The paper discusses civic literacy as it bears on adult education. Civic literacy addresses the domain of intentional actions about political community, in a process of discovery and invention, the result of a dynamic interaction between practice and theory. The action-inquiry model of civic literacy consists of two theses and five competencies. The first thesis, the Social Justice thesis, holds that each person acts in concert with other persons to devise social conditions for realization of a good life. The second thesis, the Political Community thesis, holds that the civic literacy of each person depends upon the civic literacy of every person. The five competencies which permit the translation of the theses into a process of learning and doing are: engaging in intentional action; maintaining or creating conditions for others to engage in intentional action; maintaining or inventing collective institutions which can adjudicate among different intentions, consequences, and strategies; discovering through civic action matters of common concern; and testing, extending, or redefining limits and boundaries to civic action through social invention. The competency of inventive action comes full circle: it is the end which illuminates the means of civic literacy, and it is the means to the pedagogy of discovery and invention. (JR)
WORKING DRAFT

ON CIVIC LITERACY

by

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July 1974

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PART ONE: SOME DILEMMAS
CONFRONTING ADULT EDUCATION

Introduction: The Need For a New Vocabulary

In this paper, my aim is to set forth some conditions in the education of adults which promote the acquisition of their civic literacy. I also intend to argue that civic literacy ought to become the central purpose in the educational enterprise of adults in this society. Finally, I propose to show why that central purpose cannot become an object of public policy, as public policy formation is now understood. This argument will leave us with the dilemma of arguing for a new public purpose for adult education at a time in the political history of our society when, in my view, that public purpose is not amenable to conventional policy interventions of the kind employed for education. One resolution to this dilemma lies in the development of a new understanding of public policy which rests on what I mean by civic literacy.

Civic literacy is certainly not a new idea. It is, by its very terminology, related to literacy training, for example of the kind promoted by the Adult Education Act of 1966, commonly referred to as Adult Basic Education. But the addition of a civic context to that program prescribes a radical re-interpretation of its purposes and methods.

At first cut, civic literacy might be taken as a concept akin to the program ideology of citizenship education, political education, community education, and consumer education; and, as civic literacy contains a heavy component of action, it might also be understood as closely related to such programs as community action, political action, etc.
On their face, these programs, whether in their educational or their action context, constitute variations around a theme central to the historic ideology of democratic societies: adult participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of society. Indeed, action programs as disparate in institutional sponsorship as Common Cause, the labor movement's COPE and CAP, the various legal and citizen action groups initiated by Ralph Nader and his colleagues\(^1\), Model Cities, the Community Action and Legal Aid programs of OEO, VISTA, the National Welfare Rights Organization, etc., like their educational counterparts in Adult Basic Education, Manpower Development and Training, WIN, Adult Career Education, New Careers, etc., share an emphasis on adult participation, whether as citizen, consumer, worker.

The idea of participation, or of participatory democracy, would seem to be closely related to the idea of civic literacy. But persons who labor in the vineyards of education with adults, particularly when it is their aim to nourish the flowering of participation, realize that what participation means, and under what conditions it is still possible, are moot questions. The term participation, like the ideas of citizenship, community, consumer, action, self-determination, decentralization, etc., have become opaque in modern society. One consequence is that adult educators find it difficult to make a case for public support for educational programs whose purpose is to equip citizens to participate effectively and with wisdom in influencing the social conditions within which they will live out their lives. It is much easier to make a case for programs which equip citizens to adapt to these conditions. And as, apparently, most citizens want to adapt to prevailing social conditions rather than engage in reformation and social invention, participation becomes part of the new rhetoric which justifies the old and still prevailing adaptive and market-model of adult education.\(^2\)

It is important to note the absence of a public policy which clearly aims at enabling adults to develop the skills and understanding—whatever they may be—to engage wisely and effectively with politics and governance,
or with non-political structures which nevertheless constitute the major contexts of our lives. Should we be surprised at this state of affairs? I think not. A fair reading of American culture in this Century would have to give due regard to the priority of economic goals, to the orchestration of production and consumption skills, to the subordinate yet complementary goal of the fruitful use of leisure time, and to personal self-development as an antedote to human dissatisfaction with a depersonalized society. The predominant programs of education for adults— for youth also—pursues these goals, as participation studies show.3

Traditionally, political and civic education—as distinguished from Americanization—have received short shrift in this traditional agenda of adult education goals. Fundamentally, the idea of politics is no longer celebrated as the most significant of human activities. Once it was, and not only in that special case of the Greek City-state held out for 25 centuries as the birthplace (and perhaps nadir) of citizen participation in constitutional democracy. In America, seminal writing of Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann and John Dewey, for example, stressed the special relationship between education and the political life of a society characterized by the ideals of self-government, liberty, constitutional law and such.

Of course, politics has changed much in the 200 years of this Republic. We understand it differently than we used to. Indeed, how we are to understand politics and education is a central issue of civic literacy, as they constitute its active and reflective dimensions.

Thus, the vocabulary of citizenship education and participation, like the vocabulary of adult education, stands in need of some new meanings. The opaqueness of seminal words as citizen, politics, community, participation, consumer, action, etc.,—all in relationship to adult education—are paralleled by the complexity and density of the experience to which they refer. These terms refer to many different practices. They rest on a variety of unexplicated assumptions. They attach to fundamental and complex problems in modern
society about which many adult educators are neither always clear nor willing to address.

In this paper, civic literacy is chosen as the key phraseology because of my aim to cut through this opaqueness in order to define a clear purpose for adult education, a purpose which may commend itself to adult educators and in so doing make clear to them options for their future work. Lack of clarity about that purpose may well encourage the co-option of adult learning into a new system of learning through the life span—a system of recurrent and compulsory adult education—which legitimates a continuing adaptation to social conditions characterized by their abuse of elementary notions of social justice and the good life.

Civic Literacy and the Coming Success Story of Adult Education

Civic literacy, as I shall soon argue, addresses a very large body of human experience about which we are now illiterate. It addresses the domain of intentional actions about political community. As political community no longer exists in our era; and as the language of action and intention is foreign to most social science and education: an understanding of civic literacy will require an enormous effort at redefining the categories, tasks, goals, instruments, institutions and practices of adult education. No less than a major effort at reformulating the means and ends of adult education will be required.

But this reformulation, which also always involves a searching for a new legitimacy, is to take place at a very special moment in the history of adult education. That is the moment of emergent success. Adult learning is coming of age. Public support and a new legitimacy for adult learning is on the rise. This is particularly true of those kinds of adult learning which aim at credentials, certificates, occupational or job renewal, employable skills
for the unemployed (though, alas, not necessarily employment!), and leisure-time skills, and which take place within the traditional institutions of schools and colleges (though perhaps "off campus"). But an examination of most of the literature and programming of the new non-traditional learning of adults (including, of course, the college-aid population), open universities, recurrent education, external degrees, learning resource centers, high school equivalency, etc., reveals the heavy emphasis on structural, financial, institutional, accrediting, time and place and instructional alternatives.

During the remainder of this decade and the next, it is quite likely that the adult educator's old dream of learning-through-the life span will become accepted as the new metaphor for a restructured system of education. The front load, with its emphasis on youth schooling, will become balanced by a middle and perhaps even a back load (e.g., learning how to die), and people will go to school—or do something called education—throughout their lives. The educative society may constitute a new vision. It may be worth seeking. But on these matters we should withhold judgements until we have more precisely delineated the content of this learning through the life span. Indeed, we should postpone any celebration of the coming success story of adult education until we are clearer about what will constitute the ends of education within a system which permeates other main institutional structures of society.

Why should adult educators withstand the powerful blandishments of a new legitimacy, particularly when much of it is of their own seeking? Consider the situation. Adult educators are learning to make a powerful case for the legitimacy of their programs, and for a redistribution of financial and other kinds of public support, as they seek a new status in the education system, a voice in the halls of accreditation, in the bureaucracies of State Education Agencies, in the headquarters of unions and business corporations, in the R and D laboratories which turn out the new instructional technologies linked to electronic, cybernetic, information systems. The case, as it now appears, will not include mention, except at the level of banal metaphor and hoary shibboleth, of the enduring issues of justice, beauty, love, work, peace,
community, what it means to be human, and of what, if anything, education has to do with these matters.

Moreover, higher education does not remain neutral as adult educators seek their new legitimacy within the expanding hegemony of higher education via the spurious "invention" of non-traditional learning, external degrees, credit for experience, and the like. Higher education is trying to co-opt the learning activities of adults, for the traditional undergraduate client group can no longer support the higher education system in the style to which it has grown accustomed since World War II. I suspect many adult educators welcome that co-option, particularly those who work within the core system of higher education itself.

In short, I am arguing that a new legitimacy for adult learning within an expanding system of education is not the central issue to be addressed by adult educators. The education of adults is still a non-system—unbounded, heterogeneous, innovative, uncontrolled, ungoverned and non-compulsory. It has many possibilities. Were higher education, in aggregate, prepared to promote and facilitate the acquisition of civic literacy, the issue of who shall own adult education would not be critical. But civic literacy—or its undergraduate parallel of liberal education—is not the agenda of higher education. Thorstein Veblen made that clear forty years ago. His analysis has not been invalidated by the huge growth of the system since World War II. Indeed, I believe it to be confirmed. Higher education is a system of big business, a corporate entity looking for a new market, and prepared to engage in financial, structural and functional adaptations to the new market of adult learners as a way of co-opting it and surviving.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue for adult education vis-a-vis youth education as a target for public support. It is not to argue for a new system of learning through the life span. It is to address a different order of question: what kind of education can enable adults to understand the major issues of their society from the standpoint of doing something about them. That relationship of understanding to action is central to education for civic literacy, it will require close analysis before we can describe the kind of education I have in mind.
Can Civic Literacy Be Taught? Can It Be Learned?

As this paper explicitly deals with the acquisition of civic literacy within the context of the education of adults, it may be useful to approach the matter initially from the standpoint of the activities of teaching and learning. For most persons would not understand a discussion of the ends of education apart from its practice, which has traditionally been thought to be grounded in teaching and learning. To be sure, these activities are central to the human experience. For everybody teaches and everybody learns, though not always deliberately and not always well. Schools and colleges have no monopoly on teaching and learning. They occur in almost every social setting characterized by a differential in competencies among the participants.

Many matters, perhaps most, are taught and learned sufficiently well to meet the conditions of the social setting in which some transfer of competencies is required. Civic literacy, however, poses special problems for the activities of teaching and learning, in part due to the ambiguity associated with its social setting, and in part due to a lack of clarity about what we might teach and learn to become literate in the civic sense.

It is not easy to delineate these problems clearly, for the conventional vocabulary of adult education is not appropriate for addressing these problems. To begin with, consider that civic literacy is not primarily a constellation of skills, knowledge, or attitudes. Yet these words constitute the generally acknowledged outcomes of adult education. Rather, civic literacy is a state of mind which enables us to understand a domain of human experience from a special vantage point. To put it another way, civic literacy is a meaning.

But it is a meaning which is to be discovered and invented, rather than defined and applied. Indeed, to describe the content of civic literacy is to clarify the very processes of its acquisition. Are these processes what we usually mean by teaching and learning?
Indeed, how does one teach or learn a meaning? The question itself is hardly intelligible. Still, it can not be avoided. To ask, how does a person learn—or teach—a meaning is like asking how do infants learn to speak their native tongue. All human beings do this, though not all learn to read and write, even in those societies, like ours, where most children go to school. Indeed, the United States, like almost every nation, has a program of teaching reading, writing and computation skills to adults who did not learn them as youth. But we assume, quite rightly, that illiterate adults know how to speak, that is, they use spoken language. Through that facility, which is the start of being human, they further learn to employ the special symbols of a written language...except that not everyone learns to do this latter thing very well.

The point is, we don't really know how infants learn to speak their language, although we observe their learning it, and many—perhaps most—parents help their children by teaching some of its more obvious rules. Indeed, when we say infants learn their native language, we may obscure an important aspect of that process.

Learning, after all, is generally considered a behavior whose determinants can, in principle, be known, be they neuro-psychological, social-psychological, or even physical-chemical. But language, which of course is certainly behavior, is something else beside. It is also meaning, the rich complex of symbolization by which we transcend our biology and create, while searching for, our humanness. In a most fundamental sense, acquiring the command of language—and thus of its written aspect—is a matter of intentionality.

As language and meaning are inextricably interwoven, and both are absolutely central to the experience of being human, we are confronted with a difficult problem in the teaching and learning of civic literacy. For civic literacy is a language—a language of political intentions, as it turns out—and a set of meanings which get expressed in political actions. Both are now very difficult—perhaps impossible!—to teach and learn, whether in
formal, instructional settings, like schools and colleges, or more informally, as infants "learn" to speak their native tongue.

I believe it will be helpful to substitute notions like discovering and inventing for teaching and learning, in the matter of civic literacy. One task in this paper, therefore, will be to come to an understanding of the activities of discovery and invention as alternative pedagogies to teaching and learning, although the distinctions will not be so clear cut as to form a typology or scheme of classification.

If we assume, for the moment, that civic literacy is a meaning, is an idea which renders intelligible a portion of human experience, then we would want to know a number of things. We would want to know to which aspects of human experience it refers. For to teach and learn--or discover and invent--a something, we assume we need to know what that something is. We would want to know, obviously, in what and of what civic literacy consists, i.e., what does it mean, how do we know it when we do it, as well as the question of this paper, how do we acquire it?

For example, if our aim is to teach reading and writing skills to adults who do not possess them, we must know in what reading and writing consists. This is not so simple--or obvious--a problem as appears at first glance. If it were, the teaching of literacy skills to adults would be much more effective than it apparently is. For example, there is a rather large drop-out rate in the Adult Basic Education Program in the United States. Moreover, many illiterate adults don't get recruited into the ABE program carried out by local schools, community colleges and other local education agencies. Finally, the level of retention of these skills, once learned, is problematic. They increase with use, but they decrease if not used, as the history of the literacy movement in the developing nations shows. Many persons, trained in reading, writing and computation in their youth schooling, apparently become less literate as they move into adult roles and tasks for which reading and writing are not essential for their performance.
This is a strange state of affairs. There is strong evidence that we really do know how to teach the skills associated with traditional literacy. There are several alternative pedagogies, each of which works under one or another set of conditions. Reading and writing have constituted a central feature of the Western school curriculum for several centuries.

Is it possible that, in fact, we don't know in what reading and writing consists, i.e., we don't know their meaning? In this era of mass education and the dominance of electronically mediated mass communications, I believe that to be the case, though we have the how of it down to an effective art, and perhaps even partly a science. This example suggests the problem of teaching and learning civic literacy. We would want to know what it means, what it is, to which aspects of human experience it refers, in order to teach it or see that it was learned. And if we don't know about that, we would have a pretty hard time teaching and learning it. But I have also suggested that it can no longer be taught and learned in any conventional sense.

A Dilemma for Adult Educators

By employing the analogy of teaching reading and writing to illiterate or marginally literate adults, and often failing at it despite our knowing how to, I have suggested that civic literacy includes but goes beyond skills, attitudes and knowledge to meanings about which we are not clear. Civic literacy, I have noted in a preliminary way, is a language of political intentions and a set of meanings which get expressed in political actions. It is a language which can no longer be taught and learned in any conventional sense. It is to be discovered and invented.

These preliminary remarks enable us to pose a serious problem for this paper. How are we to discuss civic literacy in the terms of an educational vocabulary with which adult educators will feel comfortable. Consider that discovery and invention constitute activities of the human imagination. But
the imagination, in so far as it is dealt with in educational theory, is a kind of unbounded reservoir of unknowable potentiality, a residue left over after we have assigned to the so-called cognitive and affective domains the array of skills, needs and dispositions amenable—so we believe—to rather precise quantitative or at least empirically verifiable description.

Unlike reading and writing, job skills, ceramics-making or political science, the content of civic literacy is not precisely bounded. To refer to civic literacy as a subject-matter which can be built into a curriculum is to assign it a precise location in one or another hierarchies of skills, attitudes and knowledge. It is to differentiate among its cognitive and affective components in such a way as to render them accessible to instrumental, or means-oriented interventions typical of most adult education.

But civic literacy is a state of affairs difficult to describe with precision. We know it more by its absence than by its presence. It begins to come into view as we address certain kinds of questions about political and moral life in our society. These are questions about ends as well as about means, about what we ought to do as well as about how to do it, about action as well as about knowledge, about the future as well as the past. Civic literacy contains within it a negation of the standard practices of instrumentality in education. Thus, the meaning of civic literacy derives, in part, from a crucial distinction between training and education which is central to understanding the problem of acquiring civic literacy. What is this crucial distinction?

Training—as I understand it—constitutes an instrumental type of deliberate intervention to bring about behavioral change. In training, both the intervenor (the trainer) and the person whose specific behavioral change is the objective of the intervention (the trainee) set about ensuring that the learner acquires some standard of competency in an agreed-upon set of instruments (i.e., skills) or means to do something. That something is, of course, a practice. It can be operating a machine tool or a voting machine,
draughtsmanship, door-to-door selling, manipulating numbers or letters, or research methodology. Obviously, a wide range of complexity can attach to the practices.

All of these, however, are practices or "doing something" within a social context. By this I mean that the practice in which the person is trained has a social meaning which is assumed to be learned along with the practice and only by learning the practice. This is part of what we conventionally mean by the phrase, "learning by experience." Further, it is a salient feature of the social context for a practice that the ends or purposes (operationally, the goals, objectives or targets) served by the practice are prescribed from outside the learning situation and are accepted as given by the persons--trainer and trainee--within the learning situation. An obvious example is the training of persons to work on a functionally rationalized automobile assembly line. Most of the skills for most of the jobs on an automobile assembly line can be learned in less than a day. They are deliberately learned. Within the social context of the factory, their meaning is assumed and the end or purpose is given from outside the learning situation.

For most of those aspects of human life which must be learned deliberately, training is sufficient. To call into question the meanings and ends of all--or even most--social practices which must be deliberately learned and which are the outcome of a deliberate intervention to bring about a behavioral change or modification is absurd. These social practices are the very stuff of life. It is only because we can learn many social practices quickly, and establish them in our lexicon of habitual responses to specific clues that we have time and energy to do other things for which training is insufficient a preparation.

Still, for some aspects of social life, particularly those encompassed within the domain of civic literacy--it is now crucial that we eschew training in favor of something else. That is the engagement of the learner in an
exploration of why he is learning what he is learning, what ends he seeks which the practice serves (not what ends are sought outside his situation, outside his purview, outside his choice), what larger meanings are implicitly carried by the practice, and are these ends and meanings constitutive of the social context of the practice any more to be accepted, by whom, under what conditions, for what reasons (i.e., reasons as intentions, not reasons as causes)?

Education, then, in this crucial distinction from training, is a state of affairs in which the teacher and the learner jointly engage in inquiry about the meaning of what they are learning to do: its history, its function, and the ends which the doing serves but which do not emanate from the practice. It is end-oriented as distinguished from means-oriented intervention.

We may say that training assumes the ends as given, and in that sense, the practice carries with it its own meanings. In education, we may say that the ends are never given—i.e., prescribed outside the learning situation and assumed and accepted inside prior to reflection and choice. They are always to be searched out and reflected upon. They become, once discovered or invented, always the object of choice.

Education, thus, always asserts the primacy of the means–ends and means–consequences continuum of human intentionality within the social context, rather than accepting as given either that context or the practices (skills, knowledge, attitudes) which the context legitimates. When and where training is successful—as it most often is—we have developed a lexicon of habits. When and where education is successful—as it too seldom is—we have reflected upon our habits, devised options to them, and moved from habitual conduct to intentional choice and action.

In practice, this distinction is never dichotomic. We confront a broad spectrum of human learning activities in which we move back and forth along the continuum, always making choices about how much of the meaning of the
practice we are to reflect upon as we learn its instrumentality. This shifting back and forth is a continuous problematic in youth schooling: how much can youth be trusted by adults to reflect upon the meaning and goals of their curriculum as they move through it, acquiring the practices of doing and thinking it prescribes?

For example, at what point are youth to be enabled to learn that the past, like the future, is not to be understood as necessary or unilinear, but is, like the future, a complex of meanings among which we choose depending upon the interaction of our intentions with our experience. At what point in their training/education are youth to be enabled to learn, not that "black" history and "white" history are different—a choice made for them by a shifting politics within which history books get written—but why there is a "black" history and a "white" history of the United States, where it comes from, what it means, and why anyone should care whether or not there are one, two or a thousand "histories" of the United States.

Among adults—and this is the only meaningful distinction between youth and adults—that choice should never be at issue. Adults should never be trained. Or, to put it more properly, adults should acquiesce to training only when the ends of that training have been fully—admittedly, always a relative matter—negotiated, understood, and agreed to. But in matters of civic literacy, that agreement is to be avoided because the ends, at this moment in the civic life of our society, can be neither fully negotiated nor fully understood. Persons can not be trained in civic literacy. And, as most teaching and learning turns out to be a training activity, we are forced to search for pedagogies alternative to the conventional practices of teaching and learning. These, I have suggested, are to be found in discovery and invention.

Herein lies part of the dilemma for educators. The products (results, outcomes, etc.) of acts of discovery and invention can not be known until after the activities have taken place. Civic literacy is to be discovered and invented. At this stage in the argument of this paper, we may say only
that the discovery and invention will take place within a domain characterized by the absence of political community and will be about political community. But the specific nature of that political community--i.e., its structures of action and its social meanings--is at present unknown.

Civic literacy, thus, is not the teaching and learning of democracy (though it may well include those forms and processes of governance). Civic literacy is not, thus, political education or citizenship education in the conventional senses of those activities, for historically such education has turned out to be more a training than an education, in which learners have been taught a set of political practices and meanings at the surface, rather than encouraged to reflect upon the ends they secure and the appropriateness of those ends to the social context of our era. Therefore, though the outcome (product) of civic literacy is to be literate in the civic sense, that sense--i.e., its meaning--has to be discovered (or rediscovered), invented and negotiated.

However, there is more to this dilemma. Civic literacy is process as well as product. It is not only a product of deliberately chosen prior activities, it is also those activities. It is a special kind of doing (action and its practices) and it is a reflection upon the meaning of that doing. If--for example--civic literacy includes the act of voting, it is also reflection on the meaning of that act, with all of its problematics in this day and age. If--as another example--civic literacy includes the practices of not "fighting city hall," it is also a reflection on what means the rule of thumb, "you can't fight city hall." If civic literacy, as a doing, includes political organization to secure welfare rights for "minorities" (e.g., the poor, the old, the disadvantaged, the incarcerated, etc.), it also involves a reflection by those very persons on the meaning of welfare rights, on the problems of distributive justice, on the criteria and consequences of success and failure in those activities. Finally, if civic literacy might include a heavy component of middle-class consumerism--i.e., the economic and legal practices by which consumers acquire muscle in an oligopolistic economy of a few, large
producers—it might also include a reflection on the meanings to them of an economy of consumption, and indeed a possible challenge to the very assumptions and consequences of an economy understood as catering to while manipulating human tastes and wants.

In short, civic literacy constitutes a dynamic relationship between practice and theory, action and reflection. Its pedagogy of discovery and invention must pay deliberate attention to that relationship. (See below, Part Three, The Pedagogy of Civic Literacy: Doing-as-Learning and Learning-as-Doing.) That is to say, civic literacy is a dynamic process of interaction between the means and ends of acquiring civic literacy, and the means and ends of civic literacy, once acquired. Civic literacy is thus a process for acquiring a product which, in many of its dimensions, is a process.

If civic literacy is a product which has form and content, but which has yet to be discovered or invented, how can we aim at it (i.e., what is and where is the target?), and how can we know it until we have produced or acquired it? If the product of civic literacy is, in part, a process which is itself the very process of acquisition, how are we to understand where it begins and where it ends?

These questions are raised to point up the difficulty of discussing civic literacy within a vocabulary of teaching and learning familiar to most adult educators. Consider that vocabulary. It consists of categories of discrete activities—call them tasks—like program planning, development, administration, evaluation; like teacher training or leadership development; like audience or client identification, goal definition, needs assessment; like organizational development or institutional maintenance. This vocabulary of categories by which we break down the totality of adult education into manageable and often measurable tasks, for purposes of research, professional development, and the practice, becomes unclear and uncertain in the matter of civic literacy.

We are, then, in this paper and as adult educators, at the mercy of the
very activities of civic literacy under investigation. The format for that investigation must be appropriate to its content. If the meanings of these activities are not accessible through the employment of a conventional vocabulary of adult education, we must adopt another, which we may come to understand as we reflect upon civic literacy in this paper and perform its activities in practice.

The vocabulary appropriate to setting forth the conditions for the acquisition of civic literacy I believe to be a vocabulary of competencies for intentional action framed within an heuristic model of action-inquiry. This model has been devised to enable us to understand a mode of thinking about civic literacy as a set of competencies which themselves constitute the doing of civic literacy and the reflection on the meanings of that doing. The model is grounded in a set of first-order stipulations about the personhood of human beings, about their capacity for intentional action, about the primacy of the practical as over against the theoretical, and about the search for a good life within a social context characterized by the erosion of the bonds of political community.

These stipulations and the competencies comprise the action-inquiry model. Their elucidation is prior to the specification of conditions for the acquisition of civic literacy. To the former task we now turn, with the aim of setting forth the model in such a way that we can, in Part Three, once again address pedagogical and program questions closer to the heart of adult educators.
PART TWO: AN ACTION-INQUIRY
MODEL OF CIVIC LITERACY

The Present Societal Context for Civic Literacy

The action-inquiry model of civic literacy consists of two theses (the first about social justice and the second about political community) and a set of five competencies which enable us to translate these theses into a learning and a doing of civic literacy. To introduce the model, I call attention to certain salient features of contemporary society. These features are the consequences of the erosion of the bonds of political community within the American nation-state and their absence in the international sphere. That erosion and absence defines the social setting within which the meaning of civic literacy is to be uncovered.

The argument that present society is characterized by an erosion of the bonds of political community is complex. The idea of political community, after all, includes but is always more than matter of fact. It is a moral apprehension by citizens of the rightness of the criteria and procedures (e.g., laws, institutions of governance, etc.) which they employ to sort out and choose among their collective intentions and the means to achieve them.

The action-inquiry model elaborates a set of competencies which persons possess—germinally or in a mature state—to devise and judge these criteria, i.e., to discover and invent the bonds of their political community. From a theoretical viewpoint, therefore, political community is a moral idea of an end—an image of the future which constitutes our theoretical intentions in this matter. Obviously, these theoretical intentions—our speculations, as it were, about how to live together—get tested out and modified in practice. The competencies of civic literacy constitute that practice.
But the idea of political community encompasses the past as well as the future. It thus includes—and enables us to understand—matters of fact (the past) as well as matters of intention (the future). As matter of fact, however, the erosion of the bonds of political community has been a societal development of enormous complexity.

Contemporary consequences of this erosion are both powerful—i.e., they affect us all, and future generations as well—and elusive. Though I consider the absence of world political community more consequential, in the long run, for humanity, it is difficult to specify the practical activities for the promotion of world political community. Of course, it is by no means certain that the situation is any easier to get at within our own society. Still, as the acquisition of civic literacy begins within an action space of intimate familiarity, "at home" as it were, the consequences to which I point are grounded primarily in the social history of our own society. What are some of them?

(1) One consequence of the erosion of the bonds of political community is a lack of understanding and agreement among citizens about potential matters of common concern. That is to say, we—the members of a society—are unclear about our collective intentions. It may well be the case that we neither have nor know our intentions about the future of our society. That case can be tested out through a pedagogy of action-inquiry which enables persons, working together, to discover their collective intentions in practice. In the absence of collective intentions, these potential matters of common concern become social issues. Social issues are disputes and disagreements among citizens, sometimes emerging into conflicts, sometimes latent. A crucial issue is: What are these social issues? A second crucial issue is: Who defines them as such?

For example, are they problems of environmental degradation and the threat of irreversible ecological disasters? Would one want to include racial and ethnic group animosity, unemployment, poverty, an inequitable distribution of
life-chances? Does the list of potential social issues include a breakdown of traditional values, an energy shortage, boredom on the job, the divorce rate, institutional incarceration of the old, the mentally ill, the criminal, or institutional avoidance of the marginal? Is it crime, illiteracy, drugs, alcoholism, school drop-outs, payola with which we are concerned? The list is long, and characterized by confusion. Citizens are unclear about definitions, causes, consequences and solutions, and they disagree certainly about the importance of any or all of these issues to their own lives.

(2) A second consequence of the erosion of the bounds of political community is an endemic ambiguity among citizens about which matters of common concern should be treated as civic matters, i.e., those amenable to localized interventions without recourse to national problems—definitions, national policy directives, a national system of sanctions and rewards, or national technical or financial assistance. This matter is central to the problem of devising public policies for the whole society, i.e., those that affect, in principal, all citizens.

This second consequence, then, has to do with the domain of civic affairs. A lack of clarity and agreement about the boundaries of collective action—later, I refer to this as action space—makes it difficult for citizens to judge which potential matters of common concern are amenable to localized interventions. The problem of the domain, like the problem of collective intentionality, is central to understanding the action-inquiry approach to civic literacy. The approach aims at enabling citizens to discover their collective intentions and invent the boundaries of civic affairs within which these intentions become actualized.

(3) A third consequence of the erosion of the bonds of political community is the incongruity—the lack of fit—between traditional structures and instruments for civic action—i.e., juries, school systems, overlapping and multiple local government jurisdictions, voluntary associations, etc.—and the major institutional systems within which we act out so large a portion
of our lives. These latter are the "big" institutions: corporations, unions, mass media, education systems, national governments, social welfare bureaucracies. These have been characterized—in scholarly literature and popularly—as large-scale, complex, interdependent, national (perhaps trans-national, like cartels), generally impersonal and rigidly role-defined. It is difficult for citizens to know how they can or understand why they should act upon these systems. Conversely, it is not easy for citizens to understand how these systems impact upon them.

There is a conventional wisdom about systemness in contemporary society which gets expressed in jokes about the computerization of an increasing portion of life: Do not punch out, bend, fold, mutilate or in any way alter life the card on which is imprinted one's fate! A corollary of that conventional wisdom is the pervasive search for an action space in the world which fits the human dimension, which is of a size congruent with a sense of self as potent, impactful, consequential.

Increasingly, this search has lead to a privatization of action space, in order to provide for the self an inner sanctum of inviolability which nobody can get at. Whether the medium is drugs, the narcotic of television, communes in the desert, or self-incarceration in mental asylums, that withdrawal constitutes a personal response to a sense of impotence within the de-personalized institutions of contemporary society. A consequence of a re-discovered and effective civic literacy will be the invention of alternatives for collective action covering a wide range of social activities in which citizens reacquire a sense of potency, of impact upon the social conditions within which they lead out their lives.

These social activities certainly include the major social institutions of a post-industrial society, for example: the delivery systems of health, welfare and education; the institutions of work, job and career; the institutions of distribution of values, goods, income; the linkage systems of mass communications and transportation; the pattern of interdependence and
consequentiality between human activities and the natural ecology of the planet; and the rich contexts for human intimacy, like family, neighborhood, congregation, and friendship.

The erosion of the bonds of political community means, then, that citizens no longer possess a set of legitimatized opportunities to reveal and negotiate their intentions in these matters. That set of opportunities must be invented. That is the agenda for civic literacy: the formulation of those structures of action-inquiry in which citizens learn to engage with each other in a collective search for the political antecedents to their community.

The pedagogy of civic literacy must, then, facilitate a searching out of concrete human experience to discover in relations among persons the source and meaning of their civic literacy rather than to accept at face value the rhetoric of participation in which we couch our obeisance to the traditional civic virtues. In that searching out, two concerns are paramount.

The first concern is the project of Part Two of this paper, the Action-Inquiry Model of Civic Literacy. It is to discover a set of competencies fundamental to those human actions by virtue of which persons come to understand what it means to be literate in the civic sense.

The second concern, which moves the argument into Part Three, The Pedagogy of Civic Literacy, is to define these competencies in a manner which renders them amenable to the interventions of adult educators who aim to tease them out of their imbeddedness in concrete human experience. This "teasing out", as distinguished from a more conventional teaching and learning, will call for a deliberate recognition by adult educators that their pedagogy for civic literacy is to legitimize a set of actions and reflections which most persons are either unable or unwilling to countenance in their habitual interactions with each other.
The Boundaries of the Model: Two Theses of Civic Literacy

The action-inquiry model of civic literacy is grounded in a point-of-view about the human capacity of each and every person to engage in a set of intentional actions with other persons. The point-of-view enables us to investigate the collective intentions of, for example, ABE learners and teachers in the classroom, or members of a board of directors of an international corporation, or a group of citizens who come together to invent the future of their city, or members of a church who come together to invent the future of their parish.

In each case, the matter of discovering their collective intentions is paramount. The "human capacity" reflects a way of understanding the activities of persons in a world of other persons. In this "way of understanding," our aim is not to construct a series of scientific hypotheses about human behavior. The two theses of civic literacy are not, thus, subject to empirical validation or disconfirmation, for this way of understanding an aspect of our humaness refers to questions about the meaning of human actions rather than about their facticity.

Consider, for example, the case of John Jones, a 25-year old unemployed person who has dropped out of an Adult Basic Education or Manpower Training Program. That "fact" is not at issue, but what it means is. We might—and as adult educators, usually do—ask what caused the dropping out, just as we might ask why there are 30 million adults who read and write at a below the sixth-grade level. But we might also consider this dropping out to constitute an intentional action of John Jones. As a teacher, administrator or policy official in Adult Basic Education, a person who asks John Jones to consider his own action as intentional is at the beginning of a most difficult human enterprise in which they may jointly engage in understanding the intentions of each other—i.e., what that action means—and discovering if they have any intentions in common. Teachers of educationally disadvantaged adults often
assume a common intention where none exists. By so assuming, they engage in training rather than education. In that case, the learner is denied his personhood, and becomes an instrument at the service of the teacher.

Consider, now, another example of a perhaps more recent common experience. To read the White House Transcripts in which the words explode upon our political sensibilities is not only or even mainly an exercise in fact gathering. It is an inquiry into meaning, in which we are humanly concerned with unravelling the intentions of the participants whose conversations were recorded and published.

In short, this human capacity in which the action-inquiry model of civic literacy is grounded is our experiencing ourselves as human, as persons in a world of persons, and, as an essential feature of that experiencing, asking what that experience means.

Our method of action-inquiry, then, is to examine concrete human experience in order to identify those actions and reflections by virtue of which we become civically literate. But this is not to suggest that "experience" speaks to us without being interrogated. To learn by experience is to ask questions of it, that is, to reflect upon and in reflection, to test out, its meaning. But what is the source of these questions? In the matter of civic literacy, I believe that source is located in a theory of intentional action and a philosophy of the person. This theory and philosophy are grounded in an understanding of that aspect of human experience we generally believe to be unique to our species, viz., our symoblic and value-forming activities, and our total inter-personal communication, of which the category of intentional action is of primary concern in the development of the action-inquiry model.

This theory and philosophy attempt to render intelligible a fundamental character of human experience, which is that persons are agents who have and know their intentions and who realize these intentions in actions with other persons who also have and know their intentions. These ideas of personhood,
action and intentionality have been subject to serious and continuing dispute in philosophy, psychology and social theory. My interest, however, is in just those intentions, and their corollary competencies, which are germane to the problem at hand, namely, the discovery in ordinary human experience of the meaning of civic literacy when its traditional context of political community has all but disappeared from that experience.

By applying a theory of intentional action and a philosophy of the person to the present societal context within which we seek a partial understanding of civic literacy, I have been able to formulate two theses or propositions which the action-inquiry model of civic literacy translates into competencies.

(1) The first thesis is that each person seeks a good life by acting in concert with other persons to devise (discover, invent) the social conditions for the realization of that aim.

I shall refer to this as the Social Justice thesis. It consists of two propositions which can be distinguished for purposes of discussion, though they are inseparable in practice. The first proposition deals with the problem of what constitutes a good life. The second proposition stipulates the essential social context for this seeking. It reflects the understanding that the person (who seeks after a good life) is a social being constituted by a relation with other persons, and not to be understood as an atomistic entity or "individual," the boundaries of whose individuality are strictly circumscribed by and located within a subjective-objective view of the world of human beings.

(2) The second thesis is that the civic literacy of each person is dependent upon—cannot be fully realized without—the civic literacy of every person.

I shall refer to this as the Political Community thesis.

Before proceeding to elaborate further the issues, assumptions and consequences of these two theses, some attention should be given to the
second proposition in thesis one (the social context). This second proposition emphasizes a notion of the person which is quite different from the way we talk about the individual in conventional discourse. This second proposition requires us to recognize and understand the essential interpersonal character of human experience despite the absence of a political community (or, perhaps, any kind of community).

The essential inter-personal character of human experience, while certainly not a new proposition, has been subject to serious dispute at least since the formulation of a Cartesian philosophy. That philosophy has resulted in a Western world view which posits the irreducible egocentricity of the individual as the ultimate depository of interest, need, value, motive, belief and, indeed, the intelligibility of human existence. Contrary to that viewpoint—expressed, for example, in the notion that each person is the best and, ultimately, only judge of his own interests—the second proposition expresses the view that intentional action—e.g., proposition one, seeking a good life—is always social. Intentions for a good life are realizable only in inter-actions with other persons who also seek a good life.

These inter-actions turn out to be negotiations about the meaning of these intentions as they get expressed in the actions to realize them. Meaning, in this sense, refers to the idea of appraisal or evaluation, wherein actions are judged in respect to their worth. Is the action in question "good", "wise", "prudent", "selfish", "moral", "stupid", "effective", "inconsequential", etc.? Of course, that kind of question can be asked of human action in general, or of any of its three components: the intention, the performance and the consequences. Though sometimes these questions are not expressed linguistically, they are always implicit in the inter-actions of persons in which their meanings are negotiated.

Within the context of civic literacy, this general case must be applied to the specific situation of the absence of political community. Persons seek a good life in concert (for there is no other way to seek a good life
except in concert). Where, however, the definition of a good life is no longer clear or consensual, persons negotiate about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the social (political) procedures and instruments within which intentions for a good life (which are always quite specific and concrete) get expressed in action.

All of these matters are social, because meaning is social even in the absence of political community. Still, the question about the content of a good life may be posed by a person, at the level of reflection, even though at the level of practice, such questions are always posed within the interactive or social context. Thus, in this paper, and at the level of reflection, we can ask: What is a good life? How is it to be achieved? How do we know when we have achieved it? Who ought to have it?

Even a cursory, common-sensical examination of daily intercourse among persons in their linguistic and extra-linguistic activities reveals how much energy is devoted to sorting out and judging what each person intends to express by his inter-actions with other persons. In no place and time is this more true than when specific issues of the nature and meaning of the good life arise in everyday contention, that is, in the absence of political community. How, then, are we to understand the first thesis, that each person seeks a good life by acting in concert with other persons to devise (discover, invent) the social conditions for the realization of that aim?

A Good Life as a Problem in Social Justice: Elaboration of Thesis One

The idea of a good life is rarely employed in discussions of adult education, literacy, civics or public policy. To assert in thesis one that all persons seek it is by no means a new proposition about humankind. That stipulation was central to Aristotelé's inquiry some 2500 years ago, in which he sought to understand what is the good for man, how is it to be achieved, and what
political circumstances appear most likely to enable persons to seek and achieve it.

It would not be difficult to argue, of course, that the question of in what does a good life consist is a sophomoric concern, with no claim to serious attention in an essay on civic literacy or adult education. At best, the argument might proceed, this is solely a matter of values, regressing ultimately to a personal faith or first principle about which another person can only say yea or nay. More aggressively, one might argue that with the poverty, malnutrition, even starvation, and human degradation rampant in the world, including the affluent United States; with the increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots, both within and between nation-states; with the totally inequitable distribution in the use of resources, capital, educated talent, and technological capability among regions and countries: to ask what is a good life is to engage in sophistry of the worst kind. That kind would subtly distract our attention from the sounder aims of increasing the effectiveness of educational and social uplift programs for disadvantaged adults, or marshalling the arguments for an income maintenance and redistribution program of substantial proportion.

Yet, it is just because we neither know its character nor how to seek it that the issue of a good life is central to every policy, program and interpersonal practice in which one person does something to, with or for another person. Because we neither know when and if we have it, or when or if we are seeking it, we employ the vocabulary of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness in formulating allocational criteria for public policy trade-offs and evaluational criteria for program effectiveness. I note that vocabulary has been regularly employed in military policies and in poverty policies. Even a casual regard for the outcomes and consequences of both categories of policies suggests that something is amiss. Could it be that criteria of benefit and effectiveness always imply or derive from an unspoken and habitually unexamined formula for the good life?
Still, it is proper to test the thesis that each person seeks a good life, in order to ascertain if that thesis advances our project. One test, for example, is to examine public policies in which the content of a good life is, explicitly or implicitly, conveyed by the means and ends of the policy. Immediately we are confronted with the absence of clarity and agreement in the collective intentions of citizens. (See consequence (1), supra, pages 19-20). Central to understanding and dealing with that absence is the distinction between a good life and the good life, i.e., the problem of social justice.

Consider, for example, the raft of public policies devised during the 1960's in the "war on poverty", including, of course, Adult Basic Education. Those policies aimed at effecting the improvement of life chances and life conditions of those persons who have been thought not to enjoy, or not to know how to seek, a good life. These have been the poor, the unemployed, the unerschooled, and the politically disenfranchised persons in our society, numbering of course in the tens of millions. Many of these policies have, implicitly, assumed that any person's notion of a good life is to be judged by its proximity to a general agreement among citizens about (a) the content of the good life, and (b) how to achieve it.

The distinction between a and the good life is not only a fundamental problem in moral philosophy; it is also a crucial issue in the collective life of the public, an issue which is always translated into inter-personal practices and into public policies of the social uplift variety. About the distinction there is much confusion, which is examplified in two popular views about social justice.

On the one hand, there is the view that individuals have separate interests which they seek to maximize in an impersonal, anonymous and (mythically) "free" marketplace of ideas and values, goods and services, and action opportunities. This first view asserts the responsibility of each individual for his lot in life. It asserts that he is fully capable of defending or promoting his
utilitarian interests so long as he is given an equal start in the competi-
tion....usually through youth education or through remedial, adult education
and manpower training, etc. In this view, the individual is the best judge
of his own interests, tastes, values. For public policy to intercede in that
judgement is to disfigure the sacrosanct inviolability of the individual who
is the guardian of his own integrity. In this view, social justice means
some kind of equitable distribution of access to the instruments by which
persons seek a good life. Popularly, that view means promoting an "equal
start" in life for children, usually through educational, nutritional, health
and cultural interventions. The angels are on the side of social justice at
the beginning of life, among youth; but at the end, in adulthood, "the devil
take the hindmost."

On the other hand is the view which proposes a minimal but universal
content to a good life which gets translated into a vague but nevertheless
operative definition of the good life. The good life turns out to be a current
norm whose indicators are the behaviors, tastes, customs, institutions and life
conditions of those members of the society who have "made it", i.e., achieved
or surpassed the norm. That norm is transgressed or fallen short of at con-
siderable expense to a person's self-esteem, i.e., self-judgements about his
own worth and thus about the worth of his own actions. In this latter view,
social justice means the redistribution, according to one or another criterion
of equity, of life conditions (i.e., the content of the good life) rather
than life chances (i.e., access to the means to seek a good life).

Both views, despite their ostensible differences, contain the same error:
the assumption that seeking a good life can invariably be translated into a
prevailing norm of the good life. The second view does this explicitly. The
first view does it implicitly, by assuming that the means for seeking a good
life (access to life chances) are universal and known.

For example, in a literate society in which over 80% of the current crop
of 18-year olds acquire a high school diploma, one such universal instrument
are the skills of reading, writing and computation. Another will be an educational credential which attests to the possession of these skills at some agreed-upon level. In that literate society, if there is also a strong work ethic which has become institutionalized into remunerated employment or jobs, another universal instrument will be vocational training (i.e., the acquisition of specific job skills, whatever the rhetoric we employ to transform low-paying, low-status, dead-end jobs into careers).

In this first view, then, if a disadvantaged adult learns the skills at reading, writing and job, he has acquired the minimal, universal means for seeking a good life. Means-oriented instruction, then, becomes the instrument of public policies for educationally-disadvantaged and unemployed adults, i.e., training as distinguished from education (supra, pages 11-14). Such policies, life Adult Basic Education and Manpower Training, assert a universal content to life-chances, to the means for seeking a good life. And in that assertion, the first view of social justice also commits the error of substituting the notion of the good life for a good life. How is that possible when the first view rests, ostensibly, on an ideology of individualism in which social justice calls, at most, for equality of life chances, for an equal start in the competition for a good life, usually through compensatory or remedial (second-chance or make-up) training?

The first view constitutes a means-consequences argument, while the second view constitutes a means-ends argument. The second view explicitly defines some minimal content of the good life. Usually, it is an approximation of a norm of middle-class affluence, employing indicators like income, health, housing, educational credentials and employment status. The means are various schemes for subsidization and redistribution. The first view assumes that once given equal access to life-chances, disadvantaged persons will negatively pursue the same indicators as a consequence of having learned, at least at a minimal level, the kinds of skills acquired by persons who have made it in the system. The negative pursuit is this: that poor, undereducated or otherwise disadvantaged adults will, by acquiring access to the instrumentalities
of literacy and job skills, get off the welfare rolls (a negative indicator), reduce their unemployment (a negative indicator), clean up their slum habitat (a negative indicator), decrease their crime, drug abuse, bearing children out of wedlock, and other anti-social behavior (all negative indicators), and decrease their incidence of ill-health (life-expectancy, tuberculosis, infant-mortality, etc., all negative indicators). Thus, in the means-consequences argument of the first view, the decrease of negative indicators must be coupled with an increase in the positive indicators of the good life. For all social justice policies, as presently conceived, cannot do without indicators which signify the existence of the good life; and in both views, the indicators, positive or negative, derive from eventually the same criteria of the good life.

These two views of social justice reflect an enduring conflict in American ideology about equality: whether it is in the opportunity or in the outcome. More importantly, however, both views, by substituting a notion of the good life for a notion of a good life, render unlikely the success of public policies which aim at distributive justice. That substitution assumes a consensus that any person's notion of a good life is to be judged by a proximity to a notion of the good life. That assumption is in error. It requires us to devise public policies for improving the life chances and/or life conditions of literally millions of persons who, because they do not meet a norm of middle-class affluence, are thought not to have, or know how to seek, a good life.

Consider their numbers. Some 60 million adults possess less than 18 years of formal schooling, 30 million less than 6 years. In our youth-oriented culture, some 20 million are over age 65, many of them poor, many of them with no sense of purpose in their lives, most of them denied action opportunities within which they can reaffirm their worth. Some 30 million citizens are at or below the poverty level, five million seeking remunerated employment are without jobs, and uncounted and uncountable scores of millions might well seek remunerated employment were they able to get it. Of course, these
groups overlap. Irrespective of the absolute size, however, there are millions of persons who (a) are deemed not to have a good life by the implicit criteria of social policies aimed at improving their lot, and/or (b) seek a good life which in one or more of its dimensions is substantially different from any norm we might describe or measure.

That so many citizens fall short, on one or more measures, of achieving some version of the good life should give us pause. Citizens who have "made it" should be chary in claiming that either their life-conditions or the means to achieve them constitute the content of the good life. Certainly, the possession of middle-class amenities is an unsubstantial base for judging the actions of persons not so situated to seek and achieve their good life. Yet an assumption of moral superiority, together with its corollary of knowing the good life, lies at the heart of most public policies aimed at persons not so situated, and is a primary reason for their failure.

But there is another reason to which we must attend. The thesis that all persons seek a good life does not imply that they have achieved it. Indeed, most citizens who meet or surpass a middle-class norm of material affluence, as well as those who fall short, have serious, inner doubts about (a) what a good life means, (b) how to achieve it, and (c) how to know if and when it has been achieved. Some common-sense indicators of these doubts, drawn from our experience, are available to us. The indicators of personal upset and depression, (i.e., mental health), unrequited aspirations, social class desiriveness and continuing racial hostility, an increasingly inegalitarian distribution of income and retrogressive tax structure, divorce and suicide rates, unneighborliness between suburbs and central cities, new concerns about "quality of life" issues, the so-called erosion of the work ethic, increasing erosion of belief in the credibility of governments as instruments to solve public problems, increasing inability among citizens to understand—or, perhaps, care about—distinctions among the ideas of law, order and justice: these signify an increasing, perhaps substantial, if still somewhat implicit and not yet completely exposed disagreement about the content of a good life, how to achieve it, and who ought to have it.
There is, finally, a third reason for the failure to achieve social justice in our society. It lies at the heart of thesis one, which states that it is persons who seek a good life, and that they so seek in concert with other persons. Yet the policy assumptions discussed above reveal that a good life for any particular citizen is to be known and judged to the extent to which it conforms to some norms of social behavior from which one can depart only at the risk of being considered less than a person. These norms are largely implicit in the culture, and become explicit as formal rules of conduct when they are breached.

In the final analysis, why is this policy assumption fallacious? For all social, and therefore public, policies carry with them, usually in the form of policy goals and criteria for measuring program success, an unexpressed but quite powerful view of prevailing social values. How else can public policy be made? Adult Basic Education, for example, considered as a public policy, clearly rests on an assumption that poor, illiterate persons hold the values and aspirations, want to acquire the competencies, and employ the collective institutions (like schools and jobs) which are taken to represent some minimal—that is, necessary, though not sufficient—definition of the means and ends of the good life.

That policy assumption is fallacious, not because it doesn't hold for some persons, perhaps many, but because it doesn't hold for all. And...it doesn't work for that reason. Consider, for example, the failure of ABE to result in effective recruitment, retention, and upgrading of the literacy skills of the hard core, most illiterate poor. The causes of this failure are no doubt many. Among them are the substantial underfunding of the program in proportion to the perhaps 15 to 20 million adults with less than a 4th grade level of competency in verbal and computation skills, the lack of jobs for those seeking literacy skills in order to gain employment, and the lack of effective linkages between ABE programs and employment recruitment programs. But there is another factor at work here. It is more subtle and pervasive than those of the kind suggested above, which are of a structural,
aggregate or fiscal character. It is a general incapacity to distinguish, among the ABE target group, between persons who possess the values, aspirations and social competencies associated with middle-class norms, and those who don't.

The size of this latter group is unknown, but could well include literally millions of adults whose life experience does not accord them a self-image in which literacy skills and other social competencies of the kind assumed in prevailing norms are important. In short, we do not know their intentions, we do not assume they have intentions; and quite often, if known, we do not like their intentions.

This general incapacity results, I believe, from a recognition of the serious consequences for prevailing modes of policy formation and program practice were an alternative approach to the social pathology of poverty and marginalism be adopted. That new approach, first and foremost, would treat members of the "target group" as persons. That approach would represent the application to policy formation and program practice of the two theses of civic literacy.

The first thesis, as applied, is that the attainment of a good life requires that persons act in concert, according to their intentions, to devise the social conditions which facilitate a seeking after it. But persons for whom majoritarian social conditions, like schools and jobs, have not worked in the past may well possess intentions not to go back to school, and not to take or hold a job. Of such persons, we are likely to say that they are "poorly motivated," have "bad attitudes," are "poorly socialized." Of course, we can not know their intentions until we engage with them. Thus, we can not discover the truth of these assertions about the intentions of persons in the target group unless and until policies and program practices engage persons at the level of their intentions. The need to discover the intentions of persons, and to provide opportunities for these intentions to guide their actions is at the heart of the pedagogy of civic literacy. (Part Three).
By emphasizing, in thesis one, the notion of a good life rather than the good life, within the social context of persons acting in concert, we are enabled to:

(1) understand the problem of diversity and pluralism as a question of social justice and political community;

(2) understand the reasons for the failure of social uplift policies for the disadvantaged to substantially alter their life conditions according to the criteria and standards (indicators) of middle-class affluence;

(3) raise powerful questions about the presumed success story of middle-class America in achieving the good life;

(4) set the stage for discovering the competencies for a civic literacy whose agenda is to invent the bonds for political community within which persons are enabled to seek a good life in concert with their fellow citizens.

Still, we must admit that many persons, perhaps most, for whom present social conditions appear to work may be unwilling to extend these conditions to other persons in the society. They may also be unwilling or unable to recognize that intentions and their attendant action differ from one person to the other. Finally, they may be unwilling or unable to recognize that seeking a good life, in principle, requires that each person act in such a way as to enable every other person to seek a good life.

To address these issues, it is necessary to elaborate the second thesis of civic literacy, that the civic literacy of some is dependent upon the civic literacy of all.
The Universality of the Bonds of Political Community: Elaboration of Thesis Two

The second thesis of the action-inquiry model of civic literacy states that the civic literacy of each person is dependent upon—cannot be fully realized without—the civic literacy of every person. In short, civic literacy is indivisible. Its acquisition and expression by one person is premised upon its acquisition and expression by all persons. To understand this thesis, we must recognize that the idea of the (bonds of) political community is both a rational principle and an heuristic aim.

The invention and discovery of the bonds of political community is an activity in which all persons engage, irrespective of their national, linguistic, ethnic, cultural and personal biographies. The universality of this principle is not negated by the evident facts that political community certainly does not exist in the international domain and has eroded in our own society. The nature of political community, and of the civic literacy to seek it in an ambience of discord, doubt and confusion, is its universality and bindingness. In principle, to devise the bonds of political community, such that some persons are excluded from it, is to render those bonds transitory, illusory and immoral. Those who are excluded must, from the nature of their personal being in this world, seek to act in concert with those who exclude them...or, prevented from so doing, seek to form the bonds of their own, exclusive political community.

Unquestionably, history reveals the emergence of a wide number of political communities and other kinds of political (societal) forms. The historic flux of interaction among these entities—most recently in history, nation-states, power blocs, spheres of influence and such—has inevitably lead to rivalry, conflict, competition and various modes of domination. But now we seek to know each other. The transnational linkages forged by communications, transportation, international economic cartels and the interdependency of a planetary ecology break the mold of parallel, exclusive, peripatetic forms.
of human society and force us to reexamine what every person in this world has to do with every other person.

The exclusionary hypothesis whose proof is induced from the social experience of ethnocentrism posits the divisibility of personhood. No one can argue with the facticity of that world. We live its consequences every day. But the bonds of political community whose emergence would signify the universal acquisition of civic literacy are of this character: they are to enable persons to seek a good life by acting in concert with other persons to devise the social conditions for the realization of that aim. To exclude some persons as a matter of principle is to decertify their humanity. It places them in an inferior (i.e., non-human) status of non-persons with whom others—the "persons"—can only have a parasitic relationship. But a parasitic relationship among persons is impossible.

To admit the parasitic relationship as a matter of principle—as distinguished from matter of fact—is to reject the viewpoint which enables us to understand the irreducible human capacity to experience ourselves as human, as persons in a world of persons, and to discover what that experience means. It is to accept a human world constituted of both persons and non-persons. Of course, a non-person—one treated as such—may treat others as non-persons. What is a non-person? It is one of whom it can be said:

1) He is incapable of engaging in intentional action; and thus

2) neither has nor knows his intentions; and thus

3) is incapable of employing his imagination to formulate them; and thus

4) can be understood not to seek a good life, and so cannot permit others to so seek; and thus

5) has a biography formed from infancy of experiencing a world totally constituted of non-persons, including those who first express to the infant
their love for him and communicate to the infant their intention to nurture the emergence and discovery of his personhood. 17

To pose the possibility of the non-person as a negative of the idea of the person is to put in starkest form the question: Who among us is a non-person? Can he be known by some special demographic characteristic? Is level of formal education and income, cultural, ethnic and linguistic characteristics, employment status, ideology, age, sex, or any other social characteristic a determinant or indicator of non-personhood?

To admit the non-person as a principle of intelligibility—i.e., how we are to understand other human beings—is to deny our own personhood, since that is formed and expressed only in a world of other persons. The negative case seems to me to contradict the variety and universality of human experience, of which my own must be the starting point.

On the other side, of course, no one can assert that in fact we treat each other as persons all the time or even very much of the time. That situation poses the question: Who among us is a person? Personhood has this dimension: it is both principle and aim. As principle, it renders intelligible the special character of being human, that is, our intentional agency which we come to have and know in interactions with other persons. As aim, it reminds us that a community of persons in a world of non-persons—i.e., the historic and contemporary situation—is at best a half-way house, parasitic, domination-oriented, transitory and recognized as such by those who realize that the flowering of their personhood can obtain only in a world constituted of all other persons.

The unlikelihood of that aim being realized in the present situation is no deterrent. It does, however, require us to apply the second thesis in an unpromising social environment and ask, Where does one begin? In what domain of interaction among persons does one seek to become literate in the civic sense? Is the civic itself a domain of political agency, and what are
its boundaries? Where is it that we begin to forge the bonds of political community?

Matters of Common Concern and the Domain of Civic Literacy

All civic matters are of common concern. It is neither clear nor certain that all matters of common concern are civic in character. Once, in our understanding of the Greek city-state of antiquity, that congruence existed. Present society, however, is not characterized by a communality which enables all of its members to act within a social action space of shared intentions (meanings) rooted in ordinary experience. Of course, the ideal-typical case never existed for all persons, even in the Greek city-state. The Athenian city-state's economy, for example, was founded on a system of slavery which, by its very nature, denied the personhood of its slaves. But for the citizens of Athens—exclusive of women, children and slaves—there no doubt existed a civic ideal from which we still derive a great deal of the content of modern day civics, literacy and action.

To understand the boundaries to civic action, we should note how closely linked in the early history of language were the root meanings of civic and home (household). In the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the following appears in the section on Indo-European Roots (summary mine):

Kei (Indo-European root): to lie; bed, couch, night's lodging, home; beloved, dear; with three basic forms: 1) Greek, Keisthai to lie; 2) Kei-wo - in Germanic hiwa; in: a. Old English hiwan, members of a household, b. Old English higid, a measure of land (? "homestead"); 3) Kei-wi - in Latin civis, citizen ("member of a household"): City, Civic, Civil.

In the origins of western language and experience, the civic idea emerged out of social conditions characterized by a high level of intimacy and communality. The social action space of Athens, for example, was bounded by clear, explicit and known, geographical, political, historical, ethnic,
linguistic and religious criteria. To be sure, the Romans boldly and imaginatively extended the concept of citizenship beyond these boundaries of intimacy and familiarity (i.e., friendship) to include persons of different language, ethnicity, religion and custom. To that extension we owe the possibility of a society of legal persons, governed by laws. But even today, that extension has not altered our ordinary usage of the civic concept. Habitually, the idea of civic is linked to those matters of common concern which we call, loosely, local in character, e.g., local or municipal government, local justice, courts and police, local services like public schools and community colleges, sewage disposal, streets, and fire districts, and of course local charity like the community chest.

Consider the distinctions between civic affairs and regional, national or international matters of concern lodged in governments, or matters of concern lodged in the institutionalized structures of national or international scope like trade unions, economic corporations, foundations, commercial TV networks, etc. In these larger domains, the action space for persons is severely limited. These institutionalized structures are founded on a complex division and specialization of labor. Persons perceive themselves as actors in roles: as consumers, voters, employees, spectators, taxpayers, etc. Role specialization is indeed characteristic of contemporary society. It severely constrains the expression of personhood. Indeed, for most persons, it does not permit that expression.

What indeed are the boundaries to civic action, and therefore the limits to our civic literacy? And how are these to be distinguished from matters of common concern about which we find it difficult to have and know our intentions, and realize them in collective action? Consider the following example which provides the extreme case of the problem.

What are the grounds for claiming that an inequitable distribution of world resources, the rapid using-up of known mineral energy sources by the highly industrialized, materially affluent nation-states, and the worldwide
population increase curve are civic matters, even if we argue—as, for example, the *Limits to Growth* does—that these ought to be matters of common concern to all peoples? The limits to our civility in this world can only be discovered by persons who intend to do something about these issues. Yet we would suppose the limits to be severe. World problems are not presently amenable to interventions resting on the assumption of world political community. Very few persons in this world of three and one-half billions are prepared to state and act upon their intentions in these matters. They do not presently possess the action space, nor do they share a willingness and ability, to discover or invent the collective institutions which facilitate a negotiable or adjudicatory process about different intentions, wherein both the institutions and the process are firmly grounded in a belief in the worth of persons as such.

This state of affairs is neither new nor surprising. Is it either feasible or desirable to argue that large numbers of persons—millions, at least, if not billions—can and ought to view these world problems as matters of common concern? From what source would such a view derive: common experience, shared understandings, a universe of discourse open to all, a universal worldview or ethic, an agreement on the problematic of human survival, etc.? None of these sources are yet at the stage of development—and may never be!—which would permit us to attest to the existence of a common civic literacy about these matters.

Still, in principle we must attest to the universality of the political community thesis even as we acknowledge that most human practice in this world seems at a considerable distance from that aim. The bonds of a political community of persons—whatever they may turn out to be—must include all persons in such a way as to promote social justice. Such bonds, then, are not "neutral" or scientifically "objective." They are fundamentally moral in character, i.e., they are means to the end of enabling each person to seek a good life by acting in concert with other persons to devise (discover, invent) the social conditions for the realization of that aim. Those bonds which cannot incorporate
all persons into that community are self-contradictory. For to include some persons and exclude others is to deny the rational principle that seeking after a good life is what all persons do in concert with other persons. It is to deny our personhood by denying others'. It is to aggress for a parasitic relationship between persons and their social forms. It is to seek permanence in a transitory and illusory state of affairs.

Still, to have elaborated these two principled theses of the action-inquiry model is not to have solved any practical problems. There is no compatibility of intentions among the inhabitants, either of the planet or our own society. We can discover no clear-cut expression of collective intentions (nor can we assume that most persons either have or know their intentions) about these matters. Indeed, many persons have intentions which are not good, which are ill-formed, immoral, selfish, lacking in civility towards others' intentions.

Hence, we can now understand that civic literacy is both end and means, product (outcome) and process, germinal in all persons as such, yet at best poorly expressed in most. In short, civic literacy is both a being and a becoming. These dynamics of the action-inquiry model of civic literacy are heuristic. The practices of civic literacy are informed by the very end they seek to bring about (supra, pages 16-17). In that sense, we may now proceed to inquire into the nature of those competencies which are both the means and the end of civic literacy.

To put it another way, is there a set of competencies which fit the two theses of civic literacy? Can we define these competencies such that we can recognize their expression in germinal form and design a pedagogy for their development? Can we define them such that persons may begin their practice when the two theses are neither articulated nor understood by the practitioners? In short, can we learn the practice of civic literacy (i.e., facilitate its discovery and invention) without the practitioners (the teachers-learners) engaging in theoretical speculation about the nature of the model developed in this paper?
I believe the answer is affirmative to all of these questions. It will be demonstrated in the definition and elaboration of a set of five competencies which constitute the practice of literacy in the civic sense.

The Competencies of Civic Literacy

The action-inquiry model of civic literacy, in addition to its two theses already discussed, consists of a set of five competencies whose practice enables us to translate these theses into a learning and doing of civic literacy. The five propositions elaborated below are sequential, i.e., each proposition contains the next proposition, which is a special case of the former as it is applied to civic literacy. The competencies, however, are not expressed sequentially in practice. They are simultaneously practiced and in fact are indivisible. In reflecting on these practices, I have disaggregated and codified them in order to elucidate their meaning within the model and in order to provide the basis for explaining the pedagogy of civic literacy.

Civic literacy, then, is to be understood as a set of competencies which enable persons to undertake certain kinds of action. These actions have to do with the reasonable adjudicating of differences in intentions about matters of common concern. Intentions have consequences, if realized in action, and require strategies for their realization. In any context in which persons formulate different intentions, consequences and strategies, adjudicating may be accompanied by, or even replaced by a richer and less formal negotiating about the differences in social meanings. Adjudication among intentions presupposes some agreement among persons about the rules for that interaction. Thus, the rules are explicitly formulated. Negotiation occurs in a context of interaction where such agreement cannot be explicitly formulated into a codified set of rules, or indeed does not exist. In that context, indeed, much of the difference in meanings attributable to the intentionality of persons might well reflect disagreement over the procedures which would govern
the context of interaction. In the former case, we would tend to use the courts—i.e., the judicial system—or the legislature or parliamentary format. In the latter case, such instruments are unavailable to us, and we must discover through a much more complex interaction the procedures which facilitate a negotiation among different intentions.

In both situations—adjudicating and negotiating—persons utilize the instruments of language. In a literate society, the instruments of language include—though they are not restricted to—reading, writing and computation. In that literate society, persons who have not mastered these latter competencies may find it difficult to negotiate meanings and adjudicate differences in intentions with persons—the vast majority—who are literate. 20

However, the case of the relationship between civic literacy and literacy (now very narrowly defined) is complex. It is by no means clear that civic illiteracy is a consequence of the lack of formal literacy skills. That question depends very much on the context of civic. Similarly, it is by no means clear that the distribution curve among the population of level of formal educational attainment (i.e., schooling) is related to the distribution of civic literacy; and if related, in what manner. However, in a literate society (narrowly defined), the acquisition of civic literacy competencies by persons who are formally illiterate in the use of these instruments of language should enable these persons to understand their reasons for becoming literate.

It may be useful to note, once again, the distinction between education and training (supra, pages 11-14), for the competencies of civic literacy are not amenable to a training pedagogy. In their practice, persons are always confronted with choosing among the intentions by which they render their actions intelligible to other persons, and negotiate their collective or shared meanings. The reasons why persons engage in these practices—the ends they seek—are central to the practices.
The five competencies of civic literacy are:

1. A willingness and ability to engage in intentional action.

2. A willingness and ability to maintain, and if non-existent or inadequate, create the conditions for others to engage in intentional action.

3. A willingness and ability to maintain, discover, or invent the collective institutions which facilitate an adjudicating among different intentions, including a negotiating among different meanings of intentions, consequences and strategies.

4. A critical capacity (i.e., reflective action) to discover through civic action what are and should be matters of common concern.

5. A willingness and ability to test, extend, and/or redefine the limits and boundaries to civic action through social invention.

The First Competency: A Willingness and Ability to Engage in Intentional Action

This is the competency of an agency: the capacity, central to being a person, to have and know one's intentions, and to act on them in such a way as to bring them about. One can distinguish between theoretical intentions and intentional actions. The former are speculations, imaginings about what we intend to do. The latter are practical. Intentional action constitutes a doing of something which is oriented towards the realization of the intention and which is expressive of it through the realization of the intention in action. The first competency of civic literacy is, in its full expression, the intentional action which, however, includes its theoretical component.
An intention is an image of the future. It is about some matter which requires action for its realization, and which is preferred, valued, judged of worth. An intention has a moral character, as the intention is about what ought to be done by the person, even though persons may disagree about the "morality" of the intention. One may speculate about a number of intentions; by choosing and acting on one of them, the person accepts responsibility for the action which carries out in practice the chosen intention.

Persons, of course, may and often do speculate about a variety of intentions, by employing their imagination to flesh out an abstract future, to concretize it, to fix in the future an imagined and desired state of affairs. So great are the variety of our theoretical intentions (more diverse by far than our intentional actions) that a few examples may help.

An unemployed person may intend to get a job, get off the welfare rolls, stay on the welfare rolls, join a cooperative, rob a bank, learn some new home-making skills, etc. An irate citizen may intend to push the municipal traffic department to install a traffic light or stop signs at a busy intersection where children frequently cross. A high school student may intend to go to college, or to drop out. I may intend to fly to the moon. A state legislator may intend to initiate environmental protection legislation; etc.

The agency of which we speak means, however, that these intentions (for the future) are expressed in action, in a doing, a practice. To intend and not to act (a common occurrence) relegates the intention to the speculative domain. The mark of having and knowing one's intentions are their expression in action. It is that action, the performance and its consequences, which enables us to raise the issues of intentionality, i.e., "What did you mean by that" (the action), "What did you mean to do," "Why did you drop out of school," "What are you up to," etc.

Not all, or even most, intentional action is of interest to the problem of civic literacy. There is a class of intentions to which we will wish to
pay particular attention: those which have to do with the modification or reconstruction of our habits (i.e., resocialization) or which have to do with matters for which we have no habits. The social justice and political community theses are just such matters. In both cases, our social habits no longer serve the ends which are encompassed in the theses.

For purposes of elaborating the model of action-inquiry, we have treated this first competency from the viewpoint of human agency, as if the agent were an isolated individual whose intentions and actions were of concern only to him, private matters, so-to-speak (supra, pages 26-27). Now it is certainly true that the activity of reflecting on one's goals, of imagining a desirable future state of affairs (e.g., a change in one's status, position, career, income, level of education, habitat, etc.) is carried out by an individual person through an internal dialogue. But the locus of the activity of reflection should not be construed as justification for an egocentric or individualized view of social life, in which our personhood is fashioned and expressed outside a world of other persons.

To be an agent is to act in this world, according to one's intentions; to impact upon it, change it, bring it into alliance with one's intentions. That world (a home, factory, classroom, neighborhood, etc.) is composed of other persons who also express their intentions in action. The context for intentional action is always social, is always interpersonal.

The chief medium for the expression of intentional action in a world of persons is, of course, language. Language enables us to attempt to communicate the meanings about our actions, and thus allows us to differentiate between action (as intentional and social) and mere movement. We can thus distinguish between "blind" activity and action. The philosophy of the person and the theory of intentional action enables us to make a powerfully consequential differentiation of action from a conditioned, or unknowing and unintentional response to stimuli, from the movement (behavior) of any organism which is by nature deprived of the capacity to have, know, and act upon intention.
These points are essential for understanding the action-inquiry model of civic literacy, and of the pedagogy which the model necessitates. It should be clear by now that as an heuristic rather than predictive model, the action-inquiry approach does not permit us to predict future events from a theory about how and why human beings behave. It will not permit us to predict, for example, the behavior of adult persons after they have acquired the competencies associated with civic literacy. Nor will it permit us to claim, for example, that if impoverished, unemployed or illiterate adults master reading and writing skills, they will want to hold jobs, save money, get off the welfare rolls, vote, use contraceptive devices to reduce the number of their children, send their children to college, boil their water, go to sleep before midnight, attend church only on Sundays, punch a time-clock, or shut themselves off from their neighbors in suburban enclaves. Any or all of these things may happen, and others besides; but to posit these behaviors as the desired effects which we want to cause through any kind of adult education program (e.g., ABE, MDTA, etc.) is to deprive the adult learners of their agency. It is to deny their capacity—and the likelihood of their developing the competencies—to engage in action to achieve their intentions. We would thus render them non-persons, and by so doing raise serious questions about our own personhood.

The pedagogical implications of this approach (to be elaborated in Part Three) are powerful. They raise serious questions about the more conventional training models habitually employed in "educational" programs for disadvantaged adults. For example, a student and a teacher may or may not share common intentions about the action of either in relation to the other, or to some common enterprise. They may assign significantly different meanings to their interactions, or the one may not permit the other to express intentions about their interaction, or to acknowledge the uncommonality of intentions. Clearly, an adult learner whose youth experience in schooling has deprived him of the opportunity to master the competencies associated with intentional action will find it difficult to return to schooling if he believes that the new experience will repeat the former. Indeed, that belief may be so strong—i.e., that the schools do not work for him, do not satisfy the minimal conditions for expression
of personhood—as to absolutely inhibit his participation in a schooling pro-
gram whose ostensible aim is to make up for the failures of the earlier experi-
ence.

In sum, then: the first competency of civic literacy is the expression
of human agency, to have and know one's intentions and to express them in
action in a world of persons. The willingness and ability to engage in inten-
tional action has been abstracted out from our common human experience in order
to enable us to reflect on its meaning (a theoretical activity and quite proper
to the mode of inquiry of heuristic modeling). But by itself, the proposition
is inadequate to a full understanding of the model, just as the competency of
human agency, by itself, is inadequate to the practice of civic literacy. First
and foremost, we must now extend the argument to the social context, to the
world of interpersonal action, of intentional interaction, and set forth a set
of competencies which address more directly the two theses of the model. In
short, we must socialize the notion of intentional action.

The Second Competency: A Willingness and Ability to
Maintain and, if Non-Existent or Inadequate, Create
the Conditions for Others to Engage in Intentional Action

To seek a good life (the first thesis) is grounded in the notion of human
agency (the first competency). But that seeking, as a practical matter, is
always social, i.e., inter-personal, done in a world of persons. The agency
of intentional action cannot be understood outside the social context comprised
of other human agencies. As a practical matter, we cannot experience our agency
in the isolated context of our own speculations, i.e., theoretical intentions.
To do anything is to do it with other persons, be they family, friends, neigh-
bors, colleagues, fellow-employees, fellow-students, teachers, functionaries
and, most importantly, fellow-citizens.

Of course, these designations categorize the world of persons into social
roles. To each of these relationships we assign a complex of social meanings which the role-name, like employee, student, congressman, bureaucrat, spouse, child, teacher, lover, boss, etc., signifies. The meaning of the role is discovered in a set of reciprocal expectations about the behaviors of the role-actors. Elementary sociology argues that these expectations—and thus their social meanings—are replicated among a large number of role-actors. Their role behaviors appear to take on a uniformity and legitimation grounded in the experiencing of each other through these complex and diverse sets of roles. As it were, the social roles mediate our inter-personal relations. Social roles enable us to organize our conduct by learned habits whose mark are uniform and predictable role behaviors. Thus are we relieved of the burden of continually confronting each other fully in our capacity as intentional agents.

But...that confrontation is increasing. We witness a disintegration of socially legitimate expectations, of societal norms, of social roles and their institutionalization into highly efficient and functionally rationalized bureaucracies. Characteristic of modern life is the unnerving experience of expecting one kind of (role) behavior and being met with actions of other persons which do not meet our (role) expectations. Indeed, I believe this to be a central feature of 20th century social life and a major indicator of our transitional era.

Consider the range of this human experience in every category of inter-personal relationships. Plumbers earn more than professors; marital intimacy in over 25% of families terminates in divorce; some young persons don't want to take jobs for which their formal schooling has presumably prepared them; a President of the United States develops an "enemies" list; terminally-ill patients ask the doctor to "pull the plug"; passive coloreds become militant blacks; nurses strike in order to acquire the legitimate authority to make decisions previously relegated to M.D.'s and hospital administrators; social workers and geriatric experts advocate setting aside places in old-age homes where the elderly can make love; "underdeveloped", oil-producing nations begin to milk "exhorbitant" profits from a natural monopoly as did the
entrepreneurial railroad barons of 19th century America; we "rediscover" that adults engage in deliberate, self-directed learning quite apart from the formal apparatus of adult education, etc.

As legitimized roles and their larger institutional settings disintegrate, we are confronted with a social milieu characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. That situation is potentially rich in opportunities for social invention, and for the discovery of new meanings in social relationships. These are opportunities for persons to engage with their intentions and their agency. The challenge to adult educators is obvious: to learn a pedagogy which enables persons to so engage, in all of the social settings in which they live and work (See Part Three, below, The Pedagogy of Civic Literacy).

However, there is more to this situation than social invention. The consequences of large numbers of persons engaging with their intentions cannot be predicted. The absence of certainty about the content of futures we might invent puts a heavy strain on our civility and reasonableness. The perception of that strain—indicated by the erosion of the bonds of political community—carries with it a powerful forecast: the likelihood of some kind of totalitarian political community, the end of citizenship, and a reversion to an Orwellian or other technocratic future.

In short, re-engaging with our agency is an arduous project, whose difficulty is compounded by the necessity of acknowledging the intentionality of other persons. Not to so acknowledge, of course, is to deny our own personhood (supra, pages 38-39).

What is the competency which translates this necessity into a practice? It is the competency of personhood revealed in the way we treat each other. It is the competency to engage in the intentional action of enabling other persons to become agents in this world, i.e., to themselves engage in intentional actions. It is the competency to act in such a manner as to facilitate others to act, including facilitating their capacity to reflect on their
intentions, release their imagination, and test out their intentions in action with other persons. It is, in short, the competency to nurture human inten-
tionality.

Clearly, then, the competency must enable persons to address the complex issue of reaffirming and/or discovering the conditions which promote this nurturing. The practices are those of the reaffirmation and discovery of personhood—as both principle and aim. It would not be surprising if these practices have to be invented, for the conditions are the practices themselves.

Perhaps the most characteristic indicator of these practices will be their ambiguity, as we learn the pedagogy of expressing an intention to foster the agency of other persons. When these nurturing practices are employed in the civic domain, we discover that the mode of their expression becomes a matter of intention, and therefore of choice.

One example—highly ambiguous but nevertheless amenable to an inquiry into civic literacy—is the attempts of persons to establish intentional communities, founded upon either (a) a sharing of a common intention about some matter, or (b) the intention to establish a community of persons, as such, and without regard to a specific matter. It is not clear if either of those two cases will lead to a re-emergence of community; that is, if the intentions of those persons will be realized. No doubt, we are approaching a situation which calls for an extraordinary increase in our capacity for social invention. Under what circumstances can the intentional community exist within a larger society of persons acting out de-personalized roles, whose expectations do not include a diversity of self-contained communities?

Prudence would suggest we ought to aim at inventing action opportunities for all persons, less the denial of these opportunities for some—i.e., the case of the parasitic relationship—legitimizes the denial of these opportuni-
ties for all. The political conventions of a democratic society—as distin-
guished from its principles—constitute highly ambiguous conditions for the
fostering of intentional action. Again and again we discover in our history what de Tocqueville aptly named the tyranny of the majority, except that under present circumstances the very idea of a majority of persons is difficult to understand. When so large a portion of the citizenry regularly obtain information about national political events—i.e., an interpretation of their meaning—from three national television networks, the opportunities for active engagement in the negotiation about these meanings are severely constrained. But that is a situation continuously replicated in the emergence of a national society bound together by such mass institutions as geographical mobility (e.g., cheap transportation), advertising and nationally commercialized tastes, electronic communications, a nationalized (though formally de-centralized) school system employing norm-referenced indicators of educational achievement (e.g., performance on standardized achievement tests), etc.

The competency to engage in the kind of intentional actions which promote the conditions for other persons to so do must be learned in a local setting in which the meanings of actions are less likely to be mediated by national institutions. The practices will be characterized by the expression of intimacy, trust and caring among persons who respect the capacity of others to engage in intentional action. We would then look for the settings within which such intimacy and trust is possible—though by no means predicated in social habit. Places of work, schooling, face-to-face exchange of values (e.g., money for goods), family, congregation, neighborhood, local governance are obvious examples. They are not however, exempt from the tyrannies of a local majority, or from the de-personalization characteristic of the larger nationalized institutions.

We discover our own personhood and the personhood of others in settings of intimacy. That discovery, once grounded in our practice with fellow-workers, neighbors, family, local citizens and functionaries (i.e. local administrators of schools, municipal jurisdictions, etc.) is in principle infinitely expandable. It enables us to attend to the much more complex aim of promoting social justice in the distribution of opportunities for intentional
action among all citizens, irrespective of their personal biographies or their proximity to societal norms of the presumed good life.

The principle of expandability is, of course, no guarantee that we shall forge the bonds of political community in the crucible of social justice. As persons learn to respect the intentions of others in an atmosphere of trust grounded in the intimacy of sharing face-to-face experiences, they are confronted with the problem of acknowledging the personhood of others with whose intentions they disagree, or, in the larger society, whose intentions they do not even know. These disagreements will occur both in the local and the national setting. New modes of adjudication and negotiation will be required, which are expressive of the intention to nurture and foster the agency of others. These will be enabling modes, whose discovery and invention constitutes the third competency.

The Third Competency: A Willingness and Ability to Maintain, Discover, or Invent the Collective Institutions which Facilitate An Adjudicating Among Different Intentions, Including a Negotiating Among Different Meanings of Intentions, Consequences and Strategies.

This competency constitutes a set of practical intentions about modes of interaction among persons. But we can no longer assume that the content of their intentional actions—whether in the purposes, the performance or the consequences—will be either uniform or compatible. Thus, the modes of interaction must acknowledge these differences as constitutive of a world of persons who may be no longer joined by the bonds of political community. Fashion these bonds we must. But how are we to do it? The practices representative of a democratic spirit so persuasively argued in such documents as the Federalist Papers no longer coincide with a 20th century experience characterized by the consequences and indicators of that erosion, (Supra, pages 18-22).

Great inventiveness will be involved in this fashioning. We are concerned
(the second competency) with an enabling mode of interaction as distinguished from a prescriptive mode, which in both constitutional law and civil rights legislation is customarily of a negative character. We can no longer a priori assume agreement about persons' intentions (particularly in matters of social justice and political community). So we must seek agreement on the desirability and possibility of enabling persons to negotiate the meanings of their interactions as expressive of their intentions.

That agreement will be signalled by the emergence of a collective intention, one held in common by persons whose intentional actions have consequences for other persons. Note that this collective intention is not the mythical free market-place where people come together to pursue their self-interest in competition with other individuals or corporate bodies. It is a moral apprehension of an end whose claim on our actions will be judged, in the practical vein, by its ability to facilitate the adjudication and negotiation of different meanings ascribed to the intentions, performances and consequences (and thus, the strategies) of persons' actions.

This collective intention will be to maintain, discover, or invent collective institutions of the intentional kind. Such institutions will be formative and exploratory, rather than codified, routinized and bureaucratic. They will be educative in character, though they are not to be found solely or even mainly in present institutions of education, like schools and colleges. In the past, such institutions have emerged in times of societal disintegration, and can be understood as the positive or creative consequences of what many persons consider the negative, disintegrating, even frightening character of social change and reconstruction. Many presently existing institutional structures in the domains of politics, governance, economy, media, education, were of this kind in their formative period, but have ceased to be so for very good reasons. The formation of such institutions is no doubt a traumatic event in the life of citizens who come together to negotiate their intentions, for a reliance on habit and well-established social custom, ideology and myth is no longer sufficient to express the intentions of such persons. Whatever
may be the limits to our capacity to tolerate ambiguity, and indeed to accept it as a consequence of such institutional formation, there are certainly some, and no doubt powerful, limits (see Competency Four, below).

These institutions, as formative, collective and intentional, are the social or interactional context for the negotiating of meanings persons ascribe to their intentions. More often than not, the institutions turn out to become the strategies for the realization of these intentions. Some examples are the formative period of the Committee on Industrial Organization (late 1930's, later, the C.I.O.); the recent development of alternative schools and free schools; the Community Action Programs in the early days of O.E.O.; probably, some communes formed by persons who have dropped out from established institutionalized structures of action; neighborhood health clinics which shift the balance between a technical and bureaucratized medicine and a more complete and integrated understanding of physiological, social and spiritual health; a re-organization of social welfare away from the concept of services provided by functionaries for "clients" to actions undertaken by persons who organize their "needs" in the service of their intentions.

There are at least three characteristics of these special kind of intentionally enabling institutions. One will be the high level of intimacy among persons engaged in their formation. The negotiating of meanings about intentional actions requires an affirmation of the personhood of others, and thus a high order of sharing and trusting among these persons.

A consequence of this institutional formation may well be a tendency towards exclusiveness, and the development of enclaves within a larger, de-personalized society. Whatever the physical and social limits to intentional institutions, there may be some which mark off the practical boundaries of our enabling intentions. Thus, these institutions which constitute the collective intention must possess a built-in educative activity, whereby other persons may learn to practice their own social inventiveness rather than to suffocate by their numbers the intimacy and inventiveness of an initial, formative group of persons.
I believe we have much to learn about alternative modes of effecting this second, educative characteristic. The spin-off or multiplying effect of an educative institution may result in parallel, segmented, hierarchical and other corporate forms of collective institutions. Their linkages represent the bonds of a larger, less parasitic political community. To discover and invent these educative modes will be a great challenge, particularly in a complex world which has simplified, indeed eliminated the problem by institutional formations which speak to each aspect of man as if it were a separate entity. What will an educative corporation, an educative school, an educative work-place, an educative neighborhood, an educative governance institution look like?

Scott Buchanan once wrote that the ancient Greeks taught us that the laws were the teachers of men. Laws did not act for or on men; for only persons can act. Laws prescribed the guidelines and the substance for persons to discourse about together. The subject-matter, drawn always from ordinary experience, was the criteria for and meaning of doing justice to one another in those cases where justice was called for. For Buchanan, to discover one's civic obligations and to learn the competencies to do them, was "learning under law."

Few of us today know how to make the laws work for us in this way, because we believe justice to be the same as the law, which puts it in the hands of "officials," courts, and legislatures. Collective institutions whose business is adjudication or negotiation among persons have become ritualized, their practices routinized. Persons no longer learn social justice in their multiple role-interactions with each other. But doing justice always comes to a matter of intentions about ordinary actions, especially in a day and age when consensus has eroded about what justice is and whether or not governments and public policies are just. We may have to re-invent common law as it was understood and practiced in its formative era, when it was accessible to persons in all walks of life and enabled them to judge what claims they could make on each other.
A third characteristic of these institutions will be an affirmation of their own obsolescence, which is the negative of their formative character. The negotiation of intentions is marked more by ambiguity than clarity, and persons so engaged are launched on an unceasing enterprise in which their own learning, once begun, does not stop. Thomas Jefferson once wrote that the Constitution should be abrogated every nineteen years, in order to enable future generations to re-discover or invent the collective rules for their self-government. We might understand this characteristic as the collective intention to increase rather than reduce the options available for future generations.

This third competency of civic literacy will be readily misinterpreted as a mindless reification of the idea of change for its own sake, and a negation of those enduring principles and historic stabilities in our social life which humankind has learned through its arduous march out from the caves in 8,000 years of civilization. That reification—change for its own sake—is not my aim, and indeed I do not understand what it means in human affairs. Social change is always for the sake of one or more persons' intentions for the future, however well or poorly conceived. But I am chary of pronouncements about either theoretical or practical necessities in human affairs, particularly of the kind promulgated by those social scientists (often, the most popular in the affections of policy-makers) who never learned the primier lesson of the scientific enterprise, that it thrives on disconfirmation of its theories and hypotheses, and that scientific knowledge is always contingent knowledge.

Social necessity, in the intentional setting, is a corollary of experiencing inter-personal action. Social necessity is learned in negotiating the meanings of our intentional actions. Whatever may be necessary in human affairs we learn out of experiencing the limits to our intentional actions. To accept these limits as given, prescribed, known is to radically reduce the possibilities for social inventiveness inherent in the human practices rendered intelligible by a philosophy of the person and a theory of intentional action. For example, to stipulate literacy as a necessary condition for employment,
getting off welfare, or even making a million dollars contradicts our experience. Moreover, it denigrates the illiterate person's affirmation of his personhood in uncommon ways.

Still, our experience suggests that there are limits to our intentional actions. Future utopias constructed by persons in their theoretical speculations are limited in practice by both the habits and intentional actions of other persons. How are we to understand these limits and what we are to do about them, particularly in the civic domain? These questions inform the inquiry into the fourth and fifth competencies of civic literacy.

The Fourth Competency: A Critical Capacity (i.e., Reflective Action) to Discover Through Civic Action What Are and Should Be Matters of Common Concern

This competency is about discovering the limits to our intentional actions as these are juxtaposed against the intentional actions of others. A person may intend to bring about a change in local traffic ordinances, or to increase the allocation of the municipal budget to agencies serving economically disadvantaged persons, or to bring into existence an educative institution which caters exclusively to persons over 65, or get a zoning change which will permit commercial activities in a neighborhood previously zoned residential. Persons practiced in the art of conventional local politics know how to do these things. Included in that doing is gaining support of other persons who make it their business to engage in civic activities and local politics. Sometimes that support is not forthcoming, or there is local opposition, or indeed there may be state or federal laws which prohibit these intentions becoming realized.

In these typical kinds of civic actions, there are conventional limits: cost or financial barriers, trade-offs among alternative programs, institutional obstruction, lack of citizen or local political party support, etc. Conventionally, we recognize these limits by talking of politics as the "art of the
One of the most powerful death-knells to social invention is the claim that a new goal/program/institution is not practical, not feasible, too costly, a pipe-dream, etc. By a critical analysis of the social experience reflected in those negatives, one soon uncovers two categories of limits to action: persons' intentions and persons' habits. In both cases, these limits establish the boundaries to intentional action, and thus constitute the action space within which intentions get expressed in goals, policies, programs, and strategies.

This fourth competency, then, is reflective action. It is not an intentional doing, but a thinking about that doing. It refers to a standing back from one's intentions to reflect upon their possibilities, their limits. The language of critical reflection is revealing. A substitution takes place in the locus of concern. Instead of asking, should I do "X" and how can I do "X" (for example, bringing sex education into the local primary school curriculum, or preventing a local branch of a national corporation from continuing to pollute local streams), one asks, should "X" be done, and how can "X" be done. In short the issue at hand gets transferred from a personal concern to a matter of common concern. And at that point, the limits to the actualization of the intention begin to emerge.

The context for the mastery of this competency is very complex. Matters of common concern contain the domain of civic action, but much else besides (supra, pages 40-43). These are matters of judgment, not of fact. They are discovered through a critical examination of the extent to which intentions, consequences and strategies are understood by persons to overlap or interface, and whether that interface is mutually supportive or conflicting.

The first three competencies come to fruition in collective action (of which civic action is one case). Collective action is what persons do when they engage in institutional formation of the kind described in the preceding section. Their agency is revealed in their goals, their visions of a desirable future, their drive to actualize their intentions in practice, to achieve
their ends, to effect their lives in some consequential way. Clearly, persons seek a common ground for their actions, and a common meaning to their intentions, for that is what it means to live in a world of persons.

We would be naive to suppose that intentions and their expression in action have no limits; that they will always succeed; that to state an intention to bring into existence a new world is to bring that vision into reality. But what are these limits? They comprise the action space within which persons seek to realize their intentions. Action space, in this sense, is the limits or boundaries to intentionality which a person discovers and accepts (for whatever reason and however imposed). Action space is the common ground which persons seek with other persons according to the mutuality of their intentions. Action space, though it includes a spatial dimension, is fundamentally social, not physical. It is bounded by the constraints we discover to our intentional actions. These constraints are either the habits (i.e., social institutions) or the intentions of other persons. It is important to distinguish between the two categories.

Consider first the category of habit. Clearly, the nature of the socialization process in infants and youth institutes within them boundaries to their action. Most fundamentally, these boundaries are the meanings they learn for their actions; and in so learning, constitute these meanings as habits, of which the chief one is no doubt language itself. In this sense, we can understand that socialization and education have always employed models of the past (e.g., the meanings and behaviors of adult roles, as job-holder, parent, citizen, etc.) as the boundaries of action which the youthful learner transgresses or does not learn at some considerable risk.

We should understand that the boundaries to intentional action formed by the inculcation of habits is not to be considered, prima facie, as a negation of our personhood. Limits also afford opportunities. For example, to learn the habits of craftsmanship, whether in art or in politics, provides us an opportunity—should we so choose—to give powerful focus and expression to
our intentions in these matters. Making, doing, and learning are always practical matters. It is probably impossible to reflect on the ends they might serve until we experience the ends they have served in the past, for otherwise we are engaged in a solely theoretical speculation. The practices are the substance on which we reflect and think about critically. Thus, habitualization imposes limits to our intentional actions by the very fact that it is the foundation—though not the meaning—of human experience.

In discussing the nature of these limits, John Macmurray has usefully employed the notion of the continuant in action. This refers to the system of motives which have become habitualized through a socialization process and which represent the determinateness of the past on action. Thus, the continuant in action is the negative of the intentional in action, which represents the actualization of an image of the future. This latter is a rarer occurrence, especially when applied to a re-socialization process in which the habits of a person are confronted by that person whose intention is no longer facilitated by his motives, and who must therefore re-enter his socialization in order to realize his intentions. Of course, that is the case of the hard-to-recruit "clients" of ABE. It is the case of all persons, irrespective of their station in life, whose habits no longer serve their intentions. What we cannot do as a matter of practice and should not do as a matter of principle is to substitute our habits for other persons' as a way of denying them the opportunity to discover their own intentions. But this we almost always do, unless (1) we are clear about our own intentions, and (2) our intentions are of the enabling kind. Thus, it will not be surprising to learn that the first principle of the pedagogy of civic literacy (Part Three, below) is to examine one's own intentions as they are expressed in actions with other persons.

But however sophisticated may be our understanding of the socialization process by which we internalize the habits of past generations, that understanding can never be a complete account of human action. Therefore, it cannot be a complete account of the limits to human action. Psychology and
sociology inform us about what we cannot do, but not about what we intend to do. For we understand that persons have intentions. They act intentionally to bring about some end, which is always a future case, and which is never, from the standpoint of their agency, adequately understood as an extrapolation from their past.

Persons may accept that the intentions of past generations, realized in the marvelously rich human complexity of culture, institutions, myth, symbolic languages, are good enough for them. The intentions of past generations become habitualized in the conduct of the present generation. There is no principled reason either to deny this habitualization or to disapprove of this heritage. But we should note that coming to know one's intentions as they are expressed in action invariably leads to an examination of the efficacy of habitualized modes of conduct, particularly as these have become routinized in the very institutional formations within which we live the greater part of our inter-personal existence.

It is not surprising, then, that the central foci for social invention have to do with the action spaces we conventionally categorize as the workplace, schooling, the family, governance, the local "community," worship, etc. These spaces put us in closer touch with the intentions of other persons. If we have acquired the competencies so far discussed, we have entered a phase of inter-personal action in which our goals and strategies become part of a complex iteration of alternative goals and strategies. That complex is the crucible for the forging of a collective intention. It is the social experience within which we discover the limits to our action. That discovery always emerges first in practice, in which persons set their perceptions of the desirable and the possible against each other. Not unexpectedly, that situation can become emotionally "charged." The attempt to articulate in action one's intentions requires a substantial effort in order to move beyond the habits we have learned, particularly in matters which touch on our often unarticulated but omnipresent notions of a good life.
This brings us directly to a consideration of the second category of limits to our actions, which is the intentions of other persons: their desired images of the future, their goals, strategies, programs and policies insofar as these are expressed in actions. Here, the "reflective action" is the critical act of standing back from the inter-actional setting and examining what I call the fit among the intentions of the persons whose action space overlaps. For fit, we use terms like compatibility, reciprocity, mutual support, common values to describe the relationship among the intentions of these persons.

Note, however, that this competency is not the political skill to win. The domain of this competency is civic action, as distinguished from power politics, patronage politics, zero-sum games. The conventional real-politic terminology of "who gets what, when, where and how" in the competition for scarce winnings does not signify the literacy of discovering through civic action what are and should be matters of common concern.

Instead, I refer to the competency for critical reflection about the "fit" of our goals and strategies (the intention, the performance and the consequences) with other persons' goals and strategies. In short, the critical reflection is about what I have called the inter-actional setting, a social context characterized by a melange of intentions held, known, and expressed in action by persons about some matter of common concern to these persons.

Note that persons' intentions and actions may fit together according to a rather wide range of criteria. For example, when we raise questions about the compatibility of our intentions and actions, our criteria can be moral, aesthetic, strategic or enabling. The fit can be over a long or short time line. We discover and judge these matters by examining the consequences and the underlying assumptions of intentional actions.

In seeking a common ground for our actions, we may discover both a collective intention of the enabling kind (the second competency) and invent a
collective institution for adjudication and negotiation (the third competency). In addition, however, we may discover the limits in practice to the realization of our intentions, either because of the constraints of social habit or because of the lack of fit of other persons' intentions. It is only by discovering and rendering quite explicit these limits that we can ever hope to transcend them and so expand the action space within which we might give practical meaning to the principle of expandability (supra, pages 54-55), and so seek to forge the bonds of our political community in a world of persons.

The Fifth Competency: A Willingness and Ability to Test, Extend, and/or Redefine the Limits and Boundaries to Civic Action Through Social Invention

As I have already cautioned, the action-inquiry model of civic literacy, bounded by its two central theses and containing a set of five competencies, is both theoretical and heuristic. The competencies have been abstracted from the practice of civic action in such a way as to render intelligible that practice as expressive of a theory of intentional action and a philosophy of the person. The competencies, then, are themselves the product of my own critical reflection about a doing and a learning; about action and an inquiry into its meaning in the domain of civic affairs.

In short, the idea of competency is itself an abstraction, a conceptual category for thinking about the meaning of practice. The practice is not a skill, because the doing, as I have understood it, contains and is expressive of the intention. To teach a skill— or to learn it— without regard for the ends it serves is to engage in training, not in education. But we cannot train persons to become literate in the civic sense, for that sense involves their intentions about a good life and about enabling other persons to seek it. Those matters are, it should be clear, highly ambiguous and problematic in this day and age.

The fifth competency, then, is expressive of the first four: to engage
in a continuous and formative process of negotiating, sharing, discovering and inventing the meanings of action space and collective action in a society deprived of substantial political community. That society (e.g., America today) is characterized by a serious erosion of belief in the effectiveness of formal governance institutions to serve the intentions of persons about matters of common concern.

This fifth competency comes into being through the mastery of the first four competencies. It is, in effect, the culmination of this mastery, and represents the open-endedness and ultimate problematic of the model. For it is the competency to engage in social invention in the domain of civic affairs; to bring into existence new civic institutions, new forms of civic action and new meanings to our civility.

Social invention is the bringing into existence of what, to the persons so involved, did not before exist. It is a discovery for those persons, and may thus constitute a re-discovery of what other persons discovered in other times and places. To "re-invent the wheel" is not a derogatory metaphor, though it is commonly employed that way. For a wheel is a very useful mechanical device. It would be quite unfortunate if we did not re-invent it every time we needed that device and not some other.

The competency of inventive action, then, brings us full circle. For it is the end which illuminates and informs the means of civic literacy; and those means, to which we now turn, are the pedagogy of discovery and invention. Setting forth the principles of that pedagogy is the project of Part Three. Thus, we will have mastered this fifth competency when, as adult educators, we have devised the practices through which persons acquire the competencies elaborated in this model. To do that will certainly require us to reflect on our own intentions, and those of other persons; to engage with them in framing a collective intention of the enabling kind; to discover with them, through our inter-actions, the limits to our actions and the possibilities of transcending or redefining them. In short, the pedagogy of
civic literacy may itself require substantial social inventiveness. We test the model in our own experience, with other persons. By so doing, we discover the meanings we ascribe to that experience. We can then critique the model—and thus, the theses and competencies—which I have formulated for heuristic purposes. That purpose is to learn from a doing—the pedagogy—and a thinking about what that doing means according to the intentions which we, as adult educators, choose to act upon.

In introducing the pedagogy, two cautions should be noted about the action-inquiry model of civic literacy. First, this model—its internal structure set forth above in the five sets of competencies—neither does nor should be understood to represent a complete account of either (adult) education or learning. It has not been my aim to solve all problems in program practice, policy formation, or learning theory associated with that vast educational enterprise. However, teleological notions provide a powerful criterion for distinguishing between learning and education; and the rubric of personal intentionality may go a long way towards enabling us to develop a more comprehensive and adequate philosophy of adult education than is now available to us. Following the elaboration of the principles of the pedagogy, in Part Three, I shall apply the viewpoints of this work to the problem of public policy for civic literacy. In that application I shall extract an argument implicit in the model to the effect that while civic literacy ought to become the central purpose in the educational enterprise of adults in this society, that central purpose cannot be effected by our current modes of public policy in education.

Second, my purpose in employing the language of intentionality throughout the model should not be construed as resting on a claim that persons do, should or can act intentionally all the time, in all situations, or even very much of the time in any situation. That is not the case. My view of the future, as the domain of our intentions and imaginings towards which we act in the present, does not rest on a notion that persons are not most of the time "creatures of habit," and that the past does not exist, or should be eliminated from our
consciousness. Even if I thought that such elimination of the past, and exorcism of our habits, was an admirable enterprise, a view I emphatically do not hold, I would not know what to do to accomplish that end. Thus, such an enterprise—which is one held by some "futurologists" and some "counter-culturists"—turns out to be purely theoretical in character, not lodged in action, and thus impossible—i.e., not real.

Still, there are times when we are, all of us, called upon to reaffirm our personhood, in policy and in practice. These are times of social transition, when established customs, values, institutions, and the manner of their habitualization in us, begins to deny our personhood. I believe that situation to be characteristics of our transitional era. Thus, I believe we are once again required to re-engage with our intentions. That re-engagement is the starting point of the pedagogy of civic literacy. It is as simple—and profound—as asking ourselves, what do we intend as adult educators.