outcome, but the same general principle, can be pursued with content that might be difficult to make into sustained high-appeal, full-length program material, such as that encountered in problems of the handicapped child (see Nygren and Withrow, 1973, commissioned paper, p. 27). The principle, already implemented in some cases, is to consider an already-popular program that reaches a desired target audience as a vehicle for inserting specialized programming content, which need not necessarily be commercial-length.

Consider the advantages of such an approach. With handicapped children and with disadvantaged groups as well, the problem at the affective level is a dual one of the disadvantaged child's self-perceptions, as well as the perceptions of the disadvantaged child by other children. Therefore, the target audience is not only disadvantaged children, but all types of children.

Speaking about inserting materials about handicapped children into existing popular children's programs, Maureen Harmony of Action for Children's Television (ACT) states the case well:

We . . . think this [television] is such an ideal medium for children to meet children who are handicapped. Most children don't meet them in their classrooms; if they do, they don't want to go near them. They don't understand them, and it's threatening to them. They think, "Maybe I could be that way, too." We think this is a good way to introduce to children that the handicapped aren't that different and that all children have handicaps whether they're visible or invisible. Every person knows they aren't perfect. By seeing other children who are coping with visible disabilities, it can help the normal children not only relate to the other handi-
capped children, but to learn more about themselves, we think. And so television seems to be an ideal way to do this. (1974, interview)

Several children's programs, some of which USOE has been involved with, have included handicapped children in their regular programs: e.g., ZOOM, SESAME STREET, and MISTER ROGER'S NEIGHBORHOOD.

If the "commercial strategy" of inserting special content in an existing program that already delivers a good audience makes good sense for handicapped children, it should perhaps be explored as a general principle for any future priority item USOE might encounter in the children's domain. That is, USOE should think twice before attempting new programs for children if existing programs are delivering efficiently the desired demographics already, and if these existing programs can function as more-or-less flexible vehicles for insertion of new priority topics. With no assurance that a new program will draw an audience, or what type of audience it will draw, and with an estimated three years needed for a program to reach its potential audience draw, the value of an existing program that delivers the desired audience is inestimable. As present and future vehicles for evolving priority topics, it would be in USOE's best interests to keep such programs thriving.

One obvious example of such a program is SESAME STREET, which outdraws any other programming for adults or children on public television, and is formatted flexibly. Any USOE priority topic insert for this age group could almost be guaranteed an exposure of perhaps 8 to 10 million children, which permits a very attractive post-per-exposure per child for the material. As flexible vehicles, existing programs could serve valuable piloting or pre-test functions for ideas for separate series. Rarely would a new children's
pilot show segment get such an exposure on its own. As a national research instrument, such a program could test social action hypotheses on a large scale.

Concepts for regionalizing or even localizing SESAME STREET could be explored, wherein times within the program could be cut into locally, as with the local news inserts on the nationally distributed TODAY show on NBC. Christopher Sarson, originator of ZOOM, has worked out several ideas for how ZOOM might be adapted regionally, or even produced regionally in toto (Sarson, interview, 1975). Regionalizing part of a series as a complement to a strong nationally-produced series of demonstrated effectiveness has many practical, pedagogical, and political attractions (see Greenberg, 1975, commissioned paper).

**End-of-Funding Considerations.** According to one USOE official, "ESAA originally was a two-year piece of legislation destined to die." Perhaps as a consequence of such an expectation, many of the strategies by USOE were short-term: concentrate on getting as many programs as possible produced as quickly as possible rather than concentrate more broadly on the entire process of distribution, promotion, and utilizations, and evaluation. Neither the legislation nor the USOE guidelines gave adequate attention to these factors. As a consequence, thorny problems have resulted and will probably continue to surface during the next year or two.

It is possible that the legislation will run out before many of the programs are aired. What is supposed to happen when the funding stops before the show goes on the air? This happened at BC/TV with VILLA ALEGRE: their grant ended June 30, 1974; their series started airing the following September. Who was to promote the show, answer the phone, respond to the
mail, conduct teacher-training sessions? Who was PBS to deal with? The answer was not to be found within USOE. BC/TV continued operation with non-USOE funds (e.g., Exxon) and with a skeleton crew, carrying on these necessary operations. The USOE-interpreted ESAA legislation seemed neither to anticipate these problems nor to allocate funding for their solution. Essential parts of the television process remain after production ends; there are closing-down operations after that which must be accommodated.

Production

Administrative Requirements. It is in the process of production that the "great synthesis" must take place, concurrently considering the needs assessment, the specific objectives, the target audience, the budget, the time line, the "concept" of the series, the creative staff, unions, formative evaluation feedback, the distribution system, and so on. The ultimate effects of the program or series will depend on whether the target audience watches it, and what the target audience does with it or as a result of it, but this is largely uncontrollable. What is controllable, within the many constraints suggested above, is the design and production features of the actual program.

The executive producer must have a great degree of autonomy because only he or she ultimately has the power to "make it happen" in terms of the creative success of the actual program. In addition to the philosophic and legal reasons the producer must have autonomy, Hartford Gunn (1975, interview) pointed out the purely practical aspects of the matter from a managerial point of view: "One of the first things you learn in station management is how to be helpful without being intrusive to the point that you take on the responsibility of the producer without the time to adequately do the
job even if you are competent and could do it."

If the staff and talent find they must serve two, three, or more masters, confusion results. If the producer's role is pre-empted or co-opted, he or she withdraws, and no one is at the wheel. "Confusion almost guarantees failures."

Studio rentals are very expensive, and complex planning is required to have everything ready to go when the studio is activated. Through a complicated process of backtiming, the scripts, actors, film inserts, animation, and the like, must be activated at different times so they can converge and be ready in coordinated fashion in the studio. A seemingly minor interference at some point along this line, even well in advance of actual production, can cause major confusion and waste when the studio is activated, and this apparently happened several times in the case of VILLA ALEGRE (Rector, 1974, interview). This again is reaffirmation of an earlier recommendation that after the funder has once decided to commit, the funder should keep hands off the process to the maximum extent.

Formats. In our view, it is premature to attempt generalizations on format and production factors in children's programming. A creative product is inherently multi-faceted and unique, while a generalization depends on isolating those particular facets that are necessary and sufficient for predicting outcomes with different program material. How can one reasonably attribute any general characteristics, say, to animation? Is animation "good?" Is animation "effective?" One could animate almost anything, from stock market reports to the Bible and their "goodness" or "effectiveness" would depend on what was animated, and how, and for whom, and under what conditions, and so forth.
There have indeed been attempts to reach generalized conclusions based on research data, the most comprehensive being Chu and Schramm's 1967 document *Learning from Television: What the Research Says*. In 1974, this review was still considered "definitive" by Stanford (in Witherspoon, 1974). How much practical guidance to a producer or a program funder, however, can be gleaned from even the definitive reviews of research? Stanford's own document provides an excellent example of the difficulty. Stanford cites the Chu and Schramm conclusion that a variety of production techniques cannot be associated reliably with improved learning. He then cites some formative research from SESAME STREET that does associate certain production techniques with improved learning. Finally, he notes that the SESAME STREET findings on the utility of puppets and animation were not supported by Korman, who was working with the program CARRASCOLENDAS: "Korman found that animation and puppets did not appear to be as effective as indicated in the 'Sesame Street' research, but he noted that this may have been due to the fact that 'Sesame Street' used professional puppeteers and animators" (Stanford, in Witherspoon, 1974, p. III-15, emphasis added).

Of what value would it be to frame a "generalization" that "professional" puppeteers and animators will be more reliably associated with learning than "unprofessional" puppeteers and animators? The term "professional" is linguistic shorthand for a host of factors that still remain unspecific, and perhaps even unspecifiable. So-called generalizations based on such nebulous criteria have the potential of doing far more harm than good if they serve to stifle the creative exploration of some particular product or format in children's television.

*Judging Television Potential from Written Descriptions.* A problem cited
in Ambrosino's commissioned paper (1975) was reaffirmed in the field site visit interviews: it is impossible to envision a television show, when nothing else is known, from a written description. There is an art to television production, and there is an art to proposal writing, but expertise in the latter is no assurance of expertise in the former. This is a problem if much of the critical decision-making is based on written proposals, especially if reviewed by panels with minimal expertise in broadcasting.

The expert in content who is a layman in television might be impressed by low cost-per-minute estimates, high proposed density of information in the series, and unadapted incorporation of pedagogical techniques borrowed from the classroom or the research laboratory. These could well be the exact opposite of what would make for a successful television series.

Examination of pilots would be an improvement, but this too poses problems. Pilots are expensive. Certain set-up costs for a proposed series would be nearly as expensive for a pilot as for the entire series (sets, costumes, etc.). More effort and resources might be put into the pilot than could possibly go into other programs in the series. It might be difficult to collect the creative staff to produce just one pilot show. If the production and talent crew collected and then dissipated, the subsequent series might not resemble the pilot. Only the larger and well-established production centers or management agencies with creative staff already on board might be able to "fire up" for a single pilot in any case. "We did not send a program to the [proposal] competition. It was just on the basis of a proposal that was written, and as far as they're [the proposal review panel] concerned, if you have never done one program, you are on the same footing as someone who has a whole track record" (Barrera, 1974, interview).
The "safest" recommendation, on all grounds except political, might be to devote Federal funds only to those production centers that have already demonstrated competence in producing successful programming at the national level. On the other hand, such a strategy would tend to entrench the status quo. A step down from that would be to make longer-term grants to a variety of centers for the production of only a pilot. Several possible mechanisms along these lines were suggested in an earlier segment of this chapter. A minimal recommendation would be to have a second review panel that would activate after all Federal requirements for review panels had been satisfied; this second panel would be outside the Government, and composed mainly or entirely of professional broadcasters. Or perhaps an entirely different mechanism is needed. In any case, the problems of judging production potential in television from written documents are widely perceived.

**Opportunities for Local and Minority Involvements.** Through subcontracting parts of the production, such as film, animation, scripts, and music, there is considerable opportunity to involve smaller production units in major national programming. Given the reality that minority-based production units are more likely to be found in the smaller organizations than in the few major organizations capable of handling the logistics required for nationally-distributed television programming, the subcontracting process appears to be an excellent vehicle for significant involvement of minority production units in a rapid and significant way. AIT has also found that local stations that would be unable, in terms of time, staff and facilities, to produce an entire series can produce limited numbers of programs within series. Given a good management system, significant involvements can extend well beyond the domain of the principal grantee. However, if typical gov-
ernmental subcontracting procedures apply, allowing numerous smaller production houses opportunities to insert segments into series can be a cumbersome and time-consuming task.

Distribution, Promotion and Utilization

National Distribution. In Chapter Two, and in Witherspoon's commissioned paper (1975), distribution systems were discussed in some detail. The general conclusion reached was that, for the in-home audience, PBS is still the most likely method of distribution for national purposive children's programming that would involve Federal funding. Access to this limited-channel system is necessarily limited and competitive. This implies that possibilities and likelihood of distribution should be examined as early in the planning and funding process as possible; that funding large numbers of programs simultaneously will probably be in excess of what the national distribution system can handle; and that it makes more sense to heavily fund a very limited number of series than to fund marginally a larger number of series. The objective is not to produce programs; the objective is to attract and affect as many target audience members as possible. The judged potential of a series to do that in sufficient numbers will be a major determinant of whether the series is offered access to the national distribution system, and the actual performance of the series in doing that will be a major determinant in the series' ability to retain that access. As one moves from national to non-national distribution systems, there are somewhat fewer problems of getting access to systems, if they exist in the first place (see Bransford, 1975, commissioned paper), but increasing problems of funding programming that will be competitive with the national programming.
The technology of electronic communication has advanced tremendously within the last 25 years, and it would be naive to assume that by the turn of the century, 25 years hence, there will not be similarly dramatic advances. The psychological and sociological functions served by these new media configurations, however, may not be so dramatically changed. There is understandable enthusiasm about what will be possible with such not-so-futuristic systems as interactive television, distributed by cable or satellites (see, e.g., Witherspoon; Greenberg; Bransford, commissioned papers). Given that it will be possible to individualize purposive in-home media offerings, does it therefore follow that the target audience will want and use that type of media services? Educators saw the possibilities for in-home instructional use of AM radio, then FM radio, then VHF television, then UHF television, now cable, and soon, interactive systems. If one were to plot the extent and impact of formal in-home instructional uses of these media in the U.S. over time, it would not give rise to great optimism as the line projects into the future. In-home purposive television for children made its greatest impact when it met the competition head on—with entertainment values. To the extent that "the competition" will continue to offer entertainment, then the advocates of advanced in-home instructional systems should be persuasive that "the competition" can and would be met effectively. This demonstration is every bit as important as the demonstration of signal-processing capacity. In the more controlled atmosphere of the school, as discussed in Chapter Two, there might well be fewer "sociological obstacles" for incorporating new media configurations.

Promotion. To the broadcaster, promotion is another link in the chain that, if ignored, can cripple the entire process. After the program is made and distributed, people have to look at it, and to do this, they need
to know that it is available and want to see it at least once; this is the function of promotion. The merits of the show must carry it after that. At one time an NCET task force was discussing the possibility of a full-time promotion person (Berkman to Hertzler, memo, July 25, 1972). In the ESAA-funded productions, promotion has not been given the high priority that the broadcasting community would have given it, however. Instead, the emphasis was on only a part of the television process, mainly in production of programs.

Even now, no mention is made of allowable budget categories or strategies for promotion in the ESAA announcements which invite proposals. In the explanation of the scoring system for evaluating proposals, no points are to be given to a plan for promotion. The only time the word "promotion" is mentioned is in the enumeration of "deliverables"; six promotional spots are required: three one-minute spots and three thirty-second spots. Aida Barrera, producer of CARRASCOLENDAS, (1974, interview) noted the extreme handicap a series is put under if it has no resources for promotional activity: stations may not know about the program; they may put it on at poor times; they may need information that CARRASCOLENDAS could supply on audience-building techniques; the audience is accustomed to responding to shows that are heavily promoted; "... because of the severe limitations on promotions, we just cannot even get out to the stations to promote it. We cannot get out with the word on anything."

Because they were able to acquire "outside" money, CTW and BC/TV both mounted heavy promotion campaigns for their children's series, coordinated, at times, by professional public relations firms. All, whose programs are targeted to the in-school audience, used the services of a professional public relations firm with "outside" money.
Apparently some ESAA monies have recently been committed "after the fact" to some or all ESAA programs in approximate amounts of $15,000 per series (Berkman, 1975, interview). In PBS, promotion efforts are needed not just to get the target audience to watch; promotion is needed to get stations to carry the show in the first place. While $15,000 might be adequate to make some efforts at contacting station managers, it is hardly a budget for promoting a series to the public on a national basis. This is, we believe, a form of false economy. If 10 percent of a total substantial budget could double the size of the audience, that would probably be the best investment that could be made.

Utilization. Utilization is obviously difficult to manage for a national, voluntary in-home audience. Utilization materials can even be offered free, but the number of requests will never reach the number of viewers. Utilization that requires the supervisory help of a parent cannot be controlled or assured. In general, it would be a mistake to design an in-home national program that required external utilization materials or procedures before it could be effective, unless the materials were commonly available and child-accessible. However, the effectiveness of almost any in-home purposive program that can stand on its own can then be improved by the addition of guided utilization procedures. CTW, for example, has done significant work in utilization at the community level through its Community Education Services. If mothers can be enlisted, trained, and supplied with supporting materials to assist her child's learning from the program, that will be an added benefit. Evaluations of SESAME STREET have shown that just a post-viewing discussion of the program between parent and child enhances learning. There will always be significant numbers of children, however, who will view the program, but not gain the benefits of these
supporting utilization activities. Taking their interests into account leads to the conclusion that the program should be designed to stand alone.

The greatest opportunity for benefiting from utilization materials and activities lies with the in-school audience, where the viewing environment is much more controlled, and the teacher is in a supervisory role. AIT, for example, places considerable emphasis and resources on the utilization materials for every series it produces; the materials are considered an integral and essential part of the package. Teacher guides are distributed by the hundreds of thousands. Frequently, in-service utilization training for the teachers themselves is required to get maximum impact from an in-school television series. Because the in-school utilizers are known—in theory one could generate a list of all the names of in-school viewers at any point in time—the utilization system can operate efficiently through its non-broadcast channels.

The low priority given to utilization by USOE in the administration of the ESAA programs is evident from its tokenism. The "Deliverables," specified in the Request for Proposal, are to include the total utilization package: "Five (5) copies of teacher guide materials consisting of one (1) typewritten page in final form for each production." The "utilization plan" is as follows: USOE will copy the single sheets of paper and send single copies to station managers. Then, if anyone requests teacher guide materials, and addresses the request to the station, the station can send the person a second generation copy of the one-page material.

**Evaluation of Purposive Programming in Children's Television**

**Introduction.** Considering only evaluations associated with specific programs or series, one can enter the policy arena by exploring the issues
associated with evaluation research in terms of its conceptualization, execution, and utilization. The program-specific research can be further broken down into formative and summative evaluations.

The terms "formative evaluation" and "summative evaluation" originated with Michael Scriven (1967), although the underlying concepts predate these particular labels which are now in common use. Formative research/evaluation deals in general with product or program improvement; it functions to provide evaluative feedback to the production staff while there is still time to incorporate this information and change the program. Formative research applies to the formation or formative stages of a program or product. Summative research, on the other hand, reports only after the program (or subdivision thereof) is completed; it evaluates, after the fact, the extent to which the program (or subdivision thereof) fulfilled its objectives. Stake (1967) added precision to Scriven's terms by contrasting the criteria to which formative and summative evaluations are oriented. Formative evaluation is oriented to "developer-author-publisher criteria and standards." (In the ETV setting, we would probably substitute writer, producer, director.) Summative evaluation, on the other hand, is oriented to "consumer-administrator-teacher criteria and standards." (In ETV we would probably add "sponsoring agency.") (Mielke, 1973, p. 348)

Conceptualization of Pre-Formative Evaluations. Whether done outside the Government (as was the case with SESAME STREET), defined by legislation (as was the case with CARRASCOLENDAS and VILLA ALEGRE), or determined in advance by the "customers" for a series (as was the case with INSIDE/OUT), much decision-making must take place prior to actual formative research for a specific program development. Minimally, this analysis needs to cover the following four points:

1. Who. Here is the specification of target audience.

Typically, this is done with standard demographics: age, sex, ethnicity, geographic locale, socio-economic status, etc.

Equally important to demographics, however, can be psychological measurements, such as feelings of alienation, attitudes toward school, self-concept, etc.
2. **Has What Needs.** From the specification of needs, discussed earlier in Chapter Four, will generated later in the development stages the measurable objectives, if any, for the television series.

3. **That Might Be Addressable by Television.** Television is not an appropriate medium for every defined need. The sociology of the proposed target audience, as discussed in Chapter Two, is a major factor in determining feasibility.

4. **With Likelihood of Success.** Success in this case would mean acceptable levels of audience attracted, and successful levels of demonstrable impact on the audience. Neither type of success can be predicted with anything approaching reliability. Shows carrying no educational requirements at all fail every year, and purposive television is vulnerable on both fronts (audience size and impact).

There is, however, a group of background or pre-formative questions, answers to which can raise the probabilities of success, or at the very least point out when the probabilities are low. Several obstacles or barriers to program success will yield to some form of empirical analysis. Here again, the sociology of the audience is critical. When does the target audience watch television? What shows do they like now? Why do they watch those shows? What elements of those shows are particularly appealing to the target audience? Who controls the set in the home? What appeals will be necessary to get the cooperation of this controller, if different from the target audience? Does the target audience have any interest in the subject matter being proposed? Do they have any fears or other forms of resistance to the proposed subject matter? What is the present level of
knowledge within the target audience on the subject matter being proposed? Are they committed at present to a schedule of activities that will be real competition for the proposed viewing time? Can they afford ancillary materials? If so, how might they be delivered and utilized? Even with all answers in hand, there is absolutely no guarantee of success for a proposed program. The utility of this kind of information to program planning strategy, however, should be self-evident.

This pre-formative activity can be summarized as follows: monitoring the capacities and constraints of the technical delivery systems; monitoring and identifying needs; and conducting a form of marketing research or feasibility study when a likely prospect for television treatment has been tentatively identified.

Conceptualization of Formative Evaluations. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting does quite a bit of physical system monitoring (Katzman, 1973; Lee & Pedone, 1974), but there remain serious gaps in information essential to rational planning. The gaps exist for almost every alternative to the Public Broadcasting Service as a delivery system. USOE should consider requesting the National Center for Educational Statistics to conduct the technological monitoring not being fielded at present by CPB. This should include a tracking of the real and potential in-school audience for television, as delivered by various systems.

Formative evaluations are supposed to help producers. A necessary condition for effective formative evaluation is an attitudinal environment of cooperation and trust between producer and formative researcher. If this is missing, nothing else will matter very much. The importance of this linkage has been stressed repeatedly (Lesser, 1974; Palmer, 1974; Land, 1972;
Mielke, 1973). The references above speak as well to the dual responsibilities involved in making work what some call an unnatural marriage between research and production. It requires typically a significant reorientation on the part of both researchers and producers to find that middle ground where both can talk to each other and help each other toward the common goal of producing the best program possible.

If formative research fails to provide useful information to the production staff, it has failed as formative research. Conversely, if formative research does provide useful information to the production decision-making process, it has succeeded, and this may or may not be within the framework of standard criteria for methodological rigor.

Formative Research: Execution. In principle, the domain of formative research questions is the domain of production questions. These can be very situation-specific, and not amenable to advance specification. If the production question is "should insert A come before or after insert B," it is the job of formative research to devise a methodology to answer that question or at least to attempt a data-based judgment. It is the further responsibility of formative research to deliver that judgment in time to be used in the decision-making, and to deliver it in a form that can be understood and utilized. This is much easier said than done.

Very little can be generalized about the methodologies employed in formative research in children's television nor are formative evaluations typically comparable across different series. Sometimes special apparatuses are employed: e.g., distractor techniques, freeze-framing on the TV screen, special graphic questionnaires, and so on. On what basis would one compare a distractor study of SESAME STREET, and eye-movement photograph...
study of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a qualitative reaction to the pilot for ZOOM, a questionnaire-based study for VILLA ALEGRE, an in-class charting of the flow of follow-up group discussion for INSIDE/OUT, and an eye contact analysis of two CARRASCOLENDAS programs. This is an incomplete listing of formative research methodologies used just on the six programs examined in depth. The mixture is further confounded by differences in research opportunity (funding, personnel, time), and program objective (cognitive, attitudinal, behavioral, and various combinations of these).

Utilization of Formative Evaluation. The "proof of the pudding" for formative research is in its utilization. Land (1972) reports several concrete instances where formative research led to program improvements at CTW. The research director at VILLA ALEGRE cited similar instances (DeAvila, 1974, interview). This is what formative research is supposed to do. Ultimately, of course, these improvements should register in the summative evaluations as well.

There is a danger in losing sight of this primary function if formal formative research reports must be submitted to project funders or to PBS for use as summative research; i.e., for use in making funding or distribution decisions. First of all, it is very difficult to serve an in-house producer and an outside decision-maker with the same research report. The formative research must be introduced with appropriate qualifications, historical context, data tables, appendices, and narrative for the outside reader, but that lowers the probability that in-house producers will read it. A second danger in sending formative research "working documents" during production is that it puts new pressures on both research and production. In-house, the formative researcher can say "this segment is terrible," but he or she will have hesitations in saying this in print for outside readership.
A producer is typically sensitive enough already just placing material for scrutiny and evaluation among in-house colleagues. If mistakes are to be aired publicly, especially before there is a chance to correct them, this will threaten the necessary openness between researcher and producer. If research is forced into the form of PR, no one is served, least of all the producer for whom it was intended.

This can present a dilemma to those in-house evaluators on ESAA projects, where pilots and accompanying evaluations are examined before go/no-go decisions are made for the series as a whole. If a bad "report card" is turned in, the project may be terminated. If not terminated by USOE, then PBS, examining the same report card, might decide not to distribute it. Yet both USOE and PBS have a right to examine evaluative data about a series or pilot for which major investments must still be made. It should be recognized that a summative-type decision is being made from a formative evaluation report. Few would advocate that in-house staff conduct the summative evaluations for precisely the reasons that cause the problem here: a report card written by in-house staff for outside readership, in which significant consequences are at stake, presents a conflict of interest. The recommendation is that formative evaluation be done by in-house staff for an in-house readership, and that the reports stay in-house. Formative evaluation makes too important a contribution to series improvement for it to be put under the pressure of serving a summative role. If summative-type decisions are to be made on a pilot, then summative procedures should be employed to generate the evaluations, and these are considered next.

**Summative Evaluation: Conceptualization.** Oversimplified, the purpose of summative evaluation is to measure performance against objectives: did the program or the series do what it was supposed to do?
The answer to the question is useful to a variety of groups: e.g.,
for sponsors: was it a good investment? Should we refund?
for administrators: should we include it in the curriculum?
for parents: should we encourage our child to watch it?
for the producers: how can we incorporate the summative
data as formative input for future projects?
for policy makers: does this augur well for future invest-
ments of this type? Does it compare well with alter-
native forms of investments?
for basic researchers: what principles emerge that might
be applicable elsewhere?

Lesser (1974) states: "Summative evaluation must go beyond assessing
simple overall effects on all children ('Does it work?') and attempt also
to answer these more meaningful questions ('For whom and under what condi-
tions does it work?')" (p. 144). Even this assumes that "working" or "not
working" can be defined in acceptable measurement procedures, but this can-
not be taken as a given. In general, cognitive information gain poses the
least difficulty in measurement, attitude change is more difficult (espe-
cially with young children), and behavioral change (as well as complex af-
effective change, such as with self-concept) is very difficult indeed to meas-
ure.

Impact assessment can be a double-edged sword. Many consider it essen-
tial for accountability purposes; it guides production strategy; it is per-
haps the only way that experience can be cumulative; it is a necessary form
of feedback for rational decision-making. On the other hand, worthwhile
goals are not necessarily measurable; the state of the measurement art can
limit what is attempted via television; television may excel in the very
affective domain that eludes precise measurement; incomplete measurement can be misinterpreted as the total effect of a series; summative evaluations can be dysfunctional if the measurement asks Question X, and the program stresses content Y.

A television series that is widely viewed will have a variety of effects, most of which will not be measured systematically. The goal structure which generates research measurements tends to be narrow (reach, attitute change, information gain, behavior change) by comparison to the extended ripples of effect that are observable after the fact. The needs of the sponsor typically will not extend to the assessment of the secondary and tertiary effects, and so they tend not to be brought into the measurement strategy at all.

It seems commonplace to anticipate in advance the multiple effects of such interventions as building a new lake in an area: water supply, recreation, new jobs, aesthetic enhancement, flood control, attraction of tourists, effect on land values, and so on. It is far less common to anticipate in advance, much less specify in advance with stated objectives, the multiple effects of a television series: spill-over audience for other television programs, impact on the image of public broadcasting in general, effects on audiences outside the specified target audience, impact on delivery and utilization systems, general contribution to knowledge, effects on other institutions such as schools and community agencies, stimulation of basic research, impact on the general language and culture, secondary audiences reached through the interpersonal network, evaluations by professional groups, reactions of the press, associative/dissociative influences on other TV programs (both commercial and noncommercial), influences on funding availabilities for future programs, negative/undesirable/socially
dysfunctional effects, effects on international audiences through exports, impact on the talent pool available for further work, impacts that are observable only long after the program is finished, and so on and on. Almost every producer of children's television programs with Federal involvements can supply anecdotes in almost every instance above; they are hot "empty" or "near empty" categories in any sense other than in the body of formal evaluation research literature.

There are occasional instances where summative data do not need to be generated experimentally; they emerge naturally. In the case of ZOOM, one of the objectives was to get participation on the part of the audience within the program. On a sustained basis, ZOOM has been getting between 2000 and 5000 letters from children per week (Sarson, 1975, interview). BIG BLUE MARBLE contains a one-minute segment inviting children to write in for the name and address of a Pen Pal in another country. Four airings of BIG BLUE MARBLE resulted in over 7000 Pen Pal requests from target audience members (Burson-Marstellar, 1974).

The most fundamental form of summative evaluation is viewer acceptance. In television, exposure itself must be an effect that is reached before the hoped-for gains resulting from exposure can take place. In national programming for in-home audiences, this exposure is voluntary, and it is measured in some form of ratings. Ratings vary from "too small to measure" (especially on public stations) to rare peaks of over 50% of all TV households (always on commercial stations).

If reach and impact could be considered simplistically in terms of algebraic equivalencies, which, alas, they cannot, an impact measure of 10 for a program that reached a million people (10,000,000 "impact units")
would be a much better investment than an impact measure of 50 for a program that reached a thousand people (50,000 "impact units"). This hypothetical example implies that message design variations intended to increase the learning gained from exposure must be weighed against the effect of those same variations on the amount of audience attracted. A television program that teaches very well but can attract hardly any audience at all is no bargain. The ideal, of course, is to maximize voluntary exposure and concurrently to maximize the learning that takes place for the exposed viewers. Even small gains become impressive when widely achieved, in the same way that a half-inch of gin in the bathtub is still an impressive amount of gin.

While the ratings and other forms of audience measures are subject to methodological weaknesses, they have in general the advantage of being standardized services not connected with any particular program or service, hence not manifestly subject to systematic bias in favor of (or against) a particular program. The assessment of performance versus goals for a program is of a different nature, and policy issues emerge on who should conduct the assessment, and under what conditions, and by what standards.

For purposive children's television projects, the weight of our experience in this investigation is clear-cut in the case of formative evaluation: the formative evaluation staff should be in-house. The summative evaluation issue is more complex. While a Nielsen Audimeter is totally disinterested in what program is tuned in, hence the resultant ratings have no systematic bias in favor of one program or another, this same value of "disinterest" is not necessarily the most useful for the more experimentally-based assessment of curriculum goals.
The contracted production agency should not be asked to summatively determine for itself with in-house staff whether goals were met and refunding should be made, because such a procedure would lack credibility and be a form of conflict of interest. The arguments in favor of total independence between evaluation staff and production agency are mostly based on the assumption that the in-house relationship is too "cozy," and will dilute scientific objectivity because of the production agency's desire for longevity and its resistance to looking bad in public.

On the other hand, if the summative evaluation is contracted to a completely "disinterested" third party contractor, there may be little motivation to develop the design into maximum sensitivity for finding effects if there really are effects. A research contractor with no interest in the goals of a program can set self-interest priorities, for example, in terms of ease of measurement, least effort, and maximum profit, and still conduct research that is ostensibly "rigorous." A measurable effect of a television program is such a fragile thing that it is simplicity itself to design studies that will almost guarantee in advance a finding of "no effect." Worse yet would be a "researcher for hire" who was ignorant of broadcasting and audience sociology. Worst of all would be a "researcher for hire" who had his/her own particular axe to grind.

A Federal agency or public official deeply involved in a social action program can also affect, directly or indirectly, the conduct and utilization of summative evaluations. Carol H. Weiss (1973) has written insightfully about the compatibilities and conflicts between the evaluation research community and the political community that generates many of the social action programs being evaluated. Some of her ideas are sampled here.
Some programs are terminated in spite of favorable evaluation reports; others are sustained in spite of negative evaluation reports; still others are never subjected to formal evaluation at all. Different systems of "rationality" are employed: the evaluator assesses the overtly stated goals (to improve X and Y), while the politically-oriented decision-maker may focus on more covert, unstated goals (to keep this or that pressure group quiet; to show that the administration or the department is "doing something" about the problem). "A considerable amount of ineffectiveness may be tolerated if a program fits well with prevailing values, if it satisfies voters, or if it pays off political debts" (p. 40). Politically-generated program goals tend to be grandiose, and, in the hard-nosed, data-based world of the social scientist/evaluator, overly optimistic and even unrealistic. "What the Congress writes into legislation as program objectives is not necessarily what the Secretary's office or the director of the national program see as their mission, nor what the state or local project managers or the operating staff actually try to accomplish" (p. 39).

The question is how to structure a policy recommendation for the conduct of summative evaluations that is administratively feasible, that has the greatest probability of generating evaluation data that are both valid and useful, and that guards against some of the more serious abuses to which the funder, the production agency, and the research/evaluation organization might be vulnerable.

In the relationship between production agency and evaluation organization, there is middle ground between (1) in-house self-evaluation and (2) total detachment: it is cooperation between the evaluating agency and the evaluated agency. The argument made here is that, organizationally, the
evaluation agency should be external to the production agency, but should consult and cooperate with the production agency in devising instruments, designs, and content coverage areas that the production agency can approve of as yielding a fair test of program effects. Hostility by either party toward the other can effectively cripple the utility of the evaluation effort on many grounds. There must be continuing communication between the evaluator and the production agency.

The utility of a third-party review/advisory panel, not beholden to the particular Federal funding agency or Federal program, the production agency, or the evaluation agency, should also be considered. The panel should probably be composed of non-Federal personnel, perhaps communication research/evaluation scholars drawn from universities, and retained by USOE for advisory service when needed. Useful services that such a panel could perform include:

1. an outside opinion on appropriate criteria for an evaluation well in advance of an actual proposal for the evaluation;
2. an outside opinion on the appropriateness of an evaluation proposal before it is executed;
3. advisory input to help the appropriate USOE official arbitrate any disputes arising between evaluation organization and production agency;
4. consultative input for mid-stream problems that might arise in the process of the evaluation; and
5. external review of the completed evaluation report.

The goal is to design and carry out rigorous and replicable studies that will show effects, if there are effects, and to analyze the effects in ways that make the data useful for administrators and policy makers who are sim-
ilarly interested in the goals.

**Summative Evaluation: Execution.** "... the controlled experiment is the standard against which other research methods are judged" (Webb & Campbell, 1973, p. 938). These leading authors in the area of methodology cite the "grave methodological difficulties of selection bias" in most studies of broadcast television. Yet they provide no concrete model or example of adequate experimental design. For regular broadcast programming, they note that random assignment of in-home audience members to "viewing" and "non-viewing" conditions is "often impossible." This assessment is testimony to the difficulty of the summative evaluation task in purposive children's television.

In brief, the problems of self-selection, which are an inherent part of broadcasting to the home audience, since "nobody can force anyone to watch anything," are that the apparent effects of the series might actually be due, in indeterminate degree, not to the series itself, but to whatever it was that induced one to watch in the first place. If one compares a motivated information-seeker who watched a program with an unmotivated non-seeker of information who did not watch a program, viewing or not viewing the program may be less important in interpreting their differences than their motivation or non-motivation to seek information. This is a classic problem in nationally-broadcast television when natural in-home settings are employed.

In-school settings afford opportunities for true experimental control, as when randomly-selected classrooms do and do not show the program (see, e.g., Ball & Bogatz' evaluation of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, 1973). However, when groups of in-home audiences were either "encouraged to view" or "not
encouraged to view," the lack of control became apparent when some of the "encouraged" children did not in fact view, and some of the "not encouraged" children did in fact view (Ball & Bogatz, 1970). Greater control was available in the second year of evaluating SESAME STREET by going on cable, finding neighborhoods not connected to the cable, then connecting cable to the "viewing" group, but not to the "non-viewing" group (Bogatz & Ball, 1971).

The design and execution of a summative evaluation cannot be prescribed generically; they must instead derive on a case-by-case basis as a result of several considerations, including:

1. the nature, specificity, and measurability of the effects to be measured (cognitive, affective, behavioral);
2. the target audience and the sociological setting for the target audience (age groups-in homes vs. in-school);
3. the organization of the summative evaluation staff (in-house, out-of-house, combinations of the two);
4. start-up time allowed (summative instruments developed in time for pre-broadcast baselines or not);
5. the extent to which secondary and tertiary effects are considered within the domain of the mission for the summative evaluation;
6. the amount of funding for summative evaluation (a single national probability survey can cost $150,000); the entire evaluation budget for INSIDE/OUT was perhaps 1/10 that amount; and
7. the decision options into which the summative evaluation will provide inputs (e.g., refunding, termination, possible modification, applicability to other Federal programs, marketability, and so on); and
8. the specificity of the summative evaluation mission
(e.g., evaluate one series only vs. comparative evaluations of two or more series).

A true field experiment, with national random samples of target audience members, would be ideal. It also might cost as much as or more than the television series it would be designed to evaluate. This design will not be found in the evaluation literature for national children's television programming. In fact, so far as we know, the only purposive children's television series distributed nationally to receive summative evaluations that compared goals with achievement after exposure to a full series, are SESAME STREET, THE ELECTRIC COMPANY, and CARRASCOLENDAS. The current version of CARRASCOLENDAS, which is substantially different from the earlier version bearing the same name, has not been evaluated summatively. Neither has VILLA ALEGRE, ZOOM, or INSIDE/OUT.

In one of the CTW summative evaluation reports, Ball and Bogatz spend almost an entire page enumerating the questions that could not be addressed in their evaluation of THE ELECTRIC COMPANY (Ball & Bogatz, 1973, p. 6). Even longer lists of unaddressed questions could easily be supplied. If these two series, with well-funded research operations, are lacking data-based answers to relevant questions, the paucity of information is obviously greater for other purposive children's television program that have no summative research.

The programs funded by the Emergency School Aid Act, such as VILLA ALEGRE and CARRASCOLENDAS have no full-series summative evaluation; there are at present no concrete plans for conducting summative evaluations, and funds for the TV research may become available later only if evaluation money
is left over from the large studies involved with other parts of the ESAA projects (Wargo, 1975; interview). The simple prerequisite of baseline data for summative evaluation among the target audience is rendered difficult to impossible by this delayed and conditional consideration of summative evaluation for the twelve series of children's programs funded under the ESAA legislation, even though the legislation itself places considerable stress on the research components, both formative and summative:

The Assistant Secretary may approve an application under this section only if he determines that the applicant—
(A) will employ members of minority groups in responsible positions in development, production, and administrative staffs;
(b) will use modern television techniques of research and production; and
(C) has adopted effective procedures for evaluating education and other change achieved by children viewing the program. (Public Law 92-318, Title VII, Section 711(b)(3))

Summative Evaluation: Utilization. "As a matter of record, relatively few evaluation studies have had a noticeable effect on the making and remaking of public policy" (Weiss, 1973, p. 40). The state of children's television programming has definitely affected public policy, but perhaps less through formal summative evaluations of specific series designed to produce positive effects than through research, testimony, and political pressure brought to bear vis-a-vis feared negative effects.

It is far more difficult to trace within the Federal Government any specific utilization or impact of the relatively few summative evaluations that have been conducted for purposes of children's television programming. Very few, if any, decisions depend for their outcome solely on summative data. The summative "report cards" will almost inevitably be mixed: some successes and some failures, and we have yet to see an advance specification
of a cut-off point of the order. "If you achieve at least X% of your goals with at least X% of the target audience, you will be refunded; otherwise you will be terminated." Instead, the summative evaluations enter as one component in an entire set of considerations, and these sets of considerations differ from office to office. For example, the Public Broadcasting Service must consider its entire schedule line-up of children's programs, the capacity of the interconnection system, ratings, station acceptance, technical quality, clearances, costs, etc., plus summative evaluation data. USOE must consider legislative mandates, agency priorities, other demands on funds, etc., plus summative evaluation data. The question is: why can't the summative assignments be expanded to include more of the real decision-making needs and more of the non-curricular effects of a series? Target recipients for summative evaluations should not conduct or interfere with the process, but they should have input into setting its objectives so that real decision needs, and not ritualistic needs, would be served.


a. Formative Evaluation

1. All USOE-funded purposive children's television programs should have a formative evaluation component.

2. The formative evaluation staff should be in-house with the production agency.

3. To keep the boundaries distinct between producer needs (spotting problems, suggesting solutions) and more summatively-oriented sponsor interests, USOE, or whatever responsible agency is delegated, should, if monitoring is necessary at all, monitor the formative evaluation process,
not the product, while production is taking place.

4. Periodically, USOE should make the very modest investment that would be required to review, synthesize, and report all formative evaluation projects within its domain, with a view toward assisting the accumulation of formative experience that could transfer to future projects. These reports should be required reading for future funding applicants.

b. **Summative Evaluation.**

1. Sponsors, distributors, utilizers, and other groups with a defined interest in the outcome of a series should have the opportunity for input into setting the agenda for summative evaluation of that series.

2. The summative evaluation contractor(s) should be organizationally independent of the production agency, but should strive to develop evaluations that the production agency can approve of in terms of content covered, the design itself, the measurement instruments to be employed, and analyses of data to be made. USOE should have available a mechanism for third-party review to be activated as needed for consultative input, arbitration of disputes, and review/evaluation of the completed evaluation report.

3. When summative-type decisions are to be made from evaluation of pilots, it is recommended that summative evaluation procedures, rather than formative evaluation procedures, be employed to generate the evaluation data.
4. With many of the goals recently assigned to children's television being in the affective area, there is far too little known about how to measure either success or failure in the affective domain. This is not a program-specific problem, but a general one. For the benefit of the summative evaluations, as well as for the benefit of the educational community in general, USOE should fund or otherwise encourage basic research and development in the field of affective measurement.

5. Until there are measurement procedures that can be generally agreed on as being reliable and valid in the affective domain for children, summative evaluations of affective series should stress prerequisite effects, such as extensiveness of in-home voluntary exposure, in-school utilization, liking, and comprehension of the intended audience.

6. In commercial television, a major form of summative evaluation is in the ratings, or the amount of (target) audience delivered. This is no less important as a summative evaluation criterion in purposive children's television programming; it is a necessary but not sufficient condition, however, due to the additional requirement of achieving desired effects among those reached.

7. As a guide for policy in the purposive use of television, summative evaluations are no substitute for basic research that will increase our understanding of the psychological functions served by television programming.
Special Considerations for the In-School Audience

Much of the reasoning in earlier sections of this chapter applies to in-school or instructional television (ITV) as well. This final section is intended to be, where appropriate, a topical microcosm of the previous sections of the chapter, with attention being paid to different or special considerations that are brought to bear when in-school television programming is the primary objective. Two fundamental distinctions of ITV that generate a host of more specific distinctions are: (1) the organizational/sociological setting; and (2) the traditional/philosophic commitment to maintain control of formal education at the local and state level.

Needs Assessment. Audiences for in-home programming are not organized or identified with a particular institution. In contrast, the in-school audience is located within a highly structured organizational/institutional setting, and this has a bearing on needs assessment. The schools are continuously in process of conducting needs assessment and devising curriculum to meet those needs. In this systemic setting, television is only one of many components, and the schools should be involved in needs assessment for at least two reasons: (1) fear of Federal curriculum-setting is removed thereby; and (2) utilization should be higher among elements that have participated in determining the consensus of needs and the type of programming that is responsive to those needs. AIT Executive Director Edwin Cohen believes that this consensus mechanism would determine subjects that are taught to most students in most places and would be amenable to television treatment. He estimates that about ten subject areas are taught at two or three levels in elementary school, and that these common interests and needs could generate, from the grass roots level, a "national curriculum" that could be addressed effectively with in-school television programming. This
Models of Program Development. Engagement of the schools, as consumers, in the process of program development, which is the model employed by AIT, is different from the alternative models described for in-home audience programming. Although both refer to national programming, the in-home models share the feature that might be characterized as "deductive" in the sense that centralized decision-making establishes the need, the programming objectives, and the series is presumably distributed via national interconnection in some form. The AIT model might be characterized as "inductive" in the sense that the needs and objectives are determined in the field by the consumer. It "grows" to a national program only with the advice and consent of each element in the constituency. National distribution is not via national interconnection, but via utilizing the individual stations in the system.

Funding. The decentralization of decision-making in the AIT model (see the section on INSIDE/OUT in Chapter Two) is accompanied by a decentralization of funding. The same values of multiple funding that accrues, say, to CTW apply as well to multiple sponsors for in-school programming. No single state agency can dictate content or treatment to the displeasure of the other agencies in the consortium.

As for the Federal role in funding national in-school programming, there is a general resolution, which we endorse as well, that was adopted by the Council of Chief State School Officers on November 20, 1974. The resolution is as follows:

The Council of Chief State School Officers reaffirms its belief that educational television and new communications technologies offer a great potential for improving public
education and encourages active participation in efforts to develop the program. In order to realize the full benefits of educational television, it is essential that there be ready availability to and wise use of high quality programming. Such programming requires the cooperative efforts of local, state, regional and national educational leaders, and the Council members are urged to participate in national consortia and other cooperative arrangements. The Council should work for the elimination of restrictions on the use of federal funds for the cooperative development of educational television programming.

The resolution was the result of two perceived problems in current interpretations of the Educational Amendments of 1974 (Cohen, 1974/75, interviews): (1) the general problem is that by July 1, 1978, states will no longer have the right to reserve monies for state-wide activities; instead, monies will have to pass through to the local education agencies. As a practical matter, it is essentially impossible to fund quality programming at or through the local level. (2) The second problem is that the Educational Amendments of 1974, as presently interpreted, restrict the use of such monies to existing "off the shelf" materials: For in-school television, such programming is in very short supply. AIT would like a modification to allow the states to invest money in the development of programming as well. AIT, which is the only organization we visited involved in developing new series exclusively for in-school use at the national level, seeks the opportunity for in-school television programming to compete for the Federal and state dollar alongside all other learning resources. Given the high development costs and the systemic requirements of television, for television to compete the states need to be able to retain some of the money for state-wide service; the states need to be able to develop the television materials they need to address the priorities they determine; and the states need to be permitted to join in cooperative funding efforts for development of learning materials (TV or non-TV) addressed to mutual needs. Typically, at the
state and local level, only about one to two percent of the budget is allocated for all learning materials, according to Cohen, placing a severe limitation on what the states can do by themselves in the way of developing new and costly television series. They need Federal help. At the Federal level last year, about $137 million was allocated to the states for learning materials, and even a small fraction of that amount (say, 5 percent) could have a great impact on in-school television programming that could serve students all across the country.

Attempts were made in earlier sections of this chapter to illustrate program development models that would be sensitive to consumer feedback, and even outwardly accountable to the consumer by way of marketplace mechanisms. The same value system applies to in-school programming. The more specific suggestions above are neither restricted to AIT as an organization nor to television as a learning resource. Accountability is built in to the process by placing decision-making vis-à-vis the Federal dollar near the consumer. Further accountability and initiative could be encouraged by requiring the Federal dollars to come into the state and local systems on some form of a matching basis.

**Distribution.** In earlier sections of this chapter, in reference to the in-home audience, PBS was determined to be and, at least in the near term, to remain the most likely distribution system for national purposive children's programming that would involve Federal funding. The public stations that comprise PBS are also by far the predominant distribution system for in-school programming. AIT neither utilizes the national interconnection nor contacts individual stations to make broadcasting arrangements. AIT supplies programs to state or local agencies in whatever format they
specify—16 mm film, cassette, broadcast quality videotape—and the state agencies arrange their own distribution. For the most part, agencies contract with their local public stations for in-school broadcasts, and the school fees are generally considered an important part of local station revenues (see Witherspoon, 1975, commissioned paper, pp. 10-12). Dependence on broadcast television is not total, however; for example, Texas uses the 16 mm film format extensively; New York and Florida are making increasing use of cassettes.

The status of reception equipment in schools was estimated from scanty data in Chapter Two. It is clear that more receivers are needed. The larger investment for transmitting equipment, however, has in large part already been made. Cohen feels that the vast majority of learners could receive a public broadcasting, closed-circuit, or ITS signal right now and that a third of the schools use an ITV transmission at least once a week. Much of this transmission equipment was set up with Federal assistance, and with the explicit expectation that part of its use would be for ITV. At this point, there is a chicken-egg relationship between quality in-school programming and completion of the reception equipment inventory. Reasoning from the precedent of RCA's push into color programming, followed by sharply increased sales of color receivers, one would conclude that the first priority now is quality programming, which would be followed by teacher demand for the programming, which would in turn be followed by acquiring the needed reception equipment. Cohen cites experiences of teachers bringing their personal television sets into school when there is programming available that the teachers really want to use.

Evaluation. A few comments that are supplementary to the earlier and
more general section on evaluation are in order for in-school programming. ITV has the potential not only for effecting desired learning in students; it can also be a force in increasing the competencies of the classroom teacher. Institutional changes frequently come about more slowly, and may not be picked up in short-term evaluation efforts (and few evaluation efforts extend much beyond the duration of the program or series itself). As in the general case, it can be a mistake to conclude that because a change has not registered on the meter, no change has taken place.

 Unlike textbooks that are typically chosen by committee and then used until worn out, teachers typically have greater autonomy on whether or not they will use in-school programming. AIT uses an annual "ratification poll" wherein teachers vote on how they liked the particular series used, and whether they wish to continue its use. Cohen states, "You can't quibble with the teacher's general conclusion that 'I'd rather have 15 minutes in second grade health coming in via television than have the school nurse,' or the little textbooks that we might have available for free reading, or me lecturing them on how to use the toothbrush'" (Cohen, 1974, interview).

 With current limitations within the evaluation "arts and sciences," it would be unwise to close one's eyes to all effects other than those that can be measured in a rigorous design. While the pursuit of more precise and exhaustive measurements should proceed full force, the readily perceivable reactions from the marketplace must also be considered a form of evaluation data. For the in-home audience, this is ratings within desired demographic categories. For the in-school audience, this is contained in such statistics as number of utilizing schools, teachers, and pupils; and number of state agencies that "vote with their dollars" that a series is performing a useful service to education.
Concluding Comment

Events that relate significantly to the Federal role in funding children's television programming have not stood still during the course of this policy investigation, and it has been difficult to cast an analytic net over such a diverse and dynamic array of issues. It is conceivable that a policy review of the scope undertaken here could continue for a long time just on the basis of evolving events, and just directed to the limited issue of Federal funding.

Considering the limitations on the analyses we were able to cover, and the far greater number of issues we were unable to address at all, the contributions of this report may indeed be modest relative to the enormity of the task and the significance of the general area of children's television. We hope that it will be of some utility to USOE and others, however, in forging future policy and in serving as a stepping stone to more comprehensive policy studies.
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Appendix A

List of Interviewees
List of Interviewees

Ozzie Alfonso, Associate Producer and Director, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLRN, Austin, Texas

Louis Barbash, Associate Project Director, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLRN, Austin, Texas

Aida Barrera, Executive Producer and Project Director, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLRN, Austin, Texas

Rick Beatty, Coordinator, Station Program Cooperative, Public Broadcasting Service, Washington, D.C.

Cora Beebe, Planning Coordinator and Acting Director, Budget Division, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C.


Marye Benjamin, Senior Writer, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLRN, Austin, Texas

Dave Berkman, Program Officer, ESAA-TV, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C.

Douglas Bodwell, Director, Educational Activities Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Washington, D.C.


David Britt, Vice President, Corporate Development, Children's Television Workshop, New York, New York


Rene Cárdenas, Executive Director, Bilingual Children's Television, Inc., Oakland, California

Christopher Cerf, Creative Director and Executive Editor-In-Chief, Children's Television Workshop, New York, New York

Peggy Charren, President, Action for Children's Television, Newtonville, Massachusetts

Edwin G. Cohen, Executive Director, Agency for Instructional Television, Bloomington, Indiana

Barbara Coleman, Director, Service Support Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

Leroy Colquitt, Managing Director, Project One, Education Development Center, Newton, Massachusetts

David Connell, Vice President for Production, Children's Television Workshop, New York, New York
Allen R. Cooper, Director, Program Research, Public Broadcasting Service, Washington, D.C.

Bert Cowan, Communications Consultant, Institute for Public Administration, New York, New York

Bill Dale, Director of Educational Technology, Education Development Center, Newton, Massachusetts

Robert Davidson, Director of Corporate Relations and Corporate Secretary, Children's Television Workshop, New York, New York


Edward A. DeAvila, Director of Research and Educational Planning, Bilingual Children's Television, Inc., Oakland, California

Nancy Dennis, Program Officer, Public Education, Ford Foundation, New York, New York

John Dimling, Jr., Vice President and Director of Research, National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C.

Allen DuCovney, Director, Children's Programming, CBS, Inc., New York, New York


Barbara Fenhagen, Program Coordinator, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Washington, D.C.

Clarence Fogelstrom, Education Program Officer, Division of Technology and Environmental Education, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C.

Bob Fox, Associate Executive Director, Agency for Instructional Television, Bloomington, Indiana

Nick Fryman, Music Conductor/Director, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLNN, Austin, Texas

Robert L. Garrison, Producer, BIG BLUE MARBLE, Alphaventure, New York, New York

Frank Gihan, Research, BIG BLUE MARBLE, Alphaventure, New York, New York

Herman Goldberg, Associate Commissioner for Equal Educational Opportunities Programs, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C.

Raoul Gonzalez, Script Editor/Lyricist and Composer, CARRASCOLENDAS, KLNN, Austin, Texas

Hartford Gunn, Jr., President, Public Broadcasting Service, Washington, D.C.
Maureen Hatmony, Director of Publication, Action for Children's Television, Newtonville, Massachusetts

George Heinemann, Vice President, Children's Programs, National Broadcasting Company, New York, New York

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Appendix B

Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACNO</td>
<td>Advisory Council of National Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Action for Children's Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>Agency for Instructional Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>American Research Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Broadcast Advertising Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC/TV</td>
<td>Bilingual Children's Television, Inc., Oakland, California</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEEO</td>
<td>Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEH</td>
<td>Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped</td>
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<tr>
<td>BESE</td>
<td>Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLET</td>
<td>Bureau of Libraries and Educational Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSD</td>
<td>Berkeley Unified School District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSSO</td>
<td>Council of Chief State School Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Corporation for Public Broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSO</td>
<td>Chief State School Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTW</td>
<td>Children's Television Workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESR</td>
<td>Division of Elementary and Secondary Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHEW</td>
<td>Department of Health, Education, and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Education Development Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEOC</td>
<td>Equal Employment Opportunity Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAA</td>
<td>Emergency School Aid Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAQIE</td>
<td>Emergency School Aid and Quality Education Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESEA</td>
<td>Elementary and Secondary Education Act</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ETV - Educational Television, see also PTV
FCC - Federal Communications Commission
FTC - Federal Trade Commission
FY - Fiscal Year
GAO - Government Accounting Office
GPNITL - Great Plains National Instructional Television Library
HEW - Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
ITFS - Instructional Television Fixed Service
IT & T - International Telephone & Telegraph
LEA - Local Education Agency
LEAA - Law Enforcement Assistance Agency
NAB - National Association of Broadcasters
NAEB - National Association of Educational Broadcasters
NBC - National Broadcasting Company
NCERD - National Center for Educational Research and Development
NCES - National Center for Educational Statistics
NCET - National Center for Educational Technology
NDEA - National Defense Education Act
NEA - National Endowment for the Arts
NEH - National Endowment for the Humanities
NET - National Educational Television
NFAH - National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities
NIAAA - National Institute for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse
NICHD - National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
NIE - National Institute of Education
NIH - National Institute of Health
NIMH - National Institute of Mental Health
NIT – National Instructional Television Center
NVETA – Northern Virginia Educational Television Association
NSF – National Science Foundation
OASPA – Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
OCD – Office of Child Development
OE – United States Office of Education
OEO – Office of Equal Educational Opportunity
OMB – Office of Management and Budget
OMPE – Office of Management, Planning, and Evaluation
OPBE – Office of Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation
OTP – Office of Telecommunications Policy
PBS – Public Broadcasting Service
PTL – Public Television Library
PTV – Public Television
R & D – Research and Development
RFP – Request for Proposal
SEA – State Education Agency
SPC – Station Program Cooperative
TEC – THE ELECTRIC COMPANY
UHF – Ultra High Frequency
USOE – United States Office of Education
VHF – Very High Frequency
VTR – Videotape Recording