The relative influence of stages of political socialization on the adult political orientation and activities of former American and Japanese student activists is examined. A causal model of the stages of political socialization, including family and school, student activism, and adult roles, is compared with the political fate of student activists who participated in the 1960 antisecurity treaty movement in Japan and the civil rights movement in the American South. The results indicate that student activism in college is the best predictor of adult politics in both countries. Family and early school political socialization are only weak predictors of future adult politics. Adult political socialization can be either a facilitator or a constraint for maintaining political commitments. In the United States, career choice has no direct effect because student activism strongly affects career choice. In Japan, career choice has a strong effect on adult politics. Former Japanese students in the knowledge and human services industries have greater left-wing commitments. For American student activists, remaining free of family affiliations is a facilitator for left-wing politics; while in Japan, family obligations are a facilitator of left-wing politics. (Author/DE)
STUDENT ACTIVISM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION:
A CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIALIZATION STAGES AND
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STUDENT ACTIVISM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: A CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIALIZATION STAGES AND LEFT-WING POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

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This exploratory study developed and tested a causal model of political socialization to explain the adult political beliefs and behavior of former college students in the United States and Japan. It treated student activism both as a product of earlier socialization and as a socialization experience whose significance for political socialization research depends on the answer to the question of what happens to student activists after graduation. One of its main purposes was to investigate one of the most important, but least-studied, issues in the literature on political socialization: the relative impact of different stages of the socialization process on adult political beliefs and behavior.

One of the unusual aspects of the paper is that it utilizes true longitudinal data to test a model of political socialization: its data is based on follow-up studies of American and Japanese student activists from major centers of student protest in the early 1960's. Another is the use of path analysis as a methodological and statistical technique to test the causal theory.

Utilizing a three stage model of political socialization, the proportion of variance explained in the adult ideological commitment and political activism of the former students was highly significant. In the U. S. the coefficient of determination was .553 for ideological commitment and .434 for political behavior. In Japan, the coefficients were .422 and .551, respectively. Our results indicate that political socialization theory can be effective in explaining adult left-wing politics, although a further elaboration of the model incorporating better indicators of earlier socialization is recommended. In the U. S. we found that pre-adult political socialization had the greatest input. In Japan, adult political socialization was more important. An explanation is offered for these differences.
In the decade of the 1960's, student protest emerged as a major force in the political systems of nation-states at all levels of social, economic, and political development. The decade began with student protests in Korea, where students helped topple the seemingly impregnable authoritarian regime of Syngman Rhee, and in Japan, where pro- and anti-Communist Party Marxist student movements demonstrated against renewing the U.S.-Japan security treaty, forced Prime Minister Kishi from office, and prevented President Eisenhower from visiting Japan. Almost simultaneously, student civil-rights activists in the southern United States staged their first sit-ins. Later in the decade, the 1964 Free Speech Movement at Berkeley proved to be a forerunner of the political activism of American college students against the Vietnam War. Toward the end of the 1960's, many other nations also experienced student revolt as student protest became a world-wide phenomenon.

Scholarly research soon responded to these developments with a spate of articles and books analyzing the sources, nature, and consequences of student protest. Some of the literature was purely descriptive, focusing on the immediate goals, organizations, activities, contexts, and impacts of student movements and the governmental and academic responses to them. Other works provided more systematic and theoretical perspectives on the background, socialization, psychology, intellectual characteristics, and politicization of student activists. But even now, fifteen years after the impact of student protest on political systems was first felt, we lack comparative and systematic data on the political fate of these student activists after graduation. We know a good deal about the childhood socialization and politicization of student activists, but almost nothing about the durability of their leftist orientations and activist behaviors now that they have become adults.

Until now, whether student activists' political identities are maintained or changed after graduation has been discussed primarily in popular myth and scattered journalistic articles. Such sayings as "He who is not a radical at twenty does not have a heart; he who is still one at forty does not have a head" are found in most cultures. Articles in newspapers and magazines frequently appear tracing the leaders and followers of former student movements. Although some of these articles indicate that popular assumptions concerning co-optation after graduation may be invalid, their samples are so small and their methods of selection so unsystematic and non-random that no generalizations can be made from their reports. Only a few scholars have addressed themselves to the problem, and their data too have been unrelated to any control sample, or have
studied their sample too soon after graduation.6

The lack of any comparative, scholarly, and systematic research on the problem of former student activists' post-graduation political identity and behavior is especially unfortunate: by ignoring the problem, relegating it to a journalist exercise, and focusing on the antecedents of student activism rather than on its products, we have missed the opportunity to test our assumptions about the significance of student movements and the importance of political socialization in youth. By looking only at the short-term effects of student movements, and by treating student activism as only the end-product of a socialization process, we have ignored the potential of participation in student politics as a potent political socialization experience in its own right. And, like all other socialization experiences, the test of student activism ultimate significance rests on the question of whether participation in the student movement has a long-term impact on participants' adult political beliefs and behavior, or whether earlier socialization to leftism and activism is mitigated by adult socialization experiences. Investigating what happens to student activists after graduation thus affords us the opportunity to test one of central issues, and confusions, in political socialization theory: the relative influence of stages of political socialization on adult political orientation and activities.

Most political scientists have confined their empirical studies of political socialization to childhood or early youth, particularly to the influence of agents such as the family and school. Where authors have found relationships between home or school environments and the political beliefs of children, they have viewed the impact of these early environments as formative for later adult political orientation and activity. But in the absence of any empirical evidence on the adult characteristics of their sample in later life, this view is speculative. Concerning the widely-held assumption in socialization studies that early political learning is relatively enduring, Searing, Schwartz, and Lind have noted:

Each of the better-known studies has simply offered a series of childhood orientations which may influence adult attitudes and behavior. Arguments have been couched in terms of conjecture or suggestive hypotheses. These qualifications reflect recognition that evidence to support such categorical assertions is, regretfully absent.9

Such unsupported assertions have been made because of the influence of child-development theory's emphasis on early learning, because of the difficulty of acquiring longitudinal data, and because of the need to justify the study of childhood and youth in terms of its all-important end-products, adult belief and behavior. As recent critiques of the political socialization literature have pointed out, although almost everyone agrees that political socialization is a life-long phenomenon and that the "payoff" in studying childhood political socialization is what you may be able to explain about adult political characteristics, almost no one has conducted political socialization studies on adults to.
ascertain whether the characteristics found in childhood do in fact persist into later life.

Although political socialization theorists emphasize the formative-ness of pre-adult socialization experiences, a contrary school of thought has advanced the hypothesis that adult experiences are more influential than earlier experiences in determining adult political beliefs and behavior. One variety of this "maturational" model contends that the socio-psychological response to the process of aging invariably brings about more conservative orientations. Thus, Lipset and Ladd used cohort analysis to analyze and political orientations of former college students and conclude that "Aristotle's emphasis on the moderating effects of experience and aging turns out to be more predictive than Mannheim's stress on the long-term consequences of the formation of generation-units among the young."

The functional analysis of Eisenstadt and Parsons emphasizes the functional need of society to integrate youth into adult roles. The functionalists see youth groups and movements as temporary transitions on the way to assuming and accepting existing adult roles. Whether the accent be on aging or on role-integration, the import of the "maturational" assumption is the same: the experiences of youth are not formative and need not predict fully adult orientations and behavior. Youth, regardless of their prior beliefs or activity, are expected to quietly assume and accept roles in adult society and become more conservative.

In contrast to the maturational stress on the universal processes of aging and integration into adult society, another variant in the youth versus adulthood sweepstakes of political socialization is an emphasis on how specific adult roles may have selective effects on prior belief and behavior patterns. Thus, one type of occupation may reinforce the patterns of socialization in youth, while another may stimulate a change in the patterns. Almond and Verba's discovery that participation in decisions at the workplace could reinforce or conflict with prior political socialization experiences in the family or schools provides one support for this hypothesis. So does much of the work in sociology on the impact of different occupational roles on personality and behavior. Thus, individuals with similar political beliefs and prior socialization experiences are expected to behave differently because of the constraints or lack of them in their adult roles: One type of occupation may allow for the expression of "deviant" beliefs, while another type may constrain such expression; the responsibilities of marriage may help stifle rebellious political behavior, while remaining single may help perpetuate that behavior. Finally, there is the added complexity introduced by varying cultures and social structures. The relative impact of different stages of the socialization process may possibly vary with the extent to which stages of the life cycle are politicized, and the definition and constraints of social roles in different cultures.

Even this brief and selective review of an issue at the heart of political socialization theory—which stage of the life cycle and which agents have what impact on adult political variables—can well lead us to despair. There is a wealth of hypotheses on the relative potency of various stages of political socialization, but most data force us to
make speculative leaps of faith or to lend support to each of the hypotheses in turn. In great part, this results (1) from using cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data to study a problem that is inherently longitudinal, (2) from using bivariate designs where multi-variant designs are called for; and (3) from having little cross-national data. This study attempts to shed some light on the issues of political socialization and of student protest raised above, by presenting a multivariate, cross-national, and longitudinal study of the political socialization into adulthood of former activists. It treats students activism both as a product of earlier socialization and as a socialization experience whose significance for political socialization research depends on the answer to the question of what happens to student activists after graduation. Constructing a general model of the stages of political socialization—family and school, student activism, adult roles—we go on to test it with longitudinal, empirical evidence of the political fates of student activists who participated in two of the most important student movements of the early 1960s—the 1960 anti-security treaty movement in Japan and the civil rights movement in the American South.

MODEL AND METHODOLOGY

A causal model is developed to explain the adult ideological commitment and adult political activism of former student activists. The model emphasizes that political socialization occurs at major stages in the life-cycle. An early stage affects later stages and all socialization experiences affect the dependent variables of adult politics. The model is presented in Figure 1. The first stage involves family and school socialization. Research on student activism suggests that both the family and school, particularly college experiences, are important determinants of student politics. A number of studies reveal that early waves of student activists were more likely to be raised in families with higher socioeconomic status (SES), particularly if SES is measured by the educational level of the parents. Presumably the more educated parents are more liberal or progressive, and consequently, they socialize their children into liberal or left-wing politics. The outcome of political socialization is not always anticipated, clearly understood, or approved by the parents. Frequently the socialization experiences are indirect and complex. Nevertheless, the exposure to political events through the political attitudes and behavior of parents as well as the other political exposure provided by parents does provide a basis for political orientation different from those youth who are not raised in high SES families. The SES of the former students family of origin was expected to influence student activism, adult political socialization and adult politics.

An important indicator of school political socialization is major in college. Academic major is the product of earlier socialization experiences at the elementary and secondary level that led to a choice in major as well as socialization experiences in college. Research in the United States has shown that faculty and students in the social sciences or other liberal arts programs are further to the left than
students majoring in non-arts and science areas, e.g., education, engineering, agriculture, etc. Major in college reflects the combined socialization experiences of the selective exposure to reading materials, lectures and interaction with students and faculty. Major in college was expected to influence student activism, adult political socialization and adult politics.

The second stage of political socialization is student activism. Participation in student politics itself is a powerful socialization experience. Adamek and Lewis' data suggest participation in demonstrations where severe force is used to suppress demonstrators is a radicalizing and activating experience. Demerath, et al. data in their four year follow-up of white civil rights activists indicates that the activists remained left wing and were choosing careers consistent with their political commitments. Lipset and Ladd estimate that in the U.S. as many as 350,000 college students were radicalized by the college protest of the 1960's. Similarly, Tsurumi found participation in demonstrations to be the experience most cited by Japanese student leaders and activists when asked what led them to adopt Marxist socialism. In Japan, one author estimates 25 percent of the students at Tokyo University were "hard core" leaders and activists in the 1960 anti-treaty student movement and another 40 percent participated in demonstrations. The intensity of experience in confrontation politics justifies the inclusion of participation in the student movement as a major stage in the political socialization of college students and to expect it to affect career choices, life-styles and adult politics.

Since most of the work on political socialization has focused on the effects of the family and schools not much is known about the effects of the third stage of political socialization—adult political socialization. However, Schönfeld and Dennis and Easton suggest that two important political socialization environments for adults are their families and work situation. The precise working of political socialization in these environments is not clearly understood. Presumably the responsibilities of having to support members of the nuclear or extended family, as well as the social pressures to meet the responsibilities from relatives and friends, are a form of adult political socialization forcing adults to be more moderate. As former students become members of the labor force, they are subject to the socialization pressures of peers and superiors in the careers they have chosen. In general, political socialization at this stage is conceptualized as a constant causing political moderation. In this analysis, however, adult family and career political socialization are variables that can be differential effects. Young adults can choose the life style they prefer with respect to family commitments. There are also occupational choices that vary widely in their potential for political socialization. Adult political socialization is expected to be partly dependent on previous socialization experiences and thereby have indirect effects on adult politics. However, the political socialization of young adults is expected to have important independent or direct effects on adult politics.
Finally, adult political sentiments, as expressed by ideological commitment, are expected to have both direct and indirect effects on adult political activism. Studies ranging from The American Voter to Goldberg suggest that political sentiments or ideological attitudes are the final mediator of all causes of political behavior. The relation between ideological identification and political activism is considered to be partly spurious, i.e., it is due to the indirect effects of previous stages of political socialization and partly a direct effect of adult political ideological commitment.

The causal model of the effects of political socialization stages on adult politics was tested using longitudinal, cross-national data on Japanese and U.S. adults who were students during the early 1960's. Initially two separate studies were designed and carried out. In many respects the similarities in the studies are remarkable. Both focused on the early vanguard members of the student protest movement. Both recognized the need for control groups to determine the long range effects of student activism. Both were aware that an extended time period between college and adult politics was essential in determining the separate effects of each stage of political socialization. Both focused on male activists, thereby eliminating the interesting but complicating problem of sex differences. Both studies included variables that made it possible to utilize a small number of either identical or similar items.

In 1962 Tsurumi interviewed one hundred students at four major universities in Tokyo, many of whom participated in the campaign against the Japanese Diet's approval of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in April-June, 1960. Of the original sample, 77 were located in 1969, and 53 or 70 percent were interviewed in 1970. Of this number, 28 were either leaders or committed activists. 25 were marginal to the student movement, i.e., they had never belonged to a major faction in the student movement and were only mobilized to demonstrate during the treaty crisis. Those who were only marginal to the student movement had a much lower level of political commitment, and therefore were used as a control group.

The student protest movement in the U.S. began in the South. The beginning date was on February 1, 1960, when four black freshmen sat-in at a lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. Over the next four years, thousands of black and white students joined the civil rights movement. Data were gathered from whites who participated in civil rights demonstrations in one of the major centers of the movement, e.g., Matthews and Prothro selected the city as one of four in the South for an in-depth study of the civil rights movement. Students who did not participate in the civil rights movement were also randomly selected for a control group. Respondents were mailed questionnaires in 1971 after the demonstrations. The overall response rate was 63 percent. Twenty-eight activists and 67 non-activists returned the questionnaires. The response rate was not significantly different for activists and non-activists.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL

Operationally, variables that are indicators of political socialization prior to the respondents' involvement in student politics are the exogenous variables. Student activism and adult political socialization are intervening variables. Both the exogenous and intervening variables are employed to predict and explain variance in the dependent variable.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Adult political activism (X1)—This concept refers to the current political activities of the former college students. Three different forms of political behavior were measured in both countries: (1) doing organizational work in political programs and campaigns, e.g., distributing petitions, activity in election campaigns, etc.; (2) being a member of either a traditional political party or a political movement organization committed to modifying or changing one or more of the major institutions in the societies; and (3) participating in political protest demonstrations. Thus we have a measure of participation in institutional and noninstitutional politics ranging from scores of 3 to 6. It is expected that the most committed leftist would be highly involved.

Adult Ideological Commitment (X2)—Conceptually this refers to the respondent's self-identification on a political continuum from right to left. It was used to measure political sentiments and beliefs. In the United States former students were given the responses of: (1) conservative, (2) moderate or independent, (3) liberal, and (4) radical. This single item was correlated (r = .77) with a 14-item radicalism-conservatism scale developed by Nettler and Huffman, indicating ideological commitment has construct validity. In Japan the four comparable categories were: (1) conservative, (2) moderate or independent, (3) progressive, and (4) very progressive. In the political culture and political terminology of post-war Japan, "Progressive" is an oft-used synonym for being politically "left," and thus being "very progressive" would be equivalent to a "radical" self-identification.

INTERVENING VARIABLES

Family Responsibilities (X3)—This simply refers to the extent of family obligations. Operationally, respondents are classified as: (1) married or single with family obligations, e.g., children or relatives; (2) married without further obligations; (3) single or divorced with no obligations.

Career Choice (X4)—Conceptually this refers to occupational pursuits after college. Occupational careers are either a facilitator or constraint of adult political socialization depending upon the nature of the employer and the work environment. They are classified along a continuum ranging from those that offered primarily the extrinsic rewards of money and status in the private sector of the economy to those that offered the
opportunity to perform human services and express creativity. Former activists were expected to pursue careers in the knowledge and human service industries that provide the opportunity to foster or maintain their political commitments. Operationally, occupations are classified into nine categories: (1) managers and officials in larger corporations; (2) proprietors, managers and officials in smaller businesses; (3) professionals and technicians in private practice, e.g., doctors, lawyers, CPA's, etc.; (4) public officials; (5) public professionals and technicians; (6) social service workers and school teachers; (7) academic professionals at the university level; (8) communicative arts specialists, e.g., journalists, writers, editors, artists, etc.; and (9) full-time activists working for social and political change.

Student Activism (X1)--Conceptually this refers to the extent that students were involved in confrontation politics with established authorities. In the United States, those students who did not participate in demonstrations were given the score of (1) and civil rights protesters (2). In Japan, the political situation was different with a higher percentage of Tokyo students taking part in demonstrations. The marginal activists who only occasionally or never demonstrated and were not members of major student factions were scored as (1) and the highly committed activists as (2).

EXOGENOUS VARIABLES

Major in College (X2)--Conceptually this refers to the general field of academic pursuits chosen by the former students. Operationally, respondents were classified into three groups: (1) non-arts and science majors; (2) arts and science majors, excluding the social sciences; and (3) social science majors.

Father's Education (X3)--This variable is used as an indicator of the political socialization in the home prior to entering college. There were four categories for the educational level of fathers: (1) less than high school; (2) high school graduation; (3) college work; and (4) graduate work beyond college.

THE DATA

Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations and the correlation matrix for the U. S. and Japan. The U. S. correlations are above the diagonal and the Japanese below. It is presented so the reader can (1) have a descriptive understanding of the data at the bivariate level, (2) test alternative causal models using the information provided and (3) compute the unstandardized path coefficients. The table indicates that the variances for the variables are not, with the exception of father's education, different. Tests for equal variance indicated that only father's education had unequal variances beyond the .10 level of confidence. The variance for the U. S. sample was larger. Since disproportionate stratified samples were used the reported levels of
Table 1 reveals that the U.S. correlations are fairly strong in the predicted direction except for father's education, which has relatively low correlations. The pattern of bivariate relations is somewhat different for the Japanese sample. Both major in college and family obligations indicate relations opposite in the direction predicted, suggesting that political socialization may vary cross-culturally (this will be discussed in more detail later). In both samples student activism appears to have the strongest effect on the dependent variables. Outside of knowledge of the strength of bivariate relations among the variables a number of problems of interpretation exist. Because the exogenous and intervening variables are interrelated, little is known about the "relative" impact of each variable on the dependent variables. There is also the problem of spuriousness. Part of the total correlation with a dependent variable at the bivariate level may be due to the indirect effects of a third variable, e.g., father's SES may not appear to directly affect the dependent variables; it may have indirect effects through the intervening variables. Finally, the bivariate analysis does not provide a way to assess the total contribution of the variables in explaining variance in the dependent variables; nor does it provide a means of determining the contribution of the separate stages of political socialization.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Multivariate analysis is employed to overcome these problems. Path analysis is utilized for determining the "best fit" of a causal model for political socialization for each sample. The procedures involved in determining the best empirical models is (1) compute all the beta weights for a fully recursive system of all asymmetrical relations; (2) from this set of path coefficients, select only those that are \( \alpha < .10 \), eliminating all other paths in the recursive system; (3) recompute the beta weights for the revised model and retain those that are \( \alpha < .10 \). Table 2 reports the path coefficients, residuals and coefficients of determination for the final models. The direct and indirect effects on each intervening and dependent variable will be analyzed first for the U.S., then Japan.

STUDENT ACTIVISM

The indicators of political socialization for the family and school do have direct effects on student activism. In the U.S. the beta weights are .168 for father's education and .338 for major in college. Both students from higher SES families and social science majors were more involved in student protest politics. Together these measures account for 15 percent of the variance in student activism. In Japan the respective beta weights for father's education and major in college are .193 and \(-.137\), respectively. Contrary to what was expected, non-arts and science majors were more active as students in Japan. Together the indicators of family and school political socialization account for only 6 percent of the variance for the Japanese sample.
CAREER CHOICE

In the U. S. the political socialization indicators of family (.109), school (.156), and student activism (.576) have direct effects on career choice. Together they account for 46 percent of the variance in career choice. Student activism has the strongest independent effect accounting for 38 percent of the total variance by itself. Both father's education (.10) and school (.20) political socialization have meaningful indirect effects on career choice. That is, the total correlations between the exogenous variables and career choice are partly spurious because of the indirect effects via student activism on career choice. In Japan only student activism (.413) has a direct effect on career choice, i.e., when the other measures of political socialization are controlled, activists are more likely to be pursuing careers in the knowledge and human service industries than nonactivists. Student activism accounts for 17 percent of the variance in career choice. Although family (.08) and school (.06) political socialization do not have direct effects, they do affect career choice indirectly via student activism.

FAMILY OBLIGATIONS

The second indicator of adult political socialization is family obligations. In the U. S. two variables have direct effects—major in college (.261) and student activism (.340). Social science majors and activists are more likely to remain single. Together the two measures account for 25 percent of the variance in family obligations. Both father's education (.06) and major in college (.12) have indirect effects on family obligations via student activism. In Japan the only direct effect on family obligations is major in college (-.301). Non-arts and science majors are more likely to remain single. Major in college accounts for 9 percent of the variance in family obligations.

ADULT IDEOLOGICAL-COMMITMENT

This is the first of two dependent variables. In the U. S. one indicator of each stage of political socialization has direct effects on adult ideological commitment. They are: father's education (-.114); student activism (.636); and family obligations (.215). Together the three variables account for 55 percent of the variance in adult ideological commitment. Student activism has the largest independent effect and accounts for 45 percent of the variance by itself. Those adults who are further to the left ideologically are former college students raised in lower SES homes, have developed the least family obligations and most significantly were student activists. Three indirect effects are meaningful. Father's education affects ideological commitment via student activism and major in college affects ideological commitment via both student activism and via family obligations.

In Japan three variables have direct effects on ideological commitment. The path coefficients are: (.134) for father's education; (.405)
for student activism and (.328) for career choice. Together they account for 42 percent of the variance in ideological commitment which is lower than for the U. S. sample but still substantial. By themselves student activism and career choice account for 23 percent and 16 percent of the total variance. In contrast to the U. S. sample, career choice has a strong independent direct effect indicating that this measure of adult political socialization has more explanatory power in Japan. Two paths have indirect effects on adult ideological commitment: father's education (.08) via student activism; and major in college (.07) via student activism.

ADULT POLITICAL ACTIVISM

In the U. S. three variables have direct effects on adult political activism. Major in college (.124), student activism (.432) and adult ideological commitment (.217) account for 44 percent of the variance. Again student activism is the best predictor accounting for 27 percent by itself. Three indirect paths influence adult political behavior. Father's education (.07) affects adult political behavior via student activism and major in college (.15) via student activism and via both student activism and adult ideological commitment (.06).

In Japan the causal effects on adult political behavior are different. The five indicators for the three stages of political socialization all have direct effects but adult ideological orientation does not have an independent direct effect. Together father's education (.144), major in college (-.222), student activism (.220), career choice (.504) and family obligations (-.207) account for 55 percent of the variance in adult political behavior. That is, those former students who participate most extensively in leftist behavior are those whose fathers had more education, were not social science majors in college, were highly involved in student protest, have pursued careers in the knowledge and human service industries and had more family obligations. In the U. S. the causal model is slightly better in predicting adult ideological orientation. In Japan the model predicts adult leftist behavior better. Also in contrast to the U. S., career choice is the single best predictor instead of student activism. Only one path had an indirect effect on adult political behavior. Major in college (.06) affected leftist behavior via family obligations.

One major advantage of a recursive model is the possibility of determining the increments in the proportion of explained variance that can be attributed to various stages of political socialization and political beliefs. Since this study focuses on the contributions of stages of political socialization, it was decided to use the forward procedure recommended by Duncan, beginning with the most remote causes, then moving toward immediate causes. Table 3 presents the proportion of variance explained for each stage of political socialization and, for adult political activism, the proportion explained by adult ideological commitment. Family and school political socialization have larger effects in the U. S. (.084) than Japan (.051) on adult ideological commitment. Student activism has the largest incremental effect for both the
Student activism is the major determinant of left-wing ideological commitment although its effects in the U. S. are somewhat greater. In Japan (.096) adult political socialization has a stronger effect than in the U. S. (.038). Thus in the U. S. socialization into adult left-wing ideological commitment is more dependent upon family, school and student politics. Whereas, in Japan student politics and adult political socialization are more important.

A similar pattern exists for adult left-wing political activism. Family and school political socialization effects at .136 for the U. S. and .083 for Japan. The incremental effect of student activism is .279 for the U. S. and .196 for Japan. Although adult political socialization has almost no incremental effect for the U. S. (.009), the effect is substantial for Japan (.272). The proportion of explained variance due to adult ideological commitment is not very great for either sample; .021 for the U. S. and .004 for Japan. While political sentiments and ideological identification may be the final mediator of the causes of political behavior and while it may have a high correlation with political behavior, this research suggests that knowledge of the causal antecedents of both political attitudes and behavior is sufficient to explain political behavior.

DISCUSSION

This exploratory study developed a causal model of political socialization to explain the adult political beliefs and behavior of former college students in the United States and Japan. Path analysis was used as a methodological and statistical technique to test the causal theory; the richness of the information it provides makes it a more useful procedure than other available bivariate or multivariate techniques in testing a theory. We used a recursive, additive, linear model to determine not only the strength but also the structure of the causal relationships. It was used to examine the total relationship of the exogenous and intervening variables as they singly and collectively explain variance in the dependent variables. Thus we could determine the relative contribution of each stage of political socialization, the differential effects of separate political socialization indicators, and the variations in the United States and Japan. Using three stages of political socialization the proportion of the variances explained in ideological commitment and political behavior were highly significant for both countries. In the U. S. the coefficient of determination was .553 for ideological commitment and .435 for political behavior. In Japan the coefficients were .422 and .551, respectively. These are strong findings given the various sources of measurement error, the necessity of using indirect indicators of political socialization, and the possible exclusion of significant variables contributing to the unexplained variance. Political socialization theory is effective in explaining adult political attitudes and behavior for former college students.

In the U. S. family and school political socialization did account for a significant part of the variance in political identification (.084) and political behavior (.136). The incremental effects for Japan were
not significant. The data suggest that this stage of political socialization is (1) not adequately measured, particularly for Japan or (2) is not as important as student protest politics and adult political socialization. The research utilized two indirect indicators of these early socialization experiences. Father's education and major in college only indicate the possible effects of general political socialization environments. Within these two environments there are a wide variety of specific socialization experiences that may have long-range consequences. For example, Krais found that Japanese activists first became politicized during their middle and high school years. Future activists could already be distinguished by their greater participation in school extracurricular activities and more frequent discussion of politics with their peers. If better measures had been available there undoubtedly would have been an improvement in the proportion of variance explained. It should be pointed out, however, that studies using more and better measures of family and school political socialization have only been able to account for less than 30 percent of the variance in student activism. In short, this stage of political socialization is not a strong predictor of student politics let alone adult politics. If the objective is to explain adequately variation in adult politics, more emphasis than at present should be placed on developing better measures of student politics and adult political socialization.

Student activism is the best predictor of adult politics. It has very strong direct effects in both countries. Those students who were most active in student protest are now the adults furthest to be left in their political identification and most active in institutional and non-institutional politics. The descriptive results suggest just how different the activists are. In the United States 54% of the former activists, but none of the non-activists are self-professed radicals. In Japan 50% of the committed activists compared to 8% of the marginal activists consider themselves radical ("very progressive"). In the United States, 70% of the activists have participated in political organizational work and 74% have participated in political demonstrations since leaving college. The comparative figures for non-activists were 47% and 7% respectively. In Japan the same figures for the committed activists were 61% and 72% compared to 20% and 20% for the marginal activists. The data strongly suggest the political commitments formed while attending college have been actively maintained and reinforced.

Adult political socialization can be either a facilitator or constraint for maintaining political commitments. In the United States, career choice had no direct effect because student activism determined career choice, i.e., once student activism explained variance in the dependent variables, there was not much variance that could be explained independently by career choice. In Japan, career choice has a strong direct effect independent of other measures of political socialization. If former Japanese students are in the knowledge and human service industries (journalism, writing, academic, etc.), their left-wing politics is facilitated. On the other hand, if they are in the private sector of the economy, their left-wing politics is constrained, particularly in reference to political behavior. These important contrasts between the
impact of occupational role on the political behavior of former activists in the United States and Japan undoubtedly reflect differences in culture, occupational structure, and role-expectations in the two countries. In the Japan of the 1960's, a cultural emphasis on finding a "place" in the normal occupational structure, a phenomenal economic growth based on private enterprise, and a development of the private enterprise "salary man" as the ideal role-model for youth, created temptations and pressures on some former activists to enter careers in the private sectors providing status, security, and money. Once in these occupations, a lack of both occupational mobility and of differentiation between public and private roles, along with expectations of loyalty to the company, produce tremendous constraints on political expression, constraints not found in the United States to the same degree. In the United States, pluralist life-styles, white-collar occupational mobility, and the specificity between public and private roles provide greater freedom to former activists in the choice of careers and in the expression of political beliefs once in those careers.

For American student activists, remaining free of family obligations after graduation was a facilitator of left-wing politics. In Japan, family obligations were a facilitator of left-wing political behavior, a result opposite from what was predicted. Although a full explanation for these different results in the two countries remains to be determined, we can attempt some informed speculation. The results may reflect the different norms governing marriage and sex roles in the United States and Japan. The division of labor between husband and wife in middle-class Japanese families is much clearer than in American families with the Japanese male having almost exclusive responsibility for the "outside world" of career and community relations, and the wife having primary responsibility for household and child-rearing matters. In addition, the Japanese husband and father tends to spend less time at home and be less intensely involved in family relationships, but has more authority than his American counterpart. These expectations governing the male role in the Japanese family would thus mitigate the weight of family obligations as a constraint on political expression in Japan. In addition, the findings may reveal that in Japan young people exercise more caution in entering primary group roles, and, consequently, former committed activists have more support for engaging in adult left-wing politics from their spouses and friends. Thus, most former activists in the Japanese sample live with people and have friends with leftist beliefs who would not object to their political activity. In the United States, paradoxically, it may be the very lack of penetration of the primary group by the political sphere that makes the marriage role a potentially constraining influence. Almond and Verba found in their American sample a consensual norm that the primary group ought not to be politicized and a social norm that placed some relationships above politics. Yet possibly this very separation of personal bonds from political affiliations may lead to conflicts between one's political role and one's family role: "mixed marriages" in the political sense, the priority of family ties over political ones, and the greater involvement of the husband in American family life can constrain expression of political beliefs for some American former activists. Whatever
the ultimate explanations for our findings of the stronger impact of post-
graduation socialization in Japan than in the United States, our study 
supports the hypothesis that the impact of different stages in the sociali-
zation process may vary cross-culturally, and underlines the need for 
further cross-national research along these lines.

Although our findings are significant, care should be exercised in 
their generalization. The results are based on small numbers of activists 
from leading centers of student protest in both countries. They reveal 
the consequences of political socialization for an early vanguard of 
student activists. Although the findings are not inconsistent with other 
published research, they should probably not be generalized to the larger 
masses of students who were less affected by student political protest. 
The political socialization of non-college youth was also quite different.
Not only may the effects of different stages of political socialization 
vary cross-culturally, they may also vary across sub-cultures.

A final caveat is that the political consciousness of students in 
the latter part of the 1960's was different from the early idealistic 
reform orientations that initiated the student movement, and thecontinu-
ity in political commitments we found in our samples may reflect that 
particular generation's transition to adulthood. That is, the major 
political events after their graduation may have helped to reinforce 
their leftist commitment. Other student generations have faced different 
political environments. Germany's political turmoil after World War II 
led to younger generations supporting the rise of the Nazi regime. In 
the U.S: the earlier radical student generation of the 1930's had to 
come to grips with state terrorism in the Soviet Union and with World 
War II, forcing many radicals to severely modify their politics. In 
contrast the 1960's generation has experienced the political turmoil of 
the Vietnam War and increasing public recognition of the costs of the 
U.S.'s role as world policeman. There has also been the Watergate epi-
sode and the energy and environmental crises. All of these political 
events helped to reinforce left-wing politics for the 1960's activists. 
In short, comparative studies of political socialization need to consider 
the on-going effects of political events that either facilitate or con-
strain the earlier political socialization.

CONCLUSION

This study developed a causal model of political socialization to 
explain adult left-wing politics. As with all such causal models there 
are major criteria which can be used to evaluate its relative worth. 
Does the model make theoretical sense? Can it stand up successfully 
against alternative theories? Does the causal model enlighten or clarify 
major issues under investigation?

Most political socialization theories would predict that the process 
has continuity and cumulative effects. Our findings indicate that this 
is indeed the case. Moreover, the development of political consciousness 
in young adulthood (between the ages of 18-25) would be expected to be
especially crucial for political socialization, particularly if political experience during this period are frequent and intense. These expectations were again confirmed by the data.

On the other hand, while alternative theories of political socialization would emphasize the formative nature of childhood-political socialization, this study indicates that more emphasis should be given to political socialization experiences while attending college, and, in many cultures, like Japan, to adult political socialization. We found, furthermore, no evidence for the maturationalist hypothesis of the inevitable conservative effects of aging and entrance into adult society. We are led to conclude that if the goal of political socialization research is to explain and predict adult politics, we would do well to pay more attention to the often intense political experiences of young adulthood and to whether their products are affected by the constraints of later occupational and marriage roles. By utilizing a multivariate, cross-national, and longitudinal design to study the political socialization process, we believe we have provided not only a more sophisticated and useful model but also important data on the various contributions of different stages of political socialization in two countries. Further research in this area using better indicators should increase the proportion of variance that can be explained and suggest additional theoretical concepts that should be included in the model.

In a recent critique of economics as a system of belief, Galbraith argued that accepted economic models, while rigorous, are not very good at illuminating reality in that they direct attention away from important social, political, and economic issues. His criticism can be extended to other causal models in the social sciences. Thus, this paper would not be complete without an assessment of the activists' impact on the political process of the two countries. We believe they will have a disproportional and possibly significant effect. The former student protesters are highly active politically and remain committed to reforming or radically changing societal institutions. Structurally they are located in the knowledge and human service industries where they can be effective societal critics through teaching, speaking, writing, and scholarship. They are in contact with youth and can continue to influence the ideological orientations of younger generations. Few former activists may be willing to make the compromises that are associated with winning an elected office; however, they are pursuing activities that define political issues through confrontation and interest group politics. The significance of student movements is not confined to the short-term influences of student protest.

While their political consciousness and commitments were formed primarily in their student days, the activist generation is not frozen into rigid ideological positions or tactics. There is evidence that the former white civil rights activists, recognizing the need for minority group leadership, have moved to other issues and organizations, and that Japanese former activists may have moved away from doctrinaire forms of Marxism developed in their youth. To say that former student activists of the 1960's have maintained their beliefs and activities as
members of leftist and activist subcultures after graduation is not to say that they are incapable of adjusting to changing times. In the final analysis, the effectiveness of this generation of student activists will be contingent upon the type of movement they can develop or influence, and upon the institutional footholds they can gain as they challenge the usual decision-making processes and struggle with established authorities. Those who sighed with relief that the student protest movement was over might do well to take a more careful look at the adults those students have become. Those who naively assumed that political revolution was imminent would do well to remember that major political changes are frequently the result of evolutionary processes and that political movements undergo many mutations in their development.
Figure 1. General Causal Model of Political Socialization and Adult Left-Wing Politics.
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix for the U. S. and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$X_1$</th>
<th>$X_2$</th>
<th>$X_3$</th>
<th>$X_4$</th>
<th>$X_5$</th>
<th>$X_6$</th>
<th>$X_7$</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major in College</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td></td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student Activism</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>-.134</td>
<td></td>
<td>.651</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.708</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Choice</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td></td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>.503</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Obligations</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>-.301</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>-.134</td>
<td></td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Ideological Commitment</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>.498</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td></td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Political Activism</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>-.223</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.641</td>
<td>-.209</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05

**p < .01
### Table 2. Path Coefficients, Residuals, and Coefficients of Determination for the U.S. and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paths into Student Activism $X_3$</th>
<th>Paths into Career Choice $X_4$</th>
<th>Paths into Family Obligations $X_5$</th>
<th>Paths into Ideological Commitment $X_6$</th>
<th>Paths into Political Activism $X_7$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p31</td>
<td>p41</td>
<td>p42</td>
<td>p51</td>
<td>p61</td>
</tr>
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<td>p32</td>
<td>p43</td>
<td>p52</td>
<td>p53</td>
<td>p63</td>
</tr>
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<td>p44</td>
<td>p61</td>
<td>p63</td>
<td>p65</td>
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<tr>
<td>p32</td>
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<td>p71</td>
<td>p73</td>
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<td>p41</td>
<td></td>
<td>p72</td>
<td>p75</td>
<td>p76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>.109**</td>
<td>.156**</td>
<td>.261**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.576**</td>
<td>.340**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.193</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.413**</td>
<td>-.301*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W_3$</td>
<td>$W_4$</td>
<td>$W_5$</td>
<td>$W_6$</td>
<td>$W_7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.923</td>
<td>.737</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>.669</td>
<td>.752</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>.953</td>
<td>.760</td>
<td>.670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2_{3.21}$, $R^2_{4.123}$, $R^2_{5.23}$, $R^2_{6.135}$, $R^2_{7.236}$

$R^2_{3.21}$, $R^2_{4.3}$, $R^2_{5.2}$, $R^2_{6.134}$, $R^2_{7.12345}$

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
Table 3. The Proportioning of the Explained Variance in the Dependent Variables.

**ADULT IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Effect of Family and School Political Socialization</th>
<th>U.S. $R^2_{6(12)}$</th>
<th>.084*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{6(12)}$</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Effect for Student Activism</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{6(123)} - R^2_{6(12)}$</td>
<td>.433**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{6(123)} - R^2_{6(12)}$</td>
<td>.282**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Effect for Adult Political Socialization</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{6(12345)} - R^2_{6(123)}$</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{6(12345)} - R^2_{6(123)}$</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum, Total Variance Explained</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{6(12345)}$</td>
<td>.555**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{6(12345)}$</td>
<td>.429**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ADULT POLITICAL ACTIVISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Effect of Family and School Political Socialization</th>
<th>U.S. $R^2_{7(12)}$</th>
<th>.136**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{7(12)}$</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Effect for Student Activism</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{7(123)} - R^2_{7(12)}$</td>
<td>.279**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{7(123)} - R^2_{7(12)}$</td>
<td>.196*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Effect for Adult Political Socialization</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{7(12345)} - R^2_{7(123)}$</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{7(12345)} - R^2_{7(123)}$</td>
<td>.272**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Effect for Adult Ideological Commitment</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{7(123456)} - R^2_{7(12345)}$</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{7(123456)} - R^2_{7(12345)}$</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum, Total Variance Explained</td>
<td>U.S. $R^2_{7(123456)}$</td>
<td>.445**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan $R^2_{7(123456)}$</td>
<td>.555**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* < .05
** < .01
FOOTNOTES

1. This article represents the application of a causal model of political socialization and of a more rigorous methodology to data previously reported in Ellis S. Krauss, Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), and in James M. Fendrich and Alison T. Tarleau, "Marching to a Different Drummer: Occupational and Political Correlates of Former Student Activists," Social Forces, LXII, 2 (December, 1973), pp. 245-253. The authors would like to thank the Institute of Quantitative Studies in the Social Sciences, University of Washington, for providing programming assistance, and the Bureau for Faculty Research, Western Washington State College, for providing manuscript typing services. Also we are grateful to Professor Kazuko Tsurumi (Sophia University) for access to her data, and to Alfred Arkley and Richard Braungart for helpful comments on the original manuscript. Work on this paper was supported in part by National Institute of Education Grant NGE 00-3-012. Field research in Japan by Krauss was supported by a National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship and a grant from the Committee on International Studies, Stanford University.


7. Most of the major political socialization theorists have discussed this issue and the contradictory data and hypotheses concerning it. See, for example, Richard E. Dawson, "Political Socialization," Political Science Annual, 1966, ed, James A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 29-41; Richard D. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), Ch. 6; Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger, 1973), Chapter 3; Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 17-20; Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," in Socialization to Politics, ed. Jack Dennis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 13-16. The issue of the relative influence of stages of political socialization is usually discussed by these authors as part of the problem of "discontinuities" in the socialization process, or of the problem of the limits of childhood socialization. They also argue the need for longitudinal and cross-national studies to clarify the issue. This paper, as we shall suggest below, explicitly seeks to respond to this need.

8. See, for example, most of the numerous articles reprinted in anthologies of political socialization research such as Norman Adler and Charles Harrington, The Learning of Political Behavior (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1970); Edward S. Greenberg, ed., Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970); and Chapter II of Robert S. Sigel, ed., Learning About Politics (New York: Random House, 1970). To their credit most of the authors who stress the formativeness of childhood learning recognize that their hypotheses are not completely confirmed.


11. Lipset and Ladd, p. 84. See also the references in note 12 for further discussion of the "maturational" model.


17. Dean Jaros, op. cit., Chapter 4.


26. Fendrich and Tarleau; Krauss. In 1972 the authors began extensive correspondence exploring the similarities and differences in their two studies. After discovering shared theoretical concerns and similar data bases and research designs, we decided to work on the present joint project.


29. For a more detailed discussion of the sample, see Krauss, Chapter 1.

30. A number of authors have cited this event as the start of the student protest movement in the 1960's. See for example, Matthews and Prothro, Orum; and Alphonso Pinkney, *The Committed: White Activists in the Civil Rights Movement* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1968).

31. Matthews and Prothro.

32. See Fendrich and Tarleau.

33. Initially a system of weighting the three types of political behavior was considered because of the different thresholds of political commitment that may be involved. We decided, however, that it would be very difficult to determine comparable weights for cross-national data. Therefore, the three political activities were weighted equally, recognizing that this would introduce a certain amount of measurement error which would make it more difficult to obtain strong measures of association. All respondents were scored (1) if they were inactive and (2) if they were active on each of the three items.


35. This measure of career choice as well as some of the others used in this study can at best be considered ordinal rather than interval or ratio measures. Although interval or ratio measures are assumed in regression analysis, H. T. Reynolds has found that ordinal measures can be successfully used in causal analysis if there are adequate
categories that are not highly skewed and control variables are measured with as much refinement as the independent and dependent variables. See H. T. Reynolds, "Ordinal Partial Correlation and Causal Inference," in H. M. Blalock, Jr. (ed.) Measurement in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine, 1974).

36. George R. Packard, III.


38. When data from two different samples are compared, unstandardized path coefficients are normally used; however, because there was little difference between our samples, we decided to use standardized path coefficients in reporting the multivariate analysis.

39. Complicated statistical problems can be handled with simple random sampling and simple statistical problems can be solved with complicated sampling design. There is a gap in our knowledge in how to determine confidence intervals when more sophisticated statistical techniques are used with complicated sampling designs. See, for example, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

40. Hubert M. Blalock in his "Theory Construction" seminar recommends retaining path coefficients in causal models if they are > .10.

41. The simultaneous equations for each final model are as follows:

U. S.

\[ X_1 = e_1 \]
\[ X_2 = e_2 \]
\[ X_3 = p31X_1 + p32X_2 + e_3 \]
\[ X_4 = p41X_1 + p42X_2 + p43X_3 + e_4 \]
\[ X_5 = p52X_2 + p53X_3 + e_5 \]
\[ X_6 = p61X_1 + p63X_3 + p65X_5 + e_6 \]
\[ X_7 = p72X_2 + p73X_3 + p75X_5 + e_7 \]

Japan

\[ X_1 = e_1 \]
\[ X_2 = e_2 \]
\[ X_3 = P_{31}X_1 + P_{32}X_2 + E_3 \]
\[ X_4 = P_{43}X_3 + E_4 \]
\[ X_5 = P_{52}X_2 + E_5 \]
\[ X_6 = P_{61}X_1 + P_{63}X_3 + P_{64}X_4 + E_6 \]
\[ X_7 = P_{71}X_1 + P_{72}X_2 + P_{73}X_3 + P_{74}X_4 + P_{75}X_5 + E_7 \]


44. Ellis Krauss, op. cit.

45. See Braungart and Aron, note 3.

46. For a fuller description of these constraints, particularly in private, large corporations, see Krauss, Chapter 6.

47. One of the best descriptions of the social role of the modern Japanese husband and father is found in Eyre Voegl, Japan's New Middle Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).


52. There is some evidence that activists of the 1960's are involved in change oriented institutional politics. A number of activists have been involved in national and local political campaigns. Still others have won elected office. A few examples are U.S. Congresswomen Elizabeth Holtzman, U.S. Senator Gary Hart, Governor of California, Edmund G. Brown. Columnist Mary McGory, op. cit. reported that a number of Democratic freshmen Congressmen in 1974 were former peace activists.