This volume resulted from an attempt to compile comprehensive and accurate data about the popular reaction to social change for a seminar attended by European and American social scientists. The volume contains eight papers which reflect the three objectives of the seminar: (1) a review of psychological indicators of social change; (2) an exploration of new areas of survey measurement of psychological phenomena; and (3) a mapping of research priorities. The first paper contrasts social indicators of the subjective type with the customary hard statistics and identifies areas for the development of indicators. The next paper stresses that quality implies value judgment and that experience is anchored in individual notions of adequacy. The relationship between subjective and objective indicators is the topic of the next paper, which points to the role of the social environment as a source of subjective welfare. Various measurement and methodological questions are dealt with, in particular the issues of scale development and causal modeling of satisfaction structures. A report on the substantive research in the area of economic welfare is followed by a caution against a straightforward interpretation of satisfaction measures as indicators of well-being. Finally, two papers deal with the interaction between the individual and society from two different perspectives. The volume concludes with a summary of the seminar proceedings. (Author/KSM)
THE OECD SOCIAL INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING

Papers presented at a Seminar of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Paris, May 15th-17th, 1972

Edited by
Burkhard Strumpel
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In the past several years, we have witnessed a growing concern with quality rather than quantity, with a more humanized life setting rather than production, income, or consumption, with the preservation of human and physical resources rather than their exploitation. The disenchantment with the performance of Western industrial society is increasingly translated into discontent with government and other institutions as they fail to accommodate people's needs and values. This failure of responsiveness has become manifest notwithstanding the widespread implementation of the principles of representative democracy, constitutional guarantees for the rights of the individual, and the emergence of both the welfare state and mass consumption society.

The protagonists of liberal democracy in the past believed government could be made responsive to the popular will through general suffrage and elective office. Among economic institutions, it was the market that had been praised as safeguarding the rights and interests of the consumer. Both the theory and practice of pluralistic democracy and industrial society generally, point to severe flaws in this traditional model that are partly due to insufficient information about what exactly is popular well-being. The limited communication between government and citizens, between producers of goods and services and consumers, and between employers and workers, contrasts strikingly with the many and complex issues facing these institutions. Voting or not voting for a political party or a candidate, buying or not buying a product, leaving a job or staying, often have the character of bulky "package deals." It is only in rare instances that the expression of such choices can be taken as pleas for specific social action. Moreover, people frequently are not sufficiently articulate, informed, or otherwise able to translate dissatisfaction with outcomes into preferences for societal action.

Because we need more comprehensive and accurate data about the popular reaction to social change, we must develop indicators of people's experiences and satisfaction with work and income, physical environment and community, health care and public services. This information is simply not to be found in available statistics, the
electoral process, or the volatile constellations of polled public opinion. The call for research on the human experience with social change then expresses the demand for information of a society that must cater not just to the popular will but also to popular needs and values.

As with every novel research undertaking, such a venture raises difficult ethical, theoretical, and methodological problems. This volume tries to pose some of these problems and to report on current attempts to solve them. It grew out of an international working seminar held at the invitation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris between May 15 and 17, 1972. The European and American social scientists who attended—psychologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists—are identified in the list at the back of the book. The objective of this seminar was to undertake:

1. A comprehensive review of psychological indicators of social change, their theoretical substance and validity, their ability to capture important subjective trends, their present and potential usefulness for analysis and application,
2. An exploration of new and important areas of survey measurement of subjective or psychological phenomena (attitudes, values, aspirations, expectations, satisfactions, perceptions), and
3. A programmatic mapping of resulting research priorities.

Since several of the developmental research projects in this area are centered in the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, Drs. Angus Campbell and Burkhard Strumpel of this organization had been asked to plan the seminar program. They were also responsible for summarizing the results. The prepared papers of some of the participants form the nucleus of this volume.

Angus Campbell in his introductory statement contrasts social indicators of the subjective type with the customary "hard" statistics, describes their role and promise, and identifies three areas as examples for the development of indicators, namely work experience, community rewards, and "bureaucratic encounters". Subjective well-being can be viewed as resulting from the confrontation of actual conditions with individual standards of judgment. While the social indicators discussion places far more emphasis on the need for monitoring the former, Stephen Withey's paper reminds us that quality implies value judgment. Experience rather than being a simple correlate of objective conditions, is anchored in individual notions of adequacy. Similarly, Philip d'Iribarne focuses on the relationship between "subjective" and "objective" indicators by
pointing to the role of the social environment as a source of subjective welfare. Aubrey McKennell deals with various measurement and methodological questions, in particular the two central issues of scale development and causal modeling of satisfaction structures. Burkhard Strumpel reports about substantive research in the area of economic welfare. He presents measures of income satisfaction, aspirations versus satiation, and preferred economic life-styles, and tests their linkages to work incentives and orientations toward government and society. Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, by drawing attention to the socio-structural analysis of poverty and marginality, urges further skepticism against a straightforward interpretation of satisfaction measures as indicators of well-being. The contributions of both Philip Converse and Samuel S. Barnes/Ronald Inglehart deal with the interaction between the individual and society from different perspectives. While Converse views "alienation" or estrangement from institutions mainly as a reaction to the failure of these institutions to respond to people's demands, Barnes/Inglehart trace the manifest changes in popular political orientations over the last decades to the dynamics of social conditions - affluence, education, mass communication - all of which in turn fundamentally alter people's values and preferences, i.e. their demands for system output.

The volume concludes with a summary of the proceedings of the Paris conference.
QUALITY OF LIFE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON

by

Angus Campbell

The societies to which we belong are all in the midst of profound change. Its manifestations are on every side, not only in technological developments such as television, jet airplanes and the contraceptive pill, but in the structure and institutions of our societies as well. We are becoming more numerous, more urbanized, more educated, more white-collar, more affluent; we live longer, move about more, and are more enmeshed in large-scale bureaucracies. These changes have far-reaching implications for the way people live and for the nature of their life-experience.

If we felt confident that these changes were all contributing to what might be called progress we would no doubt be less concerned about them than we are. Unfortunately it has become clear that we cannot make such an optimistic assumption and that some of these changes have had flagrantly negative consequences. It is increasingly apparent that social change may enlarge the lives of some and detract from the lives of others, and its overall impact may be to diminish the quality of life rather than enhance it.

It is not only we social scientists who have become aware of this fact. Our governments also have become sensitive to the disappointing results of well-intentioned programs and disillusioned by the unanticipated side-effects of "throwing money at problems". They are now pressing social scientists to provide more adequate documentation of the status of society and a more useful array of information which can be used in social planning and evaluation. In the United States this pressure is epitomized by the movement in the Congress to create a Council of Social Advisors which would prepare an annual Social Report to the President (c.f. Mondale, 1972). This proposal obviously grows out of a sense that the Council of Economic Advisors does not provide the government with all the information it needs to have to assess the quality of American life.

When scholars undertake to assess the status of national life they have a strong tendency to look for "hard" indicators to make their case. That is to say, they prefer to count things that are easily reduced to finite units and those things that do not lend themselves to easy measurement they tend either to disregard or to represent
by some surrogate measure which can easily be counted. Thus they are
greatly attracted by any kind of measure that can be expressed in
dollars, square feet, or units of time, and they are very apprehensive
about attempts to measure attitudes, expectations, frustrations and
satisfactions. It is not surprising that the major attempt by a
governmental agency in the United States to lay out a comprehensive
program of social reporting deals almost exclusively with data which
are reasonably finite, which appear to be easily counted, and which
have the appearance of validity about them; thus, number of crimes,
reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, number of children
graduating from high school, number of people employed in various
occupations, number of days per person in hospital, number of house-
holds with plumbing amenities (c.f., Cohen, 1969). The excellent
publication of the Central Statistical Office (1972) of Great
Britain, "Social Trends", has a very similar table of contents.
Neither of these reports makes more than passing reference to the
possibility of measurement of psychological variables. It cannot
be doubted that objective data are to be preferred to subjective
data when there is no question that the objective data are in fact
measuring the intended variable. Very serious problems arise,
however, when objective data are used to represent conditions which
they do not represent or represent only partially, or when we try
to avoid the use of subjective data by relying on objective data
which do not in fact tell us what we want to know. Even more serious
is the tendency to write off as unimportant those conditions which
we do not know how to measure by traditional objective methods.

No better example of the over-interpretation of objective data
can be found than in the widespread acceptance of economic indicators
as measures of national well-being. In the United States, to take
an extreme case, it has become almost second nature to assess the
nation's level of progress in terms of national income and the
distribution of consumer goods. Americans are given to comparisons
of their country's average annual income or its proportion of
people with telephones, color televisions, and two automobiles with
comparable data from other countries. The implication commonly given
is that since America is richer than other countries it is also
happier, more satisfied and generally better off. Material wealth
has been uncritically taken as a measure of the good life.

Economic data obviously have great value; modern societies
could not function without them. But it is precisely because of a
growing realization of the limitations of these data that we are
now being called upon to provide more satisfactory measures of the
quality of life in our various countries. The United States has
reluctantly begun to face the fact that it excels the rest of the
world in attributes other than its affluence. Its homicide rate
sets an international standard which has no close competitor, its record of civil disorders and violence has few rivals, its rate of drug addiction is unchallenged (at least in the Western World), it can safely compare its rate of political alienation to that of any of the other advanced countries. At the same time that its gross national product has risen and its proportion of families below the poverty line has fallen it has experienced a sickening increase in all of these other indicators of national ill health. The assumption that the quality of life could be assessed by counting the national income has proved an overly simple and disappointing delusion.

The current movement to extend the scope of national reporting to include a broader array of so-called "social indicators" is an entirely praiseworthy development. It will tend to dilute the single-minded fixation on economic measures, and it will provide a more adequate documentation of the nature of change in our societies. Social scientists have learned a great deal about reporting the course of social change; we know far less about the human meaning of these changes. We do very well in counting the quantitative aspects of life but we have only begun to think about how to assess the quality of life - the rewards and disappointments which make up the experience of living. The challenge which we now face is to look beyond the material conditions of life which we have traditionally accepted as criteria of well-being, into that far less easily measured world of feelings and emotions where the quality of life is ultimately determined.

For a psychologist there are a great many attractive possibilities in this world of subjective experience; a great many attributes of the human condition which one would like to see monitored in a long-term program of national assessment. A group of American social scientists has recently filled a sizeable volume with suggestions for research intended to illuminate the human meaning of social change (Campbell and Converse, 1972). Three examples of subjective measures proposed in this book may serve as illustrations of the kinds of psychological data the authors feel should be added to the current repertoire of economic and social indicators.

AN INDEX OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORK EXPERIENCE

The importance of the psychological meaning of work has been recognized for generations. Karl Marx argued in his early works that man's essential being is intimately bound up in his work and that with the mechanization and specialization of labor which developed under industrial capitalism, men were forced into a dehumanized existence. Because the product of his labor has no real
meaning to him, the worker becomes estranged, not only from his work but from himself.

It is not clear at this point that the meaning of work is very different under industrial socialism than it is under industrial capitalism, but it is an undoubted fact that the concept of alienated labor has remarkable vitality. After over a hundred years it is at present one of the central themes of current criticisms of Western society. One of the most widely read spokesmen for this point of view, Charles Reich (1971) in his turgid polemic "The Greening of America", writes the following: "For most Americans work is mindless, exhausting, boring, servile and hateful, something to be endured while 'life' is confined to 'time-off'".

It is not only the radical left that regards work as meaningless and dehumanizing. In recent years bargaining in the automobile industry in the United States has focused very sharply on provisions for early retirement for hourly-rated workers. The United Automobile Workers' union has argued in essence: "No man should be compelled to serve a sentence of more than 30 years in the kinds of jobs the automobile industry provides. After 30 years he should be set free". They appear to agree with Charles Reich that these jobs are in fact "mindless, servile, and hateful" and that the only time these workers are really alive is when they are off the job.

Neither the unions nor management in the automobile industry in America seem to be able to think of any answer to the problem of alienated labor except that it be as small a part of a man's life as possible. They appear to accept without serious question the assumption that work in the modern industrial situation is intrinsically unrewarding and must remain so. To be sure not all industry is as conservative as that in Detroit, and there are numerous experiments with job enlargement and work involvement now taking place in Scandinavia and elsewhere. It is surely not a very hazardous prediction that as average wages move well beyond the subsistence level and workers become more sophisticated regarding the world of work, their levels of aspiration regarding their jobs will rise, not only and perhaps not primarily in relation to the traditional issues of wages and hours but also in regard to their psychological rewards. Labor and management will find themselves under pressure to bring a good deal more imagination to bear on the question of "humanizing the job" than they have done up to this point.

Social scientists throughout the industrialized world have devoted much energy to research on the psychological quality of the work experience. They have identified those dimensions of the work experience on which workers feel themselves rewarded or deprived, and they have devised measures to provide readings of what the state of deprivation or fulfillment is. They probably know more
about this domain of life than about any other aspect of man's daily experience, and it is now realistic to think of systematic monitoring of the quality of the work experience on a national basis and through time.

A recent American study provides an example of the kinds of information such a program of research would make available (Quinn et al., 1971). A national survey of American workers (including employed men and women in all occupations) reveals that people who work evaluate their job along five separate dimensions: its comfort, its challenge, its financial rewards, its relations with co-workers, and its resources. The major concern of workers is that they have interesting and self-developing jobs, and, equally important, that they be provided by their employers with resources adequate for the successful performance of these jobs; they further want their jobs to be well-paying and to provide them with co-workers who are friendly and helpful. There is considerably less interest in comfortable, easy, undemanding jobs. Satisfaction with these attributes of the job differs substantially by sex, race, age, and type of job. The attribute which differs most markedly from one group to another is challenge - the degree to which the job gives the worker an opportunity to develop and use his own individual abilities.

One may reasonably ask why challenge is such a significant component of a worker's evaluation of his job, it is so rarely a matter of consideration in industrial bargaining. We may take this as an example of a condition which is ignored because there has been no accepted way of measuring it. One hears labor leaders deploiring the boredom and inhumanity of industrial work, particularly assembly-line jobs, but when it comes time to bargain on a new contract these concerns quickly fade into the background, and the traditional issues of wages, hours, holidays, and retirement take the center of the stage. As confidence is established in the validity of subjective measures of the quality of the work experience, they will take their place at the bargaining table. We will then begin to see the relative values workers attach to the objective and subjective aspects of their jobs, and at what point they are prepared to trade a further increase in pay for an increase in the pleasure they derive from doing their work.

**AN INDEX OF COMMUNITY REWARD**

What does it mean to a person to live in a particular neighborhood, a particular town or city, a particular nation? What do these surrounding communities provide the individual citizen?
security, identification, and pride, or threat, alienation, and frustration? To what degree is the individual's satisfaction with life expanded or diminished by the fact that he resides in one place rather than another?

No one doubts the importance of the community in which people live but many people have come to believe that the quality of community life is steadily deteriorating and the lives of the members of these communities are the poorer thereby. The large cities are the major villains in this piece. The iniquities of urban life have been a favorite theme of social reformers in the last 200 years but the growth of the population, its increasing urbanization, the flight of the middle class to the suburbs, and the resulting ghettoization of the inner cities give the problem an urgency which is quite unprecedented.

At the present time we have only the crudest kinds of indicators of the quality of the psychological return people derive from their communities. We may infer from the fact that a city votes its mayor or council out of office that a majority of its citizens are not satisfied with the return they have received. But election returns, although very countable, are often difficult to interpret and tell very little about what is on the electorate's mind or how the various segments of the electorate differ in their outlook.

We may also attempt to deduce a population's satisfaction with its community by looking at physical indices of community quality. We quickly find ourselves, however, in anomalous situations in which the physical quality of a community is increasing, and the subjective quality is decreasing. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the United States, where during the past 25 years there has been a substantial improvement in the quality of urban housing, resulting primarily from the replacement of slum buildings by modern structures. During these same years, however, street crime has increased steadily in these cities, and apprehension of assault restricts the movements of a sizeable part of the people who live there. It is hard to believe that the quality of life has improved for those people who live in their new apartments if they have to put multiple locks on their doors and are afraid to go outside at night.

A far more sensitive method of evaluating the way people see their community and evaluate its quality is by the type of sample surveys which are coming into use in an increasing number of cities. A 1968 study of 15 American cities may serve as an example (Schuman and Gruenberg, 1970). Cross-sectional samples in these cities produced a detailed documentation of what people found satisfactory and unsatisfactory about the services their cities provided them and who was satisfied and who was not. It was not surprising to learn that in 14 of these 15 cities black people were less satisfied with
their city services than were white, but data of this kind made it possible to reveal the less obvious facts that white and black evaluations of these cities are highly correlated, that Boston is the city most criticized by its residents, and San Francisco the least, and that people in these cities are far more satisfied with their garbage collection than they are with the availability of playgrounds for their children. These indicators of the quality of community services do not present extraordinary problems of measurement. Greater difficulties are encountered when we try to assess the extent to which people find personal satisfaction in their identification with the community to which they belong. Is it true, as some social critics insist, that life in the cities is becoming increasingly impersonal, that neighborhood relationships are disappearing, that community has lost its meaning for the frightened, alienated people who live in these areas? This question cannot be adequately answered simply by counting the number of people who participate actively in community affairs or who escape the city by moving to the suburbs, meaningful as these measures may be. The problem is basically psychological, and it will be necessary to develop measures which will provide an understanding of these behaviors rather than a simple count.

It can be argued that the critical determiner of the quality of community life is the nation rather than the city or town. There is certainly a sense in which the British way of life or the French way of life has meaning, and one may be generally believed to have a different quality than the other. No doubt the citizens of different nations find pleasure, and occasionally humiliation, in what they see to be their national characteristics and accomplishments. Despite the great natural interest in national differences, however, it is likely to be at the local level that measurement of community quality will move most rapidly. It is the cities with their heterogeneous populations, social conflict, high mobility and atmosphere of tension where the sense of crisis is greatest, and the need for community information is most apparent. It is also at this level that community actions intended to improve the quality of life may be most realistic.

It cannot be said that any urban community has as yet established a systematic program of reporting from its citizenry which could be properly called an index of community reward. A number of American cities have begun annual accounting of the objective characteristics of city life—air pollution, employment, crime, traffic accidents, and the like—and a few have conducted sample surveys as a means of evaluating its subjective quality. If these beginning efforts can demonstrate value and if they are sustained by public support, they will provide a new mechanism for the assessment of community life and hopefully for its enhancement.
AN INDEX OF THE QUALITY OF BUREAUCRATIC ENCOUNTERS

As our societies grow larger and more urbanized and our patterns of social interaction more complex, the intervention of official authority into various aspects of our lives tends almost inevitably to become more intrusive. At the same time our willingness to accept these official restraints or demands simply because they are legal or traditional appears to diminish.

Whether or not one believes, as some do, that modern society is becoming dominated by the computers and that the lives of ordinary people are being increasingly programmed by powers beyond their control, it is hard to escape the impression that the hand of the state appears more frequently in our daily affairs as time passes. We are brought into the presence of official authority by the increasing variety of ways in which we are called upon to pay taxes, the growing number of public programs in which we are involved—education, employment, medical care, retirement, welfare—and by the increasing appearance of police in situations where they were not previously regarded as necessary. Although contemporary societies differ markedly in the degree to which the individual citizen is involved in bureaucratic encounters of this kind, the increase of such involvement appears to be quite general throughout the industrialized world.

Coincident with this trend and related to it in both a causal and a consequent way are the various indications that deference to authority, which in the American case at least has never been remarkable, is diminishing and that industrialized societies are becoming increasingly contumacious. The relationships of parent to child, teacher to student, employer to employee, policeman to citizen, all of which have traditionally implied the acceptance of legitimate authority, are now all under challenge. Some people regard this as a healthy development in modern life; others find it deplorable. However that may be, if it is true that contacts with official authority are increasing and tolerance of them is decreasing, the implications of these trends for the experience of life are substantial. A prudent concern for the potential conflict inherent in these developments would urge a serious effort to monitor these confrontations, not only their frequency but their quality. It should not be difficult to count the number of times the ordinary citizen encounters a policeman, a city hall clerk, a welfare worker, an income tax agent, or a government bureaucrat during the course of a month or a year. And he should be able to report what the nature of those contacts was:
satisfactory-unsatisfactory, pleasant-unpleasant, rewarding-frustrating, courteous-abusive.

The purpose of such a program would not be confined simply to assessing the total burden of official pressure people are asked to bear; it is at least as important to know who it is within the population who bears the burden, why it is that inequalities exist, and whether this burden is increasing or decreasing as time passes. Here again community differences may be critical. American studies show, for example, that the citizens of Chicago are considerably more likely to report having experienced abusive behavior from their police than are the residents of other large cities, and in all these cities black people more frequently report police abuse than white people. These differences are substantial and they illustrate the manner in which official policies can influence the quality of life of people who live under their jurisdiction.

We have heard in the last decade an increasing protest against "the insolence of office", the heavy-handed exercise of authority, by public officials, and an increasing insistence on relationships based on respect, civility, and a full recognition of the individual rights of the citizen. It is not too early to move ahead to develop measures of the quality of these encounters between the people and the public agencies which they have created to serve them.

It would surely be premature at this point to attempt to lay out a full-blown program of subjective measures which might be necessary to represent the range and quality of the experience of living in modern society. The three examples given are drawn from important domains of life in which exploratory research has already been done and further development seems promising. The instruments we have at hand to take the required measurements are certainly imperfect but they will improve. We can rely on a kind of reverse Gresham's Law which assures us that good data will inevitably drive out bad. Better data will develop because the urgency of our social problems will demand it. It is useful to remember that the unemployment index which has now become such an important economic indicator was developed in the United States during the late 1930s because the estimates of unemployment then available were intolerably inaccurate, and it was imperative to have a better one. We will see a similar development in other areas of life experience and for the same reasons.

People who are accustomed to evaluating social conditions on the basis of well-established indices using readily countable units may well feel that these proposals for admittedly soft measures of the quality of life are egregiously incautious and that they amount to attempting to measure the unmeasurable.
have reason to be skeptical but they should be reminded that the
longer we wait to find reliable ways of assessing those aspects
of individual experience which underlie our social problems, the
longer those problems will be with us. Patrick Moynihan observed
during his tour of duty in the White House that "It is a good
general rule that governments only begin to do something about
problems when they learn to measure them." Nothing seems to make
a problem come alive to people in positions of decision like a
finite count, whether it is number of people unemployed, crimes
committed, highway accidents, or illegitimate births.

It cannot be assumed, of course, that if social scientists
succeed in developing the kinds of measures we have been considering
the quality of life will automatically improve. On the contrary,
we can expect without question that any data we produce that
suggest change in the established ways of doing things will be
met with entrenched opposition. Any change threatens somebody,
and for that person the main purpose in life is likely to be
maintaining a set of arrangements he finds comfortable. Drawing
on American experience, for example, it seems very doubtful that
any amount of research on the relation of homicide rates to the
possession of handguns would diminish by one iota the National
Rifle Association's opposition to gun control laws. Or that cross-
town bussing to achieve racial balance would be much more popular
among the parents of white children if it could be shown to be
beneficial to black children. Even those occasional enlightened
individuals who are not personally disturbed by new ideas find
it hard to upset an established system of bureaucratic arrangements
in which a great many people have a vested interest.

Changes in traditional beliefs and practices do occur, however,
in spite of the inertia and resistance to change which builds up
in any social system. Ideas do reach their time, and profound
repercussions follow. The Supreme Court of the United States
decreed in 1896 that "separate but equal" arrangements in the
schools and places of public accomodation protected the equal rights
of both races. In 1954 this same Supreme Court declared that such
segregation was intrinsically damaging to the minority race and
was an unconstitutional denial of their rights. It would be very
difficult to evaluate the importance of the various influences
that led to this change, but the research carried out by social
scientists during the intervening years was not the least of them.

It is inevitable that as social scientists develop subjective
measures in which they have confidence there will be interest in
using them to demonstrate international differences. Cross-national
comparisons of Gross National Product and other objective measures
have intrigued both scholars and the general public for years, and
they are commonly used to rate the quality of life in various
countries (c.f., The Economist, 1972). This type of comparison
is not without its hazards, even when based on objective measures,
and it will be fraught with additional difficulties when one
undertakes to compare subjective experiences. The obvious problems
of language differences may be less important than differences in
the meaning of crucial concepts such as those of satisfaction or
positive affect in different societies. It is probably impractical
to try to come to a global measure of the quality of life-experience
that can be compared from one country to another, leading to the
conclusion that people in Country A have a better life than people
in Country B. A more modest approach at the level of life domains
would appear more realistic, making possible a statement that
people in Country A enjoy their work more than those in Country B
or are more pleased with their neighborhood and the community in
which they live. Even these limited objectives will be difficult
to achieve until social scientists in the various countries can
come to an agreement on definitions and methodologies. Promising
beginnings are now in process, however, and it cannot be doubted
that the international comparison of subjective measures is on
the social scientists' agenda.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not very dramatic to assert that the quality of life
resides ultimately in the individual's experience of life. The
fact that economic and other objective measures are used as
surrogates for direct measures of experience in no way denies that
it is through their experience that men know the quality of their
world. There is no suggestion that objective data should be set
aside in favor of subjective measures. The value of subjective
measures of the kind proposed here is to give additional information
to the repertoire of the scholar and decision-maker, to provide an
array of psychological data parallel to the more familiar kinds of
indices. It is to be hoped that integration of the two kinds of
data will make possible a fuller and truer representation of the
state of society than we command at present.
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Quality of life is a montage of the conditions of life to which one is exposed and their impact. "Quality" implies judgment. The multiple exposure picture has objective parts, which means they can be observed by others, and subjective parts which are individuals' evaluations of their life situations. Both the circumstances of people's lives and their feelings about those conditions are woven together so tightly that it is very artificial to talk about them as separate entities. Even though someone else may see them as separate strands or threads, the individual sees the weave, the texture and the pattern.

One aspect of quality of life is "what I am" - short, tall, male, female, young or old - and the extensions of myself that are part of my identification - my house, job, spouse, children, and possessions. Superimposed, as in a double exposure, is what happens to me, and what does not happen to me in restricted experiences and missed opportunities. Historically or currently these are largely observable, objective characteristics, and they are hard data even though a researcher may, for convenience, have to gather them by verbal report.

With a more subjective quality are my answers to such questions as: How do I feel about my life? How do I see others and how do I compare myself and my lot with theirs? How do I see the larger social system in which these are embedded? And, with what interpretations and expectations do I see the past and the future?

Because we are in many ways similar it is possible to know and say much about people's behavior from knowledge of their physical surroundings. We are able to predict with moderate accuracy what people are doing from knowing that they are in church, in a store, in a hospital or in their kitchens. Similarly, we can predict with some accuracy much of people's behavior from knowledge that they live in the country or in decaying city areas, in estates or in shacks, from knowing that they are young or old or from information about where they work.
But we are also in many ways dissimilar. All rich people, youth, ghetto dwellers or storekeepers do not behave or feel the same way. Perhaps the major differences worth paying attention to are the varieties of human evaluations. People hold differing religious, ethnic, cultural, social class and generational values. People love the seemingly unlovely. People grow fond of something that is theirs. Some discount the importance of dissatisfying conditions that they cannot alter. Individuals show great variation in their evaluative criteria, and they change as time goes by.

But it is these subjective evaluations that are our target for measurement in social indicator and quality of life work. The objective indicators that have been proposed and utilized are assumed to have common value: housing, crime, disease, etc. But architecturally defined "good housing" is sometimes not appreciated and even the criminality of certain acts is not always a matter of consensus. Many objective measures are only surrogates of the concepts that they are intended to measure. Campbell (1972) states the problem this way. "The attraction of 'factual data' that can be readily counted is certainly strong, but, in my view, the possibility of assessing the direct experience is more appealing than accepting the surrogates which may be highly reliable but not entirely valid," and Bauer (1966) raised the question:

"Is it better to have a crude measure of the variable you are really interested in, or a precise measure of a variable which is only an approximation of what you are interested in?"

It is difficult to put experiences together into a picture with any clarity or focus. The result tends to be a confused overlay of multiple, descriptive exposures or a fleshless and bloodless x-ray of underlying skeletal structures. Trying to move beyond complex description there is a temptation to develop some simpler measure that has common currency across people and across situations. The major candidate for such a broadly applicable concept is the notion of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

SATISFACTION

"Satisfaction" is not a word with a clear meaning but I propose to follow Hartmann's (1959) use of the concept "value" and regard satisfaction as a mapping between what is, or what is perceived or experienced, with some comparison model or image with which it should match for some reason. Dissatisfaction is a mismatch.

If one accepts the idea that satisfaction is a match between one's circumstances and one's image of what they ought to be or
what one wants them to be, then anyone has two options for increasing his or her satisfaction. An individual can do something to change the situation—move to a better home, switch jobs, improve relations with other people, or whatever would be helpful. Or, he can change the image with which he is comparing his perspective of reality.

The standard paradigm is lowering one's level of aspiration to maintain some satisfaction with one's performance or raising it to present a more interesting challenge. One way of creating dissatisfaction is to raise the image of what might be.

One may not always be free, however, to manipulate the two sides of the comparison. One's resources may be such that changing homes or jobs is impossible. One may be ignorant of how to relate better to significant people. Also, someone else may be controlling the standard you have to attain and you may not have the liberty to back out from trying to attain it. Someone else may be raising your image of a better future, but the motivation to achieve it may dissolve in the uncertainty of how to move ahead. The image may remain a dream but not a very relevant one. The relevance may remain and the dreamer become depressed, or the motivation may remain strong and the dreamer resort to violent means.

If someone reports satisfaction with a house or a job, without further information, an observer is unaware of what the perceived and experienced qualities of the dwelling or the employment are being compared with. It could be an ideal, an aspiration, a realistic expectation, what one should have by standards of justice, what my peers have, a compromised goal that considers the cost or effort of working for higher goals, or a tolerable minimum that is acceptable because one does not attach much importance to housing or the qualities of one's work. The common coinage of satisfaction measures may, therefore, mask distinctions that are worth assessing and can be assessed by knowing something about the value and images that are used for comparison judgments.

One might hope that Satisfaction-to-Dissatisfaction was a single dimension. It can be in the sense that when respondents are asked to they can put themselves on such a bipolar dimension with considerable reliability. But analysis of components of such judgments and how people come up with an overall choice suggests that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are actually two independent dimensions rather than polar terms of a single dimension. The opposite of satisfaction is more likely to be "no satisfaction" rather than "dissatisfaction".

"Happiness" is a term somewhat similar to satisfaction but Withey and Andrews (work in progress) and Robinson and Shaver (1969) have found correlations in the .4 to .5 range between reports of
satisfaction and happiness, suggesting that while satisfaction and happiness are related, they are not the same. Also, young people tend to report more happiness than satisfaction while older people tend to say that they are more satisfied than they are happy. Bradburn (1969) presents evidence suggesting that when some event perceived as good occurs, one's positive affect can increase without any change in negative affect and when some event perceived as bad occurs, one's negative affect can increase without any change in positive affect. Bradburn also measured a variety of variables and showed that positive and negative affect correlated with different sets of variables.

One possible conclusion from this kind of work is that people do not tend to work out some sort of overall position by balancing positive and negative features but continue to weigh them separately. Another option is that people both keep positive and negative features separate and combine them in more complex integration than a simple additive model would suggest. Another possibility is that affective judgments do not combine the way more cognitive, emotion-free evaluations are determined.

**Importance.**

There is a temptation to adopt another means of common exchange by asking for assessments of importance since whether one is satisfied or not about trivial things is less interesting and less enlightening than one's feelings about significant aspects of life. Although this approach adds valuable data it does not eliminate the problems just encountered.

When people are asked to rank an area of life such as marriage or family life, it usually is given high importance. They also tend to report high satisfaction with these two domains of life. Some skeptics have seen this response as defensive or a bias toward giving culturally approved alternatives. Undoubtedly there is some truth in this viewpoint but there is also evidence that people tend to adjust both their perceptions of conditions and their images for comparison so as to achieve some measure of satisfaction with important areas of life, especially if they feel somewhat powerless to do anything more behaviorally constructive. There is also an attachment to and a valued familiarity with aspects of one's life that are unique - myself, my home, my family - that are not as subject to change or as susceptible to comparison as one's car, doctor or grocery store.
VALUES

Hartmann's axiology points out that there are three "levels" of valuing. One is comparing something with its definition - the characteristics it ought to have to be what it portends to be. Is this structure good enough to be called a house? If that is as deep as one's values go, for say a real estate investor, then one can be satisfied and it is a "good" house. On a second level one may have one's own image of what one values and likes in a house to fit one's life style. If a home fits these qualifications it matches one's personal image of a good house - a demand over and beyond the lesser requirements of just being a "house". On a third level, it is also possible to have one's own house, a unique, incomparable dwelling into which one has put one's life and effort. It is lovable as yours, with all its failings and problems. Some domains fall into such a category and one can express satisfaction with just having it, this unique thing, one's own.

The ideas of "satisfaction" and "importance" both seem closely tied to the "value" one puts on something. All three interact in the comparison of psychological perceptions and cognitive images when a person evaluates some condition, circumstance, event or personal relationship.

Looked at as an evaluative criterion, it is convenient to imagine a value, such as freedom or acceptance by others, as a quantified dimension from zero of it to more and more of it, depending on the heights of one's imagination and imagery. One can imagine a graph plotted above such a dimension, as abscissa, with very dissatisfied to very satisfied, or bad to good evaluation, as the vertical, ordinate dimension. In plotting points on such a graph, "no freedom" would be evaluated with great dissatisfaction, "little freedom" is evaluated similarly, "more freedom" begins to be evaluated positively and so on. The curve may even turn down. Too much freedom may not be desirable. Such a plot is not always a diagonal. If the evaluation rises sharply at some point we have discovered a standard or criterion point or step function where evaluation shifts precipitously. Degree of honesty shows such a standard. Honesty is not much good until it is near to complete. Dimensions of value showing such a step function change in evaluations also tend to be evaluated in two categories separated according to above or below the point at which the rapid change in evaluation takes place. This leads one, for instance, to categorize people into honest and dishonest rather than by degrees of honesty. The image raised in the minds of people at that point on the horizontal value, say some degree of honesty
or freedom, where evaluation becomes rapidly positive is the image against which judgments of satisfaction are compared. When the curve of evaluation does not change rapidly, judgments of satisfaction are somewhat vague and difficult to determine.

This use of the word "value" as a dimensional criterion for evaluation, although used by others, needs a little more explanation. People have needs that may be universal or unique, cyclic or constant. Thus nutritional requirements or a quantity of a remedial drug can be seen as values and also as subcomponents and subvalues instrumental to a more abstract value termed health. People have wants that often tend to be quite restricted, if not unique, such as particular appetites, preferences and interests. Under conditions of cultural and individual differences and limited resources one does not even expect many wants to be widely held.

Then there are evaluations and values that one expects to be applicable to role interactions. Almost any role requires a complementary or reciprocal role - salesman and customer, parent and child, husband and wife, employer and employee. If I want or think I should behave in a certain way, I am also going to put value on the complementary values required of people holding complementary roles. If I am going to be a good citizen then the government should be a good government. If I am going to be a good worker then the company should be a good employer.

Roles can be more broadly defined including the evaluations and values one expects to be shared in a group, a class, an occupation or an organization. One does not necessarily expect occupants of other positions to have such values but membership is partly defined by such shared evaluations.

Other values are supposedly widely held and engender feelings of universal "oughtness". They tend to be values about common, reciprocal, interpersonal relations such as the disvalue of aggression and the value of sincerity. People ought to behave in certain valued ways by society's definition. But, it might be noted, these values may not in the least be individual wants or to the advantage of certain roles; as a matter of fact they may be considerably in conflict with what a person would like to do in a situation.

Most evaluative judgments show a mixture of value criteria. I may be somewhat dissatisfied in that I did not get all I wanted in a situation and yet quite satisfied with what I regard as my adherence to reasonable standards of justice or sincerity. Or I may compromise my support of what I see as universally applicable values and have some guilt, but satisfy some more individually held value of what I want. Some researchers prefer to separate the nations of values, meaning universal "oughts", from values
in particular roles with their complement and both from individual wants and physical needs. However, they can all be regarded as evaluative dimensions or criteria and they all relate to each other in judgments of satisfaction. Rokeach (1973), who has developed a test for rank ordering values, conceptualizes values as divided into those that determine and describe goals and those that serve as evaluative criteria for means of achieving goals. There is obviously some choice as to which categories of valuing one wishes to engage in.

CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA

A comparison between "what is" and a valued image results in a match or mismatch or perhaps a near match if the judge is willing to think in terms of degrees of approximation and less precipitous shifts in valuing. A few people seem to think in dichotomous, black or white, good or bad categories, and I guess most people may have some values that are as simply organized as that. They are satisfied or dissatisfied with little room for greyness or qualification in their judgments. However, most people have no trouble using four or five categories for evaluating the degree of similarity between what they are experiencing and the image of what they want or what they feel they should have. But there are few people whose judgments range over as many as seven or more categories when they assess degrees of approximation to a "model". Therapists, counselors, negotiators and semanticists talk about the remedial and adjustive value of increasing one's categories of judgment. A more varied and therefore sensitive category system provides a means of gauging change and progress. The consequences of labeling people sane or insane, delinquent or not, sick or healthy, deserving or not are well documented and one of the processes of helping people is to break down their dichotomous thinking. The self-labeling of stammerers, for instance, is shaken by showing them that their blocking tends to occur less or not at all when they read poetry or sing and when they reread material their stutter becomes less frequent. Increasing one's categories at least increases one's feelings of being better off than one would be in a worse category. On the other hand, increasing one's categories so as to increase the mismatch with a desired "model" may work in the other direction and decrease one's feelings of well being.

Kelley's (1973) work on attribution theory is suggestive in this context since he finds that people tend to use different
category sets or grounds for judgment when they evaluate themselves or others. Quality of life is not limited to assessing ourselves but includes others whom we judge to be influential or significant in our lives. According to Kelley we are likely to judge our own behaviors by internal attitudes, wants, needs, goals, intentions, etc. and the limits, pressures and opportunism of external conditions. Not being as aware of the events confronting other people as we are of our own behavioral environment and being less aware of their internal conflicts and states of mind, we tend to judge other people's behavior as due to rather simple internal states and we, thus, judge them as this or that kind of person - a rather simple category system - more readily than a person in this or that complicated setting. Our judgments of foreigners, minorities, people in authority, children, etc. are often evaluations of this sort. We thus tend to use values of more universal applicability when we judge others and values of more contextual relevance when we judge ourselves. It is easy then to be dissatisfied with others as people rather than being dissatisfied with the conditions in which others find themselves.

DOMAINS AND VALUES

What I am proposing is that it is possible and perhaps necessary in assessing quality of life to get at both people's evaluations of domains or sectors of their lives and also the evaluative contexts and criteria they use for their judgments. People may hold to their values and change their evaluations as environmental conditions shift. They may also shift in their evaluations with a shift in their values even though their personal situations may be stable. It is not enough to know that people are dissatisfied with their housing, or jobs, or schools or taxes. If anything is to be done about them and the data are to be helpful for remedial measures or policy makers, one must know the values on which the various domains of life were judged to be inadequate.

Currently, my work with my colleague Dr. Frank Andrews, divides life into a number of somewhat separate domains, not independent by any means, but definable as a place or activity or role. The list of domains is long enough to cover most of life but it is not exhaustive. Examples are one's personal self, spouse, marriage, children and family life, home, job, spare time activities, neighborhood, community services, etc. A researcher can successfully ask about satisfaction or dissatisfaction (or both) with these various domains. One can also get people to report the degree of importance attached to a domain.
One can then map the relationships among various domains for all or various subgroups of the population and study the degree to which they influence or predict overall, global or summary measures of satisfaction with life in general. One can also try various weightings of the domains in such analyses based on domain importance or some other theoretical rationale for domain significance.

Such analyses clearly indicate that the domains of oneself, marriage and family relate more to overall life satisfaction, predicting more of the variance in such a measure, than do other domains, but these, in turn relate to job, home neighborhood, etc. in complicated, knotted chains. As one might expect, these relationships have some commonality across all persons but there are also clear differences in domain relationships for unmarried, for young people, for older persons and for other groupings of individuals.

We have also looked at values more recently, seen here as evaluative criteria, and asked about the degree to which these values are held, their importance and the degree to which they are satisfied. A person may, for instance, put considerable value on feelings of competence, on having fun or finding other people reliable. One can ask about the satisfactions of these values apart from the domains within which they may be relevant or irrelevant, satisfied or not. As a matter of fact, competence or fun in one area may compensate or be a trade-off for inadequacies in other parts of life. Analyses similar to those conducted with domain satisfactions can then be carried out on value satisfactions.

If one combines the two approaches one can develop a matrix model. This model invites one to study the individual cells of the matrix when domains are listed on one side, say as titles for the rows, and values on the other side, say as titles for the columns. What values are satisfied or even relevant in considering a domain? What domains are satisfying or relevant in considering value satisfaction? The structure of the total matrix can be studied, and it is complex enough to satisfy any analyst. The method of data collection is too complex and time consuming to include on most surveys of the general public but we are trying a development, an exposition of a conceptual approach to quality of life, and we regard such a foundation and exploration as a precursor to the development of handy, abbreviated, simple and usable measures for more widespread and general use.
SOCIAL CHANGE

This approach is sensitive to changes in domain conditions, to shifts in individual, group, role and societal values, to the level of evaluative comparisons (such as ideal, aspired or tolerable), to the importance or centrality of clusters of domains and values and to the resulting reports of satisfaction or dissatisfaction considered separately or as polar terms. The approach is also sensitive to the structural simplicity or complexity of evaluative categories and also the clusters and relatedness structures of domains and values. We are also alert to the need for disaggregation of findings for various subpopulations and groupings of society.

Such an approach can contribute to a sensitive assessment of social conditions and social change but it is, at present, too complex, too cumbersome, too lengthy and too expensive. Various tactics for simplification and abbreviation are being explored in an attempt to locate those domains and those values that seem most influential in explaining the bulk of the variance and structure that exists. Multiple methods for measuring the same concept can also contribute to selection of instruments that work best as judged by various criteria of usefulness.

The biggest need is for better theories about social evaluations, social processes and social change. Better theories will provide contexts and structures for interpretation and understanding and also a simplification, hopefully, of our presently complex approaches. It is difficult to make maximum use of quality of life data until our theoretical models are improved.

Social indicators are themselves a kind of social evaluation. The public's evaluations are part of the body of data. The choice of topics for inquiry reflects a certain set of evaluations held by the researchers, and the evaluative frameworks brought by policy makers to the interpretation of findings constitute a third set. A fourth set is made up of the data interpretation judgments of the public particularly with regard to proposals for ameliorative policy.

Such a complex family of evaluative sets is certain to lead to debates on interpretations and arguments about implications, priorities and modes of policy implementation. Apart from interpretations of the available data there are problems in the simplistic models of social change that are held by most people. Social programs continually produce unforeseen consequences.
Merelman (1969) has built on his early work on the development of political ideology and, more recently, worked out a number of aspects of what he calls "policy thinking". The following points summarize his approach. Policy thinking can be categorized by cognitive simplicity or complexity. This is his way of describing the abstract perceptual structure of a problem to which a policy is addressed. The second aspect is the value structure and evaluative (or moral) reasoning that is brought to the issues. A third component Merelman calls causal thinking. It includes such ideas as thinking about the root causes of the problem, social system versus personal causation and similar analyses of the nature of consequences. Another facet of policy thinking is categorized as allocation of responsibility whether governmental, collective, group or individual. The last characteristic of policy thinking is called imaginative thinking and refers to the ability to visualize the personal effects of a distant social problem, the capacity to understand opposing arguments and the capacity to visualize the problem as solved.

This complex description of "policy thinking" suggests that data on quality of life should include perception-of-the-situation data and evaluative feelings and evaluative reasoning as we have proposed. However, if people are to accept a definition of a problem and support ameliorative policies and their form of implementation, then quality-of-life data need supplementary information on how people think about someone doing something about their or others' quality of life.

If policy makers are to develop policies on their own it would be enlightening to people to have these larger considerations explicit and part of the dialogue of public debate. If information on social change is to be fed into the policy making mills then these amplified aspects of thinking about policy problems should begin to be included in the total quality of life assessment. It rapidly becomes evident as researchers move into this broad area of inquiry that the topics are complex, responsibilities are great, and the implications of such a line of development require cautious, serious and highly capable consideration.
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Rokeach, M.
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

by

P. d'Iribarne

Most of the work now being done on social indicators is based upon the assessment of the "objective" situation of individuals. It attempts to identify the domains which are clearly significant for quality of life or well-being (health, education, employment, goods and services available, housing, etc.), and then to find "objective" indicators which seem to characterize the situation of the individual in each of these fields: such as life expectancy, private consumption of both collective and non-collective goods and services, amount of education, and pollution levels. This approach is founded on the implicit assumption that a given physical and economic environment exercises a specific influence upon the individual and does so independently of the social context.

Although this is very much the predominant approach in current work, it is subject to criticism because of the discrepancies among various "subjective" perceptions of any one "objective" reality (Campbell, 1973).

The OECD Working Party on Social Indicators expresses this criticism as follows:

The perceptions which individuals and groups have of fundamental aspects of their well-being are a necessary and important component of the social indicator programme. This type of information reveals another dimension of reality and may also show up in objective factors which have not previously been recognized as significant. The well-being of individuals in many goal areas cannot be readily detected without recourse to the account of the individuals themselves. This may be particularly true of working conditions and health. In several other areas as well where there is, for example, a mixture of individual and collective ways of meeting needs, asking the individual himself is, in some instances the only way to obtain relevant information (OECD, 1973).

These criticisms would appear to show that "objective"
indicators need to be supplemented by "subjective" indicators based on people's opinions of the quality of their situations.

But there would be a problem in using subjective indicators as a guide to policy. What would happen if a certain trend in society entailed an improvement in "objective" well-being but with a deterioration in the way it was perceived subjectively? Should such a change be avoided? Ought we not to attempt to make people better informed? Our society sets much store by "objectivity", and many would doubtless be prepared to sacrifice the subjective if such divergence were to occur.

To overcome this difficulty, it is clearly necessary to look closely at existing "objective" indicators: if the results they give are so divergent from what "subjective" indicators yield, is this "in the nature of things" or could it be that our present "objective" indicators are poorly constructed?

This paper will seek to demonstrate that it is the latter proposition which is the case. The argument will be based on research in progress for some years at the Centre de Recherche sur le Bien-Etre (CEREBE) in Paris into the mechanisms, especially the psychological and sociological ones, by which the state of a society influences the well-being of its members. We shall see that "objective" indicators as currently constructed rest on implicit assumptions bearing little relationship to reality. Furthermore, it is possible using as a departure point a more realistic qualitative perception of the influence exerted by society upon the well-being of its members, to move gradually towards genuinely meaningful objective indicators for well-being, yielding results in close harmony with the conclusions that would be drawn from a subjective approach.

I. THE PRESENT CONCEPTION OF "OBJECTIVE" WELL-BEING IS ENTIRELY MEANINGLESS

In most attempts to define "objective" social indicators it is implicitly assumed that the links between a person's physical situation (his possessions, physical environment, etc.) and his "objective" well-being are independent of any socio-cultural factors. A given set of goods and services is felt to make a given contribution to well-being. The same applies to a certain level of pollution control, or certain physical conditions at work. It is also implicitly assumed that the effects of a person's physical situation upon his well-being are transmitted by exclusively physical phenomena. It is thought, for example, that health protection measures influence well-being solely by altering the state of the
individual's body: increasing his life expectancy or reducing pain. Similarly, it is thought that a higher level of consumption of private goods affects well-being by allowing the individual to eat food which is more nutritious, or by making him physically more comfortable.

This pair of implicit assumptions is closely linked. If the chain of effects connecting people's well-being to their physical situations includes only physical effects, there is no reason why they should be altered by any change in social conditions.

After these assumptions are introduced, the next steps taken in the definition of indicators for well-being are usually the following:

1. One chooses a particular society (it hardly matters which, since the physical situation/well-being relationship, assumed to be purely physical, appears to be independent of social factors and therefore identical for all societies).

2. One tries to establish which physical characteristics of a person's situation (goods available, housing characteristics, health conditions, etc.) determine the well-being of a member of the society, according to whatever intuitive and somewhat inchoate idea there may be of the meaning of "well-being". This is done by seeing to what extent, in a given state of society, various changes in the individual's situation add more or less to his well-being. For example, the rich are in an enviable position vis-a-vis the poor, and those who have received more education are better off than those whose education was short.

3. One passes from the individual to the societal level. The argument would go as follows: If the well-being of an individual varies in a certain way when there is better performance according to various indicators, while other people's situations remain the same, then the well-being of all members of society will vary in the same way when all show better performance. If, in a given state of a particular society, an individual's standard of living is a factor in his well-being, then the same applies to GNP for all members of society. Here too, to the extent that the link between physical situation and well-being is felt to be an exclusively physical phenomenon, this approach appears to be justified. On this view, there is no reason why a change in the situation of other people, in a society where everyone's situation is changing, should affect what an individual gets out of any given change in his own situation.
In fact, however, the two associated postulates - that the influence of an individual's physical situation upon his well-being is purely physical and that it is independent of socio-cultural factors - are utterly at odds with reality.

This has become strikingly apparent in consumer studies (d'Iribarne, 1972a; d'Iribarne, et al., 1972; d'Iribarne, 1973). Except under conditions where survival is at stake, a person's possessions affect his well-being far more by altering his psychological and social position (affecting the place he occupies in society, his capacity for showing his attention to others by means of "quality objects" or his feeling of being master of his world) than by altering his physiological state. This decisive influence of psychological and social effects, as against strictly physical effects, applies even to food consumption, as nutritionists have clearly shown - see the work of Dr. Tremolieres at the Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicale. Everyone has heard of the placebo effect; food can neither be properly digested nor appeal to one's taste unless it is psychologically gratifying.

This distinction between physiological and psychological effects is easily seen in connection with anything relating to comfort, whose importance for well-being depends on what meaning is being attached to it. Thus, mechanical and thermal discomfort are easily borne when they signify a break with everyday life and have been deliberately chosen - as in the context of mountaineering or other vigorous sport - yet seem intolerable when suffered from lack of resources for "ordinary" life, where they signify social decline, marginality, or powerlessness. This phenomenon is a general one.

Research on individual and collective behaviour relative to health has shown that here, too, the purely physiological considerations are outweighed by the psychological and social factors (d'Iribarne, 1969a; 1972b; Dupuy, 1973; Dupuy, and Karsenty, 1973). In particular, these factors account for the considerable differences in the amount of effort which it is accepted should be put into the saving of life in differing circumstances - in reducing accidents, for example, on the roads, at work, or in air transport (there being a variation of from one to thirty between the first and the last of these examples in the amount of effort which society is prepared to devote in order to bring about an identical physical result), or on whether it is prevention or rescue that is being considered. In fact, depending upon the circumstances, an activity whose physical effect is identical, will have very differing effects on the feeling of security of those affected by it and
on their feeling that someone else is, or is not looking after their interests. Ultimately, then, the activities are very different. Similarly, the continual replacement of old remedies by new ones with little or no innovations from a pharmacological standpoint (the proliferation for example, of aspirins which are fortified, effervescent, etc. - forms which have practically eliminated the "ordinary" aspirin) must largely be explained in terms of effects other than their strictly physiological properties.

Whenever the well-being of an individual is affected by the influence of his physical situation upon his psychological or social situation, the link between physical situation and well-being is not a "natural" link independent of society, but is liable to be heavily affected by "cultural" phenomena which will depend upon several of the characteristics of the society in which he lives.

Among the effects of a person's consumption upon his well-being, let us consider those which, through their influence upon his position in society, affect the type of relationship he maintains with others. The social situation associated with any given set of objects is clearly not an intrinsic property of these objects but depends upon what they stand for in their owner's society. This can vary enormously. In some societies, abundant food and the resulting stoutness connote ease and social respectability. In other societies they signify membership in a lower social category or, in the case of stoutness, a lack of elegance. It is therefore impossible to associate any particular kind of well-being with any particular physical situation without taking account of what that physical situation signifies in terms of the social codes prevailing in the societies concerned.

One very important phenomenon goes far to nullify "objective" indicators as now constructed. A large proportion of the effects of a person's physical situation depends upon what that situation is in comparison with the situations of other members of society. This is particularly true of consumption. It is what this consumption represents in comparison with the consumption of other members of society which locates an individual within it, giving rise to respect or to scorn and enabling him to integrate himself with one or other social group. How well a mother is feeding her family depends on how closely the food she provides matches what would "normally" be eaten in the society of the social group in which she lives. The extent to which the automobile driver feels himself in charge of events depends upon the power and speed of his car compared with the other cars on the road whether or not he can pass others or must allow himself to be passed.

Hence, examination of the way in which a person's well-being
changes in response to changes in his own physical situation, with the situation of others held constant, can give no idea of how the well-being of each individual will develop when everyone's physical situation is changing in parallel. In the first case, when a physical situation changes its meaning in terms of relative characteristics changes, but this does not apply in the second case. It is this kind of phenomenon which is largely responsible for the fact that while an increase in individual wealth considerably improves the well-being of the person concerned, no such improvement can be discovered in the case of economic growth. In moving from a study of what happens to an individual when his situation changes to the effects of equivalent changes in society as a whole, one must be careful to avoid the fallacy of composition (d'Iribarne, 1972a; 1973).

Another disadvantage of ignoring any but the strictly physical effects upon an individual's well-being is that it encourages the use of indicators which fail to pick up too many of the relevant effects. If we look at health policy for example, every indicator dealing exclusively with the effects of such measures upon the physical state of the individuals concerned (perhaps "number of days of life excluding confinement to bed", or more complicated indicators which incorporate the physical pain involved in the sickness) overlook the emotional effects of the measures. This would not matter if specific physical effects were always associated with the same emotional effects. Any particular variation in the physical effects indicator would in that case be pointing to a well-determined variation in the emotional effects and in the well-being of the individual. The physical effect indicator would be an appropriate indirect indicator of the other effects. But, in fact, as we have seen, a wide variety of emotional effects will be associated, according to circumstances, with any particular physical effect. This means that the overall implications for well-being of any change in a physical indicator depend to a great extent on the precise steps which brought about the variation. They are not the same, for example, in respect to the various ways of saving human life. The result is that well-being can even deteriorate while the physical indicator is improving (this might come about if physical health improved by transferring resources from sectors with strong emotional effects towards sectors where the emotional effects were weaker).

Taking all these phenomena into account, the conventional approach to defining "objective" social indicators yields utterly nonsensical results which cannot even be regarded as first approximations. They cannot meet the minimum requisite condition
for meaningfulness; of being such that if a state is measured by indicators $X_1$, $X_2$ ..., $X_n$, taking for state $E$ the values $X_{1e}$, $X_{2e}$ ..., $X_{ne}$, it is certain if $X_{1a} = X_{1b}$, $X_{2a} = X_{2b}$ ... $X_{na} = X_{nb}$, state $A$ is more satisfactory than state $B$. Well-being can easily decline, while physical indicators show improving performance. Without some radical change in the principles of the method in use, it will be impossible to derive a meaningful result no matter how extensive the work, however copious and accurate the data collected.

In fact, the work of "objective" social indicators to date has been based upon a confusion between the "objective situation" of an individual and his "physical state". But a person's objective situation actually includes a great many aspects other than his physical state. The way in which he fits into society, the attitudes of others towards him etc., are also a part of this objective situation. And these aspects are by no means independent of the "material" aspects of society (consumption, health policies, etc.). If objective social indicators reflecting the influence upon well-being of the material aspects of society are to be designed, then a meaningful result - even as only a first approximation - will have to be based on the examination of all the factors which actually help to determine this "objective" situation and the mechanisms through which they are influenced by the material aspects of society.

II. REALISTIC "OBJECTIVE" INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING

How, then, can one clarify the links between the well-being of the members of society and the features of the society by which it is influenced? The present paper can only offer a somewhat abbreviated description of the methodology adopted. Fuller details, with the theoretical rationale, will appear in a book by d'Iribarne, "Socio-Economie du Bien-être", currently being prepared and scheduled for publication in 1974. The guiding principles of the work being undertaken by the Centre for Research into well-being (CEREE) are as follows:

- to identify the "dimensions of life" (relations with others, "poetic" participation in the world, the physical condition of the body, "escape" in compensation for frustration) having an influence on individual well-being;
- to identify the characteristics of society ("physical" situation of the individual concerned, "physical" situation of others or institutions) which determine the performance obtained according to these various "dimensions of life";

...
to observe the choices people make in allocating their time, resources, etc., to go on from considering choice made when the individual has been fully aware of the facts to preferences implicit in certain actions according to the various "dimensions of life". We proceed, for example, from choices among possessions to a person's implicit preferences between his physical state and its relations with others.

To determine which of two social situations, A or B, provides the highest level of well-being, we look to see what they each provide in the various fields of life. If situation A provides better results than situation B in all fields, we can say that it procures a higher level of well-being. The same applies if an individual in full awareness of the facts has to make a choice between two situations, one providing the same advantages as situation A in terms of the various dimensions of life, the other providing the same advantages as situation B, and situation A is chosen.

But in arguing from whatever choices the actor has made, are not the effects of various kinds of conditioning by society interpreted as preferences actually expressed by him?

In fact, it seems, at least as a first approximation, that there is no change in the preference of actors for performance according to the dimensions of their life as between one society and another, and that there is a kind of psychological constant here, reflecting the existence of a regulating function which is personal to each actor: the conditioning factors determining the compromises, made in various societies among the dimensions, have converged toward the same limit. The very wide diversity of behavior which can be observed appears to be linked to the diversity of relationships which exist between the characteristics of the individual's situation and the performance realized according to the various "dimensions of life" - and these relations themselves depend upon the sociological characteristics of the society and each social group (for example, status allocation rules, culture encouraging a hedonistic or ascetic type of personality, etc.) - this has been verified fairly accurately for consumption of foodstuffs and more broadly for the other major areas of consumer behavior.

It is through these relations that society conditions the actor (compare this with the way in which, at a more general level, the behavior of a self-regulating system in a moving environment can be analyzed). This approach makes it possible to identify a hierarchy of states of society with an "absolute" value, and to construct a reasonably solid "function of well-being".

With every advance in research, our perception of well-being
and of the way in which it is conditioned will gradually be
refined, and we shall have a better chance of enlightening
socio-economic policies.

In the present state of research it would be too early to
start trying to develop a quantifiable indicator of well-being
associated with the various possible states. For results that
can be taken seriously, the need is still for work on the
qualitative and "semi-quantitative" analysis of the relationships
between the physical characteristics of the situation (consumption
of the various types of goods, environmental conditions, etc.)
and well-being. We must elucidate the nature of the relationship
existing between the physical characteristics of the situation
and the performance achieved in terms of the various dimensions
of life. We must also determine how these relationships alter
with the institutions of a given society and which of the variables
are the most significant. It is in fact a considerable simplification
to mention only two levels of variables: a greater number must
be utilized (for example, to examine the influence of consumption
upon relations with others, it is necessary to distinguish among
influences in terms of status, signs of attention to others,
and time available for interpersonal relationships).

This is an extremely wide field of analysis. At this stage
it already seems possible to shed a good deal of light on the
policies to be pursued by providing an idea of the influence of
the physical characteristics of the situation upon well-being
which, though not yet very precise, will be far closer to reality
than what conventional analysis could provide. It is possible
in particular to demonstrate the non-optimal character of the
situation prevailing in industrial societies, especially the
fact that work duration, and the rate at which products are
renewed, are both far higher than they would be in an optimal
state, the optimal state defined in the Pareto sense (a state is
non-optimal when it would be possible to achieve higher well-being
for all within the constraints of the community) (d'Iribarne,

It is also possible to advance our knowledge of the ways in
which these situations could be improved (d'Iribarne, 1973).

It is incidentally possible to make comparisons, from the
well-being standpoint, between states such that one is higher
than another in all dimensions of life, or higher in crucial
dimensions while being lower in less important dimensions, and
thus to obtain the beginning of a hierarchy of possible states
(see the approach of d'Iribarne, 1972a; 1973).

At all events, this kind of "qualitative" and "semi-quantitative"
groundwork is an essential precondition to any "evaluation" as such of the effect upon well-being of the physical situational characteristics. Leaving any of these relationships out of account, and trying to evaluate effects in considering only a proportion of them will result in meaningless findings if the relationships omitted are important by comparison. But it is impossible to be sure that no important relationships have been left out until they have been studied as a set, and until there has been a check that the relationships identified can account properly for the behavior observed.

Once we have obtained a good qualitative and "semi-quantitative" knowledge of the relationships between the physical situational characteristics and well-being, it will be possible to make a proper start on the problem of evaluating well-being or, more precisely, of developing quantified indicators reflecting the way in which various states associated with a particular set can be placed in descending order of well-being. These problems of grading can be tackled with widely varying degrees of ambitiousness depending upon how broad a set of states is being considered; at one extreme would be an attempt to grade all possible states in all societies (this would be "the well-being indicator"), at the other, the elementary problem of grading, in one society, different states by a single characteristic holding all other significant characteristics constant.

The more progress we make in our knowledge of the mechanisms, the further we can go in developing indicators.

**CONCLUSION**

A realistic conception of "objective" well-being can be derived if we take account of all the factors affecting it—not merely the purely physical phenomena but also the socio-cultural aspects, which play an important part in determining it. The relationships between "objective" and "subjective" well-being are then seen in an entirely new light. Present discrepancies between results provided by the two kinds of indicators are due largely to the fact that the "objective" indicators as currently constructed are an extremely poor reflection of the actual objective situations of individuals. Since it is the case that a person in any given physical situation can experience a radical change in his real objective situation by passing from one social state to another, it is only to be expected that his subjective appraisal of a given physical situation will be extremely variable, depending upon the circumstances. This in no way implies that the person is
viewing his objective situation in a distorted way. Work which has already been undertaken along the lines described above suggests that any such distortion will usually be only slight. Analysis of the relations between growth and well-being tend particularly to confirm this: the discrepancies between these aspects which are usually regarded as "objective" and "subjective" aspects of well-being are particularly wide in the case of economic growth (which is accompanied by no increase in declared satisfaction, and no reduction in the gap between estimated requirements and actual consumption); and in this area, an "objective" analysis which does not ignore the most important of the relevant phenomena leads to findings very close to those yielded by "subjective" analysis.

We can look forward to realistic analysis of "objective" well-being converging with the subjective analysis, each confirming our confidence in the other as a guide to genuinely effective policies in this field.
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SURVEYING SUBJECTIVE WELFARE:
STRATEGIES AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

by
Aubrey McKennell

1. Introduction

This commentary takes a preliminary and necessarily personal view of the methodological problems involved in monitoring life satisfactions and was written with special reference to the efforts of two sample survey organisations, one in the U.S.A., the other in Britain, which are pursuing this objective. The American work being carried through by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and the British study being conducted on parallel lines by the SSRC Survey unit in the U.K. both follow proposals initially outlined in two papers by Campbell and Converse (Campbell and Converse, 1970; Campbell, 1972). The programs are intended to be long-term; the first task being to establish national benchmarks for levels of satisfaction and aspiration in those specific domains which appear most potent in shaping overall life satisfaction. Repetition of the national surveys at intervals will then provide time series data on psychological states that accompany major social changes.

This thumbnail sketch hardly does justice to the detail of the research proposals set out in the Campbell and Converse papers. Psychological data of the scope and continuity envisaged have never before been collected on representative samples. But it is evident both from the discussion in these research proposals and even a first acquaintance with the so-called "happiness" literature (see for example, Bradburn, 1969; Cantril, 1965; Wilson, 1967; and Robinson et al., 1969) that the field of life satisfaction studies abounds with unresolved conceptual and measurement problems. Heavy investment of public resources in survey research in this field could be subject to well-founded criticism unless these methodological problems are systematically tackled.
2. Basic Strategy

It clearly would not do simply to assemble a loose collection of questions under the "quality of life" rubric and apply these at intervals to a national sample in a Gallup-poll type of operation. Running through the Campbell and Converse research proposals is a concern for the quality of data, a recognition that the appropriate measuring instruments do not now exist, and that a major investment of effort must go into their development. The Michigan researchers do not detail the steps in this development but it seems clear that more is required than the usual production sequence of pre-pilot and pilot stages which ordinarily precede a large-scale sample survey. In many of the problem areas, the order of conceptual and measurement difficulty is such as to warrant a subsidiary investigation in its own right. These subsidiary studies need not be expensive in proportion to the cost even of the initial main-sample fieldwork, but they could be time consuming. One solution might be to proceed to the first round of data collection as soon as certain areas could be dealt with adequately, even though others still had to be inadequately treated. The findings of special scale-development and other studies for the inadequately covered areas could then be fed into the second or subsequent round of data collection.

Ideally, as much information as possible from the subsidiary studies should be incorporated at the large-scale pilot stage. This might mean delaying this final pilot stage and hence the main survey. The advisability of doing so would need to be weighed against the desirability of establishing national bench marks at the earliest opportunity. There is something to be said for delay against the long-term perspective of the continuing program, a delay that seems insupportable now might look negligible retrospectively. Seen in this perspective also the investment in the quality of the initial bench marks is extraordinarily high and may prove critical. Schedule items used in large-scale trend studies have a way of becoming "enshrined", that is, standardized and carried forward in the pious hope that they are valid but with the major concern for comparability. With the passage of time, also, the credibility which attaches to weak measurements may be strained rather than strengthened, so that the question mark already in the minds of some social scientists about the enterprise of measuring happiness by questionnaire comes to loom larger. In short, the generous budgeting of time for methodological work at the foundation stage of the study may be critical for its long-term success.
The methodological work falls into two broad categories:

1. The development and standardisation on the general population of measures for the psychological variables that are demonstrably refined, reliable and valid.

2. Accounting studies in which the relation between these measures, background factors and other specific variables are fitted into a conceptual scheme which can be tested empirically.

These two categories are interdependent in that the quality of the psychological measures can ultimately be demonstrated only in terms of their "construct validity", that is in terms of the meaningful pattern of relationships they form with other variables in the study. Examination of these patterns in the cross-sectional data should lead to theoretical expectations about the way satisfactions and aspirations in specific domains are related to each other and to overall life-satisfaction for people under differing life conditions. Eventually the longitudinal aspects will add temporal depth to the study. But without the cross-sectional analysis and the setting up of theoretical expectations in advance, the mere logging of change at intervals of time would seem a less valuable undertaking, and the understanding of what was being measured, and what was changing, would be impoverished.

SCALE DEVELOPMENT

3. Measurement of Happiness

The question of validity arises particularly sharply in relation to the ultimate dependent variable of the study. The claim to be measuring happiness by means of standardised questionnaires is bound to provoke critical fire from other social scientists, for which will not be avoided simply by switching to alternative labels such as life-satisfaction or psychological well-being. Measurement in this area therefore requires as much methodological depth as can be attained.

An unsatisfactory feature of the general population surveys that have attempted to quantify this area is the reliance that has been placed on single item measures. Three or four differently worded versions are extant, but there does not seem to have been any published investigation examining, for a heterogeneous population, the scalable properties of the purported underlying dimension. Reported test-retest coefficients for single items of the order of .5 indicate that the prospect for reliable measurement is not
hopeless, but this still leaves about half the obtained score variance as possibly due to measurement error. This is clearly unsatisfactory if only because success on the accounting side of the study will be indicated by the extent to which variance on the happiness dimension can be explained in terms of associations with other variables.

Reliability of measurement can be of course be increased by using more items, this being one of the main justifications for scale construction. While it is better to eliminate measurement error directly, it can be allowed for statistically (correction for attenuation) given a knowledge of the reliability coefficient of a scale. Further, in order to make sense of shifts on the happiness dimension in longitudinal comparisons, it would be necessary to know what the susceptibility of the measuring instrument is to short-term fluctuations of mood. Conceptually, genuine mood changes can be distinguished from measurement error, but in order to differentiate the two empirically, it would be necessary to determine the internal consistency (alpha or split-half) reliability in addition to test-retest reliability. For this purpose also the scalable properties of a battery of "happiness" items will need to be examined.

Even trivial variables can be measured reliably, but "domain sampling" using a pool of items is also the first step towards examining validity. The response to single items is notoriously subject to even slight changes of wording. The items used for measuring happiness in general population surveys have tended to become standardised from study to study, no doubt because the investigators wished to ensure comparability. There are some signs, however, of "operationalism in reverse", that is a tendency to accept whatever these 'key' items measure as a criterion of happiness or satisfaction. In fact, what they do measure is likely to be accounted for in a large degree by a "word specific" factor. The general factor, free from the contingencies of specific verbal formulations, is more validly approximated by summing the response to several items, even though these items are only imperfectly related to each other. Take for example the correlation in the .11 to .60 range between the "standard" item measuring happiness and the item used to measure satisfaction with life, as found in a series of studies reported by Robinson and Shaver (1969). This is the order of correlation normally found between single items which ostensibly tap the same attitude dimension. In this case there does appear to be an underlying distinction between what the items measure, as shown by differential correlation with external variables. Possibly the happiness item taps a higher-order factor of which the satisfaction dimension is a sub-component. What is not known
is how much hangs on the particular verbal formulation used for these items. The situation will be much clearer if the properties of batteries tapping happiness and batteries of items indicating satisfaction were examined together.

4. Domain Sampling: the case for preliminary qualitative interviews

The few items that have been used to measure the happiness-satisfaction dimension have all the appearance of being framed at the desk. In deriving an item pool for the further examination for this domain it would be advantageous to invest some effort in sampling the expressions that people use spontaneously when they talk about it. This recommendation is based on a general conviction held by this writer about the way middle-class investigators should proceed in seeking to represent the attitudes and perspectives of a heterogeneous population. Briefly, the position taken is that a questionnaire measuring instrument is necessarily standardised round its designer's preconceptions, whereas the criteria of what is relevant lie at least in part with the informant. To put it more simply, if you want to know how people feel and think, it is necessary to take steps to listen to what they have to say. In practice this prescription boils down to the holding of a series of free-ranging, non-directive individual interviews and group discussions, the material from which is content-analysed to provide a source of hypotheses and questionnaire items phrased in "natural population language". Neither sampling technique nor subsequent statistical analysis, however sophisticated, can make up for lack of thoroughness in this initial exploratory phase of research, yet it is invariably skimmed by academic researchers.

These thoughts of course range wider than the mere collection of items tapping the happiness domain, which would be a small part of the yield of the initial qualitative interviews. But "happiness" or "life satisfaction" as a topic in which ordinary people should talk readily, given the chance, providing a rich source of material on which the researcher can fill out and perhaps reformulate his initial preconceptions. The initial stage of unstructured interviewing, as here proposed, could provide a foundation for the entire study.

5. The Quantitative Follow-up

But to return to the task of measuring happiness in global terms. The suggestion is not, it should be made clear, that a lengthy battery of items should be employed to measure this one dimension in the main survey where pressure on the questionnaire space will be severe. The properties of large batteries of items,
culled from a content analysis of the preliminary, unstructured interviews, would be examined by analysing responses of a small but representative sample of informants (150 to 200). Problems of response set and social desirability can also be examined at this stage. The necessary defence in depth concerning the conclusions about scalable properties of the domain would rest in large part on the findings at this development stage. The number of items carried forward to the main survey need be no more than a handful, perhaps fewer, depending on what was discovered about the internal consistency of the domain and the length of scale necessary to measure it at an adequate level of reliability (McKennell, 1970). The point is that the few items carried forward would be a distillation from the larger set, with known and defensible measurement properties.

The existence of a larger pool of items with known measurement properties would also facilitate the selection of sub-sets, 'equivalent forms', which could be used in special studies designed to separate genuine trait instability from measurement error. Further studies, involving recalls on a small sample of individuals would be required here. Although this kind of work primarily related to reliability it bears on the validity problem and is in fact sometimes referred to as establishing "domain sampling validity" (Tryon, 1957). Establishing validity, however, is a continuing process and involves examining the behaviour of reliable scales when these are related to a network of other variables.

6. Self-anchoring Scales

The Standard self-anchoring scale devised by Cantril (1965) was employed by him in a thirty-nation study which included the U.S.A. but unfortunately not the U.K. This device has several attractive features: it is simple in use, takes little questionnaire space and lends itself to open-ended probes which reveal the content of personal concerns. Perhaps its strongest advantage is that it permits global ratings of past and present satisfactions to be compared with aspirations for the future, and all within the same measurement format. Despite or perhaps because of these advantages there appears to have been no attempt to assess the reliability of this instrument, and its claims to validity do not go much beyond those of face validity. Cantril's (1965) demonstration of discrepancies between nations in ratings on the self-anchoring scale is partial evidence for its validity, but still leaves large unanswered questions about what it is actually measuring. It would be advantageous if ratings on the self-anchoring scale could be systematically related to scores on other global measures of satisfaction and happiness.
The difficulties of doing this are considerable but may not be insuperable. A clue to procedure is afforded by noting that whereas self-reported happiness declines with age, ratings on the self-anchoring scale of present life-satisfactions increase with age, while aspiration levels drop and the gap between past and present satisfaction narrows, at least in the United States population up to the age of 64 (Cantril, 1965: 375). This suggests that self-reported happiness may be a higher-order judgement in which past progress, future possibilities, and present state are subjectively integrated in a kind of running average. Bradburn has made a similar suggestion with respect to the positive and negative components of happiness. The superior happiness of the young is largely due to their excess of positive affect (Bradburn, 1969: 91), and it is noteworthy that the items used to measure this focus on recent accomplishments and a sense of continuing progress. An empirical follow-up of these speculations might uncover the subjective calculus whereby people average aspirations and experience of progress in their global happiness ratings. One empirical technique for doing this might be to cluster individuals according to the similarity of their profiles on the self-anchoring scales, these profiles to include ratings for past, present and future as well as the distances between these ratings. Separate clusters could then be compared for systematic differences in their global happiness rating. The technique of clustering people according to their profile similarity suggests itself as a general device for examining the infrastructure of happiness and is discussed further in Section 15.

7. Positive and Negative Affect

Bradburn (1969) has developed a model in which a person's position on the dimension of psychological well-being is seen as a resultant of the individual's position on two other independent dimensions - one of positive affect and the other of negative affect. The evidence he produces for the "discriminant validity" of the two components on this model is compelling. The items tapping each component are factorially distinct, forming two uncorrelated clusters; both components are independently related in the expected direction to overall self-ratings of happiness, and many specific variables which influence overall happiness are shown to be related to one component but not to the other. The complete absence of correlation Bradburn finds between the two components may yet prove to be an art fact of item wording or even item selection, but the wide range of differential statistical behaviour with external variables could only occur if these scales were tapping empirically distinct factors. Bradburn's findings, in short, represent an important break-through.
which must now be incorporated in any further research. A long-term monitoring study would obviously be defective, for example, if it failed to uncover how changes in overall happiness and specific domain satisfactions were related to shifts occurring independently along the positive and negative affect dimensions. The same point can be made in respect to other high level components of happiness which probably exist, even though their nature can at present be only dimly conceptualised.

Effective though they are, there is room for improvement in Bradburn's affect measure and for understanding the role of positive and negative affect in the infrastructure of happiness, as discussed below.

8. Other High-level Components of Happiness

It would have been neat indeed if the combination of positive and negative affect (either weighted, or unweighted as in Bradburn's Affect Balance Scale) explained most of the variance in self-reported happiness. In fact the correlation (Gamma) between Bradburn's Affect Balance Scale and single happiness items is only in the .4 to .5 range. How much of the unexplained variance is due to measurement error will not be known until the happiness dimension is properly scaled. There are indications however that the low level of correlation is at least in part due to the omission of other high-level components in the overall happiness experience.

Bradburn's item on "wishing to change one's life", for example, shows a different pattern of correlation with the affect scales than do the happiness items, yet it is related to the happiness items as strongly as these are related to each other. The life-change item shows a lower correlation than the happiness items with the Affect Balance Scale, and it is more strongly related to negative than positive affect, even though the happiness items are about equally related to the two components (Bradburn, 1969:68, 69, 51). This suggests that the life-change item is tapping a distinct component of happiness, possibly related to the aspect of aspiration and general sense of progress towards life-goals discussed above. This kind of interpretation of patterns of correlations can be made less speculative when the analysis is based on larger batteries of items containing multiple indicators of each sub-domain.

The initial research for collecting an adequate item pool for analysis would be included in that already outlined for gathering a pool of general happiness items. In the proposed free-discussion work we would listen for and seek to elicit any kind of general statement by which people spontaneously describe their feeling states. The content analysis would bring together expressions of
feeling states at a less general level than "happiness" or "total life-satisfaction" while omitting, at this stage, particularised references to the specific experience that gave rise to the feelings.

Bradburn focused for theoretical reasons on general items phrased in terms of a particular time focus - the past few weeks. Factor analysis of a wider battery of statements which included his would show the place of the positive and negative affect dimensions in the total structure of the domain. It is noteworthy that Bradburn, in discussing the unresolved problems in his own research (in the book, 1969, and also in a recent personal communication), raised what is in effect the domain-sampling problem. He notes that Wessman and Ricks (1966) distinguish four separate dimensions after factor analysing a considerably larger list of items descriptive of feeling. The latter psychological investigators, however, as so often, confined their attention to undergraduates. In seeking the dimensions of feeling states common in the general population, representative sampling of people as well as items is of course essential. But since the limits of the population of items cannot be defined in advance, thoroughgoing empirical exploration of the "universe of content", along the lines suggested in Sections 4 and 5 is what seems to be required. The dangers of premature closure in defining the limits of this universe were argued earlier. The decision on what dimensions to measure should, in other words, represent a culmination rather than a precondition of the scale-development stage.

The amount of work involved in the above suggestions cannot be minimized but would be well worthwhile if it yielded information on the total structure of the happiness domain. It seems likely that this structure is hierarchical with the happiness items as such tapping a factor at the highest order of generality. Such a factor can be expected to emerge as the first principal component in the factor analysis of a larger battery of items. The literature already suggests that insofar as people can place themselves consistently and realistically on a single overarching dimension of satisfaction with life, they do so by subjectively integrating their position on dimensions of feeling states at a lower level of generality. These dimensions, such as Bradburn's positive and negative affect, a sense of progress towards life-goals and no doubt other dimensions yet to be clarified, would then be expected to emerge as second-order factors. These still-general dimensions would in turn be compounded of satisfactions and aspirations in specific domains, corresponding to lower-order factors at the base of the hierarchy. Given such a structure people occupying the same position on a factor at one level could nevertheless have very different profiles on the factors at lower level.
The psychometric work to confirm this admittedly speculative picture would probably need to be confined initially to the top layers of the hierarchy. Intensive factor analysis of the type envisaged has fallen into disrepute in certain circles because of the indiscriminate way in which this analytical tool has been applied (more often than not to the student population). Here it is stressed that the valuation to be placed on the dimensions discovered would rest only in part on the internal results of the factor analysis and more firmly on the results obtained in operating with these dimensions in a follow-up study. The aim would be to represent each factor discovered by a minimum number of items in the pre-pilot or early pilot work for the main survey. The items would be carried forward to the main survey only if the factors they tapped proved to have explanatory power in relation to the wider range of variables included in the analysis of the pilot data. But the free-discussion work and the quantitative follow-up are here envisaged as subsidiary scale-development studies in their own right, involving relatively smaller samples, and antedating the pilot survey proper.

9. Specific Domain Satisfaction

In the paper by Campbell and Converse it is proposed to study satisfactions and aspirations in a limited number of specific domains, "probably involving such areas as health, marriage, family, job, housing, financial situation, own education in retrospect or educational opportunity for children, etc." These writers suggest, that with further care, such work could proceed along the lines pioneered by Hadley Cantril (1965). One can see that the self-anchoring scale, with the advantages and ease of application noted in Section 6, can be readily transferred from more general to specific domains simply by altering the instructions which specify the referents for the extreme anchoring points of the scale. At present, however, one would be hard put to it to answer a determined critic who, taking a long, hard look at the self-anchoring scale, concluded that it was more a convenient questioning dodge than a proven measuring instrument on which large resources should be invested. More needs to be known about the scale's reliability, its short-term stability (not quite the same thing), and, notwithstanding the work done by Cantril, the wider question of its validity - what it really measures.

To the extent that the scale is valid the ratings on it for past, present and future ought to be combinable by some kind of arithmetic to give a score summarising a person's overall feelings about a domain. The validity problem and the kind of investigation
required here is analogous to that discussed earlier at the global level, where the criterion for overall feelings would be the general happiness measure. The best combinatory formula for ratings on the self-anchoring scale might possibly follow similar principles in all its general and specific applications, which would be a valuable finding. In a specific domain however the best combinatory score for this scale would be that which accounted for most variance on a dependent variable summarising overall feelings about the domain.

While such a variable might be measurable by a single item or two in the main survey, it would first need to be demonstrated that the chosen items were not factor or word-specific but adequately measured the first principal component of a battery of items covering general feelings of satisfaction about the domain. This work would need to be done for each domain. The initial free-discussion work to derive these items and the small survey to collect data for the quantitative follow-up analysis might be incorporated with the field work for the subsidiary studies discussed earlier. In the main survey, the suggested combinatory score on the self-anchoring scale for a specific domain might even replace the scale of overall satisfaction for that domain, but only if it could be first demonstrated that the two measures were equivalent.

The level of accounting in the scale development work just discussed, although restricted to specific domains, would be focused on what was most general in the feelings of overall satisfaction in a domain. A balance must be struck in decisions on how far to go into the infrastructure, the determinants of satisfaction, within each domain. This will be a recurring difficulty in planning the total strategy of the study. With regard to housing, for example, Campbell notes that a single global question (or scale) on satisfaction or dissatisfaction may serve to disguise important differentials, and a more detailed enquiry would be desirable into what it is that people value in their housing. Some ideas for such an enquiry will now be sketched.

Briefly what is proposed is an application of the technique which sophisticated market researchers are nowadays applying to map those aspects of a product field which are relevant to the satisfaction of buyers’ motives. These procedures are not yet well documented, but for a partial account see Howard and Sheth (1969; chapter 6). The techniques resemble the semantic differential (Osgood, 1957) but with several important differences. There is no interest in the main dimensions (E.P.A.) of a generalised semantic space. Instead the factor structure obtained is that which best reveals the choice criteria in the product field. This is done by first applying unstructured eliciting techniques to find the
adjectival qualifiers (which can be whole phrases) for the bipolar scales. The eliciting techniques used range from straightforward informal interviews to sophisticated use of "Reportory Grids" (Frost and Brain, 1969). The factors found in the pilot work can be represented by a much reduced set of rating scales in the main survey. Comprehensive coverage is therefore achieved with maximum economy. As Campbell notes it may well be found that "space and physical conditions are not the primary factors and that such psychological considerations as familiarity with the neighbourhood, proximity of friends ... make a greater contribution to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction a person feels in the place in which he lives." The importance attached to any factor can be assessed by relating distances between the ratings on it of "present house" and "ideal house" in relation to overall satisfaction ratings.

Much could be learned from the analysis of the profile of ratings for past, present and ideal house (distance measures to be included in the profiles) for people, in different population segments, at various levels of overall satisfaction with their housing.

The general technique is one of great flexibility and power and can be adapted to almost any domain. The writer, for example, has applied it to the analysis of self-images and the identification process (McKennell and Bynner, 1969). In the application to any one domain there are many technical aspects concerning reference points and scale descriptions to be carefully thought through and worked out empirically. In the housing study, for example, the phrasing used to cover the concept of "ideal house in the future" would need experimental work to find the version most diagnostic in the total accounting for overall satisfaction with current housing conditions. As part of the monitoring program, the need for comparability over extended periods of time is a further constraint which would need to be carefully borne in mind.

A general point can be made which applies to this and to all the subsidiary studies proposed in these comments. The process of "cleaning up", a particular area may be arduous and demanding of research time. But the work can be done on a relatively small (though representative) sample. The cost in relation to that for the field work for a national sample survey, and certainly in relation to a series of such surveys, need not be great. All the work would be done with a concern for eventual data reduction, so that its culmination would be reflected in the main survey schedule by a finely-tuned battery of items of manageable length but of maximum diagnostic power.

The ordering of priorities in the choice of those specific domain infrastructures for exhaustive, preparatory study could follow the lines suggested by Converse and Campbell. The domains
of housing and educational opportunities are obvious candidates because of their susceptibility to influence in a direct and obvious way by public policy measures. These domains also have the advantage of being fairly clearly circumscribed. The determinants of satisfaction in such areas as work and marriage on the other hand, are not only less clearly linked to public policy development, but would require very extensive analysis, probably beyond the scope of any subsidiary study. Some coverage may be possible by borrowing from the extensive research traditions that already exist in these fields, focusing perhaps on those indicators of mediating variables which do have more implication for policy and the monitoring aims of the larger study. Something like the "job advancement index", which Bradburn has shown to account for most of the variance between job status and positive affect, seems a likely candidate for inclusion, for example, because of its relevance to aspiration levels. But comprehensive coverage of the infrastructure of the marriage and work domains, however abbreviated, would seem to require too much questionnaire space in the main survey. This does not mean however that the scaling of overall satisfaction in these domains can be skimmed. On the contrary the development of the best possible measures at this general level, along the lines discussed earlier, seems essential, particularly at the accounting stage of the study. Very strong associations have been demonstrated, by Bradburn and others, between global happiness ratings and adjustment in these major roles.

10. Social-Psychological Syndromes

Campbell and Converse discuss several social-psychological syndromes which "would seem to deserve high priority as entities to be monitored on a systematic basis" in the general population. These include, firstly, variables covered by such labels as "self-esteem", "ego-strength or competence", and "trust in others or misanthropy". Other clusters of broad attitudes about self and society are mentioned, including such variables as anomie, alienation, equalitarianism-elitism, and attitudes towards authority.

On the methodological front, all these variables have certain characteristics in common. The labels stand for sovereign concepts of great theoretical and potential empirical importance. In each concept area there have grown up a number, often a large number, of measures of uncertain equivalence, developed independently over the years by investigators who for the most part have studied only college students. As a result hardly any of the measures have demonstrated sufficient validity to carry the theoretical load they are asked to carry, and still fewer are in a form which is usable.
on other than highly educated and intelligent minorities. In most of these areas, therefore, the work of developing valid measures that can be standardised on the larger population has yet to be done. It is perhaps for this reason that Campbell and Converse write "it cannot be clear at this time whether they (the psychological syndrome measures) might be fitted in to an initial study of gratification, or would need to be postponed for investigation until a later round of measurements".

Apart from the significance of these measures as indicators in their own right of the "quality of life", it could be worth including them for the more systematic role which hopefully they might play in fitting the results of the larger study into a conceptual scheme capable of being empirically tested. That is to say, variables tapping the deeper psychological syndromes could explain residual variance in the global happiness measure after that due to specific domain satisfactions had been accounted for. This abbreviated statement necessarily oversimplifies the issue which is discussed further in the Sections 13 and 14 below, under "Accounting".

It might be worthwhile briefly reviewing here the kind of project that would be required, in this writer's view, to develop valid population measures for the kind of area under discussion. The study to be described concerns Achievement Motivation. This is not a variable mentioned by Campbell and Converse, though it does seem relevant in a study of aspirations and experienced frustrations. In any case it is quoted here as an example of a major field in which studies in an academic research tradition cry replication and extension with adequate field methodology. The study, which is to be the basis of a Ph.D. thesis, was carried out by Lunn (1970) who, as director of a major market research firm in London, was able to use its resources to secure representative population samples. The steps in the study were as follows:

1. Literature on Achievement Motivation reviewed - hypotheses about multidimensionality formalised;
2. Interviews with a representative sample of 600 U.K. adults, using existing inventories purporting to measure Achievement Motivation;
3. Factor analysis of responses - two separate dimensions discovered;
4. Qualitative interviews (without a questionnaire) with sub-samples of the 600, selected according to their scores on these two dimensions - confirmation of two dimensions but generation of hypotheses about additional ones;
5. Construction of a new inventory based on these hypotheses, using statements phrased in "general population language";
6. Interviews with a further quota sample of 600 adults;
7. Factor analysis of responses - four separate dimensions discovered. Achievement Motivation can take the form of Fear of Failure, Social Ambition, a Relish for Challenge, and Puritanical Perfectionism. These dimensions though correlated are relatively independent. For instance, many people with a relish for challenge are not socially ambitious, perfectionist or fearful of failure;
8. Validation analyses in which were studied the correlates of the factors with demographic, behavioural and other measures, and the characteristics of sample segments having different profiles across the four factors.

A feature of these results is that, using the same set of items, informants can be scored on the general factor of achievement motivation and also according to the profile of their scores on the sub-components of the general factor. People with the same general score often have different profiles. Other measurement fields designated by a single concept at a high level of abstraction may turn out to have a similar (oblique factor) structure.

It is clear, however, from Lunn's work that the development of adequate general population measures in such fields is no light undertaking. The "subsidiary" studies required would be much larger in scope than those suggested so far in these comments. In the absence of thoroughgoing work, however, it might be questioned whether the investment of much space in a main-survey schedule to measure psychological syndromes is worthwhile. Perhaps the best of measures already available might be tried out experimentally in pilot studies, even though the criteria for selecting the "best" remains undetermined. It would be possible to demonstrate the value of a syndrome measure by showing that it accounted for variance in aspiration and satisfaction at the general level, and even in specific domains (see Section 13). The field for experiment, at least at the pilot stage, is perhaps wider than that indicated by Campbell and Converse. In Section 13 is discussed the possibility of detecting the operation of syndrome factors at a more superficial but immediately operational level. Wherever there exist well founded general population measures for important theoretical concepts which bear at least ostensibly on aspiration and satisfaction, these might be tried out. We have mentioned achievement motivation. As a further example, Himmelwhite (1970) reported a factor analytic study of authoritarianism on a broad-based (London) sample. Among the four factors isolated was one labelled "pro-containment and status quo".
Loading highly on this was the item "the greatest source of happiness in life is to be satisfied with whatever you have".

11. General

Campbell and Converse write "...our primary energies would be dedicated to study of more concrete 'component satisfactions', including estimations of their relative contribution to general satisfaction within various segments of the population under differing life conditions... it would seem beyond question that any generalised sense of satisfaction would involve some weighted summation across satisfactions and dissatisfactions in more concrete domains of life".

As indicated earlier, estimation work of this kind is felt to be an essential part of demonstrating the "construct validity" of the satisfaction measures. To the extent it is successful it would transform a simple, monitoring study of fragmentary descriptive data of uncertain quality - a repetitive Gallup-poll type of study - into an empirically based model capable of enriching our theoretical understanding of the psychological states that accompany social change. To be able to account in a meaningful way for as much as possible of the variance on the final dependent variable of overall life satisfaction is also the best answer that can be given to the inevitable critics who will be sceptical of the entire enterprise of measuring happiness by questionnaires:

A complete accounting is what the study aspires to rather than what can ordinarily be achieved. Adequate measurement of the dependent variable to be accounted for is an obvious starting point, and the elaborate scaling steps discussed earlier would be justified for this reason if no other. Knowledge of scale reliability enables unexplained variance to be attributed to variables omitted from the study, rather than to measurement error. In a continuing program it then becomes possible to search for these further variables, thereby enriching the explanatory model and approximating the complete accounting ideal more closely.

12. Elaboration Studies

Under the general umbrella title of "Accounting" may be included "elaboration". This kind of work is well exemplified in the Bradburn study in his analyses of the effects on psychological well-being of demographic factors (sex, socio-economic status, age, etc.) and the determinants of satisfaction in the health, marriage and work domains. The association between two variables is elaborated by
introducing a third, fourth or even fifth. The multivariate table that results allows the association between any two variables to be studied within subgroups of the remaining variables which are thus controlled for by partialling out. The conditions under which a two-variable relationship holds good can often be specified by this means and where the variables studied can be placed in a time perspective it becomes possible to make causal inferences concerning antecedent and resulting factors. This kind of work is in the tradition of the "logic of survey analysis" as set out by such writers as Hyman (1955) and more recently Rosenberg (1968). As applied by Bradburn it is mainly used to handle the determinants of satisfaction in a particular domain. The specific domain satisfactions, however, treated as the dependent variable in the Bradburn analyses, can be redefined as independent variables for the purpose of studying their contribution to overall happiness, or life satisfaction, as the final dependent variable. Such one would expect to be the primary focus in the accounting stage of the monitoring studies.

13. Towards a Conceptual Framework

The three- or four-variable, "reason-why" analysis of the Hyman (1955) type, may have its place for the clarifying of restricted issues, but in general the contribution of a much larger number of variables must be examined to account for a dependent variable measured at a higher-order level. Hence more powerful, computer-based schemes for multivariate analysis become essential. Some possibilities are discussed briefly below.

Though these computer techniques have their own intrinsic statistical limitations, they nevertheless provide a powerful inductive base from which to develop a theoretical model of the phenomena. They do not however replace the need for providing a theoretical perspective. The initial decisions on what type of data to collect and what variables to measure will already have been taken in the light of some conceptual framework, however loose. Convergence on a more adequate theoretical scheme will be by a process of deductive-inductive reasoning continued over the long-term program. But this process will be greatly facilitated by modeling the expected network of relationships more precisely at the outset, and preferably in a form that permits alternative hypotheses to be tested statistically. For a start, the following broad perspectives suggest themselves.
The quotations from Converse and Campbell at the beginning of Section 11 suggest a model which can be diagrammed thus:

**Figure 1**

\[
\begin{align*}
D_1 & \rightarrow H \\
D_2 & \rightarrow H \\
D_3 & \rightarrow H
\end{align*}
\]

where H stands for happiness of "generalised sense of "satisfaction" and \(D_1, D_2, D_3\ldots\) are "the satisfactions and dissatisfactions in more concrete domains, of life".

There is some experimental evidence that the overall feeling state concerning a domain can be predicted by the weighted summation of the evaluations attached to components, but the evidence relates primarily to more highly specific and restricted attitude domains (Rosenberg, 1956; Anderson and Fishbein, 1965). From the considerations in Sections 7 and 8 it will clearly be necessary to articulate the scheme in Figure 1 by inserting high-level components of H thus:

**Figure 2**

\[
\begin{align*}
D_1 & \rightarrow A^+ \\
D_2 & \rightarrow A^- \\
D_3 & \rightarrow P
\end{align*}
\]

where \(A^+\) and \(A^-\) stand for positive and negative affect respectively, and P stands for further components of H, yet to be conceptualised and measured - sense of progress towards life goals (?), at a similar intermediate, but still-general level.

Not all the arrows connecting specific domains with the variables at the intermediate level are drawn. The omission of arrows reflects hypotheses that the contribution to general satisfaction would be mediated differently for different domains. Several such hypotheses can be developed from Bradburn's study. For example, the domains of health and marriage are connected with overall satisfaction primarily through their relation with negative affect, while the contribution of job status to overall satisfaction is mainly through positive affect.
A contrasting perspective leading to rival hypotheses may be diagrammed thus: Figure 3

![Diagram](image)

where S is an underlying syndrome which dominates feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in specific domains and is the main element in experience of overall life satisfaction. The intermediate level in figure 2 has been omitted from figure 3 simply to sharpen the essence of the contrast.

Figure 3 should not be dismissed as a picture of the minority fringe of neurotically-disturbed individuals whose outlook on all aspects of life is jaundiced by their internal personality difficulties. We will briefly cite evidence which shows that this picture reflects the responses of a sizable segment of the normal population. The evidence comes from studies of airport noise annoyance (McKennell, 1969) which have provided a unique opportunity for examining the variation in dissatisfaction among a normal urban population subject to grave impairment of their environment of a precisely measurable kind. (The population studied was the 1 1/4 million living within a 10-mile radius of London Airport, but similar results have been reported in the U.S.A., e.g. Borsky, 1961). The percentage who spontaneously mentioned aircraft noise as the greatest source of dissatisfaction with their local living conditions ranged from 6% in the lowest noise exposure strata to 44% in the highest, but the variation in annoyance reaction between neighbours or people within the same objectively measured noise exposure stratum was enormous. Technically, the variance in annoyance reaction due to the psycho-social factors was several times that which could be ascribed to the level of noise exposure.

The point of interest in the present discussion is the nature of the correlates of this between-individual variance. One factor was the number of items a person mentioned in reply to the open question "what do you dislike about living round here?". The more things other than aircraft noise a person mentions the more likely he was to score highly on the scale used to measure aircraft noise annoyance. Since both this scale and the number of things mentioned have only a negligible correlation with educational level, the results here are not attributable to differences in articulateness. Rather they seem to denote an underlying "perturbability" dimension, a general tendency to be dissatisfied which diffuses over many aspects of living conditions of which environmental noise was only one. A simple count of the "number of things disliked" is obviously
a very crude index of this tendency, which is no doubt quite complex psychologically. But we would expect this measure, and better measures if these could be developed, to behave statistically like the variable denoted by S in Figure 3.

The S syndrome may in fact be taken to denote a class of distinct factors all of which have in common the logic of the role they occupy in the infrastructure of total life satisfaction. To illustrate this logic further consider Campbell's discussion of satisfaction with housing. He notes evidence of the wide disparity in satisfaction with housing for people living under the same objective conditions. Among the white urban poor Campbell hypothesises that differences in housing satisfaction level have to do with aspiration levels. But if we ask what influences aspiration levels we are likely to encounter factors which operate generally to influence the experience of frustration over a wide range of specific domains. Similarly, among Negroes, the problem of racial discrimination, which Campbell suggests influences the dissatisfaction they express with their housing, is clearly likely to engender dissatisfaction in other domains. The "perturbability" dimension, referred to earlier, may be a further factor influencing dissatisfaction in housing, as in other domains.

A further example of the role of S-type factors is provided by the proposed study of what Campbell refers to as the "safety needs". "Such an enquiry might begin with an identification of those elements in life-space which appear threatening to one's sense of safety". Some results from the aircraft annoyance study are again relevant here. Another major correlate of individual differences in annoyance was a scale measure 'fear of aircraft crashing'. Those more annoyed by the aircraft than their neighbours also felt the danger of a local crash to be greater. The fearfulness of these people, however, was by no means restricted to this specific domain. In response to the open question: "Are there any dangerous conditions affecting this area?", road traffic was mentioned much more frequently than aircraft, and these mentions correlated just as highly with the aircraft noise annoyance scale. These results suggest a general syndrome of fearfulness which has ramifications for feeling states in many domains. The monitoring of changes on this underlying dimension may be necessary to make sense of shifts in the public sense of insecurity which is ostensibly restricted to particular fear producing situations, such as violence in the streets. Finally, in a similar vein, we may note Bradburn's finding about the strong relationship between negative affect and the traditional indicators of psychological anxiety. "Free-floating anxiety" would operate like the S factor in Figure 3, using an index such as Bradburn's; its net contribution to feeling states in specific
domains could be examined in an accounting study. During a period of rising national malaise it may be characteristic of more than a negligible minority.

The above discussion of the 'perturbability' dimension, and generalised anxiety, suggests the possibility that at least some syndrome factors might be accounted for at a less theoretically exalted but more immediately operational level than that discussed in Section 10.

14. Regression, Covariance and Path Analysis

In general, the S-type factors, while external to a specific domain, operate to influence the level of expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction within it. Such influence could be detected in the accounting study by seeing how far the S variable explained residual variance in specific domain satisfaction after that due to directly relevant determining factors (e.g. physical conditions in housing) had been accounted for. Also, as a general variable contributing to satisfaction in different domains, the S factor would produce correlations between specific domain satisfactions. Its influence would be reflected here in the extent to which these correlations and the correlations of specific satisfactions with overall satisfaction were diminished when the S factor was partialled out.

So far we have written as if the models in Figures 1 and 2 were opposed in an either-or fashion to that in Figure 3. In fact, both sets of conditions probably hold in some degree. Figure 3 can be mapped into Figure 2 to produce a more complex scheme. The problem then becomes that of assigning values to the various arrows to indicate their relative strength. This is the kind of problem that has been tackled by causal path analysis (Duncan, 1966). Demographic variables, for example, could be introduced on the left of Figure 2 to indicate a further, antecedent stage in the hypothesised causal system. Fully-blown causal path models are most applicable in situations well defined by relatively few variables having a clear-cut temporal order. This is hardly a characteristic of the happiness domain. But mapping one's notions on to a path diagram can help to formalise them, so that the discussion becomes more internally consistent at least. Assumptions are made explicit and the logical consequences of assumptions can be examined by using the path scheme to generate a system of regression equations. The general principles of regression and covariance analysis can still be applied, however, even where a fully articulated path model is too ambitious an undertaking.

It was tempting at this stage to include a further Section on panel studies. A model articulated from data collected at one point
in time has obvious limitations for a study of social process and social change. The monitoring program will allow trends to be plotted and the subgroups which change most to be pinpointed. While this will lead to more sophisticated speculation, trend studies are primarily useful in describing changes over shorter or longer periods of time. They are limited as a tool for the explanation of change in that they still make large reliance on informants reports in assigning a time order to changes in different variables. To do this with precision, panel studies of the same individuals—rather than equivalent samples of different individuals—are required. (The test-retest studies mentioned earlier were proposed only as a means of studying the stability characteristics of measures at the scale development stage, using small samples). During a period of rapid social change, or after some climactic national event, recall on the large-scale sample interviewed at an earlier date could provide unique information of immense analytical value. So could re-interviews over more extended time periods, if the practical problems of non-response and re-location of individuals could be overcome. These kinds of possibilities are exciting for a social scientist, but we have not developed them further here as they were felt to be somewhat outside the terms of reference for this paper.

There is some disagreement among social scientists concerning the applicability of classical multiple regression models for measures which do not have full interval scale properties. The present writer sides with those who consider that, providing the departures from other assumptions in the statistical model (e.g. linear relationships) are not too gross, the models are sufficiently robust to cope with weak measures. There are also special procedures for handling multiple regression using categorical predictors (Andrew et al., 1967).

15. Segmentation and Profile-clustering Techniques

More important in practice is the assumption in regression models that the same pattern of relationships applies across an entire sample. In the happiness domain it is already evident from the literature that the determinants of satisfaction can vary in different segments of the population; women's happiness depends more on their family situation, men's more on their job; the determinants of work satisfaction vary with job-status level; according to Bradburn (1969) the relation between physical illness and negative affect does not hold up at all among those at a high level of anxiety (who have a high degree of negative feeling regardless of their physical health situation). The regression models can
handle interactions and discontinuities of this kind in data where these are few and specifiable. In the happiness domain it seems likely that there exist a large number of as yet unspecified but possibly important interactions. To discover what the major lines of heterogeneity are it will be necessary to turn to alternative models, to taxonomic and cluster analysis techniques, in which the primary object is to segment a sample so as to maximise between group contrasts.

One approach to segmentation is by way of "sequential dichotomisation" of the sample using a computer program such as AID (automatic interaction detector, Sonquist, 1964). This maximises between-segment differences on a criterion. Interaction effects are handled by searching for the best predictor of the criterion independently in each subgroup. The subgroup is then split on this predictor, and so on iteratively, so that segments are produced by a process of hierarchical subdivision. The profile of a final segment is thus defined in terms of those values of the predictor variables which have produced it in successive splits.

While the AID program is a valuable addition to the armoury of available analytic techniques, it will not be sufficient for present purposes. Work at Southampton, and in market research, as yet unpublished, shows that it has various limitations some of which are particularly important for analyses in the happiness domain. Perhaps most relevant is the fact that it is criterion-linked. We are interested but by no means solely interested in the "need-satisfaction profiles" of people at different levels on the final criterion of overall life satisfaction. People can be equally happy or unhappy for very different reasons. The important determinants of happiness are quite different for men than for women, for example, even though the sexes do not differ on measure of overall happiness. The AID type of procedure is limited in its capacity to advance our knowledge by locating such subgroups in cases where they cannot be specified in advance.

What is needed here is an analytical technique which will cluster people according to similarities in their need-satisfaction profiles. This is a powerful heuristic approach in the present context because if people with similar profiles differed in overall satisfaction, we would be in a position to search systematically for the omitted discriminants. In addition, we may refer back to the discussion in Sections 6 and 9 on the optimum combinatory score for past, present and future ratings on the self-anchoring scale. A criterion for optimisation here would be the score which most consistently reduced differences in overall satisfaction measures for people with the same sub-domain profiles.
In general, to the extent that the profiling work was successful it would establish a typology for the varying kinds of happiness infrastructure that occur within different parts of the population. The delineation of such segments would be an important step in providing a conceptual framework for the monitoring study. The meaning to be attached to the "quality of life", so nebulous a concept when applied to a heterogeneous population, may be seen to vary in specific ways. Segmentation based on pre-set demographic characteristics - age, sex, socio-economic status, region, etc. - may no doubt account for a great deal of variation in styles of life satisfaction. But it remains to be seen whether the contrast in styles is equally great within - or in ways that transcend - these conventional categories.

There are a variety of computer routines available for clustering individuals according to their profile similarities. The literature on the topic has in fact burgeoned in the last decade, as workers in several fields have realised the potential of the computer for this purpose. All the techniques involve computing some kind of distance (or similarity) function between individuals treated as points in multivariate space. A cluster analysis program operated by Scientific Control Systems Limited, has been widely and successfully used by market research firms in the U.K. The program, which is currently being made operational at Southampton University, uses a Euclidean distance function and capitalises on the fact that the total sum of squared distances between pairs of points can be expressed as the sum of the squares of the distance of each point from the centroid of the set. Hence if \( n \) is the number of points of individuals, only a distances need be computed on any one iteration rather than the entire \( n(n-1)/2 \) inter-pair distances, a fact of some importance in sample survey work where \( n \) is ordinarily of the order of 2000 or more. The initial clustering is taken around a largeish number, usually 20, of 'guessed' nodes or arbitrary centroids. New centroids are then calculated and individuals reallocated to minimise the total sum of squared distances; new centroids are again computed, individuals reallocated again, and so on iteratively until the solution stabilises. The 20 cluster solution is then condensed to 19, by combining the two clusters having the smallest distances between their centroids, and this process of progressive hierarchical condensation is continued through 18, 17, 16 - down to 2 clusters.

The algorithm, while well adapted to survey analysis, is not free from the limiting assumptions and arbitrariness which, of one kind or another, currently beset all routines in the infant science of numerical taxonomy (Frank & Gretn, 1968, Bolshien, 1970). There is no unified body of theory common to all techniques as exists for the older established multivariate procedures (multiple correlation,
factor analysis, principal component analysis, discriminant function, canonical correlation, etc.). Even the criterion for the optimum number of clusters remains arbitrary.

These theoretical deficiencies have not prevented the useful application of taxonomic procedures for the solution of practical problems. Pragmatic criteria can narrow the range within which arbitrary decisions are taken. In survey work, for example, we are not interested in fractionating a sample too finely, and this sets a practical constraint on the number of clusters or segments, and hence on the average size of a cluster in terms of the percentage of the total population included. We would be interested in retaining the separation of two clusters if they were also distinct on important variables not utilised in the clustering. In general, a characteristic of a stable cluster solution is that members of the same cluster will be alike, and members of different clusters distinct, in as yet untested ways. These considerations raise profound and unresolved problems about the sampling of variables for a cluster analysis. But the most stable solution in a hierarchical set of cluster solutions can be examined directly by split-half trials. On the sampling of attributes, the best practical strategy seems to lie in not including as many variables as possible, but to cluster in a single domain, on need-satisfaction profiles, for example, and then to search for important external attributes which also discriminate between the clusters. Technically this is very simply done by cross-tabulating the variables held out of the cluster analysis against the segments produced in the clustering. In the present study we would be particularly interested in the variance between segments on measures of overall life satisfaction. But discrepancies on other dimensions may be no less interesting even, and perhaps especially, for segments (differing of course in need-satisfaction profiles) having a similar level of overall satisfaction.

16. On Methodological Styles

Flexibility would need to be the keynote in the type of multivariate analyses that has been proposed at the accounting stage. The location of major interactions by the methods in Section 15 might help to clarify the areas in which classical regression and covariance analysis could most fruitfully be applied. Elaboration studies, Section 12, might focus more thoroughly on particular two-variable relationships of special theoretical importance.

Flexibility should also be preserved in the choice of appropriate statistics. As open-minded position on what is the best combination of techniques is likely to give optimum results in the long run. Some social scientists feel so strongly about the necessity
for close correspondence between the properties of data and the assumptions underlying statistical models that they restrict their analyses entirely to non-parametric statistics such as Ridits and Gammas, or else, wishing to be more sophisticated, by-pass classical multivariate procedures entirely in favour of new theoretical developments as Smallest Space Analysis (Cuttman, 1967) which have still to stand the test of long-term acceptance and use. Certainly the newer developments should be tried out if appropriate computational facilities exist. But by taking a stronger view of the data it becomes possible to harness the power and elegance of the more established techniques which, used with caution (McKernell, 1965) can be extremely useful, if only for heuristic purposes.

Perhaps the essence of the open-minded position is that final conclusions should not rest on the techniques used, which are simply means to an end. The principle adopted by the U.K. Government Social Survey is one that might be applied here. Increasingly elaborate statistical psychometric methods are being applied to the analysis of social survey data. But in presenting the results the rule followed is that whatever the tools used in their discovery, results that are worth having should be expressable in the form of straightforward cross-tabulation procedures or charts based upon such tabulations.
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Wilson, W.  
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AS AN OBJECT OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT

by

Burkhard Strumpel.

I.

The history of economic thought has seen various attempts to determine the extent of welfare. Each attempt, be it the mercantilist's emphasis on the maximization of population and precious metals, the classical economist's notion that a nation's wealth is based on productive labor, or the modern welfare economist's inference of an individual's or household's well-being from his command over income or assets, has used a situational approach. The individual or nation that owns or earns more is considered to be better off. The recent emphasis in the social measurement on non-material attributes of well-being such as health, working conditions, physical environment, and victimization by crime can be viewed as an extension of the situational approach to non-economic life domains. The social indicator movement is now stimulating an increasing awareness that any situational approach to the measurement of well-being needs to be supplemented by theoretically valid readings of human experience. Such measures, rather than being mere satellites of people's situation or environment, are being shaped by their needs or wants, their values, demands, their notions of equity and adequacy, in short by the yardsticks they apply to judging their situation.

While the discussion on the relative merits and functions of objective and subjective variables in social accounting is in full swing (Campbell and Converse, 1972) there has been one area of inquiry where the relationship between "hard" and "soft" variables has been more thoroughly explored: the psychology of work (Kahn, 1972; Seashore, 1973). Research on workers' reactions to their job environment has been stimulated by active concern for the improvement in working conditions beyond the mere implementation of physical standards for noise, lighting, ventilation, or physical injury. Questions of identification with and alienation from work, the psychic effects of automation, job stress and overload, and job motivation and satisfaction have been investigated in their linkages both with environment, reward levels, and behavior.
Another perennial human problem, namely coping with scarce material resources and the related question of distributive justice, although subject to much speculation and theoretical interest, has not generated much empirical research. Knowledge about people's sense of financial latitude or constraint, of economic success or failure, of equity or deprivation, has not yet been universally recognized as background for the design of public policy. Seldom has the salary raise of the municipal police force been analyzed with respect to its impact on the sense of equity and well-being of the teachers and firemen. Rarely have data been collected or consulted by either management or unions on workers' preferences for the accumulation of pension or vacation rights over straight wage increases, before bargaining strategies were set. And not at all has income insufficiency been analyzed in its consequences for functioning in other life roles, mental and physical health, etc. However, the era of benign neglect of economic discontent as a matter of public concern may be over. Economic dissatisfaction has not only sharply increased during the sixties; its thrust has been largely redirected from the individual to the government and society at large, and has demonstrably contributed to the well-documented main-stream of "malaise", rising distrust in government, increasing pessimism, and apprehension about the future of the economy and society. Whereas a subjectively unsatisfactory financial condition before tended to be viewed - even by the discontented themselves - as individual failure, blame by the relatively disadvantaged now more frequently tends to be "externalized", i.e., attributed to a societal condition. Personal economic grievances are now more likely to become part of the agenda of public affairs. While the margin of individual tolerance to relative deprivation is shrinking, problems of individual economic well-being grow into societal problems. Indications are that the perception of income inequality has increased while its legitimacy has diminished.

This contribution will try to demonstrate the role of economic satisfaction or discontent (subjective economic welfare or well-being) in its linkages with a) its objective and subjective sources or determinants, and b) its consequences and implications. Subjective economic well-being in our model is dependent on people's actual status in relation to what they want, need, or feel entitled to. And it has consequences and implications for both their economic behavior (incentives for work, consuming, saving) and their integration into the larger community (societal discontent, trust in government and institutions, sense of equity of group rewards).
Within the framework shown above, I will take up sequentially the following issues:

1. The measurement and conceptualization of economic well-being (II).
2. Sources of well-being: The linkages between (subjective) economic welfare and its situational determinants (III).
3. Implications of well-being: The linkage between economic well-being with a) economic incentives (IV) and b) economic predispositions to social conflict (V).

The sufficiency of economic resources has traditionally been considered prototypical when social welfare was at issue. This is so not only because statistics about economic processes, as has frequently been noted, are most developed. Also, social thought since Marx has tended to view the distribution of material resources as the basis of social stratification and conflict. The question arises: is the heavy traditional reliance on an economic interpretation of welfare due to the historical prevalence of mass physical deprivation, a condition that only recently has been overcome in industrial societies for the bulk of the population? Have new social concerns (e.g., social participation, quality of the environment) been added to or have they even partly replaced the traditional economic criteria of welfare? The paper in this volume by Barnes and Inglehart appears to answer this question in the affirmative. However pronounced this trend may be, there is little doubt that economic concerns remain exceedingly salient even in the affluent society. Why is this so?

First, money is desired for many reasons other than the desire to allocate it. Income and wealth are representative not so much any more for the fulfillment of survival needs; instead, material resources have become more representative of the satisfaction of security and status needs. Money, to some extent can "buy" gratification in a range of other areas. (3) Similarly, poverty, as is well known, tends to be generalized into "illfare" in other areas of life. Second, economic status is a most sensitive life domain because its differences and
changes are so highly visible and quantifiable in a monetary society. 
Quantification is inherent in changes or interpersonal comparisons 
of economic status. (4) Third and finally, the prevalent and sus-
tained saliency of economic issues even in an affluent society is 
stimulated through its policy relevance. Economic well-being has 
been an accepted target of government intervention:

Income transfers for welfare objectives cover a large proportion 
of the budget, and virtually every adult is affected as taxpayer 
and/or transfer recipient by the extensive public activities in 
the realm of economic resource redistribution. Economic welfare, 
by virtue of the foregoing considerations, appears to be a 
promising field in order to demonstrate the potential of welfare 
indicators of the "subjective" type.

How then to measure economic well-being? In agricultural 
societies it is the manifestation of wealth, mainly land and live-
stock that figure as visible indicators, symbols, and sources of 
well-being, and, incidentally, as primary bases for taxation. In 
affluent industrial economies, the sources of individual well-being 
are much less manifest. Mainly, it is income, i.e., the flow of 
revenue from diverse sources to the individual, that functions both 
as indicator of economic status and as base for the most potent 
modern tax. The most straightforward subjective correlate of the 
individual's objective income position is his satisfaction with 
income. Yet it would be wrong to settle for this one variable as 
approximating economic welfare. Since, as mentioned earlier, material 
well-being can satisfy a variety of needs or values, I propose to 
decompose subjective economic welfare. Besides income satisfaction, 
the following concepts have been developed in our work:

- a) Satisfaction with standard of living or the extent to which 
the present income is seen as providing for a "comfortable" 
life;
- b) perceived fairness or equity of monetary rewards from the 
job;
- c) income expectations.

Concept a) is to serve as a proxy for the degree to which pre-
sent family income satisfies consumption needs or aspirations; also 
for the experience of financial constraint - the difficulty of making 
ends meet, or the felt denial of present wants in the sphere of 
consumption or income allocation. Concept b) stands for the extent 
to which a person's work income satisfies his need for recognition 
on the work place, and Concept c) is introduced as a proxy for the 
degree to which future well-being seems assured.

Exhibited in Table 1 are the distributions of proxies of the 
foregoing concepts together with a number of other satisfaction
measures in non-economic life domains from a 1972 survey of a representative cross-section of American adults. A simple straightforward summary of the results is: dissatisfaction with material conditions is much more frequent than dissatisfaction with job and marriage. And among the specific economic sub-domains income dissatisfaction is expressed more often than disenchantment with equity of own work income, standard of living, etc. (5)

It may appear strange that job and particularly marriage — which have recently become obvious problem institutions in American society — come out so relatively unscathed from respondents' self-reports, while a large proportion of people are critical or cautious in evaluating their economic situation, although sizeable income increases are very common in a growing industrial economy. There are indeed good reasons not to accept the extent of expressed affect as indicator of the severity of individual problems created by the respective domains. Some of the reasons for this caution have been developed in Stephen Withey's contribution to this volume. Two will be taken up now because they are particularly relevant to the material presented here.

First, satisfaction stands for acceptance rather than approval. Some people, more easily than others, accept undesirable and undesired situations and environments. As a yardstick against which to measure reality they employ a barely acceptable minimum of "tolerability". Others use a "fair", "good", or even "ideal" state of affairs as anchoring points for the evaluation of their reality. There is reason to assume that the use of different standards is not randomly distributed over persons or domains. It has been noted, for instance, that under-privileged groups (as long as there is little hope for 'betterment') tend to be complacent, even to express much satisfaction with their condition, while the perceived possibility of change has been observed to arouse aspirations. This relationship, as is well known, has already been described by de Tocqueville (1947):

The evil which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. All the abuses then removed seem to throw into greater relief those which remain, so that their feeling is more painful. The evil, it is true, has become less, but sensibility to it has become more acute. Feudalism at the height of its power had not inspired Frenchmen with so much hatred as it did on the event of its disappearing.

And Ted Gurr (1970: 12) defines discontent and relative deprivation as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and...
Table 1
SUBJECTIVE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, COMPARED WITH SATISFACTION RATINGS IN OTHER LIFE DOMAINS, MAY, 1972
(total sample, N = 1288)(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with Income (b)</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delighted, pleased</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly satisfied, mixed</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with Standard of Living</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delighted, pleased</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly satisfied, mixed</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Sufficient to Live Comfortably (b)</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very comfortable</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too comfortable, not at all comfortable</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Income Compares (equity) (b)</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very good deal, good deal</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair deal</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor deal, very poor deal</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>716</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (cont.)
SUBJECTIVE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, COMPARED WITH SATISFACTION RATINGS IN OTHER LIFE DOMAINS, MAY, 1972
(totals sample, N = 1288)(a)

| Optimistic About Future Standard of Living (b) | Males | | | | | | Females | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All (a) | Prof. | Other white collar | | Foremen | Other blue collar | | Retired | Working | Non-working | | |
| Quite sure | 27% | 28% | 35% | 40% | 27% | | 22% | 25% | 25% | | |
| Somewhat optimistic | 52% | 62% | 50% | 18% | 33% | | 50% | 55% | 33% | | |
| Somewhat doubtful, pessimistic | 21% | 10% | 15% | 18% | 31% | | 30% | 17% | 22% | | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 1288 | 68 | 127 | 92 | 142 | | 83 | 331 | 440 | | |
| Satisfaction with Job (bc) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Delighted, pleased | 61% | 76% | 56% | 62% | 53% | | 62% | | | | |
| Mostly satisfied, mixed | 35% | 21% | 39% | 31% | 40% | | 35% | | | | |
| Mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible | 4% | 2% | 5% | 7% | 7% | | 3% | | | | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | 100% | | | | |
| N | 720 | 67 | 124 | 84 | 130 | | 315 | | | | |
| Satisfaction with Marriage (bd) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Delighted, pleased | 83% | 85% | 90% | 84% | 78% | | 91% | 75% | 86% | | |
| Mostly satisfied, mixed | 14% | 14% | 6% | 14% | 18% | | 9% | 16% | 13% | | |
| Mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible | 3% | 13% | 4% | 3% | 4% | | 0% | 7% | 1% | | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | | 100% | 100% | 100% | | |
| N | 946 | 59 | 103 | 73 | 106 | | 68 | 220 | 317 | | |

(a) Sample described in Appendix A.
(b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
(c) Asked of employed respondents only.
(d) Asked of married respondents only.
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.

Among the social conditions that increase discontent, according to Gurr (1970), are "the value gains of other groups and the promise of new opportunities".

If, as this line of reasoning suggests, the individual's standards for evaluating his condition are tainted by the perception of its persistence, the differences between the satisfaction scores exhibited in Table 1 appear in a new light. Barring unusual circumstances, marriage is considered permanent by societal role setting. To a smaller extent, people are also "locked in" in their jobs or in the kind of job they can hope to occupy. In contrast, people's income and standard of living change often. Variations in incomes, prices, and material needs occur constantly, are often difficult to anticipate and are therefore more likely to clash with the prevailing standards of what a person can accept or accommodate to. We may well expect acceptance or accommodation in the job and marriage domains to decline in the near future, to the extent the roles and images of these institutions change, e.g., divorce becomes more acceptable and less "pathological," or efforts to upgrade the quality of employment even more visibly enter the agenda of public priorities.

Second, the social acceptability and the normative implications of dissatisfaction differ from domain to domain. The frequency of expressed dissatisfaction in a particular domain appears to be inversely related to its severity. Dissatisfaction with income and standard of living is an accepted, almost desired posture in a culture stressing mobility, opportunities, and individual progress. This is less true for the job, and not at all true for marriage.

The Model

Welfare economics and psychology bring to bear two entirely different traditions, approaches, and terminologies (6) to the problem of well-being and its measurement. From the perspective of welfare economics, the distribution of resources determines the welfare distribution. This relationship, however, is usually not assumed to be linear; the principle of "decreasing marginal utility" postulates the amount of welfare increments following situational increments to be a negative function of the initial command over a resource. The more you have, the more you must gain in order.
to experience progress. Nevertheless and in all instances, it assumes that A, by virtue of his more extensive command over valued resources, is better off than B, no matter where A and B are located in time, cultural setting, or social structure.

While the welfare function in economics is entirely dominated by situational determinants, psychological adaptation level theory assumes an almost unlimited capacity of man to adjust to reality his yardsticks for judging his situation. As the environment becomes more pleasurable, subjective standards for gauging pleasurableness will rise (Brickman and Campbell, 1972). If, according to Kurt Lewin, aspirations rise with accomplishment and stagnate or even diminish with failure, the successful will be captives of the "hedonistic treadmill", while the unsuccessful could look forward, if not to a "humble but happy" life, so at least to the same degree of contentment to which the successful will be reduced through habituation.

Neither of these extreme approaches is of much help in elucidating societal phenomena, such as the recent apparent accentuation of distributional conflict during times of prosperity, in particular the manifest increase in economic aspirations of disadvantaged segments in society when an increase in living standards, absolute and relative, was experienced by these groups. Furthermore, the welfare economic approach is hardly consistent with the absence of a noticeable positive association between income and average subjective well-being scores among countries (7) and it fails to contribute to the explanation of the large differences in economic satisfaction expressed by groups with different socioeconomic status in the United States (Strumpel, 1973). This approach fares better in explaining the fairly universal positive association between income and "happiness" or satisfaction scores at this point in time within societies (Easterlin, forthcoming), although our data will modify the notion of a linear relationship between these variables.

The overall picture then is one of a strong human potential for accommodation even to adverse economic conditions. However, there remains considerable non-random interpersonal variance in contentment within a society. It is the goal of this inquiry to develop and apply a theoretical framework for the identification and measurement of the conditions which cause or prevent people from adapting to or revolting against their material situation. Well-being, in accordance with the diagram discussed in Section I, can be conceptualized as the distance between what the individual has (or is confident of being able to obtain) compared to what he feels he needs, deserves, or deems appropriate and important to him. We operationalize this distance as satisfaction with income, as measured through a scale ranging from "delighted" to "terrible" (Appendix B herein). We
shall be looking at three theoretical approaches to explaining the extent of deprivation or accommodation to present income levels:

1. Temporal comparison, i.e., the extent of departure from past income levels.
2. Social comparison, i.e., the difference between own situation and that of "relevant others".
3. Value structure of subgroups.

Temporal Comparison

An individual tends to compare his present status with his past status. According to adaptation-level theory, time is needed until habituation to new levels of accomplishment or status occurs and new standards for comparison have superseded the old ones. It is often assumed that downward adjustment of aspiration levels is less frequent, more painful, and takes longer than an upward shift following accomplishment. (8)

Table 2 clearly shows the strong relationship between satisfaction with income and reports about past increases in income and "well-offness". This relationship persists even if the effect of the income level is controlled for (data not exhibited).

Table 2.
REPORT OF PAST INCOME CHANGE AS RELATED TO SATISFACTION WITH INCOME, MAY 1972
(employed persons, N = 757)(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with Income (b)</th>
<th>Delighted, pleased</th>
<th>Mostly satisfied</th>
<th>Mixed, mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better/worse than 1 year ago (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported past income changes (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making more</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making less</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range described in Appendix B.
Social comparison

Welfare, according to a well-known line of research, is the outcome of a comparison between own status and that of others. It is claimed that status or reward levels of others will contribute to the person’s standards for judging his own rewards only to the extent that these others are seen as similar to the person seeking comparison (Brickman and Campbell, 1972; Latane, 1966; Festinger, 1954). The studies of the American soldier in World War II, for instance, found that the better educated soldiers compared themselves not to their less well-educated peers, but to others who were similar to them in education but were getting better treatment. Since then, the notion of relative deprivation has been used to explain why people may become less satisfied, rather than more satisfied, as their objective condition improves—because the improvement of their condition raises their level of comparison at an even faster rate.(9)

Stern and Keller (1953) as well as Hunciman (1956) found in France and England, respectively, that it was relatively rare for respondents to take their standards for comparison from persons who were perceived as belonging to different social classes than their own. However, vertical comparisons may at times well become a matter of awareness and feed into conflict. This mechanism is suggested by the “white-backlash” phenomenon. (10) And in 1969 in Germany, an explosion of corporate profits following modest wage settlements aroused widespread discontent among workers who felt betrayed by their unions and shortchanged by management, and led to a series of wildcat strikes.

This paper will present further evidence of vertical comparison beyond the range of persons with equal or similar status. Already the above quoted consistent within-country correlations between income and subjective welfare points to a "demonstration effect" not limited to similar others. In a society ideologically committed to equality of opportunity, the whole nation serves as a reference group in some albeit limited sense. It is in particular the fairly uniform propagation and display in the mass media of consumptive life that contributes to the "breakdown of traditional limits to social comparison" (Brickman and Campbell). Finally, there is the notion, specific to a particular society, of an acceptable minimum level of subsistence often codified in welfare standards or "poverty lines".

Let us now look more carefully at the relationship between objective income and its evaluation in terms of the income satisfaction measures. We have at our disposal a calibrated measure of household income normalized for family structure ("welfare ratio")
as a proxy for the household's economic situation. The availability of this detailed objective measure allows a much more detailed inquiry in the "objective-subjective" relationship than is possible in most other domains of welfare. We already quoted findings showing occupational and economic status to be positively correlated with income satisfaction. But is satisfaction a continuously rising function of income? To what extent does the position in the objective and subjective stratification of economic well-being coincide or diverge?

An extension of earlier social-psychological reasoning would lead to the following alternative hypotheses to be tested:

1. If indeed people view the whole nation as a reference group, their standard may be oriented toward the poverty line - the societal notion of a minimum acceptable level of consumption. If this were the case, one might expect individuals to be progressively more dissatisfied to the extent they fall below the poverty line. Once the poverty line is reached, further increase in subjective welfare would be harder to attain. Income increments would have small albeit continuous further effects on perceived welfare.

2. In an affluent society characterized by a high degree of visibility of consumption styles, propagated in various ways through the mass media, the level of living of the average, "modal" middle income American family may have become a standard of comparison. In this case, we would expect a steadily and strongly rising satisfaction curve extending from the inception to the middle of the income (or WR) distribution, followed by a stagnant or modestly rising trend. This second scenario would be indicative of more intensive social comparison processes resulting in higher aspirations than the first one. Its advent in a society would signal the demise of the "humble but happy life". Being less well-off than the average contemporary would pose serious limitations on the ability for accommodation of the lower half of the socioeconomic stratification.

Chart I shows a curve somewhat indicative but still different from both scenarios. We encounter an initially steep, then somewhat attenuated increase in satisfaction through the middle of the distribution, followed by a flat-shaped line in the third quarter, hovering around "mostly satisfied". Progress through the lower ten '20-tiles' in the income/needs stratification is accompanied by a sizeable increase in satisfaction. This increase, in accordance with one of the hypotheses outlined above, seems to be particularly steep for the lowest 15 per cent of the distribution (roughly the segment below the poverty line) although the unexplainable low
SATISFACTION WITH INCOME \textsuperscript{a) WITHIN WELFARE RATIO \textsuperscript{b) 20-TILES\textsuperscript{c)}}

SATISFACTION A L'EGARD DES REVENUS \textsuperscript{a) SELON LES VINGTILES DU RATIO DE BIEN-ETRE \textsuperscript{b)}}

\textsuperscript{a) See Appendix B for question formulation and response range.}
\textsuperscript{b) A "20-tile" is analogous to a decile or centile, values for welfare ratio for the total sample (N = 1297) are ranked in ascending order and divided into 20 equal distribution groups each containing an equal number of cases, so that the 10th - 20 tiles is the median of the distribution.

\textsuperscript{c) Voir l'annexe B pour la formulation de la question et la gamme des réponses.}
\textsuperscript{d) Un vingtile est analogue à un décile ou un centile, les valeurs du ratio de bien-être pour l'ensemble de l'échantillon (N = 1297) sont rangées par ordre de croissance en groupes comportant un même nombre de cas, de sorte que le dixième vingtile constitue la médiane de la distribution.
satisfaction readings of the fifth and sixth '20-tiles' should remind us of the sampling error of each of the '20-tiles' readings based on approximately 60 cases. Apart from this indication of the psychological reality of the poverty line, the standard of living of the average household tends to serve as a reference point for Americans in 1972. Below this "norm" of about $11,000 in 1972, the variance in people's dissatisfaction with their income is largely proportionate to their rank in the income needs stratification. Yet attaining the norm means attaining an income which, in the average evaluation, still merits only the attribute "mostly satisfying". This cautious judgment then remains virtually unaffected throughout another quarter of the "objective" welfare distribution. Only income increments beyond approximately $25,000 (1972) for families of four (or their equivalents for different household structures) are being honored by further and rapidly rising satisfaction increments, until the curve almost reaches the mark "pleased" for the highest income/need '20-tile'.

While the shape of the relationship below the WR mean would be in line with a compromise version of the two hypotheses spelled out earlier, and can be treated with an extension of reference group theory, the curvature beyond the mean necessitates further consideration. The relation between aspiration and accomplishment in the American culture has drawn the following general comment from Robert Merton:

... in the American Dream there is no final stopping point... At each income level... Americans want just about twenty-five per cent more (but of course this "just a bit more" continues to operate once it is obtained)... The family, the school and the workplace - the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans - join to provide the intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach (Merton, 1966).

And George Katona (1964), closer to the topic of economic well-being, has repeatedly expressed skepticism of the claim that mass affluence should lead to material satiation:

The emergence of new wants following the gratification of other wants represents a major feature of a mass consumption society. ... A variety of new wants emerge when levels of aspiration are raised following the satisfaction of more basic or more standard ones. People who have a home, car, and some major household appliances become interested in other durable goods and, above all, in leisure time activities... Upwardly
mobile families exert efforts to make more money and thereby to satisfy some of their ever growing wants. (11)

These observations, as their authors are fully aware, are culture-specific, which is to say time and space-bound. International comparisons have shown Americans to be impatient in demanding and expecting economic gains. In Europe, particularly Germany, affluence does appear to generate slackening consumption aspirations, even some satisfaction. The number of German households describing themselves as satisfied with their income and standard of living has strongly increased during the last fifteen years, so did consequently the rate of saving (Katona, Strumpel, and Zahn, 1971).

**Value-Structure of Subgroups**

Katona's and Merton's observations are fully consistent with and even expressive of the nonsatiable posture of the third quarter of the WR distribution. Yet they fail to account for the apparent trend toward satiation among the well-off (but not rich throughout) highest 10 to 20 per cent of the income/needs distribution.

There are indications that the differences in the posture of the two higher WR quartiles on the aspiration/satisfaction continuum are not just a mechanistic reaction to their relative income position. First, they are related to the different demographic composition of the quartiles. Among the highest quartile, professionals are over-represented. This group is distinctly more satiable, i.e., capable of responding to rising income with satisfaction than are other occupations. It is demonstrated in Table 4 that the gradient of the WR/satisfaction function is much steeper for professionals than for other occupations in the same income range. In our past research professionals (comprising medical and paramedical occupations, accountants and auditors, teachers, natural scientists, technicians like airplane pilots, foresters, public advisors like clergymen, welfare workers, lawyers and judges, etc.) were shown to exhibit a distinctive economic life-style (Strumpel, 1973). (12) Professionals proved to be most attached to nonmaterial "self-actualizing" value like "important work" and "exciting life". They are most satisfied with their job, their education, their living standards. Their job involvement is the highest, they are the most attached to its intrinsic rewards. They also harbor by far the strongest sense of fate control in its various facets. Although most of them are working as employees in organizations, their special skills and expert status provide them with a degree of autonomy. Their social position relieves them from some of the pressures felt by other segments to strive for status through increasing income and standard of living.
Table 3

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WELFARE RATIO AND SATISFACTION WITH INCOME, MAY 1972
(White employed males) N = 388(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Ratio Quartiles (d)</th>
<th>3rd &amp; 4th Quartiles</th>
<th>3rd Quartile</th>
<th>4th Quartile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction (b) With Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's R</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance (c)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's R</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance (c)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
c) Significance determined by the F measure as calculated by the formula:

\[ F = \frac{R^2}{N - df - 1} \]

d) Quartiles based on total sample of N = 1288; hence, cell size varies for professionals and 'all occupation' groups.

Second, the meaning of dissatisfaction differs between the quartiles. To be dissatisfied for those in the middle of the income distribution more often goes along with expectations of progress, whereas in the lowest quartile, dissatisfaction more frequently is expressive of a static or deteriorating outlook. We reserve the term deprivation for the combination of dissatisfaction, pessimism, and low position in the objective stratification, while the combination of dissatisfaction and optimism describes a different condition for which the term expectation may be most appropriate indicating a dynamic, change-directed orientation. Interestingly, the relatively few dissatisfied in the highest quartile show again a higher extent of pessimism; they may be described as "disappointed" rather than deprived.

The analysis heretofore permits the following generalization: For evaluating and using indicators of subjective well-being, information is needed about both the objective condition and future prospects and how both are experienced. To make proper use of their complaints, we must know something about the actual situation of the dissatisfied. Obviously, the normative significance of a
Table 4
PERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS BY WELFARE RATIO QUARTILES, AMONG THOSE DISSATISFIED WITH THEIR INCOMES, MAY, 1972
(N = 358) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Ratio Quartiles (c)</th>
<th>Expecting improvements in living standards in 5 years (b)</th>
<th>Expecting no improvements in living standards in 5 years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest quartile</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest quartile</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
c) Difference in quartile size due to non-continuities in the income measure.

particular kind of individual acceptance or approval is different depending on the extent of his objective deprivation, i.e., the person's location with regard to the societal distribution of the condition which is evaluated. Particular attention must be paid to discrepancies between objective and subjective status. Individual acceptance, or approval of a condition of which society disapproves may be no less problematic than a pronounced lack of "satisfaction", i.e., an individual's or group's failure to accommodate to a condition which compares favorably with most others in society.

However, satisfaction readings must be seen not only in the light of their linkages with objective measures. They also are known to exhibit systematic differences among various groups of respondents in their "meaning", i.e., with regard to their seriousness, persistence and consequences for coping behavior. The above distinction between income dissatisfaction as an expression of lasting deprivation and as a motive for constructive behavior will be followed up in the next section.

IV.

The lack of incentives for economic effort has recently become a matter of social concern. This concern has been voiced not only in the course of the poverty and welfare debate but also in connection with considerations about the continuous vitality of the American
The last decade has brought growing recognition of the importance of human capital (skills, education, motivation) in the process of economic development. While the earlier exclusive stress on the role in this process of financial and tangible capital formation and allocation led to an analytical emphasis on investors' and entrepreneurial behavior, the human capital perspective stresses the educational, work, and career decisions made in private households. These decisions are seen as pivotal for both the creation of human capital and for its uses; together with the available work opportunities, they determine the quality and quantity of the input of labor into the economy.

American culture traditionally has heavily favored individual productive effort and its collective outcome. Hard manual work as well as the acquisition of practical knowledge is highly valued, particularly if leading to financial success and upward social mobility. These values become even more effective through a concomitant acceptance of risk and change leading to a high extent of job and geographic mobility and facilitating the exploitation of available opportunities. No wonder the allegations about the weakening of incentives among young people or among the poor strike a sensitive chord at a point in time when the threat of declining economic growth is perceived by many.

The monitoring of incentives for economic action then seems to be a promising subject of social indicators research for three reasons: First, it is an area of importance. Second, it is an area of normative significance, even consensus; a high level of work incentives is widely believed to be good and necessary for society. And third, it is an area where change is expected to occur.

But how to conceptualize and measure incentives? There is frequent discussion in this volume about the relative merits of subjective and objective indicators. The proponents of objective indicators might be tempted to advocate inferring incentives from behavior, i.e., monitoring the changes in people's actual work hours, absenteeism, educational choices, promotions, job turnover, etc. Yet these statistics lump together the impact of changes in what people want to do or not to do, and changes in what the situation or environment demands or permits them to do or not to do. To limit analysis to this type of information would needlessly obscure an understanding of the sources of ongoing changes. If, for instance, an increasing number of low-quality jobs remain unfilled, notwithstanding higher rates of unemployment among potential occupant's of these jobs, we can grasp this phenomenon only by following up the motivation of the workers. The sources of change in working behavior must be separated into change in the person's motivation and change in opportunities available to him. Both conditions deserve specific...
attention and, if they become problems, require different remedies.

Motivation then is one but not the only determinant of behavior. And given the fact that behavior is "bulky", not perfectly divisible, stabilized in the short-run through human inertia and constraining circumstances, observing motives offers considerable potential for anticipating medium and long-term trends in behavior. We therefore define incentives as the valence or attractiveness of productive economic action or effort. This action can take two forms. An individual can provide more of the same kind of labor supply, that is, adjust upward the time devoted to gainful employment. Or he can change the quality of the labor supply, that is, strive toward advancement through the acquisition of improved skills or education or through occupational geographical mobility (Katona, Strumpel, and Zahn, 1971 : 12 ff.).

The more static response may be called participation, the more dynamic adaptation. We will be using the following four items as measures for the valence of productive economic action, the first two of them approximating participation, the second two adaptation:

In order to get ahead, would you be willing to:

a) Give up vacations for several years?
b) Give up leisure time?
c) Take a less secure job?
d) Move your family to a strange part of the country?

These measures should be viewed only as examples; by no means do they exhaust the dimensions of productive action open to households. For instance, the educational dimension is missing entirely, since the measures had to be relevant to a cross-section of adults, and not only to a particular age group. The question might be asked: how close are these measures to behavior? We take these items as approximating the individual's customary conscious approach to an opportunity if and when it comes up in the context of his present life circumstances. The respondents are all employed, and the work role itself is not at issue here. Instead the items refer to working behavior at the margin, not frozen through rigid social rules, such as job change, acceptance of overtime work, second jobs, absenteeism. It is this type of behavior we would expect to be most sensitive to time trends in the type of orientations captured through our measures.

How are the answers to these questions distributed over the population? Incentives are not generated in a social vacuum. We expect systematic differences between subgroups of the population defined by social status and opportunity structure. There is a fragmented but venerable literary tradition interpreting the distinct economic choices, life styles and ideologies of different social
strata in the perspective of their actual opportunities and reality constraints. Werner Sombart in distinguishing between "handicraft" and "business" offers a clue to an explanation of the psychology of the "manualists". The latter, in his words, "are animated by the motive of securing a livelihood... and act according to rules prescribed by a common organization", (Sombart, 1921: 188), and Selig Perlman (1928: 239) elaborates:

There is a separation between those who prefer a secure, though modest return—that is to say, a mere livelihood—and those who play for big stakes and are willing to assume risks in proportion... The limited or unlimited purpose is, in either case, the product of a simple survey of accessible economic opportunity and of realistic self-appraisal. The manual worker is convinced by experience that he is living in a world of limited opportunity... The businessman, on the contrary, is an eternal optimist.

Since the time of the above quoted writings, the occupational structure of industrial societies has changed considerably. It is not any more the manual/entrepreneurial split that is most important in defining economic opportunity. There has been a phenomenal growth of the clerical/managerial/technical/professional occupations, to which neither of the above characteristics seems to fit. Whereas the opportunity structure of clerical workers in many respects hardly exceeds that of the blue-collar workers, professional and managerial workers command considerably richer opportunities. While farmers and blue-collar workers receive their peak income early in life and may suffer stagnation in the purchasing power of their work incomes as early as in their forties or fifties, white-collar workers and especially professional workers and managers begin their working life at relatively low salaries and reach their peak income only late in life, often just before retirement; they are permanently on the rise financially. Technological and organizational change for these groups in the past decades has offered more challenge than threat. Variation in their personal job history as well as in their economic environment usually turns out to their advantage. No wonder, then, that their work ethic is adaptation-oriented while the blue-collar group primarily thinks in terms of participation, as Table 5 shows.

Table 5 contains simple distributions along occupational and education lines. It is confined to employed white males and thus excludes blacks with their very peculiar opportunity structure. The conclusions can be summarized as follows: For blue-collar workers, participation appears to be a more realistic avenue for getting ahead, and one which is more often being favored than for white-collar workers for whom adaptation, the more dynamic approach, is more frequent.
Table 5
"INCENTIVES" BY OCCUPATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS, MAY, 1972 (white employed males, N = 373) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In order to get ahead, would you (b)</th>
<th>Give up vacations (b)</th>
<th>Give up leisure (b)</th>
<th>Take less security (b)</th>
<th>Move (b) family</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.

(c) Blue collar defined as: craftsmen, foremen, operatives, laborers, service workers, farm workers, and related. White-collar defined as: professional, technical, managers, officials, self-employed businessmen, artisans, and clerical/sales workers. High education: some college and above.

Working longer hours means to operate within given terms of exchange of labor into rewards. Yet a change of the terms of exchange is usually intended by someone who wishes to upgrade his skills or to make a risky but profitable move to a market where his skills are in greater demand. Within white-collar workers, it is education that serves as a proxy for socio-economic status. In specifying incentives, white-collar workers with low education lean toward the blue-collar posture, thereby indicating continuity of the opportunity structure across the socio-economic stratification. As one might expect, the frequency of expressed incentives on all counts is negatively correlated with age (data not exhibited). Since this relationship mainly reflects an obvious life-cycle phenomenon it will not be further discussed here.

Going beyond demographic categories, we are turning now to the psychological mechanisms that determine if individuals are more or less attracted to the various kinds of productive effort represented among our items.

Much of the research by organizational psychologists about the determinants of work motivation and performance centers around the dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. To what extent are satisfaction or work performance related to the person's fit to the work environment, i.e., his response to matters such as working conditions, pride in own workmanship, job status, or to what extent are gratifications and effort separable from the work environment?
activity, i.e., mainly responsive to outcomes benefiting the life-spheres outside the job: pay, fringe benefits, social status. The literature abounds with studies on this subject from which we will extract only two conclusions:

1. Practically every working person desires or is capable of responding to extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards.
2. There are characteristic interpersonal differences in the distribution of various rewards as well as in the importance attached to them. The higher the hierarchical level of a worker, the higher is the level of intrinsic rewards and the more important they become to the person.

As Table 6 shows, our data support the difference in intrinsic work involvement between different socio-economic strata.

In the light of the well-documented relationship between SES (socio-economic status) and the intrinsic attractiveness of work, it may appear paradoxical that the intrinsically least rewarded strata would show most inclination toward supplying more of the same kind of input while the more rewarded groups tend to direct their incentives toward the change of the work environment.

It is here that the more limited opportunity structure for the lower SES is being translated into diminished well-being. In the blue-collar situation, the work role engenders fewer rewards. Nevertheless, a fairly high level of incentives appears to be maintained, presumably in response to material needs. In the higher SES, economic action in order to get ahead tends to be less painful, demanding, conflict-ridden. The psychological meaning of work and free time is less discrete, due to more prevalent intrinsic job rewards. While in the lower strata working for getting ahead materially, or failing to do so, is too often a substitutive choice and entails a trade-off— one resource (time) must be sacrificed to attain the other (i.e., material welfare) — incentives for the upper strata are more complementary in character and reinforce each other: the higher promoted makes more and receives more intrinsic rewards.

There are then quite different conditions under which we would expect blue and white collar workers, respectively, to feel motivated toward productive economic action. In the lower strata, leisure is often viewed as the only currency available to trade in for an improvement in economic status, given the prevailing opportunity structure. This currency, to be sure, is reasonably "liquid": opportunities for overtime or extra work to many are frequently available, and if utilized, immediately lead to higher income. In other words, there is a fair extent of "instrumentality" linking the action to the desired outcome. This is less true for the unemployed and poor to whom I shall revert later. If work ethic for the lower SES means
Table 6
WORK INVOLVEMENT AND IMPORTANCE OF REWARDS ACROSS OCCUPATION GROUPS, MAY, 1972
(white employed males, N = 380) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>If no financial need, would (b)</th>
<th>Rank Importance of job related values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discontinue working</td>
<td>Keep working but not on same job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All workers</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other white collar</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen and</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>craftsmen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other blue collar</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
c) Value indicated is the average rank assigned to the particular job related value. Six job related values (important work, secure job, high income, steady income, short hours, advancement good) were presented to be ranked 1-6 in order of perceived importance. Low average numbers indicate high average ranking.
balancing the income-leisure trade-off through their own initiative and action (and not reliance on public or private philanthropy), one would expect dissatisfaction with income to express the desire toward changing the present balance, assuming there is no greater or equally great sense of dissatisfaction with available leisure. There are various reasons why we cannot expect dissatisfaction with income to be an equally strong source of incentives in the higher SES. First, as we have seen, non-material rewards in these strata are relatively more powerful motivators, thereby presumably accounting for a greater deal of the variance in incentives. Second, material goals, where they prevail, might be expected to be less compelling. They may be more aptly described as wants or aspirations rather than needs or deprivation. And third, the assumption of instrumentality of effort for the direct improvement of the income position is less clear-cut at least in the short run. Overtime pay for white collar workers is often disallowed, and it is difficult to predict for the individual if and when the more preferred avenues for getting ahead (striving for career, mobility, etc.) will pay off.

For these three reasons, the positive correlation between dissatisfaction with income and work incentives is likely to be confined to the lower SES, an inference which is clearly confirmed through the subsequent table in which dissatisfaction with income comes out as a significant determinant only for blue-collar workers, or workers with lower welfare ratios (i.e., incomes relative to needs).

The same hypothesis limiting the link between income dissatisfaction and incentives to those not intrinsically motivated can be tested directly. Table 8 shows that the sense of dissatisfaction with income tends to be translated into sacrifice of leisure much more clearly for those respondents who are less work-involved according to the measure available.

The more work-involved individuals tend to be attracted to productive action somewhat more independently of their present sense of financial dissatisfaction. In other words, material satiation appears to generate fewer disincentives for workers who feel little identification with their work role.

After the conspicuous failure of dissatisfaction with income to explain differences in the attractiveness of career change or of additional work effort for the white-collar workers, the more affluent, and the work-involved, we have to explore other analytical avenues to try to account for the substantial variance in incentives within these groups. According to the line of arguments stated earlier, the higher SES enjoy more discretion or freedom of action, i.e., are more often in a situation where choices can be made in accordance with preferences.
Table 7
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME SATISFACTION AND INCENTIVE-SCALE, WITHIN OCCUPATION AND WR-GROUPS, MAY, 1972 (c)
(white employed males, N = 388) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with Income (b)</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Welfare Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delighted, pleased</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly satisfied</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed, mostly dissatisfied</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unhappy, terrible</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance (d)</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Sample described in Appendix A.
(b) Question formulation and response range described in Appendix B.
(c) Table entries are the mean number of the four "incentive" items (willing to give up vacations, willing to give up leisure; willing to take less secure job, willing to move family) to which the respondent agreed. For each individual, the score on the incentive-scale may range between 0 and 4.
(d) Significance level determined by the F measure with the additional constraint of monotonicity.

Table 8
WORK INVOLVEMENT AS A MODERATOR VARIABLE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME DISSATISFACTION AND "INCENTIVES", MAY, 1972
(employed persons, N = 732) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with Income</th>
<th>Give up vacations? (b)</th>
<th>Keep working if no financial need?</th>
<th>Give up leisure?</th>
<th>Keep working if no financial need?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delighted, pleased</td>
<td>56% (c)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>'58%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly satisfied</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed, mostly dissatisfied, unhappy, terrible</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>136</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Sample described in Appendix A.
(b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
(c) Percentage indicates proportion of those willing to give up vacations/leisure within the cell of income satisfied, work-attracted respondents.
The better-off less often tend to be coerced by environmental demands into an unattractive course of action for extrinsic ends. In our search for psychological variables that guide economic choices we intend therefore to look at values, i.e., differences in preferred life styles, rather than at dissatisfaction, i.e., respondents' statements about their present unfulfilled needs. What counts then is more what is wanted, rather than what is dictated by the situation. Much of the theory of social change has been cast in terms of values - Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, David Riesman. Thus it seemed worthwhile to introduce this concept empirically and utilize it in the context of research dealing with people's reaction to the economic system and its changes.

Values are relatively stable personality attributes, affective states and generalized concepts. As Milton Rokeach (1973) says:

*While attitude and value are both widely assumed to be determinants of social behavior, value is a determinant of attitude as well as of behavior... If we further assume that a person possesses considerably fewer values than attitudes, then the value concept provides us with a more economical, analytic tool for describing and explaining similarities and differences between persons, groups, nations, cultures.*

We distinguish values from aspirations, the latter representing the images people have about a "good life", e.g., quality of housing, the range of durables, job status, money and savings accounts. Aspirations are assumed to change more readily with accomplishment, with reference groups, with the environment. Values, being more enduring, offer greater promise for analyzing persistent intragroup differences and trends in economic life-styles. Applying some of Rokeach's basic value categories to people's economic orientations, several survey questions were developed. The first of them assesses life goals, and is used in this analysis.

I would like you to tell me what you have found important in life. Would you please look at this card and tell me which of these is most important to you as a goal in your life, which comes next in importance, which is third, and so forth? Precoded choices to be ranked were the following: A Prosperous Life (having a good income and being able to afford the "good" things in life); An Important Life (a life of achievement that brings me respect and recognition); A Secure Life (making certain that all basic needs and expenses are provided for); An Exciting Life (a stimulating, active life); A Family Life.

Similar questions were asked with regard to the ranked importance of selected job characteristics. There are strong and characteristic differences between three subgroups: white white-collar workers,
white blue-collar workers, and blacks. Although all of these differences need further specification and disaggregation, we present this trichotomy here as a first approximation to keep in mind. White blue-collar workers are throughout heavily attracted to values related to material security, white professionals to non-material values like important or exciting life. The blacks in our sample, most of them operatives and laborers, are clearly oriented toward "prosperous life", and "high income". And, with respect to important features in a job, professionals, and managers differ significantly from the rest of the sample by referring much more frequently to self-actualizing values and job achievement, somewhat less frequently to high income, and much less frequently to income or job security.

The relationships between some of the values and the incentive items is exhibited in Table 9 from which the following conclusions are drawn:

First, those among the white-collar respondents and the better-off half of the WR distribution that express a high preference for an "important life (a life of achievement that brings me respect and recognition)" or "a prosperous life (having a good income and being able to afford the good things in life)" are significantly more likely to score high on our incentive scale than their counterparts with relatively low expressed preference for an achievement-oriented life style. For blue-collar workers and the less well-off half, the expressed value rankings for "important life" and "prosperous life" seem to make little difference in the formation of incentives.

Second, in the lower SES a high value placed on "family life" tends to reinforce work incentives (15) and in the higher SES to weaken them. Higher SES once again see themselves more often in a position to implement their values. Less constrained by material considerations, the more family-minded among them are more reluctant to commit themselves to working more or striving ahead. There is less conflict between preferred means and preferred outcomes. In the blue-collar reality, a strong family commitment accentuates the breadwinner's sense of responsibility for his material obligations. He who is most drawn to family life is more likely to feel forced to spend time away from home at work. The required action step once again is mainly of a purely instrumental nature. Preferred outcomes are conditional upon unpreferred means.

How to summarize this section and place it in the perspective of this contribution and this volume? We see our measures of incentives, and to a somewhat lesser degree, our proxies for values as responding to people's opportunity structures. They indeed allow us to trace the effects of situational constraints on individuals,
Table 9.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUE MEASURES AND INCENTIVE-SCALE, WITHIN OCCUPATION AND WR-GROUPS, MAY, 1972
(white employed males, N = 388) (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important (bc)</th>
<th>Blue Collar</th>
<th>White Collar</th>
<th>Low 1/2 Welfare Ratio</th>
<th>High 1/2 Welfare Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (Rank 1-2)</td>
<td>2.12 (d) N 41</td>
<td>2.91 N 46</td>
<td>2.59 N 22</td>
<td>2.54 N 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (3-5)</td>
<td>2.09 N 139</td>
<td>2.10 N 122</td>
<td>2.34 N 109</td>
<td>1.91 N 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.10 N 200</td>
<td>2.32 N 168</td>
<td>2.38 N 131</td>
<td>2.09 N 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (Rank 1-2)</td>
<td>2.17 N 86</td>
<td>2.65 N 52</td>
<td>2.56 N 50</td>
<td>2.23 N 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (3-5)</td>
<td>2.04 N 114</td>
<td>2.15 N 116</td>
<td>2.27 N 81</td>
<td>1.98 N 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.10 N 200</td>
<td>2.30 N 168</td>
<td>2.38 N 131</td>
<td>2.07 N 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (Rank 1-2)</td>
<td>2.22 N 137</td>
<td>2.12 N 110</td>
<td>2.41 N 100</td>
<td>1.99 N 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (3-5)</td>
<td>1.84 N 63</td>
<td>2.65 N 60</td>
<td>2.29 N 31</td>
<td>2.22 N 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.10 N 200</td>
<td>2.31 N 170</td>
<td>2.38 N 131</td>
<td>2.08 N 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Sample described in Appendix A.
b) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
c) Entries are the mean rank of the particular life goal. Five life goals (prosperous life, family life, important life, secure life, exciting life) were presented to be ranked 1-5 in order of perceived importance.
d) Table entries are the mean number of the four "incentive" items (willing to give up vacations, willing to give up leisure, willing to take less secure job, willing to move family) to which the respondent agreed. Score range: 0-4.

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[Image]
and doing so, add a new dimension to the understanding of economic well-being. Productive economic action, apart from its importance for macro-economic trends, is part of the individual's repertoire to bring his situation in line with his preferences. It is the accepted, even classical, tool to maintain or increase individual as well as collective welfare. To what extent do various groups in society avail themselves of this tool, and with what degree of success? Our data permit the identification of two distinct strata: one group concentrated in but not identical with the higher SES, tends to be motivated toward productive action not so much through dissatisfaction with but rather through a variety of rewards, extrinsic and material as well as intrinsic and directed toward affiliation, status, and achievement values. A broad range of outcomes, if desired, is more easily attained. Conversely, incentives are reduced for those individuals receiving fewer intrinsic rewards or those for whom other life spheres (e.g., family) have comparatively high attraction. The present balance of the checking account is a less compelling consideration in the determination of their work activities than more basic values, preferences, and life-styles.

While the productive reserves of this latter group tend to be mobilized by the "carrot" of a broad range of rewards, the incentives of the second group, overrepresented in the lower half of the socio-economic spectrum, are heavily tied to the "stick" of material necessity, financial constraint, even threat of insolvency. Here the inclination toward a higher level of productive action is more contingent on its immediate instrumentality - working more hours provides instant cash - and it tends to end when the needy condition subsides. Being inclined towards work in this group often does not mean to be attracted by it. Work involvement tends to be lower, and the stick of material necessity, as the data indicate, is most effective for those least attracted to do this work for its own sake.

The latter group then on two counts is worse off than the former: first with respect to its perceived material well-being, and second with respect to the "psychic costs" of work. Although these are subjective terms, it is easy to identify economic status and quality of employment as their objective correlates. Our data indeed suggest that a low quality of employment depresses incentives. The failure of the modern work environment to respond to the rising aspirations for intrinsic rewards has indeed been responsible for the scattered symptoms of declining work discipline (Dept. of HEW, 1973). Yet the second group retains one important asset, the instrumentality of additional work effort - however unrewarding intrinsically - for counteracting their pressing material needs when they arise. The opportunity structure at least provides for the work/leisure trade-off. It allows people to act in order to help themselves.
It is this important characteristic that distinguishes the second group from the third one, yet unidentified in our analysis. A substantial fraction of the poor, underemployed, or unemployed would be able and willing to work more but do not have access to jobs that provide a standard of living superior to that sustainable without work. Guthrie and Sutton, in a recent analysis demonstrated that full-time work of the average breadwinner in a large proportion of occupations in the United States fails to raise a family of four beyond the official poverty level (Guthrie and Sutton, 1972 : 471ff). In this instance, available opportunities fall short of providing both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards; the consequences for work incentives are well-known.

This example clearly shows the extent to which the widely discussed issue of work incentives rather than being due to an autonomous shift in popular ethics, values, or philosophies, is reality-based. Subjective measures of these variables have the function, among others, of gauging the problem-potential of shifts in social reality by following up their impact on people's experience.

In this section, I would like to suggest still another role for economic orientations or sense of economic well-being, namely as input variables shaping societal discontent, as represented here by the evaluation of the economy and the orientations toward governmental institutions. I shall also try to demonstrate their performance in that role.

Herbert J. Gans (1972) has referred to the American people as having gradually moved from the traditional pursuit of aspiring to improve their standard of living to expecting that improvement and to increasingly demanding it. What is suggested here is the outline of a continuum of intensity with which individual economic dissatisfaction is translated into societal discontent. Where dissatisfaction is directed merely toward the self, and opportunities are available, the classic coping mechanism of countering an adverse situation through own effort is unimpaired; there is no link between own dissatisfaction and system orientation. However, there is evidence that a large number of people look to actors other than themselves for the fulfillment of their aspirations. No doubt, this attitude, which is more frequent among blue-collar than among white-collar workers, is in large part a reflection of the prevailing economic organization. Most workers are subject to relatively inflexible terms of employment and have come to expect the continuation of past favorable income experiences which were largely due to overall
increases in productivity rather than to own effort. Furthermore, expectations matter. Unmet economic aspirations will not spill over to societal discontent as long as their prompt fulfillment is expected. One who is certain he will be better off tomorrow, is less likely to blame the system for his present plight. Conversely, if expectations deteriorate, as was the case during the late sixties, aspirations which are not diverted into demands toward self, may have to become demands toward the system. It is then the combination of dissatisfaction, the sense of being controlled through the system rather than self, and concern about the future that may be suspected to lead to system blame.

The dependent variables in the subsequent model are macroeconomic and political orientations such as dissatisfaction with political leaders, the government, recent economic policies, prices, and expectations about the economy at large (see variables A-H as listed in the Appendix B). We shall label these items with the summary term societal discontent or "system affect" (SA), but will make no attempt to summarize them in one index.

The model, following from these considerations is represented above.

Three possible correlates of societal discontent have been explored:

a) the individual's sense of economic deprivation, i.e. subjective stress or comfort (SS), as expressed by four items representing satisfaction with income, standard of living, and income changes;

b) personal economic expectation (PE) as defined by the person's confidence in being able to achieve his economic life goals; and

c) sense of external control (EC) as expressed by the belief that economic success or failure is caused by external or societal conditions rather than by one's own doing. Furthermore, we shall also keep an eye on the relationship between discontent and WR as a proxy for the objective economic situation.
How do the data respond to the model outlined above? Table 10 presents a multivariate analysis (Multiple Classification Analysis) for each of the six variables representing system affect. As predictors we used the three variables at the core of our model: subjective stress, personal expectation, and external control. We added welfare ratio, in addition to occupation, age, and political party identification. The latter variable serves to identify and sharpen the meaning of the system blame items. Party identification's clear association with both expectations (short and long term) and the evaluation of government economic policies, and its lack of strong association with the other three system variables tells us something about which items are linked to the present administration, and which, in turn, are considered more basic and permanent system ingredients. In that sense, the first three affect variables may be seen more as proxies for discontent with regime or administration, rather than with the "system".

On the basis of Table 10, we draw the following conclusions:

1. All three aspects of individual economic orientations are related to system discontent. The relationship is stronger for economic policy, prices, and national government, than for political leaders, the system dimension most distant from economic considerations. The variance explained is also somewhat lower for both short and longer term business expectations.

2. Subjective stress and personal expectation, in accordance with the hypothesis, clearly carry over to the six measures of system affect. All the relationships are in the expected direction, and are continuous.

3. External control is significantly related to five of the six items (excluding satisfaction with prices) in the expected direction.

4. There is an almost complete failure of "objective" welfare to spill over to system affect. To be sure: as established in Section III, objective welfare is significantly related to subjective welfare in the expected manner. However, the sound link of SS to SA proves to be due almost entirely to that part of the variance of SS which, rather than being linearly related to its objective component, is based in the variance in aspirations, and not in economic status.

On the basis of these findings, interpreting the link between individual economic experience and system affect can be interpreted as strong and as modified in a dominating manner through interpersonal variance in aspirations. In other words: while the relationship
between personal economic satisfaction/expectation and system affect is straightforward, the link between "objective" welfare (WR) and system affect is tenuous and inconclusive. People find their own economic situation to be of high importance for judging many aspects of the larger system, but they do not leave the extent of their satisfaction or deprivation for the income statistician to determine on the basis of their position in the distributional pyramid.

As to the interpretation of these findings, most signs point toward the theory of equity and social comparison. It is the perception of inequity even more than the experience of constraint which links the economic sphere to system discontent. The sense of not getting "a good deal" compared to others with similar education, experience, and skill turned out to be a far more powerful predictor of system affect than the objective economic situation (Strumpel, forthcoming). It thus appears that the sphere of income acquisition generates more system-relevant conflict potential than the sphere of income allocation to consumption. It is income as a symbol of success or failure, rather than as a ration-card for command over goods and services, which matters in our context. In contrast, as we may recall from the previous section, it was material need, the experience of constraint, which most corresponded with incentives in the lower SES.

It would be simplistic as well as unnecessary to assume a clear line of causation leading from the personal to the system sphere. A different scenario would start out with societal discontent, as the system and its institutions fail to command confidence and authority, so do its distributional outcomes; this is the ideological climate in which the legitimacy of adverse individual experience would suffer and questions of equity be raised easily. Indeed, available time series data cautiously support this interpretation: the drastic decline in trust in government started long before economic orientations were affected by the malaise pervading many areas of American social consciousness during the late sixties (Miller, W., 1971; Miller, A., 1972).

The recognition of inequity and deprivation, then, must be supported, if not generated, through an ideology however crude. The same is true for the notion of external control as used here. This concept can be interpreted as a departure from frugal and self-castigating notions of Protestant Ethic which declare every person master of his own fate. External control is a significant and consistent predictor of system discontent. It sharpens the sensitivity to issues of equitability or fairness of prevailing conditions. Furthermore, it is a variable which has been shown to be related to collective action (Durbin, et al., 1969). It is not accidental
that black college freshmen in 1970 differed drastically from an earlier freshman generation interviewed in 1965 in that they were much more likely to hold the belief that external forces determine whether people get ahead in society; "by 1970 collective consciousness of racial oppression had shifted to the point where system blame was the modal response", (Durin, P., 1972). In both years, black students who blamed the system for inequality, instead of other blacks, and who questioned the validity of a strict Protestant Ethic ideology, were significantly more involved in political or community action.

Although, as we repeat, no evidence for a direct impact of simple objective economic constraint on system affect was found, welfare ratio does play a conspicuous and important role in strengthening the structure and consistency of the personal stress/system affect syndrome. The findings of the previous section must be recalled. There we found that personal economic dissatisfaction or deprivation was translated into incentives only for the lower socioeconomic strata. With regard to the personal dissatisfaction/societal discontent relationship, the data (Strumpel, forthcoming), again show a much stronger link for low, than high, SES. The less well-off are more willing to generalize from the personal economic to the societal sphere. Bread-and-butter issues are more salient to them. They are more tempted to judge the system according to its economic performance, which is manifested in the size of the paycheck and the food, service, and tax bill. They are more attentive to economic system threats or reassurance, and the involuntary substitution of hamburger for steak is easily blamed on government or the present political constellation. Yet also the reverse is true; the legendary poor but happy are more likely to entertain a friendly vision of the system.

In conclusion, a brief attempt is in order to connect two still separate threads of argument:

a) the importance of subjective rather than objective - economic welfare in shaping system affect which is attenuated at the lower end of the income and welfare distribution; and
b) the contribution of ideology - equity considerations and expectancy as to who controls one's life - determining the extent of this affect.

There is little doubt that both phenomena make for a potentially unruly combination in terms of social conflict. While the poor at this point in time are no more likely than others to side against the system, they are candidates for becoming conscious of powerlessness, inequity, relative deprivation, and subjective stress. Once they have been recruited to the new ideologies, they may realign their system beliefs vast, as their impressive record of consistency may lead us to predict.
What are the implications of our findings for the generation of social indicators? Obviously, we can only guess that the variables we have singled out for use in a cross-section model are instrumental in making for change. Yet the preceding thoughts point to the necessity to extend socio-economic reporting beyond conventional financial and purely situational accounting in order to capture psychological correlates of economic well-being incentives and their societal implications. The section on Economic Orientations in the chapter at the end of this volume contains a summary discussion of the concepts and measures that appear to hold most promise in a theoretically valid system of social reporting.
Table 10
VARIABLES USED TO EXPLAIN SIX ITEMS OF SYSTEM DISCONTENT, MAY, 1972
(white employed males, N = 392)\(^{(b)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable (c)</th>
<th>One Year Business Expectation (c)</th>
<th>Five Year Business Expectation (c)</th>
<th>What Government is Doing About Economy (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross effect</td>
<td>Net effect</td>
<td>Gross effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare ratio</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective stress</td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.087)</td>
<td>(.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal expectation</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External control</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
<td>(.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.239)</td>
<td>(.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple r-square (a)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.152)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost of Necessities (c)</th>
<th>Way National Government is Operating (e) (c)</th>
<th>Way Our Political Leaders Think and Act (c) (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross effect</td>
<td>Net effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare ratio</td>
<td>(.140)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>(.134)</td>
<td>(.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective stress</td>
<td>(.364)</td>
<td>(.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal expectation</td>
<td>(.173)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External control</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple r-square (a)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by all predictors together (after adjusting for degrees of freedom).

b) Sample described in Appendix A.

(c) Question formulation and response range in Appendix B.
1. See however the study for the United Automobile Workers' Union of workers' preference for and experiences with early retirement (Barfield and Morgan, 1969).

2. However there is some literature dealing with income distribution as a psychological and social problem in Britain. See Runciman (1966).

3. Lawler (1971: 30) reports about studies in organizations that show workers who are more highly paid (even if controlled for level of hierarchy) to express more satisfaction with autonomy, esteem, and security than other workers.

4. Gur (1970: 131) : "Individuals tend to think of their economic well-being in terms of monthly incomes of X-dollars or cruzeiros, or possession of Y-number of cattle, or cultivation of Z-hectares of rice paddies. Such a calculus is seldom available for their social status, their security, or their political participation."

5. It may be noted here that data from the early 60's show clearly the same rank order in the most central economic measures. Satisfaction with standard of living was higher than income satisfaction but lower than job satisfaction, all variables measured on the same scale. See Katona (1964: 616 ff).

6. In order to preserve the flavor of the respective approaches originating in different disciplines, I shall use the terms situation, resources, command over resources, accomplishment, interchangeably.

7. For example, mean self-rating scores of happiness are higher in Egypt and Israel than in West Germany, and only insignificantly lower in Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Brazil, and Poland, according to Cantrill's "Happiness" scores collected around 1960. Also see Easterlin (forthcoming).

8. James Duesenberry (1949) in his analysis of consumer behavior and levels of consumption (rather than income) aspirations assumes no downward accommodation and uses the highest earlier reached status as reference point ("Ratchet" effect).

9. The concept of relative deprivation was developed to explain why in a number of instances persons, who were objectively better off, appear to be more discontent with their lot. (See Merton and Kitt, 1950).
10. In Gary, Indiana, the men with annual family incomes between $7,500 and $10,500 were six times more likely to prefer Wallace than those with family incomes under $5,000 (Pettigrew, Riley, and Vanneman, 1972: 98). The statement "in spite of what some people say, the condition of the average man is getting worse not better" aroused significantly more approval from Wallace backers than from the rest of the sample. This statement is interpreted by the authors as evidence for the unsatisfactory outcome of a vertical comparison process.

11. Kátona, Strumpel, and Zahn (1971: 174): "In 1957, 48 per cent of German adults stated flatly that they would be satisfied if their economic situation would remain as it was for the next five to ten years. This proportion rose to 60 per cent in 1961 and 70 per cent in 1963. There has also been an uninterrupted, steep increase in the proportion of the households which are close to feeling "saturated", and a corresponding continuously high and increasing rate of saving. Asked whether respondents intended to make large outlays during the coming year, the negative answers increased from 16 per cent in 1956 to 20 per cent in 1959, 31 per cent in 1962, and 46 per cent in 1967. And the rate of saving out of disposable income, which oscillated in the early fifties below 10 per cent, reached 14 per cent at the end of the fifties, and increased then even further, as compared to a fairly constant rate in the United States hovering around 6-8 per cent of disposable income.

12. The quoted findings are based on area-wide samples of young and middle-aged families in the Detroit and Baltimore SMSA's (Strumpel, 1973).

13. Much of the following line of argument has been developed by, or jointly with, Richard T. Curtin, who also kindly provided substantiating data.

14. David McClelland (1961: 17), comments on the sociological thinking on economic development with reference to Talcott Parsons: "It has never been really seriously attempted to bridge the gap between idealized pattern variables as tools of analysis, and social norms as presented in the minds of men. Stated another way, it is not always clear just how a characteristic of social structure-like stress on 'achieved' versus 'ascribed' status should be reflected in the attitudes of members of that social structure so that one can check empirically whether those attitudes are in fact present in society. ... The theoretical relationship between questionnaire and interview data and the social structure variables they are supposed to be getting at has not as yet been perfectly worked out.

15. There is a significant (not exhibited) correlation among the blue-collar stratum between the ranking of family life and the two income-leisure trade-off items (leisure and vacation).

16. The question: "Which of these things will have the most influence over your standard of living during the next five years?" (union or employer, respondent himself, or national economy) was answered through referring to the national economy by more than a third of all employed Americans in May, 1972; around one-quarter referred to employer or union, and only around 40 per cent to their own action.
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The individuals interviewed in this survey, (the Spring, 1972 Quarterly Survey of Consumer Attitudes) are a representative cross section of adults, eighteen years of age or older, living in private households in the United States. The households were selected by the method of multistage area probability sampling. Within each sample dwelling unit only one adult was interviewed for this study. At each address from which an interview was taken, the interviewer first obtained a listing of all eligible respondents and then through the use of a table of random numbers selected the respondent. No substitutions were permitted. The final sample consisted of 1,297 cases.
Appendix B

QUESTIONS USED FROM THE SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER'S SPRING 1972 QUARTERLY SURVEY OF CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND FROM THE DETROIT-BALTIMORE STUDY

Section I: May, 1972 Items

Some of the categories appearing in the original questionnaire and code have been combined here.

A) Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole - do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?

B) Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely - that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good times during the next 5 years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression or what?

Questions C through H, I 1 and I 2 were prefaced with the phrase: "How do you feel about..." Respondents were presented with a card which listed the following choices in a continuum design: Delighted, pleased, Mostly satisfied, Mixed or neutral, Mostly dissatisfied, Unhappy, Terrible.

C) What our government is doing about the economy - jobs, prices, profits.

D) What you have to pay for basic necessities such as food, housing, and clothing.

E) The way our national government is operating.

F) The way our political leaders think and act.

G) Your marriage.

H) Your job.

I) Subjective stress.

I 1. The income you (and your family) have.

I 2. Your standard of living - the things you have like housing, car, furniture, recreation, and the like.

I 3. Do you feel that your total family income is enough for you and your family to live as comfortably as you would like at this time? Would you say very comfortably, comfortably, not too comfortably, or not at all comfortably?
I] Compared to what you had hoped for 3-5 years ago, would you say your present standard of living is better now, worse or about the same as you had expected it to be?

J) Thinking of your material wishes - your future standard of living; what would you say are the chances that you will achieve what you desire? Are you quite sure, somewhat optimistic, somewhat doubtful, or pessimistic?

L) And five years from now, do you expect that you and your family will be better off, worse off, or just about the same as now?

M) External Control.

The first response to questions M 1 and M 2 and the last response to question M 3 indicate external control. An individual's score is the number of those three responses selected by the respondent. Thus, if all three questions were answered so as to indicate external control, he was given a score of 3; if any two of the three questions were answered so as to indicate external control, he was given a score of 2, and so forth. The distribution of responses showed roughly one-third of the group under study answering none of the questions in a manner indicating external control, and one-third answering two or three questions indicating external control. These two groups are referred to as the "lowest one-third on external control" and the "highest one-third on external control," respectively.

The following statement was read to the respondent before presentation of questions M 1, M 2, and M 3:

"In each of the next questions, I'm going to read you two sentences. These statements are listed on this sheet so that you can follow along as I read them. Would you tell me the one that comes closest to the way you feel things actually are in life. Be sure it's the way things actually are in life, not the way you'd like them to be."

M 1. Which of these first two statements is closest to the way you feel things actually are?

1. People who don't do well in life often work hard, but the breaks just don't come their way.

2. Some people just don't use the breaks that come their way; if they don't do well, it's their own fault.

M 2. Which of these two?

1. People who are born poor have less chance to get ahead than other people.
2. People who have the ability and work hard have the same chance as anyone else, even if their parents were poor.

M 3. And these?

1. It's the lack of skills and abilities that keep most unemployed people from getting a job; if they had the skills most of them could get a job.

2. Many people with skills can't get a job; there aren't any jobs for them.

N) Welfare Ratio (Means/Need Ratio)

The welfare ratio was computed for each individual by the following formula:

\[ \text{Welfare Ratio} = \frac{TFY}{1400 + (P \times 700)} \]

where \( TFY \) = total family income and \( P \) = the total number of persons living in the respondent's family unit. This is a simplified Orshansky ratio adjusted for rates of inflation. The higher the resulting number, the more "well-off" is the individual. Quintile and tercile divisions of the sample were made on the basis of these scores for use in the Multiple Classification Analysis and the covariance matrices. Thus, the lowest 1/3 welfare ratio tercile includes those people who are least well-off, while the highest 1/3 includes those most well-off; likewise for the quintile divisions. The quintile and tercile groups are not of exactly the same size due to many respondents obtaining the same welfare ratio score.

O) Single-Digit Occupation Code

The following is an explanation of the occupation codes used. "White collar" is defined as groups one through four; groups five through seven are defined as "blue collar".

1. Professionals, including physicians, teachers, technicians, public advisors, nurses, radio operators, photographers.

2. Managers (not self-employed), including purchasing agents and buyers, credit men, postmasters, government administration officials.

3. Self-employed businessmen and artisans, including automobile repair and gasoline station managers.

4. Clerical and sales workers.

5. Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers.

6. Operatives and kindred workers, including skilled-trade apprentices.

7. Laborers and service workers, all farmers and farm workers, government protective workers and members of the armed forces.
"Incentives"
In order to get ahead, would you be willing to:

a) Give up vacations for several years?
b) Give up leisure time?
c) Not see your family as much as you would like?
d) Take a less secure job?
e) Move your family to a strange part of the country?

"Work Involvement"
If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you'd like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work?

(IF YES):
Would you continue to work at the same job?

"Life-Related Values"
(Subject is given card with five values listed)
Please look at this card and tell me which thing on this list about a job you would most prefer; which comes next, which is third, and so forth?

A) A prosperous life (having a good income and being able to afford the "good" things in life).
B) A family life (a life completely centered in my family).
C) An important life (a life of achievement that brings me basic needs and expenses are provided for).
D) A secure life (making certain that all basic needs are provided for).
E) An exciting life (a stimulating, active life).

Personal Financial Perceptions
Would you say you and your family are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?

Are you and your family making as much money now as you were a year ago, or more, or less?

Five years from now, do you expect that you and your family will be better off, worse off, or just about the same as now. (IF BETTER) Would you say that you expect to be much better off or a little better off?

Political Affiliations
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

(IF Republican) Would you call yourself a strong Republican, or not a very strong Republican?
(If Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong Democrat, or not a very strong Democrat?

(If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?
POVERTY AND DISADVANTAGED MINORITIES: SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL INDICATORS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

by

Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny

"What, however, shall we say to a world where millions of people are not only statistically poor, but where also honor and dignity are debased to a degree that certainly defies description in statistical terms ... In short, it is a world where death and sickness prevail, where education and work are scarce, where dirt and stagnation reign, and where the possibilities of self-development are practically inexistent.

It was Robert S. McNamara (Die Zeit, 1972: 10) who pronounced these words at the UNCTAD conference in Santiago de Chile in 1972, a gathering which again has reminded the world of the terrible problem of poverty.

The UNCTAD conference dealt with poverty in the material and objective sense. It dealt with the fact that Malawi has a GNP per capita of 62 dollars, Burma of 73, Tanzania of 74, Haiti of 91, and many more countries could be added to this list (cf. United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1970: 603-605). Although, looking at these figures, one has to take into account the low degree of monetization of these societies, they still remain impressive enough, and McNamara is certainly right when he goes on to say that mere numbers cannot describe, let alone convey, an idea of what lies behind them.

It need hardly be emphasized that the countries which have just been mentioned are not the only ones to illustrate the problem of poverty. In the State of New York there were in the year 1968 1.7 million people on welfare, in the City of New York alone more than 1 million (Reithel, 1971: 30), and according to latest information from the USA there is now a total of more than 15 million people on welfare.

"Wage slaves of school age — according to an official communica-
tion — make in Altamura (Italy) a maximum of 200 marka a month ... Quite frequently, wages are even lower. A mill in Spinazzola paid its underage helpers a kilo of flour a day" (Der Spiegel, March 1, 1971: 118). Many more examples and data could be added to this list: Blacks in the USA, Great Britain, and France; foreign workers in
much of western Europe; women, fatherless families, and old people everywhere, are only some of the social aggregates and groups whose members have to be considered as units of observation and analysis when dealing with the problem of poverty.

Early muckrakers tried to draw public attention to the situation of the groups mentioned. Gunnar Myrdal has described "An American Dilemma" and many - although not very successful on a broad scale - battles against poverty have been fought by many men and institutions. Thus one cannot say that the problem of poverty in affluent societies as well as the problem of poor societies has not been recognized. What is still lacking is a comprehensive "Theory of Poverty" (but see Coser, 1965; Roach and Guersin, 1964) on the one hand and a system of indicators on the other hand, that provide reliable and detailed information without which no effective action against poverty can be initiated, although it must be recognized that the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, especially, has done outstanding pioneer work in this field. As Linoges and Raff (undated : 1) say with regard to the situation in the United States of America: "On the one hand, economic measures of the growth of national product and income have pointed to a society of affluence. On the other hand, the storm signals about urban unrest, social disintegration, and widespread poverty in urban ghettos and rural enclaves have suggested that there are certain basic features of American society which cry for remedy". An attempt like this one, which wants to deal with the question of how the realities behind the traditional economic measures and so-called "hard data" can be conceptualized and measured appears thus to have ample justification indeed, whatever the perspective from which the problem of poverty is seen and wherever the context in which poverty exists.

Although poverty has become a public issue and is now one of the problem areas in the social indicators movement, it is still far away from ranking on top of the list of concerns dealt with in the latest social reports. Problems of poverty, inequality, social stratification and mobility are indeed ranking very low, and problems of political power structures, ghetto riots, and social conflicts in general, "are nearly completely omitted; thus a rather traditional concept of social concerns is up to now prevailing". Zápf (1972 : 21), who has done the analysis of the reports mentioned, thus comes to the conclusion: "The presently available social reports cannot so easily reject the blame of showing an establishment perspective".

Even if one does not hold the view that an establishment perspective necessarily excludes a true concern with the problems of the underprivileged, one has to ask the question - when dealing with social indicators in the field of poverty - of how the concerns of the poor can become effective. Furthermore, even if one does not identify
with the role of a preacher of revolution, one has to realize that the problems of individual vs. collective mobility, individual vs. collective action have to be taken into account, and that it is collective action and collective protest which seem to be the most important means of making poverty a public and governmental concern. The most relevant precondition for arriving at collective action is that the poor cease to accept the Calvinist implications of the concept of poverty, namely degradation and individual failure, which had been defined in these terms by Scherpner (1962) as late as 1962 when he defined a poor man as one "who is unable to cope with the economic demands of social life and is therefore in need of economic assistance lent to him by his community".

If one wants to discuss poverty and related concepts and ways to measure such concepts, one has to try to give at least a working definition of poverty; this is true even if Herman P. Miller (1964 : 81) is right in stating: "Much needless soul searching can be avoided if it is recognized at the outset that there is no objective definition of poverty any more than there is an objective definition of art or beauty". Needless to say, we cannot conceive of what an "objective definition" would look like. But what Miller wants to point out is that there is no consensus about who is poor and who is not poor, and if we find a consensus it would be highly restricted to specific contexts. What we do find are two types of definitions, one used by legislative bodies, administrations, and different institutions, the other favored by social scientists. Because of social policy reasons the aforementioned prefer "nominal definitions" stating, for example, that the poor are persons whose financial means are below a given limit. That is, "the poor" is defined in terms of genus, proximum and differentia specifica. Again, it would not make sense to introduce a definition of this type as a universal one as long as there are extreme differences in the average income between different societal contexts. In contrast to institutions related to social policy the latter group seems to favor "contextual definitions" stating, for example, as Simmel (1923 : 369) does: "Poor is a man whose means do not suffice to reach his aims". That is, "the poor" is defined in terms of a relationship between two of his individual properties, or - as Hempel (1965 : 5) writes - "the contextual definition ... is an example of what, in logic, is called a function". This type of definition is not restricted to one specific context, it allows for generality. Harrington (1966 : 618), calling for a "social definition of poverty", suggests also a contextual definition when saying: "The American poor are not poor in Hong Kong or in the sixteenth century; they are poor here and now, in the United States. They are dispossessed in terms of what the rest of the nation enjoys, in terms of what the society could provide if it had the will". Here
the definition consists of a relationship between a societal property (a certain average standard) and an individual property (certain means), the more an individual is below - let us say - the average income level, the poorer he is, whereas according to Simmel's definition an individual is the poorer, the greater the gap between his aspirations on the one hand and his means on the other hand. That means, should we accept Harrington's definition, we would have some "objective" although relative, criterion which would help us to decide whether a person would have to be considered to be poor or not (if he is "dispossessed in terms of what the rest of the nation enjoys"); according to Simmel's definition there is no such criterion, even the richest man in the country might be labeled "poor" if his aspirations go beyond his means.

It is not possible to decide a priori which definition is the best. With regard to short-term social policy measures which aim at improving the material situation of certain low ranking groups in the society by public assistance, one would have to choose the so-called nominal definition. But this definition will always - at least to a certain extent - be based on considerations as reflected in the contextual definition of Harrington. A definition as given by Simmel could hardly be used for short-term social policy but it can be extremely useful in social theory and as well for long-term social policy measures which aim at dealing with individual action (e.g. delinquency and crime) or collective action (e.g. riots, mass uproar) which may be due to gaps between aspirations and means in certain subgroups or segments of the society (see Merton: 1967: 161-194). Thus we can see that Simmel's definition is not just a definition of poverty, but a very general definition of a configuration of individual properties, which includes poverty in the short-term social policy sense as a special case of such a configuration.

It need not particularly be pointed out that in a broader theoretical perspective the mentioned individual properties have to be related to the social, economic, and political structure, which contain the individual as a unit, influence his values and aspirations, provide him with a yardstick to measure his rank on the central dimensions, and determine his chances to obtain or not to obtain the means he needs for fulfilling his aspirations (for relevant studies, see Strümpel, 1973; Inglehart, 1971: 991-1013). Being in favor of a definition like that given by Simmel is, of course, an outcome of theoretical considerations, although it should have become self-evident that in practice there is nothing better than a good theory, to repeat a well-known statement. When, for example, the OECD (1972: 7) suggests "to discuss ... indicators of adaptation of marginal population segments" (italics by author), these specific adaptational processes are again special cases of adaptational processes that may be determined
by a situation as defined by Simmel. At a first glance adaptational processes may look different or may lead to different results in different social contexts, groups, and strata. But from a theoretical and more abstract point of view it is probably possible to conceptualize a few general types of adaptive behavior as was done for example, by Robert K. Merton (1957: 176-194) who defined the types of adaptation to anomie.

The foregoing remarks have already made clear that we have strong objections to a discussion and program of social and psychological indicators which lack a theoretical base. We do not, of course underestimate the problems, be they political, ideological, or in the field of operationalization and measurement, that have to be faced if an indicator program is to be worked out that may have some chance of finally being executed. And we are very much aware that the problems become even more severe if we want to build an international indicator program. We have, however, to agree with Erik Allardt (1971: 21) who states that the "demands for usefulness, accessibility, and speed in obtaining information tend to produce results unrelated to existing sociological and political theory". If it were not possible to arrive at a minimal consensus concerning the theoretical background we would do a disservice to the scientific community and finally also to those who have to put the information obtained into practice. We would not consider it very fruitful to assemble a catalog of possible indicators before having elaborated a precise knowledge of what these indicators are supposed to indicate. In the discussion of indicators someone will always say: "It might be quite interesting also to know this or that". But this kind of casual curiosity is surely not enough of a basis for selecting indicators. Thus, a discussion on indicators should always also be a discussion of variables and theory. And if we want to give relevant advice as to political action it is necessary to have a theory which connects individual and system properties.

It has, of course, to be stated frankly that - even if we do not take into consideration the obstacles mentioned above - it seems impossible to derive the concepts to which indicators would have to correspond from one single theory. Social science is not mature enough for that, and one can even doubt whether it will ever reach such a state. But if we take into consideration that first, there is no one-to-one relationship between concepts on the one and indicators on the other hand, and that second, existing theories have partly overlapping sets of concepts, it should be possible to arrive at a set of indicators which can serve to test more than one theory. From these arguments we would deduce that there is a fair chance of arriving at some compromise on the set of indicators which does not demand a prior agreement in the field of theory.
relevance of theory-based indicators need not be particularly stressed, but among other things the so-called "side effects" of political actions cannot be predicted if the possible relationships between certain readings of indicators which one wants to change and other individual or system properties are not known.

Before we come to some theoretical considerations and to concepts and indicators that can be derived from them, we would like to say a word of caution with regard to the concept of "satisfaction" if used in the field of poverty and disadvantaged minorities. It has to be said in advance that satisfaction measures belong to the most highly developed measures in social science (see Lingoes and Pfaff, undated; Abrams and Hall, 1971), and have been used in different fields such as occupation (job satisfaction) or consumption (consumer satisfaction). We would of course not doubt the theoretical interest of those social scientists who have done research on job or consumer satisfaction, but as one reviews their studies one wonders whether Zapf's suspicion about the "establishment perspective" of recent social reports does also prove to be right for many works on satisfaction. For example, to quote Anita B. Pfaff (1971: 2):

"These indicators may serve the ends of marketers aiming at improving their own performance, and of government charged with the task of providing happiness to its citizens. But we hope that such information will ultimately benefit consumers who will be the beneficiaries of improved market performance".

One must furthermore doubt whether satisfaction studies have, with perhaps a few exceptions, dealt with the poor in a stricter sense. As many of them have no jobs and cannot consume very much, it obviously makes no sense to study their satisfaction. Everett C. Hughes (1965: 75) is probably right when he states: "The poor are not 'respectable clients' ... Certainly, they are of little interest to those who poll potential customers concerning their tastes in cars, clothing, colleges, or even presidents and medicare systems, since their voting rates are low". In the already mentioned study by Strumpel (1973) blacks have been included in his sample, but they cannot be labeled "poor" as they are "young, employed heads of households" (italics by author). And if one reviews the lists of the domains, goods, and services for which satisfaction has been measured, one is even tempted to think that a slum-dweller might feel scoffed at if an interviewer applied such a list to him.

What is true for satisfaction studies is also true for sociological studies in general. There are innumerable studies whose objects are "lower status", "lower income" groups or the "lower class". But with rare exceptions, "research on the lower class, especially in the last decade, deals with subjects above the poverty
This confusion in terminology has led many investigators to take findings on the working class (upper-lower) for data on the group living at or below the poverty line" (Roach, 1965 : 69-70).

One is therefore tempted to believe that some of the concepts and indicators used and results gained are of questionable relevance to the poor. This assumption is supported by our own studies on the foreign worker problem in Switzerland (Hoffman-Nowotny, forthcoming).

Among our samples (probability samples) of lower-lower class and lower class Italian immigrants as well as lower and lower-middle class Swiss there are highly significant negative correlations between, for example, level of education or future chances for occupational advancement on the one hand, and satisfaction with the occupational position on the other hand. This means the lower the respondents' rank on these variables, the greater is the probability that they declare themselves satisfied. There are several hints that this reported satisfaction does not mean real contentedness. Those who report being satisfied rank significantly higher on anomie, and among the Swiss sample there is positive correlation between satisfaction and outspoken discrimination against foreign labor. It could be argued, as we did above, that our samples do not include really poor people, because, for instance, there are no unemployed among the respondents, and therefore the results may also not be relevant with regard to the poor, to their attitudes and behavior. Against this we can only say that at the time being there are事实上 no unemployed, but that our samples include a representative proportion of people in the lowest ranks that exist in the context studied. This is again a reminder of the problems that occur when we try to define poverty.

In many studies in which satisfaction is measured, the investigators arrive at - one might say - surprisingly high satisfaction scores, and this is also true, for the study we did. We must not all argue that in capitalist societies there has to be by necessity a high degree of frustration and alienation which is simply masked by what Etzioni (1968 : 628) calls the "happiness approach" in survey research. We need not believe, as Etzioni does, that man in modern society is more alienated than man in previous times, but we should ask the question, whether reported satisfaction may not, at least in certain groups like minorities or the poor, be an outcome of completed adaptation to structural conditions which the minority or the poor individual has no chance of changing. This, of course, has to be proven empirically, and we are not so sure whether this can only be done by "social science methods ... which probe the deeper layers of personality" (Etzioni, 1968 : 629). If this were the case it would be impossible to include indicators relevant to the poor in an indicator program that could be regularly carried through by using the standard survey research techniques. As has already been mentioned, our own
research (which did not try to probe "deeper layers") suggests very strongly that reported satisfaction on the lowest ranks is an indicator of the fact that an adaptational process has been completed. Different degrees of satisfaction may thus simply indicate different stages in such a process which is generally referred to as "goal reduction." Our data prove that this "solution" does not reduce the tensions experienced by the individuals in question. These findings are in line with those obtained by Strumpel (1973). With regard to the blue-collar workers in his sample he states: "They remain more worried about changes even if they reduce their goals to be satisfied with what they have." (1) Even if the poor become "realistic" (as a cynic would say) there seems to be little chance to live the life of the "happy poor," a conclusion at which one could arrive if sociopsychological indicators were restricted to the measurement of satisfaction in different domains.

There is another argument for thinking that we should reflect on the concept of satisfaction before it is included in an indicator program. We have the feeling that despite the methodologically impressive and in many respects very informative satisfaction studies, there is still a large gap between the sophisticated methodology on the one hand and the theoretical input on the other hand, not to speak of the implicit understanding that satisfaction is an a priori good and that dissatisfaction is something which indicates that marketers and governments should improve their performance. We are, of course, far away from arguing that dissatisfaction is something good. But we do doubt that without a comprehensive theory, governments can do something for the poor, left only with the information obtained by satisfaction indicators. We do not doubt that this information may help to improve sales or to win elections ("No Experiments" if you find out that people are afraid of losing the little they have, and are satisfied with this). But we doubt very much that it helps to find out about "those characteristics of the economy and society which tend to keep people in poverty, whether for a short or long time, and some kinds of people more or less than others" (Hughes, 1965: 76). There is no question that the individual and/or household must be one of the units of observation and analysis.

(1) In our study there is, for instance, a highly significant correlation between satisfaction with the occupational position (as an outcome of goal reduction) and the desire to substitute achieved criteria (such as education and occupational qualification) by ascribed criteria (Swiss nationality) as preconditions for retaining a job or social mobility. That means that those who say they are satisfied want to escape from competition with foreign labor by introducing ascribed criteria.
Satisfaction, aspirations, motivations and expectancy should be measured. But with regard to the poor this is definitely not enough. We need also, and we should say in the first place, indicators that measure the structural situation of the poor. Only if an indicator program contains both groups of indicators will it be possible to decide on the relative weight and explanatory power of theories that have a more individualistic or a more structural perspective. "Furthermore, the possibility of changing these psychological predispositions through education, training programs, etc., deserves to be discussed" (OECD, 1972:7). We do not at all want to deny the importance in the poverty context of the role of motivation and expectancy for upward economic and social mobility, and for individual coping. But to do only this would mean to accept a philosophy according to which our societies are "open" and where it depends only on the individual whether he enters the open mobility channels. We are convinced that not too many social scientists would agree with such a picture of social reality.

In order to arrive at some catalog of concepts which includes both concepts that express an individualistic (psychological) perspective and concepts that express a structural (sociological) perspective, we need a frame of reference which brings those two perspectives together. That is, we need a theory which connects attributes of individuals with properties of social or societal systems. It is true that ultimately "the only significant and really meaningful unit of social analysis and social action is the individual human being" (Galtung, 1972:1). But as no individual has a separate existence it does not make conceptual sense to discuss indicators of individual satisfaction and well-being if we do not relate these concepts to social structure.

A conceptual framework by which this could be achieved should refer to the following classes of concepts (cf. Heintz, 1971):

1. Properties of societal status lines (status dimensions):
   1.1 value,
   1.2 centrality,
   1.3 accessibility,
   1.4 complementarity.

2. Properties of system structure:
   2.1 number of status lines,
   2.2 distribution of individual-positions,
   2.3 institutionalization of values.

3. Properties of units:
   3.1 participation in values,
   3.2 differential individual relevance of systems.

4. Behavior of units:
   4.1 upward mobility,
   4.2 optimization of participation,
   4.3 adaptation to anomie tensions (individual or collective).
This conceptual scheme is part of a certain theory (cf., Heintz, 1968; 1969; 1972). But this does not, of course, mean that we want to propose one single theory as a basis for the discussion of indicators in the field in question. As has been mentioned earlier: we do not think that this would be commendable and that there is any necessity for it. The reason why we present it is that we conceive of it as being relatively general insofar as it contains dimensions that are relevant to different social theories and may thus serve as a paradigm which can be enlarged or changed in the course of discussion.

This conceptual framework would suggest among other things that we try to find out what are the values of the individual and which values are more and which are less central. The less the centrality of a value, the less would be the weight of reported dissatisfaction of an individual with regard to his position on the status line based on the value in question. Further questions that seem important are the following: how does the individual judge the accessibility of a status line? Which of them represent reward values and which of them represent the complementary legitimizing investment values? Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with regard to the one or the other status position have to be judged differently, will have different consequences, and hence call for different measures to cope with them. Furthermore, we have to ask what the individual's position on the mentioned status line is, which configurations these positions form (equilibrated or disequilibrated ones), and which reference group supplies the norms to evaluate the positions. If we compare individuals with equally high (or low) positions, the levels of satisfaction may not correspond because the individuals compared have different reference groups.

Furthermore, we would need information on the distribution of positions in the system, and which patterns of positions the individual perceives. We would have to find out where he is objectively located and how he subjectively evaluates his position with regard to the general and/or perceived pattern. There should be differences in satisfaction with his position according to whether the individual perceives himself to be in the mainstream of the pattern, or whether he thinks he is above (over-rewarded) or below the pattern (under-rewarded) (Alschuler, 1972 : 1-58). From this we can draw the conclusion that changes in the level of satisfaction can occur without any real change in the position or configuration of positions of the individual, but only by a change in the general pattern, or by a change in the reference system of the individual.

If, for example, world society would become the reference system, instead of the national system or some subsystem of it, the general
pattern would change and the poor as well as the rich would reevaluate their positions. Accordingly we would find changes in the levels of satisfaction.

Another problem to which attention should be devoted is the problem of institutionalization of values as a system property. This seems to be of special importance because institutionalization means a structuring of cognitive fields on the individual level. If values are not institutionalized, the individual is in an awkward situation because he lacks the social basis for evaluation. Much of the sometimes hysterical and reactionary response to environment and pollution problems can be considered as a mere consequence of low institutionalization of the values related to this problem. Lacking institutionalization means also that the corresponding values are not part of the socialization process - are not internalized - which poses difficulties in dealing with them if the public is included in the political decision process.

With regard to non-institutionalized values which have also to be discussed, and as far as possible to be included in the list of indicators, dissatisfaction may be an outcome not of the position of the individual or of his system on these value dimensions, but of insecurity in the evaluation process due to a lack of institutionalization. Another point which has to be taken into consideration is the number of values (goals) and the extent of the means as well as the relation between alternative goals and alternative means which are at the disposition of individuals. The idea behind this is that goal anomie as well as means anomie can be reduced or will be lower if the individual has a good chance of exchanging goals or exchanging means so that he need not give up a value or a means without having the chance of substituting another for it. This, of course, brings us back to the question of the relation between individual and system structure and the problem of centrality of values. We would have to find out about the determinants of the individual's capability of establishing new values and/or being satisfied with the possession of values that are not considered to be central in the society.

As was already indicated in the discussion of some definitions of poverty, we must take into account not only the absolute position but also the relative position of the individual or of a disadvantaged minority group if we want to learn about his or their satisfaction. The absolute position is meaningful only if we deal with individuals who are located at the extremes of relevant value dimensions. But poverty does not always mean having an extremely low position on all value dimensions. In addition, it seems important to have data on the proportion of disadvantaged groups in relation to the total population. It seems quite plausible that the level of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction will differ according to whether the disadvantaged group is a small or a great minority. One would predict that dissatisfaction is greater in the first case.

With regard to the outlined conceptual scheme, and to come closer to concepts that may serve as a basis for an indicator program, it seems fruitful to replace the concept of poverty by the concept of marginality. In accordance with Harrington's (1966: 618) demand this concept expresses the perspectives of the poor, of the marginal individual who is shut out from the possibilities of participating in the different value dimensions of society. In accordance with Simmel's definition this concept allows us to broaden the investigator's perspective so that he is not restricted to study only those who are officially declared "poor" (see Simmel, 1923: 345-374; Coser, 1965 for problems of socially defined poor). Finally, it allows the scientist to keep an open perspective, i.e., to see poverty as a problem to which general theories of sociology and psychology may be applied which in one way or the other deal with causes or consequences of marginality.

From the proposed scheme we can logically deduce several types of marginality (cf. Heintz, 1969: 27):

1. the marginality of a low status,
2. the marginality of a disequilibrated status configuration,
3. the marginality of an incomplete status configuration.

Using this broadened substitute for poverty we can define many different individuals, social categories and groups as "poor", and it is a matter of decision which of them should also socially be defined as "poor" with all the implications this has concerning the indicator program, and the questions related to the necessary research as well as those related to politics.

There is no question that we would call someone poor who is marginal on all relevant status dimensions such as income, education, occupation, and housing. Also, we would consider an individual (or a family) to be even poorer if it is not only marginal on relevant dimensions but does not, moreover, occupy certain dimensions at all. Among these we have to include families with no father and individuals who have no job, no education, or no occupational qualification. These few examples do already indicate that there are individuals or groups (like families) that are marginal in more than one respect, i.e., they suffer from a cumulation of marginality.

We would also not question that some of those experiencing marginality of a disequilibrated status configuration may be called poor. A man with an absolutely low income and high education is definitely poor. But is the same true if he has a status configuration which is disequilibrated in the opposite way? These
questions are not merely of theoretical interest because it is to be assumed that different types of marginality have different consequences with regard to adaptational processes, that is, to the probability that the individual looks for an individual or a collective solution of his problems. These processes call for different measures by governments and other agencies concerned with the problem of poverty.

Furthermore, we could ask whether a woman is poor who is married, whose husband enjoys a good income, but who had to leave a promising job, and is deprived of social contacts and of a status that is her own? To ask this question is not all absurd because we may find, for example, that she tries to "solve" the problems that arise from her marginality the same way the black slum-dweller tries to do that let us say by using drugs. In the examples given so far we were only dealing with "achieved" criteria. The conceptual scheme allows of course also to introduce "ascribed" criteria as race or sex. We could again define marginality in terms of low status or disequilibrated status configurations like ranking high on education but being black, or ranking high on education but being deprived because of being a woman, not to speak of being black and a woman.

With respect to adaptational processes to marginality we could again find similarities, for instance between the solutions chosen by educated black men and by educated white women. Activists in both groups are striving for a change in the value basis and power structure of society ("black is beautiful", "black power", "woman power", etc.).

The more open the structure of society the less we expect to find these types of collective processes or the aforementioned individual form of adaptation. Instead one would find individuals coping with marginality by means of individual mobility. This stresses again the necessity of combining the psychological and the sociological perspective.

A conclusion that can be drawn from this rather long discussion is that it seems appropriate to include at least two types of indicators in an indicator program which is meant to measure the relevant aspects in the field of poverty and disadvantaged minorities:

1. Social indicators:
   1.1 on the individual level,
   1.2 on the contextual level.

2. Psychological indicators:

Under point 1.1 we would subsume indicators for central status lines like income, education, race, employment, housing, etc. To this group would also belong indicators that measure the density of the interaction field of individuals and families, different degrees of
the completeness of the family, exposure to external stimuli and the kind of external stimuli, etc. From these indicators complex indices of different types of disequilibria between status and measures of total marginality could be derived.

With regard to the individuals and groups in question the most important indicators are those that measure the "openness", the accessibility of the central status dimensions for individuals or groups with different characteristics. It is obvious that these measures cannot be based on measurement on the individual level, but have to be global context measures. From these one could again construct indices of disequilibria between the degrees of accessibility of different status lines. Relatively complex indicators would be those that measure the learning capacity of the system or of certain subsystems and their capacity to change, and/or to induce social change directed at the improvement of the situation of marginal people.

Under point 2 we would subsume indicators that measure the evaluation of the structural situation of the individual, attitudes, motives, and expectancies that are related to it, the psychological capacity to change, the inclination toward different adaptational strategies, etc.

It is quite evident that the mentioned types of indicators are interrelated, and one must assume that many of the possible and theoretically meaningful relationships are interdependent. If, as was suggested at the OECD Conference on Subjective Elements of Well-Being, psychological predispositions of the poor were to be changed by means of education and training programs, and if at the same time the accessibility of the social structure is not improved, the situation of the people in question may become even worse, because they would experience additional marginality.

As has been mentioned before, the high appreciation which psychological indicators enjoy is the expression of a philosophy of an "open society". But there are too many facts that contradict this perspective or at least show that it is only true for certain strata and not true for those with whom we are concerned here. A second reason why the psychological indicators enjoy high appreciation is the success of studies that have been done by George Katona and his school. There is no doubt that it may be sufficient to study only attitudes and expectancies in order to arrive at relatively precise predictions of such short-term behavior as saving and spending; however, it is highly doubtful that this approach, taken alone, will suffice if applied in a situation in which there are almost no alternatives among which to choose. To find out about attitudes and preferences then would not help much in predicting behavior.

The purpose of introducing the conceptual scheme and discussing some of the questions that were derived from it was to point out
that when dealing with the poor we must be aware of a middle-class and pro-establishment bias. We would become guilty of this bias should we omit from the indicator program the structural aspects which in particular govern the situation of the poor and of the disadvantaged minorities.

In concluding we would stress the importance of avoiding seeing the relevance of the indicators only in relation to political actors, or - as has been said - in the function of an "early warning system". We should take into consideration their importance much more as a means of "enlightenment" of the population in general. What is still lacking is popular but nevertheless scientific and data-based information on social and psychological problems of the modern world. If a program for a regular collection and analysis of social and psychological indicators could be developed and institutionalized, this would be a sound basis for the reports we have in mind. They could counterbalance the impact of ideological interpretations of the social world and help to discuss and solve problems on a more rational level than is the case today. If the indicators were collected on an international scale, the reports could include meaningful comparisons and help to widen the frame of reference by which one's own position is evaluated.

Finally, we are aware that these considerations are far from offering a definite indicator program for the field in question. This was not our intention, however, since this program will still have to be discussed extensively. We hope, nonetheless, that some of the ideas sketched in the foregoing may contribute to this discussion and may help to avoid the pitfalls of a too straightforward approach to social measurement. As Nathan Glazer (1965: 12) says, "It is ... in the nature of ... (sociology) that it dissolves, or attempts to dissolve, both hard data and hard passions; that it attempts to complicate the analyses of the economists and the solutions of the reformers".
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One subject state which has received prominent attention in
the classic social literature is that of alienation. Like many
relatively popular terms, it has become overgrown with meanings,
so that it scarcely represents a tidy subject for inquiry. Even its
alleged behavioral implications, as Melvin Seeman (1972) has pointed
out in his recent review of the concept, display a confusing sprawl.
It has been used to explain all sorts of ills and their opposites at
one and the same time, including political passivity as well as
urban riots, or aggressive status-seeking as well as social retreat.
And in trying to explain everything, it risks explaining little or
nothing.

Most scholars who have tried to measure some state of mind
resembling the classic description of alienation have felt obliged
to whittle the concept down rather dramatically. Seeman (1972: 469)
has sought clearer focus, for example, by distinguishing various
"forms" of alienation, including:

1. feelings of powerlessness;
2. meaninglessness;
3. normlessness;
4. value isolation (cultural estrangement);
5. self-estrangement;
and 6: social isolation.

These states may all presumably co-occur in some individuals
at some times, and indeed, many of the writers who have leaned most
heavily on the concept seem to assume such co-occurrence on a
substantial scale. But these diverse facets are conceptually rather
easy to distinguish from one another, and almost necessary to
separate for any purposes of systematic measurement. Moreover, there
is reason to believe that their co-occurrence is a good deal less
than complete.

Another way in which the concept of alienation may be whittled
down is to ask the simple question: "Alienation from what?" Once
again, many authors have been content to refer to "the alienated
individual" without specification as to the more concrete objects
or experiences from which the person may have become "untied" in
this sense, leaving us to infer that the alienation is from the whole social surround, in a complete and pervasive sense. However, some of the contexts in which the term has traditionally been most popular do in fact specify a domain of alienation. Noteworthy among these, of course, are discussions of psychological alienation from work. Fully as popular is the use of the alienation concept in a setting which is chiefly political.

Whether one deals with work alienation or political alienation, it is tempting to press the "alienation from what?" question still further. What is it more precisely about the job that leaves the worker with a sense of meaninglessness? What is it about the political world that leaves the citizen with such feelings of estrangement?

Up to a point, such further questions are warranted. At the same time, they risk departing rather widely from the parent concept of alienation, which does seem to imply at least empty, if not rather negative, feelings that are relatively basic and generalized. We would not necessarily invoke the concept of alienation simply because a worker was dissatisfied with some aspects of his working situation. Nor would we invoke it for the vast majority of citizens in any country who like some of the political leaders and parties that compete for their support, but dislike others. In brief, localized negative attitudes toward this or that object fall well short of the state of mind usually denoted as alienation.

Where the polity is concerned, there is some consensus that the most basic attitudes relevant to alienation are those having to do with confidence or distrust in the operation of public institutions and the impersonal authority relationships they usually entail. Weber and others have regarded the attribution of "legitimacy" to wielders of authority as a crucial ingredient in the functioning not only of political systems in the narrow sense, but of any social relationships involving power and authority. From slightly different angles, Easton and Parsons consider that without a basic reservoir of diffuse "regime support", including acceptance of the propriety and viability of a basic set of "rules of the game", the fabric of political institutions is in severe jeopardy. Hence fundamental distrust in the appropriateness, rectitude or competence of authorities or the structure of authority relationships is a very natural part of what has typically been meant by alienation in its political sense.

In view of the theoretical premium placed on these subjective states characterizing a citizenry, there is a natural interest in the possibility of monitoring such levels of trust or confidence over time in current populations, as an integral part of a broader program of subjective social indicators.
At least two other major considerations heighten the interest in such a program. First, it seems likely that over recent centuries there has been a dramatic secular increase in the degree that impersonal bureaucratic relationships, even beyond those of the workplace, intrude on and are vital for the daily life of the common man. These trends are the natural consequences of the advancing density and division of labor of populations, with all the interdependencies that such conditions promote, and are well represented by the vast growth of tertiary or service sectors in advanced economies.

In a myriad of forms, ranging from welfare disbursements from governments to proper servicing and maintenance of household hardware, the frequency of individual interaction with one or another bureaucracy has been rising steeply. In view of this fact, it seems safe to speculate that the way in which such relationships are experienced as facilitating or frustrating, confidence-inspiring or disillusioning is an increasingly important element in the quality of life, and in coming decades, is likely to become more important still.

A second reason for the importance of a program monitoring reactions of this kind is that the performance of institutions lies more within reach of adjustment by policy innovation than is true of many other factors bearing on the quality of life. If individuals feel impoverished for lack of friendships or shattered by marital difficulties, there is very little of a direct sort that governments can do to improve the situation. But many features of institutional performance are the consequences of organizational design that are eminently subject, through policy change, to redesign and improvement. Therefore, a monitoring system sensitive to flaws experienced by the clientele or citizenry would be of uncommon policy relevance.

The purpose of this essay is to describe a few pieces of work, implemented in the past or projected for the future at the Institute for Social Research, that are aimed at assessing various aspects of public experience with authoritative institutions. Such experience of citizens can be both direct and indirect. Few citizens play immediate roles in the national and international affairs of their countries, yet they are more or less interested observers of the roles their governments play. They form impressions of these roles, particularly in domains where they sense some ultimate impact on their own lives, and at times these impressions evolve into bitter disenchantment or distrust. They also have more direct experience with a variety of bureaucracies which, in one form or another, are agents of some level of government. We have an interest in monitoring both kinds of experience.
GENERALIZED TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

The Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research has been engaged in a lengthening series of sample surveys of the American electorate, conducted biennially in connection with national elections. The series started in 1948, and while the content of each set of questionnaires naturally shows some variation over time, a part of the content is kept fixed from election to election in order to chart change over time. One battery of items, first used in 1958 but repeated at intervals since that time, is designed to measure the confidence or trust that is felt by the adult citizenry for the national government in Washington. The behavior of these items over time is fascinating, and seems to hold at least preliminary answers to several questions that might be raised concerning the utility of such measures as social indicators.

One such question has to do with whether or not such attitudes of trust toward government vary in any substantial way over time. The total portfolio of our studies includes literally several hundred items that have been measured at more than one point in time, and a fair proportion of these have been monitored with great regularity. Some of the variables measured have shifted up and down rather irregularly, and within fairly narrow ranges, suggesting that they are sensitive to immediate and short-term political tides. Other variables have shown a tiny secular change—perhaps as great as 5 or 10 per cent—over a twenty-year period. Still others turn out to be remarkably inert, showing no change at all that could be reliably distinguished from sampling error. The items designed to measure trust in government in the United States, however, have shown a dramatic progression over time since 1958 or, more exactly, since the middle 1960's. These data point to a profound erosion of popular trust in the competence and honesty of the national government during this period.

Perhaps the most generalized item in the set is one which asks, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" The percentages of persons giving the various possible responses were roughly the same in the fall of 1964 as they had been in the fall of 1958 when first measured. Thereafter, however, they began to register a dramatic decline in trust. In 1958 and 1964 over three-quarters of respondents who reported some judgment on the matter said that they trusted the government to do what was right "most of the time" or "always." By 1966 the proportion had dropped from 77% to 60%. 1968 brought another drop to some 62%
expressing this level of trust. By 1970 the figure had fallen below 55%, and preliminary data from 1972 suggest that the decline is continuing. These are remarkable changes.

While the item cited seems to be the most generalized in the battery, all of the items tell the same story of progressive deterioration of trust, and the sheer magnitude of the change is in some instances even greater than that for the generalized trust question. For example, another item in the set asks "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" In 1958, 81% of the respondents willing to choose between the alternatives expressed the faith that the government was being run for the benefit of all. Even by 1964, a significant decline to about 70% had been registered, and in ensuing years the drop continues majestically, such that by 1970, scarcely 45% felt that the government was being run for the general benefit, with the other 55% opining that government was being "pretty much run by a few big interests".

In other words, over a twelve-year period there had been movement of some 36 points in the percentage space, and what had been a vast-majority reservoir of faith as of 1958 had actually fallen into a minority view by 1970.

This is the most dramatic shift in the whole battery of items. The important point for our purposes, however, is the fact that all of the items in the battery show significant change and it is always in the direction of declining trust, whatever the specifics of the question may be. In 1958 only 42% of the public felt that people in government wasted a lot of tax money; by 1970, almost 70% gave this response. In 1958, 26% of our respondents were confident that "hardly any" of the people running the government in Washington were "a little crooked"; in 1970, only 16% had that confidence, with a corresponding increase in those who said "quite a lot" were crooked.

The same general trend leaves its mark, although often in diluted form, on various other items designed to measure other attitude-clusters, yet which have a manifest relation to the question of generalized confidence in government. For example, items attempting to measure individual feelings of efficacy in influencing the decisions of government, which generally showed a slow increase over the 1950's, also tend to deteriorate after 1960. (For a more detailed analysis, see Converse, 1972). For example, as of 1960 only about one-quarter of the electorate agreed with the proposition "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think". By 1970, the comparable proportion was approaching one-half.

There is a great deal that we do not know about the dynamics and significance of these changes. We cannot even be entirely sure that the decline in trust has far-reaching system consequences, in
the sense that most theory would predict. To be sure, the period since 1964 has been one of the most tumultuous and discouraging in American history, and it is possible that growing attitudes of disenchantment on a broad front have in fact been making their causal contribution to the turmoil. It is also possible that these trends mainly register the discouragement of bystanders to a series of disastrous events, ranging from a spate of political assassinations to the enormous frustrations of the Vietnam war. Conceivably a few years of respite from tragedies and failures at the national level might rapidly restore the confidence of the American people in their government.

Nevertheless, these data do speak rather eloquently, and we do know enough about them to draw a variety of significant conclusions. Perhaps the one which lies closest to the surface has to do with the generalized nature of the attitudes involved. We mentioned earlier that in dealing with concepts as vague and elusive as "alienation", it was useful up to a point to ask the question "alienation with respect to what"? And given an initial answer that one is interested in alienation with respect to politics, one could go on and ask what more specific aspects of politics are disenchanting. For measurement purposes, this heightened level of detail is almost essential. However, if we were to find that an electorate is rather disgusted at the way its government handled taxes, but otherwise expressed reasonable confidence in its performance, we would hesitate to use a term which implies as much breadth and pervasiveness as "alienation".

Nonetheless, the data we have cited suggest that the distrust being measured is generalized across a wide variety of performance judgments: all of these assessments of the government and the people running it have been deteriorating at roughly similar rates over a roughly similar time period. In such a setting, broader terms like alienation come to be more appropriate. This should not be taken to mean that the alienation is either total or ultimate. We have no evidence to suggest that any significant proportion of the American population has become so disillusioned with the operations of government as to feel that the total system must be dismantled or renovated. Moreover, there are countersigns that help to set limits on the significance of the erosion of trust. For example, some versions of "alienation theory", if it can be called such, would lead one to predict that disillusionment on such a massive scale should produce a decline in levels of political participation, with citizens turning away from interaction with the political process. There is in fact little sign that such change has occurred: no steady drop in voting turnout has accompanied the deterioration of confidence, and our measures of participation in the electoral process, such as engagement
in grass-roorts party organizational activity, have either held steady or faintly increased during the period in question. Therefore certain plausible causal sequences associated with declining confidence can be at least temporarily ruled out. Nevertheless, the perssiveness of the change in attitudes as basic as these seem to be surely warrants of our continued monitoring and analysis.

Our data also serve to rule out other plausible hypotheses concerning the nature of this change. At first glance, the overall decline in confidence might appear to be the product of the entry into the adult electorate of a younger generation embittered about the continuing involvements of the government in Vietnam, along with its apparent incapacity to deal with other pressing social problems on the home front. However, with any thought it is apparent that population turnover in itself—the replacement of elderly citizens with much faith in government by younger cohorts who are disenchanted with it—could scarcely account in any total way for the change, because the change has simply been too large and too fast. Clearly many adults who had expressed confidence in government in 1960 had suffered painful disillusionment in 1970.

Internal analyses underscore the point. Much of the anti-establishment rhetoric of the late 1960's came from a young college generation just moving into the electorate, and it is reasonable to ask whether this group has contributed disproportionately to the erosion of confidence being registered. Now it is easy to show that the youngest cohorts of college-educated citizens in 1970 expressed very substantially less confidence in government than had comparably new cohorts of the college-educated in 1958 or 1960. The problem is that the rate of decline in such comparisons is not unusual; almost every other commonly-examined subgroup in the population—the old, the poorly educated, and so on—have shown just about the same rate of decline over the same period of time. Therefore there is no evidence whatever that young cohorts of college backgrounds have made any disproportionate contribution to the trend. In fact, young college people tend to give more trusting responses than their elders or those more poorly educated. They did so in 1960 and, despite their absolute decline in the interim, remain relatively trustful as of 1970.

Thus the change cannot be attributed to any particular segment of the population in isolation: it is, in a remarkable degree, change which has occurred "across the board". This does not mean that there are no differences whatever in the rate of decline from one population segment to another. Very faint differences are in fact discernible and probably exceed the limits of our sampling error. For example, the decline in trust expressed by blacks began at a somewhat delayed pace, not showing itself until after 1966.
Over ensuing years, however, it rapidly caught up with the white decline and if anything has now surpassed it. Or again, while differences are small, whites in the South of the United States—hardly the anti-establishment New Left—appear to have shown slightly greater deterioration of confidence over this period than that registered by whites elsewhere. These minor differences are not uninteresting diagnostically, but they should not obscure the very broad front along which the major features of the declining trend can be found.

One set of correlates of declining trust do stand out rather clearly. As Miller (1972) has shown, trust is weakest in the current period for respondents whose positions on the major issues of the day—Vietnam, civil rights, law and order, etc.—are most extreme. In one sense, this is not surprising. It has been the general rule in the past that supporters of the party out of office take a somewhat dimmer view of what is going on in government than do supporters of the governing party. These negative views on the part of the opposition have not, however, reached very deeply into basic attitudes toward government, as is witnessed by the largely confident responses given by the public in an earlier period. What makes a substantial difference in the current period is that both extremes of most major issues have suffered an uncommonly severe and generalized disillusionment with the government, a matter which accounts in no small measure for the lack of clarity in the demographic correlates of the decline. Almost every group seems to think of itself as a loser in the current period. Southern whites resisting integrationist policies of the government in education and other areas feel harassed beyond all bounds, and resentment of whites all over the country toward enforced busing adds to the disillusion. At the same time, the nation's blacks have felt abandoned by the go-slow policies of the Nixon Administration in civil rights, and are joined in that feeling by white liberals. Parallel consequences flow of course from the Vietnam War, where the failure to achieve military victory has greatly frustrated the more extreme right, and the slow pace of withdrawal has led to comparable alienation of the more extreme left. Similar patterns emerge for other major issues. All told, the extraordinary intensity of feelings on these issues has left the middle of the road much narrower than it usually is.

In general, then, the interest of these attitudes of confidence or distrust in government as social indicators to be monitored with some regularity seems well established. This is true even though we are not yet entirely clear what their long-run significance may be. It is possible that we will have to see some restoration of confidence, and perhaps even another circumstance of marked decline before the full significance of such variation can begin to be formulated.
Meanwhile, work is currently going forward in an effort to broaden our understanding of how widely generalized the disillusionment has become in the American electorate. Does it extend to other levels of government, or is it limited to the federal government in Washington? Is it directed at all branches of the federal government indiscriminately, or do some branches retain confidence in some quarters? It would not be surprising, for example, if whites alienated by governmental pressures toward civil rights progress were to feel most wrathful toward the judiciary, with the judiciary maintaining the trust of blacks as well as persons alienated by the conduct of the war in Vietnam. On the other hand, distrust may generalize so readily that most citizen observers fail to make much discrimination, a possible finding which would be of theoretical importance in itself.

By and large, as we have noted, the attitudes of trust which we have monitored for more than a decade appear hinged mainly on indirect observation of governmental performance, rather than upon direct personal experience with the agencies of government, although this distinction is frequently blurred in real life. Therefore it is worth inquiring how we might monitor the quality of more direct contacts as well.

**THE QUALITY OF BUREAUCRATIC ENCOUNTERS WITH GOVERNMENT**

Robert Kahn and Daniel Katz of the Survey Research Center at the Institute for Social Research are designing a program of studies aimed at evaluating the quality of citizen interaction with governmental bureaucracies, as well as the impact of such experiences on more generalized attitudes toward government. In no small degree, such projected work has an ultimate focus on the effectiveness of service-oriented bureaucracies as "delivery systems" although it will depart rather widely from the traditional and rather perfunctory efforts of governments to assess performance of their agencies by virtue of an emphasis on direct reporting by clients of their experiences with the agencies.

To be effective, inquiry of this type needs to look in two directions. To develop meaningful and broad-gauged social indicator information, it is important to assess the frequency and quality of such encounters for a representative sample of the nation. However, a national survey of this kind will produce such a thin scatter of contacts over the set of all possible agencies and their local representatives that it will be impossible to do much in the way of linking organizational characteristics of specific agencies to variations in the quality of service delivery. These more diagnostic
purposes can only be fulfilled by studies which base themselves in particular organizations. Kahn and Katz are planning to conduct both types of work.

The national sample of the citizenry is expected to be conducted in the spring of 1973. The interview schedule will focus upon the agency-client episode, and will collect individual reports of participation in such episodes. It will generate rather global estimates of the frequency and distribution of such encounters. However, since more intensive questioning as to the character of the episodes involved must be tailored to specific types of agencies, such interrogation will be limited to respondent experience in three fields of public service - health, employment and welfare. Data will be collected on the nature of the problem producing each episode, the feelings of the client about the outcome of the episode, his attitudes toward the agency in question as well as toward public agencies in general, and perceived ways of coping with such agencies. A good deal of other information about the respondent will naturally be gathered at the same time, including his demographic characteristics, information level, and more generalized orientations toward the governmental system along the lines reported in the preceding section. The national sample also provides an ideal opportunity to collect data on failure to have contact with public agencies despite eligibility for service, or from more deliberate avoidance of the contact. The latter is of course an important topic in its own right, and one which cannot be approached through organization-based studies, where the visible clients are those who in fact attempt to receive services.

The national survey will provide a useful backdrop for more intensive study of particular agencies. These organization-based inquiries will still enjoy a client component, although in this instance the rosters of agency contacts will provide the sampling frame for selecting respondents who have been serviced. Again, such clients will report on their contact episodes in a format matching that used for the national sample. Here, however, the investigators will be able to link up the clients' perceptions of the encounters with more objective information on the character and outcome of episode. If, for example, the client feels that he was short-changed in failing to receive the magnitude of aid to which he was entitled, the perception may in fact be accurate or may instead represent pure misunderstanding of the nature of his entitlement, which the agency should learn to convey more effectively. Similarly, the investigators will be able to link estimates of the objective effectiveness of various agencies selected for study with a variety of organizational characteristics of the agency.

There is of course no reason other than limitations of interview time that such consumer-oriented evaluations need be restricted to
governmental agencies. In the United States, there are many comparable agencies in the private sector that dispense services, and whose performance might well be comparatively evaluated. Limited items of this sort that found their way into questionnaires of the late 1960's suggested, for example, that the public had become exasperated by the treatment it was receiving with regard to compensations from private insurance agencies in particular. Indeed, several facets of insurance operations have come under more authoritative scrutiny in recent years, and in some instances legislative steps have been taken to control abuses. This kind of information tends to remain obscure without client-oriented studies since the private agency itself is unlikely to advertise the fact that it has unusual complaint rates, and in fact may not itself be aware in some instances that its complaint rates are running inordinately high among parallel agencies. It may be expected, therefore, that this kind of monitoring may soon be extended to cover the private sector as well.

Between generalized orientations bearing on faith in government in its largest aspects and the finer grain of immediate citizen contacts with bureaucratic agencies of all kinds, there is surely a fertile field for activities of a monitoring sort. It seems evident that the kinds of subjective social indicators that should sift clear from exploratory work in these areas are ones which are sensitive enough to reveal telling variation across sectors and across time within sectors. They also have a direct policy relevance and are, more often than not, subject to administrative amelioration. Finally, of course, they would seem to offer an appropriate contribution to any broad scheme designed to monitor the quality of human experience in modern societies.
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During the past 25 years the standard of living has risen immensely throughout the industrialized West. This is demonstrated by virtually all of the conventional economic indicators. Only a decade or so ago there was a widespread expectation that affluence would bring an end to social conflict. Many observers believed that as the working class got higher incomes, automobiles, television sets and other benefits of a middle class lifestyle, harsh ideological conflicts would come to an end.

As must be apparent to anyone who has lived through the past several years, they did not. The late 1960s and early 1970s were times of troubles from Berlin to Berkeley. Why? On the face of it, the "End of Ideology" scenario was not such an unreasonable projection to make. If the conflicts of industrial society were largely based on economic demands, it would seem reasonable to expect that increasing economic gratification ought to lessen the intensity of social conflict. And, in a sense, it probably did. But at the same time something unexpected happened: other types of dissatisfaction became increasingly widespread and well-articulated. For the new social conflicts were very different from those of the 1930s and 1940s. The most obvious difference was that the social basis of protest had changed. It was no longer a radicalized working class that was demanding redress, but radicalized elements of the middle class.

We believe that this shift in social basis reflects another less visible phenomenon: an ongoing transformation of the world-view of Western publics. Among these publics, certain basic values and skills seem to be changing in a gradual but deeply rooted fashion. We are speaking about long-range trends. Undoubtedly there will be countertrends that will slow the process of change and perhaps even reverse it for particular periods of time, but the principal evolutionary drift is the result of structural changes taking place in advanced industrial societies and is unlikely to be changed in the absence of major and at present unforeseeable alterations in the very nature of those societies. This article will suggest some causes and some possible social consequences of these changes, moving from the
societal level to the individual level and back again. We will discuss some of the things we already know about these changes, but this chapter will also suggest a sort of research agenda. Changes seem to be taking place that have important implications for future social conflict, yet there is a great deal we do not yet know about these changes and cannot know for many years.

SOURCES OF CHANGE

Before undertaking an exploration of social change, we need to ask a simple but fundamental question: is change, in fact, taking place?

On one level, we believe we can give a straightforward yes. Reliable time-series data are available that indicate that massive change clearly is taking place in the infrastructure of advanced industrial society. These system-level changes might well alter individual-level values, beliefs and behavior. Among the many forces for change are growing economic abundance, expansion of secondary and higher education, the growing size and diversity of the mass media, and massive discontinuities in the life experiences of large numbers of people.

Statistics on affluence, education, mass communications, and foreign travel all tell a similar story. In the United States the rate of access to higher education doubled from 1950 to 1965. It more than doubled in West Germany during that period, and more than tripled in France. Secondary and university-level education are now far more widely distributed among Western populations than ever before, and this change has had a particularly heavy impact on the younger age-cohorts.

Television and foreign travel have become a part of the common man's experience in the post-war era. In 1963, only a third of the households in France and Italy had television sets: by 1970, TV was present in more than 70 per cent of the households of those countries.

Foreign travel is no longer limited to the very top and bottom of the economic scale. Before World War II, only a tiny minority of native-born Americans had ever visited Europe; higher incomes and cheap charter flights now enable millions of Americans to cross the Atlantic each year. Similarly, by 1970 most West Europeans had visited at least one foreign country; indeed proportionately more Germans visited Italy than Americans visited Florida that year.

Technological Innovation

The thread of technological innovation ties these changes together. Technology has created the unprecedented affluence that
underpins advanced industrial society; it renders expanded educational opportunities both necessary and possible; it has created the contemporary mass media, and it involves men and women in drastic shifts in personal environment that uproot them from previous patterns.

Technology is creating the postindustrial society just as it created the industrial society. Innovations in agricultural production have already enabled a very few people to feed the rest. Now industrial innovation is reducing the proportion of the population needed to produce an increasing quantity of manufactured goods. In the United States only a minority of the labor force is engaged in the agricultural and industrial sectors, and other Western countries are approaching or are already at the point of having 50 per cent of the work-force in the tertiary or service sector. (See Kahn, 1972; and Riley, Johnson, Foner and Schrank, 1972). In France, for example, 37 per cent of the population was still employed in the primary sector as recently as 1946; this had declined to a mere 12 per cent in 1970. Within a few years, a majority of the French work force will be employed in the tertiary sector. The United States passed this milestone in 1956, becoming the world's first "post-industrial" society. But by 1980, most West European countries will also be "post-industrial".

**Affluence**

Income levels have shown equally impressive changes: real income per capita is now at least double the highest level attained before World War II in virtually all Western countries, and in many it has tripled or even quadrupled its highest previous level.

With affluence has come increased economic and physical security, as higher incomes and welfare programs reduce the economic deprivations previously felt by most of the population. Furthermore, although older generations have experienced war in one form or another, younger generations in most of these countries have no direct experience with warfare, and no Western country has been invaded by hostile forces for almost 30 years.

Along with affluence has come leisure, which has taken two forms. The first is the reduction in time spent working. Hours worked have not declined as fast as during several periods in the recent past, however, because many workers have chosen additional income over free time. Already several economies are supporting large numbers of students who in earlier years would have already become a part of the labor force. Increasing numbers may be expected to delay their entry into roles as workers as others shorten the years, and yearly hours, committed to work.

Societal affluence also supports the leisure of individuals with
marginal ties to the economy. These are the dropouts, the hippies, the young and not so young who congregate in cities, in communes, and around universities and who live with minimum expenditure of time and effort on the spillover from an affluent society. Whereas in the past it was the well-to-do who had freedom from work, these new social groups are quite different from both the traditional leisure class and the lumpenproletariat. Being relatively free from conventional social and economic constraints these groups do not always submit easily to traditional forms of social and political control. They are free to develop and to propagate new and alternative life-styles.

**Mass Media Impact**

Knowledge of these, in turn, is diffused both by direct example and by the mass media, which, in its constant search for news and novelty, finds in the counterculture the bizarre and exotic elements that make good copy as well as the social criticism that is likely to be the historic contribution of the counterculture. Moreover, some parts of the mass media are greatly influenced by the counterculture and its alternative life-styles. These include the recording industry; publishing, especially paperbacks and underground newspapers; and film making. It is probable, however, that the rapid commercialization of the counterculture by the recording industry, television, publishing firms and film makers gave an exaggerated impression of its impact on society. The penetration of the mainstream by perspectives associated with the counterculture cannot currently be adequately assessed in the absence of national surveys devoted specifically to the subject.

The mass media are undoubtedly among the major sources of change, but it is not easy to specify how the influence process works. Information from communications media is filtered through numerous mediating factors and influences and is processed in ways that are not yet thoroughly understood. (Klepper, 1960; Weiss, 1973; Campbell and Converse, 1972). The expansion of the communications networks of advanced societies has been made possible by technological innovation. The result has been to make information networks national, and even international, and to communicate information very rapidly from anywhere in the world, or even space. The pockets of traditionalism within polities continue to shrink. Even if the adults are not greatly affected in their belief-systems by what they see and hear, it will undoubtedly be more difficult than in the past for traditionally oriented segments of the population to pass on their values to the young in an unaltered form. For even when the media are controlled and are consciously programmed to reflect the dominant values of a society, their coverage of news leads them to transmit information that is often threatening to existing values. This fact is well understood by protestors, who plan their activities so as to maximize...
their publicity value (Lipsky, 1968). The mass media consequently are a force for change, as they communicate dissatisfaction, alternative life-styles, and dissonant signals, even when they are directly controlled by the "establishment".

The role of the mass media is thus mixed. On the one hand they serve to incorporate more and more people into larger and larger communication networks. They have undoubtedly increased the knowledge and sophistication of the population, especially through their impact on the young. They probably have a leveling impact, a stereotyping and conventionalizing effect, in many areas of life. Yet at the same time they communicate a great deal of opposition to conventional values. And much of the specialized media provide a communications network for alternative life-styles, appealing to distinct audiences and helping to propagate various forms of the counterculture. Perhaps the unspecialized mass media help to create a "middle American" consciousness while at the same time they may suggest that these very values are threatened by the counterculture.

Expansion of Education

Affluence and the expansion of the media are closely tied in with the expansion of higher education. More and more people in Western countries want higher education. The extreme case is perhaps the United States where the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education found that 97 per cent of the American parents questioned wanted their children to go to college (Parsons and Platt, 1972: 237). We emphasize higher education because it has traditionally been the guardian of "high culture"; it is now a principal source of innovation, and it seems to be increasingly the sorting mechanism for social stratification.

The absolute number of individuals with college experience is growing rapidly. Technological growth requires the expansion of certain kinds of education. In fact, all kinds have expanded enormously. The service sector requires a vast array of clerks, technicians, managers, and, of course, innovators, that is, scientists and entrepreneurs. The economy of abundance makes it feasible to support large numbers of economically unproductive people for longer and longer periods of time while they acquire advanced training and knowledge. This contributes to the creation of youth as a special category and is clearly related to the political distinctiveness of a segment of youth. Eisenstadt has shown that this pattern recurs historically under certain conditions (1956). An extreme interpretation of the distinctiveness of contemporary youth is made by Lofland (1970), who speaks of youth as a new exploited class, and youth ghettoes around colleges as an emerging phenomenon.
Parsons and Platt, in a perceptive analysis, relate several of the principal concerns of psychological theory in this century to problems resulting from technological change and concomitant educational expansion (1972). The emergence of the firm, the father's shift from working at home to working in a factory or office, and universal primary education had particularly important consequences for the Oedipal and latency stages of individual development. The interest of psychology in the adolescent youth culture is associated by the authors with another phase of history, the stage at which large numbers began completing high school. Contemporary college unrest and the resulting scholarly attention devoted to it reflect the third historical period, one in which large numbers attend college. Parsons and Platt refer to this new stage as "studentry." They assert that each of these stages required a period of institutionalization before the social disruption declined, and "studentry" is no exception.

Allerback (1972) has written in a somewhat similar fashion of college years as a stage in which cultural norms increasingly permit and encourage societal criticism and protest, thus legitimizing and at the same time restricting it. The congregation of young people in university communities, often isolated from the larger society and in contact with adults who tend to be relatively sympathetic toward their distinctive values, creates a "critical mass" with great potential for change.

Two additional aspects of the student situation may help account for the emergence of protest activities and new political demands. The first is that the economy needs some kinds of trained people more than others. Students in humanistic disciplines and the social sciences, for example, cannot always look forward to safe niches in the economy with the same confidence as students in more "practical" fields, and this may encourage them to take the lead in combating the gods of affluence and technology (Menkoff and Flacks, 1972; Boudon, 1972; and Pinner, 1972). The causal link probably works in both directions of course; students interested in social change may be drawn to the humanities and social sciences, while those who wish to get ahead within the existing framework of industrial society may be attracted to fields like engineering and business administration. Only longitudinal research can enable us to unravel this causal cocoon.

The second point to consider is that the period of maximum isolation of the youth culture, from late high school through college, corresponds with the period of the development of higher cognitive skills and, in Mannheim's words, political cultural consciousness (1972 [1928]; see Lambert, 1972). At this stage youth has passed the stage of maximum family influence and is groping toward an intellectual justification of beliefs and behavioral predispositions. Lane has
provided us with a superb analysis of this stage among a small group of Yale students (1969). It is significant that today this stage tends to be spent in a milieu that minimizes the impact of the larger society. College culture is, in Mead's words, "configurative" : "when there are a lot of mobile young they become models for one another ... rejecting the behavior models of adults in the new environments" (Mead, 1970 : 4). Summarizing studies of the impact of college, Feldman and Newcomb conclude that college makes students more liberal, less authoritarian, less dogmatic, less ethnocentric and more interested in political matters (1969 : 20-31). Numerous studies have demonstrated the impact that higher education has on the development of political consciousness and the development of cognitive skills; indeed, education turns out to be one of the most important variables in cross-national analysis. But it is equally true that students enter college already well ahead of the general population on these dimensions (Withey, 1971).

Exactly how varying levels of education affect values and behaviors is not well understood. The emphasis on certain kinds of values by the better educated seems intuitively understandable. But education is, in fact, an extremely complex variable. We must distinguish between education as an indicator of affluence, education as an indicator of cognitive development, and education as an indicator of integration into a specific communications network. Both intergenerational differences and intragenerational differences in values could simply reflect differential exposure to given communications networks which emphasize different values.

We think that the combined impact of affluence, higher education and the specialized media serve to create an intrageneration gap between many of the educated young and those of their own age cohort who do not receive higher education. Because of the high visibility of university youth and because of the small proportion of these who are politically involved, intergenerational change may be less monolithic than is sometimes assumed. Blue collar youth, moreover, are already involved in adult roles and jobs and hence have less free time and, in a sense, more to lose than college youth of the same age. A study by Yankelovich demonstrates that on many dimensions the difference between college-educated and noncollege-educated youth is about as great as that between generations (1969). However, some of the new values may be widely diffused among the young of all social classes and educational levels, regardless of the social location of their origins. At present we cannot document adequately the degree of agreement and divergence within and between cohorts.

A number of relevant problems in political socialization are currently unresolved. Many studies have emphasized the continuity
From parent to child in the maintenance of political values, while noting that continuity in values was considerably weaker than continuity in partisan identification (Hyman, 1959; Mankoff and Flacks, 1972; Sigel, 1970; Jennings and Niemi, 1964). One study concluded that while the earlier student radicals may have been recruited mainly from upper status families (the "revolt of the advantaged"), this relationship no longer held its strength as radicalism spread throughout the college milieu in the late 1960s (Friedman, Gold and Christie, 1972). The authors found no relationship between a student's ideology or behavior, on the one hand, and parental education or occupational status, on the other. A bandwagon effect linked with peer influences may have wiped out the earlier correlation. Yanklovich reports time-series evidence that this correlation did, in fact, decline between 1968 and 1971 (1972).

Furthermore, similarities in milieu shared by parent and child could account for the continuity that does exist, without the direct intervention of the family in the process. Some studies find a high degree of group correspondence but low intra-familial pair correspondence; generation units are more similar than are pairs of parents and children (evidence summarized in Connell, 1972). If it is indeed similarity of milieu rather than family that is responsible for continuity, then the implications for social change of the institutionalization of "studentry" may be profound.

Discontinuities in Life Experiences

One more source of change seems particularly important: change in one's personal situation. Change is built into the infrastructure of life in advanced industrial societies. The average individual moves many times in his or her lifetime. New jobs are created; old ones become obsolete. The family itself becomes impermanent in advanced industrial society, with divorce increasingly widespread.

When considering the United States alone, probably nothing has had an impact comparable to that stemming from changing race relations. The civil rights movement helped to change the outlook of a generation of students, and the changing status of Blacks has forced many in all stages of life to reevaluate not only their racial attitudes but other beliefs related to politics, equality, opportunity and work, as well. And the changes among Blacks, especially among better educated and younger Blacks, are particularly extensive (Hyman, 1972).

Education as well as geographical, social and occupational mobility break down traditional patterns of thought and behavior because they result in discontinuities (Brim and Wheeler, 1966). The pace of change quickens. We posit that changes in patterns of life necessitated by changes in job, residence, social class, personal
status (marriage, divorce, widowhood, technological obsolescence, and so on) lead to changes in behavior and, probably, eventual changes in values and attitudes. Traditional beliefs need not be consciously rejected; it is more likely that they atrophy through irrelevance to contemporary problems. Thus we would expect that some traditional and basic values would persist even after behavior and attitudes change. Furthermore, behavior change may precede attitude change, with situations forcing changes in behavior before there are changes in values and attitudes (King and McGinnies, 1972; 124). We expect mobility in its many guises to be a major source of change, as it forces changes in behavior and creates dissonance among values.

Finally, a leading characteristic of advanced industrial society is freedom of choice. Ascription declines as achievement criteria come to dominate in securing education and career. But other values, behaviors, and life-styles are also today more and more often "achieved." People are increasingly able to choose their life-styles. Or they may bring to any occupation a life-style that is different from previous norms. Core values are today not as effectively inculcated and perpetuated by societal institutions, family, and peers. Old values are rejected but no single new core takes their place. Change, impermanence, perhaps superficiality, become the norm. Change feeds on change.

The Impact of System-Level Changes on the Individual

One could cite additional indications of change at great length. They are interesting because they convey a tantalizing suggestion that a more profound transformation may be taking place, not just in the number of dollars people spend or the number of years they spend in school, but in the very way people see the world and what they want out of life. But again, we must ask a simple yet fundamental question: do these system-level changes really have any significant impact on individuals? In particular, do they change people's political outlook and behavior? And here we are unable to give any straightforward answer. Most of the data we need are unavailable.

It seems likely that economic and social changes such as those we have described do tend to change people's political outlook, and exciting books have been written about their presumed consequences by people ranging from Marshall McLuhan to Charles Reich. But much of the literature is impressionistic and sometimes hyperbolic. We think that fundamental change is taking place in the values and skills of Western publics. However, these changes seem to take place a good deal more slowly than the economic, technological and other changes that give rise to them. The pace of change in Western political cultures may be linked with the replacement of one generation...
by another. We cannot yet be certain. Any reliable analysis of how economic and technological change affects individuals (and eventually feeds back as an influence on political life) will require a broad body of individual-level survey data. These data, furthermore, will need to be collected at a series of points in time. Only then will we be able to demonstrate conclusively whether or not the values and skills of mass publics are changing, begin to explain why they are changing, and specify the directions and rates of change. And only then can we begin to anticipate the probable political consequences with any certainty.

The data base for a conclusive analysis is not yet available. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to take stock of some hypotheses and findings based on a preliminary exploration of change in Western political cultures. Our hypotheses can conveniently be grouped under three general headings:

1. Changes in Values

We hypothesize that a long-term change is taking place in the value priorities of Western publics. The shift is from a primary concern with material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life and self-realization. The causes and implications of this shift are complex, but the basic reason underlying it might be stated very simply, at least as a first approximation: people tend to be more concerned with immediate needs or threats than with things that seem remote or non-threatening. Thus, a desire for beauty may be more or less universal, but hungry people are more likely to seek food than aesthetic satisfaction. Today, an unprecedentedly large portion of Western populations feel economically secure, and many of them have never known hard times.

2. Changes in Resources

We hypothesize that a significant shift is also taking place in the distribution of resources. An increasingly large proportion of the public is coming to have sufficient interest and understanding of national and international politics to participate in decision-making at this level. Mass publics have played a role in national politics for a long time, of course, through the ballot and in other ways. The present process enables them to play an increasingly active role and to engage in what might be called "elite-challenging" as opposed to "elite-directed" activities. The latter mode was largely a matter of elites mobilizing mass support through established organizations such as political parties, labor unions, religious institutions, and so on. The newer mode gives increasing emphasis to mass involvement in making specific decisions. One way of describing the change would be to say that potential counter-elites are distributed more widely among the public than ever before.

We hypothesize that a basic questioning of the institutions of advanced industrial society accompanies the above two changes. As expectations of mass publics change, their perceptions of the adequacy of institutional arrangements also change. Key American institutions, from the business corporation to the government itself, seem to be undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. A widespread decline in public confidence and support shows up in nation-wide public opinion surveys carried out periodically by The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research. Over the past 14 years, the ISR has repeatedly administered a scale of items that tap feelings of trust for the national government. In 1958, a representative sample of the American public gave overwhelmingly positive responses; only 28 per cent of the sample showed predominantly distrustful attitudes. But there has been a marked decline in trust in subsequent years, and by 1972 48 per cent of the public gave distrustful responses (Miller, Brown and Raine, 1973). A similar pattern of decline can be seen in public attitudes toward large business corporations and toward the military establishment. This decline is in part the result of Vietnam; but it also, we think, reflects a long-range transformation in the mass publics of the United States. Many short-run factors undoubtedly intervene to affect confidence, such as progress or lack thereof in ending war and racism, and we do not anticipate a monotonic decline in trust. But with changing values and resources and, consequently, a more efficacious and critical public, we expect that the secular trend in support for systemic institutions will witness a decline.

These processes of change reinforce each other. One aspect of the change in values, we believe, is a decline in the legitimacy of hierarchical authority, patriotism, religion, and so on, that encourages the decline in confidence in institutions. At the same time, the political expression of individual value-priorities is facilitated by a shift in the balance of political skills between elites and mass.

The foregoing hypotheses sketch out our basic interests in very general terms. At this point, it may be helpful to give a more detailed description of our hypotheses concerning value change and how they might be tested.

It would be unrealistic to expect any change in basic values to transform an entire population at a single stroke. Material well-being and physical security, it appears, continue to be valued positively by most people. What may be changing is the relative priority accorded to given values. Traditional values such as affluence and security are relatively likely to be taken for granted among groups that place greater emphasis on a concern with quality of life.

Furthermore, we would not expect all age-groups to be equally
affected by the process encouraging value change. One of the more widely-accepted concepts of social science is the notion that individuals tend to form a certain basic character during their earlier years, and that this character has a diminishing probability of undergoing fundamental change during later years. The conditions encouraging value change in the posited directions have been present in most Western countries only during the last couple of decades. Consequently, we would expect the incidence of value change to be greatest among the younger age cohorts that received their early socialization during recent years. Furthermore, the "new" value priorities would not be found among an entire cohort in any monolithic fashion; we would expect them to be most probable among the more affluent and better educated strata of the younger cohorts. Thus if our general hypothesis is correct, the distribution of "post-materialist" values should become increasingly widespread in a given nation as time goes by. Cross-sectional analysis of a survey carried out at any given point in time should reveal a coherent relationship between the independent variables and type of value priorities. We should expect, for example, that the more affluent and more educated groups would be more likely to have post-materialist values. Cross-sectional analysis should also reveal a relationship between age-group and value type.

Any conclusive interpretation of such a pattern depends on the availability of time-series data, for the age-group pattern could reflect generational, life-cycle, or period effects, or some combination of the three (Foner, 1972; Hyman, 1972; Land, 1971; Ryder, 1965). The term "generation effect" indicates that cohorts are different and will remain different as they age; a life-cycle effect means that as the younger cohorts age they become more like the old, so that cohorts are roughly similar as they pass through the same stages of their life-cycles; a period effect reflects the impact of historical experiences that affect all the cohorts living at that time. An outstanding example of the need to consider all three effects is found in the literature dealing with age differences in partisanship in the United States (e.g., Crittenden, 1962; Cutler, 1969; Glenn and Hefner, 1972).

Many scholars have noted that the values and behaviors of individuals are greatly affected by the atmosphere of the period in which they developed their awareness of politics. For example, Butler and Stokes have written (1969: 59): "We must ask not how old the elector is but when it was he was young." And according to an Arab proverb: "Men resemble the times more than they do their fathers." These all recognize the enduring importance of early experience. But for the purposes of understanding the political significance of
social change the concept of generations may mask as much as it reveals. Dealing with an analogous problem, the art historian Pinder speaks of the "noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous," the fact that people born about the same time may have little except birthdays in common. It is possible, for example, for most of the differences between generations to be located in specific sub-groups of an age cohort, "key criterion groups" or what Mannheim called "generation units" (1972). We have already pointed out that the impact of the forces for change seems to be much greater on the college-educated generation unit than on the blue-collar. The generation units or "key criterion groups" that think and act together must be identified empirically. The methodological problems of interpretation occur, however, when investigation sustains the conclusion that the most significant changes, the biggest differences, occur between age cohorts rather than within.

At the simplest level the life-cycle effect means that on many variables the younger cohorts are different just because they are young, and hence will become more like the older cohorts as they themselves age. But the changes that we see taking place complicate the interaction of life-cycle and generational phenomena. Most of our understanding of political generations is, of course, based on the past; and in the past old people were not simply older, they were also less well educated, poorer, less secure, less well protected against illness, and less likely to live with other senior citizens in retirement villages and complexes. In short, old people in the future may not, in general, be like those of the past; and it would be unwarranted to expect them to possess the same political values and behaviors.

The third effect is that of the period. As the time perspective expands with longitudinal data, it is necessary to pay attention to the impact of significant events that have intruded upon the political scene. For example, the Depression seems to have had an important impact on the economic attitudes of people of all ages; and the Vietnam war undoubtedly contributes to the general decline in confidence in government that has been noted among all age groups.

Beyond recognizing the conceptual distinctions among the origins or causes of generational differences, the analytic task is to avoid the confusion that ensues when one source of change is confounded with a second. In particular, life-cycle effects—which will disappear with the passage of time—must not be taken for enduring generational or period effects that will persist over time. While recognizing the dangers involved in hypothesizing without adequate time-series data that would enable us to control for the effects of generation, life-cycle, and period, we believe that intergenerational
change is responsible for at least a substantial proportion of the difference in value priorities that seems to be present across age-groups.

If this is the case, cross-national comparisons should reveal a pattern that reflects the recent economic and social history of given countries. Those countries that are relatively affluent should have the highest overall levels of post-materialist values. But those countries that have experienced relatively rapid economic growth and relatively great discontinuities between the formative experiences of younger and older groups, such as Germany, France and Italy, should show considerably larger differences across age-cohorts than those countries that have experienced slower rates of change, such as Great Britain and the United States.

The hypotheses concerning value change were subjected to preliminary testing in 1970 and 1971 by Ronald Inglehart in the framework of two cross-national surveys sponsored by the European Community. While the primary focus of these surveys was on attitudes toward European integration and regional development, it was felt that these attitudes might reflect more general underlying values; and a series of items designed to tap an individual's value priorities was therefore included in each of these surveys. The most effective of these items proved to be one that asked the respondent to choose two of the following four items: fighting rising prices; giving the citizens more say in important government decisions; maintaining order in the nation; and protecting freedom of speech. Dimensional analysis revealed a relatively strong and consistent structure among these four items and indicated that they tapped a broad range of other preferences (Inglehart, 1974 forthcoming). On the basis of these responses, Inglehart constructed an index of value priorities: each respondent was categorized as having either "materialist", "post-materialist" or "mixed" values. Those who gave top priority to fighting rising prices and maintaining order were categorized as having "materialist" value priorities; those who gave top priority to giving the citizens more influence and protecting freedom of speech were categorized as "post-materialist"; those choosing other combinations were categorized as "mixed".

The most general prediction was that the old would be likelier to have materialist value priorities than the young; conversely, the post-materialist type should be more prevalent among the young. Table 1 shows the distribution of value types by age group in each of the six European countries. To simplify a complex table, only the two polar types are shown; the column headed "Mat." gives the percentage of materialists and the column headed "P-M" gives the percentage that is post-materialist within each age group; if one
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range of Cohort in 1971</th>
<th>Belgium Mat.</th>
<th>P-M.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Netherlands Mat.</th>
<th>P-M.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>France Mat.</th>
<th>P-M.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Italy Mat.</th>
<th>P-M.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Germany Mat.</th>
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<tr>
<td>16-25</td>
<td>20% 26 (487)</td>
<td>26% 20 (770)</td>
<td>25% 20 (754)</td>
<td>28% 21 (757)</td>
<td>22% 22 (544)</td>
<td>29% 13 (508)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>29% 16 (429)</td>
<td>25% 14 (696)</td>
<td>38% 13 (726)</td>
<td>37% 13 (650)</td>
<td>36% 14 (895)</td>
<td>28% 10 (680)</td>
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<td>35-45</td>
<td>29% 16 (473)</td>
<td>38% 11 (717)</td>
<td>40% 12 (697)</td>
<td>39% 9 (735)</td>
<td>47% 9 (768)</td>
<td>31% 8 (556)</td>
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<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>30% 11 (378)</td>
<td>34% 12 (547)</td>
<td>43% 10 (649)</td>
<td>46% 6 (710)</td>
<td>47% 7 (663)</td>
<td>35% 6 (796)</td>
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<tr>
<td>55-65</td>
<td>36% 9 (409)</td>
<td>39% 7 (455)</td>
<td>50% 5 (533)</td>
<td>48% 6 (571)</td>
<td>58% 4 (593)</td>
<td>41% 6 (662)</td>
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<tr>
<td>66+</td>
<td>46% 5 (474)</td>
<td>45% 5 (324)</td>
<td>52% 3 (700)</td>
<td>55% 3 (400)</td>
<td>55% 4 (474)</td>
<td>47% 4 (748)</td>
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<td>Difference between youngest and oldest groups:</td>
<td>-26 +21</td>
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<td>-33 +19</td>
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<td>Total difference:</td>
<td>47 points</td>
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wishes to know the percentage falling into the mixed types, one can simply add up the figures for the two polar types and subtract from 100.

The general relationship between age and value type clearly bears out our expectations. In France, for example, there is an immense preponderance of materialists over post-materialists among the oldest age group: 52 per cent are materialists and a bare 3 per cent are post-materialist. As one moves up the columns, following the historical sequence of the respective age-cohorts, the percentage of post-materialist types increases. Within the youngest cohort of those who were 16-25 years old in 1971 the two types are almost equally numerous: 25 per cent are materialist and 20 per cent post-materialist. The same general pattern appears in each of the other five countries. In every case the materialists greatly outnumber the post-materialist types among the older age-cohorts, but the balance shifts toward the post-materialists among the younger cohorts.

This pattern could reflect generational change or it could be simply a life-cycle effect. Conceivably, the young might tend to be relatively post-materialist simply because they are young, free from responsibilities, rebellious or idealist; it could be argued that when they become older, they might have the same preferences as the older groups. This possibility cannot be ignored. Fortunately, some other hypotheses can give us a clearer sense of whether these striking age group differences reflect intergenerational change or life-cycle effects.

Inglehart hypothesized that World War II was a major watershed in regard to the type of formative experiences that shaped the various European age cohorts. The group born after World War II is distinct from all the other age cohorts in that it has never experienced invasion or periods of severe economic deprivation. Many individuals within this cohort have been economically deprived; but all members of the older cohorts have experienced such events as postwar reconstruction, World War II, the Great Depression and perhaps World War I. The expectation, therefore, was that the distribution of value types should approximate a J-curve - with a sharp rise in the proportion of post-materialists and a drop in the proportion of materialists as one moves from the older groups to the post-war cohort.

This feature of the age-group is, in fact, present. Across the six countries, by far the largest shift in the distribution of value types occurs between the youngest and the second youngest cohorts, that is, between those who were less than 26 years old in 1971 and those who were older. This age-threshold does indeed demarcate the boundary between those who were born after World War II and those who were born earlier. We might call this the "World War II effect"
But this also happens to be an age when a good deal of life-cycle change, such as marriage, is apt to be occurring; a life-cycle interpretation is quite plausible in this connection. On the other hand, the second largest net shift is between those who were less than 56 years of age and those who were older. If the differences in value types were a result of life-cycle changes, one might expect to find a particularly marked shift associated with the age of 65 when one reaches retirement, but for the six countries as a whole this is not the case.

The hypotheses, that link expected age group patterns with the historical experience of a given country provide a more revealing test. There seems to be no particular reason why one would expect the life cycle of Englishmen, for example, to be different from that of Germans or Frenchmen. But the economic and political histories of these countries do differ in important respects: If the age-group differences in a given country correspond to changes in the conditions prevailing during a given generation's formative years, there would seem to be relatively firm ground for attributing these differences to historical change rather than life-cycle effects.

Inglehart's expectations were that the British public should show a relatively small amount of value change: Britain alone escaped invasion in World War II; and Britain was, comparatively wealthy prior to World War II but subsequently has had an economic growth rate about half as large as that of the other five countries. In respect to both physical and economic security, change has been less pronounced in Britain. The difference between the formative conditions of younger and older groups has been greater in all of the continental countries, but one might expect Germany to show a particularly large amount of value change. The contrast between conditions prevailing in 1930 and 1970, or between 1945 and 1970, is especially dramatic in the German case.

The figures at the bottom of Table 1 sum up the differences in distributions of value types for the six respective countries. Britain stands out clearly as the country in which the smallest amount of value change seems to have taken place. The difference between the youngest British cohort and the oldest totals 27 percentage points across the two value types. The amount of apparent change across the German age cohorts is nearly twice as large as in Britain: a total of 52 percentage points. The other four countries fall between these two extremes, most of them being closer to the German than to the British pattern. The amount of change in value types across a given country's age cohorts does seem to correspond to the amount of economic and political change that country has experienced. This suggests that the pattern of Table 1 might be attributed to the impact of historical events, rather than
life-cycle effects. If this is true, the value types seem highly resistant to modification during the lifetime of an individual: the distinctive responses of a given age-cohort may reflect experiences that took place a generation or more ago.

In 1972 and 1973, the value priorities items were included in national surveys carried out in the United States and Switzerland. The addition of these two countries to our data base seems particularly fortunate: their recent history has distinctive features which help us test the relationship between cohort experiences and value type.

The United States might be grouped with Great Britain in some respects. At the turn of the century, she already was relatively wealthy - far more so than any of the European countries. Like Britain (only more so), she had the advantages of geographical isolation and escaped invasion and devastation during the World Wars. Like Britain (only less so) her post-war economic progress has been slower than that of the original members of the Common Market. Her prevailing economic level has risen substantially, however, so an American sample should resemble the various European samples in one respect: the younger groups should be less Materialist, more Post-Materialist than the older ones. But one might expect the American population to show less change across age groups than any of the European populations except, perhaps, the British or Swiss.

The most striking feature of Swiss history, for our purposes, is the fact that she was neutral during both World Wars. The Netherlands, of course, has something in common with Switzerland, having been neutral during the First World War. But Switzerland alone was spared the direct impact of either cataclysm. Since World War II, she has become the most prosperous of our European countries. We might expect to find a relatively moderate amount of value change across the Swiss age groups. But we might also expect to find a relative absence of the "World War II effect".

Survey evidence bears out these expectations. Table 2 shows the distribution of the two "pure" value types by age in Switzerland and the United States. When we compare these results with Table 1, we note that the American sample shows the smallest amount of value change of any of the eight countries. The total is only about half as large as in Germany. While the oldest American cohort is less Materialist and more Post-Materialist than any of the corresponding European age cohorts, the youngest American cohort falls behind most of its European counterparts. By comparison with Western Europe, the United States is no longer a haven of tranquility. She has experienced severe and protracted foreign and domestic conflicts in recent years, coupled with crime rates incomparably higher than
Those of Western Europe: in a given year, a single American city may have as many murders as several West European countries combined. The turbulence of the past decade may have retarded a shift in values on the American scene.

Table 2

VALUE TYPES BY AGE COHORT: UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range of cohort in 1971</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mat. P-M N</td>
<td>Mat. P-M N</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-25</td>
<td>24% 17 (646)</td>
<td>27% 15 (131)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>27% 18 (683)</td>
<td>26% 17 (338)</td>
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<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>33% 13 (547)</td>
<td>30% 15 (298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>32% 10 (488)</td>
<td>35% 9 (333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>37% 6 (448)</td>
<td>34% 6 (265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66+</td>
<td>40% 7 (440)</td>
<td>50% 6 (308)</td>
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</table>

Total difference between youngest and oldest groups: 26 points. 32 points

The British and Swiss samples show the smallest amount of value change, after the American sample. But the Swiss sample shows another contrast with the other European populations: there is a complete absence of the "World War II effect". The overall pattern indicates a shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values as we move from older to younger groups, but the youngest group is not markedly more Post-Materialist than the next group—it is actually a little less so.

The finding seriously undermines a life-cycle interpretation of the data. In Germany, France, Italy and Belgium (though not in the Netherlands, as one might expect), the major threshold of value change falls between those who were born after World War II and those who were born before. In Germany, this transition by itself accounts for nearly half of the total change across six age cohorts. Currently, this threshold coincides with being over 25 years of age: one might be tempted to link it with the fact that one is starting to take on major responsibilities at this stage of life. The cross-national pattern makes this interpretation difficult to maintain.

Though the Swiss marry at roughly the same age as their European neighbors, they show no signs of a "World War II effect" (or an "Age-25 effect"). Furthermore, World War II seems to have left a considerably fainter imprint on the American and British publics than on the Germans or French—which is precisely what one would expect on the basis of the history of the respective countries. By and large, the distribution of value types across age groups has a decidedly better
fit with the economic and political history of given nations than with any plausible life-cycle model.

The only way to be absolutely certain that long-term value change is taking place is to measure a population’s values, wait ten or twenty years, and then measure them again. We don’t have such data. But the data that are available seem to suggest strongly that basic values of Western publics are changing.

Some Social Consequences of Individual-level Change

Survey research has repeatedly shown that those with higher incomes and middle-class occupations are more likely to express satisfaction with their incomes, jobs, housing and so forth than those with lower incomes and working-class occupations. It is not surprising that those who are economically better off, feel better off. Accordingly, the post-materialist group, which is predominately middle class, expresses a somewhat higher level of satisfaction with personal income and has markedly higher expectations that income will improve in the future than does the materialist type. This, too, is hardly surprising. The post-materialists are accustomed to a high economic level and take it for granted that they will have an even higher one in the future. This points up an important component of needs — they are cumulative. People do not turn against economic well-being once they have achieved it; rather, they take it for granted and worry about other things.

Political Realignments

Another finding is not at all obvious. Despite their relatively high socioeconomic level, the post-materialists are much more likely to express dissatisfaction with the political system than the materialist or mixed types. Western societies have been rather effective in raising income levels during the past quarter century; it would appear that they have been much less effective in attaining certain goals that the post-materialists value highly. Consequently, the post-materialists are far likelier to express a desire for radical political change than are the materialists or mixed types.

Furthermore, these preferences seem to influence political party choice. Those who were brought up in a family that supports a political party of what might loosely be termed the "Left" are relatively likely to emphasize values linked with self-expression rather than values linked with stability and order. Values have a strong influence on partisan identification even controlling for parental preferences. Those post-materialists who were brought up by parents supporting conservative parties show a pronounced tendency to shift their own support to parties of the "Left", especially the New Left in countries
where such parties exist. In view of the fact that the post-materialists tend to be recruited from the upper economic strata, this finding has fascinating implications relating to possible realignment of the social bases of political partisanship. It seems likely that in the future new support for parties of the left may be increasingly recruited from middle class sources, while status quo parties may draw their support more and more from an embourgeoisified working class. And it should be obvious that this political realignment would reflect vast changes in the social bases of conflict. The differences that we have noted between blue and white-collar youth may portend a very important shift in social conflict, with a portion of the middle class becoming radical while most of the working class and lower-middle class becomes increasingly conservative. This has been anticipated by several scholars writing from various perspectives, for example David Apter (1971).

The current evidence for this is only indicative, not conclusive. Data on the relationship between party preference and occupation, income, education and labor union membership make it clear that the industrial pattern of political cleavage has by no means disappeared. Nevertheless, it seems to be declining in importance.

In the early phases of industrial society, the population tended to be divided between a large mass of poorly-paid workers and a relatively small number of owners and managers having much higher incomes and a radically different life-style. In advanced industrial societies, the ranks of the middle class are greatly increased by growth in the number of people in managerial, technical, clerical and sales occupations; the relative number of manual workers diminishes but their income levels rise and the amount of leisure time at their disposal increases, with the result that many of them are able to adopt a life-style relatively close to conventional middle class standards.

The much criticized "middle majority" theory holds that as this process takes place, there is a decline in class conflict and a narrowing of party differences. As Lipset put it in an often-cited and controversial article, "In the long run, however, the remaining bases of ideologically intrinsic politics will continue to decline due to the contradiction between reality and their definition of the situation, and because of the irrelevance of their call to action in terms of a situation which will no longer exist" (Lipset, 1964). During the 1950s and early 1960s, writers with viewpoints as diverse as those of Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Kenneth Keniston, and Herbert Marcuse discussed the decline of ideological conflict with varying degrees of approval or dismay. Implicit in the discussion was the assumption that radical protest movements could be based only on
the working class. If the working class were no longer radical, therefore, the End of Ideology had been reached.

If the foregoing phrase is interpreted to imply the end of all conflict based on politically-relevant world views, the diagnosis was manifestly false. But in a narrower sense, the implications of the "middle majority" thesis may have been correct. There is still plenty of conflict, and much of it is ideological; but it is not the conventional conflict of working class against middle class. Protest comes from different sources, for different motives. The working class is no longer a revolutionary force. Data from the 1970 surveys bear this out.

Respondents in five countries were asked to rate their family's economic position on a seven-point scale, ranging from rich to poor. In one respect, the results support the concept that politics are economically determined; those who see themselves as poor or near the bottom of the economic spectrum are very likely to vote for the Left, while those who consider themselves rich are likely to vote for the Right.

But only a relative handful see themselves as falling at either extreme: the vast majority place themselves at the mid-point or one of the two adjacent points. This self-defined "middle majority" is smallest in Italy, where it nevertheless amounts to 78 per cent of the total sample. In the other countries it ranges from 86 to 94 per cent. Not many Europeans consider themselves poor even in Italy, the country having the largest stratum that is poor by objective standards. In part this perception may be based on a comparison between one's own economic circumstances today and in the recent past, rather than a comparison between oneself and others in the same society. For the relative distribution of incomes has not become appreciably more egalitarian in recent years, but absolute levels of income have risen, and the majority of both Europeans and Americans seem to think they are better off than they were in the past (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970; Reader's Digest Association, 1970).

Is it true, then, that the working class of West European countries no longer desires radical social change? An item in the 1970 surveys provides a test of this hypothesis. The item was worded:

"On this card are stated three basic attitudes toward the society in which we live. Would you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?"

"1. We must change the entire organization of our society by revolutionary action;"

"2. We must improve our society gradually by intelligent reforms;"

"3. We must defend our present society courageously against all subversive forces."
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>(699)</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>(737)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>(725)</td>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>(605)</td>
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<td>Farm</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<td>Farm</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>84%</td>
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<td>Working Class</td>
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<td>76%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>(370)</td>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>(370)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<td>Farm</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
Table 3 shows the responses to this item in the five countries for which we have data. Once again, we find indications of a large middle majority: at least three-quarters of the respondents favor gradual reform. Working class and middle class respondents support the revolutionary alternative in about equal proportions, but in none of the five countries is it favored by more than 9 per cent of any group. And in every one of the five countries, workers are more likely to favor a resolute defense of the present society than is the middle class. If support or opposition to social change is the essence of the left-right dimension, the working class appears to be more conservative in its attitudes than the middle class. It seems quite conceivable that the working class remains more likely to vote for the Left primarily because of traditional ties. If this is the case, one would expect a gradual decline in class-voting, as time goes by. Recent evidence suggests that this may, in fact, be taking place (Glenn, 1973; Abramson, 1971). Hence the Left must go beyond a working class base if it hopes to win elections. The emergence of a relatively large post-materialist section of the middle class offers the Left this opportunity, if it can appeal to the emerging group without alienating its traditional base.

National Institutions

Nationalism seems to be declining in the West (Inglehart, 1967; 1971). Governments have traditionally exploited patriotic symbols as sources of legitimacy for their actions. As popular support of these symbols declines, governments can no longer draw so easily on this resource of nationalistic sentiments. These sentiments are apparently not being transmitted to the young with the same fidelity as in the past.

Ongoing changes in individual value priorities may partially account for the decline in satisfaction with governmental outputs and institutions that has been documented in ISR surveys of American politics over the past decade (Miller, Brown, and Raine, 1973; Miller, 1972). The political and economic systems continue to produce outputs that respond relatively well to traditional demands, but they do not seem to provide adequate satisfaction for other needs and demands that are increasingly important among certain segments of the population. Changing values combine with a growing sense of the inadequacy of existing institutions to encourage the use of new and different political inputs, including protest activity and the formation of new political movements and organizations. These innovations are facilitated by the shift in the distribution of education: political skills are no longer concentrated largely among the holders of official and corporate roles, and formerly peripheral groups are
able to act as participants with an unprecedented degree of organizational skill.

At the same time, other groups oppose changing what they see as the rules of the game that they have come to believe in. They are unhappy with institutions, but the reason is that they don’t function as they once did rather than that they need to be changed. Hence the stage is set for a new polarization.

**Political Efficacy**

The importance of a sense of political efficacy, which is closely related to what others refer to as ego strength or personal competence, has been widely documented. Noting the present juxtaposition in the United States of high levels of individual political competence with low levels of confidence in the system, Gamson finds this a fertile situation for the "effective mobilization of discontent" (1968). Indeed, Campbell and Converse have shown that belief that "voting is not the only way to influence politics" is increasing, with most of the gain accounted for by the better educated, who are, of course, the group most involved in the new politics (1972). To be sure, a sense of efficacy as measured by other items seems to have declined. The 1960s saw increased agreement with the proposition, "politics is too complicated to understand", and this agreement was most widespread among those with limited education. Almond and Verba have demonstrated the political importance of "subjective political competence" (1963) and Brim has emphasized the significance of the opposite of efficacy in his analysis of "fatalism" (1969). Certainly increasing belief that one can alter things, or even the belief that one should be able to alter things, has immense political significance. If rising educational levels are not always associated with an increasing sense of efficacy, as is suggested by the recent work of Converse, this also has important political implications.

**Public Issues**

If material concerns lessen in relative importance, there may be a decline in the importance of issues that reflect the stratification system of industrial society; ideology, ethnicity, lifestyle, and so on may assume greater importance. Or perhaps class politics will decline in favor of status or cultural or "Ideal" politics (Foner, 1972; Lipset, 1964).

We see the outlines of some consequences of change in current demands for participation in decisions that affect one's life, whether it is in schools, universities, welfare agencies, offices, factories or church. If these demands are sustained there will be substantial changes in a wide variety of institutions.
Along with demands for participation, there seem to be new types of issues brought into the political arena, issues that derive more from differences in lifestyle than from economic needs. Examples are such things as protection of the environment, the quality of life, the role of women, the redefinition of morality, drug usage, and broader public participation in both political and non-political decision making. Few of these issues are completely new. What is changing is their quantitative importance for various national political systems. Conservation of natural resources, for example, has been a subject of political controversy for many decades; and students have been politically active for about as long as there have been students. Nevertheless it is difficult to find precedents for the triumph of environmental interests over major economic interests of a magnitude comparable to that reflected in the rejection of the proposed American supersonic transport or the Alaskan pipeline. Likewise, it is difficult to find a precedent for the fact that students now make up a larger proportion of the American population than does organized labor.

The emergence of these new issues presents the existing political parties with a dilemma. If they realign themselves to appeal to the new groups they risk losing their existing constituencies. The "new politics" often clash with strongly held traditional values and norms. This has resulted in pressures toward the formation of new political parties and attempts by spokesmen for the new values to influence and capture existing parties. On the American scene, the pressures for revision of the traditional party system were reflected in 1968 by the emergence of the McCarthy movement and the Wallace candidacy, and McGovern's nomination in 1972 (Levitin and Miller, 1972).

New parties and movements have emerged in other advanced countries. Some of these are similar to previous parties, but with new and different types of organization and policies. Other movements reject involvement in normal electoral politics and become part of an "extra-parliamentary opposition". The politics of classical industrial society were based on mass parties and associated movements such as trade unions and church-related organizations that were generally bureaucratic and oligarchical in structure. Emerging cultural values emphasize spontaneity and individual self-expression. Furthermore, the expansion of education means that increasing numbers of people are available with political skills that enable them to play roles previously limited to a small political elite. For both objective and subjective reasons the old parties are being challenged by new forces that seem less and less amenable to an elite-directed type of organization.

Insofar as these demands of newly articulate groups cannot be
accommodated within existing structures, support for governmental institutions may erode. Governments face the same dilemma as the parties: to the extent that governing elites reorient themselves along the new lines they risk suffering a backlash from groups imbued with traditional values. Governments can no longer rely on appeal to nationalism and patriotism as much as in the past. Rising skill levels have been accompanied by a declining emphasis on such values as national security, which traditionally justified the existence of a strong nation-state.

It may be that there is no more dissatisfaction among mass publics today than in the past. But there is reason to believe that the type of dissatisfaction now most likely to lead to protest has different roots from those of the past. If this is true, it poses difficult problems for the policy-makers of these societies. In industrial society, it was often taken for granted that economic indicators could give a pretty accurate measure of public well-being. But insofar as change is taking place in the basic goals of Western publics, the familiar indicators such as income per family are likely to provide a less and less adequate yardstick of satisfaction. Insofar as policy-makers seek to promote the general welfare, they will need to take subjective aspects of well-being more and more into account. An increasingly articulate and politically sophisticated public may leave them little choice.
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SUMMARY OF THE SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS AND PROPOSALS

by

Angus Campbell and Burkhard Strumpel (Rapporteurs)

A working seminar of social scientists from OECD member countries on both sides of the Atlantic met in Paris between May 15 and 17, 1972, to undertake:

1. a comprehensive review of psychological indicators of social change, their theoretical substance and validity, their ability to capture important subjective trends, their present and potential usefulness and application,

2. an exploitation of new and important areas of survey measurement of subjective or psychological phenomena (attitudes, values, aspirations, expectations, satisfactions, perceptions), and

3. a programmatic mapping of resulting research priorities.

The following considerations, proposals, and suggestions for areas for research emerged:

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

The history of social science has seen various attempts to determine the extent of social and individual welfare. All these attempts, be it the mercantilist's emphasis on the maximization of population and precious metals, the classical economist's notion that a nation's wealth is based on productive labor, or the modern welfare economist's equation of an individual's or household's income or wealth with its welfare, have been characterized by situational approaches. The individual or nation that has command over more material resources is considered to be better off. The recent stress on measuring nonmaterial attributes of well-being such as health, working conditions, physical environment, victimization by crime, and so forth can be viewed as a systematic extension of the situational approach. Yet these approaches go only part of the way toward meeting the present information needs of public policy and toward utilizing the potential of modern empirical social research. Even a modified and refined situational approach needs to be supplemented...
by theoretically valid measures of psychological variables for three reasons:

1. various people differ and change in the way they perceive a given situation and past trends, as well as, most critically, in their expectations for the future;

2. various people, even those in similar situations, differ and change as to their needs or wants, their values, demands, aspirations, in short, as to the yard-stick they apply to translate their situation into subjective welfare, and consequently, as to their sense of satisfaction with a given situation, and

3. people differ and change in the way they react to and are able to cope with given levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The consequences of a discrepancy between goals and perceived realization range from constructive action to goal reduction, perceptual distortion, and systemic blame, impairment of self-esteem, depression, and finally mental illness.

At present, broadly designed surveys of life quality are underway both in the United Kingdom and the United States. These surveys have been based mainly on the concept of "satisfaction", spreading a network of satisfaction questions over the universe of individual experience. This work has established the potential of such measures as indicators of subjective welfare; it also has pointed to the conceptual issues which further developmental work on subjective indicators must yet resolve.

First there is the question as to the extent to which satisfaction measures express subjective or individual welfare. Satisfaction may reflect either goal attainment or the acceptance of its impossibility (the accommodation to an immutable reality) and dissatisfaction may express either a sense of deprivation (inequity and bitterness) or a constructive and needed disengagement from the present circumstances which precedes efforts for improvement.

Secondly there is the question as to the extent to which measures of individual satisfaction represent societal welfare and thus can claim to be useful as policy criteria. Satisfaction may restrain people in highly valued social pursuits, and dissatisfaction may frequently stimulate social progress through individual or collective action.

Finally there is the semantic question of response bias in the measurement of satisfaction. This can result either from the different meanings people attach to the term "satisfaction" or from differences between groups and nations in the openness with which they express their feelings. The latter consideration calls for restraint particularly in the interpretation of satisfaction scales.
II. PROPOSALS

Proposal 1: The role of Subjective Indicators in Social Reporting

Subjective indicators of individual well-being should be considered indispensable components of the current efforts to supplement the conventional statistics of income and standard of living through broader measures of social welfare (social indicators). These subjective indicators should relate to people's satisfactions and dissatisfactions, perceptions and expectations, stress and anxieties, and to needs, values, and aspirations in various life domains. They ought to become components of regular governmental statistical reporting. The seminar sees the importance of subjective indicators for three levels of research:

a) intertemporal analysis (following time trends or changes)
b) cross-national analysis
c) intracultural analysis (following differences between subgroups)

Proposal 2: Implementation and Methodology

The monitoring of subjective welfare and related psychological measures requires the systematic and repeated implementation by surveys with representatively selected cross-sections of adults. The periodicity of these measurements should be adjusted to the rate of change in the area in question. While, for example, for monitoring economic orientations short intervals (monthly or quarterly) are appropriate given the speed of changes in the economy, fields like health and crime will be sufficiently served with surveys conducted over longer intervals. Although a large initial payoff can be expected from one-shot surveys, mainly for cross-national and intracultural comparisons at one point in time, the full potential of psychological indicators, like that of others, can only be tapped through a repeated application. The task consists both of measuring and explaining change over time and of disaggregating change to account for differences at any point in time between societies or their subgroups. Social science methodology has developed models and techniques for linking series of cross-sections. Progress has been made in the analysis of social processes and causation.

Proposal 3: Conceptualizing Subjective Well-Being

The seminar proposes as a step toward the development of a theoretically valid and practicable monitoring effort, the implementation of surveys in the member countries to ascertain people's
evaluation of their quality of life in various domains. For the reasons stated in Section I, it is recommended that, depending on the specific context, measures of satisfaction in the various life domains must be supplemented through other measures of adaptation and well-being or their reverse, such as, expectations, stress, anxiety, depression, perception of risk or security, identification, fate control, and own action. Furthermore, insofar as satisfaction can be seen as capturing the distance between what people have and what they would like to have, a consideration of aspiration levels and their dynamics is called for.

Proposal 4: Linking Subjective Well-Being to Environment, Person and Behavior

It is the view of the seminar that the objective of developing social indicators raises as many theoretical issues as measurement problems, and that the results of this effort can only become meaningful to the extent that they contribute to our theoretical understanding of social structure and change. Data on perception and evaluation of well-being ought to be analyzed in their linkage with:

a) the environment,
b) the person,
c) his behavior, and
d) other areas of subjective well-being.

While there is no mechanistic relationship between objective and subjective changes, as mentioned above, a thorough analysis of the impact of the environment on people's feeling is called for. Likewise the interaction of this impact with personal characteristics like intelligence, level of information and knowledge, values, aspiration, and motivation levels requires considerable attention. And the link between measures of well-being and behavior (or other areas of evaluation) besides being of theoretical interest, may sometimes have predictive potential as an early warning indicator. Examples are the relation between marital satisfaction and the divorce rate; or between satisfaction with income and standard of living and the rate of saving or sales of consumer durables; or the translation of personal economic dissatisfaction into dissatisfaction with the economy, economic policy, or government; or the influence of the sense of external control of one's life or orientation toward the system and inclination toward collective action.
III. MAPPING OF AREAS FOR RESEARCH

Specific Areas

From the almost unlimited range of observable indicators in the area under discussion, we selected those representing aspects of social reality for which, besides their likely importance for social policy, the following criteria applied:

a) Considerable changes have been observed and further changes are expected;
b) There is a clear interaction of the subjective indicator with the social environment and its change;
c) The phenomenon represented by the indicator is accessible to intervention. For this reason the areas of family life as well as many aspects of time use among others have been neglected in the subsequent specification.

In some areas, the concepts and instruments have been sufficiently tested in at least one country so that the measurement can be immediately implemented across countries. This is recommended (with the qualifications spelled out in Section I) in particular for a network of measures of evaluation and satisfaction in several life domains and for a broad range of orientations in the employment, income, and consumption areas. With some lead-time, measures can be developed in the areas of physical and mental health, perception of the physical and social environment, threat and victimization of crime, confidence in institutions and processes, perceived distributional equity, and change in value and preferred life styles. In all of these fields, most of which are listed in detail below, work is already under way.

Health

Perception of one's health, both physical and mental, is basic to other values and indicators of personal effectiveness. A minimal level of health is necessary for adequate functioning in life roles, and ill health nearly always results in interference with other goals. Impairments in major role performances may dramatically affect attitudes toward and perceptions of other life domains.

While physical and mental health are sufficiently separate to require some special studies, there is a great deal of overlap; this interrelationship is strong enough that, for studies of social indicators, both can often be integrated in single studies.

Many studies of health and illness are oriented toward a medical viewpoint, inquiring about symptoms, chronic and acute illnesses, handicaps, and such. While these approaches often overlap with the concerns of social scientists, there are also major areas of divergence.
In non-medical studies of health indicators and their effects, the focus is on subjective health; that is, the individual's own experience and perception of his health. Similarly, when investigating the need for medical care, the availability of services, and the perception of these services, it is the respondents' subjective knowledge and attitudes and their implication for health-seeking behavior, which is wanted.

To understand medical care needs and anticipate social policy implications it is necessary to have information on how the individual's perception of himself and of the medical care system differs from the objective information and knowledge of the experts.

It is equally as important to learn the reasons for these disparities. Some may represent the respondent's incomplete or faulty information, but others may be based on different experiences in quality of care. Understanding these discrepancies and their sources is necessary to health planning.

Specifically, studies of health indicators would include the following topics:

1. Perception of level of health in terms of functional ability in major life roles - occupational, family, social, and personal. These include perception of both physical and psychological impairments, level of energy, pain, money, concern, and so forth. Perception of prognosis is particularly relevant. Future expectations are basic to present attitudes and understanding health behavior. Why does a person have certain expectations? With what degree of confidence can one cope, psychologically and financially, with anticipated health states? How does one perceive his risks compared to other people?

2. Use of the medical care system and other health-seeking behavior. What medical care does a person perceive that he needs and what does he think is available? Facilitators and barriers toward seeking help are also relevant, including attitudes toward medical care facilities and personnel, perception of adequacy of care and effectiveness of treatment, and such factors as knowledge and perception of cost, and convenience.

3. Both subjective and objective health can be expected to show major changes as the person grows older. In addition to this major life cycle change there will be other cyclical changes of shorter duration such as illness, injury, and depression. Each person will have several frames of reference in evaluating these changes in his health; health and energy level are compared to what they were in earlier years, to
what is expected or "normal" for one age, and to one's concept of what is "normal" and desirable. Perception of health may also have sudden and at times dramatic shifts, with catastrophic effects on life roles. Which are the factors which influence one's perceptions and attitudes change? Are expectations for health rise generally, do criteria by which people assess their health also change?

Health requirements differ greatly by occupational and other role requirements. Thus a person who is disabled for one type of work or life style would be but slightly handicapped for another. Occupation and major life roles thus become a relevant variable when studying health perceptions.

Economic Orientations
(Income and Standard of Living)

The seminar considered economic orientations, an area where data collection for establishing social indicators should start immediately, given the extent of conceptualization and preparatory empirical work.

People's financial situation is described as unsatisfactory much more frequently than any other major domain in people's lives, as both British and American data show. Even most Americans have a hard time making ends meet; they state, for example, that their income is not enough to live as comfortably as they would like to at this time. Almost every household's economic situation is in a state of permanent flux brought about by changes in wages, salaries, prices, and labor force participation. Economic change, therefore, involves an unusual amount of accommodation, social comparison, stress, and fear of future contingencies threatening people's level of living. Since most of this change is being attributed by people to events outside their control but within the control of others including particularly the government, this is an area where macrosocial events and political action demonstrably impinge on well-being. Economic dissatisfaction also is a powerful source of societal conflict.

A number of measures stand ready for immediate implementation on a regular basis in a cross-culturally comparative context. First, there is the area of "consumer sentiment", that is, people's psychological reaction to current economic developments that have been monitored in the United States (The University of Michigan) for the past 25 years and have recently been initiated by the European Communities in Brussels for the six member countries. A favorable evaluation of the economic situation, both personal and for the economy as a whole, has been established to be an early indicator of buying activity.
Secondly, while the present focus of the work on consumer sentiment is on analyzing and predicting consumer demand, there is a need for more comparative research capturing psychological predispositions of long-term behavioral change: economic life plans and life styles, the extent of aspirations for and saturation with consumer goods, and long-term expectations of well-being and economic prosperity for the country. Data of this type need to be combined with behavioral statistics on important and probably changing items of consumption, labor force participation (e.g., women, time of retirement), and debt incurrence, all on the level of private households rather than aggregates.

Thirdly, it is proposed that efforts be made to monitor orientations reflecting system performance and evaluation, such as sense of individual economic success or failure, of equity, and of sufficiency of own income and remuneration compared to others. It is also worth following how people's claims for the rewards of the system relate to their willingness to provide inputs in terms of work, mobility, and sacrifice.

Fourthly, there should be measurements of subjective market performance, namely, orientations toward quality, prices, and services - another area on which developmental work has already been done. And finally, the needs for and potential satisfaction with alternative packages of public goods and services need to be explored.

In summary, we recommend immediately implementing the monitoring of:

a) economic perceptions and expectations (both of personal income and material well-being and for the economy as a whole),
b) sense of material security, particularly for old age, of protection against the material hazards of life, long-term economic expectation, aspirations, and life-designs as well as of slowly changing ways of economic behavior,
c) perceptions of equity, of remuneration, and of own economic performance compared to that of others,
d) evaluation of market performance, as expressed in satisfaction with prices, quality, supply, and such of the goods and services offered. We also propose undertaking developmental work on economic values and role perceptions, consumer information, and satisfaction with the supply of public services.

Quality of Employment

The seminar recognizes the need to conduct special surveys among members of the labor force for the following purposes:

1. Economic perceptions and expectations (both of personal income and material well-being and for the economy as a whole).
2. Sense of material security, particularly for old age, of protection against the material hazards of life, long-term economic expectation, aspirations, and life-designs as well as of slowly changing ways of economic behavior.
3. Perceptions of equity, of remuneration, and of own economic performance compared to that of others.
4. Evaluation of market performance, as expressed in satisfaction with prices, quality, supply, and such of the goods and services offered. We also propose undertaking developmental work on economic values and role perceptions, consumer information, and satisfaction with the supply of public services.
1. To obtain data on the frequency and severity of various types of problems experienced by workers in connection with their employment;

2. To establish baseline and continuing data for studies of social trends;

3. To establish relationships between the quality of employment and such consequences as satisfaction and mental health; and

4. To further develop the theory and the measurement technology for use in comparative studies and trend studies.

Past studies in the United States indicate that while most employed people report definite satisfaction with their employment, virtually all experience some problems that reduce their degree of satisfaction. The specific aspects of employment most strongly associated with reduced satisfaction are those reflecting the challenge of the job (job difficulty, variety, autonomy, use of one's abilities). Aspects of employment least associated with satisfaction are those reflecting the comfort of the job (ease, pleasant environment, absence of stress, convenience of hours). These results apply to all segments of the work force, including those in the lowest as well as the highest status employment. Intermediate in their importance for satisfaction are job characteristics pertaining to pay, relation with co-workers, and availability of job-related resources, such as information, responsibilities, help and equipment, and supervision.

Further analyses need to be made to assess the work values and quality of employment of such segments of the work force as women, Blacks, foreign workers, the self-employed, and blue-collar workers. The questions to be sought in the data include the following:

1. Are women objectively disadvantaged as to pay relative to men of similar qualifications? Do they experience and report discrimination on the basis of their sex? Do minority groups evaluate the quality of their employment by reference to the same priority values as do their majority counterparts of similar age, education, and job status?

2. Are self-employed workers more satisfied with their employment than other-employed workers in comparable occupation although some value "trade-offs" occur?

3. In what way and to what extent is alienation from one's work and from society associated with the quality of employment, as well as with the workers category as to age, sex, race, "collar color," education, or pay?

It is suggested that consideration must be given also to the value perspectives of persons other than the job occupant himself. Job satisfaction is not sufficient as an indicator of the quality
of employment, in future research provision must be made for the values of employers (the effective and economical utilization of the work force, and the enhancement of performance capabilities) and also for the values of society (individual health and welfare, over the life cycle, reduction of the public costs associated with work-induced physical and social disabilities).

Time and Leisure

Although the first impulse when one thinks of time use and leisure is to commission collections of "time budgets" - strict accountings of the way in which individuals spend some fixed period of time, usually 24 hours - we recommend only limited work of this immediate kind, if any at all. The reasons are several. To be done well, such studies involve an uncommonly large investment of interviewing time. They also demand samples of unusual size and timing, since over the course of days of the week and weekends, not to mention seasons of the year, there are numerous obvious sources of variation in time use which are in themselves unexciting but which must be controlled to arrive at more interesting results. Furthermore, all evidence to date suggests that within the relatively gross terms in which activities are coded, variations in time-use structures for aggregates are remarkably limited, either between countries or longitudinally within the same country. While there are various administrative uses for such time-budgets or activity-sequence data, many of them presuppose an enormous density of sampling, as in the instances of their use to chart daily movements of population within urban areas, or in instances where the events to be monitored occur only rarely on any given day in any segment of population, such as the use of various public recreation facilities. In other words, if we are thinking of monitoring total national adult populations, full-blown time-budget studies do not stand up well in cost-benefit terms, although perhaps one such study every ten years or so would be warranted.

However, we could recommend some more frequent monitoring of popular feelings about time use, including personal satisfaction with the extent of spare time (in different population segments it may be too little or too much), working time, and vacation time. Attitudes toward the timing of retirement are useful indicators. It may also be of value to monitor in abbreviated form the types of activities that are preferred by individuals, as uses of their limited discretionary time, as well as the barriers (money, health, training, inadequately-sized blocks of true discretionary time) that prevent people from engaging in some leisure activities that otherwise attract them.
The citizens of modern societies are in constant contact with institutions of the state. They encounter official authority in many domains of their lives: in education, medical care, welfare services, police protection, the courts, taxation, and regulations of many kinds. As societies become more urbanized and more complex, these encounters become more frequent.

The sense of fulfillment of those needs which are widely considered to be public tasks—national and physical security, welfare services, taxes, environmental protection—are legitimate and important indicators by themselves. In addition, however, the morale of the citizenry is determined in large part by their direct experience and dealings with the institutions of public authority. Their willingness to cooperate positively with state institutions will be influenced by the degree to which they feel these agencies behave with equity, consideration, and competence. It is not likely, for example, that the tax collecting authority will receive full conformity to its requirements if it is seen to be corrupt or unfair in its application of these regulations to individual cases, or that the welfare worker will be received favorably by her clients if she is seen as a spy for a punitively oriented office, or that the ordinary citizen will maintain confidence in his government if he comes to believe it has become unprincipled and unresponsive.

At the present time most societies appear to rely on very inadequate means of assessing public reaction to the quality of the services they provide. They may depend on fluctuations in the vote in national and local elections to indicate approval or disapproval of governmental performance but these shifts are subject to a great many different influences and are often very difficult to interpret. Specific governmental agencies may keep records of complaints or commendations which they use as a kind of feedback regarding their performance. These, however, are subject to all the self-serving impulses which are inherent whenever an agency undertakes to assess its own activities.

Since the character of modern life is so strongly influenced by the activities of state institutions, it is important that procedures be devised for monitoring the quality of these services. Whenever feasible, objective measures should be developed and standardized to provide information on the functioning of specific agencies, for example, on the time required to settle legal cases in the courts or to provide hospital care to different types of patients. It will be necessary, however, to go far beyond the restricted kinds of data which official records provide into a broad program of subjective measures of the quality of public experience with these public services.

Institutional Environment
A program of this kind would include not only a simple accounting of the number of contacts the individual has with official agencies of one kind or another but a record of the quality of these experiences as they are seen by him. Were they seen as supportive or oppressive, efficient or inefficient, satisfying or frustrating, pleasant or unpleasant? Do they increase public confidence in government or diminish it? It is only through direct report of the individuals involved that it is possible to learn what is psychologically real for these people who are presumably being served by the various state institutions.

It is imperative that this program of assessment of the quality of public services be continued through time and that its findings become public information. Comparable data which accumulate through time provide the documentation of change and greatly expand our understanding of change. The public interest in these data is not properly served if they are restricted to official circles; their major purpose is defeated if they do not become part of the public's fund of information about the institutions they support.

Physical Environment

Until recently, man has demonstrated a miraculous ability to adapt to a variety of pollutants existing in the physical environment. In part, people have adapted because they were unaware of the conditions which existed around them. An increasing awareness has been fostered by those individuals who suggested that these conditions can have a deleterious effect on people's behavior and psychological well-being. Nevertheless few efforts have been made to systematically identify the effects of environmental conditions on man. Efforts that have been made have focused primarily on the physiological consequences of exposures to adverse environmental conditions. We suggest that more attention be given to the sociopsychological consequences of prolonged exposure to these conditions. As a first step, it is recommended that efforts be made to identify people's perceptions of a number of pollutants existing in the environment. Besides air, water, and noise pollution which are commonly accepted environmental insults to one's senses, attention should be given to how people respond to the physical environment, in terms of what they see. The concept of visual pollution is one which is still in its infancy stage but one which has great promise of intensifying through increased urbanization. At the same time, increases in numbers of people create conditions which more and more people will consider as crowded. The extent to which crowding is perceived as stressful needs to be determined.

An issue which must be addressed is the range of environments
in which people operate and to which they respond. One such environment common to all individuals is the home. The home consists of an individual dwelling, the land associated with it, and its immediate surroundings generally described as a neighborhood. As part of the physical environment, we suggest that efforts be made to monitor people's perceptions of dwelling size, indoor and outdoor privacy, noise levels, availability of and access to open space and services, and so forth. Aspects of the social environment which people can assess are the socioeconomic mix of residents, the racial and ethnic composition, the perceived similarity of people and the degree to which people see these conditions as changing.

IV. CONCLUSION

The seminar believes that a skillful and concerted cross-culturally comparative effort as outlined could lead to large advances toward an empirical theory and the understanding of social change. It is convinced that the effort specified above, from the outset necessitates intensive and organized international cooperation, which is emphasized for two reasons:

1. in order to facilitate progress in solving the indicated methodological problems;
2. in order to move the effort toward fast dissemination of methodological and substantive knowledge produced in individual countries.

This is why it is so important that OECD succeed in establishing agreement among Member countries on the specific subjective concerns and measures to be undertaken in the first-generation system of social indicators. With generally comparable data and the analysis which this will make possible (and with the occasional aid and guidance of OECD meetings of social scientists with both governmental and academic affiliation), the progress toward a more perceptive system of psycho-social measurement and toward a more adequate understanding of social goals and processes can be sharply accelerated.
Annex

MEETING ON THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING AND SOCIAL CHANGE
15–17 May, 1972

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