The term "governance" refers to the process and structure by which and through which decisions about current and projected activities on the campus are reached. The critical issues in governance in the mid-1970s are singled out and recent literature concerning them is presented. Those critical issues are: (1) the role of students in governance; (2) the creation of structures that allow the exercise of power and authority within the university; (3) the role of the faculty in governance, particularly as this is conditioned by the development of collective bargaining and questions of tenure; (4) the developing of state-wide coordination systems; and (5) the role of the president in the contemporary college or university. (Author/JMF)
TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

NO. 3 GOVERNANCE (ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION)
(A Review of Recent Literature)

A Report to
The Commission on the Future

THE LUTHERAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

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Preface

This is one of six monographs written during the period covering the latter half of 1974 and the first months of 1975 and that review developments in American higher education through the mid-1970s. The sources have been articles and books published in large part between 1964 and 1975. Writing during this period, has been voluminous, augmented in the last five years by the many reports, staff studies and other project prompted by, or related to, the work of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. The output has been so great that it is difficult for the college administrator, much less a faculty member involved in his own discipline, to view the literature in any broad perspective.

When the Lutheran Education Conference of North America established its Commission on the Future in 1972, it developed a series of proposals for projects that would result in documents useful for planning among the colleges related to the Lutheran Church. One of the resources requested by the Commission on the Future was an overview of the current status of higher education in the United States as that was reflected in the contemporary literature. In addition, the Commission requested that this overview be particularly directed to the implications for planning for the Lutheran colleges.

In early 1974 I was asked to undertake this particular phase of the work of the Commission. After the Commission approved a preliminary outline, and after I had completed certain other commitments, including meetings in Germany and Switzerland in June, 1974, I turned to the development of these monographs. I had considered assembling the materials in a single and fairly brief report. As the writing progressed, however, it became obvious that I would not be able to complete the work, at least to my satisfaction, in a single document. After making several revisions in the format, I decided on six monographs, five of which would deal with general topics, and the sixth of which would focus upon the colleges related to the
Lutheran Educational Conference of North America. The Commission on the Future reviewed drafts of four of the monographs in October, 1974 and approved the continuation of the work.

The six monographs are being issued under the general title of Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature. The titles of the six monographs are:

- No. 1 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Enrollments
- No. 2 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Students in the 70s
- No. 3 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Governance (Organization and Administration)
- No. 4 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Instructional Programs
- No. 5 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Financing the Program
- No. 6 Trends in American Higher Education: A Review of Recent Literature—Implications for the Predominantly Undergraduate Church-Related Institution

The monographs, while each of them is fairly lengthy, do not pretend to present an exhaustive analysis of all of the literature that has been produced. The selection of books and articles from which the material is drawn was arbitrary. These are the items considered by the author to be of significance and that were readily accessible to him and that would appear to be readily accessible to those who would be using the monographs. Each monograph provides a substantial cross-section of the writing and opinion on each of the topics. The sixth monograph draws upon the preceding five monographs and attempts to outline specific implications for planning for predominantly undergraduate church-related institutions. It will be noted that, and this is particularly the case for the most recent information, the monographs draw heavily upon the Chronicle of Higher Education. The Chronicle provides the
most up-to-date references on the items covered; some of the references are taken from issues in December 1974 and January 1975.

--Allan O. Pfister
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January 1975

Few topics concerned with the current state of higher education have elicited such broad ranging discussion as that of governance. The disruption in the operations of colleges and universities in the United States in the 1960s projected governance to the forefront of educational discussions. In 1970, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest referred to patterns of governance as the focal point for the question of "who shall have the power to make organizational and educational decisions" and contended that governance was becoming "one of the most hotly disputed topics on American campuses today."1 The report and recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education on the subject of college governance begins with the statement: "The governance of higher education in the United States is currently more subject to challenge than it has been in most earlier historical periods." The report goes on to observe that governance:

has been subject, particularly over the past decade, to a number of internal and external attacks and collisions. This development reflects the pressures of conflict and change now affecting academic life, because both conflict and change make the processes of decision-making more important to those who participate in, or are substantially affected by, higher education. Central issues have been raised. Basic principles are at stake.2

The more recent developments relating to collective bargaining and the continuing debates over the nature and appropriateness of tenure have kept the discussions lively and, if anything, have made the whole situation more complex.

In Canada the concern over the governance of postsecondary institutions has also emerged with special force in the 1960s and continues to full debate in the 1970s. Reginald Edwards points to the increased presence of the Federal Government
in higher education in Canada following World War II and to such events as the negotiations of Quebec for federal funds, the establishment of a Standing Committee of Ministers of Education which in 1967 became the Inter-provincial Council of Ministers of Education, and the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act (1960) as signs of ferment in Canada. He observes also that virtually every province initiated an inquiry into education generally or higher education specifically between 1950 and 1968. A publication addressed to the future of postsecondary education in Ontario calls attention to the emergence of "the student power movement as a potent factor in the educational affairs of the province" and notes the growing conflict over tenure and collective bargaining in Canada. And Murray Ross refers to developments in Canada as "the most profound in university government in Canada in the past half century." New academic structures are emerging in Germany in the early 1970s, and they may represent the most sweeping changes in German university governance in centuries. The French Orientation Act of 1968 created new alignments in France and new proposals advanced early in 1975 could have even more far-reaching impact. In England the Department of Education and Science emerges as a formidable power even as the debate over the role of the polytechnics and colleges of education continues.

To some, the situation in the United States has reached crisis proportions. Writing in the Journal of Higher Education, George Allan contends, "we suffer a crisis in governance at our institutions of higher education." In another issue of the same journal, and in the following month, Buryea writes about reform in university government that, "American higher education in the year 1971 clearly has entered a period of significant transition, not without parallel to a situation of a century ago." Some months later, again in the same journal, Stanley Ikenberry, states:

Colleges and universities, as institutions, are in a period of stress—a great climacteric it has been called—which may well extend into the foreseeable future. In the face of the several serious challenges that have confronted and continued to trouble nearly all of higher education, it is not at all surprising that
there has been incessant demands for increased institutional accountability, for stronger corporate controls, for greater power and authority of the office of the president, and for curbs on faculty autonomy.

A former department chairman, looking back upon his experience, writes in another journal, "My stint as department chairman convinced me our present system of academic governance is unworkable."

T. R. McConnell, writing on "Faculty Government", calls attention to the "internal struggle for participation and power among students, faculty, administration, and trustees" and refers to an observation of McGeorge Bundy that "the distribution of authority and responsibility among the various members of the university is now in question as it has not been for generations." Clark Kerr writes that the system of governance in American colleges and universities "is now in a crisis as never before." Howard R. Bowen suggests that the universities may be at about the same stage that industrial relations were in during the 1930s, a time marked by "a bitter and passionate struggle for power," but that "relationships in the universities are vastly more complex than those in industry." Paul Dressel and his colleagues refer to the challenges from both external and internal sources that are making governance on the campus more political in nature and "concerns about who holds the power, how to get a piece of it, or how to influence those who hold it become the center of attention... The resolution of this complex of internal and external issues and pressures is not yet in sight."

If there is crisis in governance—and many other voices echo the sentiments expressed above, just how is this crisis to be described? What seem to be the fundamental issues? The literature reflects a broad spectrum of opinion in response to this question. The crisis, according to some, lies in so broadening the basis of decision-making that needed decisions can no longer be made. Scott Edwards finds academic governance based upon the "democratic-pluralist model" breaking down at the point at which decisions have to be made. He finds the organizations
filled with indecision and lack of direction. Murray Ross is convinced that an act in Canada which broadens the base of university decision-making will destroy the nature of the university itself. George Allan sums up the issue as that of persons within the university being unable to agree with competence to exercise authority, that "we cannot decide who ought to decide."

Duryea, on the other hand, perceives the essential problem in governance as one of a "vacuum in central leadership" and suggests that the situation has developed because as universities have grown in size and complexity the form of governance has changed very little from that characteristic of an earlier and much simpler set of circumstances. Two points of view have grown up within the university: (1) governance is viewed as a process of managing an institution, for which the primary authority is derived from the governing board; (2) there is the view that governance is essentially a function of the internal constituency, the professors and students. These two points of view have led, according to Duryea, to the development of two bureaucracies: (1) the faculty bureaucracy with the structure of departments, schools, faculty senates and committees, and (2) the administrative structure that calls for a hierarchy of functions and officers. Duryea says the solution to the problem is "not only coordinating the two bureaucracies but combining them into joint consideration of matters of mutual interest."

Clark Kerr appears to agree, and he calls for a different kind of leadership for the contemporary college and university. He traces the development of leadership within the American higher educational institution from the period in which the pattern was a combination of president and lay board (until about 1860) through the emergence of the "presidential giants" (until the 1920s), to the third stage in which the faculty gained substantial power and authority (through the World War II), and into the fourth stage (the post-War stage) in which the function of leadership was primarily to manage the growth of the enterprise. The new period, the fifth stage, begins with the late 1960s and calls for leadership that is
prepared to manage change and conflict. In the new period, certain forces are pressing in from outside the institution: (1) the demographic shift in which higher institutions are experiencing a slowing down of growth, (2) the changing labor market for college graduates, (3) the increase in public power and control for higher education, (4) increasing tendency on the part of students to demand specific changes and developments, (5) the new electronic technology that is changing forms and modes of communication, (6) the expansion of variety and types of postsecondary educational opportunities, and (7) a reemphasis upon individual and humanistic values. These "outside" forces are combined with the following "inside" forces:

(1) Students want more influence outside their sphere of control of extracurricular activities. (2) Students are becoming more volatile in their choices of academic and vocational specializations, while faculty are becoming less adaptable with higher average age and higher percentage of tenure. (3) Faculty are more sympathetic to collective bargaining: about 10 percent are now covered by collective agreements, about 50 percent are favorable to unionization. (4) Some faculty members are politically Left with quite divergent views about essential academic matters. (5) Women and members of ethnic minorities want to break into and move up within faculty ranks on a large scale at a time of declining opportunities. (6) Fewer younger faculty will be facing more middle-age and older faculty. (7) Students and faculty have engaged in political activity, often against public sentiment, as never before, and experimented more with countercultural life styles. (8) Around the industrial world, the now more numerous intellectuals have created an "adversary culture"—as against the dominant society. Its principal home is the campus. The aspirations of some intellectuals outrun the tolerance of many citizens. (9) Narrowing income differentials between the more and the less highly educated will cause social stresses, as in Sweden and Israel, beyond those inherent in differing cultural mentalities.

The combination of pressures leads to basic conflicts over power and principle. To deal with these conflicts colleges and universities will need a new kind of leadership, because the demands will be for more administrative talent and effort, a more activist approach. The roles will now be more that of a political leader, such as a mayor or governor, using persuasion and working with others to move in
progressive ways and to keep conflict within reasonable bounds—working with media, with coalitions, and more publicly with bigger constituencies. Leadership takes more of the form of the political in regard both to internal problems and to external relations. The administrators in this new period will focus "on the selection of goals, the procurement and assignment of means, the achievement of consent for new approaches, and the interpretation of the new order to interested publics." They will be managers not only of change but of conflict.

In a series of essays from Daedalus and published under the title The Embattled University, Stephen R. Graubard also calls attention to the "erosion of authority" and observes that not only have the students become more political but the faculty as well have developed a political stance. Presidents and deans are hard put to respond to the conflicting pressures and at the same time there has been "a massive loss of public confidence in America's higher educational system." He predicts that out of the tensions will develop new types of institutional arrangements.

In similar vein, but placing the situation in the broader context of the relationship between parties of interest within the university, George Allan, to whom we have already referred, sees the crisis as arising out of the tension between authoritarianism and democracy, both essential characteristics of the university. The challenge, as he sees it, is to keep the two principles operative, to keep the "two forms of decision-making so that each can compliment the other." An organization which is excessively authoritarian or excessively democratic suffers either from its arrogance or its ignorance. It is not a matter of developing a means for working between the two extremes but rather "to devise an interplay between these extremes themselves." And the writer proposes some structures which he believes will make possible this interplay.

Another writer is somewhat less sanguine about developing such an interplay, because he sees serious problems in making clear distinctions between joint participation (which may be referred to as "democratic") and separate jurisdiction
(a form of "authoritarianism"). Over 300 institutions are in the process of experimenting with various types of campus governance bodies composed of students, faculty and administrators. To establish structures for joint participation, these institutions face the critical matters of determining representation, the appropriate structures to be developed and the relationship between campus-wide structures and existing structures. He argues that "those who yearn for peace in colleges and universities will find it a relative condition. Institutions of higher education will have to learn to live with more or less permanent conflicts and seek to make them serve the organization rather than destroy it."

But the issues are not limited to the way in which the university functions as an organization in relationship to its own needs and purposes. As T. R. McConnell points out, universities are finding themselves being called upon to respond in more ways to the wider public: "Perhaps as never before, institutions, administrators, faculty members, and even students find themselves accountable to a wide range of both internal and external agencies. Institutions and faculties, much to their concern and distress, have discovered that their autonomy is by no means absolute, but that in fact it is often highly vulnerable."

Beatrice Konheim, Professor of Biological Science and Academic Dean at Hunter College Institute of Health Sciences, suggests something of the complexity of the situation in the model pictured on the following page. After a particularly vigorous committee meeting in which "power was controlled and delegated in orderly fashion to decreasingly responsible bodies or persons," Dr. Konheim concluded that the college was far from being a representative democracy, but what was it? The model that seemed most appropriate to her was that of an interrelated, interdependent, ever-changing organismic whole, and she developed a diagram illustrating the relationships and showing the "complex, symbiotic relationship." In the past the power relationships seemed rather simple, and the flow was characterized as a set of centralized authority relationships. But the situation had now changed, and as she observes:
A View of the Academic Community as an Inter-related, Interdependent, Ever-changing Organismic Whole. Each cell at its interfaces reacting to and affecting others. Each unit and the whole reacting to and affecting environmental stimuli.

Today we have new forces (dark arrows) which are changing the power relationship. Outside influences—from the inner city, the courts, new projections of government, even the conflicts in distant societies—all previously rejected as biased or inappropriate—are impinging on our inner structure. Not only do the components respond to their pressure, they actively seek support and reinforcement from 'extraterritorial' agents. Furthermore, as the separation between F and S becomes less distinct (graduate students in both: non-teaching research personnel considered faculty; students teaching experimental classes; instructors more often participating in, rather than directing the learning experience) and as both groups participate more actively with A or as A in decision-making in academic policy and management, we have the chaos of rapid, cataclysmic evolution.\(^{25}\)

Accountable the university is. Yet, simply to say that the university is accountable is not to solve the problem.

From still another perspective, is the university accountable in the same way in which a business enterprise is accountable to a board of directors or to the public-at-large? Bolton and Genck find it fairly comfortable to refer to the university as a management enterprise. From the point of view of management consultants, they are prepared to make a number of recommendations which would improve the efficiency of the organization.\(^{26}\) And theirs is only one of many articles that might be noted which discuss the university in terms of more efficient management procedures. Without entering the debate of whether the college or university can more effectively be viewed as another kind of managed enterprise, we would refer to the observation of Stanley Ikenberry in which, while recognizing many similarities between academic institutions and other complex organizations, he points up some critical differences. He calls for "new patterns of accommodation that preserve the special qualities of academic organizations, including the academic freedom and professorial flexibility essential to effective faculty performance, but that also strengthen the central institutional leadership capacity and accountability."\(^{27}\) He notes that colleges and universities do not or are unable to define goals with a great precision, that they are inherently decentralized organizations and that they are composed principally of professional personnel.
It is with regard to the third characteristic that the issue of accountability becomes sharpened. Professionals are oriented to their own voluntary associations and are accustomed to exercising their own form of self-control. On the other hand, complex organizations are more bureaucratically structured and call for following procedures and establishing institutional goals. The issue of accountability is joined in the requirement that institutions "strike a better balance between the requirements for professional autonomy and academic freedom on the one hand and the necessity for greater institutional accountability and effectiveness on the other."28

How does one summarize the views regarding the issues facing the contemporary university in the realm of governance? In introducing a report of a seminar on restructuring college and university organization and governance, Stanley Ikenberry, in another article, summarizes the major themes that emerged as a group of fifteen scholars met to discuss the issue of restructuring organization and governance. The recurring themes were the following: (1) a decline in individual and institutional autonomy; (2) increased procedural regularization; (3) more candid recognition and management of conflict; (4) greater decentralization; (5) an emerging challenge to professional values; (6) and the apparent demise of the academic mystique. The decline in autonomy is reflected in broader participation and involvement in decision-making by persons within the academic community as well as without. Procedural regularization refers to the move to establish campus-wide and community-wide councils and assemblies and the development of more specific regulations for the conduct of activities within the university. Several of the papers in the conference pointed to the factor of conflict and the need to recognize and manage it. Decentralization was noted as a way of dealing with some of the conflicts within the institutions, namely by developing ways for better representation of the factions within the university. The professional characteristic of the faculty is being challenged, and the seeming rationality of the academic community has been questioned as the public has become more and more aware of the conflicts and problems within the university.29
The Carnegie Commission report on Governance of Higher Education lists six priority problems. These are: (1) adequate provision for institutional independence, (2) the role of the board of trustees and of the president, (3) collective bargaining by faculty members, (4) rules and practices governing tenure, (5) student influence on the campus and (6) the handling of emergencies.

In the pages that follow we shall summarize recent literature in a set of categories that draws both from Ikenberry's and the Carnegie Commission's summaries. The following areas seem to be those which may be singled out as the critical issues in governance in the mid-1970s: (1) The role of students in governance; (2) The creation of structures that allow the exercise of power and authority within the university; (3) The role of the faculty in governance, particularly as this is conditioned by the development of collective bargaining and questions of tenure; (4) The question of institutional accountability and the role of the trustees; (5) The developing state-wide coordination systems--a topic not directly touched upon above, but which is of particular importance to the colleges for whom this report is being prepared; and (6) The role of the president in the contemporary college or university.

As we turn now to the first of these topics, may we emphasize that in the monograph we are employing the term "governance" to refer to the process and structures by which and through which decisions about current and projected activities on the campus are reached.

The Role of Students in Governance

Leon Epstein observes that earlier studies (before 1960) of university governance tended to ignore the impact of students on the decision-making process and that "before the late 1960s students did not participate in the university's formal governing structure except in a few marginal areas," and whatever influence they may have exerted as individuals was not considered an aspect of governance.
Indeed, in a study published as late as 1967 the authors are quoted as bluntly declaring that they "regard students not as members of universities but as one of several clienteles we choose to put to one side as far as our studies are concerned." And the Subcommittee on Research and Planning of the Presidents of Universities of Ontario in commenting on the Canadian scene comments that the Duff-Berdahl report on University Government in Canada "devoted two and a half of its one hundred pages to the role of students in the governance of universities." The report was published in 1966. The Subcommittee continues, "A year, even six months later, the student role would unquestionably have received ten times as much attention." But, by the late 1960s and into the 1970s the topic of the student role in governance in colleges and universities had become a lively one. With few exceptions the reports and analyses of the events on American college and university campuses during this period concluded with calls for greater student involvement in college and university governance. Indeed, Earl McGrath contends:

The evidence indicates that revolutionary changes are occurring in the structure of government in American colleges and universities. Some of the most significant of these alterations in practices which have existed for centuries are related to the role of students in the academic bodies which determine the purposes and practices of higher education. Hardly an institution remains untouched by the activities of students aimed at gaining a voice in major policy-making decisions.

In the same mood the Christian Science Monitor for July 19-21, 1969 carried a full page report on "Student Power: Can It Help Reform the System?" The opening paragraphs stated that student power is moving in new directions on the campus, that students are "asking for a piece of the action, not to run the university but to input their views into the power structure." Interviews with university officials prompted the reporters to say that there was a "swelling tide of opinion that... students have a point when they demand a change in the educational system..." and many of the reports dealing with campus problems were calling for involvement of students in institutional governance. The Special Committee on Campus Tensions
appointed by the American Council on Education and headed by Sol M. Linowitz recommended that students be given "substantial autonomy in their non-academic activities" and opportunities to "participate in matters of general educational policy; especially in curricular affairs."  

Judging from the research of Harold Hodgkinson, students have been gaining more power in the university. On the basis of response from 1,230 presidents to the question of whether student control had increased or decreased between 1958-68, it was reported by the presidents of 67 percent of the institutions that the amount of control in establishing regulations governing student conduct had increased, that there had been an increase in 63 percent of the institutions in the amount of student control in institutionwide policy formation, that in 58 percent of the institutions there was more student control in academic decision-making and that in 55 percent of the institutions there was more student control in enforcing regulations governing student conduct. One of the problems in interpreting these responses, however, is that we have no clear indication what the particular degree of involvement in any one case may have been or may be now; we have only the word of the president that there was more involvement or participation in 1968 than there was in 1958. We do not know whether there was only a bit more or a great deal more, and we only have the president's perceptions of what has happened—we do not know whether the students would agree with this assessment.  

A study conducted by Earl McGrath involved 875 colleges and universities and their responses to questionnaires mailed in September 1969. He found that in 88.3 percent of the colleges students were participating in one or more faculty committees. Most often the student membership was on the faculty curriculum committee. The survey revealed that students were members of faculty curriculum committees in 57.8 percent of the institutions, although they had voting membership of only 46.1 percent. Students were least likely to be found as members of any faculty committee that dealt with selection, promotion and tenure of faculty members, but McGrath
found that 4.7 percent of the institutions reported student participation on such committees, and in 3.3 percent of the colleges responding the students had voting membership on these committees.

Other committees on which students had membership, together with the percentage of institutions reporting that membership are: student life (34.3), library (31.2), public events and lectures (29.1), faculty executive committee (22.7), discipline (18.6), admissions (17.5), planning (9.7), faculty committee on faculty selection, promotion and tenure (4.7). In addition it was observed that in 20 percent of the institutions students were related in some way to the board of trustees, in 10.6 percent they either had membership in or sat with trustee committees, but in only 2.7 percent did they have voting membership on the board.38

McGrath observed that the survey, which was undertaken under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, represented the first attempt to secure a comprehensive report on the extent of student involvement in academic government. The main generalization reached by McGrath was that "although until three or four years ago American colleges and universities severely limited the involvement of students in academic government, now membership in one or another 'faculty' committee is becoming the rule rather than the exception."39 He noted, however, that the collegial concept of the university held by most faculty members worked against the principle of involving students, because the collegial concept calls for leaving "basic institutional policy in the hands of a corpus of professionals who, like all other human beings, are largely moved by self-interest."40 The collegial position assumed that students should retain their traditional role as clients.

By way of contrast, McGrath noted that student participation in the Canadian institutions may have become greater than that among the American institutions. With few exceptions the members of the Association of Canadian Universities and Colleges have now brought students into the top policy-making bodies, which until recently had included only administrative officers, faculty members, and trustees.
(or, governors, as they are usually called). He found that in the large majority of Canadian institutions students, generally elected or appointed, sit on the Senate and its committees. In the Canadian institutions the Senate has broad jurisdiction over the educational program, admission and degree requirements, the selection and retention of faculty members. He also indicated that Canadian administrative officials overwhelmingly believed that the students were making a valuable contribution to the deliberations of the academic bodies. 41

The ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education issued a review of research under the title of "Student Participation in Academic Governance: Review 1." Among the items included in the review was a report that in a Gallup Poll in 1971 some 81 percent of the student respondents indicated that students should have a greater part in making decisions in the colleges. The ERIC review also reported:

Research surveys on student participation in academic governance have usually tried to determine what current practices and policies are, or have assessed a particular group of attitudes toward the decision-making role of students. Generally, the surveys indicate that student membership on academic committees or other governing bodies is a recent but widespread phenomenon. The kinds of changes that are increasing student control over the university policy are almost as numerous as the institutions reporting them and few regional differences can be found. It is clear, however, that student influence is largely confined to non-academic matters in which students have traditionally had some voice. Researchers agree that students still have little decision-making responsibility in such areas as curriculum planning, faculty selection, admission, college fiscal policies, or general institutions planning. 42

The Chronicle of Higher Education, in an issue dated January 25, 1971, reported on a survey undertaken by the American Civil Liberties Union. The Union surveyed 155 college presidents and found that students on most campuses were involved in decision-making in such matters as admissions, student financial aid, planning of buildings and grounds, administrative appointments, and judicial regulations. On the other hand, most of the institutions reported that students were not involved in evaluating the administration or in budget-making. In academic areas traditionally controlled by the faculty, students had been given some role in.
policy-making, but were generally excluded from personnel decisions, and most institutions reported that students were not involved in faculty selection or promotion. In 80 of the institutions students were voting members of the governing boards, and in another 46 students were included as non-voting members of the boards.43 The summary as reported by the Chronicle is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Decision-Making</th>
<th>Percentage of College Presidents Replying Regarding Level of Student Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course requirements</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular offerings</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grading systems</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grading appeals</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions policies</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial aid policies</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and grounds planning</td>
<td>45%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faculty selection</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faculty evaluation</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faculty promotion</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative appointments</td>
<td>32%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative evaluation</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget-making</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial regulations</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing boards</td>
<td>5%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Henry Mason reports a survey undertaken by the Office of Institutional Research of East Carolina University involving 85 institutions and undertaken in November-December 1968. It was reported that of the 59 institutions replying, 45 had included student voting members on at least one committee. In 13 of the institutions students were serving on the university senate.44

In the report of their own study of student participation in university decision making, Hawes and Trux review some of the other studies they had examined. One study reported that student involvement was "mild," that most colleges and universities were willing to provide more opportunity than was demanded by the students themselves.
and that student concern was primarily with student affairs and the curriculum. Another study, in assessing the impact of student participation, suggested that the student primarily played a protesting role, that complex problems of administration were dealt with in a "very superficial manner" in joint student-faculty groups, that "inordinate amounts of time" were spent trying to brief the student members on the issues and that students generally felt inadequate to deal with issues and soon lost motivation to participate. Still another study reported limited representation from the students, irregular attendance, "scant orientation" to committee tasks, and inadequate means for discussing committee proposals with fellow students.

The writers describe their own study in a large Midwestern land-grant university. They sought to find out how students participated in committee situations. They surveyed non-committee members of the student body (N=264) and in addition 64 chairpersons. Some 30 interviews involving 14 students, 15 faculty and one staff member provided more detailed information on various persons' perceptions of the participation of the students in the decision-making process. They found that students were represented on 50 percent of the committees and that among these student representatives 52 percent were graduate students and 33 percent were seniors. In 92 percent of the 546 committees noted, the faculty were found to outnumber the students. The students generally expressed the opinion that they were underrepresented, while most faculty members expressed the opinion that student representation was adequate. The general conclusions of the authors included the following:

Neither faculty nor student committee representatives have very clearly defined constituencies. There appears to be a lack of communication channels by which students learn of the academic community structure. Because of this lack of information, or perhaps because of the difficulty of obtaining such information, students are largely unaware of existing power integration mechanisms. Consequently, very few clearly defined issue-oriented student groups are formed.... Nevertheless, student participation seems to be relatively effective....Although student members influence decisions, this activity does not result in a better informed, better organized student population, or more satisfactory student-faculty-administration integration.
A review of the student and faculty involvement in policy-making at the University of Minnesota revealed that the involvement of the students had increased significantly in recent years but, in the words of the author of the review, there was still a great distance "to go in awarding junior members of the academic community any substantial voice in its governance." Dr. Eckert wrote that one of the major problems in making effective use of students on committees is the short term during which any student can actually serve; it appears that a student has little chance to do more than gain a general orientation to a given committee's role and current problems before his assignment has been completed, because the student's tenure at the university is so short in comparison with faculty tenure. Moreover, students tend to be in the minority in committees and "having only one or two student members on a committee...has not encouraged vigorous expression of the students' point of view." One exception at the University of Minnesota has been the Senate Committee on Student Affairs, where the students have held a majority of the membership appointment.

The available evidence thus suggests increased student involvement in decision-making itself and whether students have actually become accepted members of the decision-making process is still an open question. Indeed, there are some who would suggest that students ought not to become members of faculty committees. James Olsen argues that along with collective bargaining, student participation in governance represents "a departure from the concept that an institution of higher education was a community of scholars" and doubts that the university can "continue to function and to meet the requirements of the student and of society, while maintaining academic integrity" if this situation develops further.

Robert Wilson and Jerry Gaff reported on a study of faculty attitudes toward student participation in policy-making involving over 1,500 faculty in six different colleges and universities in three states. (Usable returns were received from 70 percent, or 1,069 persons.) The writers found that two-thirds of the faculty...
replying were in favor of having students involved in formulating social rules and regulations, that 45 percent were prepared to give students an equal vote on committees and that 21 percent would give students the sole responsibility for their own social regulations. On the other hand, when it came to academic policies, while 60 percent said that students should have some voice, only 36 percent would allow students to vote on academic policy matters and only 9 percent would be willing to grant students "an equal vote with the faculty."50

A different perspective on faculty opinion regarding student participation is suggested by the Gross and Grambach study of university goals and academic power among 68 nondenominational universities in the United States. The researchers received responses from 8,328 administrators and 6,756 faculty, 46.4 percent of those asked to participate. Overall, the respondents ranked "run the university democratically" twenty-ninth and "involve students in university government" as forty-fifth. Top ranking went to "protect academic freedom," followed by "increase or maintain prestige."51 When asked to list goals according to preference, "protect academic freedom" was still at the top, and "run the university democratically" advanced to twenty-second and "involve students in university government" dropped to forty-sixth. One commentator on the Gross and Grambach data suggests that there is evidence that the goals of protecting academic freedom and increasing or maintaining academic prestige may actually conflict with increasing student participation.52

Wilson and Gaff found that the faculty sorted themselves out into at least two different groups, one of which would provide considerable room for student involvement and the other of which accepted only a restricted role for students. The positions taken by the faculty in the Wilson-Gaff study reflect what have come to be basic philosophical dispositions. The arguments for student involvement generally include the following: (1) those affected by the educational program should have some larger opportunity to define the nature of the program;
(2) the contemporary student is more serious and informed and prepared for participation; (3) if students are to be educated for democratic living, they must participate in democratic decision-making on the campus; (4) students are able to make some judgments about the quality of their education and should help to improve higher education; (5) with the abolition of the doctrine of "in loco parentis" and in keeping with the new styles of student life, students should be treated as adults and admitted to the adult society of the university; (6) students are especially situated to make judgments about faculty performance and can help in the improvement of instruction.

Against expanding student involvement the following arguments have been advanced: (1) if proportional representation is to be given, students would soon come to dominate the academy, to the long-term detriment of higher education; (2) students are still, in spite of their seeming maturity, students, and by virtue of lack of experience they are unqualified to make long-term decisions for the university; (3) students spend only four years in any one institution, and many spend less; (4) the college or university is constituted by special experience and knowledge, and the students do not have the broad range of experience of a professional; (5) students cannot and will not give the time necessary to carry on the hard work of university governance.

During and immediately after the campus disruptions of the late 1960s and early 1970s there was an almost universal response that one of the major causes of disruption was that students had not been sufficiently involved in the governance of the university, and recommendation after recommendation followed for increasing that involvement. Temporarily, at least, the basic philosophical differences reported above seem to have been passed over. These differences did not, however, disappear, and the issues continue to surface.

Among the resolutions of the American Association for Higher Education in March, 1969, was one that called for re-definition and clarification of university.
goals. In the process of re-defining and clarifying goals, the universities were asked "significantly to involve all portions of the collegiate community in the re-examination process." It was made clear that students were to be included in the "collegiate community." The Special Committee on Campus Tensions appointed by the American Council on Education and headed by Sol M. Linowitz called for students being given "substantial autonomy in their non-academic activities." The report went on to indicate that students should:

participate in matters of general educational policy, especially in curricular affairs. Since increased participation will contribute to effective institutional decision-making and is also of educational benefit, students should serve in a variety of roles on committees that make decisions or recommendations. In some non-academic areas students should have effective control; in some general educational policy matters they should have voting participation; in other matters, they should act in an advisory or consultative capacity. Effective student representation will not only improve the quality of decision; it will also help to insure their acceptability to the student body.53

In similar ways the President's Commission on Campus Unrest called for "increased participation of student, faculty, and staff in the formulation of university policies."54 These statements are only samples. Innumerable special reports, monographs and books have appeared. Hardly an educational conference of any size failed to include in its consideration the recommendation of university reform and student involvement in decision-making.

But the philosophical disagreements remain.

Regardless of the position one takes about the degree of student involvement that is desirable, the problem of how most effectively students are to be incorporated into any particular decision-making situation remains. Robert S. Powell, Jr., a graduate student at Princeton is of the opinion that the particular mechanism for student participation will depend upon the characteristics of an individual campus, that there are not going to be any immediate and spectacular changes, that students will find participation as "boring, tedious, and time-wasting... as it is now to the faculty," but that students are capable of being reasonable in
their judgments about the university, that students do have the time to spend, that comprehensive university codes embodying the rights and freedoms of all members of the community will be necessary, that there will be conflict in the process. As Powell has assessed the matter, the key to effective student involvement lies in a clear definition of the rights and freedoms of various groups on the campus.

Another student leader, Jay C. Shaffer, former head of the student government at Ohio State University, argues that one approach that would make existing student governments more attractive to the students would be to provide substantial financial undergirding and to have the university administration "give public evidence of its regard for the student government." He recognizes that there are problems involved in student participation, that students are unsophisticated about the policy process itself, that they are transients, that they do not have access to information essential for effective participation, that student governments usually do not have the facilities normally available to other policy makers, that students are usually students first and policy participants second, that students are sometimes treated in a condescending manner by those with whom they are working. He argues, however, that these difficulties can be met and that students can become effective policy participants.

Shaffer's confidence that student governments, if provided with greatly augmented financial support, would afford the most viable form of student involvement in university decision-making would draw little support from Henry Mason. On the basis of his own reviews of writing and research on the subject, he concludes:

Real student participation in government cannot be accomplished merely by giving real powers rather than trivia to existing "student government." Instead, institutional devices must be found through which "student power" can be incorporated into regular channels of university government.

For his part, he would seem to opt for the position expressed in the study of governance at Berkeley, that the basic unit for effective student participation is the department. Students might become voting members of regular departmental
committees in which policies are discussed and formulated and nonvoting representatives in departmental faculty meetings where final decisions are made. And, if a separate general student government were to persist, students should be elected from departmental constituencies.

In the report of the Campus Governance Program prepared for the American Association for Higher Education, Morris Keeton argues that participation in campus governance by students is not to be defended simply because students are clients, but more because they can make contributions to the effectiveness of the campus. Admitting to both the problems and the potentials in student involvement, Keeton does not recommend one particular structure of governance, but proposes as a general principle: "Design the student role to obtain contributions available from student competencies and cooperation and to protect the other constituencies and the institution against undue effects of the special interests and limitations that apply on the particular campus."58 In designing structures, Keeton places considerable emphasis upon informal processes "where the intention to share authority is genuine and pervasive," and urges developing different patterns of participation in response to different types of policy and program decisions required. He calls attention to the existence of various student subgroups on a campus and calls for "flexibility and complexity uncommon to our presently complex society."59

Richard Antes labels the alternatives, the development of a strong and separate student government or the adoption of a community government involving students, faculty and administration, as extreme positions, and he finds that the more realistic position for university governance will be "to utilize parts of both methods, but to stress the later method." While leaning to the community government pattern, he goes on to say that "the method will vary with the institution." He also emphasizes that involvement has to be more than simply advising, that students need to have a sense of exercising some impact on the decisions that are made.60
The situation is a mixed one. The ERIC report on student participation and governance indicates a number of specific structural changes that have taken place. Some of these may continue in 1974 to exist, but several probably have been modified since the time of establishment. The report takes us only into early 1970:

Maryville College in Tennessee established an All College Council. The College Council consisted of six students from the upper 3 classes, six faculty members selected on the basis of tenure, and six administrative officers—president, academic dean, secretary of faculty are automatic members. The Council is responsible for long range planning and for directing the activities of the entire college community, under the broad purposes and policies set forth by the board of directors. There are three coordinating councils to supplement the College Council; these are responsible for academic, religious, social, and recreational affairs.

Franklin and Marshall College in Pennsylvania proposed in 1969 a College Senate consisting of 20 members—15 faculty, 3 students, the president and dean of the college. The Senate is empowered to discuss, examine, and establish policies related to the academic life of the college and is granted most of the powers and prerogatives that now reside in the faculty as a whole.

Yeshiva College created a College Senate composed of 5 administrators, 8 faculty members, 6 students, and 1 non-voting alumnus. This Senate was to have jurisdiction over academic standards, admissions policy, curriculum, degree requirements, the establishment of new majors and courses, policy determination in the areas of standards of scholastic performance, student attendance, grading system and academic honors, and the disposition of all matters submitted to it by the administration, faculty and student council. The Senate was also to make recommendations on matters affecting faculty welfare including appointments, promotions, leaves of absence, honors, and renumeration.

Queen's College recommended the creation of an academic senate consisting of 54 tenured faculty, 18 non-tenured faculty, and 36 students, as well as several ex officio non-voting members. The Senate was to have power to determine policies, standards, programs and goals for the college. It would have advice and consent on the appointment of administrative officers.

The University of New Hampshire established a University Senate consisting of 77 members—50 undergraduate students, 30 faculty members, 12 administrators and 5 graduate students. Its work is organized by an internal executive council that, among other things, serves the president of the University in an advisory capacity, prepares the agenda for Senate meetings, recommends nominations to all Senate committees, and takes action on an interim basis between meetings and during vacations. The working of this particular organization is described in the July 6, 1970 issue of the Chronicle of Higher Education.
The Florida Atlantic University Committee on University Governance proposed the University-Wide Senate consisting of 139 members—70 faculty members, 48 students and 21 administrative officers. The Senate was to deal with University budget, steering and policy; promotion, tenure and honorary degrees, academic freedom and due process, admissions and petitions, curriculum, research, library, publication, physical space, and cultural affairs and activities.

The University of Kansas established a new University Senate consisting of the Chancellor, Provost and Vice Chancellor, members of the faculty senate, and members of the student senate. Syracuse University reported that 17 graduate and 28 undergraduate students became members of the University Senate in the fall of 1969.

From other sources, we note these variations:

Wittenberg University in Ohio adopted a College Faculty and Student Government under which most of the work will be placed in a college council consisting of 27 faculty members, 22 students and four administrators. The faculty meets only twice annually and the council carries on in the interim period the major work of the council is carried on by seven committees headed by the Executive Committees consisting of 3 faculty and 3 student members as well as the dean of the college.

Elmhurst College in Illinois proposed the development of joint governance board consisting of 16 students, 12 faculty and 4 administrators. Reporting to this governance board was to be the student affairs council, predominantly students in membership; a faculty council, consisting of two students, six faculty and the dean of the college; and an academic council, consisting of 4 students, the heads of the academic divisions, three faculty representatives, and certain administrative officers. The plan was not adopted.

Luther College in Iowa established a community assembly responsible for developing social rules and regulations, judicial operations, cultural and recreational activities, spiritual life and human relations. Membership consisted of one student for each one hundred students on campus (21), 18 faculty, four student body officers, and 6 members of the administration, plus the president, for a total group of 49.

The illustrations above are only examples of what we are sure are many more efforts to incorporate students into more active roles in decision-making through the establishment of some all-institution governing body. Not only are the examples far from exhaustive of the proposals that have been advanced and in many cases implemented, but they are also limited to one kind of institutional response. It seems as though the most immediate and most widespread response to expressed need for...
changing the internal governance of colleges and universities was this attempt at all-institutional governing bodies. Little is reported about involving students at the departmental level, which may, as some suggest, be a more promising approach. Some of the above reported reforms may have already run their courses, and some may not have been implemented. While some studies are underway to determine the effectiveness of these all-institution forms, the evidence so far is mixed. And indeed, student participation in university governance presents a mixed picture. It appears that more students hold more positions on more faculty or general university committees than at any point in the past, and countless commission reports have called for more student involvement. Yet both students and faculty question whether students have had any significant impact on decision-making, and faculty are by no means united in their opinion regarding the desirability of more student involvement. How best to incorporate students into the university decision-making process, at whatever degree of involvement, remains an issue.

Structures for Broadening Decision-Making

As we have observed, the listing immediately above suggests one of the major ways in which the governance pattern has changed on American colleges and universities. A number of institutions have inaugurated some type of all-institution governance pattern, a form of organization that includes in some acceptable proportions faculty, students, administration and in some instances non-academic staff.

Most of the all-institution structures have not been in operation long enough to provide any firm basis for judgment regarding their effectiveness. We mention a few early reactions. The July 6, 1970 issue of the Chronicle of Higher Education called attention to some of the problems that early appeared in the new form of government at the University of New Hampshire. The New Hampshire governing body included 77 persons: 30 faculty members, 30 undergraduates, 12 administrators and 5 graduate students. The article reported that as many as 300 colleges and
universities were at that time considering some type of student-faculty structure. Yet even as the number of experiments was growing, one researcher gathered that "faith in the idea of representation as a governance model" was declining. As for the experience of New Hampshire, at the date of that report no clear student versus faculty splits had appeared. Some members of the New Hampshire community argued that the new structure had provided broader representation, but others contended that the organization was so unwieldy that it was not working effectively. It was reported that the overwhelming student reaction to the new senate was apathy.

Cornell University had asked a Commission on Student Involvement in Decision-Making to study ways in which students could be more effectively involved in campus decision-making, but even before the Commission report was issued—and the Commission was raising a number of questions about the possibility of developing a representative body—during 1968-69 the university had already proceeded to the formation of a constituent assembly of nearly 400 persons drawn from every type of group on the campus. The report on the development of the Cornell University Constituent Assembly is contained in another report.

Characteristic of the way in which all-institution governance structures seemed to develop is the description in a report on the Lehigh University Forum. Approved by the board of trustees in the spring of 1970, the new organization went into effect in the fall of 1970. This particular organization included 60 elected students (43 undergraduates and 17 graduate students), 60 elected faculty members, and five administrators (president, provost, vice-president for student affairs and two others appointed by the president). All were given equal voting privileges. In addition, one or more trustees and/or alumni were invited to attend meetings. The Forum was to select two students and two faculty members to attend the trustee's meetings. The Forum was created to have legislative authority and to set policy on special academic programs and planning, social life and regulations, extracurricular activities and athletics, and academic environment matters such as admission.
registration, the academic calendar, residence and dining, the bookstore, buildings and grounds, the library and computer. The faculty as a group was to retain primary responsibility in the area of curriculum course content, instructional methods, conduct of research, employment status and tenure of faculty, academic discipline and the awarding of degrees.65

The ERIC compendium series on governance in 1970 reported on, among other things, some twenty institutional studies on governance. Dickinson College at first rejected a faculty-student committee for a cabinet system of government and advanced a proposal for a system of joint faculty-student legislative and advisory committees for such areas as academic program, student affairs, admissions and financial aid, academic standards. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported on the organization of the Consultative Forum which includes representatives from all sections of the university community. The Forum was to have consultative responsibilities only. Another report referred to the proposal for a 57-member Council of the Princeton University Community. Colgate's University Council composed of faculty, students, and administrators was also noted. Other studies were noted as simply being underway.66

Another variation in structure is based upon accepting the existence of two different groups and frankly working with a dual system of organization. William F. Sturner argued on behalf of the bicameral legislature and stated that the formation of the bicameral legislature, with one house composed of student representatives and the other consisting of faculty and administrators could provide the "legal framework for the political solution of...(the) classic problem of conflicting rights and poor communication." The writer argued that one of the most important contributions of the division of powers would be "the clear delineation of constitutional prerogative among the contending groups and the formal recognition, heretofore omitted, of student rights in a democratically oriented structure."67
Observing that faculty and students differ in the way in which they approach problems and issues, Sturner wrote that the inclusion of students in faculty-administrative organizations "dilutes the strength of both groups, highlights the weaknesses of each, and does little to recognize the student as an adult in his own right."\(^{68}\) And since the two groups communicate in different ways, they are usually more effective in communicating with their peers than with members of the other group. Combining the two groups in a single body has too many drawbacks and too little potential. The solution, according to Sturner, would be to divide the groups and allow each to work in its own areas of responsibility; the two groups could then build upon their respective strengths. Each group would, however, have the right to initiate legislation for particular areas with the approval of the other group.

One of the problems in the bicameral approach has already been alluded to by another writer, Kenneth Mortimer. The problem of clarifying discrete areas of responsibility for each unit is a complicated one. Moreover, Mortimer noted that in one case where separate legislative bodies were constituted, the University of Minnesota, the separate student and faculty assemblies did not meet at all during the first year of operation.\(^{69}\)

In the same article, Mortimer reported on some other structures. The Pennsylvania State University created a University Council in 1970. The Council consisted of the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, two college deans, one director of a commonwealth campus, four tenured faculty, three undergraduate students and one graduate student. The Council exists concurrently with the University Senate and the student-governing structures. Mortimer also commented on the Council of the Princeton University Community. The following is one of the generalizations Mortimer made about such councils:

A major problem which must be confronted by the joint participation and agreements to separate jurisdictions models is that in order for them to work there must be a substantial degree of mutual respect and trust among the various constituencies. Each group must view the structures and functions of the mechanism
as legitimate and the people who operate them as trustworthy. It is increasingly apparent, however, that legitimacy and trust are scarce commodities on many campuses.70

He reported how campus-wide senates and councils can break down into internal political groups and how the separate groups can develop adversary relations. But he emphasized that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of these new approaches because of the relatively short period of time during which they have been operating. In a paper he subsequently presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of Colleges in January 1973, Mortimer reported that a recent survey of over 1700 institutions found that 640 had or were experimenting with some type of unicameral senate. The survey also found that 40 institutions which had tried unicameral senates had dropped them after having found them unacceptable. 71

Underlying most of the proposals, whether for unicameral or bicameral structures, is the contention that there must be more shared authority. At least, such is the position taken by the AAHE-NEA task force on faculty representation and academic negotiations. Established in July 1966 the task force presented its report in 1967. The group visited 34 institutions in different parts of the country and on the basis of the data developed some generalizations about faculty participation. The principle of "shared authority" is described as the middle zone of a continuum which ranges over administrative dominance-administrative primacy-shared authority-faculty primacy-faculty dominance. The continuum indicates the range within which authority can be distributed within the university. Under the concept of shared authority, "both faculty and administration exercise effective influence in decision-making."72

The report suggested that the concept of shared authority may be implemented through various procedures, but that the most effective approach would probably be through the development of an academic senate comprised of faculty members and officials of the administration. In addition, a joint grievance committee could be established to handle disputes involving issues of personnel administration. The report stated that effective implementation calls for a careful examination of faculty and administrative roles "to help determine the allocation of authority that will enhance most
effectively the quality of performance of institutions of higher education.”

The report argued that the concept of shared authority avoids the competitive model, and that through cooperation "both parties may be able to achieve their goals more fully than would be possible through antagonistic competition.”

Keeton subsequently elaborated on the central idea of the AAHE report of 1971. He argued that the "primary justification for faculty voice in campus governance is the fact that faculty alone have the kinds and degrees of qualification essential to the task of a college or university." The faculty, he suggested, are the teachers, the researchers, and the specialists that provide the various forms of service required by the institution, and even with considerable faculty mobility, this faculty has represented the "largest element of continuity and experience with the tasks and problems of the campus." By way of contrast, the student generation is short, and turnover among top administrative officers has been fairly rapid.

Yet, there are some problems endemic to turning the operation of the institution entirely over to faculty. Faculties as experts in their own respective fields tend to overestimate the significance of that expertise in issues of campus governance. Heavy involvement of faculty in governance involves heavy demands upon time and takes faculty away from tasks for which they are primarily appointed. According to the report, all of this argued for some form of shared governance is the most appropriate approach.

In pleading for more faculty involvement, the report rejected the idea of a "zero-sum" game. That is a game in which one party loses if another gains. In arguing for a "positive-sum" game, and said that in business, for example, it is possible for the lender and the borrower both to benefit. The lender gives up certain uses of his capital and derives other benefits such as interest and possibly capital, while the borrower is able to get underway an enterprise which benefits him as well as others. In similar manner, faculty and administration need to combine their efforts.
In an earlier article, Lewis Mayhew had disputed the principle that seems implicit in the AAHE report and what he referred to as "shared responsibility." He wrote that the idea of shared responsibility had been emphasized in the literature of higher education for decades, but it had not been implemented to any great degree. He suggested that the idea had not infused more practice, not only because of the complexity of the enterprise, but also because the relationships between the various parties had seldom been adequately specified. In his own description, he referred to the faculty as primarily the conservative element in the university; faculty are reluctant to change, and "the departmental system with its powerful defenses for preservation of individual interest" provides "the citadel within which to cultivate one's own concerns." But, the conservatism can balance the over-aggressiveness of central administration:

Actually, these two forces are complementary. Institutions cannot survive the overly powerful dynamic administration which is not checked by an effective faculty exercising the instruments of restraint... But institutions would atrophy and lose viability if faculty gained so much power that it could block the efforts of the weak or ineffectual administration. In some way or other institutions of higher education should be organized so that the forces of faculty conservatism and administrative dynamic are brought into a creative tension. This/bringing together probably must be contrived, for without a reasoned plan the contrasting valences of power would either drift into a state of fibrillation or into a completely adversary posture.

Mayhew argued that faculty should have virtually irrevocable power over certain aspects of the institution—determining membership within their own ranks, conditions of student entrance and dismissal. They should also have broad policy-making powers over the conditions of student life. On the other hand, the administration should have basic powers over matters such as finance, the power over budget preparation and budget control. Administration should also be able to control appointments of administrative officers. Mayhew's view of "shared responsibility" comes short of the "shared authority" suggested in the AAHE reports.
In commenting on what a system of shared responsibility needs to operate
effectively, he wrote that there must be: (1) desire on the part of the faculty and
administration for shared responsibility; (2) willingness of each element to allow
the other element disgression within its own sphere; (3) development of written
constitutions, by-laws, and other such specified procedures to insure due process;
(4) and greater openness and willingness to share information and intelligence.

Reiterating some of the points in his earlier article, Mortimer in his address
to the American Association of Colleges suggested that the options open to a college
or university seem to be the kind of shared authority referred to in the AAHE docu-
ment or clearly defined and separate jurisdictions. If some compromise between these
positions cannot be developed, the third option would seem to be that of
collective bargaining.

There is by no means universal agreement that the development of some type of
shared authority or responsibility is the solution to the current problems in the
governance of American higher educational institutions. Eldon L. Johnson has
observed that academic legislative bodies are due for some drastic overhauling and
that "the present-day university needs to concede the indispensable role of a single
executive whose scope is institution-wide." He goes on to say:

It needs to give him unmistakable authority at his appropriate
level (or his agreed upon sphere, if hierarchy must be avoided.)
Leadership cannot be legislated; it grows from being exercised.
Little of it is being exercised in universities today, essen-
tially because potentially vetoing academic groups do not view
it with favor. University presidents themselves have not been
blameless in playing the 'participatory' game, wherein they are
amiable comrades treading lightly and waiting for signals.

Gerald P. Burns, a professor of higher education at Florida State University, was
even more direct in a letter to the editor of the Chronicle of Higher Education.
He contended that it is a lack of presidential fortitude and professional wisdom
that is responsible for the growth of campus problems.
But, we have now moved from a consideration of structures for broadening decision-making to the more general topic of the nature of, and rationale for, faculty involvement in general institutional decisions, and the latter is properly a subject for separate consideration in the next portion of this monograph. Let us return to one more example a new structure for broadening decision-making. Bardwell Smith has commented on the development of the College Council at Carleton College. Inaugurated in 1971, the Council included several constituencies, seven students, seven faculty members, five administrators, two alumni and three trustees. Three policy committees were created—educational, administrative, social—with the responsibility to recommend to the Council, where authority for final approval resides. Council decisions may be challenged by any of the several constituencies; a two-thirds vote of the Council overrides the challenge. Ultimate authority for the college is still with the Board of Trustees, but the Board has delegated much of the decision-making to the local governance structure.

Smith reports on three areas of contention that emerged during the first two years of the Council's operation, and a review of these areas is instructive in pointing up issues that other such agencies have faced. The first area of contention had to do with the question of identity, of definition. There emerged "genuine confusion among all parties as to what role students, faculty, administrators, trustees and others should play in determining academic policy." The confusion was deep and stemmed from a serious concern about the basic nature of the academic community. Smith elaborates:

It should not be surprising...if instruments like college councils occasion concern about the power and authority of the faculty...about the rights of non-teaching professional staff (e.g., regarding tenure, sabbaticals, salary levels, prestige); about the appropriate role of administrators...about the meaning of trustee authority as campus affairs become immensely complex and decision-making requires intimate and continuing acquaintance with the subleties of each situation; and about alumni relationship to institutions whose changing patterns make them seem unfamiliar, even alien, from what they once were.

One specific outcome was increased concern for detailing rights and responsibilities of various groups.
The second area of contention grew out of the "recently diminished resources of higher education." Questions of how funds were to be spent quickly came to the fore. When one combines "financial exigency" with a college council approach to decision-making, the process becomes existential. The classics scholar with only taken interest heretofore in line items and planning models becomes ardently involved in discussions about what happens if one examines seriously the high cost of small classes. Students are forced to balance certain services, once taken for granted, against the possible loss of a faculty member, even that department. Faculty begin to see implications for the entire institution....

There are dangers, Smith observes, that in such situations institutions may settle just for keeping the ship afloat.

The third area of contention had to do with accountability. The call is for "more thoughtful assessment of what is going on." After the initial skirmishes there emerged support for "more thorough evaluation of teaching, academic programs and departments, and institutional commitments." In concluding his review, Smith referred to the man-hours that "can be squandered in the process" of broadening decision-making. He writes that "a balance of costs must be struck between exhaustive discussion and delegation of responsibility."

The Role of the Faculty in Governance

The categories under which this review is organized are not mutually exclusive. In referring to the emergence of new structures for broadening decision-making we have already entered into an examination of faculty role in governance. And any consideration of student role is not without implications for faculty involvement. In this section, however, we want to report on some of the broader implications of faculty participation, and in particular we shall review recent reports on tenure and collective bargaining.

In his sketch of the historical development of the governance structure in American higher education, Walter Schenkel observes that even in the post-Civil War period, "faculty participation in governance was unheard of. Faculty members in the
early universities were hired to teach. University presidents such as Gilman of Johns Hopkins and Harper of the University of Chicago made it clear that faculty participation in university governance was limited to educational concerns. University teaching emerged as a career only in the late 1800s when more advanced training for faculty led to the kind of specialization that created academic departments. The next step toward professionalization of faculty was reached with the introduction of tenure.

Until 1906, the year the Carnegie retirement plan for professors was established, a teacher had no guarantee of a secure job. Only the introduction of tenure finally made it possible for the faculty as a group to claim the right to participate, without fear of reprisal, in some areas of governance. Limited faculty control over certain aspects of the educational program had existed in some of the early universities, but the faculty received the right of control only over the educational area in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Questions over faculty status and involvement in decision-making arose infrequently before the first decade of the twentieth century. This does not mean that there were no clashes between the board of control and president and faculty; it only means that the critical questions of faculty participation in the governance of the institution awaited the development of professionalism among the faculty. Only with the rise of this professionalism, the conflicts over academic freedom, the emergence of the American Association of University Professors, and the increased stature of higher education itself did the issues of faculty involvement in institutional decision-making begin to surface.

T. R. McConnell writes that the most significant period of expansion of faculty role has been since World War II.

One of the most significant changes since World War II is the great growth of faculty power, coupled with rapid faculty professionalism. Either by formal delegation or by tacit approval, college and university faculties have attained a high degree of professional self-government.

This greater involvement and the demand for even more involvement in university affairs comes at a time, oddly enough, when faculty as professionals are also becoming
more identified with professional fields than with the institutions in which they hold appointments. Duryea comments on this paradox:

The growth of specialized knowledge in terms of disciplinary and professional associations on a national and even international basis has brought with it a concomitant outward movement of faculty members. They find their professional relationships, career lines, and related values in interinstitutional rather than internal commitments....Yet, in the main, faculties remain adamant about turning government over to administrators. The result is a dangerous antrophy in leadership within large universities during an era when leadership looms in importance.

As we have already noted, Duryea contends that the university has developed two bureaucracies. The one bureaucracy consists of the faculties who have "evolved over the past 50 years or more a hierarchy of departments, schools, and senates or executive councils, larded well with a variety of permanent and temporary committees."

And he sees this particular bureaucracy claiming the right to control "the totality of the educational operation, from admission to degree requirements and graduation certification." The other hierarchy is that of the administration. Duryea sees the administrators "congealed into a separate hierarchy grappling with immense problems of management related to a variety of essential yet supportive functions which maintain the university, not least of which is budget and financial management." The problem is that these two bureaucracies have moved farther and farther apart with the faculty remaining "committed to a traditional ideal of the university as an integrated community while giving constant evidence that they fail to grasp its real operational nature and managerial complications." On the other hand, the administrators find their "managerial tasks such consuming endeavors that they become absentminded about the nature of the academic enterprise which lies at the heart of the university's reason for existence."

One of the more helpful analyses of the present state of affairs is that of Burton Clark in his article "Faculty Organization and Authority." Clark observes that one finds what seems to be both the "collegial" and "bureaucratic" in decision-making in the university:
As we participate in our studies of various faculties in American higher education, we observe decisions being made through informal interaction among a group of peers and through a collective action of the faculty as a whole. And we have reason to characterize the faculty as a collegium. We also observe on the modern campus that information is communicated through formal channels, responsibility is fixed in formally designated positions, interaction is arranged in relations between superiors and subordinates, and decisions are based on written rules. Thus we have reason to characterize the campus as a bureaucracy.

He concludes that neither the collegial nor the bureaucratic model is satisfactory to explain all that takes place on the campus. What Clark sees as a basis for a more comprehensive explanation is the development of a "professional" model. That is to say, as the faculty has become more professional and the institution as a whole reflects more of a professional orientation, the university is neither a collegium nor a simple bureaucracy. He notes how the structure and organization of the campus has changed in recent years. The changes are in the following directions.

1. The movement from a unitary to a composite or federal structure, the emergence of the multiversity.

2. The movement from the single to multiple value systems as the faculty of a given institution becomes much more diverse.

3. The movement from non-professional to professional work as a faculty changes from general practitioners to those with specific knowledge and specialties.

4. The movement from the characteristics of a community where consensus rules to a bureaucracy where complex procedures govern decision-making.

These movements within the university have led to significant changes in the way in which the faculty exercises its authority. These changes are:

1. The segmentation of the faculty and the growth of representational systems.

2. The emergence of federated professionalism, a combination of professional development and the growth of bureaucratic authority. The campus has become a "holding company for professional groups rather than a single association of professionals."

3. The growth of individualism. The campus has become a place "where strong forces cause the growth of some individuals into centers of power."
From all of which he comes to the conclusion that we are developing a federated structure, with the campus "more like a United Nations and less like a small town." The university becomes a "loose alliance of professional man," and to keep the many components of a campus together, "we have a superimposed coordination by the administration." 90

A type of warfare develops on the campus in which the faculty develop, in Duryea's words, a "kind of academic condescension toward administrators, especially presidents and their executive staffs, which views them as servants rather than leaders of the professoriate." Indeed, Duryea finds a type of faculty schizophrenia that characterizes administrators "as minions while almost in the same breath condemning them for failure to stand firmly as defenders of the academic faith in times of crisis." 91 Further documentation of the warfare is evidenced by the many articles from faculty and administrators calling attention to the lack of insight on the part of the opposite party. We refer to an article, "The Role of Faculty in University Governance" in the *Journal of Higher Education*, the thesis of which is that "no small part of the problem in governance in higher education may be traced to the predispositions of members of the academic community to interpret the same events quite differently." 92 While in that particular article the emphasis upon the need to develop a collegial structure is perhaps overly strong and overly optimistic, the plea for developing better tools for resolving conflict and maintaining some sense of community is not overdrawn. The article was prompted in part by a paper presented at the 21st National Conference on Higher Education, "Faculty Participation in University or College Governance," by Lewis Joughin of the American Association of University Professors.

The American Council on Education published in 1968 a report by Archie R. Dykes based upon a series of personal interviews with faculty of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of a large Midwestern university. Approximately 20 percent of the College's faculty, or a total of 106 persons, was involved. Dykes found that the source of much of the tension between faculty and administration grows out of the
faculty conviction that any increase in administrative power and influence necessarily results in a decrease in their own power and influence. Dykes himself disagreed with this judgment and pointed out that faculty and administration are "fused, and each depends in considerable measure on the other." He writes that, "without strong central leadership, the mobilization of the collective efforts of faculty and administration toward the definition and attainment of institutional goals is impossible. And without his unvarying effort toward unification, a university falls into aimlessness, drift, disunity, and disarray. It becomes something other than a university."93

What Dykes refers to as "one of the most noticeable and best documented findings" of his study is the ambivalence in faculty attitudes toward participation in decision-making. On the one hand, faculty members indicated that they should have a strong, active and influential role in decisions. On the other hand, it was clear from the study that faculty members were very reticent to give the time that such a participatory role would require; he reported: "asserting that faculty participation is essential, they placed participation at the bottom of their professional priority list and deprecated their colleagues who do participate." Faculty members also exhibited a "nostalgia for the town meeting type of university government and failed to recognize the complexity of the modern institution."94 Faculty members made easy distinctions between "educational" and "noneducational" categories and failed to recognize the complexity involved. And faculty members held "an exceedingly simplistic view of the distribution of influence and power in their own community."95

A study undertaken by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California at Berkeley, with a sample of 80 colleges and universities, also explored, among other things, faculty involvement in institutional planning. They found that faculty participation in planning was "peripheral." On a number of campuses it was noted that faculty tended to view planning as an administrative task, or faculty were preoccupied with faculty-
faculty conflicts, or faculty were oriented to their disciplines. The conclusion of the authors is that planning is not considered by faculty as a legitimate part of the faculty role. Indeed, as one interviewee noted, "the faculty are the greatest drag on academic planning and innovation in the university."  

McConnell concludes that apart from some crisis, only a limited group of faculty members carry on the business for their colleagues. A relatively small number of faculty monopolize the membership of the most powerful committees. Oligarchies take over the machinery of faculty government. He refers to a study of senate committee membership at the University of Minnesota in which it was found that 10 percent of the staff had served in a period of three years on three to six different committees. At Fresno State in California, 56 persons out of 417 eligible served on three or more major senate committees. Generalizing on these and other studies, McConnell writes:

The emergence of oligarchies or ruling elites is normal in democratic polities. Political analysts have divided the voting population into gladiators, spectators, and apathetics. Gladiators, a relatively small corps of "professionals" constituting something like a tenth of the population, are the political activists....This small group governs without consultation except with the particular minorities or clienteles affected by their decisions....The same categories apply to the academic community. Since the faculty senate or the faculty as a whole, especially in large and complex institutions, lacks the capacity to make decisions expeditiously and to act accordingly, the gladiators or oligarchs carry on the day-to-day business.

Faculty are ambivalent. There is the desire to be involved, but there is also a disdaining for involvement--and, after all, only 10 percent of the faculty do become involved.

Mason, in his review of the literature on governance, reports much the same pattern of faculty response. And, after discussing the strengths and weaknesses of senates, he points to the department as the "core unit of the faculty."
The importance of the department to the faculty can hardly be exaggerated. It is the one structure of the university where loyalty to the discipline is often combined with loyalty to the institution. Moreover, it is—in many institutions—the one place where meaningful participation in important decision-making is experienced by all faculty members. The department is autonomous in many crucial respects and provides shelter and protection to its faculty.

In examining reported research on the department, Mason contends that the department, with all of its problems, "is likely to be the most effective and collegial unit of the university."101

In their analysis of departmental structures, Paul Dressel and his associates likewise refer to the department as "the refuge and support of the professor" and as the "key unit for the academic." If there is any measure of faculty involvement in planning and decision-making, it appears to be at the departmental level. Yet departments tend to be relatively isolated and preoccupied with their own concerns.102 The writers point up some of the problems in departmental organization and predict the growth of the institute as a nondepartmental structure that will grow in importance. Ikenberry's article, to which reference was earlier made, also notes the problems in departmental organization and argues for a revision of organization in terms of function, a revision that would call for developing more "task oriented units."103

While there are variations in the department as noted by Dressel and Ikenberry, the basic strength of the department seems not to have abated, and faculty participation tends to continue to be at the departmental level, although the department often relatively divorced from the concerns of the institution as a whole.

In discussing the problem of participation in decision-making and efficiency in decision-making, David Schimmel argues for what he calls "conditional decision-making." The process would be to have administrative officer, president, dean, or department head, make a conditional decision and then refer the matter to a committee with the reasons supporting the decision proposed. Copies of the decision and the reasons would be issued to all faculty and students affected, and if 10 percent of
the faculty and students did not register their objection, the decision would become final. If there were opposition, there would be opportunity to find out about the opposition and to work through to another possible solution.

**Collective Bargaining**—In June, 1974 there were 338 campuses on which faculty members had chosen collective bargaining agents. This number represented 92 percent of the 367 institutions on which elections had been held to determine whether a bargaining agent should be appointed. This figure constitutes 70 more institutions than were reported 18 months previously. In this interim the AAUP had increased the number of institutions for which it served as bargaining agency from 13 to 29, more than double its previously reported group. And, four-year campuses with collective bargaining had increased from 122 to 133. The most rapidly growing group in the collective bargaining camp was the two-year institutions. These had increased from 147 to 205. In October, 1972, four-year institutions constituted 45 percent of the institutions with bargaining agents while in June, 1974 they constituted 39.3 percent. When the American Federation of Teachers elected a new president in the summer of 1974, the organization announced that it would "allocate a larger proportion of its resources to organizing at the college, university, and post-secondary-school level" and the new president, Albert Shanker, referred to higher education as one of the major areas where the AFT would concentrate its efforts. "Higher education is one of the great areas of organizing that is available to us," he said. The AFT campus membership is now some 35,000. It is difficult to generalize over such a short period of time, and while it is tempting to do so, it is probably inappropriate to suggest that the process of collective bargaining is slowing down among four-year institutions. However one views the figures, well over 10 percent of higher educational institutions have entered into some type of collective bargaining arrangement.
The way in which collective bargaining has been, or seems to have been, accepted by faculty in four-year institutions is perhaps indicated by reference to the process whereby AAUP moved from opposing collective bargaining to becoming a bargaining agent. In reporting on its fall 1969 meeting, AAUP's Academe stated that while in accordance with the action taken the Association recognizes the right of the state to pass legislation providing for collective bargaining by faculty members, it urges public agencies charged with the administration of such laws to discharge their responsibilities in a manner consistent with the principles of academic self-government and institutional autonomy. It does go on to indicate that if faculties are interested in collective bargaining, they should turn to the AAUP as their representative. Officially, however, the AAUP was reluctant in accepting collective bargaining.108

In 1972, the outgoing president of the AAUP, Sanford Kadish, argued against the principle of collective bargaining. He said that a strike "proceeds by deliberately harming the educational mission in order to provoke the personal employee interest, in contradiction to the service ideal of subordinating personal interest to the advancement of the purposes of the university." He went on to say that the collective bargaining process "tends to remit issues which faculty should themselves determine to outside agencies, such as state and federal boards, arbitrators, and union bureaucracies."109

In a story referring to the contract negotiations between the City University of New York and two faculty unions, the Chronicle of Higher Education pointed up some of the problems collective bargaining posed for the professors. It was suggested that in collective bargaining seniority will probably determine promotions and salary rather than the traditional reliance upon merit, however merit is defined. Moreover binding arbitration could come into conflict with the practice of having professors evaluated by their peers for promotion and tenure. There will be problem of deciding who belongs to the faculty unit and who, strictly speaking, is the management of the university.110
At its annual meeting in May, 1972, the AAUP voted overwhelmingly, 373 to 54, to endorse a recommendation that the AAUP "pursue collective bargaining as a major additional way of realizing the Association's goals." While the vote was overwhelming, some of the delegates and leaders did not agree with the decision. They argued that by moving into collective bargaining the AAUP would damage its traditional activities, especially those dealing with academic freedom and tenure. One consequence of the decision was that the Association of American Colleges in July of that year in effect recommended to its 800 member colleges that they not continue to participate in the AAUP annual salary survey.

In the meantime the American Federation of Teachers, founded in 1916 as an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor, had from its early days some college professors among its members. It was in the 1960s, however, with the organization of the New York City teachers that the AFT began to become a significant factor. In June 1974, the AFT accounted for 80 of the 338 organized groups. It was also during the 1960s that the National Education Association emerged as a full-fledged teacher's union. Currently, either directly or through merged affiliates, the NEA accounts for 195 units. Apparently the NEA intends to become even more active, because in July 1974 it voted more than $1,000,000 in its fund for organizing college professors and created a Special Project in Higher Education to coordinate its organizing efforts. Reference has already been made to the subsequent announcement by the AFT that it would be increasing its efforts.

What are the possible consequences of the development collective bargaining among college professors? Ladd and Lipset, in a volume prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, suggest that it is still "too early to tell what degree of difference unionization will make in university life." Yet they observe that unionization will almost inevitably eliminate salary differentials for aspects other than seniority; generally speaking, collective bargaining will work against any general system of merit payment. There will also be a tendency to use seniority as a basis...
for reappointment and tenure. Persons employed will be expected after a "probationary" period of time to proceed into tenured positions. They will probably insist that administrative officers not have the power to review faculty peer evaluations by seeking outside judgments of the candidate’s qualifications.

Collective bargaining will probably also have some impact upon governance. Many aspects of the professor’s activity will be determined by the negotiations between the bargaining agency and "management" and in complex state systems, "management" may be a state board of commission. While existing faculty governance groups will not necessarily be eliminated, they may have less to say about the faculty member’s activity and conditions of service. Contracts already negotiated have included a wide range of concerns, all the way from appointment and tenure policies to travel funds, academic calendar, fringe benefits, and curricular matters.\(^{113}\)

Ladd and Lipset suggest that collective bargaining may also have some impact upon faculty-student relations. Indeed, picking up on comments of Myron Lieberman they suggest that there may even be the development of strong student unions that will seek to participate in bargaining between faculty and administration.\(^{114}\)

In a survey conducted under the auspices of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Ladd and Lipset found that 59 percent of the respondents (a total of 60,028 faculty members) said that there is a place for faculty collective bargaining on the campus and 47 percent agreed that faculty strikes could be legitimate action. In a subsequent survey involving a sample of the larger group and undertaken in 1972, some 43 percent agreed that the recent growth in unionization was beneficial and should be extended, and another 13 percent reported themselves to be uncertain. Some 44 percent disagreed that the extension of unionization was beneficial.\(^{115}\)

In his assessment of the impact of collective bargaining on the university, William B. Boyd wrote that the evidence is already available that under conditions of collective bargaining "the system of governance will become more explicit, more uniform and more centralized." On matters which have been vague or variable, the
bargaining table will attempt to clarify and define. Boyd was not convinced that all of this will be to the good. He suggested that something of value is lost and that on most campuses the result will be the increase in board power at the expense of faculty power. "Ambiguity and a willingness to leave certain questions unraised have been important for the rise of faculty power. Explicitness and a demand for legalism will... now contribute to a renaissance of board power." Personal policies will become more formal, uniform and centralized. Departmental and school autonomy will probably be reduced. Whereas decisions on faculty appointments, reappointment, promotion, pay increases and terminations have been initiated at the board level, these decisions are more likely to be administrative decisions, where administrators are agents of the board. He suggested also that the technique and tone of administration will be changed. Collective bargaining inevitably places the administration into more of a management role. 

Duryea and Fisk carry the analysis further. They argue, in one way contrary to Boyd, that collective bargaining will improve the opportunities for faculty to become involved in decision-making. During the bargaining procedure it is possible that faculties will be able to deal with a broader range of matters, not only personnel considerations but "decisions on the mission of the university itself." Grievance procedures will also provide opportunities for appeal from administrative decisions. Yet the bargaining process is a two-edged sword. And it may be possible for the state or board to stipulate or insist upon a more "finite and precise kind of accountability from faculty members, including such perquisites as sabbaticals or considerations such as teaching load, time and facilities for research, and student-faculty ratios." Conditions of faculty service in a very broad sense can become subjects for negotiation.

The writers see some problems. The bargaining process is costly of time and effort. Senior faculty members "may be deeply troubled by their affiliation with what can be called by no other name than 'union'." They face the tension of seeing
themselves as employee and at the same time as professional entrepreneur--researcher, scholar, consultant.

Duryea and Fisk also see in the conflict between autonomy and accountability the possibility that institutions may regain some of their autonomy. That is to say, in the bargaining process, the academic bargaining units may serve as counterforces to the trend toward external control from the state. They suggest that faculty organizations may have to compete effectively with boards for power and authority. Written contracts will replace by-laws.

In an article to which reference has already been made, Myron Lieberman sees the unionization of college and university faculties as "one of the most important developments in higher education in the next decade." He points out that over 65 percent of the nation's schoolteachers are involved in collective bargaining, and he sees a parallel development in higher education. But he sees, and approves, the end of "faculty self-government." He calls this self-government irresponsible and says that the advent of unionization will "inject a measure of management accountability into these matters." He agrees with Boyd in that he finds college and university administrators moving more into management-type roles. However, he predicts that governing boards will lose power, and he sees faculty unions stimulating the organization of student unions.

In a sense James Olsen also recognizes the possibility of the growth of student groups. He suggests that "almost invariably, collective bargaining agreements ignore the student interest...and abrogate the student voice and role gained in recent years." This will lead to inevitable clashes between student leaders and faculty units. Into the situation the administration will have to move, and Olsen sees the administration becoming more of a management group. What is required is "straight-forward, unadorned management and monitoring--functions which require an administration to plan, control, and coordinate the efficient use of the institution's resources."
It is clear that observers of the same developments come up with rather different conclusions as to the long-range consequences. We have entered into a new set of conditions, and individual institutions cannot ignore the developments. Matters will not take care of themselves. Philip Semas refers to collective bargaining as being at the threshold of becoming higher education's "issue of the decade." The Education Commission of the States suggests that "no single item seems to portend more controversy than that likely to be generated by the emergence of collective bargaining." Yet Carol Shulman observes, "Faculty collective bargaining, once a radical departure in faculty-administrative relations, is becoming a familiar and permanent feature on many campuses."

Paul Dressel and his colleagues take a fairly dim view of the development:

Higher education is closer to accepting collective bargaining than many believe. Interventions into departmental and university autonomy, tight budgets, and demands for increased faculty teaching loads will accelerate the trend. Faculty members should begin to consider the sort of organization they want to represent their interests. The choice lies to a large degree between an organization that cherishes traditions and one that has experience as a tough negotiator. The "haves" (tenure, position, and high salary) tend to prefer the former; the "have nots," the latter.

University administrators lack experience and usually continue to act on a collegial base. Many of them are "haves," cherish freedom, and do not listen to demands for equality. This posture, buttressed by inexperience, allows unions to make great initial gains and win swift support.

Collective bargaining upsets the role of middle management. Faculty salary and load differences can be maintained when department, college, and university middle managers make decisions about wages, hours, and working conditions. When such decisions are made by the entire faculty and by direct faculty negotiations with the board, it is doubtful that freedom to maintain reasoned imbalances will remain.

Almost certainly, collective bargaining in higher education will move to state-wide or system-wide levels and in the process destroy much of the autonomy of the separate campuses. Thus, collective bargaining in a state system of higher education will ultimately promote centralization of decision making. Collective bargaining will contravene the individual and departmental autonomy for which many faculty members have battled so long.
But Edward J. Bloustein, President of Rutgers University, speaking out of his experience, is much more favorably disposed, particularly in the light of the kind of contract arrived at for Rutgers.\textsuperscript{124} He states that the system of governance will and should be more explicit; that academic quality does not go down; that deterioration of departmental and school autonomy is not necessarily bad; that the management role thrust on administrators should have been assumed long ago; that the functions of university senates are not necessarily curtailed; that collegiality had already broken down, collective bargaining or not; and that bargaining is not devoid of reasoning and consensus-making.

Leon Epstein examines collective bargaining within the general context of the governing process and is much closer to Paul Dressel and his colleagues than to President Bloustein. Epstein writes, "Starkly stated, collective bargaining is a conception of government in which staff members organize as employees to exercise power through bilateral negotiations," and he sees in this process little chance for professors to continue to act "as quasi-independent practitioners who share managerial authority" even if they continue to want to do so. Under collective bargaining there must be an "identifiable management" as something apart from "employees and their representatives." The negotiations may be limited to matters of salary and work conditions or may extend to broader policy questions, but in either case, argues Epstein, "collective bargaining introduces a measure of bilateral government distinguishable both from unfettered hierarchical authority and from pure professional self-government."\textsuperscript{125} And Epstein sees collective bargaining thus changing the roles of professors, other staff members, state officials, trustees, administrators and students. For state institutions he sees more patterns developing in which the negotiations will be between the faculty unions and legislators, governors, and their staffs rather than with the administrators and regents—and reaching these authorities is essentially a lobbying process, a new role for faculty members.
As an aside, it may be noted that in President Bloustein's State of New Jersey the faculty of the state institutions—except those of the community colleges and Rutgers—went out on strike in the fall of 1974. This was the first strike to affect an entire multi-college system. The Chancellor of the state system, in commenting on the settlement brought about by the Governor's back-to-work order, said that the ending of the strike only strengthened the faculty in the opinion that "they can go directly to the governor and get things fixed up." Epstein's prediction seems to have been borne out—faculty unions will bypass administration and regents. The report in the Chronicle the following week detailed the steps leading to the governor's intervention.

Kenneth Mortimer and Gregory Lozier have been conducting a long-range research project on collective bargaining with particular reference to developments in the state of Pennsylvania. Among the issues they have been examining is whether collective bargaining has had much of an effect on internal decision-making processes. In reviewing the limited number of contracts available, they found one that provided for faculty input in the selection of college presidents, two have provisions for selecting academic deans, three set procedures for selecting department chairmen. So far the status of faculty senates is unclear, although the authors think the senates may actually be supported in collective bargaining agreements. Some agreements refer to faculty committee organization, and the structure provisions are "not radically unlike three in existence at many four-year institutions." The general conclusion of the authors, however, is that the whole process is too new to allow any definitive statements on impacts.

In his examination of the impact of collective bargaining on faculty senates, based in large part on an analysis of developments in New Jersey, James Begin finds at this early stage the collective bargaining process seems to have "enhanced the development of cooperative rather than competitive relationship" between senates and bargaining agents. He notes that a number of patterns are emerging for
faculty participation in decision-making in collective bargaining "which do not necessarily lead to the demise of traditional procedures."130

In the midst of what seems to be a good bit of conflicting opinion, Phillip Semas finds in his review of three recent books on collective bargaining that the "main problem for writers in the field is that even those scholars who know the most about faculty bargaining don't know very much as they themselves will freely admit."131 He suggests that the rapid growth "and often surprising shifts in the faculty-unionism movement breed humility among those who try to study it." In the meantime, the movement continues, and as Semas noted earlier in the year, 1974-75 was destined to see "the most aggressive campaigns so far to organize college professors into unions."132 The National Education Association was committing one million dollars to "basic organizing" of college professors, the American Federation of Teachers was launching a "substantial" effort, and a political activist, James D. Duffey, had been selected to head up the American Association of University Professors as the new general secretary. While organizing efforts were to concentrate in states that have laws giving professors the right to unionize, professors in other states, such as Ohio and Colorado, were working to gain bargaining rights without state legislation.133

Tenure.--The concern for the meaning and place of tenure in the contemporary university has been aroused as much by the financial stringencies of institutions as by collective bargaining. Public reaction to the developments in colleges and universities in the late 1960s and early 1970s have also caused the general public as well as board members to ask whether there ought not to be a stronger stand by boards of trustees in the affairs of the university.

At the 1972 meeting of the American Association for Higher Education, Florence Moog, Professor in the Department of Biology, Washington University in St. Louis, argued that tenure was obsolete, "in a period when public confidence in universities sinks as costs rise, when students are dissatisfied and young scholars
are frustrated by the shrinking job market, a system lacking effective accountability is indeed obsolete. The frequent attacks on the tenure system in recent years are a danger signal that ought to be heeded.\textsuperscript{134} She proposed in place of the current system of tenure a series of contracts, short contracts of one to three years, followed by longer contracts of perhaps as much as seven years. In such a way, she argued, it would be possible to restore some degree of accountability to academia.

Walter F. Metzger places the current debate over academic tenure within a broader historical context. He suggests that since the emergence of the western university, in each of its ages "some kind of tenure was established—tenure as privilege, tenure as time, tenure as judicadity."\textsuperscript{135} In the medieval university tenure was secured by virtue of admission to the guild of the Masters, and "expulsion from this body could be directly effected not by an outside agency but only by the body itself." In the developing American institutions, without the presence of a scholarly class, the relationship between the teachers and the institution became contractual and appointment was for a period of time, generally a short period of time. The practice was to appoint faculty for a year, "vacating their positions at the end of term, and reappointing only those among the previous incumbents who could pass a de novo test."\textsuperscript{136}

At the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century, while technically faculty members were still appointed for one-year terms, the practice was to provide a kind of indefinite tenure. Out of the conflicts in the early 1900s the call for the formation of a national association of professors led to the establishment in January 1915 of the American Association of University Professors. The 1915 General Report on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure is referred to as the "philosophical birth cry of the Association." Among other things, the report called for clear understandings as to the term of appointments and called for a kind of due process in case of dismissals. This was followed by the statement in 1925 and subsequently
in 1940 and 1958. Metzger suggests that the 1940 and 1958 statements "adopted the model of the Civil Service and the model of the criminal court." The 1958 statement was the "Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Hearings." In 1968 there was adopted "Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure."^{137}

As the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education observes, "In the current debate about academic tenure, old arguments have been repeated, earlier arguments have been adapted to new contexts, and new arguments have emerged from concerns not central to earlier periods of crisis in the history of tenure."^{138}

The Committee lists the major arguments for and against tenure. In abbreviated form, the arguments against tenure are: Since academic freedom must be assured to all teachers, academic tenure is not essential to academic freedom, but what is essential is academic due process; tenure imposes inflexible financial burdens upon institutions; it diminishes an institution's opportunity to recruit and retain younger faculty; it leads to diminished emphasis on quality undergraduate teaching; it encourages the perpetuation of established departments and specialties; diminishes accountability and fosters mediocrity; forces decisions on permanent appointments before an institution has time to assess an individual's competence; encourages controversy and litigation about non-renewal of probationary contracts and denial of tenure; provides a cloak under which irresponsible political activity can be carried on; commits the institution but not the individual; concentrates power in the hands of professors on permanent appointments and thus diminishes the role of students and younger faculty members in university affairs.

In support of tenure are the following arguments: It is an essential of academic freedom; creates an atmosphere favorable to academic freedom for all—the non-tenured as well as the tenured; contributes to institutional stability and spirit; assures that judgments of professional fitness will be made on professional grounds; forces decisions at definite times regarding retention; attracts men and
women of ability into the teaching profession; helps offset generally lower financial rewards of higher education by providing security.

The Committee suggests that if the tenure system is compared to a contract system, a series of term contracts, tenure is considered less adequate because: The contract commits a faculty member to an institution for the period of his contract; potential non-renewal provides incentive to good performance; contracts permit greater flexibility in institutional planning; and contract arrangements are conducive to educational flexibility. On the other hand, tenure is presumably superior to the contract system in that: Persons under temporary contract may be influenced to support candidacy of others in the hope of retaining their own contracts—or to oppose renewal in the hope of improving their chances; under the contract system the role of administrative officers will increase and that of faculty decrease; continuing exposure to uncertainties of contract renewal have a detrimental effect upon faculty morale and performance; there is no reason to expect better teaching under contract system than under any other system; contract arrangements do not necessarily lead to innovation; there is no evidence that the contract provisions encourage more flexibility; and there is no evidence that the contract system assures academic freedom for all through due-process procedures.

Meanwhile, as of an April 1972 survey, it was estimated that tenure plans were in effect in all public and private universities and public four-year colleges, in 94 percent of the public colleges and in more than two-thirds of the two-year colleges, public and private. An estimated 94 percent of the faculty members in American colleges and universities were employed in institutions that confer some kind of tenure. Surveys conducted under the auspices of the Carnegie Commission and the American Council on Education suggest that just under 50 percent of the faculty members in the United States were on tenure. But since this includes both full and part-time faculty, it is probably the case that a somewhat higher proportion of the full-time faculty are on tenure.
Subsequently, the American Council on Education conducted another study to update the 1972 study. That study found no overall change between 1972 and 1974. Tenure systems were found to be "nearly universal" among universities and four-year colleges and were also found in two-thirds of the two-year institutions. There was, however, an upward shift in percentage of full-time faculty holding tenure--59 percent of the colleges with tenure systems reported half or more of the full-time faculty on tenure, compared to 43 percent so reporting in 1972. There appeared to be a slight drop in the percentage of faculty formally considered for tenure who were advanced to tenure. There was also a shift of sorts toward longer probationary periods for tenure, particularly among four-year colleges and universities under public control. In procedures, a third of the institutions reported changes in review policies, and other institutions were reviewing their systems.

In reviewing the ACE report, Phillip Semas stated that tenure was being challenged by three emerging forces--hard times in higher education, collective bargaining and affirmative action. Having survived the "rhetorical attacks" of the late 1960s and early 1970s, tenure now faced more formidable powers, forces which might not destroy tenure but which had already "led many colleges to review their tenure systems."

In an earlier review, Semas commented on the annual report of the AAUP, "while mass firings of faculty members because of the colleges' financial problems have drawn the greatest public attention during the past year," there are still many cases that reflect the more traditional concerns about academic freedom. The AAUP is reported to have approximately 700 cases "currently open, about 200 of whom are related to financial exigency. Yet many of these cases involve untenured professors. Two years earlier 85 percent of the cases involved untenured professors, although one executive of the Association suggested that the proportion involving tenured professors has gone up recently."
While in some of the academic freedom cases, the contention was that tenure had been denied because of certain positions or actions of a candidate, there were still relatively few cases in which tenured persons had been dismissed—although the AAUP indicates an increase in the number of cases brought to its attention involving dismissal for incompetence.

The question of tenure most often arises when individuals are dismissed or released for financial exigencies. Two of the cases that came into prominence during late 1973 and early 1974 were those of Bloomfield College and Southern Illinois University. At Bloomfield the decision to reduce the budget by one-fourth led to a further decision to reduce the faculty from 72 to 54 by 1974. Among those released, 11 were tenured faculty. At the beginning of 1974, Southern Illinois University terminated the employment of 104 faculty members, of whom 28 were tenured professors. The University referred to enrollment declines and budget cuts as a basis for the dismissals. In both cases lawsuits have been brought. In the case of Bloomfield, the AAUP brought suit on behalf of the Bloomfield professors; the AAUP has been elected the bargaining agent for the college's faculty. It was reported in July, 1974 that the Superior Court Judge, to whom the suit had been brought, ruled in favor of the Bloomfield faculty. The position he took was that the action of the administration and trustees was primarily to bring about "the abolition of tenure at Bloomfield College, not alleviation of financial stringency." The college had abolished tenure in June 1973 and subsequently dismissed 13 faculty members, of whom 11 were on tenure. Subsequently, the college filed for bankruptcy and as of August, 1974 the college was placed under court receivership.

At Southern Illinois, the university filed a class-action suit against six representative faculty members to prevent the 104 who were dismissed from taking the university to court or making appeals through the university's internal structure. Subsequently, in June, 1974 the university dropped its suit against the staff members. Then, at the end of the month, it sought to reconstitute the suit against
19 faculty members with whom it had not reached any agreement. In the meantime, the University had reached settlement with 56 of the faculty and staff members, either providing new jobs or providing a cash settlement. The University indicated that for an additional 29 it had no obligation, since they were on one-year contracts. But no agreement had been reached with the 19.147

At the same time, a federal judge in Wisconsin ruled that the Constitution provides only limited protection for tenured faculty members who are laid off because of their university's financial troubles. A preliminary injunction had been sought by 38 faculty members dismissed by the University of Wisconsin, and Judge James E. Boyle had denied the injunction while indicating that it was up to the state government, not the federal courts, to determine when financial exigency required dismissal of tenured professors. He ruled that "faculty members are entitled only to an opportunity to prove that they were laid off arbitrarily or for exercising their Constitutional rights" and that the university had followed the "minimal procedures" for dismissal, furnishing each individual with a written statement of the basis for the initial decision, furnishing each person with a "reasonably adequate description of the manner in which the initial decision had been arrived at," making reasonably adequate disclosure of the data employed, and providing each individual an opportunity to respond. The 38 professors were among 88 who had been notified in May that they would be dismissed in June. The university had indicated to the 88 that they could retain their position as tenured faculty members without duties or pay and that they would have first opportunity at any new openings. Fifty of the 88 subsequently resigned or reached settlements with the university.148

An Iowa District Judge ruled in August, 1974 that the University of Dubuque had the right to fire a tenured professor in 1972 because of the university's financial problems. The ruling was made after a jury hearing in which the jury failed to reach a verdict. A mistrial had been declared, and the attorneys for the university asked the judge for a directed verdict. His verdict was in contrast to
the decision of Judge Antell in the Bloomfield case. Spokesman for the Iowa higher education association charged that the decision "would effectively destroy the concept of tenure."149

An untenured assistant professor at San Jose State University filed suit when he was denied tenure in the spring of 1974. He had been recommended by colleagues in the School of Education for tenure, but on the recommendation of the Dean, the President of San Jose State decided not to grant tenure, and the professor's appointment was terminated. The professor there turned to the university grievance procedure. The hearing officer upheld the earlier decision, and the President again approved the professor's termination. In his suit, the professor charged that as a faculty member he was being placed in double jeopardy, because the President had the final decision in both the promotion process and the grievance procedure.150

A decision on behalf of the professor could have "repercussions for grievance procedures throughout the country" since the practice followed at San Jose is "a fairly common practice among colleges."151

Victor G. Rosenblum, in summarizing his observations on the legal dimensions of tenure finds what he refers to as a "paucity of definitive legal content regarding tenure," and suggests as a general principle "once a professor has tenure, his rights should be well protected." He goes on to say, however, there are differences in the approach of public and private institutions. A tenure plan under a governing board of a public institution is generally considered as a form of sub-legislation having the force of law, while in a private institution any right to tenure is contractual rather than statutory. And he notes that in a public institution, any dismissal contrary to the tenure plan "can generally be followed by an order to reinstate the teacher, since the discharge was, in effect, beyond the board's authority and contrary to state law" while in a private institution "courts will not decree specific performance of personal service contracts" and "a specific order of reinstatement will not ordinarily follow a conclusion that a contract has been breached through failure to observe its tenure provisions."152
Rosenblum suggests that in most cases, the courts have been more concerned about whether or not due-process has been followed than with regard to norms or doctrines about tenure. The nine principles he sees emerging are indicated below:

(1) Questions of tenure as such have played comparatively minor roles in judicial development of applicable norms and doctrines.
(2) Courts have been less interested in allocating rights on a stratified basis between tenured and nontenured faculty than in examining basic due-process and First Amendment questions that can affect the whole academic community, at least in the public sector.
(3) The courts have stressed procedure in public institutions, entitling faculty there to adequate notice, hearing, and opportunity for representation before they can be dismissed.
(4) Judicial recognition has been accorded the principle that public employees should not lose their jobs because of their exercise of substantive constitutional rights such as free speech.
(5) Dismissal or firing is not equated legally with nonrenewal of a teaching appointment.
(6) Constitutional procedural protection is assured tenured faculty in public institutions, but nontenured faculty can be certain of constitutional protection only against dismissal in the course of an employment contract.
(7) Constitutional procedural protection is available to a nontenured faculty member contesting nonrenewal of a contract if he can show initially that nonrenewal was due to his exercise of a constitutional right.
(8) These developments with regard to public institutions do not have automatic counterparts in private institutions in the absence of contractual provisions or demonstrable customs embodying them.
(9) Thus courts can offer little certainty of protection to the aggrieved professor in the private sector who feels that his tenure rights have been invaded; for the distinctive quality of the typical private institution's tenure system is what is in substance a private grievance machinery operating under privately developed standards.

He concludes that the courts have not yet begun to deal with tenure as such, and he argues that before further action is taken, the academic community itself must be much clearer in defining tenure or "a judicial in loco parentis (will)...take control."

The Commission on Academic Tenure released its report in March, 1973. The work of the Commission was co-sponsored by the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges and covered a ten-month period in 1971-72. Coming out strongly for tenure--"the commission sees no ground for believing that the alternatives to tenure that are now in rise or that have been proposed can deal more effectively with these problems than would a strengthened...
and renewed system of tenure"—the report also acknowledged that "the principle of tenure...will not long survive unless reform of its abuses and elimination of weaknesses are vigorously pursued." Robert Jacobson estimated that as many as 100 colleges that were considering taking steps to modify or replace tenure "held back, at least temporarily, because of a strong endorsement of tenure by a national commission." When at the annual meeting of the AAUP in May 1973, the report was reviewed, the Association took exception to what appeared to be a recommendation for establishing quotas for tenured faculty (Recommendation 19). The Commission recommended that each institution formulate a "faculty staffing plan," under which "an appropriate number of tenure positions...are available for allocation to any unit where they may be needed." In its interpretation of this recommendation, the Commission made reference to the necessity of an institution facing the question "of the proper ratio of the tenured to nontenured faculty." The Association passed a resolution calling tenure quotas "an expedient dangerous to academic freedom and academic life." In a commentary on the Commission report and another collection of essays on tenure, Dabney Park, Jr., contends that both books fail to recognize that tenure rather than guaranteeing academic freedom "is probably the greatest single source of violations of academic freedom," that the "marriage of tenure and collective bargaining poses serious threats to the future," that tenure "is one of the most formidable obstacles to educational change and improvement to be found in the educational world today," that students "receive short shrift from the tenure system," and that the Commission's suggestion of a quote system is untimely and dangerous. The American Federation of Teachers also attacked the Commission report and the subsequent stand of the AAUP that "Stricter standards for awarding of tenure can be developed over the years with the consequent decreases in the probability of achieving tenure." Such a stand, contended the AFT, would allow the administration to
impose quotas indirectly. In New Jersey, the State Board of Higher Education, however, adopted in 1972 a policy that required the state's four-year and two-year colleges to impose either "specific restrictions or more intensive and rigorous review procedures" in any award of tenure. The state affiliate of the National Education Association, the bargaining agent for faculty members in the state college system filed suit in an attempt to have the policy thrown out, but the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the policy of the Board of Higher Education.

By the fall of 1974 the AAUP had begun to modify some earlier stands on tenure. Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure in November, 1974, approved a revision of the 1972 "Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure." While holding that no tenured person should be terminated in favor of retaining a faculty member without tenure, the Committee recognized that the financial situation could become so bad that the college would have to lay off professors. In situations where positions had to be terminated, the faculty should be involved at every step in the process. It were better if no layoffs should occur, but if they were inevitable, faculty should participate in decisions regarding the steps to be taken. Tenure was becoming, all protests to the contrary, a contingent kind of thing.

Institutional Accountability and The Board of Trustees

Another issue of current debate in college and university administration relates to determining the appropriate role of the board of control. In California, the board has entered directly into the internal operations of the university system and has been criticized for so doing by faculty and administration. Some presidents in other circumstances seem to take pride in being able to report that they keep the board concentrating on approving budgets and building plans and keep them relatively ignorant of the internal operations of the institution. In the meantime both faculties and students are seeking more direct access to the board of control, both to engage members of the board in discussion and debate and to achieve membership on the board.
Some years ago, H. M. Chambers in an article entitled "Who Is The University?" answered:

The university does not exist for its faculty, nor even for its students, alone. It is a servant of society, and each of its individual agents, of whatever class or level, is in a sense a servant of the public. Therefore, the university is appropriately governed, in the eyes of the law, by a body of men and women chosen as representatives of the general public. This body—the governing board, constituting a single artificial person—legally is the university.  

This statement may be contrasted with the observation by Steven V. Roberts in a discussion of the battle at UCLA over the status of Angela Davis in which Roberts states:

More important, the issue calls into question the basic relationship between the regents and the university. Who is boss? Twenty-four men, most of them appointed by the Governor, who have little expertise in the field? Or the faculties and the administration of the universities nine campuses?  

And thus the issue is joined. What is the role of the board of control in the contemporary university?  

Early in its history American higher education became committed to a system of lay government, a system in which the major decisions were to be made by boards of non-resident governors who were not teachers. With regard to this structure, Richard Hofstadter observes that it has:

created special problems for free teaching and scholarship in America. The essence of lay government is that the trustees, not the faculties, are, in law, the college or university, and that legally they can hire and fire faculty members and make almost all the decisions governing the institution. This has hampered the development of organization, initiative, and self-confidence among American college professors, and it has contributed, along with many other forces in American life, to lowering their status in the community. Other professional groups have far greater power to determine the standards and conduct of their own professions.

The American system of lay government was not planned by the founders of the colonial college, but it rather grew out of the conditions of religious and social life in the new world. The first two colonial colleges, Harvard and William and Mary,
attempted at the beginning to follow the governmental patterns of the ancient English colleges and place control in the hands of the faculty. The problem was that when the colleges were established in the New World there was no established body of scholars, and it was difficult, if not impossible, to commit the college to a group of men yet unknown and unchosen and to give to this group the full powers of management and of resources. Both of these colleges developed dual boards, at Harvard, a Board of Overseers and a Corporation, at William and Mary, a Board of Visitors and the President and Masters. Shortly after the beginning of the 19th century, the Harvard Corporation had become essentially a lay group, and at William and Mary the President and Masters apparently never developed any great power. In the creation of the third and fourth colonial colleges the governing power was clearly placed in a lay board. The first charter of Yale (1701) gave the trustees the authority to "erect, form, direct, order, establish, improve and at all times and in all suitable ways for the future to encourage" the new school. Princeton (1746) began under a charter which granted all powers of government to the trustees.

Over the years boards of control appear to have exercised significant power in directing the course of American colleges and universities. Perhaps as much as anything, the academic freedom debates at the turn of the century and during the early years of the 20th century served to increase the autonomy of the institution. Some would suggest that until the latter part of the 1960s, with the emergence of dissent and revolt, boards of control had become relatively ineffective and powerless. This is an over-generalization, and there are certainly exceptions, but the broad generalization can probably be documented.

One of the first more or less systematic studies of boards of control was that produced by Hubert T. Beck. He observed that board members hardly represented the general population. They came almost entirely from the wealthy and more conservative elements within the general population. He questioned whether these men and women could understand sufficiently the nature of the problems facing American colleges and universities. Later, Jencks and Riesman observed:
We did not think colleges were primarily shaped by the boards that formally control them, since they were much more alike than their boards. Still less do we believe that the character of colleges depends on who appoints and regulates the board. Colleges are shaped by many interest groups, a few exercise their influence through representation on the board, but most do not.167

Differing with the conclusion of Jencks and Riesman, Rodney T. Hartnett, in a more recent study of the boards of directors undertaken under the auspices of the Educational Testing Service states:

Those who would argue that the trustee holds no authority or influence need only to examine some of the trustee attitudes regarding academic freedom against the backdrop of trustee faculty conflicts. In the fall of 1968, for example, the regents of the University of California voted to withhold regular college credit for a series of speeches by Eldridge Cleaver.168

Hartnett was responsible for a questionnaire study of boards of control in connection with the revision of Morton Rauh's book on college trustees. In collaboration with Rauh, he developed a questionnaire which was mailed to trustees of over 500 colleges and universities. Responses were received from more than 5,000 board members. On the basis of the trustee response to an eight-page questionnaire Hartnett concluded:

(1) It is naive to speak of "the college trustee" as if he could be easily and accurately described and the description thus provided were generalizable to all trustees. Though summaries of the data yield modal patterns, the important point is that there is a great deal of diversity between and among trustees serving on boards of different types of institutions. So while it is true and perhaps even informative to say that trustees are very often business executives, it is also true that trustees of private colleges are very often clergymen. Even the simple matter of how much time trustees spend on board-related activities varies widely across different types of institutions.

(2) The disclaimer above notwithstanding, the modal or "typical" trustee can be described as white, male, in his late 50's, well educated and financially very successful. His current college or university board membership is his first, and he serves on only one board.

(3) Trustees are generally somewhat cautious regarding the notion of academic freedom. These attitudes vary considerably, however, particularly by geographic region. Trustees of southern and Rocky Mountain institutions are the most conservative in this regard.
Some of the assumptions held about the relationship between biographical characteristics of trustees and their style of operation as governing board members appear to be accurate generally, but run the risk of being oversimplified. For example, trustees who are business executives consistently favor 'running a college like a business' more than trustees with other occupations. At the same time, however, trustees who serve on boards at the types of institutions having the greatest proportion of business executives are the least likely to espouse a 'business orientation' for the institution.

The qualification of diversity notwithstanding, trustees, in general, prefer a modified 'top-down' form of institutional government, often preferring to exclude even members of the faculty from those decisions having to do with the academic program of the institution. Yet, the trustees themselves shy away from direct decision making except when it comes to selection of the president and matters of finance, the physical plant, and 'external affairs.' In other cases they prefer that the college officials make the decisions.

Trustees differ markedly from those occupying the academic positions 'beneath' them. In terms of political party affiliation and ideology and attitudes about higher education, the trustees are generally more conservative than the faculty.

The amount of time devoted to trustee activities varies a great deal, both within institutions and across institutions of different types. For example, at one type of institution the typical trustee spends fewer than five hours per month on board matters, while trustees of public universities estimate more than twice this amount. For the total sample of trustees, the median number of hours per month spent on trustee activities is slightly more than five hours, with attendance at full board meetings and committee meetings comprising more than half of all time expended.

Trustees do not read—indeed, have generally never even heard of—the more relevant higher education books and journals.

The January, 1967 issue of Fortune magazine provides an abbreviated case study of the role of the board of trustees in two institutions, the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Rochester. The opening paragraph is worth quoting:

For U.S. business executives of a generation or so ago, election to a university trusteeship was a commonplace—and often about as meaningful—as the award of a good conduct medal for a G.I. Though the charters of private universities invest the lay trustees with supreme legal authority and final responsibility, the post was regarded for the most part as honorific. But that was yesterday's university and yesterday's trustee. Today the world of higher education is seething with expansion, change, and challenge....
All this has substantially changed the role of the trustee. His job is no longer merely to conserve funds, he must think up imaginative new ways to finance projects of monumental magnitude. And where he once discretely kept hands off the curricula and everything else that had to do with the learning process, he now must at least acquaint himself with the educational, research, and auxiliary service programs, not only because he has to determine their financial feasibility, but because he has to interpret the goals and needs of the university to the community, to the surrounding business interests, and to the government.

The article describes the relationships of the boards of trustees to the two institutions. Both institutions were seeking improved academic quality. Both in a sense achieved their goals. But the University of Pittsburgh became virtually bankrupt and had to ask for state assistance. The University of Rochester developed an investment policy that in 1967 gave it an endowment with a market value of $268,680,000, making it sixth among American colleges and universities.

In the case of the University of Pittsburgh, the board of trustees left the management of the enterprise almost entirely to President Litchfield. There were misunderstandings regarding the contributions the trustees themselves would make to the funding of the institution. But Litchfield also operated on an ever-growing annual deficit. On the other hand, the University of Rochester trustees had developed a long tradition of financial management, and while they gave considerable freedom to President Wallis, they were informed and involved in the financial development of the institution.

In an essay in one of the publications of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, James A. Perkins writes about the conflicting responsibilities of governing boards. He points out that the original role of the board, particularly in the United States, was that of an agent of its creator, whether it be the church or state. That as it was the agency of the organization that brought the institution into existence. Subsequently, the board has been asked to serve as a "bridge" between society and the university. As the university became more and more involved in research and service, the board came into the role representing the university's interest to society as well as society's interest to the university. But now the
board is being asked to serve as an agent of the university community. That is to say, the board "has assumed more and more the function as a court of last resort for the university's various internal constituencies," and the board is also being asked "to transform the university into an active instrument for achieving social justice in society." 171

Perkins refers to the internal tensions within an institution where the board must assert its decision-making rights based upon legal authority, while a university internal governing body asserts its decision-making rights based upon representation of university constituencies. The two voices will have to be merged into a new and larger notion of public and private interest... The task for the board may now have to become a link between the university assembly and the external coordinating body, a task which will require patient statesmanship to succeed. 172

But there are those who would consider Perkins' statement too moderate. The annual meeting of the Association of Governing Boards in May, 1974 discussed a report based on a poll of 599 board chairmen. At the meeting there seemed to be widespread agreement that trustees should assume a bigger role in handling such issues as faculty workloads, tenure, and even the content of the curriculum. 173 One speaker at the conference called for much more involvement in curriculum and faculty workloads. He called for the trustees to become more accountable for what is happening within the institutions and stated, "the very essence of the university is wrapped up in two phrases: 'What is taught' and 'how it is taught.'" He went on to say that "trustees themselves must either exact accountability of the institution or see to it that someone else does and reports back to the trustees."

John Budd has accused the trustees of having betrayed their trust: "by neglecting to live up to their powers and responsibilities," and suggests the system should be "either abandoned outright or drastically revived and restructured." 174 If the trustees are to begin to make an important contribution to higher education, they must, according to Budd:
abandon their traditional secrecy; open their meetings to the public and to students; give the public, on their own initiative, an annual and candid accounting of their university; seek out platforms and opportunities to talk about higher education; use the machinery of communication they apply so swiftly in their own businesses to the problems of communications in higher education. 175

In much the same vein, if somewhat more moderately, Harold Martin, president of Union College, emphasizes the importance of an active role on the part of trustees.

By the average college and university faculty body, trustees are most admired for generous passivity. In their view, the academic business of the college or university is their business. In fact, however, the business, even the academic business, of a college or university is faculty business only in a narrow sense. It is fundamentally public business, whether the college or university is private or public; and because it is public business, the management of it must clearly link responsibility with public accountability. 176

Martin calls for trustees with an "informal perspective," and emphasizes the need for administration to take more initiative in providing the trustees with the kind of input that will assist them to be better informed on campus developments.

McConnell writes that if trustees are to exercise their powers effectively, boards will have to be reconstituted to provide for a much greater diversity in membership. He contends that membership should no longer be confined "to those who represent wealth, position, or political power, but should be extended to those who represent a wide range of economic and political interests and a diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds." He suggests that boards should include a substantial proportion of faculty. He finds, however, relatively little actual change in the composition of governing boards in recent years. 177

Mason entitles his review of the writing about governing boards "The Reality of Limited Power vs. The Myth of Unlimited Sovereignty." He finds that while the board is "supreme" and "sovereign" in a legal sense, "the board interferes only sporadically and superficially with a university's decision-making." 178 The key function, as Mason sees it, is that the board represents the "outside public." The board reminds the university of its peace in society, shields the university from dysfunctional public pressures and sometimes points out that extremes in academ...
freedom cannot be tolerated. He also, with McConnell, argues for some faculty membership on boards.

Examining further data collected for the 1968 survey of boards of trustees, Rodney Hartnett found fairly high correlations between the views of trustees and faculty, "that on a campus where the trustees have liberal views regarding academic freedom, the faculty members tend to perceive the institution as being a 'free' place." To Hartnett this and other positive correlations between views of trustees and perceptions of faculty suggest that the trustees do influence the climate of the college. The problem is, of course, one of determining which came first, i.e. do trustees set the climate, or does the climate condition the kinds of trustees selected? The study by Davis and Batchelor found both presidents and trustees agreeing that the president of the institution is the key figure in decision-making. It might be inferred, accordingly, that if the trustees influence the climate of the institution, they, in turn, are greatly influenced by the president as a decision-maker.

As the studies that have been undertaken involving board members--and there are but a few comprehensive studies--reveal, we have only limited understanding of how effective boards function, or even of what constitutes an effective board. Yet we have calls for reconstituting the board, having the board more effectively take up its proper power, or even doing away with the lay board. There is little question that the board has legal responsibility for the college or university it maintains--but the specific role played by boards is far from clear--or, perhaps more accurately, the role varies greatly with type of institution, time and circumstance. And perhaps that is the strength of the lay board, it can vary its role with type of institution, time and circumstances. As collective bargaining becomes more a part of the collegiate scene, it will be interesting to see what role the board will play. Among public institutions the board may be bypassed in favor of executive or legislative offices. Among private institutions, the board will almost inevitably be the locus of last resort.
Coordination of Systems and State Boards

This subtopic may not appear to be as closely related to the general topic of this monograph as are some of the others. Yet, for both the private and public sectors, the emergence of governing or coordinating boards in more and more states has had an impact on the day-to-day decision making of institutions. While state-wide governing boards have restricted their efforts to the public sector, coordinating boards, still in the majority, have in some states effectively incorporated private institutions into state-wide planning.

Lyman Glenny, a decade ago, observed that prior to 1945 the main characteristic of higher education in most states was a "lack of system and rationality in organization."181 Colleges and universities, public and private, were largely independent of each other, even within a state. After World War II, however, the "happy anarchy" began to change to new forms of cooperation and coordination "with institutional independence only within certain new parameters." The move to coordination did not come out of foresight and planning by educators, but it arose rather "from demands of legislators and governmental agencies for more efficient use of public monies." In further characterizing the development, Glenny writes:

"Legislators...wanted to eliminate wasteful duplication of programs resulting from competition among state institutions, to facilitate realistic and scientific budget requests, and to establish the rationale for developing new institutions and campuses. In attempting to protect the integrity of their own institutions, educators until recently generally have opposed coordination, particularly through new state-commissions with legal power."

Whether they opposed the development or not, educators in 1974-75 were faced with the reality of increased state-wide coordination. In 1965 Glenny could write about the "classic condition of autonomy" in ten states. Ten years later, there were only three states with no statewide agency—Delaware, Nebraska and Vermont, and Nebraska has a voluntary association.
Berdahl's study undertaken for the American Council on Education and published in 1971 constituted up to that date the most comprehensive review of these developments. In introducing his survey, Berdahl pointed up the significance of state involvement in higher education, even if, as then appeared to be the case, the federal government would be taking an increasingly important role in setting directions for American higher education.

---increased Federal aid notwithstanding, state governments will continue to be the major source of funds for all public institutions of higher education...and...it is likely that state support for private as well as public higher education will increase in some states.

---even if Federal aid to higher education grows by a large percentage, it does not necessarily mean a proportionate decrease in state influence...If Federal block grants are given to the states, the latter will have even wider influence over higher education than they presently exercise.

---even if the state role in financing higher education were to diminish markedly, all institutions--public and private--would still have to function in a context of state law and state sovereignty. 183

The development of the so-called "1202 Commissions" to which reference will be made later, would seem to make Berdahl's second reason above almost prophetic.

The catalog of state agencies as compiled by Berdahl and accurate up to early 1970 shows 27 coordinating boards, 14 of which were given regulating powers, and 19 consolidated statewide governing boards. Four states reported no boards; one, Indiana, has since established a statewide coordinating agency. The oldest governing board was that of Nevada, the Board of Regents, established in 1864. The oldest coordinating board was that of New York, the Board of Regents, established in 1784. Of the 27 coordinating boards, 18 had been established during or since 1960. Only 5 of the governing boards had been established during or since 1960; some 13 were in existence by 1945, or before. 184

The most recent review of developments on the statewide scene is that by Larry Van Dyne. Writing in late 1974, Van Dyne notes the rapid development of the coordinating board; in 1954 there were only four coordinating boards, while in 1924...
there were 27 coordinating boards.185 There have been some shifts, however, since
Berdahl's study. Berdahl classified both New Hampshire and Oregon as "governing"
boards; both are listed by Van Dyne as "coordinating" boards. And Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, "coordinating" boards in Berdahl's list, are now
identified as "governing" boards. Indiana in Berdahl's list had a voluntary
committee, but is shown as having a coordinating board in 1974. We thus have a
net increase of one governing board and no change in number of coordinating boards
since 1969-70.

The distinction between the governing and coordinating board is that the
former is the legal governing and regulating agency for the institutions under its
control, while in the later various levels of review and moral and political
persuasion are employed. Governing boards relate almost exclusively, if not
entirely, to the public institutions under their direction. Coordinating boards can
and do relate to private institutions in various ways. The study by the Academy
for Educational Development, completed in the fall of 1969, observed that in 14
states the official state planning agency was charged "with some responsibility for
private institutions in overall planning for higher education," and in three of
the states the law stipulated that private institutions must be included.186 Some
15 additional state agencies indicated some degree of recognition of private insti-
tutions in their planning activities. (The planning agencies to which AED refers
were not in all cases the state coordinating boards.)

Berdahl writes that except for scattered programs and certain state scholar-
ship plans—in 1974 there were almost forty state scholarship or aid programs in
effect—few state actions have been directly relevant to private higher education.187
The emergence of several state reports—Illinois, Missouri, New York, Texas—dealing
exclusively with the role of private higher education in the respective states
suggests, however, that more of a concern is developing. The California and
Washington studies also devoted chapters to private higher education. One of the
first, if not the first such report's examined state-by-state the programs relevant
to private institutions. One of the authors of that report, in a subsequent
paper prepared for a Legislative Work Conference of the Southern Regional Education
Board, after noting some of the reasons for involving private higher educational
institutions in statewide planning, concluded:

Of all of the arguments advanced, I think the most telling is that certain private higher educational institutions by virtue of history, strength of programs, or even chance development, have made and continue to make significant contributions to the advancement of the purposes of higher education in the state and in the nation. They are performing a public purpose with the assistance of private benefactions. Statewide planning should take into consideration these contributions. States ought not to ignore any resources available within the confines of the state.

And in outlining the advantages of the coordinating board over the governing board, Glenny and his colleagues observe that the "one great paramount advantage" is that coordinating boards can act as umbrella agencies, under which a variety of institutions, agencies, commissions and councils can be related to statewide efforts. They note in particular how private institutions can participate in funding programs, state planning, and information gathering.

Van Dyne's review of recent developments in statewide coordination calls attention to the organization of the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) and suggests that SHEEO may be credited with a substantial role in getting Congress to recognize the importance of statewide planning and coordination in the 1972 amendments on higher education. Section 1202 of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires any state that wants to receive assistance under Section 1203—which authorizes grants and assistance to comprehensive statewide planning—to establish a state postsecondary commission that is broadly and equitably representative of various types of postsecondary educational institutions.

After a year of limited emphasis, the Office of Education decided to encourage the creation of the commissions. The U. S. Commission of Education wrote to all
governors announcing that the Office of Education would allocate at least $1,000,000 for statewide planning grants to be administered by the "1202" commissions. The governors were to notify the Commissioner by April 15, 1974 if they had decided to establish a commission. The deadline was subsequently extended to April 25, and 43 states plus the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam and Puerto Rico reported having established such commissions. The states had three options in meeting the request: 15 established new agencies; 19 designated an existing agency or commission; 9 augmented an existing agency or commission to meet the requirement of the legislation. The 1202 commissions can be designated as the state agency responsible for certain other federal programs. In the requirement that the 1202 commissions be "broadly and equitably representative of the general public and private non-profit and proprietary institutions of postsecondary education," the legislation incorporates, or would seem to do so, private higher education into statewide planning.

The Role of the President

Much of what has been reported in previous sections of this monograph must of necessity relate to the role of the president amid the changing patterns of governance, but we should perhaps, even if briefly, comment on what is being said in the literature about the chief administrative officer of the American colleges and universities.

Over a decade ago Harold W. Dodds, after retiring from the presidency of Princeton University, undertook with support from the Carnegie Corporation a study of the American college president. The title of his report contained a question, "The Academic President—Educator or Caretaker?" Dodds was convinced that with all of the pressures coming to bear on the president, the answer still had to be that the president must devote 50 percent of his time to educational matters. The President is the educational leader of the institution, and unless he can give
sufficient time to this aspect of his leadership, "the outlook for higher education is far more dismal than we are prepared to admit." Dodds could not conceive of the president delegating to others an "overriding responsibility toward the university's primary role." The president's leadership had to be expressed within an academic climate, and, according to Dodds, the president "must be willing to accept a definition of leadership that brings about change less by the sheer power of his office and more by informal, friendly, and persuasive means." Ralph Prator, writing a year later, apparently agreed, because he referred to the president as "the leader of a specialized team...the coordinator, the catalyst, the generalist who draws resource information from people "involved in the specialized affairs of the college."

There is a sense of unreality in the comments of Dodds and Prator, especially as we have emerged from the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Dodds and Prator seem to be describing a past age, one almost idyllic in comparison to what appeared to be the experiences of academic leaders in more recent years. Speaking out of the tensions of the chancellorship of the University of California, Berkeley, Roger Heyne's, now president of the American Council on Education, told the Twenty-third National Conference on Higher Education:

I should like now to suggest a line of educational change that will work toward providing a structural setting in which administrative leadership can operate effectively. To put the matter as bluntly as possible, I feel it is necessary to give more power and effective responsibility to college and university administrators at all levels. I emphasize at all levels, lest anyone think I mean centralization of power in a top executive. We must identify the major decision-making points and center responsibility and accountability and authority in specific persons. I see no other way to avoid the pattern of mindless and inefficient stumbling from crisis to crisis than to solidify our leadership base. Authority and responsibility are so diffusely spread that there is no way for those with problems to identify who it is that can help.
I am not suggesting that we should ignore all the data that indicates that organizational effectiveness goes up with broadening the base of leadership. But I think that there is an optimum balance in an organization between corporative and individual decisions and that in the university we are no longer as effective as we could be with a greater centralization of authority in persons.\textsuperscript{197}

We have already referred to Gerald Burns' comments regarding the need for more vigorous leadership on the part of the president. He has contended that the growth of campus problems is due to the lack of presidential fortitude and professional wisdom.\textsuperscript{198}

John Gardner, while still President of the Carnegie Corporation, in his annual report of 1965, came out with a view that is perhaps midway between Dodds and Heynes. Observing that in American society the nature of leadership is seldom understood, he said:

Most leaders are hedged around by constraints—traditional, constitutional limitations, the realities of the external situations, rights and privileges of followers, the requirements of teamwork, and most of all the inexorable demands of large-scale organization, which does not operate on capriciousness. In short, most power is wielded circumspectly.\textsuperscript{199}

There are different styles of leadership, depending upon the task and the structure of the organization, but "anyone who accomplishes anything of significance has more confidence than the facts would justify." This quality has been something held in common by outstanding executives, gifted military commanders, brilliant political leaders, and great artists. Too many of the contemporary leaders are not prepared to decide. They seem to prefer to go through a "series of clearances within the organization and let the clearance process settle it." They take polls, devise statistical systems, cross accounting systems, and information processing systems. All of which is not to suggest that leadership can proceed without good information. The leader must know the facts or he is in trouble, but the leader must proceed with a degree of confidence that goes beyond the facts. Gardner refers to the little girl who told her teacher she was going to draw a picture of God. The teacher
said, "But, Mary, no one knows what God looks like." To which Mary replied, "They will when I get through."200

Gardner goes on to say that there are a good many people who ask whether leadership are actually necessary. In the first place, "many scientific and professional people are accustomed to the kinds of problems that can be solved by expert technical advice or action." They see no need for leaders in the traditional sense. And then there are those who argue that leadership may somehow or other be at odds with the ideals of a free society. A good many young people on the contemporary scene at least argue in this vein. To which Gardner answers:

We have in fact outgrown or rejected several varieties of leadership that have loomed large in the history of mankind. We do not want autocratic leaders who treat us like inferior beings. We do not want leaders, no matter how wise or kind, who treat us like children.

We can have the kinds of leaders we want, but we cannot choose to do without them. It is in the nature of social organization that we must have at levels in our national life, in and out of government—in business, labor, politics, education, science, the arts, and every other field...Leaders have a significant role in creating the state of mind that is the society. They can serve as symbols of the moral unity of the society. They can make express the values that hold the society together. More important, they can conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry down them the conflicts that tear society apart, and unite them in the pursuit of objectives worthy of their best efforts.201

These comments, though directed to organizations and leadership generally, would seem appropriately directed to higher education and the role of the president.

David Leslie describes the place of conflict in the contemporary university and suggests that we need to be more honest in seeing that the "modern public university is most emphatically not a cloistered retreat for like-minded scholars."202 Conflict is a way of life in the university and the problem of leadership becomes that of accepting conflict as inevitable and finding how to deal with it in constructive ways. To try to eliminate conflict is unrealistic, short of creating a wholly homogeneous unit—which, by definition, stifles diversity.
To overcome conflict by redistributing power may, according to Leslie, result in a
cure worse than the disease. Rather than opting for major restructuring of the
university, Leslie asks for developing more effective conflict management.

The 1970 Presidents Institute of the American Council on Education stressed the
need for a new style of leadership. The report on the Institute referred to the
new presidents as "Crisis Managers," and noted that "today's president must know
something about new techniques of budgeting scarce resources, labor relations,
the legal process, and the mediation of disputes under pressure."203 David
Bergquist's study of presidents in 1972-73 suggested that "increased demands from
the faculty, mounting pressures from trustees, and rising student expectations"
have all conspired to make the more experienced presidents perceive the job as
becoming even more complex.

The results of this study indicate that a college president
can no longer rely on his years of presidential experience
to assure the easy completion of defined job tasks. Regardless of the size of the institution or the type of advanced
degree held, the presidents' job tasks grow increasingly
complex, troublesome and difficult to complete.204

He also found in his stratified sample of presidents that the mean age was 52.7
years, the mean length of service as president to be five years and 10 months,
although some presidents (21 percent) had served in the same presidency for 10 or
more years.

Earlier, Harold Hodgkinson, on the basis of a much larger sample, had reported
that most presidents served from four to five years. Hodgkinson found the median
age to be 50 and that nearly 70 percent held an earned doctorate.205 Another
researcher reported that a sample of retired college presidents, most of whom had
served longer than the average noted above, were of the opinion that five to ten
years is the most effective term of office.206
Still another survey of college presidents revealed an average age in the presidency somewhat longer than is the case in either Leslie's or Hodgkinson's study, and less than in the report on retired presidents. This survey indicated 7.8 years as the average in the present position, with presidents of protestant universities reporting the longest average years in position. The study also showed the deanship to be the most direct step to the presidency.207

The most recent report on the college president was published in early 1974 as one of the Carnegie Commission reports. The report was based on intensive interviews with 41 college presidents, 39 chief academic offices, 36 chief business officers, 42 presidents' secretaries, and 28 other officials close to the presidents and included 42 institutions.208 Among the generalization made by the team were the following:

The American college presidency is a reactive job. Presidents define their role as a responsive one. They see themselves as trying to reconcile the conflicting pressures on the college.

The presidency is a parochial job. Presidents are normally not strangers to the institutions that choose them.

The presidency is conventional. The president comes to his job through a series of filters that are socially conservative vis-a-vis his major constituents.

The presidency is important to the president. It is the peak of his career. He obtains the job as a reward for his previous career.

The presidency is an illusion. Important aspects of the role seem to disappear on close examination. In particular, decision making in the university seems to result extensively from a process that decouples problems and choices and makes the president's role more commonly sporadic and symbolic than significant.209

In examining from various sources, the normative image of the president, the researcher concludes that there does not seem to be a clear core of objectives that presidents should pursue and "no clear set of attributes that will guarantee success."210
Cohen and March examine and find wanting most reports on "average tenure." They conclude that during most of the twentieth century the median college president has served about 10 years. They refer to the president as exercising leadership in "organized anarchy," and while recommending some steps to combat the prevailing ambiguity, conclude that the fundamental problem of ambiguity will remain.
Notes


15Ibid., p. 13.

17 Ibid., p. 45.

18 Ibid., pp. 45-46.


20 Ibid., p. xvii.


22 Ibid., p. 294.


28 Ibid., p. 34.


35 "Student Power: Can It Help Reform the System?" Christian Science Monitor (July 19-21, 1971).


39 Ibid., p. 38.

40 Ibid., p. 48.

41 Ibid., p. 34.


46 Ibid., pp. 133-134.


48 Ibid., pp. 308-314.


54 President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Campus Unrest, op. cit., p. 203.


57 Henry L. Mason, College and University Government; op. cit., p. 55.


59 Ibid., p. 21.


61 ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, Student Participation in Academic Governance, op. cit.


65 "Joint Student-Faculty-Administration at Lehigh," School and Society, 98 (October, 1970), pp. 331-332.


68 Ibid., p. 223.


70 Ibid., p. 472.


73 Ibid., p. 18.

74 Ibid., p. 24.

75 Morris Keeton, Shared Authority on Campus, op. cit., p. 11.

77 Kenneth P. Mortimer, "Forms of Campus Governance," op. cit.


81 Ibid., p. 481.

82 Ibid., p. 482.

83 Ibid., p. 484.

84 Ibid., p. 485.


86 Ibid., p. 18.


90 Ibid., p. 247.

91 E. D. Duryea, "Reform in University Government," op. cit., p. 348.


94 Ibid., p. 38.

95 Ibid., p. 42.


[100] Ibid., p. 77.

[101] Ibid., p. 81.


[115] Ladd and Lipset, op. cit.


125 Leon P. Epstein, Governing the University, op. cit., pp. 143-144.


130 Ibid., p. 592.


136 Ibid., p. 122.

137 Ibid., p. 148.


139 Ibid., pp. 1, 215-226.


153 Ibid., pp. 161-162.
154 Ibid., p. 193.
155 Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, Faculty Tenure, op. cit., p. 23.
157 Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, Faculty Tenure, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
165 Richard Hofstadter, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 120.
169 Ibid., pp. 49-51.

172 Ibid., p. 214.


175 Ibid., p. 49.


178 Henry L. Mason, College and University Government, op. cit., p. 29.


182 Ibid., p. 87.


92


195 Ibid., p. 15.


198 Gerald P. Burns, "Letter to Editor," op. cit.


200 Ibid., p. 8.

201 Ibid., pp. 11-12.


209 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
210 Ibid., p. 57.
211 Ibid., p. 162.
212 Ibid., pp. 195-216.