Although the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) created other programs, the most controversial one, and the one with which the antipoverty program came to be identified, was the Community Action Program (CAP). This bibliography covers materials about the formation and operation of Community Action Agencies themselves, usually involving such matters as participation of the poor, characteristics and activities of board members, and the impact of CAP on the community. It does not include studies of specific substantive programs such as Headstart, Family Planning, or Legal Services, or of business management or evaluation procedures themselves. It offers fairly complete coverage of the mass circulation magazines, academic journals, government documents, and contracted research reports. Most of the listings include a brief summary of procedures and conclusions. (Author/MLF)
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS: An Annotated Bibliography

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I. Introduction

Although the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) contained seven titles, and although a number of them (Job Corps, VISTA, Neighborhood Youth Corps) had their problems, the most controversial one, and the one with which the anti-poverty program came to be identified, was Title II-A, the Community Action Program. Community Action caught the attention of the nation just six months after the enactment of the bill, when conflict erupted in Chicago between the city government and The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) on the black south side. This controversy, which alternately flared and subsided for two and one-half years thereafter, was repeated
in other cities with variations, and the conflict ultimately affected the character of the Community Action Program (CAP) all over the United States.

The legislation establishing Community Action (Section 201 of EOA) begins with a very general statement:

The purpose of this title is to provide stimulation and incentive for urban and rural communities to mobilize their resources, both public and private, to combat poverty through Community Action agencies.

Section 202, which was destined to be the most-discussed part of Title II, defines a Community Action Program as a program to "mobilize and utilize" the "public and private resources" of any geographical area (size not specified). The programs which were to be used in combating poverty were also not specified, although some very general examples were offered in Section 204:

such component programs shall be focused upon the needs of low-income individuals and families and shall provide . . . expanded and improved services and assistance. . . and facilities necessary. . . in the fields of education, employment, job training and counseling, health, vocational rehabilitation, housing, home management, welfare, and other fields which fall within the purposes of this title.

As Sargent Shriver explained it in the hearings before the Act was passed:

We will review these plans and help finance them. But the initiative to determine and execute plans, to call upon local and state resources and institutions to carry the plans forward, depends on the will, the energy, and the management of each community.

The role of the federal government, in addition to providing "stimulation and incentive", was to furnish 90% of the necessary funding for the first two years, 75% for the next two years, and

50% thereafter. The emphasis on local initiative was a popular one in the 1960's, growing out of a disenchantment with established federal bureaucracies. The fund-reduction formula indicated a hope that the local communities would eventually accept responsibility for the program. (Instead of reducing the percentage of funds supplied by the federal government, however, certain programs were phased out altogether, or transferred to alternate funding sources.)

In addition to local initiative, the Act called for co-ordinated planning for a comprehensive attack on all the causes of poverty.

\[\text{the program), . . utilizes public and private resources. . . provides services. . . of sufficient variety, scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty (Section 202).}\]

The principle of comprehensive planning was taken over from the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD) established as in independent office in 1961. Before funding its sixteen demonstration projects, the PCJD had insisted on a year's co-ordinated planning at the local level, for a comprehensive approach to the causes of delinquency. Many of those who had worked with the President's Committee, including Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, its chairman, were also involved in the development of the anti-poverty program.

This concept arose out of disillusionment with single-purpose programs which had seemed to create more problems than they had solved, and from a growing conviction that established professions,
such as social work and education, were perpetuating poverty by their inability to move outside a narrow sphere of competence. The Ford Foundation's Grey Area Projects, another forerunner of the anti-poverty program, had been inspired by a request from big-city school superintendents for help in dealing with slum children in schools, but it had encountered almost insurmountable difficulties in bringing any meaningful change into the classroom.

The third aspect of the Community Action concept, participation of the poor, had also been tossed around in the earlier programs, but was given new phrasing and a new emphasis in the legislation for Community Action:

(programs are) . . . developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of the residents of the areas and members of the groups. . . to be served. (Section 202)

Its intellectual origins can be traced to the Chicago Areas Project of 1932 and its most colorful advocate has surely been Chicago's Saul Alinsky, who has devoted his life to organizing the poor in their own "indigenous" organizations to fight for their rights against entrenched privilege. Section II of the bibliography notes a number of differing, even contradictory opinions as to what the phrase really meant to those who wrote it into the legislation.

Through most of 1965, controversy raged in terms of a struggle for legitimacy between political organizations of big-city mayors and the "grass-roots" organizations of the poor, many of which had been funded, or even initiated, under the President's Committee or
By the end of 1966, over 1,000 Community Action Agencies (CAA's) were in operation, and the principle of "umbrella agencies," combining all interested groups in the community, had been well established. Now the conflict moved under the "umbrella" and became a numbers game, concerning the representation of the poor on the policy-making boards of the CAA's.

By the end of 1967, there had been still more controversy, some mayors had accused anti-poverty workers of helping to register their opponents as voters, and mismanagement and corruption had been discovered in some CAA's. With enemies surrounding the CAP, the program was saved at the cost of the "Green Amendment" widely deplored at the time as the death-knell of participation of the poor. It required that one-third of the board members of CAA's be governmental representatives, one-third representatives of the poor, and that one-third represent the community as a whole. Although the effects were not as disastrous as many had feared, the bloom was clearly off of Community Action, many programs were phased out, and national attention turned elsewhere. After 1967, magazine articles about Community Action dwindled sharply.

The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) had a small budget for evaluation and research, and by 1967-68, some of its contracted studies were being completed. At the same time the Green
Amendment was passed, the General Accounting Office was instructed to conduct its own independent evaluations; studies of individual Community Action Agencies from both of these sources also appear in Section III. The GAO studies of eleven different CAA’s, and the Yankelovich studies of nine different CAA’s, are the largest collections. The Kirschner studies are also listed, but not described, because they are concerned more with substantive CAP-run programs, than with the operation of CAA’s themselves.

Section IV includes the more ambitious comparative studies—the 100-city evaluation study conducted jointly by Barss-Reitzel Associates and the National Opinion Research Center, several smaller independent studies, and the GAO summary report. Retrospective analyses—one is almost tempted to say post-mortems—appear in Section V. These are attempts to put the Community Action Program in historical perspective, at least as much as it is possible to do so within six to eight years of its inception.

This bibliography covers materials about the formation and operation of Community Action Agencies themselves, usually involving such matters as participation of the poor, characteristics and activities of board members, and the impact of CAP on the community. It does not include studies of specific substantive programs such as Headstart, Family Planning, or Legal Services, or of business management or evaluation procedures themselves. It offers fairly complete coverage of the mass circulation magazines, academic journals, government documents and contracted research reports. Most of the listings include a brief summary of procedures and
conclusions. In the few cases where I have not been able to consult the article or report, and in the case mentioned above, where the subject matter is just outside the scope of the bibliography, there is a listing with no summary.

A number of articles from the following collections are listed separately in the bibliography by author. The collections themselves are listed here for convenience:


Sundquist, James L., ed. *On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience*. New York: Basic Books, 1969. The second in a two-volume series. The first, edited by Daniel L. Moynihan, and titled *On Understanding Poverty*, deals with economic and sociological theories about poverty. This one contains a number of articles by authors who were in a position to know about the first four years of CAP from personal experience.

Reports and evaluation studies which were prepared under OEO contracts are available in the OEO library at 1200 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506, but must be consulted at the library. Other research libraries may have them also.

Many of these reports can be purchased from the Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information (CFSTI), U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. If a PB
8. CPL Exchange Bibliography #277

number is given in this bibliography, that number should be used in ordering from CPSTI. For a more complete list of evaluation studies, order the Exploratory Assessment of CAP Evaluation Activities: Vol. II, Catalog of Abstracts of Evaluation Studies, PB 189-027.

In most cases, copies of the reports may also be purchased from the contractor who made the study. The 100-city evaluation reports may be obtained from Barss-Reitzel Associates, 139 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, Massachusetts, or the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. GAO reports are available from the Government Printing Office, or from your friendly District Congressman.

Some of the abbreviations which are used in this bibliography, as well as in the studies cited, are as follows:

CAA--Community Action Agency
CAP--Community Action Program
EOA--Economic Opportunity Act
OEO--Office of Economic Opportunity
NSC--Neighborhood Service Center
TAR--Target Area Representative
II. Early History and Analyses of CAP


These two articles are essentially the same: "The poverty program is a macabre masquerade, and the mask is growing to fit the face, and the face is one of political poronography." They constitute a blistering attack on Community Action, arguing that a permanently effective neighborhood organization of poor people is impossible unless the organization has control over its own funds, and that the planners of Community Action have devised it as a subtle means of preserving the status quo.


Traces the origins of the community action concept to the Cincinnati Social Unit Plan in the 1920's, and summarizes the early experience of the Office of Economic Opportunity up to mid-1966.


Contrasts the military perspective, emphasizing efficient organization, co-ordination, and non-controversial programing, with the civilian perspective, which they favor, encouraging dissent, controversy, and innovation.


A review of the changes in the interpretation of "maximum feasible representation" by Shriver, other OEO officials, and Congressmen. Even Adam Clayton Powell, who had defended it at first, began eventually to de-emphasize participation of the poor.


Origins of the idea and description of the problem.

Cloward, Richard H. "The War on Poverty--Are the Poor Left Out?" Nation 201 (August 2, 1965) 55-60.

The involvement of the poor is precisely a question of power and its redistribution.
The real problem is how to achieve and maintain equality in the life chances of individuals and groups. CAP personnel need to be middlemen in an effective and honest exchange between citizens and government officials.


The story of the drafting of the EOA and its early history up to 1966. He concludes, more in sorrow than in anger, that President Johnson's preoccupation with the Vietnam war left the war on poverty stranded without high level support. He believes that the phrase "maximum feasible participation" originally was meant to help Southern Negroes have more voice in programs in their areas.


The Community Action Program was a revolt against professionalism. It set in motion a controlled revolution by encouraging conflict. Conflict may have been needed, but should the federal government have subsidized it?


Shriver's method of operation works with bright young idea men, but he was undermined by the prestigious staff members who were chosen to give an aura of respectability to the program. Haddad, a former assistant director of OEO, gives a number of interesting examples. In rural as well as urban communities, the power structure is so tightly knit that it seems almost impossible to develop effective opposition.


The driving force of a meaningful war on poverty must be a new coalition of the poor, the unions, the best of the religious movements, and liberals and radicals who will insist on a massive social investment and creation of thousands of new jobs. OEO programs as announced will not do the job.

A political history of the poverty program from the New Deal to the present. He warns that Community Action will bring controversy and conflict. Unless we are prepared to accept these consequences, the program cannot accomplish its aims.


A very brief survey of the CAP and its forerunners, the Ford Foundation Gray Areas Program and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. These were the first new approach to social services since the old "welfare councils" had been formed, but were still aimed primarily at changing individuals, not the community, and were not able to do anything about the economic causes of poverty. He predicts that participation will be hard to implement, and that there will be tendencies to "bureaucratic inversion of purpose," and "program faddism."


These two articles are almost identical, except for an additional section in the Bloomberg book about the early confusion and eventual compromise in the meaning of maximum feasible participation (pp. 272-276). They are a much longer version of the article in The American Child. Kravitz is a former staff member of OEO who helped draft the early position papers for urban community action. His recollection is that "participation" generally was understood to mean sub-professional employment of neighborhood residents. Community Action's impact has been limited by a shortage of federal funds, a lack of qualified personnel, and a lack of thorough diagnosis and planning.


A later version of the same article, incorporating about eighteen months more experience with CAP. "The goal of a truly comprehensive poverty program is not even in sight—almost all of its resources have been pressed into operation of programs; rather than long-range planning. Leadership is a serious problem. It needs greater technical capacity for diagnosing needs, greater authority to reallocate resources to the poor, and more effective decentralization.

A factual summary of the legislation and the programs.


The federal role in the war on poverty was never clearly spelled out. The program incorporated a naive belief that serious problems could be licked with evangelism, money, and organization.


An outline of the top level administrative set-up and a descriptive analysis of local administrative relationships. 70% of CAA's are county-wide, 20% are city-wide, and 20% involve other types of areas (Indian tribes, multi-county, etc.).


A historical analysis of the Ford Foundation Gray Areas Program and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, and how they fed into the Community Action Program; early experience with CAP. A provocative and thoughtful discussion of the issues of planning, comprehensive coordination of services, and participation of the poor. A tentative conclusion is that although there were zigs and zags, the effort came eventually to higher ground. New ideas had been set in motion which will not die easily.


A movement for personal self-help escalated into a social movement which may have far-reaching consequences for the professionalization of public administration. The authors predict conflict in redefining the boundaries between professional and board decisions, and the possibility of a return to nepotism and individual preference in hiring personnel.


A wise strategy for implementing community action programs conceives of their developing in two stages: in the first phase, CAA's must establish legitimacy, assure themselves of continuing resources, and avoid controversy. With patience, they will reach the second phase, when they can more safely be controversial and maximize participation.
Moynihan, Daniel P. "What is Community Action?" The Public Interest V (Fall 1966) 3-9.

Four possible definitions of the community action concept: co-ordination, Alinsky-style confrontation, the Peace Corps model of self-help and provision of services, and the Task Force model of political effectiveness.


The new concern with resident participation aims at fostering participation, increasing influence of the poor, and altering their behavior, but when communities have few resources to control the activities of their representatives, sustained participation is difficult to achieve.


Once a means, participation has now become an end. It will result in a functional equivalent of the old ward politics. Historically, the poor have been organized around specific grievances, rather than in a generalized way. The forms of participation vary with the size, stability, and history of the individual community.


The most effective strategy for the anti-poverty program is to bring together the citizen and the bureaucracy, to act as a third-party intermediary without taking either side. Whenever one side is stronger than the other in a given community, there is a danger that the anti-poverty agency will lean in that direction.


An attempt to trace the origins of the phrase "maximum feasible participation" by corresponding with a number of those who helped to draft the EOA. The author concludes that it slipped in almost by accident, and that no one considered its full implications until it was too late; suggests that hidden racism led the white originators to overlook the possibility of strong effective action by blacks.

Both the poor and the not-poor hold a stereotyped view of the other. Unless there is a strong, mutually-accepted center, one side or the other will gain ascendancy. All participants need to believe that each group is legitimate and that accommodation is essential. Reverse role-playing and training in insight development might help to reduce conflict.


The specialist in anti-poverty programs for the Christian Science Monitor reviews the Congressional hearings and debates on the original EOA and subsequent amendments, up until 1968. Republican substitute proposals were effectively shut out while Adam Clayton Powell was chairman of the House committee, but after Carl Perkins took over, Republicans were included in amendment-drafting. The Green Amendment, channeling EEO funds through local governments where they chose to be involved, was necessary to save the program in 1967.


Atlanta and Chicago endorse containment of the poor; Detroit, New Haven, New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Los Angeles employ co-optation--trying to choose "safe" representatives to give the impression of participation. Only Philadelphia uses the strategy of co-determination. This model has less administrative strength, but develops more new ideas and encourages more real participation. Unless it can set an unusually good example of success, it is not likely to be adopted anywhere else.


This article, written just after the EOA was passed, gives a brief summary of the legislation with the recommendation that CAA's be supervised carefully to avoid falling into the old unimaginative patterns.

This paper by a member of Johnson's Task Force on poverty describes the earliest conversations and events that led eventually to creation of the anti-poverty program. Three streams of earlier activity led into it: urban renewal and the Ford Foundation Gray Areas Program, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, and the national concern over rising welfare costs. OEO's mission was never clearly defined.


A review of the political problems that forced Shriver to de-emphasize participation and power of the poor. Syracuse's difficulties, which led to curtailment of the community organization project under an Alinsky-trained worker, are briefly reviewed as an example.


A former staff assistant in OEO remembers that the emphasis was on increasing the "capacity of individuals, groups and communities to deal with their problems." Planning itself was to be an important stage of action. The community action concept was better suited to northern urban situations than to rural southern ones.


The former Deputy Director of the President's Task Force on Poverty describes the discussions of that group as it formulated the legislation that was to become the EOA. The Budget Bureau premises called for a comprehensive coordinated neighborhood approach. Thinking was focussed primarily on young people and on the South. The phrase "maximum feasible participation" was written in without much discussion of its meaning. Settling jurisdictional problems among various governmental agencies required a great deal of the group's time and energy.


The Alinsky model expects the poor to develop self-esteem through engaging in conflict. The Overlap Model, developed in Topeka, Kansas, calls for evolving participation. It emphasizes socialization and compromise within the system, is less prone to develop alienation of the poor than Alinsky-style strategy.
III. Studies and Evaluations of Specific CAA's


An Alinsky-organized group gained seats on the urban renewal and anti-poverty boards, then demanded 600 jobs at Eastman Kodak for employees of their choosing. Although FIGHT (the Alinsky-style group) had support of the Chamber of Commerce, Council of Churches, and other white groups, its friends began defecting as its militancy increased.


A brief discussion of the elections to the anti-poverty board. Most candidates were female, in their 30's, church members, without a man in the house. In general, they were more respectable than the CAP leaders had expected.


Base-line data on poverty in Atlanta was secured by interviewing a representative sample of 500 individuals: 16 and over in Atlanta's target areas (The Cohort Sample). Information was collected on individual characteristics, housing characteristics, evaluations of living conditions, and contact with CAP agencies. In this sample, 92.3% of the whites and 73.4% of the blacks had never heard of the CAA programs.

Another sample was taken from those contacted by the NSC's in Atlanta's CAP (The Client Sample). The majority of these respondents were pleased with the services of the NSC's and the other programs of the CAA, and felt that there had been a positive change in their life situation as a result of their contact with CAP.

Based on 5000 interviews between 1967 and 1969 with residents of poverty areas, and influential individuals in the community. All influential reported some change in San Diego as a result of CAP. A decentralized delivery system for social services was developed. Poverty in San Diego decreased during the period, as reflected in interviews with families to determine income and expenditure patterns; this was attributed partly to the general economic boom. A number of special reports are also available:


#20. C.M. Bonjean and W.J. Crow. Voices that count: establishment, black and brown influential. Identification of the power structure in three major ethnic communities and how it changed.


The Action as Viewed From the Scene. A six-part series of direct, distilled interviews with various groups of persons in CAP.

Dare, Robert. "Involvement of the Poor in Atlanta." Phylon 31 (Summer 1970) 114-128.

The program is administered by white men, carried out by black women.


A federal grant of $314,000 to Syracuse University went for development of Alinsky-style groups which eventually elected a majority on the board of the OEO-approved Crusade for Opportunity. There was continuing controversy; accounting procedures were called into question. After the moderates resigned from the board, OEO withdrew funds altogether.

The newspaperman who became director of the CAA in Trenton, New Jersey, tells why he thinks their program was unusually successful. They moved quickly, initiated thorough and innovative job training programs, were able to secure generous federal grants while other cities were still developing applications. Their emphasis was on manpower programs rather than on planning and participation; they were able to place most of their trainees in jobs.


Hazard, W.R. A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Community Action Program in Austin and Travis County, Texas. Tracor Incorporated, 6500 Tracor Lane, Austin, Texas. PB 188-328 through 188-331. Vols. I-IV.

CAP in Austin was initiated by the Community Council, and remained under its control, but was established officially as a separate corporation. The Day Care-Centers were not closely supervised by the parent agency, but seemed to have beneficial effects for both mothers and children.

The CAP program was well integrated into the organizational networks of the city, but reached relatively few of the poor people, and the poor were seldom consulted either as staff members or as board members. TAR's were generally higher in socioeconomic status than the average of residents in the areas they represented.


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The story of the $100,000 grant for organizing the poor in Syracuse, as a national pilot study. Syracuse University had the contract and used organizers trained by Saul Alinsky. The Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity, the city's official anti-poverty agency, objected to having an independent project in the poor neighborhoods.


The Program in Atlanta is touted as a showcase of the anti-poverty program while the basic problems remain unsolved, and the poor remain unrepresented. There may be some progress as the new services become institutionalized.


A case study of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles (EYOB), which focuses on the interaction between poverty members and other board members. It is concerned with the effect on them as individuals and with their effect on board decisions. Concludes that TAR's did not actually gain power over board decisions, but their own personal self-images were improved. TAR's were more dissatisfied with the pace of social change than were other board members.


In Chicago, the Negroes are firmly segregated, and kept quiet by welfare payments. OEO was designed to break up this kind of approach by giving power to the poor, but in Chicago, the NSC's are merely branch offices of city hall, offering services in the same way. Some Alinsky-style organizations are trying to get funds for other projects which would be more in tune with the needs of the poor.


Atlanta's program is run by a coalition of white businessmen and the Negro middle class. Although the poor are not represented, the NSC committees seem to have a free hand in their operations. NSC's are more successful in finding jobs for whites than for Negroes, and Headstart serves primarily white children.

The small amounts of money spent on services were inadequate, therefore wasted. The impact was totally incommensurate with the amount of funds and effort invested. Good staff was not available.


Philadelphia's was the first CAA Program to elect representatives from target area neighborhoods to the CAA board. The voter turnout was lowest in white neighborhoods, and Negro women were proportionately over-represented among those finally chosen. Four myths were exploded: (1) that Negroes are homogeneous, (2) that the poor are willingly dependent on welfare, (3) that leadership of the poor is unitary, and (4) that all blacks favor integration.


Researchers found a change in the direction of modernity of life styles, with greater changes in the areas served by community centers. Youth tended to be more likely to consider out-migration. Community leadership was unchanged at the top levels, but there was some evidence of change at lower levels, with greater participation by those with lower incomes.


The Chicago program offered a wide range of services, moved promptly to establish them, and involved many agencies and individuals. It concentrated on satisfying immediate needs rather working on long-term problems. It did not make sufficient effort to coordinate existing activities and to establish cityside priorities. The poor were not adequately represented in decision-making. The administrative staff made many decisions on financial allocation that should have been left up to the board. The non-federal contributions were, in many cases, inadequately documented, or unallowable.
Involvement and participation of the poor was generally effective, both through existing organizations of the poor and through area committees which were open to all. The Mayor's Committee on Human Resources Development (MCHRD) relied too much on delegate agencies which were unwilling to make changes in their existing operations. The various agencies of the city wanted to offer their services to poverty program participants on an individual basis and be reimbursed by MCHRD. The education program, run by the city schools, offered cultural enrichment rather than badly needed basic educational courses.

The health agencies and professionals of the city refused to provide any services or programs without full reimbursement, but when MCHRD began planning to open its own clinics, the professionals demanded to control policies and procedures. MCHRD, caught between OEO regulations and limitations, and the rigidity of local agencies, found it very difficult to meet the needs which its studies indicated should be given priority.

_______. Kansas City, Missouri, June 19, 1969.

The Human Resources Corporation (HRC) did not clearly define problems and establish priorities. Programs were already being offered by existing agencies or were suggested by OEO emphasis. There were no criteria for program effectiveness, hence evaluation was inadequate. There was particular difficulty in getting and keeping staff; many positions went unfilled for long periods. Board meetings in target areas were poorly attended, and the boards seemed to have no specific responsibilities. Most of the residents in target areas had never heard of the Legal Services Program.

_______. Los Angeles, California, March 11, 1968.

Discusses the initiation and early operations of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Board of Los Angeles. Deals primarily with management and contact fulfillment. Recommends more attention to income and dependency criteria for participation in CAP programs.

(The GAO summary report also indicates that on-site evaluations were conducted for St. Louis, Missouri, Phoenix, Arizona, Pinal County, Arizona (including the Gila River Indian Reservation), Lake County, Indiana (Gary, Hammond, and East Chicago), Becker, Mahnomen, and Clearwater Counties in Minnesota (including the White River Indian Reservation, and Carroll, Chariton, Lafayette, Ray and Saline Counties in Missouri.)

A study of the pattern of generation of issues concerning marginal groups, the public response, and OEO's role. Examines issues raised between 1960 and 1968 by or on behalf of Negroes in Seattle which required public action. OEO programs were a major factor in establishing the legitimacy of using public funds' and organizations for job training. Local officials would not have responded to minority problems without the stimulus of OEO activity. One result of the increased visibility of minority demands has been to generate conflict and competition among members of an expanded pool of minority leadership talent. Issue-oriented organizational activity seems to be more effective than neighborhood-based activity.

Yankelovich, Daniel, Inc. The ten evaluation reports listed below were all prepared by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., of New York. The summaries are drawn from the OEO Catalog of Abstracts of Evaluation Studies listed on page 7.

--- Evaluation of the Arkansas River Valley Area Council CAP. PB 176-419.
ARVAC has made a major impact on some of the poor of the area, increased recognition of poverty problems among political and economic leaders, and successfully integrated staff and programs in an area where this had not been done before.

--- Evaluation of the Cincinnati, Ohio, CAP. PB 176-420.
The NSC's of the Cincinnati CAP have touched 46,000 people. The poor have become involved and now bring their needs directly to the attention of the public authorities.

--- Evaluation of the Dade County (Miami), CAP. PB 176-421.
Information secured from interviews with staff, community leaders, and nearby families shows that CAP is helping with day-to-day emergencies of the people of the target area. It has developed a large number of programs, and has helped prevent serious disturbances. It has used 500 non-professional employees effectively.

--- Evaluation of the Elk River Basin, Tennessee, CAP. PB 176-422.
CAP is supplementing the meager social services in the area. It has become accepted, despite the strong conservatism of the area, but it cannot make much inroads on poverty without a sharp increase in economic development.
An Evaluation of the Hartford, Connecticut, CAP. PB 176-423. CAP has eased racial tensions and increased the awareness of poverty in this wealthy community. Relatively few poor families are aware of CAP in comparison with other communities studied. Some established agencies feel that it competes with their services.

An Evaluation of the Linn County, Iowa, CAP. PB 176-424. CAP has made the first efforts toward over-all planning in social services which have been made in this area. It has redirected the United Community Services Organization to more outreach and involvement of the poor. Separation of the CAP from city and county government has led to some mistrust and suspicion on the part of elected officials.

An Evaluation of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, CAP. PB 176-425. Forty per cent of the target area population has been reached. City government strongly supports the CAP program. It provides needed coordination and planning, and may be partially responsible for a drop in juvenile delinquency and crime in the city. It lacks programs in manpower and employment, and business has not been involved to any great extent.

An Evaluation of the Pueblo, Colorado, CAP. PB 176-426. CAP has drawn attention to Mexican-American problems in the city. It has gained support of a larger-than-usual proportion of the poverty population, and has established several successful programs.

An Evaluation of the Salt Lake City, Utah, CAP. PB 176-427. Participation of the poor in this CAP program is lower than in other CAP’s studied. Headstart, NSC’s, and Legal Services Programs have been established.

An Evaluation of the Tulare County, California, CAP. PB 176-428. The Tulare Co. CAP has developed programs involving the poor, including self-help community action groups. It has successfully utilized non-professional workers.


Analyzes the CAP in Appalachia. There should be more leadership training, more responsiveness on the part of the poor, and more cooperation of political leaders.


Describes the initiation and early operation of the CAA in Topeka. Takes a generally favorable view of its accomplishments, but points to some of the built-in problems. The Indian man who developed into a successful leader of a neighborhood committee found himself increasingly under attack by his own people, and finally resigned. "Those strategies which often convinced agency, business, or government officials to cooperate with the program seemed to be those which discouraged the poor from becoming involved."

During the first year, the Director was given responsibility for contacting community leaders, while the Assistant Director, a former union organizer, concentrated on developing participation of the poor. This division of labor was reasonably successful, but when both groups met together on the board, strains developed, and after these original staff members resigned, the problems multiplied.

Zurcher believes that intensive sessions for all board members would help relieve some of the strains. His study of individual board members showed a change in their social-psychological characteristics correlate with the quality and extent of their participation and their perceptions of their experience in the program. Active members increased in activism, achievement-orientation, and future orientation, and decreased in anomie, isolation, and alienation.
IV. Comparative Studies


A study, by means of structured interviews, of CAP programs in twenty cities—all over 50,000 population, but excluding the largest and most-studied cities. CAP had the most effect on the communities where participation was just beginning. There was no substantial conflict in the Community Action Program in twelve of the twenty cities. A typology of cities in terms of the activities of the CAP was developed, as follows:

Small cities—limited participation of the poor, no conflict.

Large cities, with small black population—active participation of the poor, but of advisory type (no conflict). The major CAA emphasis is on services.

Large cities, with large black population and mayor-council government—active participation of adversary type, but focused internally on the programs of the CAA.

Large cities, with large black population and city-manager government—active participation of adversary type, also directed at institutions of city government and agencies outside the CAA. CAA emphasis is on neighborhood organization.

There were some exceptions to this typology, but they could be explained by the presence of a strong individual who was able to exert unusual influence on the activities of the CAA or of the poor.


This was originally a study of twelve urban projects which grew out of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, but was later expanded by sending questionnaires to 39 others, for a total of fifty-one programs, of which twenty-one were rural. Intensive information and observation was limited to the original twelve. The authors assume that mobilization of effective social power is a determinant of success or failure of a CAP. They did not see conflict as productive of social change, however.

Where social agencies are dominant, CAP's are service-oriented, and participation is minimal. Politically-dominated programs are action-oriented. A coalition of the poor and professionals is seen as the best method of inducing change. The poor must initially depend on surrogates as an avenue to power—to expect them to do it for themselves is a "subtle rationalization for the maintenance of the status quo."

A study of thirty-five communities, twenty-four urban and eleven rural, five from each administrative region. About one-half were oriented to individual change, one-half to institutional change. Only three had a policy of deliberate confrontation. A strong sympathetic leader in a high place was necessary for an effective program. Co-ordination was easier in rural areas and with less resident participation.


This was the most ambitious single project commissioned by OEO. The three reports listed below are issued jointly by the two contractors. Specific NORC reports are listed under the name of the their principal investigator, James J. Vanecko.

The general findings of the study are summarized here:


---Reports From the 100-City Evaluation. June 1970.

All of these reports contain essentially the same information. The study consisted of structured interviews in 100 cities. All cities were chosen from the NORC Permanent Community Sample, and were sampled with probability proportionate to size from among the cities of over 50,000 population. Those interviewed were CAP directors and board members, community political leaders, officials from education, private welfare, and chief employers in the target areas. One target area was chosen at random in each city, and poor persons were interviewed there. Interviews consisted of questions concerning the emphasis of the CAP, emphasis of the neighborhood center, changes in policies toward poor people, changes in programs in the institutional sector, attitudes toward poverty of officials and of poor persons.

In each institutional sector, and in all sectors combined, community political behavior is a positive and significant predictor of change in institutions. When the CAP emphasizes service delivery, there is no institutional change. When the CAP emphasizes community organization, there is some change in education and social service agency policies, but little change in employment practices of neighborhood employers. Education and private welfare change comes through democratic and popular means, but employment change is a result of elite decisions. Changes are not large or impressive statistically, but the relationships are clearly established throughout the study, even when tested with a number of different indicators.

A brief survey of the history and culture of each Indian group (Turtle Mountain, White Earth, Gila River, Pine Ridge, and Papago) with an analysis of the economic conditions at the time CAP was instituted, and the effect of CAP on the reservation people. A number of specific problem areas are identified, with recommendations for improvement.


Twenty NSC's were studied with 500 open-ended interviews with persons having a direct relationship with the center program.


Five Bay Area CAP's were studied during 1965-1967: San Francisco, Oakland, Santa Clara, Berkeley, and Contra Costa County. There was less conflict where there was: a low concentration of power, a low coalition capability, small community size, voluntary control of CAP, and support of the key leadership in the community.


A study of the formation of five Bay Area CAP's based on interviews with key participants. The Community Coordinating Council was important in each community as the original convener of the discussions on CAP, but the Council was not the final sponsor of the CAP except in one case. There was little direct participation by business interests, and the poor generally became involved later, after urging by OEO. Absence of an initial power struggle is explained by the fact that CAP was not seen as threatening to the status quo.

More participation comes when there is a director committed to it, strong ethnic organizations, higher status poor, and more militant poor. Organization of geographic neighborhoods meant diversion of attention from issues of jobs, schools, or political protest.

A study of changes since 1960 in voluntary agencies which sponsored OEO-funded programs.


A study of the inter-relationship between CAA's and school systems in six urban centers: Cincinnati; Columbia, South Carolina; Corpus Christi, Texas; Durham, North Carolina; Oakland, California; and Trenton, New Jersey. Although the CAA's did not bring dramatic change in school systems, they helped neighborhood organizations generate demands which enabled the superintendents to make changes if they were so inclined. The policies of the CAA's were not significantly affected by the official participation of city, county, school board, or the poor as members of the board.


An investigation of alternative methods of organizing and implementing CAP's and an analysis of community characteristics as they affect the nature of the CAProgram in eleven areas studied.


A comparative study of Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia CAP's. Reform cities, with dispersed power, are better at producing political power for the poor, but machine cities, with highly centralized city government, are better at distributing material perquisites to the poor. Chicago is highly centralized, New York dispersed, Philadelphia generally falls between.


OEO has done some good, but not in proportion to the expenditures made upon it. It needs clearer supervision, better record-keeping, and broader activities in rural areas. The report recommends transfer of operating programs to other agencies. OEO should stimulate more active participation of the poor and have more stringent income requirements for recipients of services.

This is a supplement to review cited above, based on data about specific services in 90 cities. Local situational factors affect costs of programs—the distances traveled, the availability of medical services, the type of buildings used, etc. Programs are generally cheaper in big-city areas.


For summary of findings, see Bruce Jacobs, Barss-Reitzel Associates reports. Some of the NORC reports are:

Orden, Susan R., James Vanecko and Sidney Hollander. PB 185-782. Community Action Programs as Agents of Change in the Private Welfare Sector. NORC, August 1969. There was an increase of 21% in numbers of poor served by private welfare agencies in communities with CAP. The impact was over and above that attributable to increased financing.

Vanecko, James J. "Community Mobilization and Institutional Change." Social Science Quarterly 50 (December 1969) 609-630. Longer version available from CFSTI: PB 185-803. A CAA emphasis on community organization is clearly related to increased presentation of political demands by poor.


A study of thirteen programs in ten areas in terms of three CEO objectives: giving visibility and a voice to the poor, new and improved services, helping to break the poverty cycle. The third objective was scarcely touched. Almost all CAP's have given adequate representation to the poor, worked to increase participation. Recommends that other agencies should handle single-purpose services, while CAP should give special attention to its particular population, providing special part-time jobs of an unconventional nature. CAP is harpered by undependable funding, and a lack of consultation with city and agency officials in the communities.

The effects of the Green Amendment were studied in 53 communities in 37 states. There was no massive takeover by governmental officials. In 29 of the 53 communities studied, the CAP seemed to be more effective at involving poor after the Amendment; in 11, they were less effective, and there was no change in others. There was a significant loss in participation of representatives of the private sector, however.


The large majority of the poor reached by CAA's report significant changes in their own and their children's lives as a result of their participation; there seems to be a good fit between what the participating families state they want and what the CAA is providing.

The Non-Professional in the CAP program, 1966. PB 176-619 through 176-621. PB 176-606 through 176-613.

The use of non-professionals was studied in nine cities: New Haven, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Syracuse, Los Angeles, Washington, Chicago and St. Louis. The programs are operationally viable. Many previously unemployed or underemployed people are filling jobs satisfactorily, and are stimulated to develop their own resources and initiative more successfully than before.
V. Retrospective Analyses


The real danger of citizen participation is that it may result in contest for legitimacy between groups who should be working together, and in competition for scarce resources. It is dangerous because its outcomes are unpredictable, but it is still necessary. There are a number of specific examples of participation to illustrate both good and bad results.

The advantages of citizen participation are that it mobilizes unutilized resources of talent in the community, allows feedback about programs to agencies which otherwise would not know about their impact.

There are two models of citizen participation, citizens as policy-makers and citizens as indigenous employees. Only the first is true participation.


A historical review of the recent anti-poverty programs, OEO, CAP, manpower programs, income maintenance proposals. Discussion of what each is or is not able to accomplish.


A thoughtful review of the entire war on poverty. The program spent $97 per poor person as a national average, but $93 in New York City and $276 in Pittsburgh. The 40% of the poor who live in rural areas received only 30% of the funds. Rural discrimination was closely related to the absence of effective local organizations in sparsely populated rural areas.

The national policy of having many small CAA's meant that a higher proportion of total funds went to staff, who were generally non-poor. By fiscal 60% of the funds were being spent on national emphasis programs. Both strengths and weaknesses of CAP are pointed out.

"Poverty is Here to Stay: Is OEO?" Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts 4 (May-June 1969). The last chapter in The Great Society's Poor Law.

Lowi sees the Community Action Program as one of a series of programs in which hard decisions were delegated to lower levels because the national Congress and executive did not have the courage to make them—the triumph of "interest-group liberalism." Local interest groups were expected to allocate resources on the local level, but recognition of a certain set of interest groups always meant shutting out others. Community action encouraged narrow self-interest, rather than badly-needed broad reforms.


A survey of the intellectual origins of CAP and how it was conceived, with an analysis of the role of social scientists in public policy. After noting the troubles with a number of big-city programs, he concludes that, "enough snake-oil has been sold in the Republic", and that the consequences should have been more carefully considered.


Research in three cities in the Midwest finds that school boards generally deferred to their superintendents on the matter of offering CAP-funded programs, and were not aware of the extent to which school policies were affected by the need to conform to federal guidelines. If the CAA's had strong staff, they were able to exert more influence on school proposals. If the superintendent had access to the CAA personnel, there was less conflict and problems were worked out cooperatively; if he did not have access, there was conflict over what seemed to be unilateral decisions of the CAA on school matters.


The distinctions between formal, descriptive, substantive, and interest representation is used as a framework for analyzing the processes of representation in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York. The manner of selection was a function of the political resources of competing interests in the city. The influence of the various representatives was affected by their orientations and their social characteristics and these in turn affected the level of intra-neighborhood conflict.

Community Action is placed in a historical context (along with the Poor Laws and the New Deal) of attempts to keep the poor from revolting by offering piecemeal programs and handouts. When the economy is prospering and workers are needed, programs are reduced, but when unemployment is rising and there is discontent, a diversionary program is established. The CAP undercut established lines of authority to provide a disproportionate amount of funds to restive inner-city blacks.

Rossi, Peter H. "No Good Idea Goes Unpunished." *Social Science Quarterly* 50 (December 1969) 469-486.

A reply to Moynihan's *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* defending the role of social scientists in public policy-making, even though mistakes may be made.


An angry historical survey of attempts to deal with poverty. They have all failed because of our basic national attitude toward poverty. Only reached only about 6% of the poor, at best. It was a substitute for an integrated society, which is why so much effort was directed to Negroes. Those middle-class people who answered Johnson's call against poverty were guilt-ridden folk, embarrassed by a newfound-affluence and wanting to assuage their unease.

The chapter "Poverty and Local Power" summarizes big-city problems on the basis of newspaper reports, and concludes that the program was mostly corruption and conflict.
VI. Summary

The studies and articles listed in this bibliography include discussions of 163 of the over 1,000 CAA's which were at one time in operation. All of those in the ten largest cities are included, except Houston, and all of those in the five largest cities (with populations over one million) were studied at least four times. These are the cities which also received nation-wide publicity in the newspapers, much of it negative.

Of the 130 largest cities (with populations over 100,000) 76 are covered by one of these studies. 46 CAA's under 100,000 were studied, as well as twenty-four in rural areas, and five on Indian reservations. These smaller areas are seldom covered in any detail, however. In most cases, they are merely included in statistical summaries in some of the comparative studies in Section IV.

Levitan points out that the larger cities received more money, as well as more study and more publicity, and Piven and Cloward suggest that this was a conscious political decision, taken to damp down city riots. Some of the studies point out that the lack of organized agencies or groups which could mobilize resources to apply for a grant in many rural areas was also a factor, however. Levitan notes that the policy of having many different Community Action agencies meant that a proportionately higher amount of funds went for staff rather than for direct services to the poor.

As to the over-all evaluation of Community Action Programs, one could find support for almost any statement in the spectrum from positive to negative, in the studies cited here. Big cities
got all the attention for corruption and conflict, but it is difficult to say whether these problems were really greater in proportion to the numbers of poor or the amounts of money spent, than were the less well-publicized difficulties of smaller CAP's.

The Brandeis study indicates that there was less conflict in smaller cities, but some authors suggest that conflict is necessary for social change. Seligman, Alinsky, and Harrington hold that the institutions of American society are so rigid in their ways of excluding the poor, that only radical change can eliminate poverty, and that those who benefit from the present system will not give up their benefits without a struggle. Clark, however, finds that conflict rarely resulted in any real improvement for the poor in the CAP's he studied, and Zurcher points to the alienation which results from a conflict strategy which makes it more difficult for the poor to benefit from new opportunities even if they are made available.

Was there social change as a result of the Community Action Program? Most of the case studies find that active board members of CAP's (Zurcher) and those who were served by CA programs (Crawford, Yankelovich) were benefitted. Improved living conditions and more positive attitudes were some of the results. The McDowell County study states flatly that the changes were totally incommensurate with the effort and money spent, however. It would certainly be difficult to devise a generally-accepted measure of this kind of benefit to enter into a cost-benefit ratio; it is the very lack of such a measure which makes it possible for different researchers to come to such different conclusions about the value of Community Action.
Evaluations can be either tender-minded or tough-minded. The studies which ask those who have been directly related to CAP whether or not they have benefitted, are tender-minded. The tough-minded approach looks at changes in the total incidence of poverty, the total community awareness of poverty, or the total community institutional emphasis. It is not enough to compare the same communities before and after CAP, for other forces may have been at work to produce the changes. One tough-minded approach involves interviewing samples of the poverty population, as in Crawford and Doby's study of Atlanta, or in the Yankelovich studies; the percentage who have never heard of the poverty program at all is depressingly high.

A tough-minded attempt to assess institutional change is the NORC-Barss-Reitzel 100-city evaluation, which found a very small, but consistent change in the emphasis of social service agencies, city and school services when the local CAP concentrated on organizing community residents to pressure for such changes.

The most rigorous evaluation asks whether the changes are significantly greater in communities with CAP's than in communities without CAP's. Since all of the larger cities in the U.S. had CAP's it is not possible to make this kind of evaluation for them. Even in the smaller ones, it is difficult to separate the changes directly attributable to a local CAP from those attributable to national discussion of poverty problems.

Although changes by diffusion of the community action concept cannot be assigned to any specific local CAP, Harris and Rein believe that they are important in the nation as a whole. However,
it is probably true that there was also diffusion of a vast disillusionment brought on by oversell. Moynihan's Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding reflects this disillusionment.

In short, any attempt at summarizing the studies and evaluations of CAP listed in this bibliography must be equivocal. It all depends—on whether CAP is to be judged by individual changes, by institutional changes, or by a changed national awareness, on how much value one places on any particular change, and on how one values the possible benefits from some other expenditure of an equal amount of time and money.