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ABSTRACT

This document, which is a general survey of recent developments in faculty collective bargaining, reports on: the extent of collective bargaining and its projected growth in the next two or three years; the patterns of faculty bargaining in the various states; governance; faculty senates; collective bargaining; and student involvement in the collective bargaining process. Some observations are that: faculty collective bargaining is primarily a phenomenon of the public sector of higher education; growth of faculty collective bargaining, to date, has closely paralleled the enactment of state collective bargaining laws; enactment of new enabling laws in states where such action appears imminent is likely to produce a new acceleration of faculty collective bargaining activity in the public sector; state bargaining laws rarely recognize college and university faculty as special categories of public employees; the structure of collective bargaining varies considerably from state to state; failure to exclude traditional governance mechanisms from the scope of bargaining has raised the possibility that faculty senates and other traditional governance mechanisms are illegal; collective bargaining provides a new framework for a redistribution of authority and responsibility in academic governance. In conclusion the document discusses the centralization and homogenization of faculty personnel policies on the part of state governments and legislatures and the unionization of middle management. (Author/KP)
A Survey of Experience
In Academic Collective Bargaining

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by

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Introduction

This paper is a general survey of recent developments in faculty collective bargaining. Like any survey it suffers from an attempt to generalize about phenomena which do not arrange themselves into "neat" classifications. A more detailed analysis of the developments reported here would show remarkable variability in the practices and implications of faculty bargaining in postsecondary education.

The paper first reports on the extent of collective bargaining and its projected growth in the next two or three years. The patterns of faculty bargaining in the various states are then presented and this is followed by a discussion of governance, faculty senates and collective bargaining. The final section is a summary of student involvement in the collective bargaining process.

The Extent of Faculty Collective Bargaining

There are three major points that can be made about present and future status of collective bargaining in institutions of higher education. First, faculty collective bargaining is primarily a phenomenon of the public sector of higher education. There are now approximately 255 bargaining units representing about 90,000 faculty at 385 campuses across the United States. Three hundred and thirty-one (86 percent) of these campuses are public. While two-year campuses initially dominated faculty bargaining activity in the public sector, there are now 107 public and 47 private four-year campuses at which faculty are represented by bargaining agents (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1975, p. 5).

The second point is that the growth of faculty collective bargaining, to date, has closely paralleled the enactment of state collective bargaining
laws. Between 1965-1972, the growth of faculty collective bargaining was dominated by activity in a few heavily populated and relatively industrialized states that adopted enabling legislation before 1970. By 1973, there were a total of 161 organized institutions in Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania—representing 76 percent of the organized institutions in the country at that time. James Begin (1974, p. 79) documented a "slowdown" in the growth of faculty collective bargaining during 1973—a pattern that continued in 1974, leading some observers to predict a declining interest in the phenomenon. One of the major factors leading to the apparent "loss of momentum" in 1973, however, was the early proliferation of faculty bargaining units in the five states mentioned above. By early 1973, 79 percent of the 205 public institutions in this group of states had adopted collective bargaining, leaving little room for further growth.

Third, the enactment of new enabling laws in states where such action appears imminent is likely to produce a new acceleration of faculty collective bargaining activity in the public sector. According to the Carnegie Commission (1973, p. 6) there are approximately 1,313 public college and university campuses in the United States. As already noted, the faculties of 331 of these campuses, or about 25 percent of the total, are currently represented by bargaining agents.

Given the current status of legislative activity in the states, a fairly conservative projection would indicate that an additional 135 campuses will be unionized by 1978 or 1979 and that the new total will account for about one-third of all public campuses. It is possible that the figure will go as high as 230 additional campuses for a new total of approximately 40 percent of all public campuses (Mortimer and Johnson, 1975, pp. 3 and 26).
Activity in the States

Collective bargaining in the public sector is regulated or influenced by a collage of state labor laws and/or ad hoc agreements. Some 20 to 23 states now have statutes which permit collective bargaining for public employees and which have been interpreted to include college faculty and non-teaching professionals. In addition, some community colleges bargain under municipal statutes (e.g., Chicago City Colleges) and some institutions bargain or have held elections on the basis of mutual agreements between the faculties and representatives of the governing board. Even without statutory mandates the University of Colorado has experienced an election and the University of Cincinnati and Youngstown State in Ohio have agreed to bargain.

There are some general observations about the framework for faculty bargaining in states with bargaining statutes. First, state bargaining laws rarely recognize college and university faculty as "special" categories of public employees, if indeed, they are. If higher education is different from other public agencies, those differences, for the most part, are not reflected in statutes (the Oregon statute does have special two-step election procedure for higher education and the Montana law has special clauses on bargainable items and student involvement in bargaining).

Second, the structure for collective bargaining varies considerably from state to state. In three complex multi-campus systems, the City and State Universities of New York and the University of Hawaii, the faculty of two- and four-year colleges are collapsed into one bargaining unit. In Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont and a number of other states, the higher education system is divided into separate segments and each handles bargaining activity separately.
In a few states, e.g., Massachusetts and Montana negotiations are on a campus-by-campus basis.) Massachusetts and Pennsylvania provide good examples of the variability in bargaining units.

In Massachusetts, higher education is controlled by five different governing boards: The University of Massachusetts Board, which controls three campuses; the Massachusetts State College Board of Trustees, which governs an eleven campus system; the Massachusetts Board of Regional and Community Colleges, which governs a 15 campus system; the Board of South-eastern Massachusetts University; and the Board of Lowell Technological Institute, which will merge with Lowell State College in 1976 to form Lowell University. Each of these governing boards is responsible for negotiating contracts with its faculty, should the faculty choose to bargain collectively. Up to 1974, the State College Board negotiated on a campus-by-campus basis with 8 of 11 campuses. During the current negotiations, the Board negotiates all items on a campus-by-campus basis with 4 faculties represented by the NEA and on a two-tier basis with 3 faculties represented by AFT. The Community College Board is currently in unit hearings to determine whether it will have to continue to negotiate on a campus-by-campus basis with the faculties at three colleges or whether there will be one systemwide unit.

In Pennsylvania, the public higher education system is divided into three sectors. There are four state-related universities: Lincoln University, The Pennsylvania State University, Temple University, and The University of Pittsburgh. Each governing board has the authority to negotiate contracts and to make whatever financial agreements are required. To date, only Temple and Lincoln have dealt with their faculties collectively, although the University of Pittsburgh will probably have an election in the next year. In the cases of Lincoln and Temple, both institutions have
made agreements which are legally binding on them, whether or not the legislature appropriates sufficient funds. Both Penn State and the University of Pittsburgh have successfully resisted petitions to split off branch campuses from the main campus in order to hold separate elections.

The second major sector in Pennsylvania is the state-owned colleges and Indiana University of Pennsylvania. These fourteen campuses have a board, the State College and University Board of Directors, but the essential elements of control rest with the Pennsylvania Department of Education. The Department is responsible for line-item analysis of college budgets and for negotiating one collective bargaining agreement for the faculty of the entire 14 campuses.

A third sector of higher education in Pennsylvania is the fourteen community colleges. Each college has the authority to negotiate with its faculty and arrive at agreements which are to be funded by their sponsoring school districts or local boards. The faculty at eleven of the fourteen have chosen an agent. This separate sector bargaining appears to be the dominant pattern and will probably be adopted in California, Illinois, and Connecticut should legislation be passed in these states.

The structure for collective bargaining in Michigan constitutes a third category. The universities in that state were chartered with a high degree of autonomy. Consequently, there is no centralized bargaining structure in Michigan. Representatives of the board for each institution negotiate their agreements with faculty and present their budgets directly to the legislature.
A fourth structural category for collective bargaining occurs in Rhode Island. In this state, negotiations are centralized but the faculty of each institution is organized as a separate bargaining unit. University of Rhode Island faculty are represented by the American Association of University Professors; Rhode Island College faculty are represented by the American Federation of Teachers; and a National Education Association affiliate represents the faculty of Rhode Island Junior College. The chief negotiator for management is the Chief of Personnel for the Rhode Island Board of Regents. In this case, as in the others discussed above, collective bargaining relationships between the institutions and the state are closely related to the relationships that existed prior to bargaining.22

Finally, there appears to be a dominant pattern, in the multi-campus setting, to include all campuses in the system in the same bargaining unit. The exceptions to this appear to be Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Kansas, Oregon and Montana.

A third general observation is that there is considerable variability in state statutes as to what may be included or excluded from the scope of bargaining. Some of this language is mandatory, such as that contained in clauses that prohibit bargaining over various civil service regulations. Much of it, however, is permissive, as is the language in most "management rights" clauses, which allow managers to exclude certain "inherent managerial prerogatives" from the scope of bargaining but do not force them to do so.

Fourth, the failure to exclude traditional governance mechanisms from the scope of bargaining has raised the possibility that faculty senates and other traditional governance mechanisms are "company unions" and are
therefore illegal. I will return to this point when I discuss senate later in the paper.

Finally, collective bargaining introduces a potentially important set of "new" actors and provides a framework for a redistribution of authority and responsibility among the traditional actors in the arena of academic governance. In addition to state labor relations boards, the "new" actors include union officials, arbitrators, mediators, and an array of state administration labor relations officials. Most, if not all, of these individuals operate from the same basic set of assumptions about labor relations; their primary experiences are not with education; and they represent an important new policy making constituency whose base(s) of operation are external to academic institutions. Particularly in the early stages of collective bargaining, when labor relations expertise is at a premium, these new actors play an important part in shaping the role of the collective bargaining relationship in the governance of higher education.

Governance and Collective Bargaining

To the extent that contracts go beyond strictly wages and fringe benefits and faculty perquisites, they enter into the realm of governance. One of the basic reasons why governance and collective bargaining is such a volatile issue in higher education is because of the tradition which dictates that faculty have a major role in many of what industrial concerns would call management functions, namely planning, staffing and quality control. In addition, the basic functions and missions of the institution are in the hands of faculty, whose professional judgment is crucial to their effectiveness.

Governance in collective bargaining contracts takes many forms. Approximately 25% of the contracts in effect at present in higher education have
some provision for the formation of joint faculty-administrative committees to handle a variety of issues. A typical clause would read as follows:

"The presently constituted organizations of the university (e.g., the university senate, faculty councils, departmental personnel and budget committees, etc.) or any other or similar body composed in whole or in part of the faculty, shall continue to function at the university provided that the action thereof may not directly or indirectly repeal, rescind or otherwise modify the terms and conditions of this agreement."

Another typical clause reads as follows: "The board and the bargaining unit agree on the desirability of involving the faculty in formulation of college policies. This shall be accomplished at every practicable level. A guiding principle in this process is that those affected by a policy, including the community, shall have a proportional voice in the development of that policy. A formal part of this procedure will be the establishment of joint faculty-administration committees."

In conjunction with the incidence of faculty participation in governance clauses, it is quite customary that a management rights clause appear in contracts. Two separate studies have shown that between 68% to 75% of all contracts have such clauses (Chandler and Chiang, 1973 and Goodwin and Andes, 1973, p. 101). A typical clause would read as follows:

"Nothing in the agreement shall derogate from or impair any power, right or duty heretofore possessed by the board or by the administration except where such right, power or duty is specifically limited by this agreement."

To my knowledge, there are no studies which identify the extent of contractual obligation on the part of administrators and faculty for joint involvement in such matters as the selection of department chairmen, deans
and presidents. Individual contracts have, of course, guaranteed faculty participation in such matters.

While management rights clauses and provision for faculty involvement in governance are important, the major debate nationally concerning the impact of collective bargaining on faculty participation in governance centers around the relations which have or will develop between academic senates and unions. I would like to address the next section of this paper to that relationship.

**Senates and Collective Bargaining**

The rhetoric on collective bargaining and senates is that it would be very difficult for the two to co-exist in a given institution. The American Association of Higher Education Task Force Report (1967) indicated that senates were likely to atrophy in competition with external bargaining agents. There appears to be a widespread belief that senates and collective bargaining are contradictory rather than complementary. Wollett (1971, p. 25) indicates that with the exception of the AAUP, comments about senates by the leaders of faculty unions are uniformly critical if not derisive. Much of this commentary by faculty union leaders is directed against academic senates as the only voice of the faculty in universitywide affairs. For political and other reasons, faculty union advocates seldom find it feasible to overtly oppose academic senates, but rather concentrate on revealing their weaknesses. These weaknesses include the fact that administrators are members of most faculty senates and often tend to dominate their deliberative processes and that any change in their structure has to be approved by the administration. Their financial support is derived from the administration and their actions are in the form of recommendations to the administration, which can implement or ignore them at its discretion.
There is some research on the relationships between unions and senates under collective bargaining. Garbarino (1974) has classified union-senate relations as being of three types: cooperative, competitive and co-optative. According to Garbarino, in the opinion of most observers the most common relationship between unions and senates have been one of cooperation or, at a minimum, co-existence. His research indicates that cooperation has been the dominant style at single campus and main branch institutions where administrative structures are simple and unions are essentially guild unions of regular rank faculty. Senates and unions are least cooperative and most competitive in the bargaining units of large complex institutional systems with comprehensive unions and these include a majority of all unionized faculty members. Even in these large systems, presumably the State University of New York and the City University of New York, the relations between local campus senates and local branches of the union are often quite cooperative.

One factor that makes the cooperation work has been a natural division of labor where senates clearly are most active in academic matters and unions are most active in personnel and money matters. The basic question is, of course, how long such an uneasy separation of jurisdictions can prevail. Experience with more traditional forms of faculty participation in governance indicates that these separation of jurisdictions work only as long as there is a relative lack of conflict. A cynical observer of faculty senates has characterized such a relationship: "Given a benign administration, a relaxed political climate, a liberal community, a quiescent student body, a president uninterested in the day-to-day business of the institution, academic senates have been able to contribute meaningfully to the making of academic policy (Solomon, 1974, p. 1)"
In those institutions where senates tend to be competitive with unions, the union is often perceived as a means for supplanting the current power-holders reflected in traditional senate leadership. This is most likely to occur when a union representing a comprehensive bargaining unit faces a faculty senate which has traditionally excluded non-teaching professionals and others from its membership. When faced with a choice between two different representatives of a university, administrations usually show a clear preference for the senate version, thereby bringing latent competition to the surface.

There are a number of institutions which have used co-optative means to resolve the senate-union dilemma. This may simplistically be identified as collegiality by contract. In this arrangement the primacy of the union is acknowledged, and the distribution of subject matter among the various types of procedural mechanisms is negotiated between representatives of the union and the administration. The authority of the senate then is preserved by specific inclusion in a contract.

Begin has been studying the evolution of collective bargaining since 1969-70. He reports that:

To date, none of the four-year institutions which have been bargaining have reported that faculty senates have ceased to operate, including those institutions which have been organized the longest, for example, St. Johns University, Central Michigan University, City University of New York, State University of New York, Southeastern Massachusetts, the New Jersey State Colleges, and Rutgers University. In fact, at Central Michigan University and Rutgers University there is some feeling on the part of the administration that the senates are participating more actively in policy deliberation than before the onset of collective bargaining (1974, p. 584).

In a survey of faculty collective bargaining in the state of Pennsylvania, Gershonfield and Morfitmer (1975) found five or six institutions where the senate had been dissolved since collective bargaining was adopted. Only one of these
was a four-year college and university. Both the research completed by Begin and that by Gershenfeld and Mortimer is in the exploratory stage and cannot be regarded as definitive on this matter, however.

The relationships between the union and the senate at a variety of institutions indicates that there is a growing formalization of relationships between the two. The consensus appears to be that the growing formalization of bargaining agent-senate relationships has enhanced the development of cooperative rather than competitive relationships between these decision-making forums. Without such relationships, agreeing to refer issues to traditional forums is a somewhat risky business for bargaining agents. This is because there is no guarantee that a senate which might contain different constituencies (faculty not supporting bargaining, administrators not involved in bargaining, students and competing union organizations) will produce results which are acceptable to the bargaining agent. But by developing dual-leaderships and memberships, bargaining agents are more secure and thus more willing to help preserve traditional senates (Begin, 1974, p. 589).

I agree with Begin when he says that senates will likely retain authority only to the extent to which they are responsive to problems. Where they fail to act, the bargaining agent is likely to take the initiative. It is clear that the initiative under this system lies with the union rather than with the senate. "... it is evident that the type of bargaining agent-senate relationship a particular bargaining agent is willing to live with is directly related with the degree of security it feels it needs against unilateral administration decision making. An adversary bargaining relationship tends to intensify the need for a bargaining agent to exert more formal control over traditional senates (p. 591)."
The evolution of collective bargaining is still in its embryonic stages, but there are several important principles which need to be understood in judging the ultimate viability of senates under systems of collective bargaining. The first is that the future role of faculty senates on matters within the scope of negotiations will be determined at the bargaining table in unionized institutions. There exists no specific definition of what constitutes terms and conditions of employment and we expect that the bargaining process will expand existing definitions. "It appears that when faculties designate a union, they will be placed in an industrial relations context, rather than receive special considerations that some argue are appropriate to the educational area (Brown, 1972, p. 211)."

Under industrial relations case law, the only authority that faculty have to participate in decisions on terms and conditions of employment resides in the exclusive representative, i.e., the union. In order for a senate to have a voice on the matters within the scope of negotiations, that voice must be specifically ceded by the union to the senate. The point made earlier is that the union will cede this voice to the faculty senate only so long as things go well. In periods of moderate to high conflict, the union will find it necessary to assert its control over matters involving terms and conditions of employment.

The scenario that is being played out relative to the competition between unions and faculty senates, should come to a head in the near future. The direction of this debate will be significantly affected by cases which now are being litigated in which the traditional practices of senates are threatened by the application of industrial relations case law to higher education. This threat lies in three basic "facts" about senate operations. The first is that the senate is an employee organization. The second is that
its budget is derived from administrative sources. And the third is that its membership includes administrators, who would not be eligible for membership in the union.

The National Labor Relations Board has not had an opportunity to rule on whether or not a senate is an employee organization, but in the unit determination decision at the State University of New York, the New York State Public Employee Relations Board ruled that the Senate was a labor organization, although it refused to rule on the question of whether it received unfair assistance or was employer dominated (Kahn, 1973, p. 155). According to Kahn, "It would appear to be impossible for the National Labor Relations Board to hold that a senate is not a labor organization since a senate typically deals with the administration over terms and conditions of employment." The New York State Board has hinted that the proper forum for such a determination would be an unfair labor practice proceeding.

The term, labor organization, is defined in section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act as follows:

The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work (quoted in Kahn, 1973, p. 147).

In my view the precedent established by NLRB would be of overwhelming importance in the rulings of any state labor relations board.

The stage has been set for a ruling on the question of senates as labor organizations and the extent to which the assistance they receive from administrations is unfair. A National Education Association affiliate of The Pennsylvania State University has charged the administration with "(1) financing, encouraging and dominating the university faculty senate as
company union which will engage in collective bargaining activities as the exclusive voice of the faculty in universitywide affairs . . . ," and with "(2) promising economic and other benefits to discourage its employees from exercising freedom of choice in their selection of a collective bargaining representative; and (3) reconstituting the university faculty senate as a favorite, competing alternative to the employee organization in order to convince employees that economic and other benefits can be obtained from the university without formal collective bargaining under Act 195."

The real issue in this case is whether or not the senate gets unfair assistance from the administration and whether or not it is employer dominated, since it is clear that the senate is a labor organization. It is typical that a senate would receive substantial financial support from an administration. In the Penn State case the budget of the academic senate for the 1974-75 year was $73,000. In addition, the president has the authority to appoint up to ten percent of the members of the senate, and another ten percent are students.

The unfair labor practice charge has taken place in an atmosphere of an anti-union campaign on the part of the administration, so the case may not be a classic test case. There is little doubt, however, that such a classic case will be presented at some time in the near future and the ruling will be precedent setting in terms of the future of senates.

One can take no comfort from the rulings of National Labor Relations Board relative to the special nature of higher education. The Board has consistently been confounded by the question of collegiality, for example, and has not seen fit to recognize the faculty's role in the management of the institution. It is possible that some labor relations boards may order the disestablishment of senates as employer-dominated organizations which receive
unfair assistance. Certainly, it should be clear that the only legal authority that exists under collective bargaining belongs to the union. The jurisdiction of a faculty senate on terms and conditions of employment, should it be allowed to continue, will be a subject of negotiation at the bargaining table. It is problematical as to whether the union will continue to support the participation of the faculty senate in matters having to do with the terms and conditions of employment.

There is another alternative for senates, and that is they may become the political tools of the unions. In the interim stages it is quite possible that senates will be used by unions to achieve gains for faculty in areas which are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. While it is difficult to predict what such subject areas might eventually be, the future of senates under systems of collective bargaining would seem to be tied to the definition of the appropriate scope of bargaining, and the political realities of senate-union co-existence when confronted with periods of relatively high tension levels.

Students and Faculty Collective Bargaining

There is beginning to be an increase in student activity in and concern about collective bargaining. A national Research Project on Students and Collective Bargaining is studying the impact of collective bargaining on students as well as the potential impact of students on the collective bargaining process. According to Aussieker (1975) student involvement in collective bargaining can be classified into six types: end-run bargaining; consultation and observation; coalition bargaining; tripartite bargaining; collective bargaining over student status and; student employee bargaining.

Student appeals to the appropriate governing body or the legislature are examples of end-run bargaining. In the Pennsylvania State College and
University System the student leaders at one campus appeared before the local Board of Trustees to argue against a tuition-remission plan for faculty dependents. Their arguments were one of the factors which resulted in Board rejection of the plan. In Washington and California student lobbyists are making determined efforts to mold collective bargaining legislation that is at least sensitive to their concerns.

In some institutions students have served as observers of union and management negotiations. This has occurred at CUNY, Long Island University and in some of the Massachusetts State Colleges (Walters, 1974, pp. 98-101). In other institutions students have formed coalitions with either faculty or administrators. For example, at Ferris State College in Michigan a student sat on management's bargaining team. At a university in Massachusetts student leaders forced student evaluation of instruction on the faculty bargaining team and eventually got it incorporated into the contract.

Tripartite bargaining occurs where all three parties have to ratify a final agreement. In three of the Massachusetts State Colleges students were called upon to ratify those aspects of the contract which applied to their participation in college governance. The fifth type of student involvement is collective bargaining itself. In 1971, Chicago City College's students negotiated an agreement with the Board which has been incorporated into the Board Rules and, which its advocates argue, the same legal status as a contract (Swenson, 1974, pp. 106-110). The agreement guarantees student control over student fees, provides for student participation in college governance, and guarantees constitutional freedoms and due process rights to students.

The sixth type of student involvement in bargaining is as employees. The University of Wisconsin Teaching Assistant Association negotiated an
agreement, after a strike, in April 1970. (The University of Minnesota teaching assistants rejected collective bargaining in a spring 1974 election.) Teaching assistants are now part of the Rutgers faculty bargaining unit.

Aussenker reports that the extent of student involvement has not been extensive or broad in scope. "As of fall 1974, there were approximately thirty incidents of the more formal types of involvement (coalition, tripartite, student and student employee bargaining) and about seventy incidents of the more informal types (consultation or end-run bargaining) (1975, p. 17)." In four-year institutions 14 of 48 bargaining units reported some student involvement in the negotiation or administration of the contract; 13 of these were in public institutions and half were of the weak tripartite bargaining type.

Summary and Discussion

The first sections of this paper discuss developments that are, for the most part, well documented in the professional literature or from our own research. I would like to conclude my remarks by citing two other developments which may be less apparent but quite important; the centralization and homogenization of faculty personnel policies on the part of state governments and legislatures and the unionization of middle management.

The advent of faculty collective bargaining appears to be associated with a general climate of centralized control over academic personnel policies by state executive and legislative bodies. Indeed such centralization is part of the environment which causes collective bargaining. Nevertheless, it seems clear that collective bargaining in the public sector has strengthened the ties between faculty and other public employees. The link between these two groups is so strong in some states (e.g., Hawaii, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) that salaries and
Fringe benefits are essentially determined by negotiations between the large public employee unions and the state. Faculty employment interests are and will increasingly be settled in these other forums.

Finally, in several eastern states, middle management has either become part of the faculty bargaining unit or has formed its own union. The drive towards job security for these employees is strong and substantial progress in this area has been made in the CUNY and SUNY systems. In the Pennsylvania State College and University System, however, the Commonwealth has succeeded in keeping these people out of the faculty bargaining unit. In the subsequent contracts the Commonwealth has succeeded in freezing middle managers within their current rank structure and has created a new civil service-type classification for all new employees. The eventual aim is to deny faculty rank and status to these employees.

The relative status of middle managers has received little attention in higher education. Collective bargaining appears to be forcing a renewed concern about these non-teaching professionals.
References


