This booklet describes how a group of doctoral candidates at Harvard established the Clinical School Collaborative and how they tried to shape their ideal into a reality. The group wanted to form an organization which did a better job in teaching students, training adults, and pursuing research than existing institutions. They held discussions in which they formed their ideas, and they wrote a proposal which they submitted to approximately 350 institutions and school districts. They received a number of enthusiastic answers and began to narrow down their choices. The Portland, Oregon school district became their final choice. From the time of inception until the final choice was made, the membership of the group changed for various reasons. As group members came and went, the composition of the group altered accordingly, and became more routinized and hierarchical. A year after the idea was first conceived, four of the educators finally went to Portland to plan Adams High School which opened in September 1969. (RC)
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ASSEMBLING

Adams High School began at lunch, and pretty much by accident. In the spring of 1967, a group of us began eating our sack lunches in room 310, Longfellow Hall, Harvard University. At first it was just Gordon McIntosh and myself, but gradually we were joined by other congenial and talkative doctoral candidates—Allen Dobbins, Maurice Gibbons, Fred Geis, John Katz, and Saul Yanofsky. Most of us were involved with teacher training and were then, or were shortly to become, editors of the Harvard Educational Review.

Someone suggested that since we enjoyed each other’s company so well and maintained one of the liveliest seminars around, perhaps we should go off together to the same institution after graduating? By the late spring the jest became serious. All but Katz (who was about to get his Ed.D.) hoped to be free to leave by the summer of 1968. We were aware of the latest attempts at educational change, federal money was enticingly available, and the teacher shortage still nourished a boom within schools of education. With our school and university experiences, faith in collegial decision making, and some Harvard charisma, why not apply for employment as a team?

Each of us had critical views about public schools, schools of education, and educational research institutions. We wanted to put together an organization which did a better job in teaching students, training adults, and pursuing research, but at that time we really did not have much interest in actually running a school.

The only existing document from that era is a letter, written by McIntosh, to Marion Jenkinson of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. (Both McIntosh and Gibbons were Cana-
dians, and Katz was shortly to join O.I.S.E., a newly organized, well-heeled, and seemingly innovative institution.) The letter outlined a teacher preparation and research group based upon McIntosh's teaching hospital model. McIntosh was engrossed in a study of physician training at Massachusetts General Hospital and the analytical model he developed seemed to make sense to all of us. It became one of the cornerstones of our thinking. Ms. Jenkinson, however, was not encouraging in her reply. But it was a beginning. We broke for the summer with the vow that we would get together in September and think some more about how to get the clinical school off the ground.

In September of 1967, we reconvened, with Katz now gone, but with an addition to the group. The recruit was Robert Schwartz, who added a new, significant ingredient, he was training to be an administrator and was very eager that we actually run a public school. Bob was persuasive, and since he had the desire to take on the onerous tasks of administrating, this would leave the rest of us free to train adults, develop curriculum, and carry out research. It was a deal!

The seven who played the key roles throughout that crucial fall and winter were now all on board. Dobbins, a Californian, was in social science education, taught part-time in the exurban Concord-Carlisle Regional High School, and supervised interns. Geis, a Chicagoan, was in science education, taught at Leslie College, supervised interns, and was an editor of the Harvard Educational Review. Gibbons, from British Columbia, was in English education, supervised interns, worked in an experimental curriculum project in the suburban Braintree schools. McIntosh, from Saskatchewan, was in a research program, spent much of his time at Massachusetts General Hospital. Schwartz, a Bostonian, was in the Administrative Careers Program, a researcher with Moynahan's urban study group. Yanofsky, another Bostonian, was in social science education, a researcher of student attitudes. I was a third Bostonian, in curriculum and supervision, a bureaucrat in Harvard's teacher education program. We ranged in age from twenty-seven to thirty-seven and were all middle class, married, male, white, and suburban oriented. We were also energetic, ambitious, articulate, and, by and large, impatient to have power.
"The Group" held lunch meetings twice weekly, in room 310, augmented by other sessions when needed. On many occasions, these sessions began spontaneously, as Gibbons recalled later.

I remember meeting (McIntosh) in a hallway of Longfellow Hall at 5:00 P.M. Others joined us for a while and left—colleagues... faculty, and others. We broke up when we heard the Radcliffe Bell toll four times! It began as the Freedom and Discipline Debate (based on problems we were experiencing in our field work) and ended as exploration of the Discipline of Freedom. The exchange of ideas about operational tasks was the exciting reality element that made it so superior to other academic, solely theoretical discussions. This, it seems to me, was the main element we sought to preserve in our professional lives—an intellectual support system for practical, experimental operations.

Our activities, as Gibbons pointed out, attracted others as well. At our scheduled meetings it was common to have a group as large as fifteen, and to include M.A.T. candidates, doctoral candidates, faculty members, and outside guests, although we seven clearly controlled the agenda.

By late September, we had named ourselves the Clinical School Collaborative, had stationary printed with our names listed alphabetically, and took very seriously the fact that we were an egalitarian, non-hierarchical group, and operated with a rotating chairman for meetings. There was some good natured ribbing when Schwartz slipped into the head-of-the-table spot, we were too recently teachers to allow any kind of "principal" takeover!

Early in October we made a second attempt to hook a school of education when McIntosh wrote a letter to another Canadian University. It was very much the same as his earlier letter to O.I.S.E., but now the teaching of students was listed as our "most important" goal, along with training and research. Schwartz's impact on our thinking had been clearly felt.
By the first week in October, our overall plan was drawn; first make decisions about the conceptual model, then assign writing chores among the seven to produce a written proposal. We would then send this document to as many people as possible. Next we would winnow down the interested parties, and select a site. It sounds all too simple, but this is almost what actually happened.

The first stage, making decisions about the conceptual model, was an extremely complicated one. The more we talked, the more obvious it became that we had many differences of opinion about what kind of group we were and what kind of an organization we wanted to create. In retrospect, there appear to have been four key issues:

To what extent were we a reflective seminar, and to what extent an action group? McIntosh was perhaps the strongest advocate of working things out thoroughly before we disseminated our plan. Schwartz was the strongest exponent of influencing the key decision makers as rapidly as possible. The rest of us alternated between these reflective and action poles. (As it turned out, we found that “inquiry” seemed always to take a back seat to the demands of immediate, live problems. Actually we never did quite catch up to our inquiry model, either in Cambridge or in Portland.)

Should we initially secure a university base and later find a school, or should we first find a school base and later link up with a university? We realized that it was highly unlikely that we could simultaneously be assured of linkups to both worlds, and we were afraid that our primary connection would make the secondary one harder to achieve. This debate saw no resolution in the fall, and in fact, when we did have our showdown between two sites, one was a public school and the other was a university.
Should we aim for a small school with perhaps 100 students, or should we aim for a large, comprehensive school? Yanofsky argued for a small school in which variables could be tested with precision and assurance. Schwartz spoke for an organization which, as much as possible, resembled other schools in terms of complexity, such that any of our successes would have to be acknowledged. To him, size was highly correlated with our ability to persuade others that our notions were legitimate. (In 1968, the alternative school movement had not surfaced.) To Gibbons, size was highly correlated with our ability to renew and inquire:

"The spine of our structure was the principle of development. That change would be continuous because we would be continuously evaluating the effectiveness of our programs and improving them with carefully designed interventions in the ongoing operation, and we would periodically stop the whole schooling process, redesign it in light of our experience and begin again. That was the crucial issue behind the numbers debate—not that we couldn't run a school of more than 300, but that we would lose flexibility to be truly developmental."

Should we begin small, and gradually build up to our optimal size, or should we attempt to begin at near capacity in terms of programs and people? The predominant feeling was that we would probably have to start out big, as no school district or university would allow us the luxury of a long start-up period.

At this stage there were four discernible thrusts within our thinking, on which each of us had a slightly different priority. These thrusts were: (1) decentralization of power and responsibility within a school, (2) curricular and instructional reform, (3) training and research reform, and (4) "humanizing" the student and adult relationships within a school. While we each undoubtedly had a commitment to all four thrusts, Schwartz clearly felt closest to decentralization, Gibbons, Geis, and Dobbins to curriculum; McIntosh and I to training and research, and Yanofsky to "humanizing."

The writing tasks were divided up roughly according to our main concerns and areas of expertise. McIntosh and Schwartz the overall organization, Schwartz on community involvement, Dobbins and I on training, Geis on research, and Yanofsky and Gibbons on the curriculum for students.

On October 9, 1967, Schwartz presented to the seminar his section on the community. The ensuing debate was hot and
heavy. Schwartz had been in New York City the preceding summer, working as a liaison between Mayor Lindsay’s office and the school board. He was enthusiastic about decentralization and community schools. Many of us were not. I questioned whether the teaching hospital model was compatible with a community-centered school. Yanofsky feared that the community might decide not to allow innovation, he suggested that a good public relations program was all that was necessary. Schwartz conceded that it would be difficult, as outsiders coming into a district, to set up a viable community relationship anyway. Our goal, according to Schwartz, should be to set up the nearest thing possible to a community school. The next day Geis presented a three-page commentary upon Schwartz’s community section, which concentrated upon his concern about community power within the school. Geis concluded:

At the time, I feel that we are all likely to approach a community more openly and less defensively if we don’t feel our backs are against the wall. Bob (Schwartz) would probably thrive on any faculty-community interaction, but most of us are not oriented that way, and so it would be inadvisable to take on that hornet’s nest of problems until we feel we have some control over all of the other problems which will confront us.

The following week Dobbins and I reported on personnel training. We raised and attempted to answer many questions, and we laid out a training scheme which bore heavy resemblance to the teaching hospital structure which McIntosh had staked out. We were concerned that training, research, and instruction might conflict but avowed that these functions could be arranged to be mutually supportive. We suggested that our best form of generalizability would be in the form of better trained adults who would move into other schools. Parallel with our notions of teaching students, training would be tailored individually to each adult, with the greatest possible choice of experiences and the least reliance upon courses and credit-hours. We also referred to Gibbons’ and Yanofsky’s paper on curriculum (unfortunately it has not survived) and mentioned that two sub-schools would exist, one with “traditional content areas,” the other with “less rigidly delineated ‘areas’, i.e., humanities, sciences, and ‘technik’.” We forecasted that a wide variety of people might well be trained
within a clinical school, but that the "training of teachers would be dominant." We concluded with a startling chart, in three colors, showing a fanciful organization of the school, with "Administrative Services" on the lowest level. There is neither record nor recollection of the reactions of the group to this paper. It said as much about the rest of the school as it did about training. However, its final edited version within the completed proposal was considerably shorter, a fact which made Dobbins and myself a bit uncomfortable.

On October 20, 1967, Fred Geis submitted and discussed a three-page section on research in the clinical school. He suggested that there should be two quite different kinds of research, (1) "evaluation of on-going programs and curriculum projects" and (2) "broad scale research into the nature and interrelations in the educational process." Geis affirmed within the ensuing discussion that neither of these modes was really "basic" research, but they were two kinds of developmental processes. Fred also suggested that each of the clinical professors should be required to carry out research. This notion was challenged. A stronger prevailing thought was that all adults should teach children within the school and that research should be optional. This goal, while weaker than Geis' goal, was more ambitious than Conant's, namely, that clinical professors should do nothing but teach and should not be expected to contribute to new knowledge. McIntosh contrasted Conant with Schaefer, who had just published a book which was to influence our thinking about the clinical school. Schaefer envisioned a school where knowledge was generated as well as transmitted.

Early drafts of the curriculum and the overall organization papers no longer exist, but one can safely conclude that these weeks in October were extremely prolific ones. While we each had our jobs, our studies, our dissertations, and our families, an enormous amount of time went into thinking, writing, and reacting to these sections.

A rough draft of the proposal was completed by the beginning of the last week in October. On Friday, October 27, we met to go over this draft. We were joined by Dean Sizer and Maurice Belanger, another member of the faculty. They had each read the draft, and reacted, according to the anonymous chronicler of the
day, "basically negative." At this stage, however, we had curtailed our reflective seminar, and were now an impatient, action group. We thanked Sizer and Belanger, and edited a final draft, only mildly different from the one with which they were uneasy. The show had to get on the road.

The finished proposal turned out to be eighteen pages long and was dated October 30, 1967. Our first run was about 100 copies, but the stencils were accidentally thrown away. Therefore we had to commission a second typing—with no editorial changes—which is dated November 20, 1967. Altogether something like 350 copies of this fall draft were run off and disseminated.

Six years later this proposal reads well, even if close scrutiny could unearth stylistic and substantive gaps. McIntosh and Schwartz, the principal editors and organizers within the group, managed to put together a slick but creditable paper. The introduction spelled out who we were, our teaching hospital model, the institutional linkups, the primary aim of producing better instruction for adolescents, and also the secondary aims of training and research innovation. Four pages described the "inquiry" environment, with some operational examples. The community section showed the effects of our debates, it was a relatively mild statement, emphasizing the possibilities of students "learning outside the walls and adults coming in to learn and to be teachers. It entirely begged the question of community power and control. Consensus writing, just like consensus decision making, has its drawbacks.

The curriculum was divided into three interdisciplinary areas, sciences, humanities, and technical fields (the bizarre "technik" has softened a bit!). There was no mention of the two sub-schools, one radical and one conventional, the conventional curriculum was removed because we did not want to endorse any curriculum design we felt was outdated, and because we were wary of the tension between conventional and radical instructional techniques within one school. Our rule of thumb was that a "school within a school" would not work, particularly if the school and sub-school had divergent values. Four kinds of courses were outlined, new instructional strategies and great latitude of student choice were emphasized, and an adult to student ratio of one to five was bandied about.
The training and research sections bore heavy resemblance to the earlier papers. Instruction, training, and research were given major emphasis, while administration and guidance were allotted secondary roles. (Administration was soft pedaled, as noted earlier, due to our prejudice against administrators. Guidance was given a minor role, perhaps as a result of parallel feelings, perhaps because there was no strong counseling advocate among us at that time. We were essentially teachers planning a utopia for teachers and kids.)

The organizational scheme was reserved for last, and the others resisted my desire to include a fancy chart. Structural informality was highlighted with a hope that we could invent an alternative to conventional bureaucracy. Governance was clearly in the hands of the senior, clinical faculty (meaning us), and the director would be “on a par” with the other senior faculty, more like a “graduate school than a typical high school.” There is absolutely no mention of how junior faculty, paraprofessionals, students, parents, or other community members were to take part in decision making. It was a clear victory for McIntosh and his medical model over Schwartz and his political model. Or perhaps it was simply a desire on the part of would-be colonialists to keep out the natives.

Upon completion we sent the proposal off to all the people we could think of in schools, universities, and government. We put together a master list of the most fruitful recipients, and if any one of us knew a key individual, that person would write the accompanying letter. Dean Sizer, despite his concerns about our writing, wrote short but glowing letters to accompany the proposal to a number of highly placed superintendents, university deans, and foundation people. We had gained semiofficial endorsement from Harvard University, and it undoubtedly did us more harm than good. In the short run our attachment to Harvard was priceless, in the longer run it all but killed us.

We hardly had a chance to rest up from our ideological and writing stages, when we began visiting prospective sites and entering into the “heavy sell” stage of our effort. As our anonymous secretary stated on October 30:

Leaving the heady realm of the abstract and theoretical, today’s meeting plumbed the depths of the practical and mundane. Either
six, seven, or eight of us will be going down to New York, leaving from Parker's at 7:00 P.M. Thursday.

The same notes mention such other gut issues as how much money we hoped to make (between $12,000 and $15,000 per eleven-month year) and some thoughts about individual versus collective publishing policies. We were enthusiastic and optimistic about succeeding, and we could afford to worry about some peripheral details.
REATIONS TO THE PROPOSAL

Over the final two months of 1967, we received a very wide set of reactions to our proposal. I could identify four rough categories:

—Polite, but uninterested.
—Positive and interested, but only from an analytical or scholarly point of view.
—Negative and uninterested.
—Interested, positive, and in positions of power or access to power. Paydirt!

Remarkable within the second group were comments from Robert Clipner, an old friend of Yanofsky's, and ex-Harvard graduate student. In general he found the proposal parochial, inconsistent, over generalized, and filled with jargon. He admonished Yanofsky.

Do one thing and do it well. After grad school everyone seems to want to run around doing big deals, starting new schools, and assessing the state of education nationally. What is wrong with doing a small thing deeply and thoroughly?

Certainly the highlight within the third group was an answer from our near neighbor, William H. Ohrenberger, superintendent of the Boston schools. In a four-page letter he could barely contain his outrage. Ohrenberger doubted whether “able young doctoral students” could make any dent in “multi-faceted urban school problems.” He attacked the teaching hospital model as “fallacious,” suggested that the only miracles these days were “in Science, not in Education,” and concluded with:

It is my considered judgment that no great city in America would
accept the Harvard proposal as it now exists, and this statement answers your inquiry: “Is there room for it in Boston?”

Ohrenberger’s comments both amused and irritated us. At that time Dean Sizer and Harvard were trying very hard to improve relationships with the Boston schools. The dean hoped that our school might be one way to do it. Ohrenberger just did not see it that way.

Fortunately we did get a number of enthusiastic answers within the fourth category, among them Teachers’ College, Columbia, the University of Massachusetts, the Berkeley schools, the Philadelphia schools, and the Portland, Oregon schools.
GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS

In November and December we carried out heavy planning and negotiating sessions, including letters, phone calls, and visits to most of these prospective sites. Early in November we bounced down to New York City in a VW microbus, spent the day talking to Schaefer, Cremin, and others at Columbia University, and also visited the central office staff in White Plains. Joe Grannis, newly arrived as a division director at Columbia, and until recently at Harvard, did a fine job of escorting and encouraging us. With Cremin’s interest in progressive education, our ideological debt to Schaefer, and the echoes of Dewey and the lab schools still audible, Columbia would have been a very hospitable home. Unfortunately we were unimpressed with what White Plains presented us, and we felt we just could not hack it in Harlem. To cap it all, our families had unanimous, negative feelings about living in or around New York City. We quickly crossed Columbia off our list.

Until Christmas, Philadelphia appeared to be our best bet. It was urban, but not nearly so depressing as New York City. It had a young, energetic superintendent in Mark Shedd, and we had a number of good contacts well up in the district, as well as in the newly formed Pennsylvania Advancement School. In mid-December we all flew down to spend the day in Philadelphia, at their expense, visiting schools, and talking with central office staff, including Shedd.

Shedd’s behavior with us was extremely forthright. He laid out the strengths and weaknesses of our proposals as he saw them, described other school-university projects that he hoped to
develop, and explained what kind of school he had in mind for us. He stated that many of the innovative projects then underway were located in the Germantown section of the city, which was well integrated and contained a strong middle-class component (blacks as well as whites). His main concern was not to overload Germantown to the point of being accused of favoritism, therefore, he wanted us to have a look at South Philadelphia High School, scene of recent racial difficulties, for there was to be a new high school in that section of the city that might be appropriate for a clinical facility. At that point one of us asked about the social-class composition of South Philadelphia, adding that we felt we would have the greatest chance for success—given our own backgrounds and the complex nature of our project—in a predominantly middle-class school. Shedd exploded. If we wanted a middle-class school we should not waste his time. He had limited resources and he would be damned if he would squander them on a project with kids who were going to succeed anyway. The city's problem was what to do about the education of poor kids, especially blacks, and unless we were going to work on that problem, he wanted no part of us. Later that day we toured South Philadelphia High School, which was literally surrounded by policemen. We were aghast. Yanofsky stayed an extra day to visit the Pennsylvania Advancement School where he eventually took a position. We never did get any official response from Philadelphia. The associate superintendent was going to write us a follow-up letter which never came. The City of Brotherly Love did not seem to be it either!

Dwight Allen had been named dean of the school of education of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, just before Christmas. Dwight hoped to come into the sleepy town and turn the school upside down. He was a man of great vision, power, persuasiveness, and charisma. He was hell bent on turning the virtually unknown University of Massachusetts into one of the nation's top professional schools overnight. He wanted to inundate the old faculty with a series of powerful appointments, including more than a few from his previous school, Stanford. His major criterion in recruiting appeared to be the promise of high visibility. We guessed that Allen's interest in us was primarily based upon, how much our project could bring his school recognition,
and only secondarily from any belief in the intrinsic value of our ideas. This was fine as far as we were concerned, we felt with our numbers intact we could take care of ourselves within Allen’s burgeoning empire. Negotiations began in early December, and continued by telephone and microbus over the next two months.

While a microbus (both Gibbons and Geis owned them) could take care of us very well for the east coast negotiation, we were frustrated in trying to capitalize on the interest shown us in Berkeley (the preferred locale for many in the group) and Portland. Fortunately Schwartz’s wife came from California, and they planned to take the family back for Christmas. This excursion allowed him to visit both Berkeley and Portland in a whirlwind tour.

The group, incidentally, was still very egalitarian, but subtle changes were taking place in our relationships. In one sense we had begun as a kind of subcommittee of the Harvard Educational Review, of which McIntosh was editorial chairman. Through the proposal writing phase we acted in a consensus fashion, but with McIntosh and Schwartz with clear but unspoken editorial leadership. When we moved into heavy negotiations, Schwartz emerged a bit further, he was without a doubt our most effective agent. As we groped our way from brainstorming to actual operation, hierarchy and role differentiation were crystallizing.

With considerable correspondence as groundwork, Schwartz visited not only the Berkeley schools, but the University of California, Berkeley, the Far West Lab, and the San Francisco Unified School District, all on December 20 and 21. Neil Sullivan, the Berkeley superintendent, was heavily into desegregation plans, but less pressured than Shedd. Sullivan appeared to show interest, and turned the negotiation over to his staff members. The school of education within the university also saw merit in our proposal, and before Schwartz left, there was talk of joint appointments between the schools and the university to cover all of us.

Portland was the sleeper. We had made contact back in November, when I wrote Jim Wallace, director of Reed’s M.A.T. program. Jim was in his second year at Reed, having finished his doctorate at Harvard in 1966. Wallace was excited by the proposal, and, as luck would have it, was on very good terms with Mel Barnes, the superintendent of Portland’s schools. In our
telephone and letter communication before Schwartz arrived in Portland, two different sites, both large comprehensive high schools, were mentioned. One was an existing heavily black school, which was having major racial unrest, while the other was a brand new school, still under construction. With our desire to build our own staff, eagerness for a modern plant, and our New York and Philadelphia experiences in mind, we already had a strong preference for the new building, should anything work out. Schwartz flew into Portland in the late morning of December 22, was met by Jim Wallace, and whisked off to see Mel Barnes and other administrators, board members, and key executives of the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. He took off at 5:30 in the afternoon for San Diego.

On Saturday morning, December 23, the eastern six sat in the offices of the Harvard Educational Review, expectantly awaiting Schwartz’s promised call. To our surprise, he was much more optimistic about Portland than he was about Berkeley. Schwartz was impressed with Barnes and his power position within Portland and also with the possibility of Reed College becoming a partner in the venture. Bob had visited the school site and noted that it was scheduled to open in either January or September of 1969, which was very good timing for us. While the Bay Area was appealing, the number of positive factors in Portland put it well ahead of Berkeley as 1967 ended.

When Schwartz returned from the west, we had a lengthy discussion about the merits of Berkeley, University of Massachusetts, and the rapidly escalating possibility of Portland. It was still too early to call the question, but the pressure to come to a decision was high. McIntosh had been offered an instructional and administrative position at Harvard, and they wanted an answer by the end of January. Most of us also had individual nibbles, but we were still committed to staying together as a group as long as possible.

Portland had the makings of an ideal site, although a number of questions had yet to be answered. The new building, multi-racial student body, strong and favorable superintendent, and a friend at Reed, were all encouraging factors. The size of the building (capacity 2,200) was sobering, and we still had to be convinced that Portland could afford to pick up all our salaries...
and that the local colleges and universities could be enthused. Reed, while prestigious, had only a small education department, and Portland State College, the major public higher education institution in the area, was a question mark.

In an undated note, probably written in January, Schwartz recorded a summary of telephone conversations with Barnes. The number of students the first year, the opening date, and the possibility of affecting the architecture were mentioned. Two major concerns were Schwartz's eagerness that we report directly to Barnes (doubtful) and the likelihood of our controlling recruitment of teachers (good chance). The note also alluded to discussions with Portland State College's dean of education, David Willis. Willis was heading up a planning team for a new federal program to prepare the trainers of teacher trainers (TTT). It was designed to be a consortium including Portland State College, the Portland School District, Reed, Lewis and Clark College, and the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. TTT appeared to be a natural for us, particularly since McIntosh and I had been involved in Harvard's version. As negotiations progressed, Willis remained suspicious of both Jim Wallace, our main agent, and of our proposal. Apparently Willis feared a power and money grab, and his fears were undoubtedly well founded. By the end of January, the TTT planning consortium seemed to dissolve, and Portland State emerged as the sole decision maker on the final proposal, which was subsequently funded.

If Wallace was unable to get us a strong position within TTT, he was successful in giving us a number of leads on foundation money, and also paid for two air tickets to Portland for members of the group. With Reed's help, Gibbons and McIntosh flew to Portland for two days, January 15 and 16, 1968. There were a number of reasons why Gibbons and McIntosh were elected to go on this second negotiation trip, not the least of which were feelings by the rest of us that these two individuals had the strongest competing job possibilities to our collective efforts. Both were Canadian—with possible immigration problems—and both had substantial reputations before coming to Harvard. With luck, they would be turned on to Portland, as well as to enhance our bargaining position.

Gibbons and McIntosh met many district administrators as
well as those at Reed, and Lewis and Clark, colleges. They were unable to meet with Dean Willis of Portland State. Before leaving Portland, they telephoned an enthusiastic message home and wrote a memorandum of understanding to Barnes. Within this memo they outlined the following points:

1. Portland’s board of education would support hiring all seven of us, even though funds were short.
2. If all went well, Portland would pick up two salaries and a foundation would pick up the other five, and all seven of us would be free to plan full time for the opening of school.
3. If foundation money were lacking, Portland would provide all of our salaries, but five of us would have to work primarily on existing projects, and only subsidiarily with the two full-time people planning the clinical school.
4. Carnegie Foundation appeared to be the best bet for private money, and TTT was a prime prospect for federal support.
5. Reed might buy out one-third of two people to help within its M.A.T. program.

My notes on their telephone call state that Barnes’ guess was that the school could open with either 300 students (if it contained only ninth graders) or 600 students (if it contained ninth and tenth graders). Maximum student enrollment was to be 1,600, which would be progressively achieved by 1974.

In an undated note, which was probably written after McIntosh’s and Gibbons’ return, Yanofsky expressed concern about the way in which joint appointments with colleges and universities in Portland would compete for our time, about being just one of many high schools in Portland, and about the legal and administrative structure of the school. He was uneasy about getting “bogged down in problems of certification, salary schedules, teachers’ unions, administrative pressures,” and he suggested that should we elect to come to Portland we demand a very slow induction, “one-half to one year for planning, 100 kids the 2nd year; 250 kids the third year. . . .” Yanofsky made an argument for an alternative school, drawing students not just from one neighborhood, and that we be as separate as possible from the district.

On January 18, Schwartz wrote Barnes that we were very near to making a decision about our site, and that it would undoubt-
edly happen by January 24, (a prediction which was early by three weeks). The next day he wrote Rodheaver, our contact in Berkeley, suggesting that we were nearing our decision, and asking for more specific commitments. On January 26, Rodheaver wrote back that integration plans and financial constraints made further negotiations unprofitable at that time. Fortunately on that same date, Barnes wrote a very encouraging letter. He noted that the board of education had agreed to create an innovative school and had instructed Barnes to negotiate an agreement with the Clinical School Collaborative to plan it. The board also decided to delay the opening of what had now officially been designated John Adams High School until September, 1969, a useful gain in time. Barnes also referred to a meeting he had had with the thirteen high school principals who "had some concerns and made some constructive suggestions." In a follow-up letter of February 1, Barnes included a mild but prophetic caution about our capability of generating the kind of curriculum we had outlined:

As I contemplate problems of creating curriculum, I do not see how you could prepare, even in a year, whole new sets and sequences of curricular experiences for the Adams students. I believe you would want a basic program to tie to and create modifications as fast as a staff and students could invent them and put them to use. I am thinking, as you are, of numbers. We will be obliged to transfer approximately 900 students to Adams the first year.

The comment about 900 students was a bit of a shock to those of us who wanted to start small, and was markedly higher than the guess that McIntosh and Gibbons had been given just two weeks previous. It was apparent that within the time period it was decided that Adams had to open up with three grades rather than two.

Also within the first week of February, Jim Wallace of Reed College reported that he had been able to secure $2,000 from the New World Foundation to help pay for flying members of the Clinical School Collaborative to Portland to negotiate an agreement. This was a major breakthrough, and could enable all of the members of the planning team to visit Portland.

While January was a time of heavy communication with Port-
land, a similar amount of activity was taking place with Dwight Allen and the University of Massachusetts. Although the flight money improved the odds for Portland, it was still far easier to pop into a VW bus and roll over to Amherst to chat. Among the seven there was developing a strong Portland contingent, a strong University of Massachusetts contingent, and some undecideds.

On February 12, Schwartz wrote John Deady, the superintendent of schools in Springfield, Massachusetts, (the largest metropolitan district in western Massachusetts and an hour's drive from Amherst). He predicted that the group would, in fact, go to U.-Mass., and that the decision would fall "within the week." Schwartz leaned to Portland, but wanted to have as strong a fall-back position in Massachusetts as possible. He mentioned that nearly all members of the group had visited U.-Mass. on February 9, to make final arrangements for an agreement, which, similar to the Portland contingency, would guarantee all seven jobs, with half time to develop the clinical model and half time on other U.-Mass. projects. More than anyone else in the group, Schwartz saw himself a "school district" man, and he was curious to see if Deady would buy his other half time. Deady said "no" in a return letter three days later.

In the second week of February, Dobbins and I planned to fly out to Portland to become acquainted with the town and negotiate further. Dobbins, the Californian, had in the past visited and liked Portland. At this point I was strongly in favor of U.-Mass., mostly because I preferred to stay in Massachusetts. Unfortunately, my six-month old son became quite ill, so Geis went along with Dobbins instead. Geis was as staunchly pro-Portland as Dobbins.

While in Portland for three days, Geis and Dobbins made the rounds of the district and universities. Once again Dean Willis, the key man at Portland State, was out of town. In fact, he was on a train heading to Chicago to attend the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education convention with his wife and daughter. Dobbins telephoned this information back to me and, since my son's condition had improved, I flew February 13 to Chicago, while Dobbins flew there the same afternoon from Portland. As luck would have it, we traced the dean to the
Conrad Hilton Hotel and carried out a lengthy conversation in Harvard’s suite on the twenty-fifth floor. Willis, we found, had been wary of our capabilities as a group, our philosophical rigidity, and our acquisitiveness of TTT money. After two hours of rapping, Willis warmed up enough to offer his institution’s cooperation in gaining foundation money, and also a quarter time appointment for both Dobbins and myself at Portland State College for the coming year. Both Dobbins and I rejoiced at being able to communicate at long last with Willis, and to gain cooperation. For my part, a college appointment was as crucial as a school appointment was to Schwartz.

Later that evening Willis attended the Florence Stratemeyer lecture at the AACTE convention, given by the most promising doctoral candidate in teacher education each year. In 1968 the recipient was Gordon McIntosh, and his topic was the implications of the teaching hospital for preparing teachers.
SHOWDOWN

On Friday night, February 16, "the" debate was scheduled. McIntosh, Dobbins, and I had all returned from Chicago. Harvard was impatient for an answer from McIntosh. Other irons were in the fire, and Portland and the University of Massachusetts beckoned. About six o'clock on a cold evening, all seven trudged over to Cronin's cafe on Mt. Auburn Street.

To some the debate was a geographical and ideological contest between the two sites. To others the site we chose was less important than our commitment to stay together as a group. On yet another level, the subsurface tension between our leading theoretician and scholar, McIntosh, and our leading politician and administrator, Schwartz, was bound to arise. On the Harvard Educational Review McIntosh was dominant. In this quasi subcommittee of the Review, Schwartz quite clearly wanted primacy.

As the discussion opened up, the lineup was Geis, Dobbins, and Schwartz strongly in favor of Portland. McIntosh, Yanofsky, and I just as emphatically were for U.-Mass. Gibbons, though leaning toward Portland, made the plea for solidarity. We had stayed together as a group for six months, and we should, in Gibbons' view, maintain the collaborative above all. (The fact was that we had never really talked, about whether the decision depended upon unanimous vote, majority vote, or simply a sufficiently large enough subgroup interested in one site to make it worthwhile. I am certain that neither Portland nor U.-Mass. were very clear on our procedures either.)

By 9:30 P.M. we had much discussion of, but little movement from, the early positions. We left Cronin's and walked back to
Longfellow Hall, and our old conference room, 310. Schwartz took the head of the table position, and continued the "discussion leader" role he had played at Cronin's. McIntosh had been, and continued to be, far less vocal than I would have predicted.

Everyone knew I had to leave by ten. My wife and children were flying to Europe early the next day, and I wanted to be with them. It was frustrating to both the group and myself. In leaving I announced that McIntosh could exert my proxy in all further votes. I did this for a number of reasons. I felt both personally and philosophically closer to Gordon than to any other member of the group, I was afraid that a job in Canada he had just been offered, and which his family strongly preferred, was swaying him; finally, I could live with the idea of Portland well enough, but did not want to undercut the minority desiring U.-Mass. by swinging my vote westward before leaving. To me group solidarity was important also.

As I reconstruct events after my departure, Schwartz was a bit ruffled by my proxy. It underscored the leadership rivalry, and fell outside his predicted gameplan. Yanofsky reiterated his arguments in favor of U.-Mass. and stated even more emphatically that he could not go to Portland with its inappropriate size for experimental purposes. (Saul was probably the least geographically oriented, but the "purest" ideologically.) At about this time, Gibbons began to lose faith in our ability to remain a group. By many reports he "turned ashen," and announced his withdrawal from the group. Tension and confusion were very high. McIntosh then declared that he would have to defer his own judgment until the next day.

That long night ended with the three original Portland advocates—Geis, Dobbins, and Schwartz—unmoved, Gibbons had withdrawn entirely, and the U.-Mass. subgroup was in disarray. The only way a solid majority could have gone to any one site would have happened if McIntosh, pulling along my proxy, had voted for Portland.

On Saturday evening, February 17, McIntosh decided to leave the group and accept the Canadian offer. With this the group disbanded. All the efforts to design a clinical school appeared to be for nought.
On Sunday morning, however, a series of telephone calls outlined the possibility of a regrouping. Schwartz was going to drive down to Atlantic City that morning for the administrators' convention, and he was going to talk to Barnes. Schwartz and Barnes had already talked of the possibility of Bob's coming out to be principal of Adams even if the clinical group had voted not to go to Oregon. While Bob was never very comfortable with the egalitarian nature of our group, he was not particularly eager, on the other hand, to plan an innovative school essentially by himself. Dobbins and Geis—the two Portlanders from the outset—convinced me that it was better to build from a four-man operation in Portland, rather than to have no clinical effort at all. It was equally clear to the three of us that the group had gone about as far as it could go with a one man, one vote system. We acknowledged that a group of four, (augmented, perhaps by other interested Harvards) would have to have Schwartz as leader. We had realigned ourselves in a far more accountable, if less experimental fashion.

Thus, Schwartz went down to Atlantic City to bring Barnes a radically altered package. The group was smaller, less egalitarian, and more hierarchical. Barnes seemed pleased to have at least four still in the group, and was willing to continue negotiations. The fact that Schwartz had clearly emerged as leader must not only have appealed to his sense of administrative propriety, but also would make communication much less fuzzy.
THOUGHTS ABOUT GROUP DECISION-MAKING

The first phase of the project ended, and a second began: Our transition from equality to hierarchy had been slow and painful, but probably inevitable. My feeling is that the nature of the group and our rules of operation were appropriate for a brainstorming, heuristic, developmental stage. Once we finalized upon a concrete possibility, then a "one-man-one-vote" system could no longer work. It was a difficult mode for everyday functioning, and it was incomprehensible to those with whom we worked and negotiated. As the tasks became more concrete and routine, we desperately needed a more clearly visible and accountable structure for handling day-by-day decisions. Or perhaps it was not this at all; perhaps we escaped into hierarchy and away from a true "collaborative" because we really did not have faith in our ability to set up an inquiring, nonbureaucratic organization.

Another way of assessing our group's nature and future at the beginning of March is to review the key issues with which I suggested we were grappling in the early fall, in light of the loss of Gibbons, McIntosh, and Yanofsky.

Reflective seminar, or action group? As suggested above, the implications of our locking into Portland put even greater priority upon day-to-day decisions and made it tougher to be inquiry oriented. On personal terms, the loss of McIntosh, our chief theoretician, underscored this tendency. In the spring of 1968, we were still graduate students, holders of jobs, and family men—selective opportunities had to be severely limited.

University or school district based? Our prediction had been that whatever our primary attachment, the secondary one would be difficult to cement. With a school district as a base, we were
assured of adequate public funding for the plant and staff, and
direct access to modifying instruction. The other implication of
this decision would be the rough road we expected to have to
follow to get financial support for training and research. From
the outset, we never asked nor expected that the public schools
could heavily subsidize these activities. We would have to win
heavy support from the universities, the federal government,
and the private foundations to maintain these causes. The oral
agreement from Dean Willis of Portland State that Dobbins and I
would be offered part-time appointments was a very important
factor. Without this assurance, I would never have joined the re-
grouping around Schwartz to go to Portland.

Beginning small and staying small, versus beginning on a large
scale. Clearly John Adams, with a five million dollar plant and 900
students, could not be construed as a small scale effort. Yanofsky's
hopes were dashed, we were operating on Schwartz's wager that
maximum impact was going to be the result of rapid program de-
velopment.

Priority of goals. Some goal shifts have already been noted,
but quite clearly the probabilities of goal fulfillment had been sub-
stantially altered:
—humanizing the student and adult relationships within the
school, argued most strongly by Yanofsky, was to be dimin-
ished in importance
—curricular and instructional reform, promoted most expertly
by Gibbons, was of somewhat lesser probability now
—training and research reform had seen a great loss with
McIntosh's departure
—decentralization of power and responsibility, Schwartz's major
concern, was heightened in likelihood, due to the weakening
of the other three thrusts, and as a consequence of the in-
crease in his power position.

Thus, in March of 1968, we were playing quite a different ball game.
Our group membership and internal structure were markedly
altered, the two oldest and most experienced educators (along
with the youngest and least experienced educator) had departed.
The remaining four of us, as a group, were less colorful, less
creative, but at the same time more efficiently ordered for work.
At this point we were far from certain that we ever would get to
Portland. An enormous amount of detail negotiation had yet
to begin, but the residual four were still enthusiastic and optimis-
mistic about pulling the whole thing off.
NAILING IT DOWN

The major spring issues were bringing our planning group up to full strength once again, finding outside money, refining our curricular notions, and, in general, adapting the fall proposal to the Portland reality. All of these tasks were political, administrative, and developmental. We still did not find the luxury of re-analysing the model from a theoretical point of view.

In the last three days of February, five of us flew out to Portland—Dobbins, McIntosh, Levin, Parker, and Schwartz. McIntosh had been cajoled into coming because he was still highly thought of in Portland, and he was a prolific writer. There was also the slim hope that he might change his mind. Levin was another Harvard doctoral candidate in the fields of social science and research who showed a brief interest in our project. The following month he decided to join Katz and our other friends at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. The weather was one of those rare winter episodes which Portland now and again enjoys—bright sunlight with temperatures reaching the seventies. The flowers were out, Mt. Hood was visible, and the decision to “think west” seemed to make sense even to me.

The main task of this visit was to work on a Carnegie Foundation proposal to get more funds. We also wandered through the Adams construction site and were treated to a real estate tour of the city by a Portland administrator. We were amazed and delighted at how little housing cost in Portland and how un-ghetto-like the predominantly black area of town appeared through eastern eyes.

On March 5 the Portland District sent a proposal, over Mel
Barnes' signature, to the Carnegie Corporation, pretty much in the form we completed. It was essentially an adaptation of our fall proposal, augmented by letters of support from Reed and Portland State colleges and the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. We described a policy-making group of twelve, the director (Schwartz), the "administrator" (an unnamed Portland veteran), five curriculum and instruction associates (our guess as to the number of other Harvards we could import), and six area chairmen. While this policy-making group was slightly larger than the one in our fall document, it was still far from a democratic arrangement. As before, there was no mention of student or parent involvement in decision making, or of rank-in-file teachers. (Considering the fact that Schwartz had argued strongly as an equal group member in the fall for community involvement, it is a bit surprising that when he had substantially increased power that this theme did not escalate in our design.) In order to be on the safe side and to work from a more easily divisible figure for houses and teams, we projected an opening-day enrollment of 1,000 students.

Meanwhile in Cambridge we were undergoing still further shifts in our group. McIntosh declined again, firmly, Levin withdrew, and Fred Geis decided to drop out as well. Fred had many concerns both philosophical and personal. It now appeared that the three Portland advocates on the night of February 16, had papered over some of their own differences in the larger issue of containing the U.-Mass. crew. But those differences could not be covered over for long. Geis' departure was uncomfortable all around, and it tested to the fullest our new organizational model. Fred had been in the planning from the beginning; he was an incredibly hard worker and in love with the city of Portland. While often at odds with Fred, I was quite upset by his departure. In terms of expertise he left an enormous gap within the science and math curriculum areas, as well as in research. It took us a full year before we were to bring out Jerry Fletcher from Harvard to head up our research section. During that year we were unable to do any developmental work in setting up our model of school-based research and evaluation, a delay which was to make Jerry's task much more difficult in 1969.

In March we also began a search for black staff for Adams.
Our student body was forecast to be about 20 percent black, and we hoped to attract from both Portland and elsewhere approximately that proportion of black professionals. Just as crucial as black teachers were black "senior faculty." We contacted all the east coast blacks we knew or knew of, but hit a blank wall. Portland was far off, the pay scale was pallid, and the opportunities for skilled blacks were skyrocketing all over the country. Harvard was just beginning to get an appreciable proportion of black educators, and we contacted nearly every one. Economic realities coupled with the heavy cost of moving to the northwest, for which we could promise no financial assistance, effectively throttled our efforts. Ironically, the only senior black professional whom we managed to interest was ultimately attracted to our rival site, the University of Massachusetts.

If we were unable to make headway in getting black staff to come to Portland with us, we at least made a dent in our 100 percent male composition. With the exception of one woman doctoral candidate, who attended some of our fall seminars, and one or two M.A.T.'s, who wandered in from time to time, we never did have a woman in our deliberations. In mid-March my chance meeting with Trish Wertheimer brought her into serious consideration. Trish was at Harvard working on her second master's degree, on the way to a doctorate in guidance. She had taught both in Mexico and for the United Nations School in New York City, and had worked extremely well in supervising Harvard M.A.T.'s in the field of art. Trish not only gave us a woman's approach, but also buttressed our counseling and arts expertise. Initially we talked with her about one of the six area chairman positions, but as we noted her strength and enthusiasm, we elevated her to full curriculum associate status, with the approval of Portland. Trish's husband Roger was extremely supportive of her opportunity within our project, and agreed to delay his own career advancement to accompany her to Portland, should everything work out.

On March 15 we sent to Barnes another memorandum of understanding, which was a summary of what we had informally agreed upon up to that time. It reiterated that our fall proposal was the basic document upon which we were to build the school, as augmented by the Carnegie proposal. We stipulated a
three-year mutual agreement—not a contract—a reasonable trial period for each party to see whether the project could work. We again estimated opening student enrollment as 1,000 students, with a five or ten to one student to adult ratio. We would look forward to having one district administrator join us for the planning year, and if Carnegie money were not forthcoming, we hoped the district would pick up the cost of the director, administrator, and five curriculum associates. Ten days later Barnes called to say that our memo was "agreeable." Barnes was an extremely astute politician, and was very careful in both his internal and external communications relative to our project. He was a shrewd judge of his staff, the board of education, and us. He faced an uphill fight for an expanded tax levy in the presidential primary election in May, as well as the possibility of a teacher strike. In retrospect it seems quite astonishing that Barnes would have the courage to hand over the city's newest high school to "a bunch of runny-nosed kids." The fact that he could sell us to his administrative team and that four of us were to come out to Portland that summer on no more than a handshake, is a tribute to his acumen.

In the first week of May, Schwartz received a letter from Glenn Hill, a Portland administrator in charge of the ES '70 program. ES '70, funded through the Bureau of Research of the Office of Education, linked approximately a dozen districts across the country in an attempt to develop vocationally-oriented curriculum packages for secondary schools. Portland had been designated one of the districts within the network, but no specific school had been identified up to that time as a test site. Hill suggested that our goals for Adams appeared highly congruent with the ES '70 program goals, and asked whether we were interested in working with the program? Schwartz quickly wrote back that we were, indeed, very interested in such cooperation, and that we would be eager to visit the program director in Washington to discuss the matter further. This was our first attempt at federal money, with the exception of our abortive TTT effort. It happened to coincide with news from New York that our Carnegie grant had been turned down. Up to this point in time we had great faith in getting private foundation money to augment our efforts. With the exception of the small travel grant from the New World
Foundation, we never did get a cent from private funds until years later.

On May 20, Schwartz wrote to Barnes about the possibility of our bringing out some key faculty from Cambridge. He gave the backgrounds of four individuals whom we felt would work well in Portland. The list was not long, and the individuals had sterling credentials, but the letter got a very quick and negative response from Portland. Barnes had turned Bob's request over to another central office administrator whose reply included the following:

'It seems to us that the district has gone about as far as it should in bringing in new personnel to establish Adams High School. Frankly, we anticipate some opposition from other high school administrators, but we can overcome it by selecting some of our existing good teaching personnel for other key positions at Adams. To bring in teachers for key positions would compound our obstacles and prolong the period of suspicion and concern.'

This reaction amazed and shocked us. Everything had been proceeding so smoothly, and our March memo of understanding had suggested that we would bring in outside people as well as hire locals. Of the four individuals for whom Schwartz had inquired, only one was slated as an area chairman candidate, the other three were first-year teachers. The fact that the area chairman candidate was an artist and advertising man, innocent of any teaching credentials, might have bothered Portland, but certainly not enough to explain the startling response. Perhaps Barnes had moved a little too rapidly on us, perhaps he was having second thoughts, or perhaps the impending primary and tax base election, which also included three school board seats, were pressing him heavily. Whatever the cause of this letter, Bob's telephone call to Barnes appeared to smooth things over, and we busied ourselves once again at finding staff at all levels to come to Portland, but without a great deal of success. The primary election turned out well. Gene McCarthy beat Bobby Kennedy, the voters approved the district's tax base, and the three new board members, on balance, seemed to guarantee a progressive outlook for Portland's schools.

In the third week of June, Schwartz and I flew to Washington, D.C., to visit the administrators of the ES '70 program. The meet-
ing with the ES '70 officials went smoothly, but literally by accident we learned of another source of money which possibly might help launch Adams. This was the newly enacted Education Professions Development Act of 1967. We were told by a laconic public relations officer that, yes, our goals were congruent with the guidelines for Section D of EPDA, institutes for training or retraining staffs of innovative schools. The hitch was that the deadline for proposals for EPDA was on July 1, just eleven days later! On the return flight to Boston, Bob and I poured over the guidelines, making notes, discussing how to rapidly fit our design into this framework. Back in Cambridge we added Trish Wertheimer to our brainstorming group, and caught Dobbins a few moments after his phone had been installed and before his furniture had been unpacked in Portland! Fortunately each of us had had a good bit of experience at proposal writing, and armed with the word of a few days additional time from the EPDA people in Washington, we worked out a fairly decent design. On June 29, Schwartz wrote Norm Hamilton, Portland's assistant superintendent for curriculum, that we were mailing out a proposal draft, for which we requested further cleaning up by Dobbins and the district's budget wizards before sending it on to Washington. Al, Norm, and the district people did their work well, and the completed proposal, some twenty-five pages in length, was in Washington by July 5. This proposal asked for federal help to plan an innovative high school in Portland, based to a great extent on our Carnegie document, (which, in turn, was based on our fall proposal). We wanted to develop curriculum and train our staff during the spring of 1969, a full staff summer institute, and follow-up activities during our initial operational year. We upped the estimate now to 1,200 students as our opening guess, and forecast six houses, each with two teams per house, one for freshman and sophomores, the other for juniors and seniors. We outlined interdisciplinary curriculum in two groupings, one combining English, social science, and the arts, while the second united math, science, home economics, and industrial education. Later in November of 1968 we heard—much to our delight—that our proposal had been funded to the tune of $156,000! This money was to be of inestimable help in launching John Adams High School.
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPRING

During this spring “attachment” phase the group membership underwent only minor changes. The hierarchical nature of the group seemed efficient for our tasks of negotiation and development. The loss of Geis was heavy, but the addition of Wertheimer and the strengths she represented probably more than counterbalanced Fred’s departure. No further work had been done on the clinical model, and, in fact our university connections were beginning to loosen up as the summer began. Reed was no longer so sure about “one third of two person’s time” and our painfully won positions with Portland State College appeared in jeopardy when Dean Willis resigned in mid-June. The rest of our professional and personal lives took much of our time that spring. We were far from having the time to work out all details of our model. Subject after subject had to be put off until the planning year, 1968-69, when we would surely have ample opportunity to work out everything.
WERE WE GENERALIZABLE?

Most organizations describe themselves by neat charts and portray carefully worked out relationships among role occupants having specific skills and performing specific tasks. It does not always work out that way. Sheer accident, idiosyncrasy, and expediency often are more crucial.

The Clinical School Collaborative was, in fact, a very accidental group. We enjoyed each other as people and as professionals, while generating and releasing a great deal of energy. We were a kind of stew, whose texture and taste varied with each new school experience, book debate, or insight. As group members came and went, the composition of the stew altered accordingly. The fact that we eventually became more routinized and hierarchical, does not mean that routine and hierarchy are essential for organizational success, but possibly that they are appropriate at some stages while being inappropriate at others. We always believed that our process was just as important as our product. It was this quality which allowed us to maintain, even up to our last day in Cambridge, the liveliest seminar in town!
Only four of us actually came to Portland that summer of 1968, to plan Adams High School, which opened in September, 1969, and achieved some notoriety in the following years. As of this spring of 1973, I am the only one still resident at Adams. Schwartz stayed as principal for two years, and is now on the staff of the mayor of Boston. Dobbins is an administrator within the Portland School District, and Trish Wertheimer is the principal of the Princeton, New Jersey, Regional High School. Of those who helped us plan the school, but chose not to come to Portland, Fred Geis helped start an experimental set of schools in New Haven, Connecticut, and has since joined the science education faculty at New York University. Gibbons is a professor at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia. McIntosh is assistant dean and associate professor at the University of Alberta at Edmonton. Yanofsky became director of research and planning at the Pennsylvania Advancement School in Philadelphia, and this year is a U.S. Office of Education Fellow, attached to the President’s National Advisory Council on Supplementary Centers and Services.
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