Suggestions for an alternative approach to public administration education are provided. One recent movement in public administration strongly attacks the notion of neutral scientific training and emphasizes that public administrators should administer policy according to social equity. However, this standard does not provide any objective criteria for distinguishing among the various claims of disadvantaged minorities and cannot differentiate between equality and justice. The function of administration in a democratic regime is to be more than a mere reflection of the people's wants and more than a mirror of the bureaucrat's particular view of "social equity." To develop values and judgment capabilities, administrators should be educated in relating current issues with American political thought and tradition. The study of constitutional law, an apprenticeship with a public administration organization, case studies of decision making, and a research project which requires the student to develop a policy on a particular controversial question are suggested as a possible program for public administration education. (Author/DE)
DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF CIVIL SERVANTS

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I Introduction

According to the 1967 Honey Report on "Higher Education for the Public Service," "[t]here is a sense among practitioners that the intellectual interests of academic public administrators are trivial or irrelevant to real public service problems." The Report contends that an important underlying cause of this "negative assessment" of academic research and training in public administration has been the efforts "within public administration... to make it a science; to abstract it from the governmental processes, and to define it as the staff services with principles of its own." The assumption behind the efforts to create a science of administration is that there are certain techniques of management which are applicable to the running of any organization regardless of whether its ends are public or private. Thus, the attempts to construct a science of administration, according to the Honey Report, have led to the development of graduate programs which focus primarily on "management" or staff functions -- planning, budgeting, personnel administration and organization. The Report argues, however, that the "efforts to make [public administration] a science have run afoul of reality. The verities which have been isolated tend either to be culture-bound or to be so general as to have limited significance for behavior in the conduct of public business." Thus, the disparaging view of the study of public administration held by practicing administrators implies that the courses offered to students of public administration provide inadequate preparation for the aspects of their work which are distinctive to public service employment. Courses in budgeting, personnel, and organization and management problems, according to the Report, lead to "excessive specialization and professionalism, and to isolation from governmental reality." The notion of training public servants in the techniques of administration which are supposed to be equally applicable to public and private business as well as to different forms of government owes its origin to Woodrow Wilson's famous essay on "The Study of Administration." According to Wilson, the similarity of administrative functions performed by all modern governments regardless of their political ends points toward the need for the development of a neutral science of administration, that is, "one rule of good administration for all governments alike." Wilson's view is based on his understanding of the distinction between "politics," that is, "the formulation of the broad plans of governmental action," and "administration," or "the detailed execution of such plans." According to Frank Goodnow, who followed
Wilson's distinction between "politics" and "administration," as government's program ought to be derived from the popular will as expressed through the elected representatives of the people. It is the function of public administrators in a democracy simply to implement the popular will in the most efficient manner possible according to well-established, uniformly valid and politically neutral principles of administration.

Wilson's and Goodnow's dichotomy between politics and administration has been seriously questioned by contemporary writers on public administration. There seems to be widespread agreement among academicians and practitioners alike today that public administrators in this country are not and cannot be merely neutral instruments implementing the commands of their political superiors. Rather, they play an inevitably political role because of their active participation in the initiation and formulation of public policy. Yet the recognition of the political function of public servants is still not reflected in the academic training provided to them. According to a recent analysis of a 1974 survey of member institutions of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, most graduate programs of public administration continue to focus on organization theory and behavior, public finance and the budgetary process, public-policy analysis, personnel administration and planning. Thus, the authors of this analysis argue that most programs are still primarily concerned with offering the staff functions of personnel, budgeting, and organizational analysis.

Perhaps the continuing preoccupation of academic teachers of public administration with the neutral techniques of administration, despite their recognition of the public servant's broader political role, reflects the belief that the kind of political judgment necessary for policy formation can be based only on the public servant's own values or experiences, and hence cannot be taught.

One recent movement in public administration strongly attacks the notion of neutral scientific training and emphasizes the need for commitment to "normative goals for administration." If the approach of the "new" public administration movement can equip public servants to deal competently with substantive questions of public policy rather than concerning themselves only with the techniques of administration, then this approach would represent a valuable addition to, if not replacement for, existing public administration curricula. However, an examination of some of the fundamental precepts of the "new" public administration, and their implications for the education of public servants, may suggest that its remedies for deficiencies of the older view of public administration are open to serious objections. I propose in this paper to suggest certain defects in the "new" public administration approach, and then to describe an alternative approach to the teaching and practice of public administration which would take account of the public
servant's political role but avoid the problems present in the "new" public administration.

II The "New" Public Administration

The essays presented in the volume entitled Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective were papers presented at a conference in 1968. Although diverse in their style and emphases, these essays seem to reflect the central concerns of what has come to be known as the "new" public administration. According to Dwight Waldo, the originator of the conference, the "new" public administration arose in response to the dissatisfaction of the younger generation of teachers of public administration with the Federal government's inability to fulfill its promises to resolve the war in Vietnam, to provide equal treatment of minorities, and to eliminate poverty. The evident failure of particular governmental policies, which stimulated a "wave of sentiment against governmental solutions," apparently crystallized the emerging view that public administrators cannot and should not conduct themselves according to the principles of a value-free science of administration. According to Orion White, one of the participants in the Minnowbrook Conference, "It has always been assumed that administrators operate in an environment where basic issues of values or objectives have been settled in the legislative process." However, White argues, such issues are in fact simply transferred to the administrative arena by the legislative process. The recognition that the public administrator's values and objectives inevitably influence his decisions may be responsible for what Waldo calls the "new" public administration's "concern with finding and realizing the proper values." This interest in values represents a promising attempt to move beyond the view that public servants merely implement policy on the basis of value-free principles and to provide a new foundation to guide public administrators in the making of policy. However, many of those who advocate a "new" public administration share the view of the exponents of the older science of administration that questions of value cannot be dealt with objectively. Michael Harmon, another of the conference participants, argues in his essay on administrative responsibility that there can be no proof for the ultimate correctness of normative positions. Thus, in Harmon's view, the "responsible" administrator is simply one whose decisions are truly guided by the administrator's own values; the objective correctness of those values cannot be appraised.

Other participants in the Minnowbrook Conference contend that there is an objective standard which the administrator should follow in making decisions, but they seem to make little attempt to demonstrate the reasoning behind it. Todd La Porte,
for example, argues that "our primary normative premise should be that the purpose of public organizations is the reduction of economic, social and psychic suffering and the enhancement of life opportunities for those inside and outside the organization." The difficulties of "operationalizing" such a standard and of resolving probable conflicts between enhancing the administrator's "life opportunities" and those of the people outside the organization are pointed out by Edward Friedland in his comments on La Porte's paper. Perhaps equally important, however, is understanding that the foundation of La Porte's standard does not appear to rest on any serious deliberation of alternatives, but rather on his sentiments. 

George Frederickson, among other participants, shares La Porte's sentiments. Frederickson uses the phrase "social equity" to summarize similar "value premises." In his view, "pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor of established stable bureaucracies and their specialized minority clientele ... and against those minorities who lack political and economic resources." Therefore, public administrators must "work for changes which try to reduce the deprivation of minorities." "Social equity," according to Frederickson, "includes activities designed to enhance the political power and economic well-being of these minorities." 

One major problem to be raised regarding the standard of the "new" public administrationists is not the fact that they advocate social equity but rather the meaning they attach to it. Frederickson implies that the role of the public servant is to redress the deprivation of those minorities who he thinks have suffered discrimination: In other words, he must attempt to equalize political and economic resources among all groups. Does abstract equality, however, necessarily constitute justice? For example, it may be argued that criminals are a disadvantaged minority because they are deprived of certain privileges when convicted of breaking the law. If the public administrator is to enhance the well-being of the criminal then he must tax the law-abiding citizen to support this disadvantaged minority. Would the citizen who obeys the law consider it just that the criminal share the same economic benefits or living conditions as himself? It appears that the "social equity" standard proposed by the advocates of a "new" public administration does not provide any objective criteria for distinguishing among the various claims of disadvantaged minorities. Those who propose this standard apparently believe that in all instances the underprivileged should be favored. They seem to assume that simple equality is identical with justice.

There are at least two problems which appear to arise from the "new" public administration's advocacy of one particular set of "value premises." Urging public servants to commit themselves
to redressing the deprivation of minorities may lead them to reject automatically any opinions of those who disagree with them and any compromises with their beliefs. Instead of making judgments based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, public administrators may become the sponsors of one set of values to the exclusion of all others. In this regard, the "new" public administration movement appears to be incompatible with the views of those political scientists who argue that what gives the bureaucracy a legitimate claim to share in policy formation is that it represents a broad spectrum of values and opinions, all of which are heard before a decision is made. Norton Long, for example, argues that a major task of public administration is to organize itself for thinking so that it may "perform rationally and responsibly the task of formulating policy alternatives" for politically responsible superiors. Thoughtful policy, in Long's view, is the result of having a wide cross-section of value represented in the bureaucracy and of establishing procedures which insure that all points of view are heard before a decision is made.

The "new" public administration movement, on the other hand, argues that policy should be based on a commitment to the "social equity" value premises. The result of such a commitment, according to Orion White, may be a growing tendency among public administrators to believe that "there exists a set of fundamental values which are unambiguous and which comprehensively define proper relationships between individuals and hence between institutions and individuals." The possibility of administrators adopting a "comprehensive value framework" suggests to White that public servants may demand that in-organizational procedure "confrontation be substituted for the traditional concepts of decision by compromise, reasonableness, tolerance and balance of interest." In other words, public administrators, if they follow unquestioningly the formula laid down by the advocates of a "new" public administration will come to reject precisely those principles and procedures which seem to make the bureaucracy a democratic institution entitled to contribute to the formulation of public policy. Edward Friedland is even skeptical that rejection of democratic procedures in favor of confrontation within the organization will bring about "social equity." He suggests that public servants may have to resort to "resistance, sabotage and rebellion" to insure the adoption of their conception of an equal distribution of economic and political resources.

A second problem created by those who advocate commitment to a particular set of values is that they encourage the public servant to think that his primary responsibility is to determine policy simply on the basis of his understanding of how to redress the deprivation of minorities. As Dwight Waldo points out, there is little discussion by the "new" public administrationists of the public servant's responsibility to formulate policy which conforms to the principles of the Constitution and the laws enacted by the elected representatives of the people. How does the administrator resolve a conflict between his view of "social equity" and a
Legal statute? Would the advocates of a "new" public administration encourage public servants to operate outside the Constitutional-legal framework? Surely, in the light of the Watergate affair, there ought to be serious objections to the notion of the public servant as a policymaker free to operate beyond the pale of the law.

If a commitment to "social equity" is, nevertheless, to be the primary purpose of public administration, then it appears to the "new" public administrationists that the government's bureaucracy must be reformed. But the direction of the organizational reformation advocated by the "new" public administration is somewhat vague. For example, there seems to be almost universal agreement among the participants at the Minnowbrook Conference that a commitment to "social equity" involves public administrators in the pursuit of change. But if the administrator is taught that "social equity" is the normative premise on which he is to base his decisions, then presumably not all change is beneficial. How does he distinguish between beneficial and harmful change? As we have seen in the case of the criminal, applying the "social equity" standard may be beneficial for the convict but its effects on the rest of society are by no means so clear. How does the administrator decide his course of action? Implementing the "social equity" formula as interpreted by the "new" public administration movement does not seem to provide the civil servant with adequate guidance for distinguishing good from bad change.

In spite of the difficulty in reconciling an openness to change with the "social equity" standard, the advocates of a "new" public administration recommend changes in the bureaucratic structure which they think will enhance the possibilities for "social equity" both within the organization and in its policies. Several of the participants urge considerable modification of the hierarchical arrangement of bureaucracies because, they argue, relations of dependence, control, and subordination deny men freedom, security, and "space for growth." According to the advocates of a "new" public administration, replacing the "centralized structure of authority" with greater employee participation in decision making will promote "social equity" by providing everyone with greater access to the decision-making process, and thereby enhancing everyone's "life opportunities" to be creative within the organization.

Dwight Waldo raises the question of whether the "new" public administration's concern for the well-being of the individual bureaucrat and for seeking solutions at the individual and small-group level might imperil the "power to govern." In other words, to what extent can greater consultation and participation be achieved without jeopardizing an organization's ability to arrive at decisions within a reasonable time period and to act decisively?

Another means of promoting "social equity," according to the "new" public administrationists, is for governmental agencies to
encourage "client involvement." Otherwise, "policy formation really amounts to elitist rule" since the "client" has no effective power over the representatives. The use of the term "client" seems to imply that the public servant's responsibility is to serve the interests of a particular group to the exclusion of all others. The view of the "new" public administrationists further implies that if public servants are to serve faithfully the interests of their "clientele," then they must at least share equal power with them. These assumptions have been questioned by Theodore Lowi, among other political scientists. The notion of the public agency as responsible solely for serving the wishes of a particular group and for providing its "clientele" with an organization and a mechanism for participation amounts to what Lowi calls "interest-group liberalism." Lowi argues that an agency which encourages strong organization and broad participation by its "client" tends to become the captive of that "client." Lowi contends that "interest-group liberalism" is harmful to democratic government because it regards all interests as legitimate and worthy of accommodation without regard to their effect on the public interest. The Tenth Federalist, on the contrary, treats interest groups as necessary evils whose claims are not to be satisfied when conflict with the public good. A "faction" according to Madison, is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Thus, it would seem that the particular interests of factions should not merely be accommodated; rather they should be regulated so as not to be harmful to the interests of the community as a whole.

The "new" public administrationists, however, advocate more than a general increase in "client involvement." They are specifically interested in "a considerably higher client involvement on the part of those minorities" who they think have been deprived of political and economic power. According to George Frederickson, A preferred form of deprived-minority-client involvement would be routinized patterns of communication with decentralized organizations capable of making distributive decisions that support the interests of deprived minorities, even if these decisions are difficult to justify in terms of either efficiency or economy. Thus, it is the intention of the "new" public administrationists not simply to promote "social equity" by providing deprived minorities with equal access to the decision-making process. Rather it is their goal to redistribute goods and services so that the groups they think are underprivileged have an equal share regardless of the cost to or the effect on the rest of society. The ordinary citizen may question why he should obey and pay taxes to
a government that decides arbitrarily which groups should be favored and ignores the interests of other groups.

The objections raised to the "social equity" standard suggest that there are serious defects in its use as a guide for the development of public policy. Since, however, the public administrator is recognized to be necessarily involved in the formulation of public policy, it seems equally impossible to return to Wilson's and Goodnow's understanding of the civil servant as the efficient implementer of the will of the people. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the public administrator can make a distinctive contribution to the formation of public policy which recognizes his political role but avoids the difficulties that arise from following the precepts of the "new" public administration.

III An Older View of Public Administration

Sir Henry Taylor, a nineteenth century senior civil servant in the Colonial Office of the British government, wrote a treatise entitled The Statesman, in which he suggested a different view of the proper role of the bureaucracy within a democratic regime. Taylor's guide to statesmanship consists of a treatment "of Administrative government as it ought to be exercised in a free state." Taylor's view of the role of administration is based on his understanding of the problematic character of democratic government: it must take account of the people's wants but it must not be subservient to those wants when they may prove to be detrimental to the long-range interests of the community. Thus, Taylor would disagree with Wilson and later writers who contend that the role of the administrator consists simply of the efficient implementation of the will of the people. In Taylor's view, the administrator must also contemplate the long-range consequences of the wishes of the people. He would also disagree with the advocates of a "new" public administration who argue that the public servant's policies should be guided by his partial view of which minorities require his sponsorship to enhance their political and economic well-being. According to Taylor, administration at its best should have "regard to the larger public interests, and the deep individual concerns with which they deal."

In Taylor's judgment, understanding the role of the administrator in a democracy depends on a recognition of the disjunction between the requirements for rising in office and a democracy's need for leaders of wisdom and foresight. Under popular government, the man who would advance in office must call forth "the arts of rising," and "the tricks of statesmanship which it may be quite as well to despise as to practice." In Taylor's view, the requirements for rising in office in a democracy include such things as
popularity, humbleness, subserviency, pliancy, and the ability to use flattery. Taylor argues, however, that these characteris-
tics incapacitate the statesman for command. The man who would
lead a nation effectively cannot be weak and submissive. Taylor
contends that a statesman must sometimes make decisions which di-
verge from popular opinion and for which he may lose or be forced
to quit his office. According to Taylor, however, most statesmen
are so intent on listening to every shift in public opinion in order
to be elected that they rarely contemplate the long-range conse-
quences of the people's desires. The exigencies and immediate de-
mands of becoming and remaining a statesman allow him neither the
time nor the opportunity to "meditate the good of mankind." Thus,
in Taylor's judgment, once a man has acquired the characteristics
necessary for rising in office, "it is not in nature" that he
should have the qualities to be a wise administrator as well.

Taylor's remedy for this deficiency is the development of a
permanent civil service which would constitute the locus of states-
manship under popular government, "a wise and constant instrument-
ality at work upon administrative measures (distinguished as they
might be from measures of political parties)." Whereas politicians
constitute a "numerous body of efficient statesmen" who are to be
"more externally active and answer the demands of the day," civil
servants should constitute a body of "closet statesmen" who are "to
be somewhat more retired and meditative in order that they may take
thought for the morrow." Thus, Taylor advocates a partnership
role between the bureaucracy and the politician, the former to con-
template more the "permanent and aggregate interests" of the country,
and the latter to respond more to the immediate wants of the people.
Taylor's formulation of the relationship between elected officials
and career civil servants takes cognizance of the political role of
administrators but it avoids the problem created by the "new" public
administration of having administrators impose policy, by confront-
tation if necessary, on the basis of their own view of "social
equity." Taylor's proposal suggests that civil servants help to
formulate policy by thinking through the long-term consequences of
measures and the various alternatives available. By performing
these functions faithfully, and offering prudent counsel, civil
servants become the trusted advisors to their political supervisors
who, under popular government, must bear ultimate responsibility for
decisions.

Taylor discusses several examples of how such "indoor
statesmen" can influence the governing of the country. First,
the man who writes a summary of a report "estimates the relevancy
and significance of the respective facts of a case," thereby ren-
dering a judgment upon it. His précis influences the disposition
of the document because the superior functionary will seldom take
the decision away from the man who has made an elaborate and ju-
dicious investigation into the facts. In addition, the civil
servant aids in the formulation of new legislation by filtering
upward to the Parliament the digested and generalized knowledge accumulated through the execution of law. Furthermore, "official criticism" tactfully exercised by an inferior functionary may influence and improve the superior's work. 53

In Taylor's view, however, the English civil service of his time was ill-equipped to assume the role he outlined for it. Perhaps the most important reason is that the conditions which are necessary to "breed" statesmen are not readily available under democratic government. In Taylor's judgment, the two most able statesmen of his own time were a naval officer and a soldier of the Indian Army, both of whom developed their statesmanlike faculties under conditions of "solitude and seclusion" separated "from persons of their own race or class" while exercising "absolute authority" over those with whom they did associate. 54 Living under these conditions, they did not develop the characteristics of subservience and humbleness which would incapacitate them for statesmanship. Officeholding under democratic government, however, is not compatible with living "aloof from the excitement of society and of daily political contention." The statesman in a democratic regime cannot afford to be arrogant; he must serve the people:

Having to act always with others, through others, and upon others, and those others for the most part vulgus hominum, his presumptions should be in favor of such opinions as are likely to be shared by others.

Since the conditions for breeding statesmen are not available in a democratic government, Taylor urges the statesman who loses office to use his time wisely in serious and solitary study. 55

Taylor's argument points toward a tension between the need for statesmanship and the requirements of popular rule. Taylor contends, nevertheless, that the perpetuation of a democratic regime is contingent on there being statesmen who understand and minister to the people's "greatest want[s], though the least felt." 56 In other words, the statesman's most important function is to recognize the "permanent and aggregate interests" of the people and to serve those interests. Taylor suggests the means by which the statesman can devise measures appropriate to his function:

He would find [the measures] not certainly by shutting himself up in his closet and inventing what had not been thought of before — but by holding himself on the alert; by listening with all his ears...
suggestions of circumstance; by catching the first moment of public complaint against real evil, encouraging it and turning it to account. 58

Thus, the measures proposed by the statesman would not be the product of a "spontaneous invention" but would be firmly grounded in the view that the end of democratic government is to serve the people. In Taylor's judgment, however, the best means of achieving that end is not through constitutional changes which only "postpone the substance of popular power to the form" but rather through administrative measures introduced by the kind of civil service he proposed. 59 The civil service, in Taylor's view, must be staffed by great men who can be got to serve the people by "a common bond of reverence for what is greater than either," namely "a zeal for public objects [that] predominates over self-importance." 60

An understanding similar to Taylor's of the role of the civil service within a democratic regime seems to be embodied in several contemporary works on public administration, including the 1955 Hoover Commission Report which proposed a "Senior Civil Service" and the writings of Herbert Storing and Fritz Morstein Marx. According to the Hoover Commission's report, the function of the civil service is not a merely instrumental one, responding automatically to political instructions. Rather the civil service is to share political functions with elected and appointed politicians and to provide its distinctive perspective which, according to the Commission report, is complementary to that of politicians. Thus, governing should be the result of the combined contribution of both civil servants and politicians. 61 The purpose of the "Senior Civil Service" which the Hoover Commission proposed was to provide within the civil service system an exemplary group of administrators who could bolster the partnership relationship between civil servants and political executives. 62

The principle features of the Senior Civil Service proposal include assigning rank, salary and status to an individual civil servant as opposed to attaching rank and salary to the job; and shifts in assignment without the danger of suffering loss of pay or status. The proposal also required the bureaucrat to serve where needed most and to maintain strict political neutrality. 63 By this last recommendation, the Commission intended for career administrators to maintain strict neutrality with regard to particular policies. It did not mean that they should be neutral, in the sense of indifference to the consequences of a policy, but rather in the sense of being able to point out the weaknesses in any proposal no matter how great its appeal, and in being prepared to implement whichever proposal is finally adopted by their political superiors.

The development of a Senior Civil Service has important advantages for the operations of government. A rotating corps of
general administrators would be more concerned with a broad conception of the public interest and the coordination of programs than with serving as spokesman for particular interests. Theodore Lowi argues that a Senior Civil Service "would tend to develop a profession of public administration as distinct from a profession of a particular technology and a career within a specific agency." Although the members of a Senior Civil Service would not be loyal to a particular agency, they would not be insensitive to the special claims of an agency's "clientele." They would, however, in Lowi's view, force interests to compete more openly so that their claims on the public would be debated rather than simply accommodated.

The specific contribution which the civil service can make in the formulation of public policy to complement that of elected officials is elaborated by Storing and Marx. First, the civil servant's relative permanence in office compared with the short tenure of elected and appointed officials means, according to these authors, that the civil service is likely to have a greater familiarity with the internal operations of departments as well as external relations with Congress and interest groups. Second, the civil servant is likely to have more experience than his political superiors in developing proposals for legislation. On the basis of that experience, the civil servant can judge the probable success and consequences of particular proposals. He is more likely to be sensitive to the long-range effect of decisions, since the consequences will be felt long after his political superior has departed from office. Marx and Storing argue that the politician's impatience to get things done in order to enhance his popularity with the electorate is beneficially moderated and countered by the restraining influence of the bureaucrat. This influence is based on the bureaucrat's knowledge of pertinent facts as well as on his relative insulation from shifting political breezes. This insulation provides the civil servant with more of an opportunity than his political counterpart to consider the long-range interests of the community. He does this by following procedures which may prolong debate, suggest alternative courses of action, and even delay final implementation of a policy. Under popular government, however, the civil servant may guide and advise, but his decisions can always be overruled by the elected leadership which has ultimate authority for governing. Finally, Storing notes that the civil servant's emphasis on rules and procedures leads to a concern with following precedents, and hence, treating men reasonably and fairly. In other words, bureaucratic procedures embody the principle of justice of treating similar cases similarly. In sum, the bureaucracy contributes competence in the art of government, knowledge and foresight of the problems of government, and continuity in the operations of government. Both Storing and Marx contend that these qualities of the bureaucracy merge into a distinctive view of the common good which supplements that of the political leadership. Viewed in this light, administration in a democratic regime can add something to democracy. As Marx observes:
Democratic administration, above all is to be a source of strength for democracy. To give strength, it must have strength to give. It does not give strength if its voice is that of the echo, if its attitude is that of the errand boy who mistakes public whims for manifestations of the general interest. It must think of itself as the color guard of the common good. To this end it must have an identity of its own, built upon the consciousness of its public function.

Thus, in Marx's view, the function of administration in a democratic regime is to be more than a mere reflection of the people's wants and more than a mirror of the bureaucrat's particular view of "social equity." Its qualities may lead to a unique conception of the public interest.

IV A "New" Education for Civil Servants

What are the implications of the foregoing view of democratic administration for the education of prospective public servants? First, it points to the need for civil servants to have a thorough understanding of the institutions of a constitutional democracy and the role of the administrator in relation to them. The basis of a university curriculum covering these areas emerged from a series of conferences held at the Brookings Institution, in which high-ranking career and political executives discussed the "job of the federal executive." The discussions focused on the distinctly public character of their positions, the nature of their responsibilities, the relationship between career and non-career executives, and the political environment within which the bureaucrat must operate, that is, his relationship to the President, the Congress, political parties, interest groups and other agencies. These discussions implied that public servants should receive a political education which concentrates on the distinctive character of American institutions. A political education should consider the levels of government and their interrelationships so that the bureaucrat recognizes, for example, that Congressional investigation is not an unwarranted invasion of his area of expertise.

A political education should also take cognizance of the fact that civil servants are intimately involved in the formulation of policy, and thus, that their own values inevitably enter the public realm. Therefore, the kinds of values held by public servants and the manner by which they arrive at them should be of central concern in educating men for the public service. Rufus Miles, who for many years held important posts in government and academia including Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and director of a program for
government officials at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that an educational program should encourage public servants to develop a coherent set of values. The danger Miles fears from this suggestion is that educational programs might become vehicles of indoctrination. In order to avert this danger, Miles recommends that courses incorporate discussions of issues of social ethics and the values, faith, and prejudices which underlie each person's judgment on such issues. Miles's proposal implies, unlike that of the advocates of a "new" public administration, that values may be clarified and improved by being based on questioning, rational debate, and serious reflection. It is possible to distinguish among sets of "values" by the degree to which they rest on such reflection, rather than on mere whim or sentiment.

John Rohr, who recently initiated a program at Governors State University in Illinois for the training of future public servants, agrees with Miles's contention that an education for civil servants ought to teach them to reflect on values rather than to provide them with a "set of values" to apply to contemporary issues. Since public administrators must formulate policy that is compatible with the principles and institutions of the American regime, then they ought to deliberate about American values. In Rohr's judgment, the best means of encouraging such deliberation is "to relate a contemporary issue to the fundamental values of the American political tradition." He argues that the emphasis on contemporary issues provides "the concrete, specific, decision-making orientation" that is essential for the formation of public policy. A consideration of the principles underlying the regime encourages public administrators to reflect more deeply by relating the specific issue to the broader foundations on which American society is built. For example, the student might study the contemporary problem of strikes by public servants as a means of approaching the perennial issue of civil disobedience in American society.

The proposal to connect the study of current issues with American political thought and tradition has several advantages. First, this approach avoids the danger of obsolescence that arises from an education which deals only with current, "relevant" problems. A second reason for uniting the study of contemporary issues with American political thought is that it encourages public servants to read and consider the writings of men like Hamilton, Lincoln and Jefferson who, because of their wide-ranging discussions of the advantages and problems of this regime, were the most thoughtful exponents of American principles. A third reason for studying a specific issue in relation to American political principles is that such an exercise would show the working out of American values and the tensions which arise from them, i.e., the tension between individual rights and majority rule. This approach brings out the problems in democratic.
government; unlike the approach of the "new" public administration which ignores such problems and encourages the absolutization of a partial set of "values."

Rohr suggests that the most fruitful approach "for unifying contemporary issues with American values may be through the study of Constitutional law." Every case provides an opportunity to study American values within the context of a practical concrete situation. However, Sir James Grigg, who rose to the top rung of the British administrative ladder and served as Secretary of State for War in Churchill's cabinet, argues that the study of law has a narrowing influence on the administrator when compared to the classical liberal education formerly required of the British civil servant. Grigg contends that administration requires a man with "a wide general outlook and culture . . . who is concerned much more with arriving at sensible working arrangements than at the narrow and exact legal truth." The study of Constitutional law, however, frequently involves broad philosophical questions inherent in the meaning of such guarantees as freedom of speech and due process. Thus, it may provide the prospective administrator with the opportunity to reflect seriously on the broad meaning of the political principles underlying the regime.

According to Rohr, an additional reason for studying Constitutional law is that the various opinions of a particular case provide the public servant with the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the decision. The student-administrator can follow the Justice's attempt to solve a practical problem in the light of the principles of the American regime. If the prospective administrator studies a series of decisions over a period of years, all of which relate to a particular question, such as private property or equal protection of the laws, then he is able to trace the evolution and development of important principles of the American regime. This kind of study provides the future administrator with a foundation from which to think about related contemporary issues in public policy. Thus, the study of Constitutional law enables the public servant to see problems, to weigh the points on both sides, to look for long-range implications, and to relate particulars to general principles.

While this kind of education trains men in American values and in the importance of serious reflection on them, it may be argued that this is not sufficient since public servants are essentially men of action. According to Edward Banfield, the most essential function of the administrator is to make judgments and to act on the basis of those judgments. Paul Van Riper has argued, therefore, that civil servants should not be trained "in the image of college professors . . . The predominant emphasis [of their education] must be toward effective action." One may reply, however, that the administrator, as a man engaged in a
Flurry of activity, will be only too impatient to act. Thus, Taylor's suggestion that the administrator be periodically exposed to scholarly activity to give him time for reflection may have considerable merit. Van Riper contends that the administrator would learn to act effectively primarily from studying the social sciences. Edward Banfield and Sir James Grigg have pointed to problems in this assumption, however. According to Banfield, there is no science which tells the administrator how to make a value judgment or a moral judgment:

In matters that are subject to statistical treatment -- i.e., that involve many instances of the same thing -- science has a great deal to say. But, alas, the matters the executive is called upon to decide are almost never of this kind. He must make probability judgments about unique events, and in this science has no help to offer.

Banfield and Grigg argue that reliance on so-called scientific analysis can mislead the administrator, as well as undermining his confidence in his judgment. The result may be to forestall his taking any action. Grigg illustrates these points by noting the difficulties which result from an intensive study of economics. Grigg argues that economics "pretends far too often to be an exact science" which "offers a very imperfect guide to those who have to act and not to deliberate." He contends that "it is often forgotten that economics must be conditioned by politics," that is, by the ends, and that "no conclusion at which men may arrive by purely economic reasoning can ever be integrally carried into effect" without consideration of what is possible in a democratic political system. An additional objection to the study of economics by an administrator is that it encourages, according to Grigg, "a passion for collecting facts -- all the facts which may conceivably be relevant to a particular problem." When carried to an extreme, the passion "is very liable to interfere with the capacity . . . of the administrator to . . . arrive at a common sense workable solution of the problem quickly." If these are the results of the administrator's taking a narrowly "economic" point of view, it may for similar reasons be doubted whether the social sciences generally can be relied on, as Van Riper proposed, to prepare the administrator to take the kind of "effective action" his job requires.

Banfield and Grigg argue that sound judgment may best be learned by putting the neophyte administrator in a position where he has to make judgments and bear the responsibility for them. In this regard, Banfield suggests that the prospective civil servant serve as an apprentice "in intimate association with a master craftsman in the art of judgment." A supplement to serving an apprenticeship is the detailed study of history and biography in order for the administrator to become immersed in
the lives and ways of thinking of good judges.83

An additional guide to sharpening the administrator's judgment and encouraging more thoughtful decisions on his part is the use of case studies which depict the intimate and informal aspects of organization, and detail the position of the writer who had to make a decision in a particular situation. The problems with the case study method, however, are first, that the case summarizes only the facts selected by the writer; and second, that the reader does not bear actual responsibility for the decision which he can make on the basis of hindsight. In other words, the administrator generally has to make decisions on the basis of incomplete information, whereas the reader is privy to all the facts that become known after the decision was made. The Executive Development Program which is conducted at the Administrative Staff College in England would seem to be an improvement on the written case study method in one respect: the College tries to reproduce the actual environment in which decisions are generally made by having the participants arrange themselves in teams composed of a variety of professions. Each team considers current questions of public policy and makes decisions within a limited period of time on the basis of whatever information it can obtain.84

As the culmination of a formal educational program for prospective public servants, one might consider a research project which would combine thought and action by requiring the future administrator to develop policy on a particular question. In this regard, the proposal offered by Taylor in The Statesman is an appropriate guide:

Let a question be selected which has been inquired into by a committee of either House of Parliament; let the minutes of evidence taken before the committee be laid before the pupil without their report; and let him be required to report upon that evidence himself, exhibiting 1st. The material facts of the case as drawn from the evidence; 2nd. The various views and opinions which have been or might be adopted upon this matter; 3rd. The conclusions of his own judgment; with his reasons; 4th. If he concludes for legislation, a draft of the law by which he would execute his purposes; 5th. A draft of the speech with which he would introduce his proposed law to the notice of the legislature.85

A comprehensive project (for example: What should be the government's policy with respect to strikes by civil servants?) would give the student the opportunity to do extensive research with public documents, gain familiarity with all phases of policy development, formulate the possible alternatives, reason out the best solution, and develop the materials for enactment
of that policy. Included in such a project would be a considera-
tion of its constitutionality through an analysis of the relevant
court decisions and a consideration of its effect on various in-
stitutions and interests. Such a project would amply illustrate
the kind of understanding necessary for the development of good
public policy.

The final justification for a political education for public
servants is that it may help the civil service to perform what
Storing and Stephen Bailey suggest may be its most important po-
litical function. According to these authors, civil servants
ought not merely reflect their society; since they formulate
policy, they might help to shape and guide it. Civil servants
perform this function not simply by what they do, but by what
they are as men. Bailey argues that the "nobility of society," is especially encapsulated and made manifest in the world of per-
sonal example of its leaders and public servants." An educa-
tion which emphasizes the distinctive contribution of the bureau-
cracy to the governing of the nation conveys the idea that civil
servants are and ought to be engaged in the serious deliberation
of important substantive issues of public policy. Thus, a poli-
tical education may help to earn for the public servant a measure
of popular respect that will, in turn, encourage a more general
appreciation of American institutions and the values implicit in
them.
Footnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 300.


5 Ibid., p. 302.


7 Ibid., p. 496.


10 A.J. Mackelprang and A. Lee Fritschler, "Graduate Education in Public Affairs/Public Administration," Public Administration Review (March/April, 1975), p. 188.

11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., p. xvii.

14 Ibid., p. 76.

15 Ibid. Bob Zimring makes a similar point in the same volume, p. 230.

16 Ibid., p. xvi.

17 Ibid., p. 181.
18 Ibid., p. 32.
19 Ibid., p. 51.
20 Ibid., p. 32.
21 Ibid., pp. 215, 231-232.
22 Ibid., p. 311.
23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
25 Marini (ed.), p. 75.
26 Ibid., p. 79.
27 Ibid., p. 55.
28 Ibid., p. xviii.
29 Ibid., pp. 76-82, 85, 161-164, 312.
30 Ibid., ppi 35, 304, 312, 321-2, 327.
31 Ibid., p. xviii.
32 Ibid., p. 312.
33 Ibid., p. 74.


36 Ibid., p. 23.

38 Lowi, p. 23.
39 Marini (ed.), p. 324.
40 Ibid.

42 Ibid., pp. 103-107.
43 Ibid., p. 116.
44 Ibid., p. 45.
46 Ibid., pp. 72-145.
47 Ibid., p. 72.
48 Ibid., p. 87.
49 Ibid., pp. 103, 105.
50 Ibid., p. 72.
51 Ibid., p. 105.
52 Ibid., pp. 103-105, 108.
53 Ibid., Chs. 13, 24, 27.
54 Ibid., p. 130.
55 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
56 Ibid., p. 44.
57 Ibid., pp. 152-154.
58 Ibid., p. 158.
59 Ibid., p. 104.
60 Ibid., p. 158.
62 Ibid., p. 51.
63 Ibid., pp. 50-54.
64 Lowi, "The Public Philosophy . . .", p. 23.
65 Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Ch. 3; Herbert Storing,

Storing, pp. 154, 156, 157.

Marx, p. 187.


Ibid., p. 349.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 8.


Rohr, p. 9.


Banfield, p. 29.

Grigg, pp. 156-157.

Banfield, p. 36.

Cf. Henry Taylor, p. 28.