The announced general focus of the 1972 Oberlin Film Conference was "Goals, Methods, and Scope of Film Study in the 70's," the intention being to emphasize the conceptualization of the cinema experience as messages within larger sets of discourse. To this end, each student submitted an application essay and participated at the conference in discussions dealing with various topics. This document contains a conference schedule, selected student essays, and several transcribed discussions from the sessions. Among the essays included are the following: "Eisenstein and Joyce: Making the Mind Visible," "Film as Media as Epidemic," "Dimensions of Film Genres," "Metaphor in Film," "A Sociovistic Approach to Film Communication: Theory, Methods, and Suggested Fieldwork," "A Metalogicon of Film: Topics in Film 'tasesmiotics,' "'Boudu Saved from Drowning' (1932) Directed by Jean Renoir," "The Concept of Visual Space as a Critical Tool in Cinema," "Cinema as a Humanity: An Objection to Narrowness," "Godard's Paradigm," "Increasing Depth of Field and Sharpening Focus in Film Study," "An Analysis of 'Jules and Jim' as an Adaptation," "The Motion Picture Industry, 1896-1921," "Rocking the Role of Cinema in Latin America," "'Fellini-Satyricon,' a Baroque Masterpiece," "Film and Visual Perception," and "The Image of Women in the Cinema." (LL)
1972 OBERLIN FILM CONFERENCE

SELECTED ESSAYS AND DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPTIONS

VOL. II

Compiled and Edited by

Christian Koch and John Powers

The 1972 Oberlin Film Conference was made possible by an Educational Grant (EII-6006-72-84) from the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities.
During the academic year 1971-72, graduate and undergraduate students from around the United States were urged to write essays of application for a Student Conference on Film Study (Oberlin Film Conference). The conference was sponsored by Oberlin College and made possible by an educational grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The sessions were held on the campus of Oberlin College from Thursday evening, April 20, to Sunday noon, April 23. Thirty-one students were invited; each was provided round-trip air fare plus a per diem allowance for meals and lodging. In addition, two special guest participants were in attendance: Christian Metz of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, and Yves De Laurot, filmmaker and film theorist, New York. Christian Koch of the faculty of Oberlin College was the conference director and John Powers the student chairman.

The idea of a Student Conference on Film Study grew out of a conviction that increasing college and university interest in establishing academic programs of cinema studies might benefit, particularly at this time, from a nation-wide forum in which various emerging attempts to construct film study methodologies and goals could gain expression and consequent dissemination. There were two additional underlying premises. First, it was felt that such a forum or conference should be attended principally by students -- from different areas of the country with diverse educational backgrounds (e.g., linguistics, anthropology, communication studies, psychology, American studies, etc.) -- many of whom would very soon be fostering the growth of cinema studies programs by virtue of their own positions on academic faculties. Second, it was felt that the conference should be structured in such a way that the participants' own discourse, and not of that of a group of guest experts, should constitute the major portion of the conference sessions.

The announced general focus of the conference was "Goals, Methods, and Scope of Film Study in the 70's." If an emphasis on group discourse was to prove fruitful, it seemed essential that the group involved be small in number -- hence the rather arbitrary total of only thirty-four participants. The physical environment for the meetings was one which permitted the participants to sit around a table, rather than 'oppose' each other over a lecturn.

In general, the Student Conference on Film Study was designed to bring together, for a period of three full days, a group of people who would be able to discuss the cinema not only in relation to the world of film-as-object but who would also, and primarily, have the ability and interest which would permit them to talk about the cinema in relation to contexts both larger and other than -- yet inclusive of -- images on the screen. There was, therefore, a conscious intent to emphasize the conceptualization of the cinema experience as messages within larger sets of discourse.

Due to the presence at the conference of Professor Christian Metz, whose special academic competence is cinema semiotics, a large part of the conference program came to be devoted to semiotological approaches to the problem of cinema studies. In Western Europe, students have been seriously studying the cinema from a semiotic perspective for some time; in the United States this has not
been the case. In response to a suggestion by Professor Thomas Sebeok, a selection of conference materials dealing specifically with cinema semiotics was selected for publication by Mouton, The Hague. This manuscript has been completed and is entitled *Semiotics and the Cinema: Selected Essays and Discussion Transcriptions from the 1972 Oberlin Film Study Conference, Vol. I*. Some of the essays contained in this collection are revisions of articles originally written as essays of application to the conference; other essays are reworkings of presentations delivered orally at the conference itself. The "Discussion" portions of the book were edited from tapes made at the meetings. The contents of Vol. I are: "Introduction" by Christian Koch; "On trying to Introduce a Distinction Between Cinema and Film" by Christian Metz; "Discussion of the Metz Presentation"; "Semiology of the Film: A Review of Theoretical Articles to 1970" by Julia Lesage; "The Referential Generality of Film Imagery" by Jeffrey Bacal; "Discussion of Semiological Analysis of Non-Narrative Films"; "Deillusioning the Narrative, Destroying the Sign: Robert Nelson's Bleu Shut" by Marshall Blonsky; "Film and the Limits of Semiology" by M. Claire Kolbenschlag; and "Discussion of the Kolbenschlag Presentation". "Semiology of Cinema: An Analytic Review" by Nicholas K. Browne.

The 1972 Student Conference on Film Study was by no means, however, only concerned with semiotics. Consequently, this second volume of materials (1972 Oberlin Film Conference: Selected Essays and Discussion Transcriptions, Vol. II) has been prepared and is being made available through Oberlin College, Department of Communication Studies. Many of the excellent essays contained in this latter collection will also be appearing in various journals and magazines.

No attempt was made to standardize procedures for footnoting, referencing, etc. in the present collection. The authors were asked to revise their original essays of application if they wished. Some of the essays were revised; most were not. Four presentations and discussions included in the volume (the Mills discussion and the three concluding discussion/presentations) were edited from tapes recorded at the sessions. Every effort was made in the editing to remain faithful to the spirit, as well as to the letter, of the discourse involved.

The following listings include the names of all student conference participants, their schools, and their application essay titles. Most of the students were, at the time of the conference, graduate students at the schools listed. Many are now on the faculties of other institutions. Following the listing of participants is a schedule of the actual conference sessions. This schedule includes the names of those persons specifically responsible for 'shaping' each meeting. The schedule itself, however, including the focus of each session, was drawn up by the conference organizers prior to the sessions. Participants were asked to assume the 'roles' listed, even though the particular session in which they were asked to participate may not have actually reflected their own specialized academic interests.

**INVITED STUDENT PARTICIPANTS AND APPLICATION ESSAY TITLES**

Jeff Bacal (University of Iowa)
"The Referential Generality of Film Imagery"

Siew-Hwa Beh (University of California, Los Angeles)
"Andy Warhol"

James Belson (University of Southern California)
"Eisenstein and Joyce: Making the Mind Visible"
Vanda Belichten (Yale University)
"Film as Media as Epidemic"

Marshall Blonsky (New York University)
"Notes for an Affective Film Stylistics"

David Bordwell (University of Iowa)
"Dimensions of Film Genres"

Nicholas Browne (Harvard University)
"Prolegomena to a Study of Signification in Film"

Noel Carroll (New York University)
"Metaphor in Film"

Richard Chalfen (University of Pennsylvania)
"A Sociovidistic Approach to Film Communication: Theory, Methods, and Suggested Fieldwork"

Stephen Duplantier (Indiana University)
"Film and the Hominological Sciences"

Charles Harpole (New York University)
"Cinema as a Humanity: An Objection to Narrowness"

Brian Henderson (University of California, Santa Cruz)
"Godard's Paradigm"

Roxanne Glasberg (University of Wisconsin)
"Boudu Saved from Drowning"

Malcolm Gordon (Temple University)
"Proxemics and Film: A Study of Personal Space as a Critical Tool"

M. Claire Kolbenschlag (Notre Dame University)
"Notes for a Course in Cin-esthetics/Cin-ethics"

Julia Lesage (Indiana University)
"Semiology of the Film: Its Theory, Contribution, and Cultural Significance"

Jim Linton (University of Pennsylvania)
"There Must be Some Kinda Way Outta Here: Film Studies in the 70's"

John Llewellyn (University of Chicago)
"An Analysis of Jules and Jim as an Adaptation"

Timothy Lyons (University of Iowa)
"The Motion Picture Industry, 1896-1921"

Louis Miller (University of Michigan)
"The Face of America"

Ian Hills (University of Wisconsin)
"Fellini-Satyricon: A Baroque Masterpiece"
Sollace Michell (Brown University)
'Some Thoughts on Cinema and Its Relationship to Art and the Future Role of Cinema and Art of Society'

Robert Mugge (University of Maryland)
'Narcissus Well-Lit'

Bill Nichols (University of California, Los Angeles)
'Newsreel: Film and Revolution'

Ruth Perlmutter (New York University)
'Add Film to Rhetoric'

John Powers (Oberlin College)
'The Frameup: On Divorcing a Film from Its Context'

Elizabeth Rodes (Sarah Lawrence College)
'Film and Visual Perception'

Mary Shaughnessay (State University of New York at Buffalo)
'Film: A Language of Vision'

Doug Shryock (San Francisco State College)
'Connotation and Denotation in the Cinema'

John Tokar (State University of New York at Buffalo)
'The Social Presuppositions of Film'

Doris Yue (San Francisco State College)
'For a Responsible Program of Film Study: For a Responsible Cinema'

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE -- APRIL 20-23, 1972 (Meetings held on the campus of Oberlin College)

Thursday Evening -- April 20

7:30 p.m. The Importance of Examining the Consciousness of the Filmmaker: Focus on the Films of Federico Fellini and on Christopher Parker's Cut (the latter shown at the session)

Presentation: Ian Mills
Comments: James Belson, John Tokar
Discussion Coordinator: John Powers

9:45 p.m. Reception

Friday Morning -- April 21

9:00 a.m. The Significance of Significance: Problems and Portents of Selected Aspects of the Semiological Writings of Christian Metz, Illustrated with Reference to Parker's Cut

Presentation: Nicholas Browne
Comments: Noel Carroll, Julia Lesage
Discussion Coordinator: Jeff Bacal
Friday Afternoon -- April 21

1:15 p.m. The Implications of Deillusioning the Narration, Destroying the Sign, Tearing Away the Signified: Robert Nelson's Bleu Shut (Shown at the session)

Presentation: Marshall Blonsky
Comments: John Llewellyn, Ruth Perlmutter
Discussion Coordinator: Jim Linton

3:30 p.m. Who Cares if it is a Non-Diegetic Shot Interpolation? The Limits of Semiology

Presentation: M. Claire Kolbenschlag
Comments: Richard Chalfen, Doug Shryock
Discussion Coordinator: Charles Harpole

Friday Evening -- April 21

8:00 p.m. Presentation: Christian Metz, "On trying to Introduce a Distinction Between Cinema and Film"

Saturday Morning -- April 22

8:30 a.m. Beyond Nostalgia: How Can a Re-membering of the Past Contribute to Pro-jecting the Future? (The teaching of film history as contexts of change)

Presentation: Brian Henderson
Comments: Timothy Lyons, Elizabeth Rodes
Discussion Coordinator: Doris Yue

10:30 a.m. Colonialism and the Cinema: The Screen, a Repressed Order?

Presentation: Sieh-Hwa Beh
Comments: Roxanne Glasberg, Robert Mugge
Discussion Coordinator: Mary Shaughnessy

Saturday Afternoon -- April 22

1:15 p.m. Film and Revolution: The Cinema as Trigger to Social Change? (illustrated with reference to Newsreel films)

Presentation: Bill Nichols
Comments: Wanda Bersh, Louis Miller
Discussion Coordinator: David Bordwell

3:30 p.m. The Individual Consciousness Film: From the Digital to the Analog (illustrated with reference to Jordan Belson's Allures--shown at the session)

Presentation: Sollace Mitchell
Comments: Stephen Duplantier, Malcolm Gordon
Discussion Coordinator: Ruth Perlmutter
Saturday Evening -- April 22

8:00 p.m. Presentation: Yves de Laurot and Ciméma Engagé

Sunday Morning -- April 23

9:30 a.m. Strategies for Action: To What Specific Activities Can or Should This Group Direct Its Efforts -- Individually or Together -- In the Academic and Non-Academic Communities?

Discussion Coordinator: Jim Linton

An enthusiastic response to the 1972 Student Conference on Film Study has made possible a second conference, which took place during the spring of 1973 in Washington, D.C. The conference, with the cooperation of the embassies of various countries, included participants from both the United States and Western Europe--a first step toward a more far-reaching international gathering. These meetings were again funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, sponsored by Oberlin College, and held this year at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts by invitation of the American Film Institute. The theme of the conference was "Cinema and Ideology: Systems, Semiotics, and Society." Materials from these meetings are now being prepared for dissemination.

October, 1972; June, 1973

Christian Koch
John Poyers
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks are due Professor Daniel Goulding, Chairman of the Department of Communication Studies at Oberlin College, for his many-faceted support of the conference, not the least which was the reading of the many essays of application submitted to the conference prior to the extending of invitations. Many thanks also to John Powers, a student at Oberlin College and Student Chairman of the Conference, both for his reading of the essays of application as well as for his help with the editing and preparation of this volume. I would also like to thank Andrew Axilrod, also an Oberlin student, for the care which he took in recording all sessions of the conference. The excellence of his recorded tapes made transcribing the conference proceedings a possible task.

-- C.K.
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In 1929 James Joyce and Sergei Eisenstein met in Paris and discussed, among other things, the possibility of making a film of Ulysses. Leon Moussinac writes in his biography of Eisenstein that they "talked of the future development of their mutual preoccupation—the 'internal monologue'—how the mind could be made visible and comprehensible through the film medium." They seemed to share a mutual admiration of one another's work in this area. Joyce's interest in film was quite clear. He interrupted his writing of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man for several months to manage Dublin's first movie hall. After viewing Eisenstein's attempts to reveal the inner core of man in Potemkin and October, he named Eisenstein as the only director, beside Walter Ruttmann, who could direct a film of Ulysses, if such a film were ever to be made. And Eisenstein, who based his film theory on literary models ranging from Dickens to Lewis Carroll and from Flaubert to Mayakovsky, found what he believed to be numerous positive analogies to his theories of interior monologue and montage in the literary techniques of Joyce:

"What Joyce does with literature is quite close to what we're doing with the new cinematography, and even closer to what we're going to do...My mind is filled with a truckload of thoughts about Joyce and the film of the future."

In a recent article in Film Quarterly, "Two Types of Film Theory," Brian Henderson objects to this "ill analogy" in the use of literary models by film aestheticians. He finds Eisenstein, as well as Andre Bazin, guilty of unjustifiably shifting their categories when they discuss the whole film as narrative on the basis of literary models, after they have been discussing the formal aspects of film—shot and sequence—in cinematic terms. "Why narrative should...emerge as the central or sole category of analysis—when it has not been an important category at lower levels—is not clear." Perhaps what is not sufficiently clear is the narrative nature of these formal aspects of film. A more thorough understanding of the narrative essence of film will help us approach the common concerns of Eisenstein and Joyce, and might, at the same time, clear up what otherwise may appear to be a category mistake in the theories of Eisenstein and Bazin.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a detailed analysis of this narrative essence. But it will be necessary to provide a few general definitions of the narrative and mimetic theories of film and novel in order to speak clearly about the implications of the 'internal monologue' and the other techniques of revealing the inner life of character which are common to both forms, and, at the same time, to discover their significant differences.

One way to define narrative is to contrast it to drama. In this definition narrative is distinguished by two characteristics: the presence of a story and a story-teller. Drama, on the other hand, is a story without a story-teller.
In drama characters act, but directly 'that Aristotle called an 'imitation' of such action as find in life.' Thus, the novel is, by definition, a narrative form. That the film is also a form of narrative may not be quite so obvious. In Stanley Cavell's neo-platonist philosophy of film, *The World Viewed*, the possibilities he sees in the film medium lead him to believe that the general answer to the common question, 'In what ways do movies differ from novels or from theater?' ought to be: 'In every way.' Cavell makes a valuable point: a demand that film stretch the possibilities of its medium to the limits. Yet later in the book Cavell writes that 'one can feel that there is always a camera left out of the picture.' This is at least a semi-conscious recognition of the narrative aspect of film. The 'camera left out of the picture' is the story-teller. Film is narrative and not dramatic then, not because there might be a running commentary complimenting the visual images, but to the extent that the story is presented indirectly, through a controlled point of view--the eye of the camera--sharpening or blurring focus, using close-up or long shot, coloring and shading the image, providing word, music, noise or silence through its sound track.

The second important theoretical aspect of film which bears close analogy to the theory of the novel is its insistence on establishing its mimetic quality. Aesthetics of the novel (fortunately there have been few) have continually posited it as the most mimetic form of narrative literature, as opposed to the tape, or the exemplum, or the romance, etc., which are supposed to be more mythic, less representational forms. Earlier novelists, such as Fielding, Sterne and Dickens, were less encumbered with rules for 'realistic' prose. They are responsible for the healthy, undisciplined growth of the genre before the critics and theorists (many of them novelists themselves; e.g., Flaubert, George Eliot, the Goncourts, Zola, Galdos, Dreiser, Henry James) prescribed their mimetic principles. Fielding was able to describe the novel as a comic epic poem in prose. But by the time we get to Stendhal this conception of the novel has changed. He feels that the novel is capable of a kind of photographic representational truth: the 'novel is like a mirror walking along the road.' And Dostoievsky, perhaps the greatest of all creators of labyrinthine characters, considers himself 'only a realist in the highest sense of the word.'

Quite naturally, film theory is equally insistent on the relationship of film to reality:

Film...is uniquely equipped to record and reveal physical reality and, hence, gravitates toward it.

In recording and exploring physical reality, film exposes a world never seen before. (Janacar)

Photography is a system of reproduction to fix real events and elements of equality... The shot's tendency toward complete immutability is rooted in its nature. (Eisenstein)

The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. (Darin)
Of course every form of art may be considered 'realistic' in some sense or other, so it is not surprising that both the film and the novel take themselves seriously enough to conclude that they are capable of capturing such an elusive quality as reality. In his 'Materialtheorie' Aronheim points out clearly that all artistic, as well as scientific, descriptions of reality are dependent more upon the medium, or material, they employ, than they are upon the specific subject matter. Theories of both the novel and the film are founded upon the belief that the media at their disposal—visual or verbal—are accurate descriptions, if not the 'stuff' itself, of reality.

The guiding myth of both forms is that 'recreation of the world in its own image' which Bazin writes about in 'The Myth of Total Cinema.' In 'The Evolution of the Language of Cinema' Bazin tells of the dream of Zavattini: "to make a ninety-minute film of the life of a man to whom nothing ever happens."2 Zavattini's dream is a statement of the mimetic impulse; to escape from plot into character. For closely this resembles the ideal of Flaubert, the greatest French Realist:

"That strikes me as beautiful, that I should like to do, is a book about nothing, a book without external attachments...a book which would have practically no subject...a geometrically straight line. No lyricism, no comments, the author's personality absent."9

This fiction of authorial silence is the myth which leads Roland Barthes to label the traditional novel a lie. According to Barthes the convention of neutral observation, which begins with Flaubert, is the most preposterous of all theories. The 'fact' is really, contrary to Flaubert's wishes, an 'artifact'.

Yet the dream persists; like the archetypal, recurrent dream of the palace in Borges' essay, The Dream of Coleridge. And thus Leger dreams of a monster film which would have to record painstakingly the life of a man and a woman during twenty-four consecutive hours: their work, their silence, their intimacy. Nothing should be omitted; nor should they ever be aware of the presence of the camera.10

Cavell not obviously spent more hours in the movies than Leger. We are condemned like him to feel the presence of the 'camera left out of the picture', whether or not Leger wants the character on the screen to be unaware of it. It is a presence of which Warhol makes us painfully aware. But Leger and Zavattini must be excused. How could they have known that Warhol would take their dreams seriously?

There is a third aspect shared by the film and the novel which further defines their methods of revealing character: a highly developed consciousness of time. The novel has been called 'an attempt to come to terms with time', an attempt which often has the effect of turning critical attention to the character and away from the plot. Bearing in mind E. M. Forster's distinction between 'life by time' and 'life by values' in the novel, we can see how 'the movement toward the chronological plot in modern narrative is part of the general movement to emphasize character in narrative';11 the chronological plot representing a trend away from the ethically based plot line. The distinction is an important one.
because it introduces a particular kind of character in narrative: the 
chronological-dynamic character, as opposed to the changeless character (e.g., 
Achilles) or the merely developmental character (e.g., Don Juan).

The chronological-dynamic character does not emerge in literature until a 
fairly sophisticated time consciousness develops in Western culture. And 
narrative development of this type of character depends upon access to the 
inside, the psyche, of the character. This applies to film just as it does to 
the novel. Much has been written, much of it contradictory, about the sense 
of time in film. There is some confusion about the availability of tenses to 
the motion picture. There is a convention, for example, accepted by many film 
aestheticians, that film is always in the present tense. This is probably 
related to the view that film is a dramatic rather than a narrative form. But 
a deeper insight is Balin's reading of the French imperfect tense in Citizen 
Kane, and his discovery of an equivalent to the simple past tense in Delannoy's 
Symphonie pastorale. Later, we shall have to consider what is meant by the 
ability to spatialize time in the modern novel and film and how this effects 
the method of revealing character. Panofsky's understanding of the 'temporal organization of space' would seem to explain our ability to move about in time in a film quite as effectively as we may in a novel. To summarize: film shares with the 
novel its narrative, high-mimetic, time-conscious nature. An elaboration of these 
points would be useful, but for the present they establish a basis for comparison. 
Here to the point here, these last two qualities tend to reveal a particular kind 
of character, a character largely defined by the inner life.

Pudolf Arneheim is indulging in wishful thinking when he writes:

- writer... relying intuitively on the principle which Lessing 
formulated in theory, tend to describe what is by what happens...
- The description of a scene becomes an interpretation. The 
writer uses the idiosyncrasies of his medium to guide the 
reader through a scene, just as a film can move the spectator 
from detail to detail and thereby reveal a situation by a con-
trolled sequence.

In his comparison of the writer's control to the camera's control Arnheim helps 
confirm our view of film as narrative. But writers do not, in fact, restrict 
themselves to describing 'what is by what happens'. Novelists do reveal the 
inside of character by describing what happens--Henry James is a master at this--
but they also use direct narrative statement, dramatization (of inward states), 
dreams and, to get back to Joyce and Eisenstein, internal monologue. Does film 
have access to parallel devices, as Eisenstein believes? Siegfried Kracauer 
writes that the multi-facted thoughts and experiences of the characters in 
Proust's novel no longer have an equivalent in the visible world. They are 
language bound; even the most ingenious camera work would be only a poor 
substitute for the vision roused by words. And George Placstone finds that 
Joyce would be 'abused' on film. Were Eisenstein and Joyce really being 
assured they, when they considered making a film of Ulysses?
Eisenstein sees in the internal monologue, as developed by Joyce, a means of presenting the inner life of character on film. In fact, he believes that the inner monologue is more suited to film than to literature: "only the film-element commands a means for the adequate presentation of the whole course of thought through a disturbed mind." But Eisenstein admits that literature may be able to break through its traditional limits by exploiting the use of inner monologue. He offers the internal monologues of Bloom as an example of how literature can abolish the distinction between subject and object. Thus, he agrees with Wladimir: eeeff the internal monologues of Bloom as an example of how literature can abolish the distinction between subject and object.

A composition in words is able, and therefore disposed, directly to name and penetrate inner-life events that range from emotions to ideas, from psychological conflicts to intellectual disputes. Yet Eisenstein refuses to place limits on film's possibilities in this area and would have to disagree with a conception such as Rudolf Rach's:

Bel Proust, Joyce, Woolf und Broch z.B. wird die traditionelle Form des Gedankenberichts zum 'monologue interieur' oder 'stream of consciousness'. Hier ist, bei dem Versuch für bestimmte Bedeutungsbereiche der Sprache annahernd eindeutige visuelle Äquivalente zu finden, zeigen sich die fundamentalen Differenzen zwischen den beiden Medien. Es wäre unrichtig von graduellen Unterschieden zu sprechen, es sind prinzipielle.10

Interior monologue is a literary term which is synonymous with unspoken soliloquy. It is a dramatic element in narrative because it directly presents the unspoken thoughts of a character without any intervening narrator. Interior monologue "can only be present ... narrative literature because only in narrative can a soliloquy remain unspoken yet be understood by an audience." Yet according to Bela Balázs the unspoken soliloquy is an option open to the film. It was, in fact, the silent film which brought us what Balázs calls the "silent soliloquy":

In the film the mute soliloquy of the face speaks even when the hero is not alone, and herein lies a great opportunity for depicting man. The poetic significance of the soliloquy is that it is a manifestation of mental, not physical, loneliness...a novelist can, of course, write a dialogue so as to weave into it what the speakers think to themselves while they are talking. But by so doing he splits up the sometimes comic, sometimes tragic, but always awe-inspiring unity between spoken word and hidden thought with which the contradiction is rendered manifest in the human face and which the film was the first to show us in all its dazzling variety.

Balázs sees the close-up as a more powerful, closely related, technique of interior monologue. But it is not the 'close-up' which Eisenstein has in mind when he refers to the possibilities of interior monologue in film. Eisenstein and Balázs seem to be talking about two different narrative techniques for revealing the inner life of character. In the quote above, Rudolf Rach has identified inner monologue with stream of consciousness, but we must now distinguish between
them before we can understand the different meanings assigned the concept in the theories of Eisenstein and Balázs.

If interior monologue is a literary term which is synonymous with unspoken soliloquy, it is also a rhetorical device, just as spoken soliloquy is. By 'rhetorical' we mean words artfully deployed so as to move the reader or audience by focusing on him and his responses. Stream of consciousness is more precisely a psychological term, the description of a mental process. It refers to the illogical, associative patterns of thought, whether spoken or unspoken, rather than the logical sequence of rhetoric. Balázs is properly speaking of interior monologue, and it would seem that he is somewhat justified in comparing it to the use of the close-up, which may be considered as a kind of rhetorical device of the film. It is equally apparent that Eisenstein is really speaking about stream of consciousness and not interior monologue, although we cannot blame him for failing to make this distinction between the psychological term and the literary method. While interior monologue and stream of consciousness are often combined in modern narrative, we can see that in Ulysses Joyce leans more toward stream of consciousness, while in The Sound and the Fury, for example, Faulkner leans more toward the rhetorical device of interior monologue. It is clearly stream of consciousness, the psychological term, to which Eisenstein refers when he describes Ulysses and Finnegans Wake as "the most heroic attempt" in literature to venture outside its own frame and embrace both the inner and outer worlds of man in a simultaneous depiction of events as they "pass through the consciousness and feelings...the associations and emotions of one of his chief characters."21

The displacement of rhetoric by psychology signals another movement toward character at the expense of plot. In respect to plot, mimetic characterization is the antithesis of mythic characterization. In the eighteenth century, for example, Henry Fielding is supremely successful in employing generalized character types because his fiction is so dominated by plot. The movement toward stream of consciousness methods of characterization, the movement into the psyche, effectively subverts traditional chronological order, Bergson's 'time of intellect', into the 'time of intuition'. We shall have to set aside consideration of this phenomenon for the moment, and how it relates to the spatialization of time. For the time being, note that even if the chronological order is tempered with in favor of other rhythms, an underlying chronology is always at least implied, if not stressed, by this very conscious 'artistic' act of disordering.

While Eisenstein speaks of Joyce's use of interior monologue, he does not directly identify the novel as having a montage structure. Instead he compares Joyce's word-creations, new word combinations formed through juxtaposition, in Finnegans Wake, with montage principles of juxtaposing two shots to form a montage phrase. "It has been left to Joyce," Eisenstein writes, "to develop in 'literature' the depictive line of the Japanese heiroglyph."22 And the importance of the heiroglyph lies in its ability to "copulate" (i.e., combine) with another heiroglyph to form an ideogram. Two objects combine to form a concept. This is precisely Eisenstein's definition of montage: "Two pieces of film of any kind, placed together, inevitably combine into a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that juxtaposition."23 Eisenstein probably comes closest to actually identifying stream of consciousness (he says 'inner monologue') as a montage structure
when he says that 'the secret of the structure of montage was gradually revealed as a secret of the 'structure' of emotional speech' emotional speech being described as the use of affective logic in speech, which is distinct from written language. He compares written language to the 'clumsy long shot.'

Harry Levin's study, *James Joyce*, makes the connection much more explicitly when he titles an entire chapter of his book 'Montage' and examines montage as a literary device to reveal character:

Bloom is our sensorium, and it is his experience that becomes ours. To record this experience, however, has not been a simple process of photography. Bloom's mind is neither a 'tabula rasa' nor a photographic plate, but a motion picture, which has been ingeniously cut and carefully edited to emphasize the close-ups and fade-outs of flickering emotion, the angles of observation and the flashbacks of reminiscence. In its intimacy and in its continuity *Ulysses* has more in common with the cinema than with other fiction. The movement of Joyce's style, the thought of his characters, is like unreeling film, his method of construction, the arrangement of this raw material, involves the crucial operation of 'montage.'

Thus, it is in terms of its ability to examine the psyche of character and its competence in handling time that Levin defines the montage structure of *Ulysses*. Like stream of consciousness, montage structure replaces logical linear, sequential order with associative patterns. Stream of consciousness is not identical with montage structure, but it might be regarded as a radical type of montage not unlike what Eisenstein termed the fifth level of montage (after the four levels of metric, rhythmic, tonal and overtone montage)--intellectual montage--which is used 'to direct the whole thought process'. Montage is a juxtaposing of shots or words, while stream of consciousness, what Eisenstein referred to as inner monologue, is a montage method of revealing a character's psyche. It is that type of montage which provides those 'flickering emotions' and 'flashbacks of reminiscence' which Levin speaks of.

More significant, however, in this quote from Levin, is his use of the motion picture screen as a model for the human brain. It is as crucial to the theory of character in the film as it is to the modern stream of consciousness novel. For the interior monologue is based on quite another model. The earliest, and some of the most memorable, interior monologues occur in the *Iliad*. In about half of the interior monologues in the *Iliad*, the line "but why does my heart (thymos) dispute with me thus?" occurs at crucial points in the narrative when the speaker is experiencing fear. This formulaic line is invoked to show the mind disputing with the will. There is a picture, or model, of the human psyche in the *Iliad* which is inherent in any use of the interior monologue: the conception of a divided psyche capable of carrying on a discussion with itself. Thought is conceived by Plato, for example, as the talk which the soul (psyche) has with itself about any subject which it considers" ("Theaetetus", 189, E; "Sophist", 263 E). The ancient tendency was to consider thought as speech minus the sound, i.e., as a kind of internal dialogue. This was the prevailing assumption about the nature of thought until rather recently. So, if thought
is merely unspoken speech, the same rules of rhetoric apply to it as to words which are pronounced aloud. This is an understanding implicit in our acceptance of the interior monologue.

But if associative, non-linear patterns characterize thought, the rhetorical model of the 'dialoguing mind' no longer suffices. This is how we must accept Harry Levin's 'motion picture screen brain'. This same model appears when Herbert Read writes that the aim of good literature, as well as the ideal film, is "to project onto that inner screen of the brain a moving picture of objects and events." Such an image is essential to the view that Arnheim proposes in Visual Thinking, that language is not indispensable to thought (even though Arnheim's description of the human brain as an "empty cloud chamber" is a much more interesting model).

Summarizing the argument above, the switch from interior monologue to stream of consciousness in narrative seems to depend upon, or at least implies, a change in our conception of thought. It also signals a new conception of time, which further introduces different means of expressing character. The 'motion picture mind' does not order words sequentially, but describes character with word groups whose meanings depend on their spatial relationships. Stream of consciousness, Eisenstein's inner monologue, is used to describe the irrational thought processes and thus discards logical order in favor of what Eisenstein calls "sensual thinking." So stream of consciousness assumes the original task of interior monologue, which was to reveal a mind tormented by a dilemma. As Norman O. Brown writes:

progress toward a higher rationality in our understanding of time depends on a psychology which explores the irrational in general and specifically the irrational in human needs.

Bazin feels that it is the novel which has made the 'subllest' use of montage, and believes that Citizen Kane would not have been possible prior to Joyce. Ulysses seems to have a certain 'rhapsodic quality'. A quality which Arnold Hauser describes as a triumph of the contents of consciousness over chronological order:

The spatialization of time goes so far in Joyce that one can begin the reading of Ulysses where one likes, with only a rough knowledge of the context...and almost in any sequence one cares to choose. The medium in which the reader finds himself is in fact wholly spatial.

It is somewhat misleading to say that you can begin reading Ulysses wherever you like. The pattern of associations in Bloom's mind may not be chronologically ordered, but there is an order. It would be helpful if we could say that one can begin reading Ulysses 'whenever' one likes, but that sounds like a recommendation to begin 'sometime'. As Susan Sontag has pointed out, the difficulty is that our idea of form is spatial; we don't have a sufficient vocabulary of forms for the temporal arts such as the novel.
What we don’t have yet is a poetics of the novel, any clear notion of the forms of narration. Perhaps film criticism will be the occasion of a breakthrough here, since films are primarily a visual form, yet they are also a subdivision of literature.

We have arrived at the problem of the spatialization of time, a phenomenon which is held to apply to the film and the modern novel. Joseph Frank puts the matter more clearly than Hauser when he explains that what it means to say that Joyce and other writers are moving in the direction of spatial form is, simply, that the "reader is ideally intended to apprehend their work spatially, in a moment of time, rather than as sequence... juxtaposing word groups so that they may be perceived simultaneously. Once again we find ourselves back to Eisenstein's definition of montage; still another commitment by the narrator to reveal the inner life of character. The narrative of Ulysses is principally modulated through the consciousness of Bloom. The spatialization of time tends to dissolve plot almost entirely, and character becomes the sole focal point. Everything is change in this type of narrative. Character is the one remaining primary substance to which all else is attached, although it too may be undergoing changes. This narrative movement represents a tendency toward spatial art which presents its materials simultaneously or in random order. Spatial art has no plot. One has the temptation to say that the movement further into the psyche of character leaves the reader completely 'spaced', until plot becomes so thin it seems to disappear.

Although Hauser and others refer to the spatialization of time in the modern novel as a 'cinematic' effect, we seem to have been led somewhat away here from a consideration of the theory of character in film. Perhaps this is inevitably so. Despite the fact that the kind of modern narrative we have been discussing is often called cinematic, it is not at all certain that stream of consciousness is a possibility in visual narrative (whether or not it is desirable).

Increasingly mimetic characterization requires an ever increasing freedom from plot. The ultimate form of mimetic narrative is thus assumed to be the 'slice of life', virtually a kind of 'unplot'. "All narrative forms," write Scholes and Kellogg, "if pushed to their ultimate capabilities, and purged of 'impurities' disappear into the outer fringes of the world of art or of the actual world." Appropriately, the fullest extension of mimesis brings us back to myth. The journey into the interior in Ulysses brings us full circle, so that in the "Circe" chapter Bloom acts out his subconscious phantasies in a surrealistic, external dramatization. Face to face with the psyche the novelist seems to discover not the ultimately mimetic 'clockwork orange' of the mind, but a world of myth. Mimetic characterization self-destructs as it breaks through the boundaries of the psyche into the world of mythic expressionistic patterns. The world of myth which has been concealed through mimetic characterization is once again revealed.

It is with good reason that the film has not made the round trip. This brings us to the one narrative element we have not yet discussed: point of view. The novelist has numerous options in respect to point of view. He may be an
eyewitness, recorder, omniscient observer, historian, etc. But does the film have these same options? Most film theorists do not believe so. For example, Etienne Fuzellier writes:

Les romans que l'on appele parfois 'en premiere personne' - ceux qui se presentent comme une sorte d'autobiographie - doivent subir (in the case of adaptation) une transformation tout aussi profonde: le lecteur du roman voyait et imaginait par les yeux du heros, s'identifiait avec lui directement; le realisateur doit, lui, presenter au spectateurs ce meme heros visible a l'ecran' la narration sort du personnage, se fait exterieure a lui, et adopte ainsi d'autres perspectives, un autre systeme de coordonnees, une autre dimension.33

All of which leads Fuzellier to the conclusion that "en depit des apparences la piece de theatre est beaucoup plus proche du film que le roman." This is contrary to Bazin's contention that the theater, unlike the novel, is a "false friend" when it comes to adaptation. And Francois Truffaut disagrees entirely with Fuzellier's ideas about the possibilities of 'first person cinema'. He writes that the film can be "plus personal encore qu'un roman, individuel et autobiographique comme une confession, ou comme un journal intime. Les jeunes cineastes s'experimeront a la premiere personne."34

The truth probably lies somewhere between these two positions. Verbal narrative, and the novel in particular, possesses a greater range of point of view, because it exercises a greater control over point of view than visual narrative. Since we have previously defined film as narrative precisely because it does control point of view, we had best state clearly what kind of control we are speaking of. To do this we must bear in mind a distinction which psychologists make between the visual field and the visual world.35 The visual world is an abstraction, it cannot be seen, but is rather thought. The visual world is the conceptual world of things 'out there'. The visual 'field' is that which we actually see. It shifts with the movement of the eye. Verbal control of point of view is a result of the writer's ability to present us with a conceptual visual world. In the perceptual visual field point of view is changing much more rapidly, although subjective camera and hand-held camera are attempts to stabilize this effect.

Words tend to stabilize visual fields into a visual world, even though narrative methods such as stream of consciousness attempt to present the reader with a visual field. The film achieves a modified control of point of view which is experienced through a clustering of visual fields perceived as impressions: of light with color, contour, motion and distance. On the other hand, the word more naturally adapts itself to montage structure and stream of consciousness to achieve characterization. Arnheim writes:

One cannot take pictures or pieces of pictures and put them together to produce new statements as easily as one can combine words or ideographs. Pictorial montages show their seams, whereas the images produced by words fuse into unified wholes.36
Eisenstein was well aware of this when he said that "the frame is much less independently workable than the word or sound... the shot... is more resistant than granite."57 For Eisenstein, however, this greater resistance was the promise of more powerful montage 'collisions' when two shots were successfully juxtaposed.

While greater facility of montage is possible with words, it is necessary to remember that words tend to solidify the perceptual impressions we have received from direct experience; or, as Arnheim puts it, language helps 'to stabilize the inventory of visual concepts'. This greater stability allows the word a firmer control over point of view in narrative, and provides verbal narrative with its broader repertory of point of view. The richness of Dickens in large measure is due to his willingness to continually break the fictional plane, confiding and confessing, exhorting and addressing the reader, violating point of view. Thus Dickens' novels approach filmic operation in the visual field. It is interesting from this standpoint that Eisenstein saw Dickens' novels as "the most expressive means of revealing the inner world and ethical countenance of the characters themselves."30

Flaubert's dream of 'pure' fiction imposes a rigid point of view and restricts itself, or rather, attempts to restrict itself, to the visual world. The constantly shifting eye of the narrative camera, on the other hand, presents us with a visual field constantly changing in size, contour and color as it is perceived by the eye. Stream of consciousness techniques may be less a part of film experience, because point of view, while it is modulated through the eye of the camera, becomes much less obvious, it tends to disappear in the visual fields we experience through the shifting motion, color and distance of the visual narrative. This does not mean that the narrator, i.e., the camera, disappears in film as Flaubert thought the author of the novel should disappear. Instead, the camera opens up another ironic gap between the 'objective' photographic reproduction of the world and the limited view of the camera's narrative choices.

In Resnais' films, for example, we experience carefully wrought attempts to filter time through the mind of character. In both Hiroshima Mon Amour and Last Year at Marienbad we are presented with visual fields modified by memory. Both films may be seen as forms of 'memory working' or attempts to distinguish between public and private memories, as John Ward has shown in his book, Alain Resnais. Resnais' films add to the cinema's power to express time and turn the idea that film is always in the present tense into an empty convention. But Hiroshima and Marienbad still operate in visual fields and do not restrict our experiences in them to anything like pure stream of consciousness.

The inward life of character in film is revealed mainly through such rhetorical narrative devices as the close-up, shooting angles, etc., as well as through flashbacks of memory or actual dream sequences which may be signaled to the audience by various techniques which affect the visual field, such as slow-motion, changes of color or light intensity, distortion, etc. And these are already something like the surrealistic dramatization of the "Circe" chapter in Ulysses. As we mentioned earlier, the film does not seem to make the round-trip through stream of consciousness in order to recover myth. Stanley Cavell
points out that realism and 'theatricalism' are not opposed in film, but are somehow connected. Film and novel are both mimetic narrative. But the presentation of a visual field in film means that film also has a certain 'dramatic' effect on the viewer. Film seems to be narrative in a technical sense, as well as dramatic in psychological effect; it thus straddles the boundary between narrative and drama.

Attempts have been made to describe the "Circe" chapter of *Ulysses* as a dream sequence, relocating the action in the mind of one of the protagonists. Such attempts are ultimately unsatisfying because Joyce has completely abandoned realistic characterization in this scene. The Nighttown sequence formed a substantial portion of the film which Joseph Strick adapted from *Ulysses*. Yet this sequence did not appear to be strikingly different in form from the rest of the film. Perhaps the dream mode is too much with us in the film as Susanne Langer has expressed it in her "Note on the Film."

This essential difference between novel and film has disclosed a deeper truth which applies to both: thinly veiled behind mimetic reproduction of the world lies the world of myth. The sheer physical presence of character in film, the combination of narrative and dramatic elements, fractures the mimetic impulse in a continual dialectic between the inside of the characters mind and the outside world of his perceptions. Eisenstein and Joyce shared a common interest in the means of expressing the 'inner life' of man in art. Eisenstein developed a theory, based upon Joyce's literary techniques, by which film might more fully express the inner life. Joyce borrowed the narrative-dramatic aspects of film for the same purpose and created the 'cinematic novel'. Bazin's "Defense of Fixed Cinema" is an acknowledgment of the possibilities of cross-hybridization between these two bastard narrative forms. It is the richest possible combination of 'impurities' that produces the most powerful stories and the most convincing characters.
Just as the theory of the novel posits its mimetic nature by contrast with narrative forms of myth, Bazin establishes the mimetic nature of film with a similar contrast in the world of painting in which the discovery of perspective is described as a mechanical means of reproduction since which time painting has been "torn between two ambitions, namely the expression of spiritual reality, wherein the symbol transcended its model; the other purely psychological, namely the duplication of the world outside" (p. 11). But for Bazin photography is the first truly objective art.

13. In his book, The Art of Fiction, James writes: "What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character? What is either a picture or a novel that is not of character? What else do we seek in it and find in it? It is an incident for a woman to stand up with her hand resting on a table and look out at you in a certain way; or if it be not an incident I think it will be hard to see what it is." James view of character is firmly constructed on 'realistic' principles. For James the novel's supreme virtue was its "air of reality."

14. Kracauer, p. 239.
19. Scholes and Kellogg, pp. 177-78.


Balazs is speaking, of course, of the silent film. In the sound film a subdued narrative voice is sometimes offered as an equivalent to the interior monologue. This is no longer 'unspoken' soliloquy; the principal difference between this and the soliloquy spoken on the stage is that the actor on the screen speaks much more softly and doesn't even have to open his mouth. Yet even the 'unspoken soliloquy' form of the interior monologue, is not, finally, unspoken. It relies on the acceptance of a rhetorical convention—the dialoguing mind.


22. Ibid., p. 35.


24. Eisenstein, *Film Form.* P. 249.


32. As G. Spencer Brown tells it, near the conclusion of his *Laws of Form:*
"What is revealed will be concealed, but what is concealed will again be revealed... we somehow cleverly obscured this knowledge from ourselves, in order that we might then navigate ourselves through a journey of rediscovery." *Laws of Form.* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, p. 106.


35. See James J. Gibson's *The Perception of the Visual World.*


37. Eisenstein, *Film Form,* p. 5.

38. Ibid., p. 199.
No one assumes that the **content** of a newspaper is: news about the Kellogg pact, a scandal at the Gazette de France, or such a daily incident as that of a drunken husband murdering his wife with a hammer.

When we speak of the **content** of a newspaper we mean the principle of organization and cultivation of the newspaper's **capacities**—aimed at the class-cultivation of the reader.

And in this is the production-based inseparability of combined content and form that makes an **ideology**.

S. Eisenstein, 1929

I. Uncut film rushes, somewhat like newspaper copy, are always a record of a complex event, i.e. the perception by a particular human being of another person, object or occurrence through the filter of his brain and his camera's capabilities. Thereafter various kinds of manipulations may be performed upon that film record. It may become entertainment, a documentary statement; propaganda, fantasy, even a form of art. It may be one or some or all of these at once. Whether left as record or further manipulated, every piece of film is a cultural artifact, encoding some kind of information about the manner and purpose of its making.

Archaeologists collect pot shards from pre-historical cultures as we collect art from the more recent past in the attempt to find out how things used to be. Moving picture film is perhaps the closest we have ever come to actually re-possessing the past. And just as no cultural artifact (be it pots or paintings) is devoid of some significance, neither is any piece of film truly neutral. All artifacts, like Eisenstein's newspaper example, express the ideologies of their makers. Some are personal and some are public, and taken together the artifacts of each culture embody its character as clearly as any written document.

The Russians in 1917 were quick to recognize the extraordinary power of film to convey ideology. Not only did the state finance large-scale production (on Revolutionary themes, of course) but the showing of foreign films was strictly regulated. The more frivolous forms of cinema being produced in Western Europe and the U.S. were considered not merely irrelevant, but dangerous. Eisenstein, a great admirer of Griffith and Chaplin as well as other non-Russian film, defined cinema as an educational medium in which the most serious issues of life and thought might be explored. He had little use for the notion of "entertainment" film, considering that to be rather an insidious form. A film's job, in his mind, was to make the audience "help itself", to provide an active rather than a passive occasion. The means by which film could provide that active occasion were Eisenstein's lifelong study and concern on film as well as in his voluminous theoretical writings.
Almost 50 years have passed now since the "golden age" of Soviet cinema, and we live in a media environment which would doubtless boggle Eisenstein's mind. Movies, radio, TV, advertising posters, etc. surround us daily in all but the most remote areas. In fact, the media environment has become so pervasive that it requires no small amount of ingenuity to escape from its constant blare. Periodically questions are raised about the content of certain films or TV programs. Does violence and explicit sex on the screen encourage such practices in "real life"? Should children watch so many hours of TV? Won't it ruin their eyes? For most, however, all those sounds and images and musical ditties are simply a fact of life. (Don't we always sing about cigarettes and underarm deodorants?)

Many artists (perennial troublemakers that they are) in recent years have begun to suspect that those "facts of life" are not nearly so innocuous as B.B.D. & O. would have us think. Pop artists, Oldenburg and Warhol in particular, opened a Pandora's box by revealing the banal and fraudulent nature of the media images we encounter every day of our lives. Campbell's soup and the great American hamburger when presented as "art" outraged both laymen and critics. And as if that were not bad enough Warhol commenced to make movies of interminable length in which absolutely nothing happened.

These artists meant to provoke and to outrage. If you wanted to argue that hamburgers were not the stuff of art, and the Empire State building no subject for a movie, you had to decide what was appropriate matter for art (and movies) and why. Those issues, however, were not so easy to settle. In fact they loosed a whole flock of nasty and difficult questions about the definition of art and of mass media in relation to society, which was exactly what the artists had in mind. If media is not a simple, innocuous fact of life, what are its powers and effects? Do movies, TV, radio, etc. affect people's thinking and behavior? How? If so, don't the people who make movies, TV, and other media have considerable power over their audience? Isn't that kind of power supposed to entail certain responsibilities? How can we be sure those responsibilities are honored? Must we learn to make media and thereby know its dangers? Or should we make rules for the "professionals"? What is a movie supposed to be?

The appalling thing is that we have no real answers to any of these questions. Film and related media are considered by most artists of the past 50 years to be the most powerful single medium of this century. And if we require further proof of the importance of media on every level of American society and culture, we may note the foresight of the corporate business community in gaining ownership of ABC, NBC, CBS, all major advertising agencies, Time, Life, Newsweek, Vogue, Universal Studios, MGM, and so forth. The list is infinite.

I do not mean to imply that there is a conspiracy of the powerful few against the innocent sheep on this side of the page or screen. I do mean to suggest that we are all operating out of total ignorance of the social, political, psychological and historical effects of media, that we are all guilty of an irresponsibility which may have the heaviest of consequences. We have all, those who make and sell media in America, and those who consume it, stuck our heads in the proverbial sand.
II.

I submit that we cannot have control if we do not have knowledge--all members of a communicative stream influence the shape of that stream but control can only be exerted if we have information about the stream itself...if we are to change telecommunicative boundaries either for education, amusement or science, we must comprehend the artifacts of the structure and attempt to hold them in mind, or change the structure to fit our needs.

R. Birdwhistle, 1969

And along the line of knowledge in the field of the system of laws of formal constructions, cinematography, and indeed the arts generally are still very poor... These questions, however, can successfully be approached only by means of very serious analytical work and by very serious knowledge of the inward nature of artistic form....at the moment at which I began to interest myself in these basic problems of the culture of form and the culture of cinema, I found myself in life not in film production, but engaged in the creation of an academy of cinematography...

S. Eisenstein, 1935

One cannot in a few pages do justice to the history of men's growing awareness; first of himself, second of his environment, then of himself scaled to his environment, and finally of the transaction between himself and his environment. It is only possible to sketch in the broad outlines of this story, which demonstrates more and more clearly that man has inhabited many different perceptual worlds and that art constitutes one of the many rich sources of data on human perception. The artist himself, his work, and the study of art in a cross-cultural context all provide valuable information not just of content but even more important of the structure of man's different perceptual world.

E. Hall, 1969

If there is a lesson to be learned from these statements, it is that both artists and scientists seek knowledge of the structural laws of communication (be it "artistic" or practical, a distinction which we have not room here to discuss). Individual and collective awareness of the communicative environment which we simultaneously and continuously create and consume is the aim of both science and art. And if that is so, why not pursue that knowledge with the most refined tools of each discipline?

I has not been the custom in this country, for reasons unclear to me, to approach problems in the so-called "humanities" with scientific methodology, or vice-versa. Contemporary artists have made some moves to invade the sacred territories of science and technology by such endeavors as the Experiments in Art and Technology initiated during the 1960's or the recent
collaboration with aerospace corporations in Southern California under the direction of Maurice Tuchman. Artists attempting earthworks have become involved with geologists and other environmental sciences while groups like PULSA and members of the alternate video movement have sought out biochemists and neurophysiologists in the course of their work.

The radical innovation of science in this century, however, has been one of method rather than of information. Scientific research approaches problems which are clearly too large for any single person to even define, by group effort. Various teams select different aspects of a problem. Then by maintaining contact through specialized journals and periodic conferences, enough clues are turned up so that some day, some group will actually find an answer on the magnitude of the Watson-Crick discoveries about DNA.

Why should the approach to problems like how film is perceived visually and aurally not be approached in the same way? Clearly it is only by a massive assault on the part of many minds over a considerable period of time that such complex questions may be answered. Nor need we approach the moral, legal, political, social and psychological aspects of media any differently.

What I am suggesting is that the "future of film study" is too narrow a statement of the issues at hand. Film is one among many forms of media, the production and viewing of which can only be enhanced by a general knowledge of the nature of human communications. I don't think we have any basis at all for judging what is a "good" film, or by extension an appropriate course in film-making until we know what film can do. We have been cavalier with this gift of the Industrial Revolution, as we have with so many others. Do we wish to have our brains polluted by media as our highways, our air and our cities are strangled and poisoned by the automobile?

Media is no less related to ecology than is the composition of air or soil. There is a psychic economy of the mind and emotions which requires as delicate a balance for healthy survival as does the natural world. If we continue to ignore the laws and structures of our minds and thought-processes as consistently as we have those of the natural world, we may no doubt expect the consequences to be similarly dire.
Ironically, while American cinema has produced some of the most influential film genres, American film students have devoted relatively little discussion to the problem of genre. Most of what we have now are remainder-table picture-books aimed at the fan; such volumes have some merits, but they hardly constitute rigorous film scholarship. Yet the genre concept could be an enormously fruitful one if we cared enough to cultivate it. Although generic considerations aren't pertinent to all films, flexible genre models can account for much creative activity in cinema. What follows is an attempt to synthesize some prevalent theories of the definition and development of film genres and to suggest some ways film scholars might pursue the problem in the future.

A genre, for preliminary purposes, can be defined as a number of films grouped by some standard. But in specifying further, we face large difficulties. How define a Western or a musical? The usual response is to look for common intrinsic characteristics, but our current definitions seem thoroughly inconsistent. We define a Western by common themes (e.g., nature vs. civilization; see Kitses' Horizons West), by iconography (certain costumes, settings, objects), and by plot structures (e.g., ranchers vs. farmers). Yet some writers define a horror film by its effect (see Butler's Horror in the Cinema); the social-comment film seems to be defined by content; and a musical is defined by its mode of presentation. Before we can study anything, we must know what it is, and such incompatible generic definitions hamper us at the outset.

We should remember, though, that generic groupings need not be absolute. It is misleading for Andrew Sarris to write in The American Cinema that genre criticism "presupposes an ideal form of the genre" (p. 30). I propose instead that genre criticism should begin by looking at the films empirically, seeking forms which are not idealized but simply typical. For the critic or historian, the genre is "what has been done. This premise keeps our study resolutely descriptive and historical, preventing us from rocketing the notion of genre into a Platonic limbo.

But what does an empirical examination of films yield in the way of genre-definition? This problem has been explored most ingeniously by various scholars in the excellent British Journal Screen, and their answers, while tentative, are stimulating. It is significant that all the proposed generic definitions revolve around the notion of convention, the central concept of genre theory. Tom Ryall suggests that genres can be located by common material subject-matter, thematic pre-occupations and recurring iconography. Ed Buscombe proposes that the genre's "outer form" (settings, costumes, objects) determines its "inner form" (themes, dramatic structures). Richard Collins argues that settings, costumes, and other iconographical elements of "outer form" are purely contingent upon the time and locale of the story; he suggests instead that genre be defined in terms of "a repertoire of key situations that recur again and again in films."
We should be grateful to these writers for raising questions which Anglo-American film study has so long ignored, but we must also recognize that their answers are far too simple. Significantly, all three essays concentrate on the Western, surely the tidiest generic grouping we have; a look at other genres would reveal that such models as the Screen essayists construct run quickly aground. We would, for instance, naturally call Goldiggers of 1935, Meet Me in St. Louis, and Help! all musicals, but where in these films is Ryall's common subject-matter or Buscombe's recurring "outer forms" or Collins' vaguely-conceived "key situations"? Certainly, a flexible and inclusive model of genre needs to take account of all the intrinsic factors these writers have stressed--conventional subjects, themes, iconography, and situations--but we should also consider the extrinsic factors which may determine generic groupings.

One such extrinsic factor is, most abstractly, the genre's historical context. If we are to construct descriptive, nonidealized generic models, we must remember that genres exist in specific historical situations, and perhaps the most important constituent of the genre's historical identity is the audience's awareness of the genre. In another Screen essay, André Tudor writes perceptively:

To talk about, say, the 'Western,' is (arbitrary definitions apart) to appeal to a common set of meanings in our culture. From a very early age most of us have built up a picture of a 'Western.' We feel we know what a Western is when we see one, although we must also be willing to admit that the edges are rather blurred. In short, when we call something a 'Western' we are generally implying more than the simple statement 'this film is a member of a class of films ("Westerns") having in common x; y, z.' We are also suggesting that this is something which would be universally labelled 'Western' in our culture...Genre notions--except the special case of arbitrary definitions--are not critics' classifications made for special purposes, but sets of cultural conventions. Genre is what we collectively believe it to be.4

Implied in Tudor's thesis is the point that many critics have constructed genre categories that are eternal and unspecific--i.e., ahistorical. The recognition of the force of contemporary usage, as long as it is intelligible and unambiguous, introduces the need for historical context: to find out what a genre is, we must find out what the genre was for a particular audience in a particular time and place and in the context of a certain tradition or style. Only then do principles of convention, audience expectation, and generic norms make any sense.5

Not that the factor of audience awareness is a sufficient condition for generic grouping, since there are series (e.g., Tarzan, Gidget) and other groupings (e.g., Doris Day films, color films) of which audiences are aware but which we would not normally call genres. A synthesis seems necessary. Let us define a genre as a kind of film which is recognized as such by audiences of a particular time and place and which, for analytical purposes, may be characterized by a stock of recurring, conventional subjects, themes, situations, icons, or stylistic or formal devices. This definition, however broad, at least recognizes the genre's
historical context and its system of intrinsic conventions; it guards against metaphysical definitions on one hand and arbitrary ones on the other.

A definition of genre is not sufficient to clear our path entirely, for we need to recognize the various levels of a genre's import. On one level, a genre creates an autonomous artistic world, distinctly bounded by its conventions. At the same time, it has specific functions in a given culture. And the genre can also appeal to audiences in very different cultures. There are, then, at least three dimensions of a genre's significance: an intrinsic level, a cultural level, and an archetypal level.

At the intrinsic level, the conventions are chiefly intra-referential; they combine into an interlocking set of dramatic structures which we learn to associate with the genre. In the gangster film, for instance, the time is vaguely modern and the locale is usually the city; Colin McArthur has pointed out some typical characters (brony racketeers, molls, squealers, cops, legal mouthpieces, crusading attorneys, etc.) and objects (weapons, vehicles, phones, printing presses, torture devices, etc.). The interaction of characters, objects, and settings generates a number of conventional situations (e.g., the "ride," the beating in the alley, the kids' crime, the murder of the squealer, the meeting of the mobsters, the telephoned warning, the party or banquet, etc.). What holds such conventional icons and situations together are certain basic themes, intrinsic to the genre. A frequent theme of the gangster film, for example, is the problem of reconciling the desire for power with the demands of love. By brains, strength, and force of will the gangster achieves a glamorous success, but this very success makes him hated by others. So wonder, then, that the vindictive moll so often precipitates the gangster's end; his betrayal of her signals his failure to love, his inability to conceive of people as ends rather than as means. Sometimes the protagonist discovers this need for feeling, and his punishment takes on an ironic weight by coming after his change of heart. When Bull Weed in Underworld lets his girl escape with his best friend and surrenders himself to the police, he admits: "I've been all wrong. ...I've been wrong all the way." When the significantly named Tom Powers of Public Enemy is wounded, he repents and decides to return to his family, but he is killed anyway. In Underworld USA, Tolly Devlin must betray the girl who loves him, but when the girl is threatened, he recognizes his need for her; he turns in the syndicate killer but dies soon afterward. Sometimes, though, the protagonist dies as blind as he lived: Poettcher's Legs Diamond is vicious to the end, but his girl provides his epitaph: "He never knew how to love." Thus the genre's conventions are essential to its paradoxes and ironies and express a range of themes and attitudes that may justly be called a moral vision of the world.

Yet these conventions are also extra-referential, in that they point to conceptions of reality which can be culturally specific. The Western, as most analysts have suggested, can illustrate some basic attitudes toward our past. Science-fiction's common theme of how man is to use his machines wisely (repeated from Metropolis and Things to Come to 2001) may have its source in cultures coming to grips with technological change. The brash and breezy rapacity of the down-at-heel showgirls in the 1930's musicals are symbols of what many critics see as the Depression temper. Yet flat-footed literalness must be avoided here; genres rarely reflect reality directly, but more often distort it into schematic patterns.
The gangster of the 1920's, for instance, was usually morally repulsive and petty, yet he became a kind of culture hero; crowds mobbed Capone as if he were a movie star. What the cinema took from the real gangster was his glamor, his danger, and, most interesting, some basic tensions which he incarnated. In striking out on his own, the gangster is reenacting American initiative; his racket parodies capitalist enterprise; the gangster is the logical culmination of laissez-faire capitalism. He is a bad man, but his badness is a result of his taking to the limit certain premises which we call good. Moreover, the classic gangster films (Underworld, Little Caesar, Public Enemy, and Scarface) maintain a marvelous ambivalence: an air of brutal contemporaneity envelopes a highly styled protagonist. Public Enemy, for example, admirably summarizes what might have seemed to 1931 audiences the rise of a typical hoodlum: from slums, overabundant beer, and the juvenile gang through World War I to the arrival of Prohibition and the forming of the mob. Yet all this actually "explains" nothing about real gangsters, since almost no reference is made to the crucial factor of national origins and since no factor is seen as decisively shaping the young crook's career: Tom is bad at the start, even before his first swig of beer. Although the film alludes to many contemporary events, its plot and characters are sufficiently conventionalized to make it a model of the genre. Specifically how one might interpret these conventions as revelatory of a society's pre-occupations will be sketched below in the discussion of the work of John G. Cawelti; at this point we need recognize only the essential dialectic between fact and fiction, document and symbol, that obtains in the cultural dimension of a genre.

Yet audiences in many cultures respond to a genre; American Westerns and films noirs are as popular in Paris and Tokyo as in Dallas. I suggest, then, that there is in some genres a third dimension of import: the archetypal one. Beneath the genre's intrinsic system of conventions there may rest a narrative pattern common to many cultures. For instance, the Western contains elements of both pastoral (the juxtaposition of civilization and nature permits a testing of each) and romance (the heroic quest). The hero of the gangster film, in his search for power, often enacts a pattern of rise and fall close to that of Macbeth. Horror films frequently feature a scientist who searches for absolute knowledge beyond mortal capability; the standard epitaph, as bystanders view the scientist's grisly end, could apply to Dr. Faustus: "He went too far." Not all genres contain such obvious mythical substructures, but there is a possibility that besides the intrinsic and cultural levels of a genre, there may subsist a kind of universal structure of appeals.

It remains to consider some questions that definition and analysis of genres can answer. Genre study seems to me to have three main functions: to assist the critical interpretation of specific films; to elucidate relations between cinema and society; and, most significantly, to act as an ordering principle in film history.

When Anglo-American film criticism is not indulging in half-baked sociologizing or psychologizing, it consists mainly of intrinsic analyses of individual works (e.g., the "close readings" of the Movie Critics) and of auteur analyses of bodies of work. Both critical approaches can benefit from the control of genre study. It seems undeniable that intrinsic analysis of many films
must await some grasp of the film's generic position. As Leonard Meyer points out in Emotion and Meaning in Music, the aesthetic situation demands some kind of "preliminary set" so that the spectator may generate the proper expectations; and since generic response is largely based on delayed, thwarted, and ultimately resolved expectations, an acquaintance with the demands of the genre is essential. A critic who ignores the generic dimension of the film at hand risks uncontrolled speculation and flatly wrong interpretations.

Generic understanding is even more vital for auteur criticism, since, as Raymond Durgnat points out there is the possibility that an auteur may simply be working in a "collective" style. Originality is one of the unspoken assumptions of auteur criticism, and in determining originality, context is all. It seems essential for the analyst of a Hollywood auteur to locate the genres he works in and construct some historically specific norms for them. Given the "bound" conventions of the genre at the moment, one could plot the auteur's deviations from the norm—the additions, alterations, and exclusions which reveal his idiosyncratic style and vision. One could, for instance, examine Preston Sturges' 1941-1944 comedies in the context of Tom, Dick, and Harry (1941), Hellzapoppin (1941), Ball of Fire (1941), Here Comes Mr. Jordan (1941), Talk of the Town (1942), I married a Witch (1942), Heaven Can Wait (1943), The More the Merrier (1943), Arsenic and Old Lace (1944), and similar films; then the characteristic screwball-comedy conventions Sturges selects and his deftness at exaggerating and burlesquing them will come into focus. No artist can work completely apart from some tradition, and in Hollywood, genre is about the only tradition artists have.

If we can analyze the relation between the genre and the individual artist or work, we can also analyze the relation between the genre and the audience. But it is here that crude and unverifiable speculations have run most rife. Who hasn't been tempted to assume a cultural Zeitgeist (e.g., a fear of the UH in 1950's America) and then read it back into certain genres (e.g., science-fiction of the 1950's)? (The Kracauer Fallacy.) In opposition to such theoretically unsystematic vagueness, two superb essays by John G. Cawelti emerge as highly valuable, if tentative, explorations of the intricate relations between a genre and a culture. Cawelti studies films not as ends in themselves but as clues to the functions, which mass entertainment performs for American culture. He is well aware, though, of the reductionism that hovers over such studies, and the first section of The Six-Gun Mystique contains an excellent critique of simple determinism, whether Tönnies (art reflects a society's life), Marxist (art expresses a society's ideology), or Freudian (art reveals a society's collective dream). Cawelti is rare among social scientists in recognizing art's multiplicity of appeal and its essential differences from reportage. As a result, Cawelti offers "formula" (what I have been calling the cultural dimension of genre) as a "model for the construction of artistic works which synthesize several important cultural functions which in modern cultures have been taken over by the popular arts" (S-GM, 31). He further maintains that the ritual and fantasy aspects of formulas can be studied as "game" and "dream" respectively. After analyzing the Western's basic plot-structure and the relations among its characters, events, settings, themes, and language, Cawelti suggests that the Western is a three-sided game (townspeople, villain, hero) whose goal is "to resolve the conflict between the hero's alienation and his commitment to the good group of townspeople" (S-GM, 72);
that the Western also constitutes a social ritual, reconciling the tensions
between the value progress yields and the price it exacts by reaffirming "the
act of foundation" (73); and that the Western also represents a psychological
wishfulfillment, externalizing "the adolescent's desire to be an adult and his
fear and hesitation about the nature of adulthood" (82). Cawelti's hypotheses
assume in part that formulas are covert ways of reconciling basic contradictions
within a society, and that the repetition of formulas builds up a kind of
traditional manner of reliving this reconciliation. (Here he is not far from
the myth-analysis methods of Levi-Strauss's structural anthropology.) In
general, Cawelti's system is coherent and fits the data. However, his study
lacks concern for film as a distinct medium and a specification of the process
whereby a culture's preoccupations come to be expressed in formulas (though
Cawelti hints at a "survival of the fittest" notion in his explanation of the
Western's popularity). Moreover, he pays relatively little attention to a
formula's historical identity. Still, Cawelti's approach seems to me the most
potentially rich way to analyze the ties that bind a genre to its audience.

Both critical and cultural inquiries into genre, as I have reiterated, need
to be qualified by the genre's historical dimension. Why do genres persist
through time? How do genres arise? Do they mature and die, analogously to
biological organisms? How do genres mix? How are they transformed into new
genres? Why do genres appear at certain times and places but not at others?
I am far from offering satisfactory answers to such questions, but I offer one
model of generic phases and levels.

It is rare for an artist to invent a genre (e.g., Poe's virtual invention
of the detective story); usually the genre springs from some source in real life
or popular entertainment. The Western issues primarily from Western history,
secondarily from Western dime novels, paintings, songs, photographs, and Wild
West shows; the musical film retains fairly obvious ties to vaudeville, Broadway,
and folk opera. We must not expect the genre to correspond to real life, since
usually some rudimentary conventions come into play almost from the start. When
these conventions crystallize into a recognizable, recurring format, the phase
of formalization and codification appears. Although the conventions may be
similar for the genre's manifestations in various media, the film student should
look for the specific strategies by which cinema selects and treats the con-
ventions. For example, how do film musicals uniquely handle the relation of
music and dance to the narrative pattern? It may be, as Bazin suggests, that
only the cinema can do justice to the Western, but this proposal needs to be
supported by detailed comparison of Western films with Western novels.

By the time the genre is formalized, artists begin to use its conventions to
express their own visions, and the generic possibilities fan out into progressively
greater differentiation. This is the start of the typical dialectic between
theme and variation, norm and deviation, convention and invention. This activity,
which tends to break into period and cycles, usually takes place while the routine
repetitions of the generic format keep rolling on. Eventually a fourth stratum
of activity may commence: the making of films which break apart generic conven-
tions and force us to reflect on the genre itself (e.g., Une Femme Est Une Femme,
Alphaville, Bonnie and Clyde). These last three stages, needless to say, can
coexist and will be limited by external conditions and shaped by internal changes
in generic norms.
French critics talk casually about the "evolution" of genres, but the kinds and causes of genre change require much more research. I am not sure whether genres can entirely disappear, considering the two astonishing reappearances of the gangster film (circa 1960 and 1967); perhaps a notion of confluent genres best accounts for phenomena like the transformation of the gangster film into the C-man film of the later thirties and into the spy-film and film noir of the forties and fifties. The causes of genre change are various: a new style (e.g., the return of fast cutting in the 1960's), new stars, new directors, technological changes, industrial changes (e.g., the Hays code), and societal changes. Again, it is the historian's job to account for the genre's development as precisely and fully as possible within the given context.

Two further approaches offer fascinating possibilities for genre study. Since a genre is a symbol system, it would seem accessible to semiotic analysis, which would put the whole question of convention and deviation on a far more rigorous basis than heretofore. To less exciting would be attempts to define a genre in structuralist terms. Although this approach would result in a squashing of the genre's historical dimension, the resulting inferences could offer valuable insights into the underlying structures of a society's mythology. In short, serious consideration of genre is just beginning, and, if carried out systematically and precisely, the quest for the aesthetic, historical, cultural, and archetypal dimensions of film genre can be enormously rewarding.
NOTES

5. In an unpublished BFI seminar paper, "Genre and Iconography," Colin McArthur argues that a genre constitutes an iconographic sign system which contemporary audiences can "read."
It is important for film theoreticians to isolate and to describe the basic elements of cinematic expression. This is not to say that all films must be emotionally or intellectually expressive. Rather, many films are expressive. Hence, it is crucial to determine how they are expressive. Moreover, this task is not evaluative, but descriptive.

One aspect of expressiveness is communication. Among the formal vehicles of expression available to cinema for the communication of information and emotion are certain tropes which are analogous to literary figures of speech. For example, we see a close-up of a man's face, and insert of a revolver, and a close-up of a woman screaming. An event, a murder, is depicted to an audience through the representation of discrete phases or parts of that event. To represent a whole, in literature and rhetoric, by an invocation of its parts is to adopt the figure of speech of synecdoche. Thus, there is a mode of shooting and editing film that is strictly analogous and perhaps in some sense even equivalent to the rhetorical trope of synecdoche. We may say, in fact, that there is a cinematic trope of synecdoche which enabled or facilitates the communication of information through film. It is a linguistic unit of a filmic language. It is a formal vehicle of expression.

Given the fact that there are cinematic tropes that are analogous or even roughly equivalent to literary tropes, we can formulate a research program which will enable film theoreticians to discover some of the basic elements of cinematic expression. That is, we know a certain list of rhetorical tropes. We can regard that list as an hypothesis for discovery. We select a literary trope, say synecdoche. Then we turn to film to find its analogue. In this way the film theoretician can use the list of rhetorical tropes, known to scholars, as a working hypothesis for the discovery and description of a certain set of basic elements of cinematic expression.

This premised, let us test our claim. Metaphor is a trope of written and spoken language. Given the strongest statement of the above hypothesis, it should also be a trope of a filmic language. Thus, it is to the point to 1) demonstrate that metaphor is an element of cinematic expression and 2) to illustrate how metaphor functions as a formal vehicle of communication in film. That is, we must isolate and describe the uses of metaphor in film.

Propaedeut. A discussion of metaphor in film is a discussion of metaphor in more rhetorical forms. Metaphor is the comparison of two objects by means of identification. 'New York is a jungle' is a metaphor. Here, 'New York' is identified with some jungle in order to compare certain aspects of New York with aspects of a jungle. Metaphor is characterized by the use of the word 'is' for purposes of comparison. Metaphor achieves comparisons by making putative identifications.
Counterpoised to metaphor in language is simile. The trope of simile compares two objects by use of the words 'like' or 'as.' In language, we are able to discriminate between the tropes of metaphor and simile. Thus, we should be able to discriminate between instances of metaphor and simile in film if the strongest statement of our initial hypothesis is true. Nevertheless, such a discrimination is not as easy as it may appear. For, in general, we determine whether a given trope in language is a metaphor or a simile on the grounds of its semantical components. If the word 'is' is used, it is a metaphor. If 'like' or 'as' - a simile. But in film we lack such semantical components for film states its comparisons in a visual rather than a verbal medium. Hence, if we are able to isolate metaphors in film we must be able to establish some basic difference between metaphor and simile beyond the identification of certain semantical units.

For this reason, let us suggest that there is a functional difference between metaphor and simile in language. 'The Empire State Building is like a mountain.' This is a straightforward comparison. But consider the statement 'The Empire State Building is a mountain.' How does this differ from the former simile? The idea, stated as a simile is true, But the same idea states as a metaphor is, strictly speaking, false for it claims the Empire State Building is identical with a mountain. The simile purports an outright comparison and is true. The metaphor is a covert comparison, but, as an outright claim of identity between two dissimilar objects, it is false.

We, of course, want to say that in some sense the claim that the 'Empire State Building is a mountain' is true. But to ascertain that sense we must ask what the statement means. This asked; we say it means the building is like a mountain.

Here it is important to regard our responses to metaphor and simile. Our response to the simile, if any, is 'how is the building like a mountain?' Our response to the metaphor, if any, is 'what does it mean?' After we learn what is meant then we are in a position to ask 'in what ways is the Empire State Building like a mountain?' Thus, one can say that similes and metaphors differ in regard to clarity where clarity is explicated in terms of truth value. Parenthetically, similes are contingently true or false, whereas metaphors, in principle, are always, strictly speaking, false. This difference, moreover, provides grounds from which we are able to discriminate a functional difference between similes and metaphors. Metaphors are suggestive. They imply comparison covertly and implicitly. Similes are explicit. They make forthright comparisons. Thus, metaphors suggest comparisons whereas similes present comparisons outright.

Similes are apparent comparisons. Their intellectual visibility is high. Two separate objects are presented individually for comparison. There is no confusion over the identity of each object. Turning from rhetorical languages to film, we can readily ascertain instances of similes in film. In OCTOBER, Eisenstein cuts from a shot of Kerensky to a shot of a statue of Napoleon. Kerensky is like Napoleon. The two flanks of the comparison are presented individually. The comparison is straightforward. In FURY, Lang cuts from a crowd of gossiping women to a flock of hens. In MOTHER, Pudovkin cuts from a
political demonstration to an ice flow. These are similes. Each object to be considered is presented to the attention individually. Each object maintains its self-identity. Similes might also be achieved via split screens. Editing is not the only means by which cinema can enunciate similes. In fact, similes can occur in single frames as in SPIONE where the dead Hargi lies beside a collapsed toy spider. Yet, all these instances remain cases of similes. For in all our examples, two distinct objects, via certain editing and shooting styles, are presented individually to our attention for the purpose of comparison. We compare two objects each of whose individuality is unquestioned.

Given the functional discrimination between metaphor and simile, we can begin to look for instances of metaphor in film. The purpose of metaphor is to suggest comparisons. But not all suggested comparisons will be metaphors. In Lubitsch's PASSION two executive scenes at opposite ends of the film are shot from the same overhead angle. This similarity in shooting suggests a comparison of the two events. These sequences of shots, though they suggest a comparison, do not represent a case of metaphor, however, because they do not employ identification to suggest comparison.

The above explanation illustrates how one can establish that a given sequence of shots is not a metaphor. Now we must consider how one identifies two dissimilar objects as the same object. That is, we must consider how metaphor is achieved in film.

Let us begin with examples. Both the creators of and the commentators on THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI describe the thrust of the film metaphorically. Somehow, CALIGARI is taken to state that authority is made or authority is insane. Hans Janowitz, the co-author of CALIGARI, was an Expressionist poet who, according to Siegfried Kracauer, believed that 'this new medium (film) might lend itself to powerful poetic revelations.' Janowitz approached film as a means of propagating images resonant with meaning and implication. The image he produced was CALIGARI. It was an image meant to express 'authority is mad.' The intent of CALIGARI was metaphoric. This intent was articulated by the representation of an authority figure, who is a madman. Caligari, the psychiatrist and the master of Caesars, is himself insane. The audience observes that the same man who represents authority is also mad. Authority and madness are identified in the same character. The visual data of the film implies an identification of authority and madness. That is, the man who represents authority is the man we observe performing acts of homicidal insanity.

We can observe the same strategy in operation in Lang's first two Mabuse films. Mabuse is a master of disguise. Mabuse is a stock speculator, but he is also a master criminal. In the course of the films he adopts successive disguises. He becomes a gambler and a psychiatrist. Since the same man who is the stock speculator is the man who is the gambler and the psychiatrist we are entitled to draw the following metaphors from the visual data of the film—'The stock speculator is a gambler' and 'The stock speculator is a psychiatrist.' That is, the visual data of the film implies an identification of dissimilar social types. The meaning of the identification, moreover, is comparative. Lang claims that a stock speculator is 'like a gambler and like a psychiatrist. Likewise, the visual data of CALIGARI claims that authority resembles homicidal insanity in its lack of restraint.
The Mabuse case shows that costuming can be a means for achieving metaphor in films. For costuming, especially disguise, can suggest the identity of different social types. Examples of this abound in Roger Corman's film GAS. GAS is a film resplendent with metaphoric structures. The very form of the film is a movement from metaphor to metaphor. An example of the costuming variety of metaphor occurs in the case of the uniform of the football captain worn by.

The premise of GAS is that everyone over thirty has died. Only the young survive. We follow the exploits of one band of youths in this new world. At one point, this band of youths encounters a band of heavily armed marauders. These marauders are dressed in football uniforms. They have shoulder pads, jerseys, etc. The leader of the marauders wears a football helmet and shoulder pads, but also German army jodhpurs, Hessians boots, and a long, black leather Luftwaffe jacket, and he carries a riding crop. Thus, the visual data of the film implies a metaphor - 'the athlete is the soldier' or perhaps 'the athlete is the officer.'

Costuming aside, the Mabuse case illustrates further depths of cinematic metaphor. Mabuse, the stock speculator, is a criminal. Criminal behavior is identified with the social role of stock speculator via the character of Mabuse. 'The stock speculator is a criminal' is the central metaphor of the early Mabuse films. The means of identification rely on the attribution of a behavior set appropriate to a criminal to a stock speculator. Two dissimilar ideas are super-imposed in the single person of Mabuse. Every action of the criminal is an action of the stock speculator Mabuse. The stock speculator is the counterfeiter, for instance. Thus, the criminal and the stock speculator are identified.

Mabuse represents a paradigmatic case of film metaphor. At the same time, however, it serves as a clear-cut paradigm because it is a hyperbolic instance of metaphor. That is, it maintains a strict, literal identification of stock speculator and criminal throughout the film. It does this by centering the metaphor in the personal identity of Mabuse. The identification of the criminal and the stock speculator is maintained unequivically throughout the film. For every act of the criminal and stock speculator is an act of the self-same person.

Most instances of film metaphor are not instances of strict identification. Rather than strict identification, most film metaphors do not identify every aspect of the two objects they compare. Most film metaphors are cases of what might be called topical identification. They maintain identity between their objects of comparison only in virtue of certain aspects.

An example of topical identification can be found in Lang's YOU AND ME. The scene involves a salesman demonstrating the use of a can opener to a customer. As the salesman goes through the series of hand movements required to operate the can opener, we realize he is going through a set of motions used in opening a safe. Thus, we derive the metaphor 'a can opener is a safe.' This is a topical metaphor. It is also analogous to what is called a metaphor of sensation in literature. That is a metaphor which compares objects or our sensations of objects. 'The moon is a ghostly galleon' or 'Your eyes are azure pools' are literary metaphors of sensations. The purpose of such metaphors derives from
the artistic drive to establish order in experience. Metaphors of sensation are found in fine art as well as literature. Modern examples abound, for instance, in the work of the Surrealists as well as the German Expressionists. Such metaphors, moreover, may be articulated in film as well as literature and fine art.

An especially rich source of topical metaphors in film is the abundance of metaphors of sensation in American silent comedy. In ONE WEEK, for instance, Buster Keaton detaches the railing from the front porch of the house and then leans the railing against the house in order to climb into a second story window. Here, 'the railing is a ladder.' Or again, in COLD RUSH, Chaplain serves a boot to Max Swain in the cabin scene. The nails of the boot become bones while the laces are eaten as though they were noodles. Here we have a series of metaphors--'the boot is a chicken,' 'the cobbler's nails are bones,' and 'the boot laces are noodles.'

We have been able to distinguish between two types of metaphor on the basis of the categories of strict and topical identification. Though these categories differ in their ontology, they are isomorphic in their methodology. Thus, if we can isolate the methodology of both these categories of metaphor we will answer the question of how metaphors are achieved in film.

In CALIGARI, metaphor was achieved via the attribution of maniacal behavior to an authority figure. Analogously, metaphor in MABUSE rides on the attribution of criminal behavior to a stock speculator. In YOU AND ME, behavior appropriate to opening a safe is applied to the manipulation of a can opener. In GAS a football captain wears military paraphernalia. To accentuate this last metaphor, the football captain also directs military operations in the language of football thus enhancing the degree of identification between the soldier and the athlete.

MABUSE, CALIGARI, GAS, YOU AND ME. Each of these is a case of a strict or topical identification. What principle binds these instances together? The answer is that each of these cases is an instance of visual and/or aural substitution. Observable criminal behavior is substituted for the behavior of a stock speculator in MABUSE. Pieces of military regalia substitute for football regalia in GAS. Again in GAS, military language is substituted by football language. In CALIGARI, observable insane behavior substitutes for the behavior of an administrator.

From the above, we may postulate that metaphor is achieved in films via visual and/or aural substitution. Metaphor is the comparison of two dissimilar objects by identification. Two objects are identified in film by the substitution of visual and/or aural aspects of one object for certain aspects of another object.

This promised, we can begin to explore the range of cinematic metaphors. In this way, we can test our criterion and also illustrate the extent to which it is an effective tool for isolating cinematic metaphors.

A relatively recent example of an instance of film metaphor occurs in the famous eating sequence in TRILSH JONES. Here, Tom and a lady sit at opposite ends of a table. They begin to eat. Their eating manner is very lascivious. They end their meal running to the bedroom. The visual data of the film implies a metaphor. Namely, 'eating is foreplay,' or perhaps 'eating is sex.' This metaphor
is achieved by a substitution of the limbs and bodies of Tom and his lady with the animal limbs and bodies of the meal. Put another way, this substitution involves the substitution of normal eating behavior by sexual behavior.

An analogous metaphor occurs in BLOW-UP. Here in the well known Verushka sequence, the act of photographing is equated with intercourse. The acting style of the scene implies the metaphor 'photographing is intercourse.' This is an instance of topical identification. It is achieved by the substitution of the penis by the camera as a probing instrument. Via identification of two dissimilar experiences through visual substitutions Antonioni compares photography and love making in respect of the probing and exploratory qualities of these endeavors.

Another recent example of metaphor in film occurs in PERFORMANCE. Here, metaphors figure importantly, in the thematic import of the film. The visual mechanism for these metaphors involve the use of small mirrors. A mirror is placed on James Fox's chest and a woman's breast is reflected in the mirror. Likewise, a mirror is placed on Fox's face. A woman's face is reflected in the mirror. The woman's face substitutes for Fox's face, just as her breast substitutes for his breast. The force of these metaphors is to be read in the context of the film whose theme is the affirmation of unisexuality. The two metaphors cited iterate this notion in that via the substitution of male anatomy with female anatomy they purport 'the man is a woman.'

The above examples lean heavily toward visual substitutions. For an example of a metaphor that relies on aural substitution we need go no further than the recent film EL TOPO. In the fourth part of EL TOPO, El Topo encounters a town that is ruled by fat bourgeois women. They have, however, the voices of men. Their own voices have been substituted with men's voices on the soundtrack. This dubbing procedure yields a metaphor - 'The women are men.'

A final example of metaphor can be found in von Sternberg's JET PILOT. Here, we have a scene in which a male, American airman and a female Soviet airwoman are flying next to one another in jet planes. They can speak over their radios. On the soundtrack we hear the man and woman talking to one another. Their talk could be that of lovers. They both compliment one another. Some of their dialogue has sexual associations (e.g., the Soviet woman tells the man 'you're fantastic' after a particularly daring maneuver). Meanwhile, the two airplanes themselves are going through a series of complex and beautiful maneuvers. The planes pursue one another. They do 'flip-flops' over one another. They pursue: they pull back. They weave in and out of one another's path. The planes, in fact, become substitutes for the unseen bodies of the actors whose voices we hear on the soundtrack. The planes court and make love to each other as the voices on the soundtrack do likewise. The Soviet and American flyers are their jets. The visual and aural data of the screen yields a metaphor - 'Fighter pilots are machines.'

The above examples should establish that there are metaphors in film. Furthermore, these examples should support the claim that visual and/or aural substitution is the index by which we verify an instance of metaphor in film. If substitution is the indicator of film metaphor, however, a question arises. Namely, why is substitution an appropriate indicator of metaphor?
must await some grasp of the film's generic position. As Leonard Meyer points out in *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, the aesthetic situation demands some kind of 'preliminary set' so that the spectator may generate the proper expectations; and since generic response is largely based on delayed, thwarted, and ultimately resolved expectations, an acquaintance with the demands of the genre is essential. A critic who ignores the generic dimension of the film at hand risks uncontrolled speculation and flatly wrong interpretations.

Generic understanding is even more vital for auteur criticism, since, as Raymond Durgnat points out there is the possibility that an auteur may simply be working in a "collective" style. Originality is one of the unspoken assumptions of auteur criticism, and in determining originality, context is all. It seems essential for the analyst of a Hollywood auteur to locate the genres he works in and construct some historically specific norms for them. Given the "bound" conventions of the genre at the moment, one could plot the auteur's deviations from the norm—the additions, alterations, and exclusions which reveal his idiosyncratic style and vision. One could, for instance, examine Preston Sturges' 1941-1944 comedies in the context of *Tom, Dick, and Harry* (1941), *Hellzapoppin* (1941), *Ball of Fire* (1941), *Here Comes Mr. Jordan* (1941), *Talk of the Town* (1942), *I Married a Witch* (1942), *Heaven Can Wait* (1943), *The More the Merrier* (1943), *Arsenic and Old Lace* (1944), and similar films; then the characteristic screwball-comedy conventions Sturges selects and his deftness at exaggerating and burlesquing them will come into focus. No artist can work completely apart from some tradition, and in Hollywood, genre is about the only tradition artists have.

If we can analyze the relation between the genre and the individual artist or work, we can also analyze the relation between the genre and the audience. But it is here that crude and unverifiable speculations have run most rife. Who hasn't been tempted to assume a cultural Zeitgeist (e.g., a fear of the UN in 1950's America) and then read it back into certain genres (e.g., science-fiction of the 1950's)? (The Kracauer Fallacy.) In opposition to such theoretically unsystematic vagueness, two superb essays by John G. Cawelti emerge as highly valuable, if tentative, explorations of the intricate relations between a genre and a culture. Cawelti studies films not as ends in themselves but as clues to the functions which mass entertainment performs for American culture. He is well aware, though, of the reductionism that hovers over such studies, and the first section of *The Six- Gun Mystique* contains an excellent critique of simple determinism, whether Taincean (art reflects a society's life), Marxist (art expresses a society's ideology), or Freudian (art reveals a society's collective dream). Cawelti is rare among social scientists in recognizing art's multiplicity of appeal and its essential differences from reportage. As a result, Cawelti offers "formula" (what I have been calling the cultural dimension of genre) as a "model for the construction of artistic works which synthesize several important cultural functions which in modern cultures have been taken over by the popular arts" (S-GI, 31). He further maintains that the ritual and fantasy aspects of formulas can be studied as 'game' and 'dream' respectively. After analyzing the Western's basic plot-structure and the relations among its characters, events, settings, themes, and language, Cawelti suggests that the Western is a three-sided game (townspeople, villain, hero) whose goal is "to resolve the conflict between the hero's alienation and his commitment to the good group of townspeople" (S-GI, 72);
that the Western also constitutes a social ritual, reconciling the tensions between the value progress yields and the price it exacts by reaffirming "the act of foundation" (73); and that the Western also represents a psychological wish fulfillment, externalizing "the adolescent's desire to be an adult and his fear and hesitation about the nature of adulthood" (82). Cawelti's hypotheses assume in part that formulas are covert ways of reconciling basic contradictions within a society, and that the repetition of formulas builds up a kind of traditional manner of reliving this reconciliation. (Here he is not far from the myth-analysis methods of Levi-Strauss's structural anthropology.) In general, Cawelti's system is coherent and fits the data. However, his study lacks concern for film as a distinct medium and a specification of the process whereby a culture's preoccupations come to be expressed in formulas (though Cawelti hints at a "survival of the fittest" notion in his explanation of the Western's popularity). Moreover, he pays relatively little attention to a formula's historical identity. Still, Cawelti's approach seems to me the most potentially rich way to analyze the ties that bind a genre to its audience.

Both critical and cultural inquiries into genre, as I have reiterated, need to be qualified by the genre's historical dimension. Why do genres persist through time? How do genres arise? Do they mature and die, analogously to biological organisms? How do genres mix? How are they transformed into new genres? Why do genres appear at certain times and places but not at others? I am far from offering satisfactory answers to such questions, but I offer one model of generic phases and levels.

It is rare for an artist to invent a genre (e.g., Poe's virtual invention of the detective story); usually the genre springs from some source in real life or popular entertainment. The Western issues primarily from Western history, secondarily from Western dime novels, paintings, songs, photographs, and Wild West shows; the musical film retains fairly obvious ties to vaudeville, Broadway, and folk opera. We must not expect the genre to correspond to real life, since usually some rudimentary conventions come into play almost from the start. When these conventions crystallize into a recognizable, recurring format, the phase of formalization and codification appears. Although the conventions may be similar for the genre's manifestations in various media, the film student should look for the specific strategies by which cinema selects and treats the conventions. For example, how do film musicals uniquely handle the relation of music and dance to the narrative pattern? It may be, as Bazin suggests, that only the cinema can do justice to the Western, but this proposal needs to be supported by detailed comparison of Western films with Western novels.

By the time the genre is formalized, artists begin to use its conventions to express their own visions, and the generic possibilities fan out into progressively greater differentiation. This is the start of the typical dialectic between theme and variation, norm and deviation, convention and invention. This activity, which tends to break into period and cycles, usually takes place while the routine repetitions of the generic format keep rolling on. Eventually a fourth stratum of activity may commence: the making of films which break apart generic conventions and force us to reflect on the genre itself (e.g., Une Femme Est Une Femme, Alphaville, Bonnie and Clyde). These last three tapes, needless to say, can coexist and will be limited by external conditions and shaped by internal changes in generic norms.
French critics talk casually about the "evolution" of genres, but the kinds and causes of genre change require much more research. I am not sure whether genres can entirely disappear, considering the two astonishing reappearances of the gangster film (circa 1960 and 1967); perhaps a notion of confluent genres best accounts for phenomena like the transformation of the gangster film into the C-man film of the later thirties and into the spy-film and film noir of the forties and fifties. The causes of genre change are various: a new style (e.g., the return of fast cutting in the 1960's), new stars, new directors, technological changes, industrial changes (e.g., the Hays code), and societal changes. Again, it is the historian's job to account for the genre's development as precisely and fully as possible within the given context.

Two further approaches offer fascinating possibilities for genre study. Since a genre is a symbol system, it would seem accessible to semiotic analysis, which would put the whole question of convention and deviation on a far more rigorous basis than heretofore. No less exciting would be attempts to define a genre in structuralist terms. Although this approach would result in a squashing of the genre's historical dimension, the resulting inferences could offer valuable insights into the underlying structures of a society's mythology. In short, serious consideration of genre is just beginning, and, if carried out systematically and precisely, the quest for the aesthetic, historical, cultural, and archetypal dimensions of film genre can be enormously rewarding.
5. In an unpublished BFI seminar paper, "Genre and Iconography," Colin McArthur argues that a genre constitutes an iconographic sign system which contemporary audiences can "read."
METAPHOR IN FILM

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It is important for film theoreticians to isolate and to describe the basic elements of cinematic expression. This is not to say that all films must be emotionally or intellectually expressive. Rather, many films are expressive. Hence, it is crucial to determine how they are expressive. Moreover, this task is not evaluative, but descriptive.

One aspect of expressiveness is communication. Among the formal vehicles of expression available to cinema for the communication of information and emotion are certain tropes which are analogous to literary figures of speech. For example, we see a close-up of a man's face, and insert of a revolver, and a close-up of a woman screaming. An event, a murder, is depicted to an audience through the representation of discrete phases or parts of that event. To represent a whole, in literature and rhetoric, by an invocation of its parts is to adopt the figure of speech of synecdoche. Thus, there is a mode of shooting and editing film that is strictly analogous and perhaps in some sense even equivalent to the rhetorical trope of synecdoche. We may say, in fact, that there is a cinematic trope of synecdoche which enabled or facilitates the communication of information through film. It is a linguistic unit of a filmic language. It is a formal vehicle of expression.

Given the fact that there are cinematic tropes that are analogous or even roughly equivalent to literary tropes, we can formulate a research program which will enable film theoreticians to discover some of the basic elements of cinematic expression. That is, we know a certain list of rhetorical tropes. We can regard that list as an hypothesis for discovery. We select a literary trope, say synecdoche. Then we turn to film to find its analogue. In this way the film theoretician can use the list of rhetorical tropes, known to scholars, as a working hypothesis for the discovery and description of a certain set of basic elements of cinematic expression.

This premised, let us test our claim. Metaphor is a trope of written and spoken language. Given the strongest statement of the above hypothesis, it should also be a trope of a filmic language. Thus, it is to the point to 1) demonstrate that metaphor is an element of cinematic expression and 2) to illustrate how metaphor functions as a formal vehicle of communication in film. That is, we must isolate and describe the uses of metaphor in film.

Propaedeutic to a discussion of metaphor in film is a discussion of metaphor in more rhetorical forms. Metaphor is the comparison of two objects by means of identification. 'New York is a jungle' is a metaphor. Here, 'New York' is identified with some jungle in order to compare certain aspects of New York with aspects of a jungle. Metaphor is characterized by the use of the word 'is' for purposes of comparison. Metaphor achieves comparisons by making putative identifications.
Counterpoised to metaphor in language is simile. The trope of simile compares two objects by use of the words 'like' or 'as.' In language, we are able to discriminate between the tropes of metaphor and simile. Thus, we should be able to discriminate between instances of metaphor and simile in film if the strongest statement of our initial hypothesis is true. Nevertheless, such a discrimination is not as easy as it may appear. For, in general, we determine whether a given trope in language is a metaphor or a simile on the grounds of its semantical components. If the word 'is' is used, it is a metaphor. If 'like' or 'as' - a simile. But in film we lack such semantical components for film states its comparisons in a visual rather than a verbal medium. Hence, if we are able to isolate metaphors in film we must be able to establish some basic difference between metaphor and simile beyond the identification of certain semantical units.

For this reason, let us suggest that there is a functional difference between metaphor and simile in language. 'The Empire State Building is like a mountain.' This is a straightforward comparison. But consider the statement 'The Empire State Building is a mountain.' How does this differ from the former simile? The idea, stated as a simile is true. But the same idea states as a metaphor is, strictly speaking, false for it claims the Empire State Building is identical with a mountain. The simile purports an outright comparison and is true. The metaphor is a covert comparison, but, as an outright claim of identity between two dissimilar objects, it is false.

We, of course, want to say that in some sense the claim that the 'Empire State Building is a mountain' is true. But to ascertain that sense we must ask what the statement means. This asked, we say it means the building is like a mountain.

Here it is important to regard our responses to metaphor and simile. Our response to the simile, if any, is 'how is the building like a mountain?' Our response to the metaphor, if any, is 'what does it mean?' After we learn what is meant then we are in a position to ask 'in what ways is the Empire State Building like a mountain?' Thus, one can say that similes and metaphors differ in regard to clarity where clarity is explicated in terms of truth value. Parenthetically, similes are contingently true or false, whereas metaphors, in principle, are always, strictly speaking, false. This difference, moreover, provides grounds from which we are able to discriminate a functional difference between similes and metaphors. Metaphors are suggestive. They imply comparison covertly and implicitly. Similes are explicit. They make forthright comparisons. Thus, metaphors suggest comparisons whereas similes present comparisons outright.

Similes are apparent comparisons. Their intellectual visibility is high. Two separate objects are presented individually for comparison. There is no confusion over the identity of each object. Turning from rhetorical languages to film, we can readily ascertain instances of similes in film. In OCTOBER, Eisenstein cuts from a shot of Kerensky to a shot of a statue of Napoleon. Kerensky is like Napoleon. The two flanks of the comparison are presented individually. The comparison is straightforward. In FURY, Lang cuts from a crowd of gossiping women to a flock of hens. In MOTHER, Pudovkin cuts from a
political demonstration to an ice flow. These are similes. Each object to be considered is presented to the attention individually. Each object maintains its self-identity. Similes might also be achieved via split screens. Editing is not the only means by which cinema can enunciate similes. In fact, similes can occur in single frames as in SPIONE where the dead Naghi lies beside a collapsed toy spider. Yet, all these instances remain cases of similes. For in all our examples, two distinct objects, via certain editing and shooting styles, are presented individually to our attention for the purpose of comparison. We compare two objects each of whose individuality is unquestioned.

Given the functional discrimination between metaphor and simile, we can begin to look for instances of metaphor in film. The purpose of metaphor is to suggest comparisons. But not all suggested comparisons will be metaphors. In Lubitsch's PASSION two executive scenes at opposite ends of the film are shot from the same overhead angle. This similarity in shooting suggests a comparison of the two events. These sequences of shots, though they suggest a comparison, do not represent a case of metaphor, however, because they do not employ identification to suggest comparison.

The above explanation illustrates how one can establish that a given sequence of shots is not a metaphor. Now we must consider how one identifies two dissimilar objects as the same object. That is, we must consider how metaphor is achieved in film.

Let us begin with examples. Both the creators of and the commentators on THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI describe the thrust of the film metaphorically. Somehow, CALIGARI is taken to state that authority is mad or authority is insane. Hans Janowitz, the co-author of CALIGARI, was an Expressionist poet who, according to Siegfried Kracauer, believed that 'this new medium (film) might lend itself to powerful poetic revelations.' Janowitz approached film as a means of propagating images resonant with meaning and implication. The image he produced was CALIGARI. It was an image meant to express 'authority is mad.' The intent of CALIGARI was metaphoric. This intent was articulated by the representation of an authority figure, who is a madman. Caligari, the psychiatrist and the master of Caeasre, is himself insane. The audience observes that the self same man who represents authority is also mad. Authority and madness are identified in the same character. The visual data of the film implies an identification of authority and madness. That is, the man who represents authority is the man we observe performing acts of homicidal insanity.

We can observe the same strategy in operation in Lang's first two NABUSE films. NABUSE is a master of disguise. NABUSE is a stock speculator, but he is also a master criminal. In the course of the films he adopts successive disguises. He becomes a gambler and a psychiatrist. Since the self-same man who is the stock speculator is the man who is the gambler and the psychiatrist, we are entitled to draw the following metaphors from the visual data of the film—'The stock speculator is a gambler' and 'The stock speculator is a psychiatrist.' That is, the visual data of the film implies an identification of dissimilar social types. The meaning of the identification, moreover, is comparative. Lang claims that a stock speculator is like a gambler and like a psychiatrist. Likewise, the visual data of CALIGARI claims that authority resembles homicidal mania in its lack of restraint.
The Mabuse case shows that costuming can be a means for achieving metaphor in films. For costuming, especially disguise, can suggest the identity of different social types. Examples of this abound in Roger Corman's film CAS. GAS is a film resplendent with metaphor structures. The very form of the film is a movement from metaphor to metaphor. An example of the costuming variety of metaphor occurs in the case of the uniform of the football captain warlord. The premise of GAS is that everyone over thirty has died. Only the young survive. We follow the exploits of one band of youths in this new world. At one point, this band of youths encounters a band of heavily armed marauders. These marauders are dressed in football uniforms. They have shoulder pads, jerseys, etc. The leader of the marauders wears a football helmet and shoulder pads, but also German army jodhpurs, Hessian boots, and a long, black leather Luftwaffe jacket, and he carries a riding crop. Thus, the visual data of the film implies a metaphor - 'the athlete is the soldier' or perhaps 'the athlete is the officer.'

Costuming aside, the Mabuse case illustrates further depths of cinematic metaphor. Mabuse, the stock speculator, is a criminal. Criminal behavior is identified with the social role of stock speculator via the character of Mabuse. The stock speculator is a criminal is the central metaphor of the early Mabuse films. The means of identification rely on the attribution of a behavior set appropriate to a criminal to a stock speculator. Two dissimilar ideas are super-imposed in the single person of Mabuse. Every action of the criminal is an action of the stock speculator Mabuse. The stock speculator is the counterfeiter, for instance. Thus, the criminal and the stock speculator are identified.

Mabuse represents a paradigmatic case of film metaphor. At the same time, however, it serves as a clear-cut paradigm because it is a hyperbolic instance of metaphor. That is, it maintains a strict, literal identification of stock speculator and criminal throughout the film. It does this by centering the metaphor in the personal identity of Mabuse. The identification of the criminal and the stock speculator is maintained unequivocally throughout the film. For every act of the criminal and stock speculator is an act of the self-same person.

Most instances of film metaphor are not instances of strict identification. Rather than strict identification, most film metaphors do not identify every aspect of the two objects they compare. Most film metaphors are cases of what might be called topical identification. They maintain identity between their objects of comparison only in virtue of certain aspects.

An example of topical identification can be found in Lang's YOU AND ME. The scene involves a salesman demonstrating the use of a can opener to a customer. As the salesman goes through the series of hand movements required to operate the can opener, we realize he is going through a set of motions used in opening a safe. Thus, we derive the metaphor 'a can opener is a safe.' This is a topical metaphor. It is also analogous to what is called a metaphor of sensation in literature. That is a metaphor which compares objects or our sensations of objects. 'The moon is a ghostly galleon' or 'Your eyes are azure pools' are literary metaphors of sensations. The purpose of such metaphors derives from
the artistic drive to establish order in experience. Metaphors of sensation are found in fine art as well as literature. Modern examples abound, for instance, in the work of the Surrealists as well as the German Expressionists. Such metaphors, moreover, may be articulated in film as well as literature and fine art.

An especially rich source of topical metaphors in film is the abundance of metaphors of sensation in American silent comedy. In ONE WEEK, for instance, Buster Keaton detaches the railing from the front porch of the house and then leans the railing against the house in order to climb into a second story window. Here, 'the railing is a ladder.' Or again, in GOLD RUSH, Chaplain serves a boot to Max Swain in the cabin scene. The nails of the boot become bones while the laces are eaten as though they were noodles. Here we have a series of metaphors—'the boot is a chicken,' 'the cobbler's nails are bones,' and 'the boot laces are noodles.'

We have been able to distinguish between two types of metaphor on the basis of the categories of strict and topical identification. Though these categories differ in their ontology, they are isomorphic in their methodology. Thus, if we can isolate the methodology of both these categories of metaphor we will answer the question of how metaphors are achieved in film.

In CALIGARI, metaphor was achieved via the attribution of maniacal behavior to an authority figure. Analogously, metaphor in MABUSE rides on the attribution of criminal behavior to a stock speculator. In YOU AND ME, behavior appropriate to opening a safe is applied to the manipulation of a can opener. In GAS a football captain wears military paraphernalia. To accentuate this last metaphor, the football captain also directs military operations in the language of football thus enhancing the degree of identification between the soldier and the athlete.

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This premised, we can begin to explore the range of cinematic metaphors. In this way, we can test our criterion and also illustrate the extent to which it is an effective tool for isolating cinematic metaphors.

A relatively recent example of an instance of film metaphor occurs in the famous eating sequence in TOA JONES. Here, Tom and a lady sit at opposite ends of a table. They begin to eat. Their eating manner is very lascivious. They end their meal running to the bedroom. The visual data of the film implies a metaphor. Namely, 'Eating is foreplay,' or perhaps 'Eating is sex.' This metaphor...
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Another recent example of metaphor in film occurs in PERFORMANCE. Here,
metaphors figure importantly in the thematic import of the film. The visual
mechanism for these metaphors involve the use of small mirrors. A mirror is
placed on James Fox's chest and a woman's breast is reflected in the mirror. Like-
wise, a mirror is placed on Fox's face. A woman's face is reflected in the mirror.
The woman's face substitutes for Fox's face, just as her breast substitutes for
his breast. The force of these metaphors is to be read in the context of the
film whose theme is the affirmation of unisexuality. The two metaphors cited
iterate this notion in that via the substitution of male anatomy with female
anatomy they purport 'the man is a woman.'

The above examples lean heavily toward visual substitutions. For an example
of a metaphor that relies on aural substitution we need go no further than the
recent film EL TOPO. In the fourth part of EL TOPO, El Topo encounters a town
that is ruled by fat bourgeois women. They have, however, the voices of men.
Their own voices have been substituted with men's voices on the soundtrack. This
dubbing procedure yields a metaphor - 'The women are men.'

A final example of metaphor can be found in von Sternberg's JET PILOT.
Here, we have a scene in which a male, American airman and a female Soviet air-
woman are flying next to one another in jet planes. They can speak over their
radios. On the sound track we hear the man and woman talking to one another.
Their talk could be that of lovers. They both compliment one another. Some of
their dialogue has sexual associations (e.g. the Soviet woman tells the man
'you're fantastic' after a particularly daring maneuver). Meanwhile, the two
airplanes themselves are going through a series of complex and beautiful maneuvers.
The planes pursue one another. They do 'flip-flops' over one another. They
pursue; they pull back. They weave in and out of one another's path. The
planes, in fact, become substitutes for the unseen bodies of the actors whose
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'Fighter pilots are machines.'

The above examples should establish that there are metaphors in film.
Furthermore, these examples should support the claim that visual and/or aural
substitution is the index by which we verify an instance of metaphor in film. If
substitution is the indicator of film metaphor, however, a question arises.
Namely, why is substitution an appropriate indicator of metaphor?
The answer to this question has to do with the nature of substitution. Logically, substitution implies identity. We can substitute '1+1' with '2' because the two quantities are identical. Metaphor claims an identity relation between two dissimilar objects. This identity relation, of course, is not a real relation but a claimed relation. As a claimed identity relation, metaphor maintains the formal structure of an identity relation. Substitution presupposes identity of some sort. Substitution, or at least substitution as it derives from something like a law of uniform substitution, implies some kind of identity relation such as metaphor purports. If two objects are identical, they can be substituted for one another. Likewise, parts of identical objects are interchangeable. Thus, an instance of substitution is an appropriate indicator of a putative identification. And as such it can serve as an indicator of film metaphor.

Metaphor is a comparison that is achieved by identification. In film aural and/or visual substitution is the means for suggesting identification. That is, aural and/or visual substitution is the means for both expressing and recognising metaphor in film.

One objection to the above formulation must be considered. A critic might say that in metaphor the meaning or significance of one object in the comparison is amplified or extended by the invocation of the other object of the comparison. Thus, 'England is a pit' tells us something about England not about pits. The discussion thus far gives us no way to ascertain which wing of a given cinema metaphor is amplified. Consequently, the formulation offered is inadequate because we have no way under its aegis to unravel the significance or meaning of a given metaphor. Moreover, if we cannot establish the meaning of a given metaphor, it is questionable as to in what sense we have identified a putative metaphor.

Along with the above objection, a critic of our formulation might add the following corollary argument. We interpreted the eating scene in Tom Jones as reading as the metaphor 'eating is foreplay.' A critic might ask why not interpret that metaphor as signifying 'sex is eating.' Such a reading makes sense for sex is like eating insofar as it is a function of appetite, instinct and need. Thus, the critic again is asking, how by the suggested procedure, can we identify the sense of a given metaphor.

In answer to the first argument, it must be pointed out that metaphors are actually comparisons. That is, metaphors must be explained by similes if they are to state true propositions. It follows that any metaphor 'x is y' becomes 'x is like y.' Now, it also follows from the transitivity of resemblance relations, that if x is like y then y is like x. Therefore, if metaphors generally amplify the meaning of only one flank of the metaphor, that is a psychological fact about auditors of metaphors and not a fact about the objective meaning of a metaphor. To say 'fighter pilots are machines' is actually to claim 'fighter pilots are like machines.' 'Fighter pilots are like machines' implies both 'Machines are like fighter pilots' and 'Fighter pilots are like machines' because resemblance is a transitive relation. The order of the comparison is irrelevant. For the logical structure of the meaning of a metaphor implies an amplification of meaning to each member of the comparison. That people may read the
significance of the metaphor only in one direction is an irrelevant psychological
fact that does not mitigate that the metaphor in fact expresses. Hence, the
suggested method for isolating metaphor in film is not imperiled because it
cannot designate one arm of a metaphor as the arm to be amplified because in
fact metaphor a priori amplifies both arms of the comparison.

The answer to the J. J. O. S. argument follows from the above. 'Eating is
foreplay' or 'Eating is sex' actually means 'Eating is like sex.' This in turn
implies 'Sex is like eating.' Thus, again, we see that the failure of our
analysis to single out an amplified or inflected wing of any given metaphor is
not problematic.

If the above is true, then our procedure for isolating metaphor seems
unproblematic. That is, we have established that there are metaphors in film.
Metaphors are comparisons of dissimilar objects via identification. In film, two
dissimilar objects are identified via visual and/or aural substitutions. Thus,
we are able to know not only how metaphors function in film, but also how to
identify instances of film metaphors.

The ability to identify metaphor in film is of theoretical import. It
provides a descriptive category by which film theorists or critics can
explicate a basic cinematic element of expression. Thus, the isolation of metaphor
as a basic film trope supplies partial answers to questions like 'how is film
expressive?' and 'how is a given film, x, expressive?' Moreover, metaphor as
a descriptive category also provides a tool for understanding the cinematic style
of a given director. That is, important to the description of any director's
style will be the degree to which that director employs the trope of metaphor.

In concluding, mention of Dr. John Kuiper's work on cinematic tropes must
be made. Dr. Kuiper, in his doctoral dissertation on Eisenstein, proposes a
criterion for metaphor in film. His formulation, however, seems to rely more
on the tendency for the film viewer to generate metaphors in his description of
films rather than on an observable system of audio-visual structures within given
films. That is, in terms of his analysis of metaphor, Dr. Kuiper's work verges
on a variant form of an affective fallacy rather than attending to the specific
structure or arrangement of audio-visual information in films. The primary
advantage of our formulation of a criterion for metaphor in film is that we have
defined an observable metaphoric structure in film that hinges solely on an
analysis of the arrangement of the audio-visual data on the screen rather than
on the mental or linguistic performance of the viewer.
A SOCIOVISTIC APPROACH TO FILM COMMUNICATION: THEORY, METHODS, AND SUGGESTED FIELDWORK

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Introduction

The general purpose of the following essay is to present a method for the analysis of film communication based on the dimensions of social activity that necessarily surround the manipulation of a syrthotic environment, and to suggest the use of such a method on some specific bodies of material.

Treatins communication as social process, this essay proposes an analytic scheme for the systematic study of social behavior performed in the production and reception of series in mode of film communication.

In studying the social organization around filmmaking, social activity is seen as structured by specific characteristics of the context of the film communication and as activity that actually structures a situation around it.

For the purposes of this essay, we must initially consider the study of film in a broader context of human communication. Communication shall not be considered as the study of information storage or as the operation of data retrieval systems.

More relevant is the treatment of communication as social activity; that is, as culturally structured behavior, prescribed and restricted within sets of formal and informal social rules.

Communication is further thought of as human behavior that aligns itself with certain categories of subcultural specific norms, and as behavior that is directed more by social restrictions than by physical and/or technical limitations.

In studying communication as social process, specific attention shall be paid to principles of social organization that surround the use of the medium.

Rather than giving priority to the study of the content and the physical aspects of the produced film, more attention shall be given to describing the relationships between (1) different kinds of communication activity, or "Events", (2) ways of looking at such activity, or "perspectives", and (3) observable constituents of such activity, or "Components" (see pages 25-32).--all of which make film communication possible.

Content and structural qualities of the films shall be discussed in relation to this larger context of social behavior.

Two structuring processes are involved in the study of the social organization surrounding the production of an actual piece of film communication. Traditionally, the social activity within the film is considered as being the concern here.

Traditionally, the film is treated as an entity of its own, and the social activity within is considered as being the concern here.

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When thinking of communication as interpretation and manipulation of symbolic environments, we must focus more attention on the social aspects that structure the use of symbolic forms, rather than merely on the syntactic organization of the symbolic forms themselves. The "sociovidistic" approach that I am proposing shall be developed in these terms.

I. Relevant Approaches to Communication Study

Film has traditionally been studied within two contexts: film as art, and film as a mass medium form of education and/or entertainment. As with other mass media, film has been examined for its content and for its effects.

The importance of effect studies is seen in what Gerbner has called "the tactical approach." (1965) Katz and Lazarsfeld observed that "the overriding interest of mass media research is in the study of effectiveness of mass media attempts to influence--usually change--opinions and attitudes in the very short run." (1955:16-19)

Studies in content analysis have played an important part in communication research. Data and evidence are most accessible to the researcher in terms of tangible results of communications activity, e.g. transcribed words, letters, photographs, motion pictures, television tapes, etc. In what I would call a "code in content" approach, researchers have generally overlooked studying the content of the content within a framework of a communication process.

The persuasion-effectiveness approach was followed by a functional approach, which "turned the question around from 'what do media do to people' to 'what do people do with media.'" (Gerbner, 1965:2) The approach that I offer treats the context bound relationships between people and use of media as problematic. While study of media use and the interpretation of mediated symbolic environments is not new, a field approach to the observation of people actually in the process of media communication is relatively rare (see Ross, 1952: Powdermaker, 1947, 1950). The concept of combining ethnography and communications research becomes very important to my suggested mode of film study.

An alternative approach to this concentration on code and content would seek to broaden the parameters of what is considered a studiable element of a communication code. As advocated by LeQuil, more attention might be paid to asking questions "about the complex pattern of interaction and interdependence between individuals in a communications situation." (1969:59) My emphasis is to work out a descriptive scheme by which, previously considered unmanageable social aspects surrounding the production and reception of message forms may be coded.

So far, I have suggested that studies of film, based on film content and subsequent effects, have tended to segment the general process of film communication. Attention should further be paid to the neglected study of the content of the film communication process. While a concept of context means different things to different people, it is specifically the task of this essay to list and describe meaningful contextual items relevant to the analysis of any form or configuration that a film communication process may assume. It is significant to note that developments in the fields of
sociolinguistics (Hymes, 1964; Fishman, 1963, 1970; Bright, 1966), kinesics
(Birdwhistell, 1952, 1955, 1961), proxemics (Hall, 1966; Watson, 1971) and
mass communications research (Gerbner, 1966) are largely due to a greater
awareness of articulating a manageable scheme of contextual variables.

A. Review of the Film Literature

One assumption that a communications scholar might make is that the
literature on "film" can be treated as a source of information on "film
communication." Examination of this assumption reveals that the theme of
"communication" is seldom a common feature of the "academic" and/or "popu-
lar" treatments of film. An understanding and explication of film com-
unication as social process is seldom developed in these materials. This
is not to say that film has not "worked", or that film producers should read
articles on communication, or that film has not been successful in communicat-
ing many forms of information. My point is that few authors have made serious
tries to study the entire process of people making movies, the movies
themselves, and people seeing movies.

For my purposes, there is one crucial flaw in the majority of film
literature. While film has been systematically and unsystematically investi-
gated by numerous workers and scholars from varying fields and disciplines,
the majority of such efforts have treated film as "communications" rather than
"communication." Here I am calling attention to a distinction made by
Gerbner: "The singular, communication, connotes the unitary concept of process.
Communications tends to emphasize the pluralistic concept of a diversified
field, or the multiple ingredients of the process with emphasis on media,
channels, messages, etc." (1970:6) While the study of film communication
as process is not totally satisfactory for my formulations as stated above,
it does provide a critical point of distinction from other treatments and
approaches.

There has been a general neglect of treating film as social process in
favor of exhaustive studies of segments of the filmmaking process. One finds
adequate studies of (1) individual filmmakers, directors, producers, etc.;
(2) of individual, and groups of, "classic films"; (3) films produced by a
particular country or historical era; (4) film content in terms of themes,
plots and character types; and (5) aspects of film audience behavior, such
as attendance figures and effects studies. Other important areas of film
study include film history, film theory (aesthetics) and film criticism,
each of which are seen to interact with the five categories mentioned above.
My point is that these areas of interest may be restructured to develop a
greater understanding of "film" as social process, rather than film as a
separate entity which necessarily neglects its position in a more general
process of communication.

In a further review of the film literature, it is clear that few studies
have been developed that treat film as culturally structured behavior. A
number of content analytic studies initiated this approach, but this strategy
failed to generate much interest (Metraux, 1955). Unfortunately these studies
are usually restricted to analysis of the films per se and some generalized
characteristics of the culture that produced the films. Other elements of
the total process have been neglected and not treated as equally important
loci of socially "organized" activity.
One notable exception to this claim is the "bio-documentary" film research initiated by Worth (1964, 1965), and the Havaho Project (1966) directed by Adair and Worth (1967, 1970, 1972). Generally speaking, this research strategy was to observe individuals as they made filmic statements; to study characteristics of their socio-cultural backgrounds; to analyze their films (a) in terms of their ways of syntactically organizing filmic elements, and (b) in relation to selected socio-cultural features; and to relate audiences and reactions to shared or distinguishing background characteristics.

My point is that while sporadic treatment has been given to both of these general approaches, no one has analytically studied film communication from the combined perspective of "film" as social activity and as culturally structured behavior.

B. Film Research and Language Studies

Specifically, two bodies of literature have structured my approach to film communication: Dell Hymes' approach to language study and Sol Worth's contributions to an understanding of film as a communication code as well as a communication medium. These two authors are greatly responsible for the new perspective that I offer—which might appropriately be called "socio-vidistic." The writings of Hymes and Worth have related and shared several important concepts:

(A) The utilization of a language paradigm to understand extra-linguistic behavior and to develop a multi-modal approach to communication activity.

(B) The treatment of "codes in context."

(C) The strategy of studying man's manipulation of symbolic forms as fundamental to all forms of human communication.

Taking these writings separately, it is possible to trace parallel threads of development through communication study and linguistics that lead to a study of a communication code in a context of social activity.

C. Film Communication and Language Models

The suggested application of a linguistic paradigm to an explanation of film communication is not a new approach. Phrases such as "the language of film," "film syntax," and "the grammar of film" are common but loosely used. As early as 1934, Sergei Eisenstein made frequent reference to "film language." In a 1944 essay, he compared the basic units of the two modes (language and film) by suggesting relationships such as the word: the "shot" and the sentence: the "montage phrase." (1957:236) Since then other authors such as Spottiswoode (1935), Whitaker (1970), Lawson (1964), Hodgkinson (1965) and Bazin (1967) have worked on transferring the syntactic organization and dynamics of a verbal code into a visual one. At present it is very easy to find examples of the "pictures are a language" approach in the popular literature on home moviemaking and in the Kodak manuals on slide show production. Most of these attempted transfers have been very incomplete, little more than speculation and seldom fully explained. As Worth points out, "Although the term "grammar" has been used in connection with films, it has been used metaphorically, and no cohesive body of elements and operations has been formulated from which rules of syntax or use can be developed or studied." (1960)
Worth's early papers (1964, 1965) struggle with legitimizing concepts of "film language" and visual language as he only makes suggestive references to discovering a film grammar. Worth initially works through a psychological frame of reference, centering on problems of cognitive interaction. His study of potential linguistic contributions leads him to state that:

> It is within this linguistic and psycholinguistic framework that the hypothesis is advanced that film can be studied as if it were the "language" of visual communication. (1966:331)

In terms of the film-language discussion, Worth uncovers the following questions when he assumes an "as if language" approach to film communication:

1. What is the nature of basic units in the verbal and visual codes? What is the film code's compensates for the finite quality of an "ethically" derived system of sounds in spoken language?

2. What problems exist for the development of a notation system for the coding of verbal and visual output?

3. Can Noam Chomsky's notions and definitions of "grammatical" be applied to film language? Are concepts of "native speaker" and "communications community" applicable to visual encoders and decoders?

4. What happens to a langue-parole distinction when applied to a visual mode of communication?

5. Is the competence-performance argument pertinent to analysis of film communication? Are any other arguments in the linguistic literature clarified when comparisons are made to a non-verbal code?

It is important to realize that Worth does not treat the idea of language as a "model" for film too literally. He insists on treating the relationship as an analogy that can suggest fruitful comparisons and lines of analysis.

Sensing the many shortcomings to the literal treatment of film as language, Worth re-directed his research toward the development of a semiotic of film rather than continuing to stress the "grammar of film" approach.

The decision to concentrate for the time being on developing a semiotic rather than a grammar was made because it seems nonsense at this stage of ignorance to prejudge whether film communication should be considered a language in a formal and serious sense. The notion of a semiotic allows for the discovery of linguistic-type rules for film organization and inference but does not preclude other less formal, less commonly understood, and perhaps different, patterns of use. (1966:11)

The value of this realization for the proposed analytic scheme shall be clearer in the following pages.
D. Concepts of Context in Film Communication

If we agree that all codes of human communication use some system of signs to create and manipulate symbolic environments, we must ask what aspects of this system of signs should be examined. If we concentrate on Lan's use of signs, we still are faced with decoding what "use" entails. Domains of syntax, semantics and pragmatics represent three different concepts of "use" and different concepts of context.

Worth's papers have paid varying degrees of attention to social context but very little attention to constructing an analytic scheme into which contextual factors could be codified. While Worth has always stressed the importance of studying the process of film communication, aspects of the psychological context of the process have received more attention than the social context of the communications event. In Worth's later papers, however, he points out that social context is crucial in the study of film as a communicative code—an investigator should know something about Navaho culture and especially Navaho language while undertaking a study of Navaho filmmaking. However, in general, Worth's concerns with cognitive interaction and Whorfian determinism have taken precedence to basic considerations of the social context surrounding the communicative acts.

In 1958, Worth turns more attention to context when he explains the nature of an "ethnographic film" as "any film whose makers or viewers intend to use it to study the customs and peoples of the world."

It would seem therefore that in order to know something about ethnographic films, we must examine not the films primarily but why they are made and how they are used... We must study the code within some specific functional context. In our case it will do us no good to study film qua film. We must begin to develop the relationship between the film code and its context within ethnographic research. (1960:3-4)

The problematic area of context has always plagued the credibility of ethnographic film. There has been a determined avoidance of this subject in the meagre theoretical literature that does exist.

Worth's positional statement is well put in a footnote in his 1970 paper "Development of a Semiotic of Film."

Of course, the social, personal and cultural context in which making and viewing takes place must be taken into account. My specific point is that the SPECIFIC signs in a film must be determined before they can be related to a context. A code always exists within a context, and both must be known before their interaction can be known. (1970:301)

This paper, more than the others, comes closest to stating that a contextual framework for studying a sign's use outside of its syntactic organization is needed. This realization was inevitable. When working within a semiotic frame of reference one must question the use and function of signs for their users. This necessitates an understanding of the relationship between the encoding and decoding (both in psychological and sociological terms) of the film signs and the socio-cultural context and physical environment of their use.
II. Sociolinguistics and Film Communication

The field of sociolinguistics has emerged in reaction to certain conceptual shortcomings and theoretical developments; namely, (1) a maturing interest in the study of structure and form in language; (2) a realization of the necessary interdependence of linguistics with other disciplines; (3) a need for examining and accounting for extra-linguistic phenomena; (4) a growing concern for studying the functions of language; and (5) more attention to a new perspective which "focuses on the integrity of the verbal message as an act." (Hymes, 1968:35) This, in turn, demands that attention be paid (a) to the structuring of the use of language forms; (b) to integrating language and socio-cultural perspectives; and (c) to treating the speech community rather than the individual code as the natural unit of study.

One specific point deserves further attention. There has been a growing concern in anthropological methodology and in language study for the consideration of texts as situated in contexts. Interpreting "text" broadly, any form of mediated and coded symbolic behavior may be studied—be it a native's verbal report of an event, myth or kinship system or an anthropologist's film of a Navaho shaman in a curing ceremony. Attention to the nature of the mediation, in terms of contextual variables, and consideration of the "text" as "code" naturally leads to an analysis of "codes in context."

The most important reason for studying the development of a unified approach to language study and the development of sociolinguistics is in the realization that it treats one mode of communication—speaking—in the way that I propose to study film communication.

Whereas Worth has aided my understanding of film as a communicative process, essentially one of human activity (not mere technological manipulation), Hymes has contributed to my organizational abilities in describing the position of a communicative mode in its social context.

In the paper, "Functions of Speech: An Evolutionary Approach" (1961) Hymes develops the notion of "speech habits" and "linguistic routines." It becomes evident that when we study speech as non-random patterned activity (behavior that is situated and partially controlled by social context), societies differ in the content of equivalent routines and in the kinds and numbers of their routines.

The nature of speech patterning, as well as its cross cultural variations, can be brought out by considering four aspects of it: (1) in terms of the materials of speech, there is a patterning of utterances in discourse; (2) in terms of the individual participants, there is a patterning of expression and interpretation of personality; (3) in terms of the social system, there is the patterning of speech situations, and (4) in terms of cultural values and outlook, there is the patterning of attitudes and conceptions about speech. (1961:58)
If we look at the social system of the behavioral activity involved, we can see it as a network of interaction in situations of behavior settings, and can discover related patterns of speech. For example, societies differ in the settings in which speech is prescribed, proscribed, or simply optional. (1961:60)

The concept of a mode of communication as situated activity, carrying different behavioral formulas cross-culturally, is very important to the proposed study of film communication.

Hymes proposes a way to understand and compare these patterns by describing a "set of factors whose interrelations may serve to describe its pattern of speech activity, and so provide a basis for comparing the functions of speech in different social situations." (1961:60) I shall not stress functional comparisons in my analytic scheme. However, the basic requirement of extracting a "set of factors" (later called "components") plays an important role in sociolinguistic description and analysis.

In Hymes' 1962 paper, "The Ethnography of Speaking," he further develops the notion of a paradigmatic approach to the study of speech behavior which requires "discovering a relevant frame or context, identifying the items which contrast within it, and determining the dimensions of contrast for the items within the set so defined." (1962:18) After reviewing the study of speech in cognitive and expressive behavior, he concludes that "analysis of the role of speech in cognitive behavior leads into analysis of the ethnographic context of speech." (1962:20) A parallel argument can be developed for the contextual study of film in native behavioral settings.

Hymes continues by outlining a descriptive framework that he intends to treat as a series of questions rather than as an imposed system. The suggested framework for the analysis of the ethnographic context of speech concentrates on discovering and describing (1) speech events, (2) the constituent factors of speech events, and (3) the functions of speech. In this more fully developed treatment, the factors, now also called "components," are listed as (1) a Sender (Addressor); (2) a Receiver (Addressee); (3) a Message Form; (4) a Channel; (5) a Code; (6) a Topic; and (7) a Setting (Scene, Situation). (1962:25) The reader is asked to see Section III of this paper for my adapted scheme.

Hymes also lists and describes seven broad types of functions corresponding to the seven types of components listed above. The list of components is suggested as a heuristic framework; questions are to be asked of relationships between components and between components and associated functions.

More importantly, Hymes calls attention to the concept of "rules of appropriateness." The notion of appropriate behavior can be applied to either linguistic code or social code. This is very important when some form of communicative performance is being studied. Hymes emphasizes the need to discover patterns of distribution and organization of the suggested components that are appropriately used in speech events. This necessitates the study of co-occurrence of factors, as possibly being obligatory, or
optional, or structurally excluded. In such a way, speaking, as a system, may be described.

From an ethnographic point of view, the discovery of such rules of appropriateness...is central to the conception of speaking as a system. One way that patterns of speaking constitute a system is in virtue of restrictions on the co-occurrence of elements. (1962:23)

It is interesting to note that in 1962 Hymes only makes a parenthetical reference to an analysis of a "communicative" event: "(In discussing it, I shall refer to speech and speaking, but these terms are surrogates for all modes of communication, and a descriptive account should be generalized to comprise all.)" (1962:24)

Hymes' 1964 paper, "Toward Ethnographies of Communication," makes it clear that he is concerned with communication events. This paper is extremely important for my purposes because, for the first time, it formally unites the concept of ethnography with the study of communication. This combination has contributed heavily to my conceptual formulations of a sociovidistic approach.

The descriptive and analytic scheme is further developed to suggest that ethnographies of communication be guided by the study of four aspects: (1) the components of communicative events, (2) the relation among components, (3) the capacity and state of the components, and (4) the activity of the system so constituted.

Emphasis remains, however, on the study of speech. Interestingly enough, when Hymes does mention the study of media (citing non-ethnographically based references as McLuhan and Carpenter (1960) and McLuhan (1964), he notes the "tendency to take the value of channel as given across cultures, but here, as with every aspect and component of communication, the value is problematic and requires investigation." (1964:25)

Hymes' suggestion and challenge that modes other than speaking can be ethnographically studied has not been met. The proposed sociovidistic framework for describing and analyzing film as a mode of visual communication is one attempt to answer this challenge. No one is contributing to film communication study what sociolinguistics has offered to language study.

It remains the central task of this essay to build on the theoretical foundations presented in the previous pages. More specifically my intention is to develop a theory and complementary methodology to facilitate the systematic analysis of film, as a communicative code, within its social context. If, as I claim, there is an importance to the convergence of specific trends in both language and communications study, then the proposed theory should be able to uncover and successfully answer new questions--important questions about human communication that have previously been overlooked. Herewith lies the major contribution to what Worth and Hymes have called "codes in context."
The projected result of such an inquiry is to make meaningful conclusions about the following questions:

(A) What social relationships in the context of film communication meaningfully separate one "production genre" from another?

(B) Is there a difference between the film products and the production styles of the different "communication communities" that have been studied? By what criterion can the label "same" and/or "different" be used?

A further question that must be dealt with involves the nature of the relationships between film production style, film content and the socio-cultural and life style characteristics of specific groups of filmmakers. One serious problem to be faced initially is how one can talk about such relationships. Ways of discussing, and procedures for defining such relationships are not well developed at this time.

III. Toward a Sociovidistic Scheme of Analysis

While this is not the time to develop a complete theoretical organization of the field of communication, I feel that some statement which situates the domain of my work in relation to others is necessary. I have made innumerable references to "film communication," tacitly stating that "film" and "communication" can and do denote and connote different things to different people. Therefore some explication of my use of these terms is necessary in light of a larger contextual scheme which encompasses "communication," "language," "modes," "codes," and "genres."

Within the field of communication it is possible to speak of systems of communication and their associated areas of study, such as kinesics, proxemics, tacesics, linguistics, etc. On this level, I am primarily concerned with the study of visual communication.

Within the study of visual communication, which includes photography, painting, graphic arts, sculpture and forms of telecommunications (such as live television and videotape), I am specifically working toward a clarification and amplification of "vidistics." As defined by Worth, vidistics treats film "as if it were the 'language' of visual communication, and as if it were possible to determine the elements and to understand the logic of its structure." (1966:331)

When studying film as a central concern of vidistics, we must take into account the existence of different "types" of films. We hear and see references made to feature films, "art" films, industrial films, educational films, underground films, family films ("home movies") and documentary films, to mention only the most common varieties. Within the documentary frame of reference, we can speak of interpretive films (in the Grierson school), ethnofilm, cinema verité, direct cinema and bi- and socio-documentary, again only to mention a few.

The mere fact that I am able to list these varieties of film begs the question of the nature of distinguishing characteristics. By what criteria have these types of film been established? Is there a tacit agreement among some group that different codes are involved? Do configurations of social participation and activity make the difference? Are functional relationships
the distinguishing factor? Or, perhaps a combination of these three explanations will clarify the problem.

The study of vidistics can be treated from two perspectives. Vidistic phenomenon can be described as film codes; the internal structural rules are the unit of analysis. In another perspective the same material can be treated and organized as "film communication genres" when the external sociocultural rules are the dominant unit of analysis.

While speaking of the "visual mode of communication," I shall consider the concept of "film" as one that encompasses a variety of communication "codes." My central concern is to demonstrate that a concept of film code is meaningless when it is isolated from consideration and analysis of social context. This unified perspective of code-in-context shall define and structure the lowest level of my projected organization—that of "film genre."

My approach to an understanding of the genre level will be to describe genre as a pattern of relationships between film communication EVENTS, film communication PERSPECTIVES, and film communication COMPONENTS. The specific relationships can be suggested by the use of two lists of contextual items that appear below. It should be kept in mind that Events, Perspectives, and Components are proposed as a means of description. The relationships between the following two lists are meant to be suggestive of potentially distinctive characteristics and will enable the analyst to isolate one genre of film production from another. It is thus proposed that all forms of "film genres" may be located, described and meaningfully distinguished by the patterns of relationships that result from describing film Events in terms of Perspectives and Components.

The descriptive framework is to be organized as follows. Three categories of film communication Events, namely (A) Planning Events, (B) Filming Events, and (C) Exhibiting Events are to be cross-referenced with six categories of film communication Components, namely (1) Participants, (2) Setting, (3) Topic, (4) Message Form, (5) Code, and (6) Auxiliary Channels. Each category of Event is to be examined through two Perspectives: one of Preparing To (do the event), and another of Preparing The (event itself). All of these categories shall be explained shortly.

We, therefore, have three terms which we will be using: EVENTS, PERSPECTIVES AND COMPONENTS. Events will be described in terms of Components from two Perspectives. The resulting description will define a GENRE.

It is further proposed that each film communication case study be examined through this framework. The framework seeks to account for analyzable social factors that surround all filmmaking activity. In past research some of these factors, either types of components or events, have not been recognized or considered "mere" context. The lists of contextual items described in the following pages attempt to account for all forms of social activity across all "production genres." Forms of social activity performed in Hollywood and backyard filmmaking must be accounted for.

In part, the purpose of sociovidistic fieldwork is to evaluate and test the appropriateness of these components and events as I look for the
contextual boundaries common to all film production. Furthermore, the purposes of developing such a framework are, first, to establish boundaries on the variability of each contextual item; second, to provide evidence for a non-random distribution of the behavior of each component within each event of the particular film production under investigation; and third, to provide a structure amenable to comparative results.

The framework that I have suggested essentially outlines the descriptive task of a sociovidistic field study. The Events, Perspectives and Components deserve some further explication (see diagram on page 13).

Events and Perspectives are to be conceptualized as follows.

A Film Communication Event is a conceptual unit, described in terms of Components, in which some form of film production activity is the central organizing concern. The spate of activity is seen to include all forms of mental, physical and social performance present in various forms of filmmaking production. This broad category includes, in Worth's terms the FCs and FCr phenomenon as well as learning how to use a camera and 'going to the movies.' Events are to be primarily conceived of as social activity that is regulated by normative behavior. Events are further understood as examples of culturally structured behavior, governed by sets of prescriptions and proscriptions. What may and what may not be done within filmmaking events should be analyzed so that what can and what cannot be done with the available technology can be placed in its proper sociovidistic context.

I propose that all such activity and behavior that I am calling "Events" can be organized into the categories outlined below.

1. A Planning Event is any activity in which a person or persons formally or informally decides what to record and how to record it in motion picture images.

2. A Filming Event is any activity in which a person or persons puts an image on film by using a motion picture camera. A Filming Event takes place in two major ways.

   2A. A Filming: On-Camera Event is any activity performed by a person or persons that takes place in front of an operating motion picture camera.

   2B. A Filming: Behind-the Camera Event is any activity performed by a person or persons behind the camera and taking or not taking responsibility for the camera while it is recording images.

3. An Exhibiting Event is any activity which occurs after the Filming Event in which film is to be shown in any way.

Each of these categories of Events should be examined through two perspectives of Preparation.
The Prepare To perspective concentrates on socio-cultural aspects of Event preparation, that is, on the social activity that surrounds the actual planning, filming and exhibiting per se. This context-affiliated perspective examines social behavior external to the film product.

The Prepare The perspective concentrates on analyzing the structural arrangement and re-arrangement of symbolic material. This is a code affiliated perspective that examines the rule-like behavior considered internal to the film product.

Scheme of Events and Perspectives

△ The PREPARE TO Perspective
○ The PREPARE THE Perspective

As I have indicated, each of these events and perspectives can assume a wide variety of forms (arrangements of components). They cannot be fully described, however, without reference to each, or at least several, of the following six categories of components.

1. The component Participant involves anyone who participates in any activity for which the major concern is producing a specific film. Therefore, included in this category are the actual filmmakers, actors (including animals), audience members, observers (such as "participant-researchers"), sponsors, friends, relatives, gang members, church leaders, social workers, etc.

2. The component Setting describes actual times and places of the Events and Perspectives.
3. The component **Topic**, as a category, contains information on film content. Response to the question, "What was the film about" must be answered by both the observed and the researchers. The "observed" category includes people listed in the Participant component for a specific film.

4. The component **Message Form** refers to "style." An "style" reference is made to "habits" or "routines" (such as always starting a sequence with an establishing shot, followed by a two-shot and then a close-up, or editing out any shot that has any camera movement in it) or "fashions of showing" (such as always producing a coherent logical sequence rather than a fast cut of quick shots jumping from place to place). Thus, particular, consistent and patterned ways of shooting a scene or a consistent, patterned manner of editing are appropriate material for this category.

5. The component **Code** describes the elements or units that define the particular style. Whereas the style is likely to be noticed and discussed first, the code will only be mentioned when one is asked to differentiate one style from another.

This use of "code" consists of more than syntactic elements and their arrangements. Code also describes social elements when they are codeable. For instance, one might describe people always facing the camera, people always wearing new clothes, or simply, people appearing in every shot (as opposed to not appearing) as appropriate social units of this component.

6. The component **Auxiliary Channels** describes any use of communicative channels that are either heavily relied upon, substituted for, imitated, or used in association with the film channel. Examples include the drawing of pictures in a planning event (such as a storyboard) or pictures with word balloons to actually be in the movie. Information on (a) the use of verbal communication, still photography and/or television as a template for how a film is made, or (b) a reliance on words, gestures and/or music falls into this category. The "use of auxiliary channels" must be studied in the social organization surrounding the film's making as well as the syntactic organization of the film's construction.

In dealing with Events and Perspectives, we can combine them in whatever way they happen to be used by a specific filmmaking group. For example:

1. One can Prepare to Plan as well as Prepare the Plan. The former might describe the formation of a filmmaking club with officers, dues, etc. in order to begin to make a movie; the latter might describe the procedure by which an individual or group structures and/or changes a script through the use of drawings, writings, talking into a tape recorder, etc.

2A. One can Prepare to Film in the sense of Preparing to Be-On-Camera, or in the sense of Preparing the Being-On-Camera event. Examples of the former include rehearsing scenes with or without dialogue, learning how to act. The latter might describe the building of the set, applying make-up, putting people to stand facing the camera.

2B. We can Prepare to Film also in the sense of Preparing to Be Behind-the-Camera event. Behavior appropriate to the former category would include deciding who will shoot the film, who will make the light meter readings or
Just as one can prepare to film, one can also prepare the film. This category might describe developing the film (either in a lab or at home), editing, and/or re-editing the film, syncing the sound with the film, etc.

One can prepare to exhibit the film and one can prepare the exhibition. For instance, describing the procedure by which people are selected and invited to see a particular film, the types of activity that accompany an exhibiting event (such as having dinner) etc. are examples of the former category. The latter category is exemplified by describing the time and setting of a particular exhibition, the placement of chairs in certain locations, the way the film will be spliced together if it breaks, etc.

It should be noticed that the prepare to and the prepare the perspectives are suggested as ways of locating certain relevant pieces of behavior and activity. They are presented as ways of most clearly seeing the social aspects of a film communication process. It is not suggested that each and every category will be relevant to, or even appear in, each case study. The proposed relationships are not to be thought of as cells that must be filled. This framework presents categories that will contribute to a comparative study of differently organized filmmaking productions.

As an example of how I plan to use these terms, let us for a moment compare a possible Annenberg School film production (a graduate school of communications study) with that of a possible home movie production along the proposed framework of Events, Perspectives, and Components.

In terms of Events, we see several major differences. The Planning event receives the majority of attention in an Annenberg production, whereas this event is noticeably neglected in the production of a home movie. That is, Annenberg students may spend half or more of their total allotted production time in some form of planning activity; Home Movie Planning usually consists merely of purchasing the correct type of film at the drug store and remembering to get the camera out. On the other hand, the Exhibiting event in a home movie production is the activity that receives the most attention; in the Annenberg production the same event receives the least attention.

In terms of the Filming event, another reciprocal relationship appears. In the Annenberg production, central attention is paid to the Behind-the-Camera activity; Home Movie making emphasizes on-camera activity.

In terms of different emphases on preparation, the Annenberg pattern of production stresses preparing the plan, preparing to be behind-the-camera, and preparing the film. On the other hand, Home Movie production emphasizes preparing to be on-camera and preparing to exhibit.
Progress in the study of socioidemics rests in the abilities of 
communication researchers to systematically gather contextual forms of 
information and data that have previously been overlooked. An anthropo-
logically based method of participant observation must be the primary 
research strategy. In the concluding section of this essay, I shall sugges-
te a series of guidelines for such work.

IV. Socioidemetic Research and Fieldwork

Initial concern must be paid to looking for groups of films and their 
associated "film communications communities." By this I mean study should 
be made of (1) the people responsible for particular film productions, (2) 
the actual films that were produced, and (3) samples of audiences that either 
the films were made for, or, people who otherwise became audience members for 
these specific films. Attempting to define the parameters of participation 
in specific film communication productions should be stressed. Secondly, 
emphasis must be placed on integrating certain social and physical character-
istics suggested by the socioidemetic analytic scheme.

In some cases, it may be possible to reconstruct the relevant kinds of 
information on participation, social activities, intentions, reactions, etc. 
through examples in the literature, or through a series of structured inter-
views. The socioidemetic descriptive scheme could serve as a guide in such 
an approach. It is my feeling however that, in most cases, this approach 
will not be feasible. The reader will recall my earlier remarks concerning 
the lack of ethnographically based studies of Hollywood film production 
activity. On the other hand, this strategy may be well suited to an invest-
egation of the home movie production genre.

An alternative strategy would be to design a participant observer 
methodology that would study specific forms of communication behavior 
operative in the filmmaking process. Without interrupting the process, or 
causing irreparable behavioral change, it should be possible to gather 
relevant socioidemetic data by observing people as they plan, make, and see 
movies.

Readers will realize that at present, adolescent filmmaking is a common 
and popular activity. It is recognized that in the last decade there has 
been a tremendous growth of teenage filmmaking in the United States and 
Great Britain. 

A few of the filmmaking projects in this country that come immediately 
to mind include Larson's work with Puerto Ricans and blacks on the Lower East 
side of New York (Larson and Neece 1970, Larson 1971); Robbin's project with 
blacks in Richmond, California (Robbin 1976); Haskins' project with the 
12th and Oxford Streets black youth in North Philadelphia; Stetzer's Los 
Angeles study of Chicanoos as Casa Naravilla (Stetzer 1971); and the Boston 
Public Library sponsored film with East Boston Italian youth (Morzy 1970).

The fact is, however, that few, if any, of these projects were designed 
to serve research needs similar to those I have proposed. It is equally 
true that few, if any, of the film productions or film products have been 
analyzed in ways that I have suggested. This point become more interesting 
when we realize that in many cases the primary purpose of organizing a
filmmaking project has been to provide a socially attractive activity. The projects have been socially motivated and justified by social explanations. My point is that none of these productions have been observed or studied from a communications perspective—an approach that seeks to utilize these social foundations.

The fact that such a large amount of filmmaking exists as an on-going activity provides us with a fertile field of sociocriticism data. Easily accessible research sites exist in

1. home movie making activity;
2. high school filmmaking classes;
3. adolescent ghetto filmmaking projects;
4. college and graduate school film production courses; and

Another alternative strategy would be to actually generate a "filmmaking project" with a specific group of people, or within a specific community of special interest. Worth's bio-documentary research techniques (1964) have been designed with this objective in mind. More specifically, this approach offers individuals the technical abilities and materials to make filmic statements about themselves. Worth and Adair's collaborative effort with a group of on-reservation Navaho Indians (1977, 1970, 1972) is a direct result of applying bio-documentary techniques to the study of film as cross-cultural communication.

Simultaneously Worth urged his students to investigate the possibilities of conducting field research on local sub-cultural populations. This work was initiated on a small group basis rather than with individual filmmakers. Achtenberg's study of black teenagers at the Tabernacle Church in West Philadelphia (Achtenberg, 1967; Stoddard, 1957; Gilber, 1957). Waterhouse's work with upper-middle class girls attending the Shipley School in Philadelphia (Waterhouse, personal communication), Smelser's projects with a group of young Chicanos in Los Angeles (Smelser, 1971) and my work in South Philadelphia at the Houston Settlement House are all products of this stimulation.

It is within this context of work that, in 1969, I initiated a 3-year film research program at the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic (Chalfen and Haley, 1971). Funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, primary objectives of this program were to have groups of adolescents, differing in sex, class and race, make their own movies. Each group was to conceive, shoot, edit and sound track a 16mm black and white film on any subject of their choosing. The major stipulation was that they had to make the movie as a cooperative group effort, make group decisions on what the film was about, who was to be in it, who was to shoot it, who was to see it, etc. My function in these projects has been to instruct the young filmmakers in technical matters while making a determined effort to neither structure the content nor the construct of their films.

Rephrasing this research in terms of socio-documentary methodology, meaningful cross group differences have begun to emerge in areas of (1) preferred shooting locations, (2) preference for participating either on-camera or behind-the-camera, (3) behavioral prescriptions and restrictions...
for either on-camera or behind-the-camera activity, (4) degree of storyline importance, (5) restrictions on who may become an "official" vs. "unofficial" participant, (6) appropriate topics and themes for the film, (7) the importance of a "message" in the film, and (8) specific audiences selected to see or not to see the finished film. It should be noted that these areas of comparison only became evident after categories of sociovidistic description were organized.

Conclusions

I have proposed a sociovidistic framework for the description and analysis of film communication from a social activity point of view. It is legitimate at this point to ask what my results shall contribute to an understanding of film communication, what can be gained from the material I have proposed to study, and what is the value of such an effort.

It must be borne in mind that the proposed work is not an experiment in any formal sense. Results of this work may or may not lead to research conducted under experimental conditions. That is not my concern at the moment. However, I intend to think of the proposed study as more than an exploratory effort or a "fishing expedition." I have specified a framework of Events, Perspectives and Components which I feel is worth "testing." By "testing" I mean: applying the theoretical constructs of the suggested sociovidistic approach to specific instances of filmmaking and film communication. The question then becomes, how well does the proposed framework account for specific activity and behavior that actually does occur when people make and look at movies. What kinds of new questions are we forced to ask as a result of this new perspective?

Another important reason for the development and demonstrated application of the proposed framework is that it shall provide a basic foundation for future work. Investigators shall have a tested theoretical and analytical base for applications in other areas such as cross media analysis, cross cultural comparisons and cross mode communication.

This essay has outlined the development of a theoretical scheme for the systematic observation, description, and comparison of a form of communication in a way that has never been done before. The proposed study is primarily a descriptive effort that shall test a scheme of conceptual units that define communication as a social process. However, the purpose of description should be more than list making and categorization. More importantly, formulation of categories, relationships and patterns should generate relevant questions that have not been asked before. It is further hoped that such questions may be applied to areas beyond the immediate interest and scope of film, namely to the study of a communication process in general.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Holsti (1949) for methods in content analysis. In many examples of content analysis, researchers seek to learn something about senders and receivers of messages from what they have left behind (see Kracauer 1949 and Wolfenstein and Leites 1947). A reconstruction process takes place not too unlike some archaeological methods, which, as in "the midden theory," believes that 'you are what you throw away.'

2. See Wright (1959, 1954).

3. The writings of Eisenstein (1957) and Bazin (1967) are good examples of this point.

4. The literature on what might be called a "sociology of film" provides a good example. This literature usually selects one portion of the total film communication process, which must include filmmakers, films, and the film audiences. The other aspects are ignored.

   In The Sociology of Film Art (1955), Hucuo analyzes film content with little reference to filmmakers and "no information" on film audience; Mayer's Sociology of Film (1945) concentrates on the effects of films on children as audience; Kracauer's From Caligari to Hitler (1947) ignores data on reactions by German audiences; Wolfenstein and Leites' thematic analyses appearing in Movies, A Psychological Study (1950) only makes "guesses" about movie makers and audiences; and other studies by Bateson, Dolo, Gorz, Weakland and Wolfenstein (in Head and Metraux, 1959) generally concentrate on analyzing the film product in various content analytic schemes. These studies represent product-centered analyses which neglect numerous components of film as a communication process.

   The majority of work mentioned above has dealt with films after they have been produced. Few investigators have looked at the actual filmmaking process. In one rare account, Lillian Ross's Picture (1950) documents the making of John Houston's film "The Red Badge of Courage" in Hollywood. This book includes information on the people producing the film, the actors and cameramen, the content of the film, and the reactions of certain "test audiences" to several release prints. Also the anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker in Hollywood, the Dream Factory (1950) hypothesized that in order to functionally analyze Hollywood films, one needed (a) to know the social system that influenced the film's making and (b) to study the audiences that viewed the film. More recently, I.C. Jarvie, in Towards a Sociology of the Cinema (1970), asks the following sociological questions: (1) who makes films, and why? (2) who sees films, and why and how? (3) that is seen, how and why? and (4) how do films get evaluated, by whom and why? (1970:14) It should be noted that such enlarged contexts of analysis, attempting to deal with the filmmaking process, have only worked with a large-scale institution and industry, namely Hollywood.

5. In 1959, Kodak initiates a series of periodicals titled "Visuals are a Language." The thesis of these publications is that principles of language and language study may be directly transferred and literally translated.
into studying the meaning and organization of pictures and picture sequences. Topics discussed include "the syntax of still picture arrangement" (no. 1, 1950), "the rhetoric of the movie" (no. 2, 1950), "transformational grammar and visual communication" (no. 2, 1960), "deep and surface structure of visual language" (no. 2, 1963), etc.

2. Gerbner calls our attention to processes, both internal and external to the product, when he speaks of definitions, approaches and frameworks in communications study. He says that such approaches should "accommodate the study of structure as well as of function; they should permit the analysis of inner and interpersonal processes as well as of social and institutional systems and relationships; they should allow for the existence of subjective appearances as well as objective events.

7. An important reference here is John Searle's Speech Acts (1959). In this philosophic treatment of language, concentrating on "regulative" and "constitutive" rules of speech behavior, Searle justifies his concentration on the study of speech acts by arguing that "all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts. The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act." (1959:16)

5. Hymes speaks of linguistic routines as follows: "Beyond the syntactic structure of sentences (with which grammars usually deal), utterances have an organization into what we may call 'routines.' By 'linguistic routine' I refer to sequential organization, what follows what, either on the part of a single individual or an interchange between more than one. Routines range from reciting the alphabet...[to] the direction of a buffalo hunt." (1951:5c)

9. The broad types of function are listed as follows: (1) Expressive (Experiential); (2) Directive (Conative, Pragmatic, Rhetorical, Persuasive); (3) Poetic; (4) Contact; (5) Intelliguistic; (6) Referential; (7) Contextual (Situational). (Hymes 1952:31)

10. A more orthodox treatment of code might only describe certain "edema" characteristics (Worth, 1956, 1958), such as use of very short shots of 3 and 4 frames in length, or shots that are put in a film upside down; or a particular cademe-odeme transformation such as always cutting out parts of a shot that are especially underexposed or overexposed, or editing out sections of a shot in which the camera has jerked or moved too fast, etc.

11. In 1959, the Community Film Workshop Council (established by the American Film Institute) identified 70 film workshops in 35 cities which have produced about 200 films. Most of these workshops are in urban ghetto neighborhoods. Since 1959, innumerable other groups have been organized in similar situations.
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* Title Changed To:

Through Navaho Eyes: Research in Film Communication.
A METALOGICON OF FILM; TOPICS IN FILM METASEMIOTICS

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1. The problem of understanding information about different cultures traditionally belongs to the anthropologist. The task of reporting the findings of cross-cultural research falls to the ethnographer. Ethnographic film, is perhaps the most sophisticated tool of the ethnographer for presenting his data. Ethnographic films can combine photography, verbal track, and music track to reach a synergistic description of a people, unmatched by any other representational device.

But there is a true sense in which all films are ethnographic. All films show others to ourselves as foreigners -- as people who are not ourselves, regardless of their nationality. This seems to be true even when the people on the screen are ourselves. When we are objectified by the film process, we are always foreigners to ourselves when we are objectified by the film process.

For some reason, it is more interesting to look at ourselves in a film than in a mirror. We can look at ourselves in home movies without being narcissistic, but more than a few minutes in front of a mirror is enough to earn the name "narcissistic." Both a synchronic and a diachronic understanding of ourselves has value. Self-study through film is diachronic; through the mirror, synchronic.

The phenomenon of film subverting subjects into ethnographic "objects" is more than the difference between synchronicity and diachronicty. A simple demonstration with videotape can prove it: two tandem video tape recording decks can be arranged to tape live action and play it back on a monitor with a few seconds delay. The playback on the monitor is only seconds older than the live action so there is essentially no difference between the viewed and the viewing. Let the viewer sit back and play it back on a monitor and play it back on a monitor.

The question of perception of self as a foreigner through media belongs to a field I have named "teleproxemics," i.e., being media bound to a field. The question of perception of self as a foreigner through media belongs to a field I have named "teleproxemics," i.e., being media bound to a field. Feibleman (1969) views human culture as consisting of the use of artifacts -- both tools and signs. The study of tools is the study of material culture; the study of signs belongs to the second story of Feibleman's "two-story world." The two-story world is a way of applying this concept to the study of signs. Both a synchronic and a diachronic understanding of ourselves has value. Self-study through film is diachronic; through the mirror, synchronic.

Applying this to culture gives an ontology of culture (things, relations), and a logic of culture (universals of culture). Ethnoscience, the work of the ethnographer, does its work on the second story: it is about a theory of signs (Werner 1969). But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic. But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic. But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic.

Feibleman (1969) views human culture as consisting of the use of artifacts -- both tools and signs. The study of tools is the study of material culture; the study of signs belongs to the second story of Feibleman's "two-story world." The two-story world is a way of applying this concept to the study of signs. Both a synchronic and a diachronic understanding of ourselves has value. Self-study through film is diachronic; through the mirror, synchronic.

Applying this to culture gives an ontology of culture (things, relations), and a logic of culture (universals of culture). Ethnoscience, the work of the ethnographer, does its work on the second story: it is about a theory of signs (Werner 1969). But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic. But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic. But a theory of signs is metasemiotic. Thus the theory of film is metasemiotic.
1.1.1. Film is metasemiotic though it is also semiotic in itself because it shows photographic records of real-life semiotic incidents. Fitz behaves semiotic because it is "patterned communication" and contains several modalities (to paraphrase the definition of semiotics given in Beek, Hayes and Bateson 1964).

2. Wallace (1962) has shown that a comparison of folk sciences is an effective procedure in reconstructing the logical structures of cultures, since in science the structures of the cognitive processes are most explicit. He finds "the most useful methodological assumption with which to approach the study of logical calculi in folk sciences is that these calculi are already contained in logical structures similar to, or least implicit in, Western symbolic logic." (p.6). It would be quite an advance for cultural universalism if the logical structures of mind are constructed the same way cross-culturally. Those who say that film is a "universal language" may be wrong about the "language" part (for reasons not given here), but right, so it seems, about the "universal" part if Wallace is correct.

2.1. The work of Gödel, Turing, Church and Tarski in metamathematics has established "some limitation on a logical system, either its completeness or its consistency, and these limitations are not quite the same. Yet they do form a common family of limitations, and this is because they arise from a common difficulty in all symbolic language. The difficulty is that the language itself. (Bronowski 1966:237). The effect of this phenomenon, as Bronowski puts it, is to create "an endless regress, an infinite hall of mirrors of self reflection." What might we say about the hall of mirrors? Is it a circus sideshow? A maze of inviting depth and complexity which invites us closer with its mysteries? But when we try to explore it we rudely bump our noses. Is infinite regress merely an illusion? Infinity is not illusion; but mirrors feed us back to themselves are deceptions. What appears to be infinite depth is but a shallow illusion. Bronowski offers the "logic of the mind" as a way out of the labyrinth.

The logic of the mind differs from formal logic in its ability to overcome and indeed exploit the ambivalences of self-reference, so that they become instruments of imagination. (Bronowski 1966:241)

Bronowski puts the logic of the mind in a kind of superordinate category, apparently to escape the trap of either incompleteness or undecidability. But the domain of logic should not be very far away from the domain of matter. Matter is the science of man's successes and failures, disasters and triumphs, since man himself is a material object. (Feibleman 1970). Feibleman notes that man's "mental processes have devised a way of discovering how certain properties of matter can be represented by signs and in this way manipulated in absentia for the exercise of greater control..." (1970:52). This is the domain of logic which is "abstracted from the matter in which it exists"
Feibelman concludes that since logic is derived from matter, its products can be applied back to matter." (1970:52). Thus, to return to Bronowski's proposition, the logic of the mind (imagination), which goes beyond the formal "trap" of incompleteness undecidability, can feed back to the matter which gave it birth and the formal logic which entrapped it, and liberate them.

If this conclusion seems far-fetched, it can be looked upon as the return to homeostasis of the system in question. That is, if Bronowski has extended Gödel's theorems too far, this conclusion restores the balance of the system. Van Heijenport says "The bearing of Gödel's results on epistemological problems remains uncertain" (1965:357). So Bronowski may have erred by not taking the least effort: it is intuitively certain that a rigid conception of formal systems does not fully explain the realities which we experience. But instead of looking beyond formal logic toward a very uncertain territory, I have found it worthwhile to look at the steamy interstices found between matter and logic. This is the area of analogy.

Analogyl thrives on the same and the different: it needs contradictions in order to be itself. Analogy is a course steered between equivocation (everything is different from everything else) and univocation (everything is the same). The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition sees analogy as "a metaphysical explanation of the structure of existence, indeed of all that exists" (Lynch 1960:149). So it is not quite proper to view analogy as a hybrid of univocation and equivocation. Diversity is together, the contraries are united - not because equivocation and univocation have been mixed in the right proportions, but because existentially, this is the structure of reality.

Nevertheless, the task of the filmmaker is to follow the movement of analogy and metaphor - to reach out and clasp things together. So much the better if there are contradictions. At the troublesome spots where things do not fit together comes the imaginative power of making answers through synthesis-through analogy.

3.1. In linguistics, the pairs metaphor/metonym, paradigm/syntagm, or system/syntagm (to use the terminology of Jakobson, Levi-Strauss and Barthes respectively) seem to describe fundamentally different movements. Whether the field of analysis is myth, cooking, fashion, photography or language, "metaphor (system, paradigm) relies on the recognition of similarity, and metonymy (syntagm) on the recognition of contiguity." (Leach 1970:47). These two axes are Cartesian coordinates (as Leach has pointed out). Thus the x-axis and y-axis seem, on the face of it, to screen off into infinity without ever meeting. But this could be the case only in a non-Einsteinian, simultaneous universe, which the universe is not. A curved, non-simultaneous universe would accept, and even welcome coordinates which are not so antagonistic. By seeking out the seemingly irrefutable, namely metaphor and metonym, we find that these two axes
are themselves analogical to each other. That is metaphor if not syntagmatic, i.e., contiguous: metaphor is a reaching out (which corresponds to its traditionally assigned function of similarity (Lynch p. 47); but it is also a clasping together (Wheelright names these functions epinphor and diaphor). The clasping together is contiguity. Thus can metaphor be syntagmatic (metonymic). Conversely, syntagm (metonym) is metaphorical because it is contiguous. Jakobson uses the example of the "superimposed dissolves" in Chaplin films as "filmic metaphors". (Barthes 1964:60). What could be more contiguous than a lap dissolve, yet these, Jakobson calls metaphors. Montage is likewise contiguous (metonymical); but it is also quite obviously metaphorical (montage can emphasize either the similar or the dissimilar, and is equally effective in doing either; examples: the eye/lens puns of Dziga Vertov; and the polarized diagonals of Eisenstein).

3.1.1. Analogy bends the Cartesian coordinates of the two fundamental axes to conform to our non-simultaneous, curved universe. Analogy and dialectics seem to walk the same path. But dialectics insists on stepping on the face of one of the members of the pair: dialectic denies in order to synthesize. Whereas analogy is much more congenial in reconciling opposites.

Existance, as it descends, is analogous. It is never the same act of existence. It is a completely new fact; it must be new; for it must adapt itself completely to the new materials which it confronts, adapting itself in its bone and heart to the bone and heart of each new subject of being, each new part of the total organism...So too with an analogical idea, with our inward thinking about being. The work, the thinking of it, is never done. (Lynch 1960:150)

4. Peirce believed that the ultimate interpretant of signs is not outside of the sign process. So, infinite, or at least a very infinite regress is a necessary part of Peirce's sign theory (See Winkoff 1970). The final interpretant is a habit of inference or rule of action "but it can only be coded in further signs." I suggest that film can be the codification of the signs (rules of action). Film can be the final interpretant which breaks the mirrors of infinite regress. Film is not a mirror, i.e., an image maker, but an image breaker: it shatters false reflections. Film refracts, it shines with own inner light, is itself a source of light, not a silvered surface. Film penetrates reality, it does not reflect it. Film makes signs explicit. By objectifying, magnifying, own, is-torting signs, film does a great service. Our thought as knowledge is by signs. Film takes those signs, even the most far-far, and makes then foreign to us.

Film thus breaks the ethnocentrism of our imagery. Forced to look at things objectively, we have no choice but to try to understand them.
4.1. Of all expressive systems, film\(^2\) is the hybrid one which has the synergetic energy to most successfully be a self-referencing device. As such, film is a way to momentarily close the system and make all parts of it visible.

5. The direction of film study must be toward the true logical and ontological nature of things. The crevasse between art and science must be bridges. Art is meaningless without science (science is the truth of things). Art versus science, art versus life, science versus life are worlds upon the body of the universe which film can help heal. Through film's signification, the analogical imagination can stitch together the open, bleeding cuts of our discontinuities.
1. (NOTE: a full treatment of analogy would have to include Bunge's (1969) formalization of the types of analogy as well as Hesse's (1966) typology of analogy. The types of analogy which Bunge classifies range from strong to weak. At the bottom of the scale, there seems to be no room for metaphor. Metaphor is thus put as the weakest of analogies—so weak, in fact, that it does not qualify as analogy. I prefer Lynch's view, however, which sees no difficulty in joining the orphaned metaphor with its siblings. The kinship gained by relating the contraries is a powerful one indeed.)

2. I am not excluding video when I say "film" since film and video are analogous.
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Boudu Saved From Drowning (1932), Directed by Jean Renoir

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"Man in life represents a variety of roles, including the role of himself and the roles that his fellow men thrust upon him."1 If the notion of performance rests at the basis of all human activity, man in society will always carry a kind of double personality and will tend to disregard his station in life in order to play a part. Louis Jouvet explains in Les bas fonds, "quand je pense à ma vie, il me semble que je n'ai fait que changer de costume"; thus we may reject the rigid interpretation assigned to Boudu, that of the elephant in the china shop or the anarchist overturning Lestingois' bourgeois household. Rather than analyzing the character of Boudu as linear, we may attribute to him an attitude similar to that of the Baron: if life is only play, why should one paralyze himself in one position? Boudu changes costume like everybody else; the new suit "en carreaux" he so proudly parades in for a time belongs to one fantasy, to one role, the scarecrow's rags to another. Costumes are principally tied to the idea of a game: trying on Lestingois' suit, Boudu observes delighted "en voila un déguisement..."

The subject of the film assumes something of the part of a theme which a composer or a painter develops, embroidering on it endless variations - thus we can look at Boudu as a character potpourri ranging from the clochard, the suicide victim to the lover or the enfant terrible, or we can discover a succession of attitudes and costumes in one character, the sense of continuous, passing movement underlined by the mise-en-scene and the sound track. It seems to me that only in light of a game can we account for Boudu's apparently incomprehensible acts. Why does he throw himself in the water? Is it a suicide attempt, an escape from his newly acquired marital status? He himself forgets the cause...the river assumes a specific meaning, the yellow waters of the Marne with the warm sun shining on its surface tempts him to carelessly float along and to enjoy the purely physical pleasures it affords.

Conventional dramatic technique contents itself with manipulating the narrative so as to release at a set moment the typical reactions of the hero's constitution. Renoir asserts in every way that in life there is no such notion as a definite character. The so-called characteristic traits are but momentary reactions, due to certain circumstances which change shortly after and provoke correspondingly new responses. Lestingois himself embodies two tendencies familiar in Jean Renoir's work: instinct (impulsive emotion, relaxation) and ceremony; while he offers a student Voltaire manuscripts, he attempts to maintain the proper decorum of the household, "I have a piano because we are respectable people." Although surrounded by books and presided by the spirit of the 17th century philosopher in the form of a bust, he does not frequent "la bonne société." Lestingois is never observed selling books - what he has to sell appears more the idea, against the bookshelves that resemble the painted backdrop of the staged prologue, he can charm Anne-Marie with mythological allusions or ponder on his condition...I fell asleep again last night as I was going to see her" or caustically confront his spouse.
Viewing Boudu involves the experience of looking through a kaleidoscope. Characters achieve reality in a context of inversions, the most obvious example of which is the river that causes Boudu to almost lose his life and subsequently proves to be his salvation. As in the Roman trompe l'oeil wall paintings, framing devices - doors, windows, telescopes - persuade us to witness twice removed action; each show contains a second, which itself holds in a third, in a way reminiscent of the Russian wooden dolls fitted into one another (we see Lestingois looking through a window at Anne-Marie and Boudu in the kitchen - a new permutation in the peep show, or a remainder of a previous scene in which he had been an active participant; or the maid jealously observes Lestingois surveying young girls through the telescope from the window). These enclosing devices also provide transitions and means of revealing new people and situations, discoveries which after a brief interlude appear as déjà-vu: Madame, in her amorous fervour pushes Boudu against the door which opens to frame, in the center of the screen, Lestingois embracing Anne Marie. While the women react with shock and embarrassment, the men remain calm and thus allow the solution to the dilemma to emerge clearly: Boudu will marry the maid and the dignity of the family will be maintained.

There is however one essential difference between the painting medium and film - "just as footlights and scenery in the theater serve to mark the contrast between it and the real world, so, by its surrounding frame, a painting is separated off not only from reality as such, but even more so, from the reality that is represented in it...the essential role of the frame is to emphasize the difference between the microcosm of the picture and the macrocosm of the natural world in which the painting has come to take its place...The screen's outer limits are not the frame of the film image. They are the edges of a piece of masking that shows only a portion of reality. The picture frame polarizes space inwards. On the contrary, what the screen shows us seems to be part of something prolonged indefinitely into the universe. A frame is centrifugal, the screen centripetal." Thus the several times Renoir makes use of framing, he disorients our sense of space, that is, he takes us in, confines us, but only to open another door, plunging us in a movement-dominated reality.

The perspective from which the viewer may observe the film is furnished in the opening sequence, with a presentation of the mythological characters Priapus, Chloe and Bacchus on a stage against a painted backdrop of a Louis XIV castle and gardens and an accompanying commentary in the subsequent scene taking place in the bookshop. The interlace of the two sequences through the slow dissolve magnifies once again the jest aspect, the pandælian, "Where does life begin? Where does the comedy end?" By having recourse, from the opening to theatrical styles and conventions, instead of concealing them, Renoir actually engages the complicity of the viewers. He inverts conventional dramaturgy; instead of making believ-od the stage is not a stage, but the familiar living room, he pretends the familiar salon is not real, but a stage, enclosing several "realities." His picture represents a kind of happy, ingenious celebration, in which the director and cast, with no intention to organize, and build upon a logical scheme, sometimes pause, diverge (even find time to display a head stand). The intermission lasts only moments, before they take up their game, governed by impulse and desire to movement without precise destination, in a sense reflecting the Bacchanal
wine festival, occasion for the joyful procession led by Dionysus and his cortège of satyrs, pans, nymphs, centaurs and priapi (Renoir evades the strictly phallic connotations associated with the Lestingois-Priapus and infuses him with the qualities of a benevolent guardian of wanderers). The opening envisions the predilection for constructing scenes as playful choreography: two "puppets", Chloe and Priapus move on strings, manipulated by a master puppeteer who then lets them free to perform in the film. Released, characters still take time out to move graciously; Anne Marie climbs up the stairs - when she reaches the second floor, she looks over the balustrade, as though taking a bow before her public. The men in Boudu may all be regarded as priapi, delighted in roving the streets, parks or forests, frisking with the "nymphs": Lestingois and Anne Marie, Boudu and Mme Lestingois, the jovial driver and the Pekinese's coquette mistress. We may consider the mythological sketch as the beginning of an exuberant cortège that the film will become; as Pan amused the Immortals on Mount Olympus, the pans in the film will amuse us, with Boudu, the "meneur du jeu." He moves away from the center and expands to the periphery, with a special predilection for games and disguises as visions of a world in which nothing expects to be but expects to constantly become. And in addition, Michel Simon has succeeded in giving the character named Boudu a personality; unlike a character, determined a priori and shaped towards a given end to remain essentially in a frozen position, the personality may grow, change and respond to the surroundings. In an extremely versatile comedian, Simon succeeds in injecting life into Boudu who in turn, is able to carry the spectator, entice him into his game. Boudu progresses through a kind of convergence of episodes and characters towards a conclusion that will lend itself to the grouping of all elements (technique also employed by René Clair in the contemporary A nous la liberté and Le million) yet its open-end also reflects the inconclusiveness of every-day experience (as distinguished from the Clair characters that tend to perform with the accessories appropriate as emblems in a methodically stylized orchestration). Treating life as very real, Renoir reaches no conclusion, in the sense of the traditional happy or tragic resolution - Boudu closes with the camera in a ditch, shooting the defile of wanderers singing "Sur les bords de la rivière." The protagonists' disappearance (like in Grande illusion) suggests the director's detachment vis-à-vis the story about to finish; he has accepted it and thus censors to question on that matter, although no clear solution has been reached.

The film is theatrical, yet not filmed theater; although the actors play in scenes rather than shots and the dialogue are carefully constructed and delivered, the director's interest lies less in the dramatic progress of history than in capturing the fluctuations in the exchanges established in a group. Indeed, theatrical would have been to show the group together, then separately detach and reunite and conflicts, that is, proceed from general to particular, according to an analytical system. Renoir insists on not isolating characters; even during tête-à-têtes, we sense the presence of others. When testing, I open the window of the study, he seems to raise the curtain of the "théâtre en pleine éclat" about to take place in the streets - the story of Boudu. His gesture offers the entire neighborhood the opportunity to assist to a performance, to find a sunny afternoon amusement, such as "ride on the pleasure boats along the Seine" witness Anne Marie's reaction in this conjunction.
...nne Marie: What is it?...There is a crowd.
suddenly she understands:
...nne Marie: Oh! An accident!
takes off her apron, jumping with excitement.
She
throws the apron on a chair and goes out.

The rescue demarche introduces the elements of the cinema that Renoir
will successfully accomplish with Arizona Jim in Crime de M. Lange. He
films the sequence the way the spectators would have expected to watch it
on a cinema screen: fast cutting, shot-reverse-shot, action and reaction;
amidst the enthusiastic onlookers, Anne Marie races a clochard, resident of
the later 1930's films noirs, "who had seen so many [suicides], he doesn't
even pay attention." And yet the sequence appears to have been shot despite
its logic: the crowds packed on the bridge and the banks of the Seine that
furnished a voluntarily abundant figuration visibly do not witness a
catastrophe; they have installed themselves to watch a movie being shot,
amused by the whole thing and especially by the fact that they were not
instructed to affect the verisimilitude of the situation.

Andre Bazin refers to Renoir as the most responsive and easily-in-
influenced director; Renoir regards cinema as a "mauvais coup" - on ne peut
d'aventurer dans ce monde cinématographique que si l'on se sent entouré des
complices...C'est aussi une exploration...l'homme seul en face d'une
entreprise redoutable risque d'être pris de panique." Among the "accomplices",
friends like Jean Genet, Max Delban, Jean Daste acted, produced and offered
rural support year after year. The climate of conspiracy is fortunately
transferred to the public: Jacques Becker, one of the assistants, appears as
the poet in the park; Jean Genet who interprets the role of Vigour co-
produced the film. The Spanish painter Jean Castanier who begins his
collaboration with Renoir as set designer in Boudu would continue to plan sets
in la nuit du carrefour, prepare the script and assist in Crime de M. Lange,
and some twenty years later was to act in French Cancan.

The fluidity of the camera work re-enforces the sense of celebration
led by Boudu. "Je ne pars jamais de l'angle, de la camera, je pars de la
scène...une chose que je ne fais pas, c'est de décopper une scène en champ
et centre-champ, en partie de l'ensemble, c'est à dire en tournant toute la
scène en plan général, puis en passant à des plans plus rapprochés et ensuite,
au montage on tient de tous ces éléments. Il ne s'agit pas de chaque partie
de la scène à un angle et pas deux." Renoir relies much less on ruling omni-
ously over the material; his goal is using the long shots abides in linking
individuals, despite their physical or moral differences rather than forcing
them one against the other. Combining the film with scenes rather than shots
forces the actors to enter into their role without "the interruption of the
"take one" men or of other technicians. Actors were allowed to move, to
spiral into the natural environment; Boudu remains incognito along the
pays, covered in a long travelling by the camera hidden in a truck. The
long shot "cinematographically and "the wise" understood" reported to Renoir
because of its capability to hold several characters together. Unlike close-
ups, including people and things automatically implying frequent cross-cutting,
this type of shot retains people and objects in mutually justifiable posi-
tions, interweaves these elements on several planes, and thus it eliminates
the two-men confrontation directly facing the camera, or of the main action
taking place in the rear ground. Lastly, the deep focus raises the intensity of the image.
In conjunction with the deep focus technique, Renoir explores a variation of the lateral expansion, into the area "Behind the camera" (or the -2 dimension of a parallelepiped) through the camera pull back. Several shots open with the close-ups of objects (the toy boat in the park, the soldier sounding his trumpet) or of a person (Boudu's face, water dripping from his mouth); from it, he expands the field, to reveal the larger locales. These close-ups are "not a cut out picture with a frame; it's always merely part of a picture, like for instance the reopusoir figures in baroque painting; which introduces a dynamic \( \delta \) into the picture, similar to that created by the close-ups in the spatial structure of the film."

Enlarging the scope of the scene, Renoir pulls away from the still (or stable) life into space, whereas most directors would have followed the opposite method: present a general, orientation shot, then select two or three relevant details on which to focus. By enlarging the image, he increases the dramatic impact as well as the ambiguity of the scene because it provides more uneded information, from which the spectators are to make out one or several meanings. Ultimately, the camera is not used to free dramatic relationships or to purify events in order to make the strategic points clearer, but on the contrary, to search for particulars in all objects and livings.

Renoir's shots lack a center of gravity, leaving the eye free to indulge among several components. The situation is well illustrated in the following example: Boudu lying on the bench, Vigour still resuscitating him in the foreground, while in the middle-ground, the other neighbor leans against the table; in the background, Lestingois is drying up after the rescue of Boudu - his wife faces him. Marie had been standing near her master; she advances to the foreground, then returns, followed by Vigour. As Boudu comes to, he is temporarily neglected in the heated dialogue centered around the rescue societies. The danger of losing the spectator's interest because of generalities in the long shots does not materialize here for two reasons: the movement, always justified in the context creates rhythm (or when Boudu catches a fly with his hand and moves to show it to Lestingois solemnly reading, cut intimated, picks up a book - although the action is suspended, the camera is thrust forward nonetheless) and the actors' professionalism is relied upon to carry the film, thus replacing arrangement in the editing room.

The camera tends to observe from a distance as people reveal themselves, or "perform" in front of it; rarely does the camera create the focus of attention, when Boudu brushes Marie's scruples, the two go off the screen, free from camera scrutiny. The costume changes are carried through long shots. In fact, in the last instance, as Boudu returns to cloistered handshakes, the camera remains "over modest" away from the scene - we are provided only with the hint of the wedding clothes flying in the air from the bushes and landing on the ground.

In Jean Vigo's *L'Atalante*, to accentuate Félix and Arsène's immersion amidst the brick-a-brac of his studio the shot, mostly close-ups and medium shots were composed from different angles without explaining the spatial relationship between them, so that the barrier of objects forms a net that almost physically engulfs the film. Although the sets for Boudu were completely closed off, the camera's eye passes through a crack between two panels, or through a hole in the wall, concealed by a picture, in order to unfold...
complete and clear view of the decor. The subjective camera has become an invisible witness and we, the viewers are given permission to look through a key hole and in a sense invade the privacy of the Lestingois.

The stylistic coherence is strengthened by the repetition of certain visual motifs, as for example, STAIRCASES, privileged places, favorable to escapes (Anne Marie mischievously breaks away from Lestingois-Priapus to return to the kitchen), bursts of enthusiasm (Boudu to the maid, "I really took care of him!...I could run a bookshop myself if I wanted!"). Explanations (Anne Marie firmly declares her attachment to the older lover), confrontations (Lestingois leaves the task of chasing Boudu to his wife; the latter inquires through the bars of the staircase, "Who is the man with the onkey?"); FLOWERS, representing mildly erotic victories (the laurels worn by the couple in the prologue) the artificiality of man's preoccupations (the next on the piano), or a warning (the water lilies); WATER, one of the images present in almost all of Renoir's works, serves as transition, it suggests the possibility of adventure and related dangers (the toy boat in the pond).

Music becomes a noticeable element in the film's total rhythm - blending and interacting with the visual, it re-enforces and comments on it. Melodic themes, beginning on a solitary note serve as links between particular characters: Vigour plays the flute, Boudu mumbles his off-tune, unintelligible song, Anne Marie hums a popular melody. Primarily, two or three themes are developed and modified into several variations, mainly for flute. Music, camera and action harmonise to capture the authentic flavor of the period; for example, the Blue Danube waltz associated with the 1920's and 30's cafe society "en vacances." The music that first appears behind the credits is then identified with the affair between Lestingois and the maid. The flute theme is picked up again, as the bookseller's plans to see his mistress are foiled by Boudu sleeping in the hallway. As the film progresses, the two men join Anne Marie with "les fleurs du jardin..." (one must smile at the success of this song; remembering the commentary made in les notes du Capitaine Georges on another famous tune, la Marseillaise: "les paroles sont d'une stupidité intégrale...mais le fait que les francais les chantaient ensemble leur confère des lettres de noblesse") adding momentum to the music up to the finale Johann Strauss' Blue Danube, played by an orchestra on the shores of the Marne. The waltz, following in the mood of the sermon Lestingois delivers in honor of the nuptial, blends with the visual images; Boudu's hat floats away over the river landscape, dancing to the rhythm of the accompaniment.

A significant effect is achieved by the speech pattern of the characters; like Tino, Renoir creatively exploited Michel Simon's poor diction and his predilection for onomatopoeias (na, heu, he, ho). The repetition of the dialogue, sentences or portions thereof, help sustain a harmonious interplay. For instance:

Boudu: You guessed that all alone?
Anne Marie: All alone...

A: Do you eat well here?
B: Yes, I eat well.

A: Do you sleep here also?
B: Yes, I sleep here also.
Some of the most clever revelations into characters and their motifs emerge from the manner in which words are spoken:

Lestingois: One must have a little luck in everything...
Vigour: No, one must know how to swim.
Mme. Lestingois: You can't swim?
Vigour: No, I was counting on saving stray horses.

Bazin interprets the function of music as essentially an erotic indicator, be it an announcement (peddler's organ - cut to hairdresser's shop sigh - cut to Boudu proudly displaying his dernier cri coiffure as he returns to the Lestingois), a signal (Anne Marie's sign melody or, as Lestingois opens the window of his bedroom music is heard in off, to cue the forecoming inconveniences in the relationship with the maid), a triumph (the clarinet heard in the parade virtually represented by the zouave's trumpet as Mme. Lestingois yields to Boudu).

Characteristically, Renoir has enlarged the scope of the René Fauchois play, from the single setting in the bookshop, to the rest of the house, to the surrounding streets; quays and even propelled it to the banlieu. His strategy has been to create an urban setting that beckons "public celebration." He sees the world through the eyes of a town dweller, stressing the feeling of changeability, the flowing, ephemeral rhythm of the city. In this locale, men are not dehumanized by machines; rather, they find a welcome challenge to their sense of observation and capacity to improvise amidst city life. In the locale expansion, a series of characters are created and intertwined; if Boulu loses his dog, it gives him the opportunity to come into contact with the poet, then a policeman, who in turn gallantly offers his protection to a young woman in distress, and who finally goes off with the owner of a shiny new automobile. When Boudu enters into his mentor's household, he also fascilitates the access of the sailors and of the inquisitive passerbys, two social categories with which Lestingois would normally have no contacts. The bookshop becomes a kind of "action" headquarters - around it, spreads a real city that stretches the film beyond the strictly plot line. The people and the places on the periphery gain our attention because they make Boudu's story feasible - streets and bridges are made real, even the drowning location precisely identified on Pont des Arts. Extras and crowds mime their character not to distract attention from the protagonist, but rather to construct a tableau with him. Among the pioneers in installing sets in natural surroundings, Renoir allowed the store to resonate with the noises of the traffic and people. The landscape opposes the traditional Rive Gauche "atmosphere", that is, the hazy, picturesque, bohemian milieu of the artists. Instead Boudu documents the Paris of 1932, in a manner similar to that of Monet who detected blue reflections in a parquet floor and transferred them to the canvas. "To paint everything in its REAL tone without painting anything in its OWN tone", Chardin's comment on the use of colors echoes Renoir's film conception. And Boudu, even if projecting the authentic man of the people, escapes all traces of the film noir's sentimentality. In his shaggy, worn-out coat he does not carry the message of the so-called happiness to be found in poverty. Boudu embodies the clochard that Michel Simon recalls having met around 1925: "Qu'est-ce que tu vas faire avec ça?" inquired Simon handing the pauper a coin, "Je vais me souler la gueule", came the answer, not "Je vais acheter du pain pour mon mère ou mes enfants." Not sheltering
a universe of his own, hidden in jars, ancient photographs (Père Jules in L'Atalante) or in a bourgeois bazaar (Zabel in Quai de Brumer), he creates only with borrowed or handed-over props: Lestingois' cigar, Mme's eau de cologne, the coin offered by the little girl in the park and "charges" the characters he encounters to follow in his erratic actions, reminiscent of Clair's crowds chasing the hearse. The kitchen comes alive only when Boudu, gradually and almost magically animates every utensil. Recalling in the original shot of the kitchen, Anne Marie rotating a pan, with the Chardinesque glow bestowed on the soubrettes' daily chores, one must be impressed with the contrast the scene of the final "attack" offers - the film has progressed from a stationary composition to a rapid, spiral movement.

One notices the primitivism permeating the work; Boudu possesses the mysterious ability to remain childlike - he projects juvenile daydreams of success: with 100,000 francs he would buy a bicycle and learn to ride on it, while at the same time, he is persuaded that he could replace Lestingois as librarian. Functioning as child, the notion of the future escapes him. He needs to be happy in the immediate present. It is in this spirit that what ought to be a failure of plausibility becomes in the actual context of little account - we are convinced by the fervor with which the characters pursue their "games." If the original significance of many actions and words today has been displaced by superficial gestures that feebly attempt to retain reality, Boudu lives in the original state, questioning incessantly: on Mme's "oh! oh!" tic-tac on the relationship between the couple,

Mme to Lestingois: Tu es le maître.
Boudu: C'est ta femme?

Like Vigo's schoolboys, he is never at a loss in discovering almost enchanted qualities in the most banal, disregarded objects; unable to understand the conversation between Lestingois and his wife, he communicates with the table napkin. Later in the film, an impeccably well dressed gentleman approaches Boudu about the first edition of Les fleurs du mal that Lestingois had acquired for him... With a grand gesture, Boudu scolds him for mistaking stores... Because in 1932 Baudelaire was fashionable among the French intelligentsia, it was assumed that everybody would be acquainted with his works. Boudu assumes nothing and responds only to concrete things... he begins to hum "les fleurs du jardin." Unlike modern man, Boudu copes with the world, untroubled by its growing complexities - in the event that he fails to understand the meaning of actions around him, he surveys his surroundings and translates the acts into familiar physical actions: Mme dips a cherry into the wine, he drops a pickle. Renoir has acknowledged that "pour ma part, si au cinéma on me montre les tames gene que je peux rencontrer au café, je ne vois pas pourquoi je n'irais pas au café plutot qu'au cinéma?" Perhaps, paradoxically he approaches classic authors like Moliere in the desire to spring from reality (maybe even banality - i.e., universality) and surpass it in order to charm viewers. If Moliere had called his characters Orgon, Phillibet or Cléante, instead of Dupont or another of the commedia dell'arte, Renoir has created and has allowed BOU-DU to "empty" out an unworked sack and like Santa Claus, after contact with the world into which he brings pleasure, or at least surprise, he retreats, amidst the other singing travellers.
Like the bouquinistes he passes on the quays, Boudu "survives" despite the rains and the winds, holding to a life of his own. Like the second-hand dealers' portable boxes, housing together junk and rare editions together, the clochard constitutes a mélange of naïve charm and vulgarity ("franche lubricité," as Bazin refers to it).

In a sense Boudu mocks the metaphysical, quasi-sacred objective of the artist that saw his function as that of a high priest. In the historical context, the café, as alternative to the movie theater, occupies a special position, if the term café brings to mind a Deux Magots or a comparable establishment on the left bank boulevards, alive with excited debates on the horrors of life faced with no redeeming ideals, outside of death, or on the creative function of the Artist. "Les fleurs du mal comprises a devastating image of the spiritual and physical anxieties of modern man. The theme of exile, voyage and the lost paradise of childhood, eroticism, sadism, revolt, artificial paradise induced by alcohol and drugs intertwine to form the portrait and provide analysis of a neurotic, urbane sensibility." If this quote would describe the universe of many café habitues, it remains totally foreign to Renoir, the raisonneur, willing to accept truth as the product of the endlessly varied conceptions people have of it. The urbane society had perhaps witnessed a schism; no longer were painters undistinguishable from poets or from filmmakers; films no longer emerged at ballet performances; the philosophers had moved away from the magic makers.
FOOTNOTES

1. Hubert C. Hefner, "Pirandello and The Nature of Man" in Modern Drama ed. by Travis Bogard and William I. Oliver, Oxford University, p. 261.


7. Jean Renoir, Les notes du Capitaine Georges, Gallimard


THE CONCEPT OF VISUAL SPACE AS A CRITICAL TOOL IN CINEMA

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The central concern of this paper is the exploration of the uses of visual space as a primary means of expression in the cinema. All space is by its nature visible, or able to be seen. The term visual space here, though, means the unique way that space can be presented visually on the screen.

Disparate elements like camera angles, depth of focus, styles of lighting, etc., have all been written about previously for their stylistic significance. The problem is that, save for individual studies of individual films or even directors, there has been little attention paid to the use of visual space in movies on the elemental level. There is, however, a common groundwork for the use of visual space in films. This common groundwork, I would propose, is simple in its individual elements, yet fascinatingly complex and intricate in the possibilities of its significant combinations as a stylistic tool.

The common groundwork of visual space is based on the visualization of four major areas surrounding the human body as four ever widening concentric circles. These four areas or circles of space are the basic elements of visual space with which the film maker has to work.

The first circle is the skin with its sense receptors. Here the eyes, mouth, and sex organs are particularly important. The second circle is the clothing, especially the states of dress or undress of the actors in relation to the other actors in the scene. The third circle is that area immediately surrounding the body, which a person considers his own. This area or circle represents what anthropologists have come to call personal space. The size and nature of this area can vary according to the physical situation of the actor or the cultural matrix in which he finds himself. For example, it can shrink radically in a crowded subway car or grow more intimate in a Latin culture as opposed to a more reserved Nordic environment.

The fourth and last circle is the total physical space beyond this personal area which we are allowed to see on the screen. This last area can be called architectural and environmental space. It can be anything from a cramped room to a trackless desert.

It must be emphasized that these four circles are not at all the same thing as the nature of the shots a director might use to photograph them. Activity about the mouth, for example, can be photographed with a long shot as well as with a close up. Architectural or environmental space, while difficult to encompass with a close up, can be dramatically denied with close ups or medium shots. For example, the opening sequence under the titles of The 400 Blows shows us looming tenements on Parisian streets while teasing us with glimpses of the Eiffel Tower in the background.
With this common groundwork having been roughly delineated we can now turn our attention to some important dramatic or cinematic techniques which are common to each area. The first area or circle, the skin, should be watched for the presence or absence of body contact between the characters. Eating and drinking are also important here, especially the manner in which it is done and the circumstances under which it takes place. *Clockwork Orange* and *Tom Jones* come to mind here as having significant and dramatic eating scenes which are the core of the total meaning of both films. Sexual activity and violence are also important in this area.

The second area, as we have mentioned, is important for the states of dress or undress of the actors in relation to each other and for any dressing or undressing that goes on in the scene.

The area of personal space, the third circle, is perhaps the most important for defining the social status and relationships of the characters. Once these relationships have been established this area of personal space should be watched for any radical changes which contribute to the development of the dramatic action.

The final circle, environmental or architectural space, is important for its possible psychological, social or historical significance. It could be claustrophobic, it could be an army base or a prison, or it could be the Washington Monument.

Three technical elements that effect all four circles are camera angle, lighting, and the choice of lenses. The camera angle puts us, the audience, into a unique physical relationship with the actors while at the same time placing them in a unique relationship to their environment. Lighting carves out space, and it can be used to define space in all four of the areas with which we are presently dealing. The choice of the lens is important primarily for its unique power to distort visual space. A lens with a long focal length compresses distances in all three dimensions. A short focal length does just the opposite and expands space in three dimensions. Stanley Kubrick is enamored of such short focal length distortions in *Clockwork Orange*.

I would like not to discuss four particular films with particular attention to the four areas or circles that we have been discussing. I have chosen these four for two reasons, first, I am reasonably familiar with them, and second, they represent a broad range of cinematic tradition. The four films are Marcel Carnes's *Le Jour Se Leve*, Luis Bunuel's *Nazarin*, Francois Truffaut's *The 400 Blows*, and John Boorman's *Point Blank*. In all four the first element that I noticed was the use of architectural space. It was only on reflection that I began to notice how the other three areas or circles were used in parallel fashion. It is the combination of the four circles together with the three technical elements mentioned above that makes possible the complexity and variety of the use of visual space in all four films.
Compartmentalized Space - Marcel Carne's *Le Jour Se Leve*

The importance of architecture in the pictorial composition of films first struck me when I was doing a study of Marcel Carne and Jacques Prevert. The film that particularly impressed me in its use of architectural space was their 1938 collaboration, *Le Jour Se Leve*.

The film is an unpretentious melodrama relating the tragic relationship of four people, two men and two women, in pre-War France. Francois, a simple working man, loves Francoise, the florist's helper. Their relationship is ruptured by the evil machinations of one Valentin who so enrages Francois that Francois shoots him dead, thus sealing the fates of all four characters. Valentin is dead, Francois is doomed to die, Francoise loses both men, and Clara, who had found freedom from Valentin with Francois, is also left alone.

With this simple situation provided by Jacques Prevert Carne has managed to create a minor visual masterpiece. By carefully placing his four main characters in definite physical relationships in all their key scenes Carne visually underlines, sometimes directly, sometimes ironically, their basic psychological attitudes and relationships. Carne's contribution as a director and as a skilled visual technician is an essential element of the masterwork that is *Le Jour Se Leve*.

Architectural or environmental space is the area which Carne emphasizes most fully in the visual construction of his film. The second area, the clothing of the actors, is also developed extensively as a major metaphor in the film. Both areas flow or revolve throughout the film, parallel to and in conjunction with each other.

Carne uses two basic architectural devices, doorways and windows, to concretize the relationships of his characters. In the opening sequence of the film, as we slowly truck up to the tenement where Francois lives, the first thing we notice are the windows in the building. Then we cut inside the building to a blind man slowly climbing the stairs and then slowly pan up to a door behind which we hear muffled voices. We are not yet allowed inside. We then hear a shot, see the door open, and watch a man stagger out clutching his side. Before he falls, however he manages to close the door behind him shutting the other person inside.

When we first see Francois, his back is to us, as he faces the door from the inside. He has just fired through it at the police. Throughout the film Carne will constantly return to Francois' door and window as architectural focal points of the film. The room is totally Francois', and he will die in it alone. In a real sense his room is also the center of almost all the developing action of the film, since it is from his recollections there that we see most of the film through flashbacks.

The first meeting of the two orphans, Francois and Francoise, is also heavily underlined with doorways and windows. Our first view of Francois at work shows him in a sandblasting factory in a heavily padded suit, helmeted and gloved. We are just barely able to see his eyes in a medium closeup through the small protective window in his helmet.
We first see Françoise outside the factory walking towards and then through the door into the room where François is sandblasting. Carne takes pains to show us this entrance and its architectural definition in a long trucking shot, as we follow Françoise into the clearly delineated territory of François. We then see François turn and notice Françoise through the little window in his helmet as she stands by the door looking lost. François then removes his helmet and his gloves and goes to greet her. This removal of clothing is a physical and visual correlative to the psychological process of opening one's self that Carne will use throughout the film with all four characters.

Later in the film, when François goes to Françoise's house at night, Carne continues to underline the psychological processes that are occurring with architectural metaphors, especially with his use of doorways and windows. Françoise meets François at her door where they talk for a while before she invites him in. He remarks that this is the first time in the three weeks that they have known each other that she ever has extended this invitation. The two of them then go through the door, and it shuts behind them. They are now alone in the private environmental space of Françoise. The camera then trucks along the street, and we see the two of them through a window. We see them but are not yet allowed to join them. The next shot finally brings us inside. We, like François, do not have an easy time of entering either the physical or psychological private space of Françoise.

Once inside the room we see that it is cluttered and obstructed with a maze of hanging sheets. Françoise moves behind an ironing board and continues to iron a small collar for her dress, which she tells François she is going to put on. She then further withdraws back into the privacy of her bedroom to change her clothes. François jokingly threatens to come back into the room with her, but he is forced to detour around the hanging sheets and the ironing board. François is then able to meet him at the doorway. Again she is fully dressed. The end of this sequence, François's exit, stands in strong contrast architecturally to his entrance at the beginning of the scene. He simply turns and walks across the length of the room in a straight line, directly to the door, the way which is remarkably clear, goes through it and shuts it behind him.

The imagery of architecture and clothing of this sequence stands in strong contrast to Carne's use of visual space of François's entrance into Clara's room later in the film. François simply knocks on her door, says "come in, come in" to himself, enters the room and finds Clara covering her nakedness only with a fragile shower curtain. Even this she lets drop easily away. Clara's private space is simple and uncluttered.

Carne brings his four characters together into one place only once in the film. It is at the café where Valentin and Clara are performing, and Carne makes the most of the visual imagery implicit in the architecture of the set and the clothing of the characters.

This scene at the café occurs immediately after the scene in Françoise's room, and it is our first introduction to Clara and Valentin.
They are both onstage, the separateness of which has already been high-
lighted by the curtain dropping and rising three times. During their
act Clara suddenly walks off on Valentin, after first deliberately drop-
ping his hat, and leaves him stranded on the stage. We then see her exit
from the door of the dressing room to the right of the stage, close the
door after her, and walk through the audience down the center aisle to
the bar in the rear. Here she joins Francois.

At the end of Valentin's performance we watch Francoise rise from
her seat and then enter the dressing room through the same door by which
Clara had just made her exit. The characters are now architecturally and
psychologically rearranged. Francois and Clara are together at the bar;
Francoise and Valentin are together in the private space of his dressing
room.

When Francoise and Valentin leave the cafe together, Carne makes a
point of following both of them with the camera so that we see them go
through the main door and shut it after themselves. The two couples have
first been architecturally rearranged and then separated. Carne further
emphasizes this rearrangement by showing us in a single shot Francoise
and Valentin outside on the street while at the same time we see Clara and
Francois through the window at the bar.

Valentin is the one character in the film whose private space we
never see. Francoise enters his dressing room, but we don't follow her.
In a sense this is a negative use of visual space. Moreover, later in
the film Carne makes a point of Clara catch him listening at the keyhole
to her door.

The final striking bit of architectural imagery that Carne employs
occurs near the end of the film. Francois is still besieged in his room,
and he pushes a heavy wardrobe across his doorway to reinforce it. He
now has a double door to his room, one covering the other, as he with-
draws deeper and deeper into his isolation.

The clothing imagery, the area of the second circle, runs parallel
to the architectural imagery in the film. Francois, as we have seen,
removes his protective armor when he first meets Francoise in the factory.
His basically simple outfit of a simple pullover shirt remains unchanged
throughout the film until the very end. It is only then that we see him
in a black leather jacket, a visual reinforcement to the ultimate re-
treat back into himself, his suicide.

We have already seen the differences in the clothing of the two
women. Francoise is fully dressed in her room and even adds some clothing.
Clara is covered only by a shower curtain when we first see her, which
she almost immediately lets drop. The other important clothing scene for
the two women is at the cafe. Francoise never removes her overcoat while
Clara is dressed only in scanty black tights.

Finally, Valentin is the most clothed of all. Except for the brief
time on stage in his costume, we never see him in the film without his
topcoat. Even as he lies dead in the room of the concierge, he is fully
clad.
The two areas of clothing and architectural or environmental space are the main sources of the visual imagery for Carne in Le Jour Se Leve. Right from the opening sequence, as Valentin manages, although mortally wounded, to close François's door behind himself, Carne's use of visual space is to support the isolation of the characters. They shift both physically and psychologically, but they somehow never connect. They are as alone at the beginning of the story as they are at the end.

Expanding Space - Luis Bunuel's Nazarin

Luis Bunuel made Nazarin in Mexico in 1958. The film documents the life of a simple priest serving a small town in the country, who is either courageous or foolish in his stubborn insistence in following the literal message of the Gospels.

Bunuel puts his hero, Nazarin, in a situation where he is forced to leave his simple life in his home parish and make his own way in the world while still trying to live up to his strict principles. He is sorely tried, but keeps his integrity despite no little suffering.

The basic image of the film is that of a pilgrimage or journey, a common one in Bunuel's films, and the resultant narrative form is largely picaresque. The journey of the priest in his exile is also a psychological or spiritual one, and it is this interior journey of the priest that Bunuel cleverly supports by a consistent use of architectural imagery. The visual space of the film and the personal horizon of the priest constantly grow wider and deeper, as the film progresses. The horizon of Nazarin's vision (as well as that of the audience) begins in the claustrophobic atmosphere of his room and ends on the endless expanse of the plain in the last scene.

We are first introduced to Nazarin at the beginning of the film as a disembodied voice offscreen calling to a woman in the cramped plaza where the film opens. When we first see him, it is through the window to his room which opens onto an almost totally enclosed veranda. He is conversing with some townspeople through this window, which is waist high and guarded by heavy wooden shutters. We then come to learn that this window is the primary passageway to his room, which must be climbed through with some difficulty. Although Nazarin indicates that there is a door to his room, we never see it on the screen, and, moreover, he mentions that it is rarely used.

Three striking aspects of visual space characterize Bunuel's dramatic treatment of the priest in the early part of the film. First, he never deliberately touches anyone, although there are situations where this could normally be expected. Secondly, he never appears without his black soutane tightly closed at the neck, even when he washes. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly from an architectural point of view, he never appears outdoors. The three locations in which we see him on screen are in rooms where either the windows are shut or nonexistent or they open onto other enclosed spaces.
When he first appears on the open road at the beginning of his exilic pilgrimage, two of these three situations are radically and immediately different. First, he is out doors in the largest expanse of space we have seen thus far in the film, and, secondly, he is dressed completely in white.

As the journey progresses, he is gradually denuded, first his shoes to a poor old man, then his hat which he loses in a fight. He is also frequently touched, first by a stone thrown in scorn, then tenderly by one of the two women who have followed him into exile, as she sits next to him and leans her body softly against him. Finally, he is beaten by a pair of thugs in the prison where he and his party are held overnight and then held and comforted by a mysterious kindly thief, who rescues him from his tormentors.

From the beginning of the journey until the last scene on the arid plain Bunuel lets us see further and further out to the horizon. The town plaza from which the pilgrimage began is narrow and cramped, more like a tenement backyard than a town square. Enclosed by steep vertical structures of the surrounding buildings it is dark and full of shadows. The plaza we see at the end of the film is open and wide. The low squat buildings surrounding it are mostly white and set well back from the wide flat well, which stands at the center of the plaza. Even the prison in which Nazarin is held overnight has a huge barred window with a good view of the outside. Compared to his room which we saw at the beginning of the film it is almost totally open.

Bunuel's carefully employed architectural imagery of gradually expanding space in Nazarin provides a subtle, though integral, visual correlative to the spiritual journey of the priest. This architectural imagery is supported and complemented by the imagery of touching and states of dress. As with any well crafted film the imagery in Nazarin flows naturally along with the narrative, quietly supporting it, yet never obtrusively calling attention to itself. The simplest and most natural of human situations are carefully selected and woven together to form an imaginative supportive pattern of visual space to the dramatic development of the film.

Repressive Space - Francois Truffaut's The 400 Blows

The opening sequence of The 400 Blows has always puzzled me. It introduces us to the streets of Paris with a series of long trucking shots that, except for some brief glimpses of the Eiffel Tower in the background, allow us to see only the upper stories of the buildings along the streets. What this sequence meant visually only became clear when I began to notice the architectural imagery that runs throughout the film.

Francois Truffaut is presenting us here with a film on repression, and his use of visual space consistently reinforces his theme. The environmental space is the film is, save for four exceptions, claustrophobic. These four exceptions, which are the only times in the film
where we are able to see further than a few hundred feet into the dis-
tance, stand out in striking contrast to the rest of the film. The first occurs in the opening sequence mentioned above. The second is the brief glimpse of the Parisian rooftops we get as Antoine and his friend Rene run down the steps of Sacre Couer while they are playing hookey. The final two distant vistas occur near the end of the film, Rene mounting his bicycle in front of the reform school, and the famous last scene of Antoine on the seashore.

The environmental or architectural imagery of Truffaut is primarily demonstrated throughout the film in his selection of locations. Almost two thirds of the film is spent indoors. The major exception to these indoor locations is the scenes in the street, and these are shot either at night where a small physical space is carved out of the darkness or in tight physical quarters surrounded by the close vertical structures of the buildings.

Three specific locations, the school, the Doinel apartment, and the prison occupy more than half the film. In each location, which is claustrophobic to begin with, Truffaut further encloses the space.

The school where we first meet Antoine is enclosed by a thick wall. The schoolroom itself is dark and cramped with no view to the outside either through the windows or the door. This first sequence with Antoine ends with him being even further enclosed. While the rest of the class is allowed outside to the enclosed courtyard for recess, Antoine is punished by having to stand behind a wooden partition in the front of the classroom.

We next see Antoine at home in the Doinel apartment. Truffaut delineates its limited size by a number of visual cues. The living room table doubles as Antoine’s desk. He does not have his own room but sleeps in a small anteroom in a cocoon-like sleeping bag. The couch on which he sleeps so blocks the door that it only can be partially opened, and passage through the room can only be achieved by stepping over the couch.

When the three members of the Doinel family are all together in the apartment, they are forced to brush against each other in order to move about. The ironic counterpoint to all this architectural repression is the auto club posters that hang on the walls, magic amulets invoking the charms of the open road, which the Doinels are never to see. This auto club poster imagery is highlighted by a banner, which Monsieur Doinel has brought home. When he unfurls this trophy to his frustrated enthusiasm, it takes up practically the entire length of the apartment and forms an obstacle under which Madame Doinel must peevishly stoop on her way to the kitchen.

Truffaut further represses the private space of Antoine by having him descend the stairs of the tenement with the garbage. Just as he reaches the bottom, the lights which are on a time, go out leaving him in total darkness.
The third major location where Truffaut gradually compresses the already claustrophobic space is the police station. Truffaut will spend more than 1/7 of the film here, the longest uninterrupted period of time in any location in the film. Antoine is first taken to a small room at the station, then placed in a small detention cage where he is forced to sleep on the floor. Then later he is cramped even more severely as he is joined in the cage by a group of prostitutes.

The final location in the film is the reform school. Truffaut has one final architectural irony here. The opening shot at this location shows the inmates marching outside to the playing fields. We then see a group of small children, presumably those of one of the caretakers, being locked into an outdoor cage to protect them from the influence of the inmates. This final touch underlines the entrapment of everyone in the film. No one, save for the clever Rene, escapes.

The last sequence of the film, Antoine’s escape from the school down the long road to the open expanse of the sea, is architecturally significant from a number of points of view. First, the eye is allowed to travel in this shot for both the furthest distance and for the longest amount of time. The previous glimpses into the distance are only for fleeting moments. Secondly, it is the first time we see water, and it is a good guess judging from Antoine’s surprised expression that it is also the first time he has ever seen the ocean. Finally, the freeze frame that ends the film has Antoine looking back. The meaning of this posture and the use of the cinematic technique are still ambiguous, but they certainly don’t indicate clearly that Antoine has found a final escape. Up until this point he has at least been able to run with some sense of relief. The freeze frame makes the strong suggestion that even Antoine has come to the painful realization of the futility of it all.

Truffaut’s treatment of Antoine’s loyal friend, Rene, provides an interesting contrast in the use of architectural metaphor. Rene’s home is a large apartment with a huge playroom. Truffaut emphasizes the unique spatial characteristics of the playroom by a camera placement that is singular in this particular film. The camera is placed high in one corner of the room to emphasize the height and depth of this environmental area of childlike escape.

Rene is also the one who leads Antoine out into his brief flings at freedom in the early parts of the film and who is with him on the steps of Sacre Coeur when we get one of our brief glimpses into the distance. Finally, he is the one outside the glass door of the reform school while Antoine is trapped inside with his face pressed to the glass. The last we see of Rene is as he mounts his bicycle in front of the walls of the reform school and starts to ride down the long, clear road we see stretching before him.

A few other examples of visual space might be mentioned here that support the theme of the film. The interviews in the film are very important. All three of the main characters, Antoine, his mother, and his
father are subjected to interviews, a highly formalized type of social intercourse in which one person has complete psychological superiority over the other. The important point here is that by the use of this simple device, which involves the third area of visual space, Truffaut shows us the total atmosphere of repression that pervades the film and all its characters.

There is also the instances of body contact which support the theme of the film. These are mainly the instance of Antoine’s father slapping him in the schoolroom, his mother bathing him, and the police photographer roughly twisting his face for the mug shot. All these minor events are integral to the psychological relationships being expressed.

The architectural imagery and the use of visual space in Bunuel’s *Nazarin* was one of gradual expansion. Truffaut’s visual imagery is predominantly one of repression, which ends in a final frustrated burst.

**Psychotic Space + John Boorman’s *Point Blank***

John Boorman’s *Point Blank* was released in 1967 and for the most part was received as a rather gratuitous exercise in excessive violence. The film, which stars Lee Marvin, Angie Dickinson and Keenan Wynn, is indeed a violent one, but there is an eerie quality to its dramatic development that makes it unique.

The narrative movement of the film follows Lee Marvin on a mission of revenge against a vaguely defined hierarchy in a crime syndicate. Marvin seeks out and destroys each one of them in ascending order in his quest to get back a sum of money that he claims is rightfully his.

On the surface the story is a common enough plot for a blood and guts gangster film. Boorman’s use of architecture in the film, however, gives us subtle hints that something else is going on. In *Point Blank* like *Le Jour Se Leve* the film begins and ends in the same location. In Carne’s film this device is used to indicate that most of the story has taken place in Francois’s mind. He recalls through flashbacks the dramatic events that have led up to his predicament. In *Point Blank* we begin and end with the same location, the deserted interior of Alcatraz. Boorman’s point here is similar to Carne’s but with a slight twist, as we shall see presently.

The film begins with the betrayal of Marvin by a conspiracy of his wife and best friend. He is shot at point blank range with a high liber pistol and left to die in one of the deserted cells of Alcatraz. Then under the titles we see a series of shots of the physical obstacles that Marvin must overcome to make his escape from the prison. He is seen in most of them, but it is significant that he never moves in any of them. Indeed he seems to be on the point of dying in his tracks. The final shot in this sequence shows him floundering in the water while the soundtrack lets us hear the voice of a girl detailing the fact that no one has ever escaped from this island fortress. We then cut to Marvin on a tour boat and learn the voice of the girl complete with a delayed echo is the voice of the tour guide.
The visual or verbal explanation of how Marvin overcame his spatial predicament is a masterpiece of ambiguity. Throughout the film this pattern of architectural obstacles clearly presented and then almost casually ignored is repeated several times, as Marvin carries out his series of individual revenges.

Another prime example of this pattern is Marvin's revenge against his former best friend and betrayer. This character named Mal Reese has been placed as bait by the syndicate in the penthouse tower of an apartment house, which has been practically converted into a fortress. Armed thugs guard each entrance on the ground floor and surround the penthouse itself. Boorman uses a series of shots with the camera tilted up at an extreme angle to emphasize the dominance of the building. He also has at least two of the characters say that while Marvin might get in, he will never get out.

Marvin first sends Angie Dickinson up to the penthouse to distract Reese's attention. He then creates another diversion involving the police to distract the attention of the guards on the ground floor. The next scene shows Marvin tying up two guards just outside the penthouse window. He then is able to catch his betrayer literally with his pants down.

The use of personal space here is also interesting. Earlier in the film we had seen Mal Reese practically pin Marvin to the floor while shouting in his face begging for his help. The obvious sexual connotations of this physical position is repeated but in the opposite posture, as Marvin straddles the naked Reese in the penthouse and puts the gun to his head.

Marvin has caught his enemy both physically and psychologically stripped, the perfect situation for revenge. The friend, helpless and naked before his wrath winds up going over the edge of the roof. The scene ends with Marvin looking down after him while we hear the voice of one of the guards call out. The next scene with Marvin shows him making good his escape in the basement of the apartment house. When we consider that Marvin had repeatedly been warned that though he might get into the fortress, he would never get out, this abrupt cut stretches our credibility.

This basic pattern is repeated throughout the film. Marvin's enemies, as he progresses up the criminal hierarchy, are cocky and self-assured. They have taken great pains to physically protect themselves, the architectural details of which the director, John Boorman, has delineated with some detail. Each time, though, Marvin overcomes these obstacles with a highly underdetailed architectural explanation.

Marvin's reaction to each success is not a gloating self satisfaction, but rather a sense of puzzlement. In his physical actions, which range from everything from kicking an adversary in the groin to pistol whipping a bodyguard into bloody submission, he is straightforward and decisive. When he pauses after each act of violence, he appears to be bemused and disoriented. His only response to these recurrent states of confusion is further violent physical action.
The film finally ends with Marvin's meeting Wynn, who turns out to be Mr. Big, back at Alcatraz where the whole thing began. There is some last minute double dealing, as there has been in every step up the line, a shot rings out killing Carroll O'Connor, and Marvin simply disappears. The disappearance takes place in two separate shots each showing Marvin progressively disappearing into the shadows.

Boorman's architectural imagery in Point Blank is one of the most imaginative since The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari in reflecting a disturbed state of mind. In Caligari, this mental disturbance is reflected by the deliberate distortion of the sets. In Point Blank it is shown by the architectural illogic, which is typical of a dream or fantasy. The physical structures are vividly presented on the screen. The actual barriers they present are then simply ignored by the dreamer who simply skips to the ultimate object of his fantasy in this case the wreaking of revenge.

Basically, this spatial illogic is a three step process, contemplation of the victim, overcoming the obstacles between the subject and the victim, and the final execution of the revenge. In each instance the first and the last steps are both clearly detailed, but the second step is simply ignored as in a fantasy or a dream.

I mentioned above that Point Blank like Le Jour Se Leve begins and ends in the same location. In Carne's film this device is used to show that the action of the film takes place in the hero's memory. In Point Blank Boorman uses the same device to tell us that the whole violent story of revenge we have just witnessed takes place in the frenzied imagination of Lee Marvin, as he lies dying of the gunshot wound he received at the beginning of the film. The architectural illogic of the film has been structured by the psychotic desire for revenge in Marvin's fevered imagination. The periodic bemusement of Marvin, which we referred to above, can be seen as reflecting the struggle between fantasy and reality in his dying brain.

The film is rich in other imaginative uses of visual space, and it would take a disproportionate amount of space in this brief paper to detail them all here. Hopefully, a short listing will suffice. Touching is very important in the film both in the violence that Marvin wreaks on his enemies and the physical contact between him and his wife, Angie Dickinson, and the office secretary. The clothing of the actors is also important. Marvin's meeting his wife to be on the waterfront is a masterpiece of visual irony when you contrast their states of dress. What we hear on the soundtrack suggests a tender meeting. What we see on the screen is closer to a gang rape. The frequent violence done to personal space, especially the scene at the bar with the black singer and the rupturing of the personal space of authority by Marvin, is a key visual element in the film which is almost always a prelude to physical violence and death. Finally, there is the violence involving machines, particularly automobiles and planes and the violence they wreak on normal human intercourse. Twice at least in the film the characters can't hear one another due to machine noise.
A Final Note

I feel that the concept of visual space has helped me considerably to come to terms with visual style in films. Space in motion pictures, though, almost necessarily demands a serious and parallel discussion of time. In a sense time in films can be critically translated into time by footage counts to determine dramatic emphasis. This is not the last word, though, and I feel more work has to be done in this area.

Two areas of time in films, which would appear to demand much more emphasis than I have given them, would be editing and camera movement. I would like to pursue them further for their obvious contributions to visual style.

Finally, I also feel that the concept of visual space can be profitably applied to non-representational films like Allures or even Bleu-Shut. Such an approach might be an analysis of negative values, how we are disoriented by such cinematic styles, but I suspect that it would be very profitable nonetheless.
CINEMA AS A HUMANITY: AN OBJECTION TO NARROWNESS

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Dedicated, with humility, to the memory of George Amberg

"A work of art produces insight. To experience it is to become different. If not wiser, at least more human."

O. B. Hardison

The massive, organized, long-term study of cinematic art has really just begun. Some of the best statements on cinema have already been made, but deeper study of film is just now beginning to leave off scratching on the cave wall. At such a point, at the beginnings of the study of a new art, a student of cinema is sometimes overly impressed with his "pioneering" role: the urge to be an Aristotle is very great. And perhaps I am indulging myself hero in thinking that one should (or can?) point the course of the study of an art. Nevertheless, I believe that it needs to be said that the most essential and important value of cinema to people who experience the art is the not-often-stated fact that, as an art, cinema is humane and that the appreciation and study of the art of the cinema is humanistic.

The humanistic in cinema studies deals with the essence of art: the human condition, with what it means to be human, with the truth of life, with the artful reflection of and statement about Man. Humanistic cinema commentary concentrates on, for example in RAMPARTS OF CLAY, the theme of man's rebellion and submission, on the necessity to resist and to yield to civilization's demands, and on the very human problem of when to do which. Fluid camera movement, the aptness of mise en scene, how many close-ups are used, and such like observations are and should be clearly secondary to considerations of the humanistic qualities of such a film (or any film). This is not to say that a shot analysis, for example, has no place in the study of cinema. In fact, in general, much humanistic discourse depends upon some study of the prosody of film as well as perhaps a hundred other detailed technical and structural considerations. But, we must hone our sensibility along with our sense of the art. Certainly, too, the "content" or theme of a work is not the only consideration in humanistic study. Within a humanistic context the separation of content from rhythm, structure, and style is as artificial as the separation of artist and scientist. (The true artist and true scientist are both dealing with expanding the outer fringes of humanity's perception of reality.)

Yet, the direction of the study of films should lead toward a discernment of the workings and thinking of Man. Art never has truly existed for art's sake alone nor should the study of an art ever turn in on itself and study itself (as the study of literature has tended to do, for example). When the serious student of film, and by student I mean one who is a lover, a participator, a careful watcher, and an artist (or an aspiring one at least) of film, begins to concentrate his attention and writing solely on the kind of film stock used or how line relates to form in a sample shot or comment of this kind, then cinema study is as dead and equally as useful as the Latin language and cinema commentary will become a self-perpetuating body that will be continuously beside the point.
Two dominant critical "stands" seen in the body of writings about film—art as process and art as finished theme—are central to a discussion of cinema as a humanity. That is, a part of the problem is to find just the right degree of comprehensiveness of approach and a critical stance and language to discuss cinema as a humanity. Those critics who choose to talk about film in one sense, as finished meaning, often degenerate into literal discussion of plot summaries or the relative aptness of the casting of a star in so and so rôle. A quasi-New Critical analysis of film results, frequently, as can be seen in Kael, Sarris, and Agee for example. In the other sense, film as process, critics stand in the quesy ground of the visceral of pop-art sensations and/or in the realm of the as yet hopelessly ambivalent. (See as typical Ehrenstein's article in The New American Cinema for a pugnacious rejection of the "theatro-literary" tradition.) And worse even, at least today, the members of these two camps glare at each other disdaining the "too literal" "theatre" qualities of one side and the "meaningless" qualities of the other. The truth is, however, that neither of these directions of critical inquiry is bad in itself, but, pushed to extremes as is so often the case, both of these critical directions fail in their isolation to bring their limited views to bear on the universal and humanistic qualities of art.

For example, on the one hand, there is good reason to follow the argument that, as Shklovsky says, "Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important." That is, art is the process of perception as an aesthetic end. This idea would allow as art all sorts of films, such as Kubelka's ARNULF RAINER, which in no valid stretch of the imagination can be classified as a film which speaks to and/or about man qua man. The value of ARNULF RAINER is embodied in the experiencing of the mathematical symmetry/asymmetry in the relationships among sound, silence, white, black, and grey. Thus, the film has power but no emotion nor meaning. The film has been compared to music and yet music, great music, has both power and emotion and, yes, even meaning (in the context of the word as used here).

Then, on the other hand of the issue here, there is the demand for meaning, many times symbolic meaning, much in the way of the New Critics' view of literature. That is, a work must have logical meaning and thus an analyzable structure, a system of symbolic codes, and a completeness in and of itself. The work must not need to reach beyond itself, in a major way, to "complete" itself. All one needs to bring to such a work is a general knowledge of the world and of man so that one can supply the "given" of analogies—metaphors. The known or "given" will then supply the information for the understanding of the unknown which is the meaning to be received from the symbolic in the work. Yet, from this critical direction, missing is consideration of the emotive power of the visual pictures and, many times, a discussion of the essences of the cinematic: (I am thinking in particular at this moment of Agee on Film, Vol. I, despite its solidity as it is for what it is.)

In sum, then, as Gene Youngblood says, "From the cinema we receive conceptual information (ideas) and (aesthetic) design information (experiences)." Yet, in detail, what are the critical assumptions and "working bases" which deal with the experience and the ideas?
Artistic cinema is "the process of perception [as] an aesthetic end in itself" and if this statement is true and a final word on the subject, then a part of the result of this approach is bound up in the necessity that each art object must exist alone, beyond any other context. That is, when art exists only for its own sake, it need not have any expressive value or meaning beyond the tiny world of any one work. Films that are only intricate in design or structure; only require an audience’s witnessing of the works' existences; or depend on the audience to supply much of the "matter" of any artistic experience possible from them are clearly not works of art. Baldza says, for example, that the "art-for-art’s-sake toying" by the post-World War I European "avantgardiste" ended up in the blind alley of the "subjectless' 'absolute film' style..." which leads to "frustration and emptiness." Minimalist art," for further example, can be seen as the advent of the artist as a "suggestor" who lays down a very thin tissue of a work that the audience can then "make of it what they will" and thus the situation makes the audience "artists" also. Gene Youngblood gives an incisive comment to this point:

The viewer is forced to create along with the film, to interpret for himself what he is experiencing. If the information (either concept or design) reveals something previously unrecognized aspect of the viewer's relation to the circumspect universe—or provides language with which to conceptualize old realities more effectively—the viewer re-creates that discovery along with the artist....

If Youngblood is correct, the artist is then a "suggestor" who necessitates his audience-cum-artiste to create because and while the process of perception is going on. But can this be the case in art? It seems rather, that the "artist as suggestor" is to the true artist just as a "bull session" is to a session of true Socratic teaching. The word artist carries with it the idea of "artifice" and of "maker." And it seems that, by definition, a work of art is a fully wrought, created, and completed thing. Of course, the problem is central to that "old" question, "How does a poem know when it is finished?" Perhaps when (as has been suggested to me) its rhythm is played to a conclusion, is satisfied, a poem is finished. But, this answer includes a completion and a completeness in and of the art object itself. After all, it is the artist's duty to "make us see," and, while the "seeing" often requires strenuous work on the part of the audience, the seeing is not to be left to chance and whim. An art work is an ordered whole. Thus, critical views which see potentially artistic films existing independently of frames of reference other than their own and relying on the audience, for and by itself, to create meaning are not writings of criticism of art. Without seeing the expansive frames of reference and tensely compacted meanings, a critical stand can have little to do with the humanistic, which is universal and cosmic, and must be limited to the personal, at best, which is transitory and localized.

Many times the use of the idea that "cinema is a process of perception" as a critical base if coupled with an excessive and zealul bias against words. Granted that a great part of the essence of even modern cinema is visual, the role of words is still important. Can we think without words? That is, going down to the most basic level of human intelligence, it is possible to be conscious and even aware without verbalization, but it is

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not possible to know that one is conscious or what one is aware of without words—be they used in the mind, sub-vocalized, spoken, or written. Information can be received by the mind through pictures but no cognitive sense or use can come of that information unless it is encoded into words. Pictures can, without words used at any point, cause involuntary emotional and physical states and changes in us and thus it is only on the level of the visceral that pictures—films—can affect us without words. (And even as soon as we think of the emotion or speak of it, we use words.) Thus to reject words in the realm of cinema, leaves one with only the visceral.

Let us see a specific example in painting: One looks at a canvas painted entirely in reds and has spiked shapes. One feels a visceral response of anger. One reaches for meaning beyond "anger" and, finding nothing, moves on. However, one looks at a green swirling vertical shape, heavily piled with paint; feels tension, fear; and awe; looks further for meaning and finds the torsion of the torture and confusion of a human search and an aspiration of an answer: Van Gogh's cypresses evoke feeling and meaning. This is not to say that the visceral has no place in the artistic experience, but rather that visceral feeling is a step (likely a necessary one) in the totality of art. In the study of films, the visceral is given great weight among some critics, more than it deserves. Not only is the visceral indispensable communication but, stopping there, it is a shunt which bypasses the higher reaches of feelingful mental pleasure. Real and final artistic appreciation occurs in the mind.

Art reaches to the human heart, touches it and inflames it, which in turn brings the mind into action producing the complete artistic experience. The experience is a mystery which can only be explored but never solved like a problem. It is a profound sense of feeling and, most of all in the end, a profound sense of knowing. Art engenders man's passion and infuses his mind with meaning. It is in this world of passion and then knowledge that man really lives and it is feeling and knowing (as verbs) and not emotion vs. reason (as nouns) that is at the center of humanity and a humanity. Where is "this unusual state...[resulting from art] to be found? If it is not solely the work of the rhythms and the beat, what is the work of? The answer would seem to have to be: of the meanings. Cinema studies must reach for the humanistic quality in films if it, as a study, is to have any meaning for man. Students of cinema must look, ultimately, for the connotative meaning in their art beyond its own sake and beyond their own sakes. In the context of a humanity, artistic cinema commentary must be approached in broader terms than the view that value comes only from a process of perception of a work that does not enlarge beyond itself. Too, although the visceral is a powerful force in the cinematic art, it can not be an end since the visceral lacks expressive meaning and universality. Filmic art maintains its ultimate value to mankind by speaking clearly and expressively about Man.

Seeing cinema as having either no or only a "plot-like" moral or message is a limited view of the art since expressive values are ignored. This limited idea is based, in part, on the notion that cinema is a body of artifacts. An artifact can be treated as a cut-and-dried thing from which little expressive humane value can come. The humanistic allows for a
pluralistic posture as opposed to the idea of an artifact. A film artifact is an object that results, say, from an industry that produces it, from critics who see all films on an equal level, and from a treatment of the artifact as an extension of the maker's personality alone.

To consider a man's work as an extension of his personality is both true (in a very basic psychological sense) and a most damaging critical assumption. This assumption particularizes a work to such an extent that the work ceases to be operant in any world or matrix of ideas except its own. In effect this assumption says, "Here is only the state of one man's mind at one time without extension." It is possible that a work can take on the name of art and remain so peculiarly particularized? Certainly, on one level, every work of art is an extension of its maker's personality and from this knowledge can come an idea of a continuous style within the body of one man's work. But when the tracing of this strain of personality becomes the beginning and the end of film criticism, we have descended (as Andrew Sarris admits with the title of his book, Confessions of a Cultist) to cultism and are mistakenly studying the art maker instead of his works. This error is a decidedly anti-humanist approach to film (or any other art) since, in its very assumptions as well as practice, it denies the quality of universality. Andrew Sarris says that he has "a table of values that converts film history into directorial autobiography." But art is more than autobiography.

The film-makers of the New American Cinema are particularly subject to analysis on the basis that their works are extensions or "outerings" of their inner depths. Paragraph 1 of "The Group's" First Statement says, "1. We believe that cinema is indivisibly a personal expression." And yet, while this Statement is typical of the sense of the critical approach under discussion here, there is a great deal of difference between this Personal expression..." and the slavish following of the post-operative comments of a film-maker discussing his work. It so happens that until recently the only writers giving critical attention to the New American Cinema were the film-makers themselves. And a list of operating intentions announced only after the fact (i.e., after film works have been made) has become an explanation and justification of finished works. Of course works of art are "outerings of inner depths" and "indivisibly a personal expression," but this fact does not mean that critics can or should look into the "depths" better to see the "expression." Studying the artist in order to know the art is ultimately invalid.

Too, today's habit of hanging on the words of a cannon of "established auteurs"--mostly directors--as they speak about their own works is another false trail set down by those, it seems, for whom interviewing a "great" director is a sensual thrill and who find a tape recorder infinitely more easy to use than their writing fingers or especially their minds. Film criticism has yet to focus on the essential act of artistic creation for what it is and the study still, in many quarters, holds most valiantly to the hope that a director will give some final, authoritative word of what this or that film of his is "about." Art criticism never comes that easy. For one thing, in the universal context, the director does not know what he is talking about because he is (if we are dealing with a work of art) smaller than his creation.
One need open only Film Comment, Film Quarterly, Interview, Sarris's Interviews with Film Directors or a host of other film books and periodicals to see that all kinds of film-makers are being asked, "What did your husbands think about the movie?" or "What would you say was the theme of the [your] film?" And certainly the film-maker has a right to his opinion, but when answers to such questions are given great, weighty consideration, film criticism suffers proportionally. In sum, what is asked in these interviews is what are the film-makers' methods and intentions in doing this or that in their own works. However, these interviews can not take us beyond a history of art making and biographical data.

Criticism and aesthetic film study which hope to reach the humanistic essences of an artistic film work must go beyond method and artists' intentions. Critical study would be greatly simplified if the critic were called on merely to compare intentions of artists to their works and applaud according to greater degrees of agreement of artist and work. This approach is limited in many ways but the over-riding limitation centers on the nature of the artist. From Classical Greece through the Middle Ages, Romanticism, and enlightened modern mental science comes the idea of the artist as "maker" practicing his "techna"- -an artist who is inspired by the gods or, in modern idiom, by unexplained mental processes usually called intuition or genius. For one to deny the existence of this spark from the non-conscious mind who can fire an otherwise mundane work into art is to deny the very existence of art itself. The essence of art lies in intuitively perceived transcendent truth—truth which ultimately cannot be reached only with the rational mind. This "intuition" part of human beings has never been pinpointed and, thankfully, not dissected and thus cannot be totally known. Not being able to dissect artistic intuition, the critic can never know the basic intentions (if such can be said to exist at all) of an artist nor can the artist himself KNOW his intentions. In fact, after completing a work, frequently he seems to surpass and often surprise himself. Since the artist cannot know the full measure of his work, we should not take the artist's statements about himself and his intentions for a work with such intense (if any) seriousness. Art transcends the man.

Where are we left then without artists' intentions to consider? We are left with the intent of the work of art, no small thing indeed. Rather than turning to the artist, we must turn to the work to answer our questions about it. What province of truth does the work claim as its own? How serious is the work? What does the work claim it will tell us? When these kinds of questions are asked and answers are proposed, then analysis of film approaches from a valid perspective divorced from the artists' personalities.

Seeing cinema as an artifact also leads to a study of what are here called "business making" films. These films callously use the star system formula plots, super-publicity, and sensationalism to promote and sell a film to an audience. This kind of film is frequently a vehicle for a money-making star. But it is not the box-office grosses that mark these films as much as the qualities within the films themselves. To turn so very seriously to these films, as film students do, however, is tantamount to turning to greetings cards for the serious study of poetry. The lofty doggerel that sentimentalizes Christmas, Easter, New Year, Mother's, Father's, and Birthday days is business-making verse. Why do we not see literary critics turn to this plentiful field for the study of the poet's art? And, why do film
commentators continue to take so seriously the business-making films? To put Brakhage and Bresson in the same context with ROSEMARY'S BABY and THE LION IN WINTER; to put FACES, THE HOUR OF THE WOLF, and BELLE DE JOUR along with THE CHARGE OF THE LIGHT BRIGADE (new), THE GREEN BERETS, COOL HAND LUKE, and CLEOPATRA (see Sarris and Alpert, Film 68/69, for example, among many other works) is to say that, in effect, if it is on film, it must be good. An exaggeration, perhaps, but it is not so in the case of comparing the serious study of business-making films with the serious study of the greetings cards verse industry. The phrase "the movie industry" should tell us something. (Why, by the way, aren't the framed-ready-for-your-wall pictures for sale at the "dime stores" snapped up by discerning art critics and students?) "Art" by industry is a near impossibility. Studying the art of film by studying the films of industry is less an artistic and more an economic and sociological adventure.

The trouble with this and other approaches may result from a zealous urge to "legitimazie" film as Art; that is, to make films into artifacts and artifacts that are "acceptable." Almost every serious film reviewer from Sarris to the man on the local television channel goes to and reports on all films with expectations of Art (especially since "movies" have become "films" and now even "cinema"). Thus every film is considered, all too often, on an equal level: as potential Art and not as a potential vessel of expressive, intonational value. That is, the expectation on Art with a capital A automatically places limits and boundaries on what a critic will allow himself to see. A good example might result from noting the division between students of the New American Cinema and students of other films. Predetermined ideas and labels often put blinders on what could be a humanistic treatment of cinema as a body of artistic works.

Films of all kinds are usually evaluated on nearly the same scale since, at least partly, the field of cinema study is too new to have developed consistent ways of looking at genres of film. Even silent and sound films or documentary and fiction films have not been truly delineated (if these are the proper categories!) to the satisfaction of a majority of film students. Close study of film in what for other arts are traditional ways cannot function without categorization. Perhaps films are unique and should not be put into anything like genres, but some method must be found to refine the hodge-podge aesthetic that presently puts, for example, NANOOK OF THE NORTH in the same critical bag with THE GOLDEN COACH.

It has been the intent of this paper to affirm the necessity of a broad and humanistic approach to cinema study. The objection to the narrowness of some current views into cinema specified and exemplified herein purposively does not use such terms as "phenomenological," "behavioristic," "ontological," "Marxist," or "structuralistic" since, many times, such terms can insulate the negative (and positive!) aspects of the matrix of ideas each carries as a "school" of study. Of course, there are no final answers to the kinds of questions raised in this paper, but a note of direction and caution must be sounded in our fast-growing study. A look at the failures and closed strictures of other disciplines such as literature and economics should serve as a signal warning to the scholarly study of cinema.

Humanistic study of films cannot be narrow: there is more to film than auteurs or New American Cinema or westerns or nouvelle vague or whatever. Students of film must bring to all cinema an attitude, an approach, that seeks filmic essences, yes, but also that seeks expressive humane value.
NOTES
7. Youngblood, pp. 64-65.
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WARD'S PARADIGM
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Near the end of Weekend one of Godard's young guerillas attempts to reach another by short-wave: "Battleship Potemkin calling Prisoner of the Desert... Battleship Potemkin calling Prisoner of the Desert..." and, in a later attempt: "Costa Berling calling Johnny Guitar.... Costa Berling calling Johnny Guitar...." These signals make up a schematic outline of the history of narrative cinema, embodying not just a chronological sampling but an analytic conception also. The four titles, in the arrangement given, constitute an ingenious paradigm of the expressive possibilities of narrative cinema and of the realization of those possibilities over four decades.

First a definition of terms, perhaps unnecessary. Prisoner of the Desert is the French title of John Ford's The Searchers (1956). Johnny Guitar (1954) is Nicholas Ray's moody, rather fantastic love story and Western. The Legend of Gosta Berling (1923) was the last Swedish film of Mauritz Stiller and the first film of Greta Garbo. After Gosta Berling, Stiller accompanied Garbo to Hollywood where her career flourished and his crumbled after a few efforts. Potemkin (1925); Eisenstein's second film, requires no identification.

How do these films relate to each other and in what sense do they form a paradigm? Paul Hayersberg, in a review in New Society, said this:

"Battleship Potemkin calling The Searchers..." To translate: "Sergei Eisenstein calling John Ford". The twin poles of film style. Eisenstein, the formal, montage, operatic director. Ford, the informal, the invisible cutting, the naturalistic director. Can they get together to save the cinema (the world)?

Hayersberg is (more or less) right as far as he goes but stopping where he does renders his remarks more misleading than helpful. For one thing, he omits essential and obvious differences between Eisenstein and Ford that could not have been far from Godard's mind. Besides stylistic differences, the two directors are also at opposite poles of ideology and dramaturgy. Ford celebrates the founding of a civilization by the imposition of one people's will on another's; Eisenstein celebrates the overthrow of a civilization by the destruction of an imposed will. Ford stresses the differences between the races or, at any rate, the subjugation of one race by another. Eisenstein celebrates the brotherhood of races in the revolutionary act. Ford films from the point of view of the colonizers-oppressors, Eisenstein from that of the colonized-oppressed. Finally, Eisenstein renounces "the individualist conception of the bourgeois hero" (Film Form, p. 16) in favor of the collective hero, or mass as hero. Ford celebrates the individual hero, his tenacity and skills, for his benefits to the colonizer-group.

A more serious limitation of Hayersberg's (truncated) scheme is that he does not consider the other half of the formula, Costa Berling and Johnny...
In truth the similarities between Eisenstein and Ford are greater and more important than their differences. Indeed it is not their polarity but the opposition between the two of them on the one hand and Stiller and Ray on the other that makes the paradigm interesting. *Potemkin* and *The Searchers* are not at different poles of cinema; in fact they speak the same language (just as *Gosta Berling* and *Johnny Guitar* do): they can talk to each other. On the other hand, *The Searchers* and *Johnny Guitar*, though American Westerns made two years apart, have almost nothing to do with each other. They exist in different universes of cinema.

The central contrast of Godard's paradigm may be expressed in terms of several sets of opposed qualities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potemkin-Searchers</th>
<th>Berling-Guitar</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public (Social)</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Apolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epic</td>
<td>Dramatic/Poetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outdoors</td>
<td>Indoors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>Sets</td>
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<td>Action</td>
<td>States of feeling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
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Fundamentally, Eisenstein and Ford are concerned with public problems, with the progress and convulsions of civilizations and peoples. Stiller and Ray are concerned with the self and its conflicts, primarily with the erotic. Peoples, states, even groups have hardly any reality for them—only as they impinge on the self.

A distinction made by Goethe, quoted by Rudolph Arnheim in regard to "Epic and Dramatic Film," is helpful here:

The epic poem preferably describes man as he acts outwardly: battles, travels, any kind of enterprise that requires some sensuous breadth; tragedy shows man led toward the inside, therefore the plot of a genuine tragedy requires little space.

Eisenstein himself explicitly identified montage as "the dramatic principle":

Dramatic film, in Arnheim's sense, undertakes a particular problem and proceeds step-by-step to its solution; one of its effects is suspense. The film epic, by contrast, reaches no solution: it is concerned with the unchanging conflicts of human existence. Its form is static, it proceeds by stringing episodes in sequence. At some point the story ceases to continue. *The Searchers* is a partial exception that proves the rule. It is one of Ford's greatest films precisely because its many episodes are united by a single thread: the search for the girl and the mystery of what happened to her. Thus a keen dramatic tension is sustained through the film's epic stages—the changes of seasons and the passing of years. Many Ford films, such as *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, are entirely episodic, with no unifying thread whatever. In a different manner Eisenstein also sought to combine the epic and dramatic (and lyrical?) modes. For him ideal film art was epic in subject and dramatic in treatment. Eisenstein himself explicitly identified montage as "the dramatic principle":

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According to this definition, shared even by Pudovkin as a theoretician, montage is the means of unrolling an idea with the help of single shots: the 'epic' principle.

In my opinion, however, montage is an idea that arises from the collision of independent shots--shots even opposite to one another: the 'dramatic' principle.

By this theory, Ford's "invisible editing," the mere linkage of shots, is the true epic style in cinema. The Searchers is an epic told epically, Potemkin an epic told dramatically.

Costa Berling and Johnny Guitar are dramatic films in Arnheim's sense. They undertake a problem and proceed to its solution. Above all, they are entirely concerned with the inward and in the intensity of this concern both works draw near to the condition of poetry. In each film there is a spectacular fire. In the world of Eisenstein and Ford a fire is a communal catastrophe that threatens society itself. In Stiller and Ray the great fire is entirely symbolic: it is an image of the self, specifically of that abolition of the past which is necessary for life in the present.

Generally speaking, epic film tends toward outdoor shooting in natural locations, dramatic/poetic film toward set design and studio work. Eisenstein and Ford are among the greatest outdoor directors in cinema history, Nicholas Ray is one of the unquestioned masters of interiors. (Stiller, in Costa Berling and elsewhere, lent about equal emphasis to interiors and exteriors, but his way of relating characters to environment, indoors and out, is very like Ray's.) Potemkin was filmed in the city and port of Odessa (and in Sevastapol), where its events took place. The Searchers was shot in Colorado and in Monument Valley (Arizona), Ford's favorite location (first used for Stagecoach). It is essential to the art of Eisenstein and Ford that they show the actual terrain whose struggles they are chronicling. Both are masters at getting the dimensions of vast landscapes (and seascapes) into their frames, at the same time organizing them in accord with a mythic/ideological thesis, fusing fact and symbol.

Potemkin to The Searchers is a call from one place to another, literally from ocean to desert. It is a connection that we can picture. A call from Costa Berling to Johnny Guitar cannot be pictured, because these are not places but states of mind. The cinema of Stiller and Ray attempts to realize incorporeal realms by virtue of concrete images. The interior, the designed set, in their hands, suggests the inner, the psychological, the spiritual. Ray's sets--and color, light and shadow--for Party Girl (1956), his 1920's gangster film, create not a period or location, but a realm of feeling. Both Costa Berling and Johnny Guitar have outdoor sequences of beauty and power. What is important, however, is that in both landscapes become extensions of character. All of nature is a set expressive of this or that human emotion. No matter how vast the view behind a character, he and his emotions obsessively hold the frame and our attention. Analogously, the lyric poet as well as the epic poet refers to ocean and plain, but he does so strictly as an enlargement of the self, as an item of personal color. In Stiller and Ray the outdoor frame is organized in regard to the character, never in regard to nature itself. Nature has no independent existence or reality--it is called into being as coloration of human emotions.
Another polarity between the two sets of films, less tangible than the others, is that of masculine and feminine. Eisenstein and Ford present man's world and man's activities—civilization-making in its colonial and revolutionary stages. Woman holds an honored place in the world of each, but in fact she is ignored. By contrast Stiller and Ray are directly concerned with woman—as love object to be adored by the camera, as Garbo in Costa Berling and Joan Crawford in Johnny Guitar are, but also with woman's feelings and point-of-view. Stiller and Ray, as well as Eisenstein and Ford, are myth-makers, but they create myths of the erotic, legends of the self in quest of its love object. Not surprisingly, men in Stiller and Ray are different from men in Eisenstein and Ford. Eisenstein and Ford deal with men who take effective action, Stiller and Ray with men who disintegrate. Costa Berling is a defrocked minister whose life, though buoyed by the love of women, is falling apart. Johnny/Guitar is a fast draw who cannot control his gun and who has failed, in some unspecified, unforgivable way, Vienna, the woman he loves. Ford and Eisenstein have a certain heartiness, a frontier cheerfulness. Stiller and Ray (in these films anyway) tend toward the moody and the dark. A pall of immobility and futility hangs over Costa Berling and Johnny Guitar.

There are many other similarities, parallels, differences among the four films, some trivial, some not so. The Stiller and Eisenstein are, of course, silent and in black-and-white. The Ford and Ray are in color and have sound; The Searchers is also in wide-screen (VistaVision). Thus a compendium of the plastic and aural possibilities of cinema is realized in the paradigm. Appropriately, these technical advances are shown at work on both sides of the paradigm. Just as Ford's use of color added greatly to the realization of outdoor reality and epic themes, so Ray's use of color (in Guitar and elsewhere) greatly increased the expressivity of sets and interiors.

At the level of biography, Eisenstein, Stiller, and Ray came to cinema through theatre, Ford began directly with cinema. Stiller made his first film in 1912, Ford in 1917, Eisenstein in 1924, Ray in 1949. The careers of Stiller and Ray both reached premature, (in light of their talent) disastrous ends in Hollywood. Several of the important films of each were heavily re-edited and/or finished by someone else. (Stiller's The Temptress (1925) and The Street of Sin (1927) were finished by another director; Ray's The True Story of Jesse James, Bitter Victory, Wind Across the Everglades, The Savage Innocents, King of Kings, and 55 Days at Peking were all re-edited.) Eisenstein also had serious career problems, including a frustrated Hollywood project (his treatment of An American Tragedy) and collapse of his cherished Mexican project, Que Viva Mexico. Also, Eisenstein was required by Stalin to re-edit October so as to omit the role of Trotsky in the Bolshevik Revolution. Despite these reverses, Eisenstein survived both Hollywood and the first wave of Stalinism to make three more important features, for the most part on his own terms, Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible, I & II. Ford seems the only one of the four to have had an untragic career—he held an honored place in Hollywood from first to last. But even he has had films re-edited, and said once that one was lucky in Hollywood to make 1 film in 3 that one wanted to make.

Finally, Stiller and Ford were masters of comedy, while Eisenstein and Ray seem equally without humor. Stiller created the film comedy of erotic allusion, as Lubitsch acknowledged. Ford's humor is evident in more of his works and is the dominant tone of several, including The Whole Town's Talking, The Quiet Man, and Donovan's Reef.
FOOTNOTES

1, 2. In Hollywood Stiller completed only Hotel Imperial (1927) and The Woman on Trial (1927), both with Pola Negri. He also shot parts of The Tempest (1926) and The Street of Sin (1927), both credited to other directors. Stiller died in Sweden in 1928.


4. Eisenstein’s montage versus Ford’s invisible cutting is unassailable, the other oppositions are not. What, for instance, is meant by Eisenstein’s “formality” and Ford’s “informality”? Ford’s visual style (30s, 40s, 50s, 60s) is anything but informal. Eisenstein is “operatic” only at the end of his career, precisely that time at which he no longer emphasized montage; and “naturalistic” is an entirely inadequate term for Ford, either for his exquisite studio work of the 30s and early 40s or for his epic outdoor works of the 50s and 60s.

5. Eisenstein’s remark about James Fenimore Cooper applies equally to the films of John Ford: “From the ideological point of view, this type of novel, exalting the deeds of the colonizers, follows entirely the same current as the detective novel in serving as one of the most pointed forms of expression of private-property ideology.” (Emphasis supplied) The Film Form, p. 128.


7. See Film Form, pp. 150-191: “The solution of this problem has been left entirely to the cinema. Only here can real events, preserving all the richness of material and sensual fullness, be simultaneously—epic, in the revelation of their content, dramatic, in the treatment of their subject, and lyrical to that degree of perfection from which is echoed the most delicate nuance of the author’s experience of the theme—”.

8. Film Form, p. 49; in a footnote Eisenstein adds: ”‘Epic’ and ‘dramatic’ are used here in regard to methodology of form, not to content or plot!” This was written in 1929. Eisenstein’s later discussion of epic (quoted above, Note 7), written in 1939, is in terms of content. This change may or may not reflect ideological changes in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

9. Early and middle Ford and late Eisenstein of course worked magnificently with interiors; we speak here of Potemkin and The Searchers and, arguably, of the greatest work of each. For discussions of Ray’s interiors see Movie #9, article by V. F. Perkins and interview with Ray, and also the entries on Ray and Anthony Mann in Andrew Sarris, The American Cinema, pp. 98 and 107.

10. Interestingly, this is close to Eisenstein’s formula for the highest ambition of cinema: the creation of concepts by the juxtaposition of images of the concrete. “By the combination of two ‘depictables’ is achieved the representation of something that is graphically undepictable.”
Film Form, p. 30. Andre Bazin taught us that there is nothing magical in the number 2. One depictable can represent the undepictable as well, sometimes better than two or more.

11. It is no accident that Ray's films are discussed pointedly in Le Mepris (1963) and Pierrot le Fou (1965), Godard's most personal films, both dealing with the corrosive break-up of a relationship and with an unstable male character.
INCREASING DEPTH OF FIELD AND SHARPENING FOCUS IN FILM STUDY: 
ISSUES OF DEFINITION, THEORY AND PRACTICE, AND CRITICAL AWARENESS.

Jim Linton 
University of Pennsylvania

"There Must Be Some Kinda Way Outta Here": 
Film Studies in the 70's.

Much as scholars dislike the elliptical and sometimes obtuse "probes" employed by Marshall McLuhan, he does manage to get to the heart of matters at least once in a while. Such is the case when McLuhan's remarks about successive technologies are applied to the case of movies and television. "Each new technology creates an environment that is itself regarded as corrupt and degrading," McLuhan says. "Yet the new one turns its predecessor into an art form." When television displaced the movies as the premier mass medium, the movies became "film" or "the cinema"; the size of its audience dropped drastically, and the audience itself became more demographically homogeneous; the film society movement burgeoned; and the film became an acceptable subject of study in universities and colleges. Clearly the movies had arrived.

Not everyone was pleased by the nature of this transformation, and some tended to question the motives of the new audience. Witness the remarks of Richard T. Jameson:

Film is securely in now, and to those of us who have always taken it seriously, the feeling is a little strange, even incongruous...Film-as-a-phenomenon has received infinitely more press than film-as-the-movies-that-are. Film is the art of our time, we are told; we are all children of the movies and instinctively understand them better than any generation that has gone before. And some people have been quickly convinced of this god-given expertise.

An attitude of trendy fashionableness is particularly prevalent on the nation's campuses where the nucleus of the new film audience can be found. One has the feeling that, given the director or fashionableness of a film to be screened, ceteris paribus, it would not be too difficult to predict the size and composition of the audience that would attend: a large, somewhat heterogeneous audience for the films of Bergman, Bunuel, Truffaut, Polanski, the early films of Antonioni, and the like; a small band of loyal 'freaks' for the films of Brakhage, Baillie, Emshwiller, VanDerBeek, Mekas, and the rest of the underground; an even smaller number of radicals and pseudo-radicals for Godard's later films, the works of Rocha, Solanas, Sanjines, Littin, and other directors of the Third World Cinema; and standing room only crowds for Blow-Up, If, Woodstock, 2001: A Space Odyssey, etc.

Film has also become popular as a practical activity, and Jameson notes that this too has become disturbingly fashionable:
Perfectly unremarkable acquaintances who used to shoot home movies now tell you, "We made a film last weekend." It's the same home movie but the phrase has changed, and with it an attitude.

Young people with a creative bent who want to make a statement on life, and in the 40's and 50's would have set out to write the Great American Novel, now dedicate themselves to making the Great American Movie. One of the results is that the statistics concerning film courses offered in the United States has skyrocketed. The American Film Institute in its Guide to College Film Courses 1971-72 lists 427 schools, from junior colleges to universities, offering training programs of one sort or another—in an increase of 126 in one year. Forty-seven universities offer a degree in film, while 96 offer a film major, a 40 percent increase. The survey turned up 2,392 film courses, with 4,169 students majoring in film as undergraduates, and 1,508 graduate students in film.

Film courses outside of established film programs are normally offered by departments of English, History, Art History, Drama, etc. The people teaching such courses normally are film buffs who might have had some experience in the practical aspects of filmmaking but generally have not, and merely apply the approach or methodology of their central discipline to the study of film—often bending film to the needs of their discipline in the process. While such studies are not to be discouraged entirely, they tend to give a fragmented picture at best, and are pounced on by the students who have little interest in really learning about film, but who feel that being able to discuss the latest film sensation is certain to be socially rewarding. This arrangement has the potential to produce incredibly ironic situations, one of which I witnessed in a lecture in a history course which examined film as a form of "social and intellectual history." The lecturer was discussing German Expressionist films in a manner similar to the way Kracauer deals with them in From Caligari to Hitler. He explained how the films mirrored the response to the destruction of social values in Germany in the 20's, how they reflected the attempt to foment revolution without changing the structure of society, and stressed the emphasis on the aestheticization of politics—or as the lecturer wittily expressed it: "planting your feet in the middle of your head." As the analysis continued, it became clear that the lecturer was implicitly drawing parallels between the situation in Nazi Germany before the ascendency of Hitler and the attitudes of "the Woodstock Nation" with its "do-your-own-thing" ideology. If that was not enough, the lecturer concluded his talk with a harangue that would have made Frank Zappa proud, ending with the statement that "the Greening of Nazi Germany was the Third Reich." And how did the students, these upper-middle and upper class white kids (notice how blacks generally do not enroll in film courses or attend "films"), react to this put down of the much vaunted youth revolution? They clapped, they hooted, they stomped their feet in approval—but then they tend to applaud at the end of every film history lecture.

These examples by themselves, however, would not be significant—would not even warrant mention—but for the fact that similar trends are evident in film writing, and as Ernest Callenbach observes, "...if anything signifies seriousness, it is books." Both Callenbach and Roger Manvell note that the output of film books has outstripped the ability of even the most
dedicated film scholar to keep up with them. As Manvell describes the situation:

It was not so long ago that there was only half a shelf's worth of books with any authority on the history, art and technique of the film. During the 1960's the graph of book production on cinema resembled that of the growth in world population; it had the upward trajectory of a rocket.

The attitude of both men toward this "explosion of film studies" is rather ambivalent, however. They are happy that their "faith in the art is at last being justified," as Callenbach puts it. But there is the gnawing feeling that the rapid growth may be out of control, that (Callenbach again) "we need to stop and try to take stock of the purposes and worth of what has been done." Callenbach is quite blunt in asserting the need for such a review:

...a publisher and editor like myself must be constitutionally skeptical, in hopes of conserving both sanity and trees. The motives people have for wanting to publish are, to say the least, mixed--though we have only recently begun to receive in the film field any sizable number of manuscripts that are clearly sprung from the publish-or-perish fount, that source of so much academic intellectual corruption (not to mention the waste of paper).

Manvell is a little more guarded but the thrust of his remarks is the same.

Charting the vast output of the filmmakers during the first 75 years of the cinema has certainly begun, though largely conducted in an ad hoc manner, as individual enthusiasts and their publishers pinpoint areas of the subject. History is being achieved, as it were, piecemeal, both on the "popular" and the "scholarly" levels. Perhaps the biggest need in this country is for subsidized research by competent and dedicated historians and critics who are prepared to give considerable time to the field of film studies. (Emphasis added)

Callenbach briefly surveys anthologies, interview books, how-to-do-it books, scripts, director studies, history, reference books and miscellaneous books, before launching into an extended examination of his greatest concern, criticism and "theory." As shallow as he found most works in the first seven categories, Callenbach finds the greatest shortcomings in the area most important to him. The basic problem, Callenbach asserts, is "that practically nobody writes books of film criticism." Most critics are absorbed writing reviews for newspapers and magazines, and are constantly facing the pressures of journalistic deadlines. Those deadlines mean little time to spend theorizing, and if theoretical matters are broached at all in the review format, they can only be implied. In addition, allusions to other films must be kept to a minimum since each review is expected to stand on its own. In this regard, after examining the works of several prominent critics, Callenbach is moved to assert that
the act of "criticism", in essence, as opposed to the mere opinion-mongering of most of the daily press, is the application of such terms [the terms appropriate to the aesthetic and social assumptions underpinning a critic's way of thinking] to the realities of a given film: describing it, analyzing it, and in the process also refining the terms and assumptions.

He concludes that "the particular task confronting our little film magazines at present is to seek out and develop critical writing with some theoretical ambitiousness and bite."

Perhaps even more disconcerting than Callenbach's review of film criticism is Brian Henderson's assessment of the status of film theory in the same issue of Film Quarterly. Classifying film theories itself presents a problem, Henderson asserts, because of "the paucity of positions," the lack of exploration of possible approaches, and the possibility that no "comprehensive or complete film theory" has yet been articulated. Despite these difficulties, Henderson attempts an analysis of two principal types of film theory since "the careful review of older theories is part of the spadework necessary for the formulation of new theories." The two principal types that have been developed are part-whole theories and theories of the relation to the real; Eisenstein's theories are analyzed as representative of the former, Bazin's of the latter.

Upon examination, the works of probably the two most revered (or at least discussed) theorists in the history of film turn out to be far from adequate. In the first place, "neither theorist defines the real nor develops any doctrine of the real whatever." And once we get beyond the old argument (actually more of a non-argument) as to which is the true artistic unit of film, the montage sequence or the sequence shot, we find that neither theorist was able to "contain or achieve a complete aesthetic even of the sequence," let alone of an entire film. In fact, Henderson contends, since "both discuss the problem of wholes in literary not cinematic terms...their solutions in terms of (pre-cinematic) literary models are a failure to take up the problem at all." Eisenstein's does seem to come off better in the comparison of the two theories since his theory begins with "the relations of the cinema to the real" (first stage) but goes on to "the relations of cinema with cinema" (second stage), while Bazin's theory is arrested at the first stage.

Clearly, Henderson concludes, neither of these theories is adequate to deal with film, and have created more problems than they have solved:

It seems to me that consideration of reality and relation to reality in Eisenstein and Bazin, and in the senses which they mean, have been a source of serious confusion and even of retardation to theoretical understanding of cinema.

According to Henderson, subsequent theoretical efforts must attempt to develop more complex models and theories of part-whole relations incorporating sound as well as visual styles; once that is accomplished the relations with reality can be studied. In addition, attention should be shifted from "reality-image interaction to image-viewer interaction." To facilitate these avenues of discovery it is necessary to move to a further
level of generality and abstraction as far as the original typology of film theories is concerned.

Behind part-whole theory and relation to the real lies relation-to-self and relation-to-other, the two most fundamental categories in which anything may be considered....there can be no choice between them.... these are the two fundamental categories or aspects of the subject, neither of which can be ignored or suppressed. Rather the question is one of the mode of their interrelation, the answer to which will be different at different times and places.

The point of this extended examination of the present state of film study, in all its various forms, is to demonstrate that despite the tremendous growth in interest in film, the quality of knowledge and insights that have been generated to this point does not seem to have been worth all the effort. The first priority, then, would seem to be to channel this essentially misdirected enthusiasm and energy into constructive forms of film study activity and scholarship. Although this would appear to be an extremely simple-minded suggestion that everyone can readily accept, the practical means of achieving such constructive approaches are not as easily agreed upon.

There has been some discussion as to what should be considered the proper domain of "film studies." Dominique Noguez, for example, describes the cinema as a continuous process that may be broken down into five more-or-less distinct stages: 1) artistic creation, 2) distribution, 3) reception, 4) the seeing or "reading" of the film, and 5) theoretical reflection. The last two stages of the process are the areas in which film study needs to be developed, Noguez says, "for the simple reason that, in France at any rate, practically no teaching of this type is available at all in or out of the university, whereas instruction corresponding to the first three stages either is available at certain universities, or else can be obtained elsewhere."

Gerald O'Grady sets out the four main areas of current confusion and disagreement about the teaching of film in the form of four questions:

1. Should film criticism or film appreciation be taught, as they are in most colleges and universities which have recently added such courses, by members of the traditional departments in the humanities, such as English, French, classics?
2. Should such courses be taught solely by departments of communication or of journalism and speech or of radio/television/film?
3. Should art departments expand their offerings to include photography, film, and television?
4. Should the teaching of film be placed in a more general context, which might be called media studies?
O'Grady asks these questions somewhat rhetorically since he knows exactly how he would deal with the confusion and disagreement, opting for the development of "new multidisciplinary programs of media studies" which would encompass "the exploration of the creation, the aesthetics, and the psychological, social and environmental impact of the art forms of photography, cinematography, videography, radio, recordings, and tapes within the broad framework of general education in the humanities."

This confusion over the proper domain of film studies is not unique to film, but rather symptomatic of a general crumbling of boundaries between what were formerly considered distinct disciplines, as a result of the trend toward multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary study. An extremely involved but perceptive analysis of a similar confusion over the range and method of the study of communication is provided by Klaus Krippendorff.

Traditionally, Krippendorff says, an inquiry process (i.e. "any process that generates explicit as opposed to implicit knowledge") was considered coterminous with an academic discipline. Disciplines were delineated by reference to their unique investigative method, by their concern with a specific subject, or by being tied to a specific purpose. While allowing that "inquiries into communication cut across the boundaries of traditional disciplines and are not easily classifiable in their terms," Krippendorff feels that the difficulty results not from the nature of inquiries into communication, but "from an organizing principle for disciplinary differentiations that has not been used systematically in classifying approaches to knowledge." In this light, inquiries into processes of communication...

...are characterizable only by theoretical commitment...
[to] the belief that a number of observable phenomena can best be connected or understood as processes of transmission of structure [in the mathematical sense of the word].... This theoretical commitment implies the conviction that they [communication constructs] are all special incidences of, and potentially deducible from, a general theory of communication which has yet to be explicated.

(Emphasis added)

On the basis of this assumption, Krippendorff proceeds to differentiate among modes of inquiry into communication by reference to the aim of each, and the portion of the "real world" each selects to deal with. In this regard, he distinguishes among three fundamentally different approaches: the praxiological, the scientific and the axiomatic. While a praxiology of communication is concerned with "prescriptive and instrumental knowledge about communications that claims to yield specified results subsequent to implementation...[being] governed in part by considerations of utility and...[being] validated in action, (emphasis added) a science of communication is concerned with the more limited aim of formulating theories that have...predictive validity solely in terms of observational truth--such truth being obtained without the necessity of manipulating the environment towards desired states, as is the case with the praxiological mode. The axiomatic mode of inquiry is even more abstract than the scientific mode, in that it is not restricted to existing systems of communication, but rather deals with "all possible systems of communication and control whether existing or only
conceivable." Simply stated, the focus of the axiomatic mode is on "formal systems and consequent theorems; its introspective operation [internal mechanisms] is formal extension." According to Krippendorff, this final mode of inquiry "has come to be identified with the term and body of knowledge provided by cybernetics."

In addition to referring to the differences among the modes of inquiry, Krippendorff refers to the difference among domains of inquiry in attempting to explain the crumbling of boundaries between what were traditionally considered independent disciplines. Domains of inquiry is a term used to describe "emergent intellectual complexes," each of which incorporates aspects of numerous diverse fields, drawing them together in a specialization to deal with a particular communication phenomena.

For example, boundaries between psychology, psycholinguistics, computational stylistics and the philosophy of language have become less and less recognizable and workers specializing in the study of verbal communication freely shift among the respective departments...

These domains of inquiry appear to crosscut modes of inquiry—each domain seeming "to incorporate praxiological, scientific and axiomatic components in such a way that they stimulate each other productively." Admitting that many such domains are already recognizable, Krippendorff contends that there are three major ones: the domains of artificial, biological, and social systems. These domains are found to differ in the flexibility of their communication network, the extent of determinism involved in their transmission processes, the complexity of structures transmitted, the difficulty of identifying system boundaries, and the extent of external control over the type of organization of the system. More simply, these domains might be characterized as being concerned with communication processes in the areas of technology (artificial systems), nature (biological systems), and social organization (social systems).

By superimposing the modes and domains of inquiries so delineated, a typology of inquiries into communication is obtained. (See diagram) The modes of inquiry are represented by concentric circles; the major domains of inquiry by sections. "The resulting intersections of modes and domains of inquiries are given names, the current usage of which corresponds most closely to the designated type of inquiry."

Most people concerned with the future shape of film studies may fail to recognize the relevance of Krippendorff's analysis for their situation. While they would probably agree that the scope of such studies could not be delimited either by reference to a unique investigative method or by being tied to a specific purpose, many would assert that a discipline concerned with a specific subject--"film." And, in all likelihood, most of these people would accept Hollis Frampton's statement that "a film may be defined operationally as 'whatever will pass through a projector'." This attitude would constitute an improvement over the type of intellectual disdain toward "television" films that Emile De Antonio describes:

In 1963 Richard Roud excluded Point of Order from the New York Film Festival on the ground that it was television and not film. Eight years later the distinction
Krippendorff's Typology of Inquiries into Communication
seems reactionary and short-sighted; even then it was old-maidish, faddist and self-serving. It's not where it comes from that matters but what is projected. Anything that can go through a projector is film, [to borrow Frampton's definition]...Three months later Roud made the discovery that Point of Order was a film, after all, and invited it to the London Festival.13

Such an approach, however, still precludes us from dealing with the works of VanDerBeek, DeWitt, Bartlett and the other "underground filmmakers" who have taken to working with videotape;14 it also presents the prospect of not being able to deal with the works of Jean-Luc Godard in the future, since Godard said that he intends (intended?) to work with videotape when it becomes more economically feasible to do so.15 While not having to deal with the video freaks or Godard may be attractive to a large proportion of film teachers and students, I am not convinced that such a pose is any less "reactionary and short-sighted" or "old-maidish, faddist, and self-serving" than Roud's initial reaction to Point of Order. Such an attitude is really a form of technological elitism based on the mystique of technique. Granted there are obvious differences between the media of film and videotape, but these are more along the lines of channel differences than inherent code differences16 and should themselves become objects of study rather than reasons for discrimination against videotape. I am not sure how to resolve this problem; the simplest way would be to amend Frampton's definition to also include anything that could be played on a VTR. The theoretical issues raised by this matter, however, require more thought than such a simple answer entails. A more meaningful approach would be studies directed along the parameters which Worth feels "when defined, can become a starting point describing the structural elements of a film language."

These parameters are an image in motion over time in space with sequence--including as an overlay a matrix of sound, color, smell, taste, and other as yet unknown technological or sensory stimuli.17 Krippendorff, in dealing with the issue of definition in delineating the typology of inquiries into communication, strove for "a fairly abstract and sufficiently general definition" of the term "communication." Our concern in defining "film"--and consequently establishing the parameters of its study, to a large extent--should be the same.

Krippendorff's typology of inquiries into communication also indicates the direction that film study could take. In fact, given Krippendorff's definition of communication as "a process of transmission of structure among the parts of a system which are identifiable in time and space," film could also be considered a form of communication.18 More concretely, film is a form of visual communication, which Worth defines as "the transmission of a signal, perceived primarily through visual receptors, treated as a message, from which content or meaning is inferred."19 Film is most logically located in the domain of social systems, and its study would involve both a praxiological and scientific mode of inquiry.
The praxiological mode of inquiry would consist of the formulation of goals and the asking of questions; in addition, it would involve the making of films. Much controversy surrounds the assertion that people who study or comment on films should know how to make films. Gerald O’Grady, for example, warns that anyone contemplating teaching film should be warned that he has no business becoming a serious film teacher until he acquires grounding in the tools and techniques of the medium;20 Dominique Noguez asserts that “the cinema, more than anywhere else, theoretical teaching cannot be fruitful unless it goes hand in hand with practical work;21 courses concentrating on the analysis and aesthetic evaluation of specific films have demonstrated that the exacting academic standards often associated with the study of filmmaking are actually academic hurdles that students quickly and easily possess an understanding of filmic equipment (cameras, editing tables, sound equipment, etc.) and to filmic creation.”21

In this regard, some film critics—perhaps particularly defensive about this issue—assert that you don’t have to be able to make a cake to know when you’re eating a good one (or a bad one); however, as Ernest Callenbach asserts, “criticism cannot in fact rely upon ‘taste’ alone.”22 The point in insisting upon having film students make films is to increase their awareness of film’s technological possibilities and practical limitations, to give them a “feel” for the process, and to bring them into contact with the reality about which they are studying.

Knowing the mechanical and intellectual processes involved in filmmaking may not make it any easier to say whether a film is good or bad; hopefully, however, it would add another dimension to the purity evaluative discussion of film which has become so pervasive as to be commonly considered the only valid form of film “criticism.”23

More generally, the desire to have students who are studying film become involved in making films, presupposes an interest in film that includes dimensions in addition to the critical—psychological, sociological, cultural, economic, moral, etc.—which could provide a social and cultural, political, economic, moral, etc., context to the actual filmmaking processes.

Contrary to much common wisdom, filmmaking proper (in contrast to filmmaking being used purely as a heuristic device) is a justifiable and desirable area of concern for film study in the 70’s. Filmmaking, however, is not thought of merely as the constant repetition of mechanical skills or the polishing of established techniques, for Worth’s work with various cultural groups has demonstrated that the basics of filmmaking are quickly and easily assimilated.23 Courses consisting of a whole semester of film editing exercises, for example, devoid of any purpose other than practice—practically an absurd concept—do not make it any easier to think about the actual filmmaking process, to see them as “films” for the process, and to bring them into contact with the reality about which they are studying. Knowing the mechanical and intellectual processes involved in filmmaking may not make it any easier to say whether a film is good or bad; hopefully, however, it would add another dimension to the purity evaluative discussion of film which has become so pervasive as to be commonly considered the only valid form of film “criticism.”23

In this respect, it seems relevant to examine what Christian Metz has said about film and the types of censorship to which it is subject.24 Film is quite obviously subject to institutional forms of censorship; political censorship, i.e. “censorship properly so-called,” and economic censorship “in the name of the requirements of market-ability.”

More importantly, however, film is subject to a rather insidious form of ideological censorship which Metz calls “cinematographic plausibility.” The difference between these two main forms of censorship is...
that the institutional censorship (political and economic) is directed toward the "stuff" of the content, i.e., the subject matter, and thus represents nothing more than a categorization (brutal and vague at the same time, although incontestable at its level) of the principal "things" of which film can speak.

The censorship of the Plausible, on the other hand, is directed at the form of the content—that is to say, at how the film speaks about its subject rather than the subject itself, hence at what it says, the real content.

There are two avenues of escape from the Plausible, according to Metz: the first is to make films that are "true to their genre"; the second is to make "truly new films." The second alternative is the preferable goal for this expressive aspect of film study to pursue, since as students and teachers, we are, or at least should be, concerned with the expansion of both knowledge and technique, rather than the continual repetition of existing forms.

This situation can only be achieved if filmmaking is taught, not as a craft which will enable the student to find his place in the motion picture industry upon graduation, but rather as a method of inquiry and form of expression which, in the words of Yves de Laurot, allows the student to "express the truth, whose aspects are at once personal and universal." 25 And in this quest to express the truth, the filmmaker must develop a "very thorough, resolute and self-disciplined theoretical praxis...[since] the real dilemma for filmmakers today is not a choice between theory and practice.

The theoretical matters of the praxiological mode are essentially philosophical, ethical, and political—in the broadest sense of the word. They involve the asking of questions, the setting of goals, and the establishment of priorities:

- What is the role of history as opposed to reflection?
- How is creativity to be channelled?
- What is the relationship between art and politics?
- etc.

Since these are matters that go beyond the strictly filmic, the education of film students must go beyond the strictly filmic, and should encompass philosophy, aesthetics, politics, economics, history, literature, etc.

Few, if any of us may be capable of becoming "hombres clúster"—the men of cinema that Christian Metz described, and on which our education centers. It does seem desirable, however, that much of the academic estrangement prevalent in today's university be avoided by "students" of film, so that they may make meaningful contributions to the world at large, be they teachers, filmmakers, or critics. This is the real dilemma for filmmakers today.
justifies the requirement for a broad-based education as noted above:

...the fourth stage...calls into play a very large number of disciplines: in order to be able to see, decode and interpret a film we need (ideally) to be able not only to situate it in the history of the cinema in the author's work, and in a precise cultural and artistic context, but also to be able to apply to it all the existing critical grids (structural, thematic, philosophical, political, psychoanalytical, etc.), and be capable of weighing up its ideological status and role.

On the basis of these requirements, film criticism as presently practiced--be it the rarefied aestheticism of John Simon, the rank-ordering auteurism of Andrew Sarris, the engaging spontaneity of Pauline Kael, the enumeration of recurrent themes, archetypes and antinomies by the structuralists, etc.--would normally fall far short of the ideal, as is well documented by Ernest Callenbach.

Lee Atwell is as equally disappointed at the lack of perceptive historical studies--available in English at least--as Callenbach is of the lack of substantial critical writings:

For the film teacher and student, one of the most distressing aspects of film scholarship in this country is that much of the most provocative literature in film is only accessible to those with a good reading knowledge of Modern European languages....In history we have only Iris Barry's skillful though unfortunately abridged translation of Bardèche and Brasillach. Sticking to the works available in English, there is scarcely a single other volume that can be recommended without serious, sometimes embarrassing qualifications. True, we do have excellent specialized studies....But what of the broader cross-cultural perspective? Here we find a familiar and perhaps inevitable American phenomenon: the popularization of what is already assured to be a popular art form...[such works being] all justly informative, but lacking in scope and significant insights....

A shift in emphasis in film studies toward the type of comprehensive film-centered education suggested, will no doubt in the long run, produce the caliber of "scholar" who will write film criticism and film history with the depth and substance that Callenbach and Atwell presently find lacking.

If the praxiological mode of film study could be considered the realm of "what film can and should be," the scientific mode would be considered the realm of "what film is"--its characteristics and the mechanisms by which it works. The scientific study of film differs importantly from its praxiological study, which is predominantly prescriptive, in that it is primarily descriptive and analytical. In Krippendorff's terms, it is concerned with theories having predictive validity rather than dealing with...
philosophical matters of ontology, epistemology, axiology, etc. and practical matters of technique--and in the process eschews manipulating the environment towards desired states.

This scientific mode is what Vogues has described as the fifth stage of the filmic process--theoretical reflection. Such theoretical reflection is "the stage of abstract of empirical research" which "cannot be reached without a very advanced conceptual apparatus and a rigorous methodology." In addition, this stage cannot be considered to be independent as the other stages largely can, since it uses the other stages as raw material for its operations "...the cinema can be the object of theoretical reflection which can be directed upon any of the stages, and of the component parts of the cinematic "process.""30 In other words, it is possible for there to be theoretical studies dealing with artistic creation in the cinema, the distribution of films, the reception process in filmviewing, and the seeing or "reading" of films.

As described here, the scientific mode of inquiry also has a certain affinity to Metz's description of filmology. Filmology is...

Metz differentiates filmology from "the theory of the cinema," the latter being "a fundamental reflection" practiced by someone involved in some aspect of the institution of cinema. While this may be a useful distinction, it has been more clearly established by Andrew Tudor in his discussion of the differences among film philosophy, film aesthetics and film theory:

Film aesthetics...[is] a set of criteria (implicit or explicit, consistent or inconsistent) which are employed to judge the 'quality' of a film...Film philosophy is related to film aesthetics in the sense that it is concerned with the grounding of the specific aesthetic standards...Film theory, finally...[is] a body of work which makes certain assertions about the manner in which film functions, communicates, etc., these assertions in effect being hypotheses which may then be tested according to the normal canons of verification and falsification.32

By introducing the requirement of the possibility of empirical testing, Tudor puts film theory on the same footing as all scientific theory, making it is more meaningful term than it presently is--being quite imprecise but generally suggesting all that which is apart from practice. This requirement would also seem to indicate that Metz's classification "filmology" is more accurately labelled "theory," while his classification "theory" seems more akin to philosophy or aesthetics, or a hybrid of the two. In elaborating these distinctions, Tudor also manages to suggest...
(by extension) that the controversy between Bazin and Eisenstein exists at a philosophical or aesthetic level rather than a theoretical level, explaining in large part the failure of either to enunciate an adequate theory of film. When one is involved in justifying a method of judging the "value" of a film or refuting the validity of another such method, one is involved in a praxiological endeavor that differs profoundly from science (i.e. theory building and testing) in its basic characteristics.

This scientific mode--Noguez's fifth stage of the filmic process or Hetz's filmology--has remained a relatively impoverished area of film study. Little attention has been paid to the process of creation at the individual level in filmmaking, although director studies of a "popular" kind proliferate. At the macro-level, George Huaco's "causal account of the rise and fall of three stylistically homogeneous waves of film art in terms of the presence or absentences of four structural factors" might be considered such a scientific study of creation but its shortcomings indicate the amount of work that has to be done in this area. The most fruitful examples, in this regard, might be studies of aesthetic creativity in the other arts--suggested methodologies to be employed, variables to be studied, and questions to be asked. Another avenue of research concentrating on the creation stage, but directed at production activity where filmmaking is viewed as a form of communication rather than the creation of art, has been suggested by Chalfen and called "sociovidistics." This approach is described at length elsewhere in this volume. (See pp. Achtenberg has made a similar proposal for a social-psychological study of the role of the film director.

The stage of distribution would not seem to be amenable to the strictest form of scientific study--the experimental paradigm--as the other areas are, but it is open to less rigorous (but often more meaningful) forms of empirical study. Distribution is essentially an economic function, although of course, there are the inevitable political aspects. Economics is an area of the cinema of which most people involved with the study of films exhibit a profound ignorance, if not a complete unconcern. Despite this attitude, there are a number of works dealing with the economic aspects of the cinema; however, most of these works are probably not what Noguez envisages as theoretical reflection. One work that does come to mind as an admirable model for future works to emulate is Thomas J. Guback's *The International Film Industry* which manages to be, at one and the same time, a theoretical reflection on both the economic and political aspects of international film distribution.

The reception stage of the filmic process, according to Noguez, deals with problems "such as how the film is perceived, and what is its social impact." The former would appear to be the natural province of perceptual psychology, but the interest which that science has demonstrated toward film has been slight indeed. Julian Hochberg has spent a great deal of time attempting to discover the perceptual mechanisms at work in the connecting of shots for various classes of cuts, but the meticulousness of his methodology and the level at which his study is aimed, has been such as to limit him to dealing with rather elementary types of transitions. Apart from Hochberg, one must go back to the work of Arnheim, Münterberg, and Buckle to discover psychologists who have speculated upon the mechanisms involved in the perception of film.
A more recent development in the area of semiology has seen different writers present varying theories about how films are perceived--basing their arguments on their conceptions of the relationship between the film sign and the reality that it reproduces or represents. Lesage deals with these writers in sufficient detail elsewhere in this volume (pp. ) to make a recounting of their theories unnecessary. It should be noted, however, in the case of semiological explanations, that the distinction between theories of perception and theories concerning the "reading" of a film is often difficult to establish.

Noguez himself admits of a degree of arbitrariness in breaking the filmic process into stages, attempting to differentiate the third stage from the fourth on the basis of the number of skills required and the degree of understanding or "meaning" attained in each: "if not everybody can really see a film [fourth stage], everybody can receive it [third stage], with or without training, with or without 'culture'." More generally, this can be seen as a problem of disentangling processes of perception, cognition and interpretation--which in Noguez's case have been divided into two stages, each of which appears to contain some cognitive elements. These are areas which require further study, since--contrary to what Noguez contends--there have been at least anecdotal reports of people of various cultures (especially "primitive" peoples) who have been unable to "receive" motion pictures, prompting two writers to suggest the existence of a five-step ladder of film literacy. Segall, Campbell and Herskovits have produced some empirical support for such a notion.

A more satisfactory approach to dealing with the study of the three processes might be to combine the processes of perception and cognition, and consider the process of interpretation separately. Such an approach would correspond to Metz's distinction between a semiology of the cinema (explaining, or at least investigating, the basic "communicative" mechanisms of all films) and the structural/textual analysis of a single film (in which all "codes" embedded throughout an entire film are examined). The former would supplant, and at the same time expand, Noguez's concept of the third stage, while the latter can be considered equivalent to Noguez's fourth stage--a thorough, enlightening explication des textes.

Noguez has further confused the nature of the third stage by suggesting the inclusion of the question of the social impact of films. That area would seem to be of such scope as to deserve consideration as a distinct stage--if not chronologically separable from the stages of reception and "reading," at least logically separable. This stage would involve the study of the attitude-formation-and-change type at the individual level--such studies being the major focus of "effects studies" in communication--as well as more wide-reaching considerations of the influence of films on the formation, maintenance and change of belief-systems and value-systems, and on the specific configuration of the worldview of any given individual, society or culture. Studies of this scope are presently nonexistent--at least to the knowledge of this writer.

Finally, the scientific mode of film study deals with the stage of interpreting a film. The only work which has attempted to deal systematically with the bases of judgment in interpretation is Tudor's "Sociological
Perspectives on Film Aesthetics," noted above. Tudor's work is, by his own admission, "very much a 'working paper' in the sense that certain threads of argument are not as completely worked out as might ideally be desirable." Nevertheless, the distinctions that he draws among film philosophy, film aesthetics and film theory, the classificatory scheme that he delineates for systems of aesthetics, the levels of meaning that he outlines, and the suggestion concerning the existence of 'master-standards' provide a useful starting point and valuable suggestions for future study in this area.

Such are the myriad ways, then, in which films can be "studied." It would seem to me that the only adequate approach to such a dynamic entity would be to integrate all the approaches described herein, in a meaningful 'combination of doing, seeing and thinking.' For as Ernest Callenbach observes, "we are now...coming to a point where both of these emphases [humanities and social science] seem limited and insufficient, and people seem to be getting ready to try integrating them, to deal with film as an art that is inherently political even in the most apolitical hands." Dominique Aoguez, despite his deemphasis (in the following quotation at least) of the contribution of the "theoretical praxis" of filmmaking to knowledge and enlightenment—a contribution I find immense—best summarizes the form that film study should take in the 70's:

In our opinion, cinema study will only deserve a place in the university if it can be rigorously and methodically conducted. It cannot and must not be treated as a mere academic diversion, a sub-discipline devoted to insipid exchange of views and banal pseudo-sociology. The ideal film teaching programme must indeed include some discussion of the social dimension of the phenomenon, and will need to make use of the existing audio-visual services, but its priority must be the study of film as a cultural creation, an art, a system of symbolic devices and an ideological product. It should not aim to turn out technicians capable of concocting advertising films or businessman capable of exploiting the commercial possibilities of the medium and the public, so much as teachers, historians, critics or even simple cinéphiles. This viewpoint on cinema study, which we will call the 'cultural' for want of a better term, and also to distinguish it from those which are based on a profound antipathy to culture, cannot neglect any of the instruments of analysis and research offered by disciplines centred on comparable cultural objects (literary studies, art history, etc.). Like these disciplines, cinema study will thus be able to contribute to the great work of interpreting the totality of social phenomena so urgently called for, each in his own way, by such thinkers as Marx, Freud, Saussure, Francais and Panofsky.
FOOTNOTES


2. DeFleur mentions several factors other than the advent of television that caused the decline in magnitude of movie audiences. Melvin L. DeFleur, *Theories of Mass Communication*, (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 42-3. Even if television did not have as great an impact on movies as McLuhan asserts, it is still interesting to note that the status of film as art did not achieve prominence until well after television had supplanted the movies as the number one entertainment medium.


5. Zappa is well known for the contempt he holds for his youthful audience. He has been reported to have said about the typical rock fan that he "wouldn't know a good piece of music if it bit him on the ass." One particular Zappa antic involved him asking for requests from the audience and assigning each request to a different member of the Mothers of Invention. When everyone had been assigned a request, the group began to play--each Mother playing his own tune. This continued for several minutes. The audience loved it.


15. "Videotape is still very expensive—if not, we would have done it with videotape. I think in five or six years we'll be able to, especially when the video cassette is better developed. But it will still be very expensive." Michael Goodwin, Tom Luddy and Naomi Wise, "The Liziga Vertov Film Group in America: An Interview with Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin," Take One, Vol. 2, No. 10, Mar.-Apr. 1970, p. 15.


18. Such a definition is in contradistinction to the notion of communication that Nogues finds so abhorrent when applied to film—Nogues's notion being more akin to interaction. "...the cinema is a one-way means of communication." The only exchange which takes place at the cinema—which can scarcely be regarded as communication—is when the member of the public hands over his money at the box office and gets a ticket in exchange..." Nogues, op. cit., p. 133.


22. Callenbach, op. cit., p. 22.

23. "First, we proposed to determine the feasibility of teaching the use of film to people with another culture. Worth had already shown that this could be done with eleven-to-fourteen-year-old Negro dropouts in Philadelphia and with college students in a school of communications. Since then, many others have worked with a variety of cultural groups, such as Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Negroes, ranging in age down to 8 years. Although methods and aims varied, almost everyone could be taught to use motion picture cameras.

   We have found that with limited instruction Navajos can be taught to conceive, photograph and edit 16 mm. silent films." Sol Worth and John Adair, "Navajo Filmmakers," American Anthropologist, 72:10-34, pp. 11-12, 1970. Worth reports the Navajo learned to film and edit in approximately two days and made complete silent films in the course of a summer.


27. See MacBean, ibid., for a discussion of Rocha's and Godard's position on some of these matters. Yves de Laurot answers one of the most fundamental questions as follows: "For cinema's function concretely is to re-create the values and feelings which have been atrophied in this society precisely for the purpose of returning them to man and to revolution, of reinstating in the American the capacity for projection and, therefore, for moving from liberation to freedom. Thus, as engaged filmmakers it is our task to apply ourselves towards the recreation on the screen of an authentic definition of man and, thereby, prove--despite the prevalent defeatism, cynicism, self-absorption, and despair--that man and Mankind are possible." "Yves de Laurot Defines Cinema Engagé," op. cit., p. 15.


31. Christian Metz, "Cinema: Language or System of Communication?" 1969, p. 32, translated by Christopher King from "Le cinéma: langue ou langage?" in Essais sur la signification au cinéma, (Paris: Editions Klinckseck, 1969). By this statement I believe Metz means that these people from outside, being scientists rather than filmmakers, critics, historians, etc., are interested in films abstractly--as a means of providing observational truth about predictive theories, to allude to Krippendorff's notion again--rather than as a means of communication or an art form, etc. that exist as individual concrete examples, i.e. as particular films. This would seem to be the extreme version of the "film-as-phenomenon" attitude that Jameson is skeptical of. (See quote on p. 1.)


33. In this regard, Henderson, op. cit., p. 37 claims that neither Eisenstein nor Bazin managed to "achieve a complete aesthetic even of the sequence." (Emphasis added) While Henderson claims to be discussing "theory," he does in fact examine aesthetics and philosophy--jumping from level to level from time to time. An explicit recognition of the differences
between the three terms would eliminate conceptual confusions that are often a result of, or can lead to, terminological confusions.

34. It can be argued, however, that science too has its philosophical or "ideological" tenets—usually unexamined and unconsciously held. Note, for example, the comments of Anton C. Zijderveld: "...sociological positivism, the belief that gathered data and constructed modes can be taken as a full account of life and society, is the basic philosophy of too many social scientists and represents a fatal form of social meta- physics. It is one of the most fallacious distortions of genuinely objective and empirical research. Afraid of metaphysics, these empiricists retreat to a positivistic standpoint where they are not aware of the value judgments and normative assumptions that 'secretly' enter their research and theoretical models." Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society: A Cultural Analysis of Our Time, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), p. 4.


37. For example, there are 46 titles listed under the "economics" heading in the Larry Edwards Bookshop Cinema Catalogue.


43. Moguez, op. cit., p. 130.


46. "That (the logified description of the mass of codes identified as specifically cinematic) is indeed the object of the semiotics of the cinema. But it is not that of the structural analysis of film. The object of the latter is the particular structure of each film taken as a whole: we must then take into account all the codes that appear in the film under consideration, and whether they are specific to the cinema or not. These, it seems to me, are two fundamental approaches: related, complementary, and yet distinct, because they do not both obey the same principle of pertinency. One can trace a single code through several texts; one can grasp a single text through all its codes. The first approach is the study of codes (a code always appears in several texts), and the second is the study of texts (a text always involves several codes)." Raymond Bellour and Christian Metz, "Conversation on the Semiotics of the Cinema," 1972, p. 13, translated by Frank Fogarty from "Entretien sur la semiologie dis cinema," Semiotica, Vol. iv, No. 1, 1971.

47. Andrew Tudor outlines the problems involved in this kind of "effects" research in his article, "Film and the Measurement of Its Effects," Screen, Vol. 10, No. 4 & 5, July/October 1969.


Studies of filmic adaptations of literary works often take the original novel, short story or play as a starting point and use it almost like a checklist in comparing it to the film detail by detail. In some, but not all cases, the original is then used as a standard in judging the adaptation so that films which deviate greatly from the novel are considered inferior to those which are more faithful to the original. The normative aspects of this procedure have been shown to be critically lacking too often to need repetition here. Detail comparison, however, which continues its unenlightening path as ever, has yet to be rejected.

Any work of literature brings together its various aspects according to principles of organization some of which are peculiar to itself and some of which it shares with other works of literature. The same is true for films. These principles may be ancient conventions or new inventions but without them the critic can scarcely explain the reasons why the various parts of the work are put together as they are. The present paper was originally written as an exercise in searching for the essential differences in the organizing principles of an original literary work and its filmic adaptation. It was written for a seminar in film criticism, thus I chose works which seemed to present problems to critics because of the peculiar position of the works outside the usual genres.

There are two aspects of Jules and Jim that I want to discuss in this paper. First, since the mixture of comic, tragic and other elements in the two works seem to confuse critics, I want to see if we can find some basic structure in the action of the two works. Second, I want to consider the way in which the different means used by the two works reflect different sorts of interests which they present to the audience.

The most common means of finding the essential nature of the actions of mimetic works is to compare them with other similar works in their genres. But since, as I mentioned above, the present works lie outside the more common genres, we have to look elsewhere for clues as to what sort of actions they represent.

If we abstract the essential oppositions of characters and the structural principles used in the conventional genres out of their historical and social conditions, we will find that what on the surface seem to be totally different sets of conventions may have underlying structures that are very similar. This idea is the basis for Northrop Frye's essay Archetypal Criticism: Theory of Myths in which he discusses the "...narrative pre-generic elements of literature which I shall call mythoi or generic plots."\(^1\) In addition to the usefulness Frye's theory has in the analysis of individual works, it has also been used to demonstrate more clearly the lines of continuity in such traditional genres as the detective story and the western.\(^2\)
However, I want to use Frye in this paper to aid in the search for the essential plot structures in the two forms of Jules and Jim. To begin with, Frye sets out four general categories of mythoi. "Romance" is defined as an adventure and the "element that gives literary form to the romance is the quest." The usual outcome of the quest is "the exaltation of the hero."

In Jules and Jim we are not dealing with a single hero but with a pair of heroes. Whatever adventure is found in the action, the general movement of the works cannot be called a quest. Finally, the culmination of the works is not in an exaltation of the hero(es). Jules survives but he is merely relieved at doing so. Thus Jules and Jim is not a romance.

But perhaps Jules and Jim is a satire. "As structure, the central principle of ironic myth is best approached as a parody of romance: the application of romantic mythical forms to a more realistic content which fits them in unexpected ways." If this is the case, the fact that the present two works lack the essentials of romance, even in parodied form, i.e., the quest and the heroic exaltation, would indicate that we are probably not considering a satire or an ironic work as Frye defines it.

If we consider the death of Jim and Catherine (she is called Kate in the novel but in this paper I will use the name Catherine to refer to both the novel's and the film's heroine) which comes at the end of the two works, we might want to call them tragedies. But Frye describes two aspects of tragedy which would militate against the idea. First, he says that, "In full tragedy the main characters are emancipated from dream, an emancipation which is at the same time a restriction, because the order of nature is present." Second, our essential impression in tragedy is of the "tragic hero as disturbing a balance in nature, nature being conceived as an order stretching over the two kingdoms of the visible and the invisible, a balance which sooner or later must right itself."

In Jules and Jim, far from being 'emancipated from dream', the characters live in a 'world far from reality, isolated from the normal world. Further, though the characters are in a situation which might be considered as moving from imbalance to balance, the emphasis is not on the natural world righting itself but on acts of willful destruction.

Finally, we come to the conventions of comedy. The immediate impulse is to reject comedy as a possibility because of the ending in death. But this is premature. Though some forms of comedy require a happy ending, this is not the case with all forms. Indeed, there are many forms of comedy which are able to contain tragic elements. And, there are many individual works which, though dominated by the conventions of comedy, and in death and/or destruction. To see Jules and Jim as an essentially comic work we must try to determine which comic form will account for the work's humorous and tragic elements.

In addition to differentiating between the four general mythoi, Frye divides each mythos into six phases. To see how Jules and Jim fits into Frye's comic scheme, let us consider for a moment how that scheme is constructed.
The question of the new society and its relation to the old is, for Frye, the central concern of comedy, "...the movement of comedy is usually a movement from one kind of society to another." While it is not possible to consider here the functions of all of the phases of comedy as Frye sees them, we may note that the first,

"...five phases of comedy may be seen as sequences of stages in the life of the redeemed society. Purely ironic comedy [the first phase] exhibits this society in its infancy, swaddled and smothered by the society it should replace. Quixotic comedy [the second phase] exhibits it in adolescence, still too ignorant of the many ways of the world to impose itself. In the third phase it comes to maturity and triumphs; in the fourth phase it is mature and established. In the fifth it is a part of the settled order which has been there from the beginning, an order which takes on an increasingly religious cast and seems to be draining away from human experience altogether."

"At this point too comedy proper enters its final or sixth phase, the phase of the collapse and disintegration of the comic society. In this phase the social units of comedy become small and esoteric, or even confined to a single individual. Secret and sheltered places, forests in moonlight, secluded valleys and happy islands become more prominent as does the pensiero mood of romance, the love of the occult and the marvelous, the sense of individual detachment from human existence."

In trying to place Jules and Jim into this scheme there are two questions which must be answered. First we must find out whether or not the idea of the new society is essential to the works, and second, we must see how the progress of the new society fits into the six phases.

If we take the idea of the new society as a theme, we will find it throughout the two works. The relationship between the two heroes embodies this idea in many ways. First, Jules and Jim share an interest in writing which brings them very close to one another. The novel tells us "They sat up late at night, each teaching the other the language and literature of his own country. They showed each other one another's poems and translated them together." The novel does not make as strong a point of the literary aspect of their friendship as the film which includes more references to particular literary questions. Thus, the novel often makes such statements as "Jules began talking to Jim about literary topics," without mentioning what the 'topics' are. The film, on the other hand, brings up the ideas of individual figures such as "a Swedish author" and Baudelaire. There is also a scene in the film which shows Jules translating Jim's book into German. Though this scene is just a fragment, it does function dramatically as more than a simple illustration. In it we are given a hint that Jim is against Jules marriage to Catherine. The line translated is "Dann ist es wohl besser fur diesen Mann, nicht zu heiraten." [Then it is probably better for this man not to get married.] What is being said about Jim's fictional character can be applied in the mind of the viewer to Jules.
The literary interests of Jules and Jim set them off from most other people including Catherine. It is Jules' literary conversation in both the novel and the film which causes him to offend Catherine leading her to jump into the river. This opposition is made somewhat differently in the novel where Catherine is a painter who eventually takes on the burden of supporting the family. In the film, she is not shown in any occupation.

In the areas outside their professional interests, their relationship transcends the ties of patriotism, love and marriage. A succession of love affairs, a war and an unhappy marriage cannot pull them apart. Even the affair between Jim and Catherine does not impair the feelings of Jules and Jim for one another. Their relationship is thus a new world.

But then, Catherine is herself a new sort of woman. In an age when married women were expected to be the slaves of their husbands, she is a distinctly independent soul. The comparisons of Catherine with Napoleon in the film and Friedrich the Great in the novel, in addition to their other functions, serve to put her into our minds as a fully independent human being who has thrown off the traditional role of the woman. Even Therese, with her bed hopping, bragging and self-vilified rejection of lovers, is a comic model of a new sort of woman.

But is the question of the new society more than a theme? Is it an essential part of the informing principle which underlies the structure of each of the works? If it is, then the coming, operation or destruction of that society will characterize the essential action of the work and we will be able to fit it into one of the phases of comedy as Frye has outlined them.

There is at least one way in which the works might deceive us with regard to the question. From the perspective of Catherine's relationship with Jim, the new world has yet to come. Their relationship centers on the idea that they are exploring a new kind of love. The symbol of the achievement of this love, however illusory, is the child which Catherine wants to have with Jim. One place in which we are told this aspect of their relationship is in Jim's thoughts. We are told that Jim thought, "it's a fine thing to rediscover the laws of human life..." But in both cases he expresses despair at having failed.

The question is whether or not this coming world, as projected by Catherine and Jim and their failure to achieve it, is the event which dominates the works or whether there is some other, more basic action. I would contend that the essential feature of the works is the relationship between Jules and Jim as an ideal of human conduct which is already achieved and that the demonstration of the strength of this relationship in the face of the progressively worsening relationship between Jim and Catherine provides the essential action of the plot. Put another way, Jules and Jim have, in their friendship, an ideal world. But through the destructive relationship between Jim and Catherine, which is in itself a futile attempt to establish an ideal world, the relationship between Jules and Jim is shown, their ideal world is shown, to be vulnerable only to death. Jules and Jim is thus in its action a comedy in the sixth phase, the "collapse and destruction of the comic society". In this way, both the comic and the tragic elements become reconciled to one another.
But what about the rest of the situation, does it fit into the sixth phase? Indeed, the social units are small, as one would expect, being concentrated for the most part on three characters. The action is often isolated in 'secluded valleys' such as the house Jules and Jim rent on the coast or Jules and Catherine's chalet. Finally, we feel the 'individual detachment from routine existence,' particularly in the fact that the heroes are writers and can do their work wherever they please.

Having shown in roughest outline the kind of plot represented in the two works, we may now proceed to consider the way in which the action progresses within the works. I would like first to make a few comments on the general form of plots. As in other forms of literature, drama and film, the comic plot may be linear or episodic. The linear plot begins by establishing a situation with some instability in the relations between the characters or with the characters in some sort of a predicament. Through a more or less direct progression, the linear plot returns the situation to stability or orings the characters out of their predicament. In the linear plot, this instability to stability movement underlies the action of the whole work. The episodic plot sets a character or characters into a situation in which the movement from instability to stability is repeated or reversed cyclically a number of times. The end of the work may coincide with the end of one of the cycles, but it need not. The essence of this form is a sort of perpetual motion. What this sort of plot lacks is a visible development from the beginning to the end.

The plot of the present novel and film partake of aspects of both of these general plot types but do not fit neatly into either of them. To the extent that the introduction of Catherine into the relationship between Jules and Jim creates an unstable situation, which is resolved by her killing herself and Jim, the plot resembles the linear plot. However, the interactions of the characters do not clearly progress in a straight line. The motion of the plot is a series of cycles each composed of a group of episodes. The cycles show love affairs being established, enjoyed and then broken. With the coming of Catherine, each cycle puts greater pressure on the relationship between Jules and Jim, something like a series of tests. The progressively destructive cycles, through which Jules and Jim's friendship endures, imply the end but do not develop towards it in the conventional sense.

There is an essential difference between the cyclic motions found in the first part of the novel and those found in the film. In the first part of the novel both Jules and Jim have love affairs with a series of girls. Sometimes these affairs are independent and sometimes Jules and Jim exchange girls. But what is important about these affairs is that they show us the motivations within the two heroes which cause them to have the sort of relations with women that they do. The cyclic affairs would exist with or without Catherine, though without her they might not reach the extrem. But what are these 'motivations'?

Jim is very aware of his partner's needs and desires. He is attracted to independent women just as he himself is independent. One of the things he needs most, and expects his women to need, is variety. His relationships end either by his simply getting someone new or by his partner leaving with someone new.
In either case, what happens is just part of the game, she could leave me or I could leave her, and neither one of us would bat an eyelid. 13

Jules, on the other hand, is not really aware of what his partners are like or what they need. Nor is he aware of what he himself is like. He is even less aware of how others see him. His relations with women are characterized by the way in which he at first idealizes a girl and then, having established a relation with her, proceeds to become indifferent. At this point he begins to talk about what really interests him. His dominating conversation and unkind remarks generally alienate his partners and cause them to leave him and he wonders why.

By the time Jules and Jim meet Catherine in the novel we know pretty well how they will treat her. Though the film tells us about a succession of relationships, it does not involve us as deeply in their psycho-dynamics.

But this is beginning to sound like the two works are deadly serious. To see how they are comic perhaps we ought to consider some of Frye’s comments about the way in which comedy proceeds and see how Jules and Jim compares with these comments. Frye’s analysis of the comic action centers around the types of characters found in comedy and their functions. He sees four character types dominating comedy, “the alazons or impostors, the eirons or self-deprecaters, and the buffoons,” and the “agirokos or churlish, literally rustic.” As to their general functions he says, “The contest between the eiron and the alazon forms the basis of the comic action, and the buffoon and churl polarize the comic mood.” 19

Just as the buffoon-like antics of Therese and Odile set off Jules and Jim, their opposite in the buffoon-agirokos comic contrast is found in Albert, Catherine’s lover. One form of the agirokos is the “straight man, the solemn or inarticulate character who allows the humor to bounce off him, so to speak.” 20 In the novel we are told, “Albert was correct and ordinary.” 21 His role as the butt of ironic commentary is seen in many places. After a visit with Jules, Jim and Catherine, “they discussed him. Jules, who was happy and hilarious, asked what she had done to charm him.” 22 In the film, after Catherine has gone off with Albert to shock Jules and Jim, the latter says, “I’m surprised she didn’t choose a no-man to play-the part. Albert has done it so many times before.” To which Jules-replies, “why? Albert was perfect for this evening.” 23 A similar function is played by Catherine’s other lovers.

But what about Catherine? Her spontaneous actions, such as her jump into the Seine, might impel us at first to put her into the class with the buffoons. Indeed, she is one of the unconventional young women. Yet she is also the person who leaves her husband and children for other men, who tries to commit suicide and who finally succeeds in killing herself and Jim. Though at times she resembles the buffoon figure, the demonic element in her dominate as she continually tries to inflict pain on others. Because of this she is essentially a blocking figure, an alazon.

Frye has other comments on this type of figure that may be helpful here. The female alazon is rare: “Catherine the shrew” [in Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew] represents to some extent a female miles gloriosus [boasting soldier], and
the precious ridicule a female pedant. He goes on to say that this figure, which, "stands in the way of the true heroine", is more often found in melodrama. But if, following the more conventional usage, Catherine is merely in the way of the "true heroine", then Gilberte must be that heroine and by subordinating her role the works are damaged. This would be the case if the essential action focused on the hero being kept apart from his true love. In the present works however, the focus is on the perfect relationship between two men and how it relates to a woman, however perverse she may be, that they both love. Gilberte is merely a quasi-heroine, a refuge for Jim when he is out of favor with Catherine.

There are many types of blocking figures and Catherine comes closest to the "the 'humor', the character dominated by what Pope calls a ruling passion. The humor's dramatic function is to express a state of what might be called ritual bondage. He is obsessed by his humor, and his function,..." is merely to repeat his obsession.25

In the early part of the works, the relationship cycles are dominated by the male figures who change females. Later is is Catherine who dominates as her male partners alternate. Here, the cycle is dominated by Catherine's 'obsession'. She is very sensitive to offense and demands that all attention be centered on herself. Even under the best of conditions however, she gets bored when things go to well. The majority of the action of the two works involves a series of cycles in which Catherine becomes interested in a man, has an affair with him, finds a justification for leaving and in the process of separation tries to cause her partner as much pain as possible to make up for her feeling of being injured. The 'injuries' are of four sorts, an offensive comment, an unfaithful partner, being ignored or just her own boredom.

But if Catherine is such a negative figure, why should Jules and Jim love her? Jim is attracted to her because she is his ideal of the independent woman. It is this quality that attracts him, but in order for her to be truly independent, she must also keep herself from him. To understand Jules attraction to Catherine, we must understand the fact that he is a masochist. He cannot respect a woman who truly loves him. "I shall never be able to forgive a woman for loving me."26 Catherine, in her attempts to punish him relieves him of his masochistic tensions and enables him to do his work more freely. He is, of course, of little satisfaction to Catherine in this respect. This pattern is found in both the novel and the film.

How does this affect the relationship between Jules and Jim? At the outset, Catherine's retribution is carried out by her jumping in the river, then it is running off with another man. As things progress however, she realizes that, though she can easily hurt Jules, she cannot easily move Jim. With each turn, she ups the pressure on all of them, her demonic whims becoming more evidently homicidal, until she finally kills herself and Jim. Only in death does she find release from her 'ritual bondage' and only in death is the pressure taken off the relationship between Jules and Jim.

To see Jules and Jim as a comic action, we must see how Catherine's actions are comic. In the early scenes, her retribution is obviously funny. She slaps a
face, and all have a good laugh. When she jumps in the river, even Jim cheers her on. "He felt a surge of admiration for her and mentally threw her a kiss." in the film, and, "He felt a sudden burst of admiration for her, like a lightening flash." in the novel too.

Then Catherine begins to run off with other men, there is a possibility that the comic mood may be broken. Indeed, the first time we hear that she has done so, we are sobered for a minute. But there are several things which bring us back into the realm of comedy. For one thing, Jules resigned attitude towards the matter and his unexpected request that Jim have an affair with Catherine lead us to feel that perhaps the matter isn't so serious after all. Further, by interweaving comic scenes between the serious scenes, the overall mood is lightened. Similarly, after the first few times Catherine has left, we begin to expect her to leave. As her retributive actions become more extreme, they remain comic because of their regular character. Frye observes this principle in a play. He says that in a, "...full length tragedy plodding glumly through...seven drownings one after another, the audience would [be] ...helpless with unsympathetic laughter long before it was over."28

But why must we laugh in Jules and Jim? If we omit the humor and merely show two friends who bravely persist in their friendship through thick and thin, we have the makings of a tawdry melodrama. By putting the action into comic form, the dramatic contrast is greater. The characters are no longer meagerly 'brave' but are shown to be far superior, in their friendship, to any adversity. We see this especially in the above quoted lines when Catherine runs off with Albert, and Jules and Jim exchange their quips about Albert's appropriateness to the situation. Finally, Jules' relief, at the end of the work, lets us know that he is glad that the testing is over and that further, this solution to the problematic situation is not tragic. What was most important, the friendship, could be destroyed by death, but not by anything less.

Up to this point, I have been discussing the action of the two works apart from their means of presentation. This of course is a separation made for the convenience of discussion. We found that an essential intent underlies the action, i.e., the representation of an ideal relationship which is tested and proven sound, and then destroyed by an abortive attempt to bring a new ideal relationship into being. This intent relates to the action as a coherent structure in itself. In the same way, the means of presentation, as implicit choices on the part of the artists, reflect what sort of effect on the audience the works are intended to convey. The changes in the means of presentation, in the process of adaptation, must be considered, not simply as medium changes, to be judged, with the original as the norm, but rather as an opportunity to use different means to create new effects.

The narrator, though used in both the novel and the film, is used for very different purposes. He is used in the novel to describe all of the action. Since there is relatively little dialogue in the novel, we follow the narrator who, though himself faceless, leads us through the minds and worlds of the main characters. In the novel, the flow of narrative information continues relentlessly through the narrated action comes to us in very short bits. Few scenes are extended, most of them being confined to a paragraph or two. The shortness
of the scenes makes it impossible to build extended dramatic effects and it is not intense drama that is important in the novel. What is important in the scenes is how they make a point with regard to the personality of the characters. The scenes thus become something like the short brush strokes that a painter would use to build effects on a canvas. Thus for example, early in the novel, Jules' mother comes to Paris for a short visit. Of course, Jim observes Jules and his mother. Following this, there is a paragraph in which we are told about Jules storing his top hat in the stove. When Jim finds it there, Jules makes excuses to which Jim responds, "I'm not your mother, Jules." Here we are given a hint of Jules' immature response to things which will later be used to show why he cannot be an adequate mate for any female he would like to have.

It is by the accumulation of such short detail-producing scenes that we get to know all of the characters and it is attention to detail that is encouraged in the reader. Thus, the importance of the above quoted passage is emphasized when, some fifty pages later, Jim sees how Jules functioning as a father is really inadequate, "he gradually came to realize that the solutions Jules imposed on these problems were of the same order as the top hat in the stove." Considering the great number of sexual affairs in the works, one might expect that one of the essential effects of the works was sexual titillation. But this is not at all the case. By allowing the reader to penetrate into the minds of the characters yet maintain a distance from their actions, by the use of the narrator and the short scenes, the author leads the reader to more than a vicarious enjoyment of a chain of sexual affairs. By showing us only the significant portions of scenes, the author impells to understand the characters and why they act as they do.

In the film, the role of the narrator changes radically. The use of the camera obviates the need to describe the action. An, though the narrator still probes the minds of the characters to let the viewer understand them, the function of this understanding becomes subordinated to more aesthetic or rather synaesthetic effects.

In the novel we see the cycles impelling the characters from one partner to the next as a series of complex motivations. The film is almost like a ballet by comparison. The motivations are subordinated to the need for motion. The emphasis is on the motion of the characters from one partner to the next and it is re-enforced by the inordinate number of walks, foot-races, bicycle and car rides that we are shown. In many of these, the actual change of partner is the culmination of the physical motion, as it is when Catherine abandons Jules and Jim for Albert at the end of an automobile ride.

Earlier in this paper, I said that the action of the two works was isolated to a great extent from the rest of the world. While this is true in the novel, it is even more true of the film. Because the novel builds its effects on a huge collection of details concerning the characters, it moves through a wider social and geographical world so as to avoid more obvious repetition. Thus Jules and Jim travel more extensively in the novel, going not only to Greece, but also to Germany where they meet some of Jules' old girlfriends. In the same way the.
The relationship between Jules and Catherine is carried all over Europe from Italy to northern Germany.

The novel's widened social circle includes Jules and Jim's mothers, Jules' cousin and former girlfriends, and finally, some of their fellow writers and artists. In this context, I might mention that in the novel, Catherine is not French, she is German, from Prussia, and Jules is not a 'pure' German, he is a German-Jew. This in the novel, the relationships have racial overtones which they do not have in the film. "Jules and Jules weren't of the same race...Jules was purely Germanic, a fighting cock who happened to have been born a female. Jules 'as a Jew, one of those who, apart from a few close friends, avoid other Jews." The novel does not emphasize this racial different at length. It is one fact among many. Its elimination in the film is completely consistent with the change in emphasis from a wide understanding of motivations to the experiencing of particular interactions as motions.

Though the film has considerably narrowed the novel's social breadth, it has not done so by simply eliminating all of the material connected with the omitted characters. Indeed, the things that we remember most about Catherine in the film are often derived from other characters in the novel whose traits have been compressed into Catherine. Thus the scene in the film in which Catherine tells of having a child by Napoleon is taken from a comment by Gertrude in the novel. The bottle of vitriol for the 'eyes of men that tell lies,' is connected with Odile in the novel, who is also the one who teaches Shakespeare. Even the trip to the dunes with the trio has a different girl going with Jules and Jim. Again, the elimination of the other girls is a part of the shift to flowing relationships found in the film.

The sense of flow in the film comes, in part from the narrator, who bridges the gaps between the scenes, from the physical motion of the characters and it is also established by the motion of the camera itself. Rather than use a stationary camera when showing the moving characters, Truffaut finds many ways of setting the camera into motion. In addition to the usual tracking shots and pans to follow motion, there are many rapid pans from one character to another to avoid the need for cuts as we see when the camera begins with close-up of Jules (p. 50), rapid pans to a close-up of Jim, and then rapid pans to a close-up of Jules and Sabine. Shots from the Paris metro and helicopter shots of the train in the country also add to the feeling of flow.

Yet another means used to create the film's sense of flow is the music which is played in many parts of the film. This ranges from popular tunes from the period to the song Catherine sings to Albert's guitar accompaniment.

Much comment has been made about the historical setting of the film and the novel. The film especially recreates the atmosphere surrounding the First World War. In addition to the costuming and the choice of settings and properties, the film uses a special film stock which as an aged quality to it and documentary film footage from the war.

The use of the historical material has led to some confusion. One critic says, 'The pressures of society are noticeably absent and the action tends to take place in a void, which detracts somewhat from its impact.' This sort of statement is made outside the context of the work's intentions. What we are
seeing is not a serious social commentary, nor is it supposed to truly reflect
the historical period. It is a comic close-up view of a set of particular
human interactions. To the extent that they must exist in time, that time is
rendered in the film. As the times exist 'objectively' outside the film, they
are not relevant and are rightly ignored.

The same critic also comments on the structure of dramatic time in the film
of which he says, "the whole handling of time is weak... and generally speaking
the devices used to indicate the passing of the years... are insufficient to com-
pensate for the failure of the characters to age or mature." If we look more
closely at this and the preceding statement, we will see that the critic is
applying criteria normally applied to serious works to a work of comedy. In
judging a work of comedy such as Jules and Jim these criteria are out of place.
The conventions of time, place and character are regularly broken in comedy.
Indeed, breaking these conventions is often the basis of the comic action.

The real function of the historical material in the film is to establish a
mood, to surround the characters with an air of nostalgia which will make them
more sympathetic. What is important is not the objective verisimilitude but
whether or not the viewer is able to feel his way into the period. For me, the
film succeeded admirably in this respect.

To sum up, the novel Jules and Jim is a comic work which shows the reader
the testing of an ideal relationship between two young writers which is traced
as they have affairs with a series of women and as they fall in love with the
same woman, who eventually ends the relationship by killing herself and one of
the writers. The novel uses various devices to let the reader see the actions
of the characters from a distance so that the complexity of their motivations
may be understood.

While the film adaptation is also a comic work, it takes the general situa-
tion in the novel and its overall action and, while maintaining certain distancing
mechanisms and the values of the means used to let us understand the characters,
re-focuses our attention on the interactions between the characters as motions so
that we tend to experience the actions as a series of rhythms.

With the perspective of a year's time, I can see that I have not gone far
enough in the above discussion. I have now come to believe that critics, myself
included, who approach film as if it were only a literary enterprise have a
difficult time in giving an understandable account of the visual texture of films.
In addition to quotes from the dialogue, we must find ways of making still
photographs of shots from the films under discussion. Whether we like it or not,
we have entered into an area of criticism which overlaps the critical practice of
the purely visual arts. And just as it would be absurd to imagine discussions of
the formal aspects of individual paintings which did not set some sort of illustra-
tion before the reader so that he could follow the discussion, so it is hard to
imagine that film criticism can continue in a serious manner without making
copious use of illustrations. I am not talking here about publicity stills
handed out by studios, I am talking about copies of shots made directly from the
films.
Though there may be some legal questions involved when it comes to publishing articles and books using these stills, it seems to me that such material is, or should be, a vital part of film criticism. Thus if there are legal obstacles to be surmounted, the sooner they are confronted the sooner the practice of film criticism will have a new and vital tool. Without illustrations of the visual elements, film criticism will remain a blind enterprise.


9. *ibid.*
17. *ibid.*
18. Roche', p. 49.
21. Roche', p. 78.
22. *ibid.*, p. 79.
23. Truffaut, p. 95.
29. Roche', p. 11.
31. Truffaut, p. 95.
32. Roche', p. 129.
33. *ibid.*, p. 16.
34. *ibid.*, p. 36.
35. *ibid.*, p. 34.
36. Truffaut, p. 90, 92.
37. *ibid.*, p. 75, 89.
39. *ibid.*, 
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THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY, 1896-1921

A Preliminary Study

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Introduction

The changing nature of the film industry today raises questions about the general development of the commercial cinema in this country since its inception in 1896. Today the period of the giant studios is coming to an end. The five or six major companies which have dominated the film industry for over forty years are being infiltrated by outside conglomerates while small independent firms have taken over the majority of production responsibilities. From an era of "bigness" and monopoly, the industry is slowly returning to a condition of modest facilities and plurality of participation.

Those who are confused by this recent development would benefit from a close look at the early development of the industry. From 1896 to 1908, film production in this country resembled nothing more than a non-business: a handful of companies provided short films for the developing mass culture with little effort toward systematization or industrial organization. In 1908, however, the situation began to change with the formation of the Motion Picture Patents Company, the first attempt to stabilize film production (and later, distribution and exhibition) in this country. With this effort also came a parallel movement by independent companies to challenge the dominance of the Patents' monopoly. By 1920, the independents had succeeded in sapping the strength of the Patents' Trust; in its place, the independents had joined together, amalgamated into the major companies which were to dominate the field until only recently. Today's industrial picture of Hollywood can be viewed as not totally unlike the activities of 1908: today, however, the roles are reversed--the "new independents" are challenging the "old independents."

Background to the Study

In 1937, the Englishmen Klingender and Legg suggested a useful division for viewing the progression of the film industry in America:

The development of American film finance . . . can be summarized as a spiral movement from early monopoly control at a time when the industry . . . was but a minor sphere of economic life and when its undreamed of possibilities of expansion threatened to be stifled by that monopoly hold, through a phase of meteoric expansion coupled with violent competition back again to monopoly control. It is a movement which is never for one moment basically deflected by the unceasing obligatto of government anti-trust actions that enliven its progress. 1

The early development of this entertainment industry in America is not only a capsule history of 'gamblers" vs. "conservatives," 2 struggling for control of
a wholly new business phenomenon, but also a time in which the industrial
tframework for the motion picture business was formulated and strengthened,
influencing not only the products of this system but also the society which
served as consumer.

A "business history" approach to the American silent film era entails the
understanding of the period as one in which the major interest was in machines
necessary for motion picture production and projection. The inventors' interest
in the nature of the films produced and the methods of organizing distribution
and exhibition interests was a later development, one which was not evident
until the formation of the Patents Company in 1906. This conglomerate was the
means by which the manufacturers attempted to control the industry.

What the manufacturers found, however, was a breed of men who saw dis-
tribution as the major position of strength in the industry. These "independ-
dents," called so because they stood apart from the licensed Patents members,
had strength in film distribution exchanges throughout the country providing
an intermediary between the producers and the exhibitors. With the source
of supply dried up, due to estrangement from the Patents Company, the indepen-
dents formed their own producing units. The Patents were now challenged on
two fronts: the independents not only distributed films but were also in
the production business. The area which was still dominated by the Patents,
however, was that of exhibition: through the required fees for use of licensed
projectors, theatre owners were at the mercy of the Patents Company policies.

When the validity of the Patents claim of control over machinery began to
be doubted by the courts, the independents saw the chance to move into the
exhibition business, and their accumulation of theatres began. This develop-
ment, however, took place over a long period of time. Changes in the business
climate, increased demand for the supply of both more films and better films,
a growing desire for longer films, the government's scrutiny of the film in-
dustry—for over two decades the film industry was influenced by these develop-
ments, the details of which are covered in the discussion below.

Early Monopoly Control, 1895-1910

The history of the American film industry begins not with the artists but
with the inventors and the businessmen. From 1895 to 1906, the motion picture
business in America was dominated by companies interested primarily in the
manufacture and sale of motion picture equipment. The major figure in this
battle was the inventor Thomas A. Edison, who held control over important film,
camera, and projector patents. Opposing Edison and his licensees were the
American Mutoscope and Biograph with its own licensees. For the first thirteen
years of the film industry, each camp kept the other involved in court suits
over the right to manufacture and sell film equipment.

During this time, the number of actual film production companies grew
steadily. Before the turn of the century, the industry was represented by
four major studios: Edison (1893), American Mutoscope and Biograph (1895),
Lubin (1897), and Vitagraph (1897). By 1907, other studios had been formed
to compete in the growing market. George Kleine, whose Optical Company had
been importing the films of Gaumont and Urban Eclipse, joined with Samuel Long
and Francis Marion in 1905 to form a production company, entitled "Kalem,"

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utilizing the first letters of the three men's last names. In the next year, Colonel William N. Selig formed his Polyscope Company, and George K. Spoor with actor Gilbert W. Anderson organized the Essanay (S. and A.) Film Manufacturing Company. When 1900 arrived, eight major companies and a few small producing units were vying with importing firms to fill the demands of the market.

As studio activity increased, so too did the length of the films produced. Beginning as a peep-show curiosity viewed through the Edison Kinetoscope and Biograph's Mutoscope, the films grew from a few feet in length to the standard 1000 foot reel which ran about fourteen minutes. With the increased length also came the possibility for story-telling. By 1903, with Edwin S. Porter's The Great Train Robbery, most film producers recognized that the dominant appeal of the commercial motion picture was in its narrative capacity.

The move of films from the nickelodeons and vaudeville theatres as "fillers" to theatres in which they were the sole source of entertainment also called for increased efficiency of distribution. Before 1904, exhibitors bought films directly from producers or their appointed agents. However, people like the Miles Brothers of San Francisco quickly recognized the opportunities of exchange businesses which would purchase a number of prints from producing firms and then rent them to exhibitors. By 1907, between 125 and 150 film exchanges had sprung up around the country, handling distribution on states right agreement. Among the new members of the film exchange business were men destined to become major figures in the industry's development: Carl Laemmle, whose exchange interests and DIP company would seriously challenge the Motion Picture Patents Company; William Fox, whose Greater New York Film Rental Company was the one licensed exchange to challenge the Patents' attempt at controlling all licensed exchanges; Harry and Sam Warner, two of the Warner Brothers; John R. Freuler and Harry Aitken, who together later formed the Mutual Film Corporation; plus a number of others who would form production companies to challenge the Patents group.

By 1900, the film industry in America—though far from achieving the industrial complexity it would eventually encompass—contained all of the elements necessary to grow and to prosper. Ten major companies were producing the majority of films, although Edison involved many of them—particularly Biograph—in court suits over violation of patents; film exchanges were functioning throughout the nation; and, perhaps over 3,000 theatres were available to exhibit the product to a society hungry for cheap mass entertainment. In this field of potential splendor, some members of the industry could see the possibility for real industrial stability by collecting the three areas of the business—production, distribution, exhibition—under one umbrella. For this stability to occur, peace had to break out between the two warring camps of Edison and Biograph.

In September of 1906, this peace was effected by the formation of the Motion Picture Patents Company. This "holding company" controlled all the important camera and projector patents necessary for film production. A major function of the company was the collection of royalties from anyone making use of equipment falling under the Company's patents. The collection activities were of three types: machine royalties (cameras), exhibitor royalties (projectors), and film royalties. By early 1909, the Patents'Company has entered into agreements... (a) the supplier of raw film [Eastman Kodak Company], (b) the most
important producers of motion pictures, (c) the several manufacturers of projecting machines, (d) the great bulk of rental exchanges, and (e) the leading exhibitors. In the summer of 1909, the members of the Patents Company could view themselves as partners in a prosperous, trouble-free future—almost.

The potential control by the Patents Company seemed to many, a most favorable development in the industry. The roles of the Patents Company appeared to be soundly determined:

(a) holding title of patents governing motion picture film, cameras, and projectors;
(b) licensing individuals and companies to conduct motion picture operations under its jurisdiction;
(c) regulating the conduct of business of those licensed;
(d) preventing infringement by those not licensed by the Patents Company; and
(e) collecting royalties from various functionaries in exchange for the privilege of operating as licensed companies in the field.

But other aspects of this period undermined the Patents’ security. The Patents Company was formed in a period of trust-breaking. The American public had showed in a previous election, and would continue to show in the future, an adverse feeling about monopolies—Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson followed the public’s mandate in attacking the trusts. Two years after the forming of the Patents Company, the Supreme Court would hold Standard Oil in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and order the corporation to dissolve. This was also the period of unlimited opportunity in business, a period in which penniless immigrants became dramatic personae in real-life Horatio Alger success stories. Strong figures entered the motion picture field, men who were not easily controlled and who were unwilling to be partners in the Patents Company scheme.

Two of these rebels—Carl Laemmle and William Fox—have received adequate coverage in other sources. Laemmle achieved his fame by challenging the Trust policies in his advertisements for his unlicensed film exchange business in which he openly called for resistance from exhibitors. Fox refused to sell his licensed exchange to the Patents Company when they attempted to consolidate all of the licensed exchanges under one management. Laemmle and Fox were not alone; there were others who held an early aversion toward the plans of the Patents Company.

Unlicensed exchanges throughout the country tried to maintain their solvency by distributing the product of the unlicensed manufacturing companies: in October, 1909, of seven reels per week—compared to around eighteen from the Patents available from the independents (Carson Company, Columbia Film Company; In Motion Picture Company; Phoenix Company; Powers Company; and World Manufacturing Company). Additional independent sources for films were the small number of importers of European product: Cricks and Martin; Hepworth Manufacturing Company; Robert W. Paul; Walter Tyler; William, Brown, and Earle. Less than a dozen exchanges operated openly as unlicensed: Anti-
Trust Film Company (Chicago); Chicago Film Exchange (Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, Nashville, Omaha, Salt Lake City, and Washington, D.C.); Eagle Film Exchange (Philadelphia); Eastern Film Exchange (Pittsburgh); Economy Film Service (Pittsburgh); Harsen [sic] and Company (New York); Keystone Film Supply (Scranton, Pennsylvania); Liberty Film Exchange (Philadelphia); New England Film Exchange (Boston); New Jersey Film Rental Company (Jersey City); Unique Film and Construction Company (Chicago). These unlicensed exchanges were in competition with over one hundred licensed agencies. Unlicensed exhibitors in 1909 numbered 2,500 compared to a total of 10,000 to 12,000 licensed theatre operators.30

Besides those who decided to risk business operation without Patents' licenses were a few who tried to support the independent cause while still retaining their licensed status. Firms such as Western Film Exchange, organized in 1906 by John R. Freuler and Harry A. Aitken, were licensed by the Trust but also distributed unlicensed films. Another firm, H. and H. Film Exchange, founded by Samuel S. Hutchinson and Charles J. Hite, tried to play both sides of the fence. But such activity did not go unnoticed by the Patents Company. A letter to Standard Film Exchange of Chicago, dated July 10, 1910, from the Patents Company decreed the following:

Gentlemen:

The licenses of the O. T. Crawford Film Exchange Company, St. Louis, Missouri, Western Film Exchange, St. Louis, Missouri, and Kay-Tee Film Exchange, Los Angeles, California, have been canceled.

We hand you herewith a list of exhibitors served by these exchanges.31

Almost half of the over one hundred licenses for film exchanges were revoked during the first two years of the Patents operation.32 The final controlling move by the Patents Company was the formation of the General Film Company in April, 1910. Within eighteen months, the General Film Company "had purchased fifty-eight [of the sixty-nine licensed] American exchanges, and during the same period the Motion Picture Patents Company cancelled the licenses of ten."33 The one licensed exchange to hold out against the General Film Company was William Fox, who then joined the other unlicensed exchanges in the battle. For the Patents' partners, the General Film Company was a necessary move; but for the United States Government, this move convinced them the Trust had to be stopped.

Expansion and Competition, 1910-1917

Most sources cite legal action as the cause for the dissolution of the Patents Company. This explanation has been shown to be far too simple.34 Edison and Biograph were the only stockholders in the Patents Company; the other members received the privilege of operating under Patents' sanction, while Edison and Biograph received the major share of machine royalties. There is little doubt that this situation weakened the kind of solidarity which the Company expected of its members. An analysis of the internal decay of Patents' esprit reveals a fluidity of personnel-trading from the Patents' members to the independent ranks, a willingness of Patents' companies to aid independent production efforts, and challenges to the Patents' regulations brought by the members themselves.35
Of course, outside influences were also felt. There was the growing strength of the independents, led by Carl Laemmle, which undermined the Patents' attempt to control stars' salaries through anonymity, to keep film lengths under three reels, and to regulate the amount of product released weekly. Not only did the independents plan to exploit star attraction in their productions, but they also continued to release Trust films after their licenses had been revoked. The Trust replied by legal action, but the time factor between instituting a case and receiving a ruling allowed exchanges to continue along this line until their own production units had built up an adequate supply of films for release.

The independent movement had a number of strong points in its favor: (1) the "trust-breaking" spirit evident in the country, in the courts, and in the government, gave the independents' cause a sympathetic appeal for the general public; (2) the independent exchanges could deal on a more regional, and more personal level with exhibitors than could the mammoth General Film Company, the Patents distribution outlet; (3) without the commitments called for by Trust production policies, the independents could release as many-or as few-films as the market would stand, and of varying lengths; (4) the independents could also raid the personnel of Trust companies by offering "star status" to the actors and actresses; and (5) they could vary the price of films without adhering to the Trust scale.

By 1912, the power of the Trust had been weakened sufficiently so that the territory was fairly open. For three long years the independents had grown steadily, resisting the Trust at every move. What resulted from this struggle, however, was not merely the downfall of the Patents' Company; in its place were put all the ingredients for new and larger trusts.

As early as 1909, the independents had formed the National Independent Moving Picture Alliance aimed at providing an alternative to the Trust. This organization was replaced in the Spring of 1910 by the Motion Picture Distributing and Sales Company, formed by the heads of IMP (Carl Laemmle) and the New York Motion Picture Company (Adam Kessel and Charles Baumann), with some unofficial backing by Western Film Exchange (John R. Freuler and Harry A. Aitken). The Sales Company was billed in trade journals as direct competition to General Film. However, within a few weeks after the Sales Company had been organized, a number of independents could see no difference between the licensed and unlicensed distribution agencies. On June 16, 1910, a third exchange organization was announced: the Associated Independent Film Manufacturers combine, composed ofThanhouser, Nestor, Eclair, Actophone, Lux, Electrograph, Centaur, Motograph, and others. With dissension now apparent in the independent camp, fear arose that General Film could not be broken. The Sales Company was supported by IMP, Ambrosio, Cines, Eclair, Great Northern, Italia, and Powers; Associated was made up of independents who announced they would "not sell through any Sales Company." Less than a month later, a compromise between the two independent factions was announced:

The Motion Picture Distributing and Sales Company was re-incorporated under a new charter which gave equal representation to Sales Company and Associated Independent interests.

With this compromise, the independents joined together to wage battle with the General Film Company for the next two years.
The early dissension among the independents, however, was again evident in 1912. In April of that year, the trade journals announced the formation of Mutual Film Corporation; included in this move was the establishment of the Film Supply Company of America to compete with the Sales Company. Laemmle immediately countered by dissolving the Sales Company and organizing Universal, an amalgamation composed of loyal Sales Company members. The independents were again split into two groups:

Thanhouser, Gaumont, American, Great Northern, Reliance, Eclair, Solax, Majestic, Lux, [New York Motion Picture,] and Comet . . . were allied with the Film Supply Company; while . . . IMP, Powers, Rex, Champion, Republic, and Nestor became part of the Universal organization.

Some explanation for this dissension has been offered by noting the personalities involved. Kelton C. Lahue has suggested that it was dissension between Aitken and Laemmle which resulted in the split between Mutual and Universal. Aitken's brother Roy has also chronicled some of the differences which Harry had with other executives. There were other reasons, too, which suggest that Laemmle's Sales Company in practice was not unlike General Film. The Sales Company attempted on a small scale to regulate the number of films offered to the market by its member independent firms. Because Laemmle held large interests in certain independent companies, it was conceivable that some films (particularly from IMP, Powers, and Rex) would receive preferential treatment, which would arouse the displeasure of other firms. No one factor can explain the actions of men involved with the industry during this period. As suggested at the outset, this group of individuals can be divided between the "gamblers" and the "conservatives," those who were eager to explore new possibilities in production, distribution, and exhibition, and those who found comfort in following the previously proven methods.

During this period, the standard length of films for both licensed and unlicensed manufacturers was the one- or two-reel film. In this area especially there was potential conflict brewing between the "gamblers" and the "conservatives." The one- and two-reel film was an accepted, marketable product; longer films demanded more time, more financing, and a generally increased mode of production. The majority of conservative producers seemed reluctant to consider the importance of a new phenomenon appearing in 1912--the feature film.

The arrival of the feature film from overseas played a large part in the attempts to find new methods for distributing the longer films. Because the majority of theatres in the country were small and built for the short, rapid turnover method of exhibition, features had to be aimed at the larger theatres and for extended runs. Consequently, the limited-conservative-distribution of the Sales Company, no doubt, seemed inadequate for those companies wanting to gamble on a more intense method of distribution to support longer films.

Instead of a central distributing agency, the dissident independents favored the selling of territorial rights to regional distributors, a method known as states-right distribution. Under this system, the right to exhibit a film would be sold to a territorial distributor for either a flat rate or on a percentage basis. This method was advantageous in that it showed an immediate return to the original producers of the film; the drawback was that the producers might not share in any extraordinary success at the box office.
The developments of 1912 included not only these changes in distribution instituted by the formation of Universal and Mutual, but also an entry into feature production along two fronts. On one side, George Kleine, a Trust member, and Adolph Zukor began importing foreign features and spectacles. The presentation of Queen Elizabeth by Zukor in 1912 led to the formation of "Famous Players in Famous Plays," an organization founded by Zukor on the principle that the feature film and the "star system" were the directions most promising for the industry. On the other side, William Fox formed the Fox Film Company, immediately beginning plans to produce features. Fox joined a long line of distributors-turned-producers, such as Joseph Engel and William Swanson (Rex, founded 1909), Edwin Thanhouser and Charles J. Hite (Thanhouser, f. 1910), Samuel S. Hutchinson and John R. Freuler (American, f. 1910), Harry Aitken (Majestic, f. 1910). The feature film in America had developed both in the importing end and in the domestic end of the industry.

By 1913, a number of one-time distribution companies had become feature film producers. Warner's Features, first organized in 1912, and Box Office Attractions (eventually to become Fox Film Company) were established specifically to produce feature films and co-acquire other features from independents for their own distribution chains. This was also the year in which Zukor's Famous Players instituted its 'block-booking' form of distribution, in which the company received a guarantee of acceptance of a number of features from the individual distributors and exhibitors.

In May of 1914, the trade papers announced the formation of Paramount Pictures Corporation to handle distribution of Famous Players Film Company, Jesse L. Lasky Feature Play Company, and Bosworth, Inc., films.

Mutual's attempt to organize a national chain of distributors was quickly followed by other companies, but with an added ingredient—the accumulation of theatres. Alco, which was the stimulus for Metro Pictures, allied itself with Loew's Theatre Chain, laying the foundation for the eventual formation of M-G-M; World Film (Selig) also began acquiring theatres for its distribution interests; Triangle (formed by Aitken with directors Thomas Ince, D. W. Griffith, and Mack Sennet) entered the theatre race by purchasing a few large, metropolitan first-run houses; and even four Patents members, V.S.L.E. (Vitagraph, Selig, Lubin, and Essanay) began theatre acquisition.

The rise of the feature film not only intensified distribution concerns, but also led to the development of movie palaces. Profit could only be won from large crowds viewing the longer, more expensively produced films, and this fact called for more appealing theatres. Throughout the country, a move began for glamorous showcases of feature films, theatres which would attract larger audiences—and higher prices.

For all areas of the motion picture industry, the period from 1910 through 1912 was marked by eventful developments: the dissolution of Patents' control, the rise of the independents, the struggle for power among the independents, and a change in the scale of film production which demanded financial stability beyond the capabilities of the one- and two-reel manufacturers.
The Second Monopoly, 1917-1921

By the beginning of 1917, the structure and operation of the film industry had changed drastically from the nickelodeon days. The Patents Company had been all but dissolved by the Court and by its own members. The number of producing companies had diminished, with the result that only a few large feature-film companies controlled the majority of the industry, unconcerned with and unbothered by the number of short-film manufacturers struggling to maintain solvency.

The year 1917 saw the move by Paramount to incorporate Artcraft, Keystone, Realart, and Hearst’s Cosmopolitan studios. The year also saw the formation of Goldwyn Pictures and the organization of First National Exhibitors Circuit by twenty-six leading theatre owners throughout the country. First National immediately engaged in competition with Adolph Zukor for control of the industry; owning far more theatres than Zukor, the First National had the financial backing to steal the two highest priced stars of the industry—Mary Pickford and Charlie Chaplin. For the next four years, the industry was to be shaped by the race for theatre acquisition on one side by First National and on the other by Adolph Zukor.

Such a race called for the strongest of financial support. As early as 1912, Wall Street had shown a willingness to participate in the financial activities of the film industry: Crawford Livingston and Otto Kahn had placed their financial resources behind the formation of Mutual. Most of the major theatre chains had backing from financial wizards, and as production increased both in length and in budget, the same type of backing was necessitated for the stability of studios.

Early in 1918, the United States entered the European War closing some of the foreign markets for American films. After some early boom in theatre attendance, the year saw the demise of Biograph and Edison (the two stalwarts of the Patents Company), Mutual Film Corporation, Triangle Films, and Thanhouser, among other smaller firms. By the war’s end, the stage was set for the major companies who were to control all three areas of the industry for twenty years.

In 1919, United Artists was formed by comedian Charles Chaplin, actor Douglas Fairbanks, director D. W. Griffith, and actress Mary Pickford. Harry and Jack Cohn, with Joseph Brandt, formed C.B.C. Pictures which, in five years, would become Columbia Pictures. Warner Brothers strengthened its alliance with the Stanley Corporation, assuring the company of its own theatres. Paramount, First National, Goldwyn, and Loew’s were all actively procuring theatres to insure their own exhibition markets. In two years, the breakdown would be as follows:

- First National . . . . . 3400 theatres
- Paramount . . . . . . . 303 theatres
- Loew’s (H-C-I) . . . . . 70 theatres
- Goldwyn . . . . . . . 30 theatres

This move for gaining theatre control was the final step in the “new monopoly.” In 1921, the same court actions which eliminated the power of the Patents’ monopoly were begun against Famous-Players-Lasky and Paramount for unfair competition. The era had come full circle: from chaos to monopoly had come new chaos and then a new monopoly. And in its wake, the wave of
business expansion had left behind companies which had helped to build the
industry but who were ill-equipped to play for such high stakes. Smaller
companies managed to lag a step behind, waiting for the dust to settle before
venturing forward. These smaller companies in their conservatism and their
careful practice are not as widely known as their flamboyant rivals; yet,
economically, these lesser firms acted as partners to the budding conglomerates
in the development of a mass entertainment industry.

Conclusions

If we are to understand the potential impact of film on society, it is
important to survey the industrial structuring of the film business. Where
the money comes from will influence the ideas in a film. Today, film ideas
in this country must be strained through the purses of Gulf-Western (Paramount),
Kinney Parking Lots (Warner Brothers), Transamerica (United Artists). Wall
Street has permeated the executive branch of Hollywood and holds a major say
over what reaches our film screens.

How did this occur? Clearly, the answer is a complicated one, and this
study only scratches the surface of one possible interpretation. But it should
be evident from the discussion that in America, at least, film is run by the
businessmen. Certainly, some inventors were akin to the artists in their
vision, their cultural responsibility, and their progressive contribution to
a society's development. It took the businessman, however, to push the industry
into the massive dimension we see today.

Film history can serve more to today's student than the standard justifica-
tions which have been offered. Film history provides not only a cultural
heritage but also a scrutiny of the structure beneath the tradition. Film
history not only gives meaning and perspective to the past but also provides
the challenges for the future. And film history gives a context which instead
of providing predictability, actually stimulates the potential for change.

This short history of the film industry from 1896 to 1921 should suggest
some of the goals of film historical study. In short, it should demonstrate
the nature of doing film history: a retreat to the past to re-think the
present; a re-thinking of the past in a present state of mind; and a searching
through the past to find the future.
Footnotes

1 F. D. Klingender and Stuart Legg, *Money Behind the Screen* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1937), p. 78. My italics serve to point out the division this chapter will use.

2 See Richard Griffith's introduction to the reprint edition of Hampton.

3 The generally recognized date for the first commercial exhibition of motion pictures in America is April 23, 1896, when Thomas Armat demonstrated his and Thomas A. Edison's Vitascope for the Koster and Bial Music Hall audience in New York City. See Ramsaye, pp. 231-32; Hampton, pp. 11-12; Lewis Jacobs, *The Rise of the American Film* (New York: Columbia University Teachers College, 1963), pp. 3-4; Arthur Knight, *The Liveliest Art* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 13; and Macgowan, p. 122. Most of these sources seem to base their use of this date on The New York Daily Mirror, April 25, 1896, p. 20.

4 The Motion Picture Patents Company was incorporated on September 2, 1908. Ralph Cassady, Jr., "Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and Distribution: 1908-1915," *Southern California Law Review*, XXXII (Summer 1959), 329. As my discussion will suggest, the formation of the Patents Company was a major development in a hitherto unorganized industry. Cassady's coverage of the Patents Company and its effects on the industry is based primarily on court cases and contemporary evidence, and is by far the most accurate and dependable research done on the economic and legal aspects of this era. The source for much of Cassady's material is the Transcript of Record of United States vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (1915) to be referred throughout this study as Record. His article will be a major reference and influence in this chapter.


6 Edison's film patents (nos. 12035 and 12192) and camera patent (no. 12037) were not his only assets. His associates were Thomas Armat, who held projector patents (nos. 576,185—the star-wheeled intermittent motion device; 500,749; 566,953—the "Thanscope"—with Charles Francis Jenkins; 568,916, from William C. Steward and Ellis F. Frost; and 673,992—the "Vitascope"), and Albert E. Smith, of Vitagraph, who had projector patents (nos. 673,329—framing device; 744,251; 770,537; 771,260; 785,205, from William Ellwood; and 785,237). Edison's role as an inventor of motion pictures has received a serious debunking in Gordon Hendricks, *The Edison Motion Picture Myth* (Berkeley: University of California, 1981).

'Biograph,' as the AIBC was called, held camera patent no. 629,033 (an intermittent motion device from Herman Casler) and projector patents nos. 707,934 (from Woodville Latham, on the film loading method popularly known as 'the Latham Loop') and 722,382 (from John A. Pross, on the shutter mechanism).

9. The Biograph's licensees, unlike the Edison licensees, were importers rather than domestic producers (Cassady, 328). These included Williams, Brown and Earle; Kleine Optical Company; Charles E. Dressler; and Thomas Armat. Until the Patents Company was formed, Armat held contractual agreements with both Edison and Biograph.

10. For a list and description of some of these litigations, see Cassady, 328. Also Michael Conant, Antitrust in the Motion Picture Industry (Berkeley: University of California, 1960), pp. 16-21; and Lewis, pp. 1-27.

11. Before the exchange system was initiated, the distribution of films was in the hands of the producers themselves. A few producing companies, however, had agencies which would handle this end of the business for them; for example, Edison appointed Frank R. Gammon and Norman C. Raff as his exclusive representatives. Such agents took on the responsibilities of getting their client's products into the theatres, while also protecting the patents held by their clients.


13. Jobés, p. 43. She explains the term 'states right' to mean that each exchange purchased pictures with the understanding he might rent them only in states agreed upon in the deal.

14. For an authorized --and somewhat generous--biography of Laemmle, see John Drinkwater, The Life and Adventures of Carl Laemmle (New York: Putnam, 1931). Contrary to some sources, IMP was not founded in 1907 but instead in May, 1909; see Moving Picture World, IV (May 29, 1909), 740, for Laemmle's announcement of Independent Motion Pictures.

15. An extremely biased biography in favor of Fox and against the film industry is Upton Sinclair, Upton Sinclair Presents William Fox (Los Angeles: By the author, 1933).

16. American Mutoscope and Biograph Company; Edison Film Manufacturing Company; Essanay Film Manufacturing Company; Kalem Company, Inc.; Kleine Optical Company (importers of Gaumont and Urban Eclipse films); Lubin Manufacturing Company; Gaston Liéliés (representing Georges Méliès Star Films); Pathé Frères; Selig Polyscope Company; and Vitagraph Company of America.
Jobes, p. 55. The source does not cite where this information was found, and it is difficult to believe the number is completely accurate. No government census for theaters covers this early period; in fact, actual census information is not available until 1921, and then only for production firms. In 1909, a Patents Company official testified later, there were approximately 5,000 theaters in the country; these, however, were theaters devoted solely to the exhibition of motion pictures. During 1908, many legitimate theaters would feature films along with the live dramatic or vaudeville presentations. It is highly possible that Jobes' figure includes both legitimate theaters and motion picture houses. The point here is that without accurate statistical data for this period, all numbers are approximate. Another factor—one which this study will constantly confront—is that the industry was rapidly changing. In 1912, The Moving Picture World underlined this fact in noting, "Until the year 1912 a list of motion picture theaters in any one city might be correct on the day it was made but a week later could not be relied upon, so constant was the changing of the ownership of theaters."

Holding Company has the following legal definition: "A super-corporation which owns or at least controls such a dominant interest in one or more other corporations that it is enabled to dictate their policies through voting power; a corporation organized to hold the stock of other corporations; any company, incorporated or unincorporated, which is in a position to control or materially influence the management of one or more other companies by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership or securities in the other companies." Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1968), p. 665.

See notes 7 and 9 above.

By July, the following had signed agreements with the Patents Company, all of whom—with the exception of Méliès—were charter members: Biograph, Edison, Essanay, Kalem, Kleine, Lubin, Méliès, Pathé, Selig, and Vitagraph.

Edison, Lubin, Selig, and George K. Spoor (of Essanay)—all of these also producing films—, Armat, Edengraph, Enterprise Optical, Nicholas Power, Eberhard Schneider, American Moving Picture Machine, Gaumont, Biograph, and Precision Machine.

Cassady, p. 332. It would be difficult to provide an accurate list of both exchanges and exhibitors: 'The Motion Picture Patents Company in an Exhibitors' Bulletin dated January 22, 1909, listed 1.1 licensed exchanges throughout the United States' (Cassady, p. 340; the list is available in 1 Record 87-94). Also according to the testimony of Harry M. Marvin, Vice-President of the Motion Picture Patents Company, there were approximately 5,000 exhibitors in the United States in 1909, and he estimated that three or four thousand of these became licensees [1 Record 27]. However, those remaining outside the fold were for the most part, no doubt, small and relatively unimportant (Cassady, pp. 342-43).
In a report of a special committee of the Film Service Association (made up of erstwhile Edison exchange licensees) dated January 9, 1909, the new exchange agreement was judged in the main satisfactory and it stated '... that the Patents Company's license should prove desirable to all members who wished to build up the business along legitimate lines' (Cassady, 339; 1 Record 499-500).

Cassady, p. 345.

See notes 15 and 16 above. Most general histories covering this era will focus on Laemmle and Fox as the two leading figures in the independent movement. However, the participation was far more extensive than merely the activities of these two men, as will be shown later in this chapter.

For example, an advertisement in the Moving Picture World, IV (May 1, 1909), 533, read: "Good Morrow! Have you paid $2.00 for a license to pick your teeth this week?"


Cassady, p. 363.

Ibid. See also Moving Picture World, IV (January 23, 1909), advertisements passim.

Conant, p. 19.

Cassady, pp. 348-49. 2 Record 1076.

Cassady lists 116 licensed exchanges in early 1909, with forty-two being cancelled by February, 1911 (335).

Cassady, p. 357.

For a well-documented study of the multifarious causes for the Patents' failure, see Jeanne Thomas, "The Decay of the Motion Picture Patents Company," Cinema Journal, X (Spring 1971), 34-40.

See Thomas, pp. 35-40.

Although the star system was not as yet in effect in the motion picture industry in 1909, some players were known to the public by a general designation rather than by specific name. For example, the very popular Florence Lawrence was known as the 'Biograph Girl' by the public even though she remained anonymous" (Cassady, p. 369). See also Moving Picture World, V (December 18, 1909), 866, for Laemmle's exploitation of Miss Lawrence after he had stolen her away from Biograph.
George Kleine, importer of Gaumont and Eclipse films, was limited to 3,000 running feet (or three reels) of new subjects per week, plus 1,500 running feet of special subjects imported" (Cassady, p. 336).

This aspect, however, should not be overstated. Cassady notes, "While importer-licensees were limited in the footage that they were permitted to release, the manufacturer-licensees were not restricted in the amount of motion picture films they were permitted to produce and sell" (p. 336). At the same time, the actual licensing affected control of the weekly supply. Most historians cite the Patents Company's dogmatic policy in dictating how much film their licensees could produce; the facts don't support this. Instead, the Company's licensing should be seen as an indirect method to regulate the number of companies releasing on the market, thereby controlling somewhat the number of reels which would be available.

Announcements by H. and H. Film Service Company (Record 1433-34), Laemmle Film Service (1439-40), and Western Film Exchange (1455-56) mention the large supply of licensed film available from them, even after their licenses had been revoked. See Cassady, p. 367.

Moving Picture World, V (September 25, 1909), 410.

Moving Picture World, VI (April 16, 1910), 569. Laemmle, Kessel, and Baumann could openly advertise their names as "rebels" because they had severed relationship with the Trust. Others--such as Aitken and Freuler--however, still entertained Trust connections and were forced into a "silent partner" relationship in the organized rebellion. Fear of Patents' censure and repressive court action caused many independents to work undercover.

Moving Picture World, VI (June 18, 1910), 1037. This article, entitled "An Open Market and an Open Door," expressed the sentiment that the Sales Company was General Film in a different guise. See Cassady, pp. 371-72.

Ibid.

"Cassady, p. 372. See also "The Dove of Peace," Moving Picture World, VII (July 9, 1910), 74-75.

Moving Picture World, XII (April 6, 1912), 34.

Cassady, pp. 373-74. See also Moving Picture World, XII (May 25, 1912), 707, 507.


See Roy E. Aitken, The Birth of a Nation Story, as told to Al P. Nelson (Middleburg, Virginia: William J. Denlinger, 1985).
42. See note 42.
43. Cassady, p. 361.
44. Cassady, p. 362. See also Moving Picture World, XX (May 30, 1914), 1239.
45. For a chronicle of theatre development, see Ken Hagg, The Best Remaining Leases (New York: Clarkson-Poole, 1941); also Jobs, pp. 271-73.
46. "The actual legal coach-well was sounded by United States v. Motion Picture Patents Company, 225 Fed. 300 (E. D. Pennsylvania 1915) in which the Patents Company was found to be a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Through appeal, the Patents Company was officially dissolved by motion Picture Patents Company v. United States, 267 U. S. 526 (1925). See also Conant, p. 21.
49. Conant, p. 25. United Artists, Columbia, Warners, and N-K-O are noticeably absent from this list. UA's acquisition of theatres was slow and short-lived, while Columbia never really got involved in the theatre race. Warners did not acquire a theatre until December, 1926; by 1926, Warners had absorbed Vitagraph and Stanley Corporation, gaining 144 theatres in less than four years. N-K-O absorbed the Keith-Orpheum Theatre interests, but was not formed until 1927. See Daniel Bortman, W. J. Evans, and E. L. Marshand, The Motion Picture Industry: A Pattern of Control, Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph no. 43 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 33-39.
50. Conant, p. 27.
ROCKING THE ROLE OF CINEMA IN LATIN AMERICA

Louis Miller
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I. THE FACE OF AMERICA

An important distinction of film as a twentieth century art-form, has been its ability to transcend traditional geographical, political, social and linguistic barriers in transmitting its moral values and cultural ethos. In part this was due to the motion pictures' emergence as a silent medium. Not only was there no need to understand the filmmaker's native language, but it was possible even for illiterates to grasp the film's message. Written titles, with their simple vocabulary, were kept to a minimum, and the pictures were often understandable without them. A second reason was the superficially apolitical nature of most films made in the United States. They were predominately melodramas, light comedies or adventure films notably lacking in controversial content of any kind.

While the medium was still in its infancy the Motion Picture Industry was already big business. Control rested in the hands of a few powerful companies, which besides producing and distributing pictures often owned the theatres where they were shown. Credit for this phenomenal growth is largely due to their relentless and fiercely competitive search for new markets. The potential appeal of the movies seemed almost unlimited and the major studios took advantage of it by creating a worldwide network for distributing their products. As a result, and despite their lack of substantial content, these films became an international medium for mass communication. To quote Peter Bagdonovich: "I relate to things in movies better than I do to things in life. It's easier to understand things in movies"1

Perhaps if the all-talking, all-singing, all-English pictures had been around from the start, the extensive system of foreign distribution would have been less far reaching. However because the network, the theatres and the audience were already established the studios extended themselves to adapt the sound film for export. Among other things they tried shooting some movies simultaneously in two or more languages.

"Buster Keaton appeared in four different versions of his early talkie comedies... For the dialogue scenes he learned the French, German and Spanish lines phonetically, calculating that any errors he committed would add to the comic effect."2

Such extravagant measures eventually proved impractical and Hollywood was forced to resort to the butchery of dubbing in voices. Yet it serves to point out the industry's awareness and consideration of the foreign market as an important source of revenue.
American cinema's influence in the early work of many foreign directors indicates to some extent the broad distribution these films received. More significant is the effect these imports had on the development of domestic film industries in less highly developed nations. During the 1930's, the Brazilian cinema produced eighty feature films; in the following decade, no more than 100. The motion picture trade completely dominated by foreign concerns since World War I, was so contemptuous of the national product that one year's entire production did not get as much attention as a single third-rate import. Brazilian filmmakers were hampered by the obstacles encountered in a domestic market controlled by foreign companies. The situation was similar in Mexico, where locally made films produced by a neo-colonialistic elite generally imitated the American product. After the commercial success of Mexican pictures during the forties— with the opportune help of World War II and the growing illiteracy in Latin America—those who held on to the reins of the film industry refused to share the pie they were savoring. The only reason they were enjoying this was not because they merited it— they were just fortunate enough to arrive at this cultural party first. Determined to keep everybody else out, they sealed the doors to entry into the film industry. Partly, this penetration enough to have arrested at this stage was not because they refused to— they were just unprepared. The only reason they were enjoying this was not because they were unable to meet the challenge or the threat, those who held on to the reins of the industry refused to share the pie they were savoring in Latin America. Those who held on to the reins of the film industry refused to share the pie they were savoring. The only reason they were enjoying this was not because they merited it— they were just fortunate enough to have arrived at this cultural party first. Determined to keep everybody else out, they sealed the doors to entry into the film industry.

II. WHY DO YOU THINK THEY CALL IT DOPES?

By a neo-colonialistic elite generally imported the American product, the attraction was similar in Mexico, where locally made films produced

"For the development of domestic film industries to be effectively thwarted, these imports had to be so overwhelming, so so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so overwhelming, so 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"The ordinary Argentine has little sense of national identity and has a way of looking at the world that is not really his own. Aesthetic attitudes are geared to mirror the Capitalist ideology of the imperial ruling classes. European styles in painting, in literature, in film, in fashions; British and American styles in popular music and creative comfort; the only models of behavior held up to the Argentin masses are models offered for sale by the neo-colonialists. Ideologically, the masses are inculcated with the cultural values that lead them to desire the very things which serve to perpetuate their state of dependence, neo-colonization and exploitation."5 - J. R. MacBean (paraphrasing the revolutionary film, La Hora de los Hornos.)

Pop culture creates a narcotic need that only it can fulfill. This psychological dependence is blatantly evidence by the realistic genre of modern Latin American fiction. In Manuel Puig's novel, Betrayed By Rita Hayworth, the central character turns on his father to the euphoria of cinema:

"Rita Hayworth sings in Spanish in Blood and Sand and Dad liked it, since it was a benefit for the Spanish Society that day... he walked out glad he had come "Now I'm going to the movies with you all the time," since he had forgotten all about his store bills watching the movie, and we were walking out the movie house and Dad said he liked Rita Hayworth better than any other actress, and I'm starting to like her better than any other too..."6

More subtly Puig suggests the duality of this escapism:

"(Yet) sometimes she looks wicked, she is a pretty actress but she's always betraying somebody."7

A similar observation is made in Tres Tristes Tigres by C. Cabrera Infants. He presents a Cuban youth who every Thursday travels the Santa Fe Trail:

"(because Santa Fe, as the reader will have guessed already, was Arcadia, the glory and the panaces of all the sorrows of adolescence; the movies)... it felt good there, in the front gallery facing the screen, especially if the second-balcony front row was free (which nicknamed paradise: a place for princesses, the equal of the royal box of other times, other spectacles) and directly under the stars: it was almost better even than my memory of it."8
But it is a habit that demands extreme sacrifices and the novel goes on to relate the cost of such an artificial high in outrageously metaphorical terms:

"Our last and best resort was books: my father's or his uncle's or his great-uncle's; we sold off the family's literary inheritance... (the library) every day became more and more like the memory of a library."

In selling their books they are symbolically selling out their native culture for the glamour, excitement and adventure promised by the movies; an empty promise as it turns out because they are betrayed by fleeting memories.

"I can't for the life of me remember the name of the film we were going to see, which nothing could have stopped us from seeing, which we did see."

A principle protagonist in Mario Vargas Llosa's *The Time Of The Hero* fantasizes:

"And I'll come by for you in my new convertible, with my silk shirt, my filter-tip cigarettes, my leather jacket, my hat with its bright red feather, I'll honk the horn, I'll tell them to get in, I just came back from the United States yesterday, let'sgo for a ride, let's go out to my house in Orrantia, I'd like you to meet my wife, she's an American who used to be a movie star, we got married in Hollywood the same day I graduated from the Acadamy..."

While his girlfriend is equally addicted:

"She was completely absorbed by what was happening on the screen: her mouth was half open and there was a hungry stare in her eyes. Later, when they were outside, she described the whole movie as if Alberto had not seen any part of it. She chattered about the actresses' dresses and their jewelry, and when she recalled the comedy episodes her laughter was very bright and innocent."

"You have a good memory,' he said, "How can you remember all that?"

"I told you, I'm crazy about the movies. When I'm seeing a good movie I forget everything else. It's like I'm in another world."

"Yes," Alberto said, "I could tell. You looked as if you were hypnotised."
The deed behind this facade of other worldly innocence is only hinted at later when Vargas Llosa, like Puig, uses Rita Hayworth as a metaphor for the motion picture industry's shallow surfaces.

"They called him (Alberto) Dracula, the Monster, Frankenstein, Rita Hayworth... the bandage covering his face was a perfect mask, no one could read the truth from his features."13

"Teacher, your eyes are exactly like Rita Hayworth's... half serious, half mocking. They say he isn't a Frenchman (American), he's a Peruvian trying to pass as a Frenchman (American), and that means he's a son of a bitch. I don't know anything worse than betraying your country."14

The evidence appears overwhelming that our Hollywood worldview has penetrated to the very depths of Latin American consciousness. Glauber Rocha, spokesman for Brazil's revolutionary nationalistic CINEMA NOVO, emphasizes the pervasive effects of the media:

"Like every other culture in this technology-dominated world, Brazilian culture shows the influence of cinema. Film arbitrate life-styles, activates the imagination with its fantasies, and shapes moral life. Yet it is impossible to speak of the cinema in its Brazilian context without re-zooming the North American film, whose influence and aggressiveness distributes North American cultures through the world so that audiences now expect from all films only those images they are accustomed to seeing in Hollywood cinema."15

III. HOW'S YOUR MOTHER?

The 'Alliance for Progress' has obviously deceived us and broken faith with the Latin American people by becoming an alliance for repression with the ruling oligarchies and military elite. It already seems to late for simply developing nationalistic cinemas, the disease has spread too far and festered too long. The cure, if there is one, must necessarily involve the formation of a new cinema: revolutionary in form, content, production and distribution.

"It's very hard to define what a revolutionary movie is, but I asked people in Latin America what they thought a revolutionary movie should be. They told me that any movie that exposes the reality of American life is revolutionary in the context of Latin America, because they're battling 30 years, 40 years of brainwashing. You
know, the movies that show the big American crew-cut hero and the sexy svelte American woman who's every-thing the Latin American women aren't and want to be. The blonde blue-eyed monsters, and the comfortable life in America. "Well, that ain't the way it is, you know." -Jane Fonda

Now there are signs of hope; over the past few years more and more experiments in radical filmmaking have surfaced and come to the public attention. CINEMA NOVO, most noticeably, has started destroying long standing cinematic stereotypes in Brazil while, at the same time, Argentinian's CINE LIBERATI0N GROUP has given us a significant prototype for a new cinema; Fernando Solanas' La Hora de los Hornos (The Hour of the Furnaces). It's a film that seems to challenge traditional cinema on every level. Fundamentally, it's most innovative and hope-full aspect is its format. Where Hollywood movies have basically been a divergence, an escape, a 'dream factory', an advertisement for the 'American way of life' and ultimately a passifier, La Hora de Los Hornos is an open-ended film-essay, an emotional experience, and teaching machine; provoking discussion and hopefully political action.

"La Hora de los Hornos never permits the audience to sink in and just flow, it forces the audience to stop, to wake up, to interrupt the hypnosis, to regain consciousness, to question themselves, to think; it expects the public to answer with further thought and action."17

Hopefully this will be a start to a new medium and a new consciousness. In the words of Frantz Fanon: "Every Spectator Is A Coward Or A Traitor." If they remain so, all we'll have to look forward to is another Shirley Temple rerun.

"SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK- The former child star, now a chic 44, will return to the screen to narrate and appear in a 20-minute film about Jose Antonio Velasquez, a Honduran primitive painter, because she feels "a great affinity and admiration" for Latin American people."18

"...a pretty face like the dancers that dance in a row, not the betrayer face Rita Hayworth has: Dad says she's the most beautiful of all. I'm going to write in big letters the R of Rita and H in big letters, for the background I'll draw a mantilla comb and some castanets. But in Blood and Sand she betrays the good boy. I don't want to draw R. H. in big letters."19

Finally we see the reality of the promise (i.e. Sex) Rita enticed us with.

"Q: What happened to Rita Hayworth's two daughters?
A: Rit's oldest from her marriage to Orson Welles, looks (unfortunately) rather like her father. Rebecca, 27, lives mostly on welfare in a rundown house in Tacoma, Wash., with her hippie husband, Perry Moede, a potter. The younger child, 22-year-old Yasmin, fares better, having inherited money from her father, Prince Aly Khan, who died in an auto crash in 1960. Yazzy is spending the winter skiing in St. Moritz with her step-brother, Admin, 33.

Our way of life, as well as the Argentine's, is extensively shaped by Madison Avenue and Hollywood opinion makers, we are in effect the children of Rita Hayworth, the great mother whose face is the face of America.
FOOTNOTES

1. Detroit Free Press, 1-23-72, pg. 9-0.
7. ibid, pg. 63.
9. ibid, pg. 28,29.
10. ibid, pg. 33.
12. ibid, pg. 103,104.
13. ibid, pg. 364,365
14. ibid, pg. 175,173.
19. Puig, pg. 64.
20. Detroit Free Press, 2-22-72, pg. 9-A.
FELLINI-SATYRICON
A BAROQUE MASTERPIECE

Ian Hills
University of Wisconsin

Some suggestions about new criteria for film criticism

Fellini-Satyricon! How few have leapt to their feet to shout "bravo"! And the walls of every theatre should have resounded with the cry, "bravissimo! bravissimo!". Fellini can not be surprised, it only verifies what he is saying in the film itself:

Ay name is Eumolpus. The masterpieces you see exhibited here all cry out against the present lethargy. There's no one alive who knows how to paint like this, the fine arts are dead....In the old days they loved virtue, excellence pure and simple, the liberal arts flourished. But look at us -- between wine and prostitutes we don't even know the masterworks that exist. What's happened to logical argument?

In reading the critiques of Fellini-Satyricon one might well ask, indeed what's happened to logical argument? Critics today seem so seldom capable of perceiving it or practising it. Perhaps it is the glut of undisciplined film fare that has blunted their vision, the 'private eyes' of these "cowboys" see only the very naked girls", As Eumolpus says, "Between wine and prostitutes we don't even know the masterworks that exist. But it is not only that our vision is blurred by the inferior wine of poor films and so makes us perceive in a masterpiece only those things which approximate to the many prostituted forms of film art around us. There is, also, something limiting about our vision, anyhow. For sixty years we have been looking at films with private eyes only, there has been no commonly accepted standards of judgement, as there have been for other, much longer established arts. This is what is wrong with most of the characters in Fellini's Satyricon they encounter the world with private eyes, they cannot communicate with each other because common standards, indeed all standards, have disappeared. Because these people, like our critics, observe the world they encounter with private eyes only, they remain only 'cowboys' (satyrs, half animal, half man) in search of the next exciting naked girl. The unexciting prostitute is a failure; the protagonist's ultimate failure is to be impotent in his encounter with the prostitute. When he does encounter a girl 'clad in beauty', as with the Patrician family, he is afraid and nonplussed, he cannot understand this phenomenon. The question is: can this state be changed? If it is not we know that, in the end, it will affect the artist as well as the critics. Eumolpus the poet, in the second half of the film, enters the arena crippled, drinking wine, and accompanied by a prostitute.
Many critics have attempted to approach film with criteria borrowed from traditional approaches to other arts. But, as Vachel Lindsay demonstrated very early in film's history, the art of the film embraces all the arts, so that to approach it from only one point of view is to leave much of it undiscovered. The first decision such a critic has to make, if he is not already the victim of crippling "technical presuppositions and critical preconceptions," is which art's criteria will he choose. Often he chooses the least suitable. So Russell Campbell complains that Fellini-Satyricon is not good because, "the characters are not developed, and that the film demonstrates, the eroding effect that plutlessness can have." In choosing as his yardstick the criteria of the traditional novel -- not even the modern novel, which would have been somewhat appropriate -- he has not only shown a narrowness of vision, but has obviously paid no attention to the artifact's framework as stated by the artifact itself and outlined by the author. The film has the form of a fresco, it begins with graffiti on a wall and ends with the characters depicted on a broken mural in a lonely landscape. The style of the whole film supports this framework which, in turn, defines the film's field. When Campbell says, "Fellini has reduced Petronius's magnificent comic creation . . . to almost a cipher," he is criticising not the work, but the intent of the work and the intent of the author.

If the work of Petronius is the realistic, bloody and amusing description of the customs, characters and general feel of those times, the film we want to freely adapt from it could be a fresco in fantasy key.

As a film critic Campbell should have been familiar with Fellini's similar intention in his other works, for example in his preceding film Giulietta degli Spiriti which, he says, is 'like the ancient frescoes," and in La Dolce Vita. I just thought of it as a vast fresco." Unfortunately Campbell is a private eye, and what's worse, a private eye with the wrong clues. He cannot solve the mystery.

Supposing, then, a critic approaches this work according to its intent, as a fresco, bringing to it the criteria usually employed in judging a fresco. Would such a point of view provide a satisfactory solution? It would probably solve the mystery, it would tell us a great deal about the film, but it alone could not provide a full appreciation. This critic's point of view, also, would be too limited, because any artistic film is related, in varying degrees, to all the arts, even though it may be most strongly related to one in particular. The solution, on the other hand, does not lie in dismissing all criteria, though such tens to be the attitude adopted by a number of modern critics -- they have the most private eyes of all. So Chris Morris states,

The art of Fellini and the Fellini spectacular are a little more complex than that. Satyricon is a roll in the hay with history . . . It is a film which clearly relishes its own sensuality.
Except for disciples of the "Jaw" Sutra, does "a roll in the hay" really constitute great art? Such a non-response is exactly the degraded, private way the anti-heroes in *Fellini-Satyricon* make their encounter with their world. John Russell Taylor is almost as evasive in his definition of what is artistic about this film:

The film does, though sometimes by a very narrow margin, function as a work of art, recreating effects rather than reproducing them.  

Criticism of this kind seems to imply a passive attitude on the part of the critic; the film, Taylor suggests, "is for those who can let it work on them."  

Apparently the critic is supposed to bring no positive standards at all to contemplate the artifact:

*Satyricon* . . . is a lascivious, vile film, some kind of bug, pornographic funny that blows up in your head like a boiler maker.  

Morris's claim that this is a description of what makes *Fellini-Satyricon* unique is ridiculous, as the words can be applied to thousands of most inferior films.  

The irony of this position is that it is the very one being satirised by Fellini in his film. Basically Taylor and Morris are passive and absorbent in their approach because they don't know what the film is about and they don't know what the film is about because they don't have, or haven't used, the appropriate means of examination.

Since some standards are necessary for proper judgment, and since the criteria applied to any one of the traditional arts is not sufficient when applied to film, what is needed, obviously, is a methodology which will encompass film's alliance to all the arts and, at the same time, consider the unique nature of film itself. Is this too much to expect? One would be tempted to answer "yes" to that question if it weren't for the fact that the history of art forms presents us with periods in which other critics faced a similar problem, and found a reasonably successful solution. Such periods were those in which the baroque movement was predominant. "Movement" is a key word in any definition of the baroque, as it is, significantly, in any definition of the cinema -- we call the latter "movies". Indeed, one might almost dare to say that the art of the film, of its nature, tends towards the baroque. Marcel Brion "goes one step further.

Le cinéma existent aujourd'hui en même temps que les possibilités neuves, et étonnement riches, d'un art mouvant, c'est-à-dire d'une peinture et d'une sculpture en mouvement, doit-on penser que de ce fait, les chances d'apparition d'un nouveau baroque, d'un baroque futur, diminuent énormément?"
When one observes the tendency towards the baroque in the other art forms in the first half of this century, in literature, painting, and music, cinema can be seen as a natural phenomenon in the evolution of art generally. It is logical that it should have appeared at this time, technically everything was available for it to appear much earlier, but it was not yet time in the evolution of art.

If film has something in common with the baroque periods of art generally, it may be helpful to employ criteria used during such a period, for example the post-renaissance baroque era.

Baroque art, bursting out of the confines of the renaissance classicism, must have startled and perplexed the critics of the period, initially at any rate. In place of the linear, closed forms, unity, and absolute clarity of renaissance art there appeared the episodic, open forms of the baroque, with its profusion of inventive detail and apparent turmoil. But the critics of the period were equal to the task and evolved, parallel to the new art movement, an aesthetic theory, based largely on the ancients, but adapted to their own times, broad enough to encompass all the then known art forms, and yet detailed enough to examine every aspect of each form. It is just possible that, by using some of their criteria, we may gain insight into Fellini-Satyricon, a twentieth century baroque artifact.

Asked once for his definition of the cinema Fellini replied, "c'est un miroir dans lequel nous devrions avoir le courage de découvrir notre âme." This is consonant with Hobbes's definition of the memory: "The ancients, therefore, fabled not absurdly in making memory the Mother of the Muses. For memory is the World (though not really, yet so as in a looking glass)." That Fellini considers the memory is important is evident from his emphasis on the subject in his film 8½, the story of a film director struggling with his memories in the process of composition. The same theme is predominant in Giulietta Degli Spiriti, the story of a woman, her memories, and the part the latter play in her liberation. That Fellini makes extensive use of his memory in the inventive detail of his films has been amply demonstrated by numerous critics, perhaps most ably by Genevieve Agel and Gilbert Salachas. Fellini-Satyricon is no exception; every scene and practically every person has a predecessor (usually a number of predecessors) in previous Fellini films. No director repeats himself so often, "I believe I'm always making the same film". Although many critics have discussed endlessly this repetition of setting, mise en scène, character, and theme, it is necessary to observe the phenomenon with each new Fellini film; for these images, raised anew from the well of the memory, tend to emerge in a new context and therefore take on a slightly different significance depending on the nature of the new film and such things as their position and predominance.
in it. Fellini, and he knows it, is never really making the same film. What must be avoided, however, is trying to wrench some symbolic meaning, especially continuing symbolic meaning, out of these revived images. This is particularly true of Fellini's images; they are so direct, simple and archetypal that they defy interpretation, and this is what Fellini himself intends, "The problem was to make them clear on a symbolic level, but of not having them fall into an overwhelming symbolism." So Erich Auerbach speaks of "the kind of uninterpretable symbolism which is also to be encountered in other forms of art of the same period (20th Century)."23

What can we think, for instance, about the opening shot in the film; a youth, Encolpius, crying in anguish with his back to a graffiti strewn wall? We can think of Gelsomina with her back to the wall when found by Zampano, we can think of Alberto in I Vitelloni, crying, with his back to a wall plastered with posters as his sister departs with her lover, of the husband in Lo Sciecco Bianco backed against a wall as he is assaulted by his family, and of Picasso glued to a wall by his vision of the virgin in Il Bidone. Such comparisons will help us realise better the particular character of Encolpius's imprisonment. A study of the author's memory is one way of understanding the artifact it has helped produce. The post-renaissance audience had been trained, as a matter of course, to appreciate the commonplace (topoi) from which the artist drew his illustrations. But the recognition of the "commonplace" and the observation of the image's new context was considered sufficient. We, also, should be content to say no more about "the wall" or other images of Fellini-Satyricon unless it is to say with Gilbert Salachas, "Orichesse des allegories involontaires!"24; for we should realise with Kenneth Burke that such images are indefinable instruments of the artist's rhetoric, "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."25 The images the film maker puts on the screen picture what cannot be said in words; if it could be said in words he would not have needed to make the film. It should be sufficient to compare images in the context of Fellini-Satyricon with the same images as they appear in other Fellini contexts (This is done in Appendix A). It is an enlightening sufficiency.

According to Hobbes there are two sources in the memory, one, the artist's own experience, and two, what he remembers from books:

There remains now no more to be considered but the Expression, in which consisteth the countenance and colour of a beautiful Huse, and is given her by the Poet out of his own provision, or is borrowed from others. That which he hath of his own is nothing but experience and knowledge of Nature, and specially humane nature, and is the true and natural Colour. But that which is taken out of Books (the ordinary boxes of Counterfeit Complexion) shows well or ill, as it hath more or less resemblance with the natural, and are not to be used without examination advisedly.26 (Italics mine)

Certainly Fellini has not used Petronius' Satyricon "without examination". Petronius's creative mind works in the same way as does that of Fellini. The
fragmentariness of Petronius's work is caused not only by pieces apparently being lost, but is essential to its nature. One feels that his Satyricon, as Fellini's, seems fragmented because of the extreme directness with which images are transferred from the memory to the artifact. As Auerbach has pointed out in his discussion of an excerpt from the Trimalchio's feast scene:

The presentation, explicit though it be, is entirely subjective, for what is set before us is not Trimalchio's circle as objective reality, but as subjective image, as it exists in the mind of the speaker, who himself, however, belongs, to the circle -- a highly artful procedure in perspective. . . . Modern writers, Proust, for example work in exactly the same way.

But to Petronius' double mirroring Fellini adds his own manifold mirroring, for there is, in addition, the perspective of the image drawn from his experiential memory; the many other similar feasts we have seen in his other films are reflected here with a difference-yet-sameness. Hobbes's two sources, "out of his own provision, or borrowed from others" come together. What Auerbach says of Proust can be said of both Petronius and Fellini; they, all three, use their memory to get to the "essence of events":

Proust aims at objectivity, he wants to bring out the essence of events; he strives to attain this goal by accepting the guidance of his own consciousness -- not, however, of his consciousness as it happens to be at any particular moment, but as it remembers things.

But, of course, Fellini obtains greater objectivity by adding to his own consciousness the consciousness of Petronius. Perhaps a comparison with James Joyce's Ulysses would be closer to the method used. And yet Fellini goes a step further still for Petronius's Satyricon is, in turn, a parody of Homer's Odyssey, the work of a third consciousness, that of Homer. Fellini achieves omnitemporality through a multiple reflection of consciousness. If critics realized the relationship between the way Fellini works and the way modern novelists work, they might give more attention to his artifacts.

When one comes to compare the consciousness of Petronius with that of Fellini one observes a compelling phenomenon. For years Fellini's critics have been telling us that there are certain images which keep recurring in his films in a way unique to him, for example the anguished hero with his back to the wall. We have seen all these favourite images repeated in Fellini-Satyricon (Appendix A). But what happens when we examine Petronius's Satyricon? Lo and behold: they are all there similar in nature and tone to Fellini's, for example, the wall:

There I caught sight of Giton, towels and scrapers in his hands, standing beside the wall, utterly desolate and forlorn.

The completeness of these correspondences (See Appendix B) seems to refute the claims of the critics who have said that the recurring images drawn from Fellini's
memory are part of what makes him unique, different from other "auteurs". Obviously such images are archetypal; here is veritable proof that the direct transference of images from the memory to the artifact is a satisfactory means of expressing universality of experience. The surrealists thought they discovered this concept, but it was already a part of renaissance thinking; so John Oldham can say of Ben Jonson:

All in thy faithful glass were so expressed,
As if they were reflections of thy breast,
As if they had been stamped on thy own mind,
And thou the universal vast idea of mankind.31

As Erich Auer32 says, "there is confidence that in any random fragment plucked from the course of life at any time the totality of its fate is contained and can be portrayed." Perhaps, then, the surrealists were right about the pensée parlée? But, no! for Breton's pensée parlée is situated "en l'absence de tout contrôle exercé par la raison"33. "Aye! There's the rub."

If we return to Hobbes's definition we notice that he insists that Fancy be governed by Judgement; but Dryden's famous passage probably makes the point better:

when the fancy was as yet in its first work, moving the sleeping images of things towards the light, there to be distinguished, and there to be chosen or rejected by the judgement.34

The surrealists fail to communicate satisfactorily with the audience because in recalling images they fail to order them significantly. Fellini, on the other hand, insists that the mirror in which he observes himself become a mirror in which the audience can, also, see itself:

Je ne suis pas un surrealiste, au sens moderne du mot... Si le paysage reflète un état d'âme, le spectateur trouve sur l'écran un miroir qui l'éclaire en même temps sur lui-même.35

To this end Fellini insists that fancy must be governed by judgement. "Satyricon will be a dream. Or to be more precise, the documentary of a dream."36 It is not the images Petronius and Fellini recall from their memory which makes their work unique, it is the significant order they impose on these images. The two "auteurs" recall similar images, but in a different order. It is the significant ordering of his dreams that Fellini sees as the crucial creative effort:

I have had to objectify the fruit of that imaginative operation and detach myself entirely from it in order to be able to explore it afresh from a disquieting viewpoint.37

Fellini is here stating in different words, a principle held firmly by renaissance rhetoricians. They would have called it disposition -- disposing oneself to dispose effectively the elements of one's composition.
We have from Fellini not only a definition of film in terms of memory (See p. 5), but also a definition in terms of disposition. The first concerns what film is, the second what it does:

En effet, qu'est-ce faire un film? C'est, bien entendu, tenter de mettre de l'ordre dans certaines fantaisies et les raconter avec une certaine précision.

What art creates is not just objects but the forms of objects. The artist's reflections from the mirror of his memory are moulded into a unique pattern with its own equilibrium and rhythm. When we speak of disposition in terms of equilibrium and rhythm we are speaking in a language which can be applied to all the arts. So John Oldham (1653-83) speaks of Ben Jonson:

Some curious painter, taught by art to dare
(For they with poets in that title share)
When he would undertake a glorious frame
Of lasting worth, and fadeless as his fame,
Long he contrives, and weighs the bold design,
Long holds his doubting hand e'er he begin
And justly, then, proportions every stroke and line,
Nought ever issued from thy teeming breast,
But what had gone full time, could write exactly best

Nought incorrect there was; nought; faulty there,
No point amiss did in the large-voluminous piece appear.

One "point" which must not be "amiss" is, of course, the point of equilibrium. In a Fellini film, as in any good painting, this point tends to be in the centre of the framed artifact. Just as in Leonardo Da Vinci's Last Supper all perspectives lead into and depart from Christ's head; so in Fellini-Satyricon everything leads to and departs from the Suicide Villa scene. Here is perfect stillness. Here time stands still. This scene is so different that even the most casual observer must notice it; his mind's eye will be drawn to it as inevitably, if unconsciously, as his real eyes are drawn to the centre of a painting as being the point of balance. The difference is that a filmmaker has to supply the point of equilibrium, whereas for a painter it exists as soon as he has decided on the borders of the canvas. But, given the point of equilibrium, how does one reconcile it with the wild cavortings and disorderly episodes that surround it? We can say of Fellini's latest film what Salchaès said of La Dolce Vita,

La doucer de vivre n'est pas un tableau harmonieux et poli,
mais une fresque aux excroissances monstrueuses, un monument baroque constitué par une multitude d'éléments rapportés.

"Une multitude d'éléments rapportés" is a characteristic of baroque art which delights in asymmetrical equilibrium. The wild rage of a Fellini episode finds its own equilibrium in the inevitable moment of stillness which follows it. There may not be the geometrical order of classical art, but there will always be the cadences of the finest baroque art. Fellini himself makes this distinction when speaking of Giulietta degli Spiriti.
The slightly rhapsodic tone you speak of probably derives from this -- the story told in chapters, in little pictures, like the ancient frescoes or cartoon strips. I would very much like to be able to do a film one day that is as neat and precise as the design of a crystal. I would have to impose a discipline upon myself, as an exercise. Get away for once from the charms of a story told in sweeping cadences, enclose everything in perfect geometry.  

John F. A. Taylor sees this principle of cadences leading to points of equilibrium as an inevitable one in the art of the film of which he says:

"Picorially it is powerful only as it works by cadences, resolving actualities of movement into moments of poise or suspension. These moments of poise or suspension, from which movement issues, towards which it gravitates, are the pictorial equilibria here under analysis. Fellini does impose a discipline on himself already; he carefully plans, in each of his films, these moments of "poise or suspension" towards which action "gravitates" and from which it "issues." There are the empty deserted scenes where the hero, or anti hero, is left alone; scenes which have the same significance as the negative field of a painting where the painter has deliberately put nothing so that what he has drawn may stand out all the more in contrast, and, yet, the negative area has a shape of its own as in The Dance by Henri Matisse:

Pouvez vous définir cette notion d'espace qui est un des décors essentiels de vos films? -- Le vide laisse la place à des présences occultes qui tentent d'aider les personnages à regarder autour d'eux avec des yeux neufs."

We see that Fellini is aiming at the same effect as does a painter. But besides this suspension in space there is, also, a suspension of time:

"J'essaie de créer une sorte de suspense du temps où on peut espérer qu'adviennent un miracle, que les personnages aient enfin la révélation. C'est comme un suspense à rebours de l'action intérieure."

In Fellini-Satyricon there are five such points of equilibrium which stand out above the turmoil, in a suspension of time and space. There is, of course, the central one, the Suicide Villa, but on each side of it are two more. The first occurs after the collapse of the Isula Felices; the climax of the revellings in the first section of the film; it is when Encolpius finds himself alone in the art gallery. The second time he finds himself alone is at dawn near the desert fountain after the night of Trimalchio's feast. After further episodes of lust we find rest at the Suicide Villa, then the Hermaphroditic scenes lead us into the fight with the Ninotaur, and Encolpius's isolation in the arena. The fifth point of suspension comes near the end of the film near
It should be noted that each one of these five points of equilibrium immediately follows a death scene. This highlights the suspension of time and space, the equilibria are always dead points, "the still point of the turning wheel." As John F. A. Taylor says of paintings:

The point of intersection of the perpendicular axes is the cemetery of all dynamic effects: it is the point of no tension, absolute zero for that field, as perfectly static and immobile as it is singular and compulsive. (Italics mine)

The most immobile, singular and compulsive scene in Fellini-Satyricon is that of the suicides; the place where time is deliberately stopped has to be the strongest point of equilibrium. So it is with the suicide of Steiner in La Dolce Vita, the suicide of Biulietta's girlhood friend in Giulietta degli Spiriti and the suicide of Il Malto in La Strada (he allows himself to be killed); each of these suicides is the main point of equilibrium of the films concerned. The four subsidiary points of equilibrium in Fellini-Satyricon have something else in common, not only are they preceded by a death scene, but they are immediately followed by a significant meeting: they are not cul-de-sacs, but crossroads like the intersections of the axes in a painting. In each case, following upon his isolation Encolpius meets the poet (source of inspiration) Eumolpus who attempts to lead him to some kind of salvation, sets him again on the journey of life. It is roughly equivalent to Marcello's meeting of the innocent young girl after his moments of isolation in La Dolce Vita; the last time, near the dead bloated fish on the seashore, certainly reminds one of Eumolpus's dead body on the seashore near the end of Fellini-Satyricon. Around these points of equilibrium, then, one can observe another principle of disposition at work, a cyclic rhythm of events; they really are still points of a turning wheel.

John F. A. Taylor speaks of this cyclic rhythm, and its accompanying intrinsic rhythm in terms of painting:

An ornamental sequence will invariably exhibit two distinguishable rhythmic patterns. The first is the rhythm of its cycle; the second is the rhythm within its cycle. The one depends on the repetition of a motive; the other depends on the character of the motive repeated.

If we think of each of the points of equilibrium as the end of an act when time and space is suspended, or the end of a movement in music, then within each act we can discern the same rhythm of events forming a pattern or theme, with variations in each act or movement. There is in each of the five sections of Fellini-Satyricon a fight or struggle, a procession, a journey, an orgy with a climax, and each time, for Encolpius, a sexual encounter. These events do not occur each time in the same order but, as in a musical composition, there are significant variations, variations which are quite complex yet, it bears repetition, quite significant (The pattern of these events in each act is set out in Appendix C). There are two episodes not mentioned in the list above, the two stories of the two widows, one coming at the end of the second
act and the other in the last act. But these two excrescences balance one another; it is the device Fellini has employed to emphasise the balance of the first two acts of the film against the last two, regarding the third act as a central panel. Such is the cyclic rhythm which touches the souls of men; the external events are there to convey an interior meaning; the disposition illuminates the invention. Beneath the varied order of similar events there is a rhythmic movement within the hero's soul which is unvaried each time. His attempt to distract himself in wild entertainments is inevitably followed by a moment of mockery which leaves him isolated. In each movement the soul is distracted, divided and isolated; each time the isolation is interrupted by an invitation which begins the cycle again. In the first half of the film there is an invitation through contemplation of art and poetry, in the second half an invitation to debauchery and cannibalism, which suggests an intrinsic rhythm in the film as a whole. This is, indeed, the case. The joyful, "good fun" attitude of the first half is contrasted with the sadistic, revolting degradation of the second half. The homosexuality of Giton, Asclepius, and Encolpius, and the feast of Trimalchio, have a veneer of pleasantness, but the hermaphrodite scene and the cannibalistic feast of the second half illustrate the final masochistic atage in the cycle of corruption. The two widows' stories make a similar contrast.

The meaning as it emerges from the form of an artifact was known to renaissance critics as invention:

The poet imitates not the particular, but the simple idea clothed in its own beauties, which Aristotle calls the universal.49

Invention consisted in clothing an idea in a beautiful form to achieve a universal truth; the form is itself part of the invented idea. Fellini speaks of film in terms of invention as well as in terms of memory and disposition. Having finished Fellini-Satyricon he commented, "it was certainly a psychological course, inventing the whole world. ...In the film everything is invented; faces, gestures, situations, surroundings, objects.50 The most compelling thing about the invention in the film is the way the ideas are made luminous by their disposition. The main principle of the disposition here is, as has been illustrated, fragmentary episodes. But the fragmentary nature of the structure is only an outward expression of the fragmentariness of life, which is one of the principle ideas in the film. The effect of the fragmentariness is to give a sense of alienation which is a second theme in the film. According to Fellini,

The Satyricon is mysterious first and foremost because it is fragmentary. But its fragmentariness is, in a certain sense, symbolic -- of the general fragmentariness of the ancient world ... It's a completely alien world, in fact.51

But what chiefly interests Fellini is the ancient world, its fragmentariness and its alienation, as an image of today's world:
The encounter with that world and that society turned out to be a joyful affair; a stimulation of fantasy, an encounter rich in themes of remarkable relevance to modern society. In fact it seems we can find disconcerting analogies between Roman society before the final arrival of Christianity — a cynical, society, impasive, corrupt and frenzied — and society today, more blurred in its external characteristics only because it is internally more confused. Then as now we find ourselves confronting a society at the height of its splendor but revealing already the signs of a progressive dissolution; a society in which politics is only the cordial, routine administration of a common aﬄuence and an end in itself, where big business intrudes at all levels in the brutality of its instruments and the vulgarity of its ends; a society in which all beliefs — religious, philosophical, ideological and social — have crumbled, and been displaced by a sick, wild and impotent eclecticism, where science is reduced to a frivolous and meaningless bundle of notions or to a gloomy and fanatical elitism. If the work of Petronius is the realistic, bloody and amusing description of the customs, characters and general feel of those times, the film we want to freely adapt from it could be a fresco in fantasy key, a powerful and evocative allegory — a satire of the world we live in today.

It is interesting to notice how each element in the disposition, each element in the cyclic rhythm of events, ﬁgures forth its own element of meaning, the theme being varied, as in a musical composition, in each episode. In his journey through life (journeys and processions) man will try to relate himself to the people he meets either privately (sexual encounters) or publicly (staged shows and orgies) with the inevitable result of being alienated (fights) and left alone to start the cycle again. The only way out of this "vicious" circle is suicide or death. In the journey the hero makes in the various episodes of Fellini-Satyricon one can't help thinking of Everyman, the same anonymous kind of personality, who had to pass through a partly moralised bog and endure fire, sword, and the halter. Speaking of his previous films Fellini said:

"each time I am telling the story of characters in quest of themselves, in search of a more authentic source of life, of conduct, of behavior, that will more closely relate to the true roots of their individuality."

But, although every meeting is precious, the Fellini character never seems to find in them any permanent salvation:

"L'exemple des uns, l'expérience des autres, les bonnes paroles des Samaritains de passage, ne suﬀisent pas à changer la vie. La résistance passive des héros négatifs de Fellini est prodigieuse."

In his journeys the hero's main efforts are concentrated on trying to relate to others, attempts at love. These attempts to relate to others are objectiﬁed in sexual encounters, staged shows, and orgies, all of which leave the hero alienated, without love. What Fellini said of his ﬁrst works can be said of all his ﬁlms, including his latest:
Elles sont une tentative de montrer qui les origines de toutes nos angoisses, peurs et défaillances sont un manque d'amour.55

Every encounter offers a different kind of love, but one thing they all have in common is, finally, a rejection of all love. Asked if his films were Christian, Fellini replied,

Si, par chrétien, vous entendez une attitude d'amour envers son prochain, il me semble que... oui, tous mes films sont axés sur cette idée... Il y a une tentative de raconter un monde sans amour... des gens qui exploitent les autres.56

By the end of the film one has the impression that love in this world has reached the stage of what Kenneth Burke calls,

sheer neutral communication (communication being the area where love has become so generalized, desexualized, "technologized", that only close critical or philosophic scrutiny can discern the vestiges of the original motive).57

The state of alienation is complete, "man standing alone before the fascinating mystery of life, all its terror, its beauty and its passion."58

Just as the fragmentariness of the disposition helped to create the idea of alienation, so the elocution Fellini employs helps to reinforce it: "In order to give the film this feeling of alienation, I have adopted a dream language."59 This is why he wanted to use Latin: "Latin. This will increase the sense of alienation."60 The characters were planned as, "personalities which seem to have breathed another air, eaten other foods."61 As with Brecht, alienation is not only a theme of the film but also a technique for maintaining the truth which might be lost in involvement:

I am convinced the framework of alieness is the only one that can insur me against the danger of a dialectical relationship with a vertiginously remote and unknown reality.62

One way in which Fellini achieves alienation within a scene is by the lack of physical communication of characters within the same scene, as with the people in Seurat's Sunday Afternoon on the Grande-Jatte. Such a technique is perhaps most obvious in the Suicide Villa sequence, but is also true of many of Encopius's scenes. Allied to this is the juxtaposition of a highly lighted character against a dark background or vice versa; a chiaroscuro effect which distinguishes baroque artists such as Tintoretto and El Greco. The isolation achieved by this percussive rhythm of light and shade is intensified by the continuous rhythm of a person against a large immobile background, or the immobility of a person against a moving background such as a crowd.63 Besides the way Fellini lights or
colours a scene and moves his people around in it, often the unreality of the scene itself gives a sense of physical estrangement. One thinks of El Greco's View of Toledo where one is not sure where the scene is real, and where deliberately an expression of what Fellini would call "a state of soul." *Mes personnages sont transparents et les paysages sont des états d'âme objectifs par eux.* The characters, also, are often grotesque for the same purpose:

sometimes more than one character is presented suddenly with a completely unreal look, so much so that a stimulating ambiguity between fantasy and reality is created.

Fellini has the ability, like Kafka, to build into a real character the appearance of an unreality, which has fantastic and symbolic overtones, without ever letting us forget the reality of the character. Since he is working with film he can combine the ambiguity of an El Greco-like scene with the ambiguity of a Kafka-like character. Just as in his exploitation of the memory he achieved multiple layers of consciousness, so in his exploitation of film language he portrays manifold levels of reality.

The ambiguity realised by skilful manipulation of mise en scène and character is supported by an ambiguity arising from editing techniques, especially the jump cut. We are suddenly taken out of a scene before the action is finished, often at the crucial point, as when the Insula Felicis is falling around Encolpius or when Eumolpus is apparently about to be flung into the furnace.

What interests Fellini in this film is:

To work, in fact, as the archaeologist does, when he assembles a few potsherds or pieces of masonry and reconstructs not an amphora or a temple, but an artifact in which the object is implied; and this artifact suggests more of the original reality, in that it adds an indefinable and unresolved amount to its fascination by demanding the participation of the spectator... corruption, the leprosy of time, makes everything more ambiguous, indecipherable, obscure, and thus full of enchantment.

This aim is similar to that of the metaphysical poets of the early seventeenth century, also baroque artists, significantly back in fashion in the twentieth century. Cowley speaks with approval of, "the manner of the Prophets' writing... where half is left out, to be supplied by the Hearer." Accompanying the distortion of figures, space, and time for the purpose of achieving a metaphysical reality within a physical reality is Fellini's creation of dissonance in the use of colour.

Just as elements may be disposed according to space and time so, in a visual medium, they can also be disposed according to colour. In Giulietta degli Spiriti Fellini first used colour to achieve ambiguity. He says:

The ambiguity is intentional and is one of the keys to the film. The thing that really made it effective was color. It is the color that determines the ambiguity between the trickiness and the fantastic lighting.
This happens in Fellini-Satyricon, but in the latter film the author goes a step further. Firstly he imposes a limitation on himself in the use of colour as a painter or musical composer often chooses to work within a limited scale, and, obviously, for much the same reasons. Such discipline has a compulsion of its own, like a poem confined to a somet form. The colours Fellini chooses to use for most scenes are not complementary: yellow, orange, brown, red and black; their combination inevitably produces a dissonance which reflects the dissonant mood of the invented ideas. One exceptional scene, as is to be expected, is the Suicide Villa scene where white and dark green are predominant. These two colours are close enough to being complementary, and produce a harmony which when combined with other harmoniously ordered elements in the scene has a very powerful effect of peace in contrast to the other scenes of the film. A theme announced in one act in a certain combination of the principle colours is varied in another act by a different combination of colours which suggests a different mood. For example the changing colour of Eumolpus's garments counterpoints his gradual degradation. In the gallery he is wearing a brown, almost monkish, ascetic gown which changes to red, a garish yellow in the arena, and a white burial cloth on the beach. This is a very simplified example of the way the disposition of colour supports the disposition of other elements throughout the film as a whole.

Where classical art tends to make manifest the order of external reality, baroque art suggests an additional order of internal reality. The genius of Fellini is that he can convey both these realities simultaneously in all the elements with which he is working, space, time, and colour. He distorts these elements sufficiently to suggest metaphysical overtones, but never lets them lose touch with their earthly existence.

Oui, le baroque est une rhétorique, mais qui a besoin pour survivre et refleurir d'un substrat métaphysique justifié par des situations concrètes assez particulières pour soutendre une époque ou une région précises, assez générales pour pouvoir s'échanger avec d'autres lieux et d'autres temps analogues; il peut aussi exprimer les grandes émotions que le style classique-laisserait-échapper.69

Fellini not only encompasses the complete scale and fantastic variety of the baroque spirit, from its energetic, dynamic enjoyment of life to its melancholic, almost masochistic contemplation of death, a tribute to his fertile memory and fruitful invention, but he also achieves with his disposition and elocution an ordering of this variety which is both logically compelling and artistically satisfying. In addition he is able to suggest manifold levels of consciousness and reality which give his artifact a universality which should make it immortal.
Thou fadom'est the deep Gulf of Ages past,
And canst pluck up with ease
The years which Thou dost please.
Like shipwrecked Treasures by rude Tempests cast
Long since into the Sea,
Brought up again to light and publick Use by Thee
Nor dost thou only Dive so low,
But fly
With an unwearied wing the other way on high,
Where Fatés among the Stars do grow;

There into the close Nest of Time do'st peep,
And there with piercing Eye,
Through the firm shell, and the thick white do'st sip,
Years to come a forming lie.
Close in their sacred Second sleep,
Till hatch'd by the Sun's vital heat
Which o'er them yet does brooding set.
They Life and Motion get,
And ripe at last, with vigorous might
Break through the shell, and take their everlasting Flight.
NOTES


2. In this respect the encounter of Encolpius with the Minotaur is revealing.


4. This distinction of I.A. Richards might well be applied, for example, to Siegfried Kracauer's Theory of Film.


6. Ibid.

7. His preface to Fellini's Satyricon, op. cit., p. 44.


12. Ibid.

13. Morris (See Note 10).

14. It could be argued that Morris is too insignificant as a critic to be considered in this context, but his article is a conveniently hyperbold extension of a fashionable critical attitude, and illustrates the absurdity of such a point of view by taking it to its logical conclusion.


16. Ibid.

17. The rapid increase in knowledge and consequent expansion of the mind demanded in the Renaissance period, as in the twentieth century, new media of expression. In both instances it is a case of the message forming the media, not vice versa.


22. Interview with Tullio Kezich, op. cit. p. 44.


27. op. cit. p. 27.

28. op. cit. p. 542.

29. This has been demonstrated by R. Heitmö, E. Klebs and J. P. Sullivan. See the letters The Satyricon of Petronius (London, 1968), p. 93.


32. op. cit., p. 547.

33. 

34. Preface to The Rival Ladies.

35. Interview with Agel, op. cit., p. 94.
36 Fellini's Satyricon, op. cit., p. 27.
38 Quoted by Gilbert Salachas, op. cit., p. 89.
39 op. cit., p. 69.
40 op. cit., p. 75.
41 Interview with Tullio Kezich, op. cit., p. 47-48.
43 Interview of Fellini with Agel, op. cit., p. 94.
44 ibid., p. 95.
45 They correspond to the ends of the five acts in a Shakespearean type dramatic form, with the climax, the main point of equilibrium, coming near the end of the third act.
46 The people dying in the earthquake, Trimalchio in his tomb and the widow of Ephesus story, the deaths of the Patricians, the death of the Hermaphrodite, and the death of Ascyltus.
47 op. cit., p. 47 (note).
48 op. cit., p. 100.
51 ibid., p. 25.
52 ibid., pp. 43-44.
53 Interview with Kast, op. cit., p. 182.
54 Salachas, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
55. Interview with Agel, op. cit., p. 95.
57. op. cit., p. 15.
58. Fellini, in preface to _Fellini's Satyricon_, op. cit., p. 46.
60. ibid., p. 28.
61. ibid., p. 5.
62. ibid., p. 30.
63. One could, of course, discuss this technique in terms of music as well as of painting.
64. Interview with Agel, op. cit., p. 93.
66. Fellini; _in Fellini's Satyricon_, op. cit., p. 4.
68. Interview with Kezich, op. cit., p. 59.
70. A. Cowley, _Poems_, op. cit., pp. 185-86.
DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER PRESENTATION ENTITLED "THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE FILMMAKER: FOCUS ON THE FILMS OF FEDERICO FELLINI AND ON CHRISTOPHER PARKER'S CUT."

Powers: I saw, or at least I think I saw, Jim Belson frantically scribbling during Ian's presentation. I think we would all be interested in hearing Jim's comments on Ian's notions of memory and consciousness.

Belson: I did take notes on Ian's comments, but I'm not exactly sure where to begin. There are quite a few points I would like to have clarified before I make any statement about Ian's presentation. I don't want to develop a debate, and as of right now, there doesn't seem to be any reasons for one.

The relationship between Petronius' and Fellini's SATYRICON was an interesting one. What struck me when we were talking about archetypes was the similar relationship between Fellini's film and Cut. Ian made, I believe, some questionable remarks about the meaning for the audience of some of those images. If Fellini's Satyricon, and if Petronius' work is the origin of the wall archetype, to what extent can one draw similar conclusions about the obvious relationship between Satyricon and Cut? Cut presents the double image and the voice giving advice to the filmmaker, while in Satyricon, Guido rejects similar advice from his writer-friend at the spa. The carnival atmosphere in which the filmmaker is involved and the recurrent themes of music are similar in both films. The pictures on the wall of the filmmaker's editing room in Cut are like the images Guido has passed on his walls in Satyricon. The symbolism of the two amused women in Cut, with their continual juxtaposition, resembles the whore/madonna of Claudia Cardinale in Satyricon.

I can understand the division that Petronius granted as fragmentary: extra parts in fragmentary form; but to go and draw a structure for Satyricon as a classical five act form seems somehow strange... is that what you mean?

Wills: I was making a comparison in terms of imagery. I wasn't trying to make a comparison in terms of structure. I was speaking of the film itself.

Belson: You seem to be speaking simultaneously of fragmentation and structuration.

Wills: I don't think the two things are opposed. I think you can have fragmentation and structure as well. The idea of the fresco is important in that regard. The opening and closing shot of a fresco (in Satyricon) gives an indication of the style that Fellini uses: If you look at a fresco, it is fragmentary in one sense, and yet it also has a structure. I don't think that because something is fragmentary it necessarily means that we have to omit the notion of structure.

Fellini looks upon the memory as a mirror in which, in a sense, we can see a reflection of ourselves. Hobbes, interestingly, uses the same image to refer to memory. There is a clear analogy between the two notions.

Powers: Perhaps John Tokar could make a few comments.

Tokar: My perspective on the consciousness of the film director is quite a bit different from the one employed by these gentlemen. I'm more interested in a philosophical question: What are the filmmaker's presuppositions? Are they old; are they new? In other words, I want to know his worldview. This is a question of consciousness. Consciousness can only be conceived in a relational or contextual way. I don't feel that consciousness can be conceived of as it has been, tonight: as an isolated phenomenon, or as a prima facie first cause for creation. Yet this is how it has been treated.
This type of treatment of consciousness is in the tradition of philosophic idealism which, at times, becomes subjective idealism. In the case of the film Cut it becomes solipsism. In other words, one is not sure that the material world really exists, that there is a materiality. This can be summarized as the theory that consciousness precedes matter. I think the impact of such a theory is to be found everywhere; we don't have to look very hard.

Fellini is an excellent example of this, as a man who has stated in a recent interview that he doesn't know what everything is all about, that he's not certain about one thing. We get the impression he is hanging on by a hair.

Another form this subjective preoccupation takes is its elevating of form; form is an end in itself; it is more important than any content, any materiality. This leads to a preoccupation with memory, with dream, with all the psychological apparatuses that idealism has historically developed. We're victims of it; we were brought up in it; the whole culture is permeated with it. Some people call it bourgeois ideology. That's probably what it is; that's why they call it that.

I would like to present a few concepts taken from people who have taken the position that I take: historical materialism. Let me read a quotation from Eisenstein:

The effect, at times, is astounding, but the price paid is the entire dissolution of the very foundation of literary diction and the entire decomposition of literary method itself. For the lay reader, the text has been turned into abracadabra. In this joy shared the sad fate of all the so-called left tendencies in art that reached full flower with the entry of Capitalism into the imperialistic stage.

And Lenin, in Imperialism, The Highest Form of Capitalism, sets that date at just before the beginning of World War I. He claims that the people involved in that war were there because of conflicting property interests.

On the one hand, there is a firm belief in the permanency of existing order, and hence, a conviction of the limitations of man. This frequently produces an implosion for the artist, inwards toward form. The implosion is not creative and progressive but destructive. The arts themselves can escape the fretters of bourgeois limitations only in a revolutionary ideology and revolutionary themes.

Bretolt Brecht once wrote. "One does not progress by being profound. Depth is a dimension in itself, just depth in which, then, nothing at all comes to life. In fact, this idealistic world so heavily hung with psychological interpretations increases and spreads the darkness instead of cutting through it."

Another solution had to be thought of, an idealistic one, namely the psychological transformation of the personality. If you can't get what you want, we will make you like what you get. In this attitude, the Buddha was a forerunner of Freudianism.
No Maharaja in India has ever had the mendacious arrogance and insolence of the American ruling class and its toad-eating vassals. They have not merely threatened cities with extermination, but entire continents who refuse to pander to their insolent greed.

Blonsky: A portion of what you said interested me. But there was a quotation that you plucked from Eisenstein which had to do with bourgeois narrative as reinforcing belief in the permanence of the existing order, re: ideology, and I understand you to be incorporating that into your own voice.

There has been some work that's been done for example in de-mythologizing mystifying voices. And I had in mind a book called Mythologies by Roland Barthes, which is concerned with various kinds of mystification: wrestling, coins, food, etc. I was interested in your thought related to the Satyricon or Cina in terms of its mystificatory or anti-mystificatory structures.

Tokar: It doesn't tell us a damn thing.

Blonsky: I beg your pardon.

Tokar: It doesn't tell us a damn thing.

Blonsky: I'm terrible. I don't follow.

Tokar: I would associate that film with the New American Cinema Group, which films don't tell us a damn thing, at least about anything that'a really important. I'm not interested in the fact that Fellini is hanging on by a hair. We all are. What's new?

Llewelyn: But for the historical materialist, any capitalist or any non-revolutionary art is bound to be reactionary, is bound to be part of the superstructure; therefore, it is idealist. They define art that way. Non-revolutionary art is by definition part of the superstructure; so they just eliminate it.

Blonsky: Why would Satyricon be called reactionary?

Llewelyn: I'm just saying that in their frame of reference, they define terms so that they can reduce all works of art to a single, easily disposable vocabulary: rather a sanitary way of dealing with an uncomfortable aesthetic word.

Tokar: You say that with a sneer.

Llewelyn: Yes, I say that with a sneer because I speak with respect for the products of thousands of years of human efforts in aesthetics. I don't think it can be easily disposed of.

Berenson: Could you be more clear, John, in what you are opposing to Ian's comments. I've assumed that you are talking about a philosophical position that has to do with activism as opposed to reflections.

Tokar: No, I'm trying to deal with rationalism, not activism. You have to be rational before you act.
Bershen: You said that Ian's interest was not important, that Cat was not important, that New American Cinema did not deal with anything important. What is important?

Tokar: I think all these works are based on a similar psychological premise. They're dealing with consciousness in a subjective, internal way, they're going inward with consciousness. Consciousness is about something. You can go outward or in. Everyone is going in.

Blonsky: You say "going-in". Do you mean that they, a huge domain of films, are introspective regarding consciousness, going in in much the same way that Kant went in, to use the metaphor, and examined the functioning of the consciousness.

I gather that your objection is to a kind of art which explores consciousness, because it (to use Mr. Liewelyn's term) does not alter the proletarian consciousness. Of course you're not saying that.

Lesage: I'd like to re-focus the question somewhat. If you're using a Marxist aesthetic or an historical materialist aesthetic, what is happening to people when they see a film? And what should be happening to people when they see a film?

Tokar: They're seeing it with the eyes of the culture in which they live. In other words, unconsciously everyone has a way of looking at the world: it's a matter of environment. It doesn't make much sense for us to see a film by the Third World Cinema of South America and expect to relate to it in a meaningful way.

Lesage: Are you saying, then, that people are reacting to films in the same way they are reacting to visual-audio reality around them?

Tokar: Yes, I'd assume that the substance of film is about some material that has something to do with people's lives.

Lesage: I'm not sure that I agree, because I don't believe you have really elaborate a theory of what is happening to people when they see a film.

Tokar: I'm not interested in physiological or psychological mechanization that is in operation. I'm not interested in perception.

Lesage: Eisenstein was interested in perception.

Tokar: We all have eyes, we can see. We all have brains, we can reason.

Harpole: Is this an accurate re-statement: There is no need for the common man to see Satanicon or Cat, because it doesn't tell him anything about the improvement of his life. Is that accurate?

Tokar: Yes, he can identify with it, but what feeling does it communicate to you when you walk out of the theater. What are you left with? Anything substantial? Is the identification with a dying man something you want?

Blonsky: As against?
Tokar: As against growth, energy, life!

Blonsky: To talk about a man whose credentials are totally revolutionary, Godard...

Tokar: Those are his words, not mine!

Browne: There are some very interesting parallels between Cut and A Man with a Movie Camera. Could you tell us exactly how this film differs from Vertov's film, and tell us whether you consider that film a proletarian inspiration.

Tokar: There's a certain group of people who have grasped onto this film for its formal qualities, and they've look at this film as an apology for their own work. In other words, it's the structural people—the New American Cinema people—who like this film. They aren't really sure the world exists, so they say, Vertov's using that way back then, so he's our mentor. They disregard the fact that Vertov was a man that evolved, his work evolved, that his first and most important contribution to film was Kino Pravda; they disregard the fact that after making A Man with a Movie Camera, he made an extraordinary film called Three Songs About Lenin. But if you ask the New American Cinema people about these films, they'll put the foot down on them.

Bershen: What you're saying is not the truth about the New American Cinema's treatment of Kino Pravda and the Songs about Lenin. Annette Michelson does not consider Kino Pravda a sun burst through rain on either side.

Tokar: I don't think she sees it in its historical perspective.

Powers: John, you say that people unconsciously sees things the way their society sees them. But at the same time you say you don't go in for psychological mechanisms. What exactly is your viewpoint? Where does consciousness begin and where does the unconscious begin? What exactly is meant by the term "the consciousness of the filmmaker"? What value is there in discussing it?

Mitchell: I think that approaching the consciousness of the filmmaker can be approached from two viewpoints. Are we interested in examining his consciousness because we, too, are interested in making films, or are interested in the processes a filmmaker goes through? Or, are we interested in it from the viewpoint of the art product itself, the film? If we look at it from the second viewpoint, I would say that the consciousness of the filmmaker is rather unimportant to the product of art. I think that the art product itself should be examined. If you look at the consciousness of the filmmaker and its relation to the product, you're getting into a lot of guesswork which may not help clarify the work. It may also pervert the work and what the work is trying to say.

Blonsky: Which raises, of course, some very interesting questions. The first is the question of the act of consciousness versus the re-writing of the text or the perversion of the work. It may well be that to look upon a text is to systematically deform it as Malraux said. What I am suggesting is that it may very well be that we are not dealing in the field of truth at all, but rather in demonstrating the "polysemie" of the particular text. For example, what some might be interested in doing is inaugurating Ian's thoughts relating to the consciousness of the filmmaker. Then, he might find an absolutely opposite interpretations; if another interpretation came along, it too would serve;
and so on. Thus we would be incurring a chain of interpretations which will move through time.

Second, the ancient Yale New Critical structures against intention don't seem relevant to the question of locating the consciousness, or a consciousness, as manifested in a filmic text.

Belson: I think there may be a danger in getting involved in some kind of "intentionalist Fallacy" in dealing exclusively with consciousness. For John to quote Eisenstein, somewhat out of context, on Joyce seems to me to be a little unfair, since Eisenstein is concerned with the form of Joyce's writing and the revolutionary dialectical form Joyce is working with. I think you can see in Eisenstein a movement toward an increasing interest in the workings of the consciousness and of the form of film itself to portray, depict, and present the working of the inner mind. I reject the statement that Joyce gets involved in meaningless abracadabra.

Harpole: You're not saying we're going to study the man by studying art, not studying one man's mind by studying his art?

Belson: No. But it does seem to be valid to discuss the particular form of a film to see exactly what has been done in terms of camera and narrative point of view, to determine how the filmmaker focuses on particular faces with particular cuts—as well as their length and intensity.

Harpole: You would really see as justifiable a study of one man's mind by studying his art, Marshall?

Blonsky: If I have Strike by Eisenstein on my moviola, it gives me great pleasure to think that he's not dead in the sense that the consciousness is still alive (I'm not trying to speak mystically). The structures of the consciousness, the symbolical structures, the intellectual structures are preserved and are the only thing of interest to me. They may provide a relation—text to reader or text to me—as I project the film on the wall.

Harpole: In other words knowing that a man created it warms it for you.

Blonsky: The point is that certain minds are of greater interest to the naturalizer (that is, someone who brings them alive again) than others. I think that anything we want to study is legitimate since we're all aristocrats here. There's no doubt that we're not siding our proletarian comrades.

Harpole: Well, I suppose that underlying my comments was the assumed question: Is it legitimate to study art in order to find out more about one man's mind?

Blonsky: Georges Poulet. The answer is, "Of course." But, on other hand, it's legitimate to do anything.

Llewellyn: Well, you go to extremes if you say that it's legitimate to do anything. I'm just thinking that necrophilia is not particularly my thing. I think you're taking relativism too far. I think we'll have to assert some sort of ethic. I mean if you don't, you can say 'anything goes'. This is why I brought the necrophilia business in.
Blonsky: As Albert Ellis said... (laughter)
I would be very arrogant, frankly, if I were proposing areas of exclusion.
If I understand what Mr. Tokar was saying, he expressed an interest in a kind
of art that—so far the 'kind' hasn't been specified—will revolutionarily
alter either consciousness of appropriate persons or materials.

Llewelyn: What you're saying essentially is that you're affirming critical
pluralism. I suppose that I'd have to agree with you if that's what you're
doing.

Blonsky: I have no idea what I'm doing. (Much laughter)

Harpole: The point I was trying to make is that to study the filmmaker's mind—
whether you come at him from the psychoanalyst's couch or through his eye—is
openly a psychoanalytic procedure, not an artistic one.

Blonsky: Absolutely not. A psychoanalyst is a man trained in a certain discipline
who above all is a structuralist of a certain kind. I could imagine a study of
Eisenstein which would entirely dwell at the level of the surface of the rhetoric—
which analysis, for example, would go frame by frame, as one chooses, treating
each frame as a pictogram and analysing its rhetoric. Such a man would be a
stylistician and he would surely not be a psychoanalyst. At the same time, it
could be well argued that he was giving himself a kind of access to consciousness
which could only be gotten to live again this way, an inscriptive relationship,
that is, reader to text. Then we could talk about metaphor implantations by the
reader.

Harpole: You can't function as an art critic without studying the mind of the
maker of the art, and I say that primarily because the process of artistic
creation does not always involve a completely logical and completely explainable
series of steps.

Blonsky: I slightly cavilled or bristled when you used to term 'art critic'.
To begin with, I don't know what a critic is, in a real sense. In my mind I
proposed a substitution: analyst. Above all, another word came in mind: 'poet',
or, 'extender of the text'. That is to say, Eisenstein is dead; his texts are
there and inert. If one chooses, he may leave them inert or there may come
along another man, a poet, and though his discourse is of a very different order
from that of Eisenstein, he will gladly and joyfully implant and extend the
discourse through another kind of poetry. I find this a very worthy endeavour;
the reason I mention that is that there is some connotation in the term 'art critic'
that seems to somehow cut against this notion of the rewriter and extender of
texts.

Bordwell: I got the impression from your paper, Ian, that consciousness is
a kind of prior thing which the filmmaker externalizes. I wonder if that is
a fair conclusion.

Wills: What is really important is a study of the relationship between the
director's mind and the external world. That's what I see as being consciousness.

Bordwell: The question I had concerns the implications of your notion of
consciousness for the creative process. Film may cause a special problem here.
I'm wondering if your notion allows enough room for the medium. I'm wondering
if you posit consciousness as the primacy of the mind's relation to the external
world, where do we consider the medium the artist works in?
Mills: There always exists the necessity of structuring this consciousness.

Bordwell: Consciousness is not so much structured like an object is structured, but is discovered in the medium. You're really talking about two things. First, a prior thing which is a kind of a process of translation, despite the structuring and objectivation process. Second, consciousness as an abstractable--and extractable--thing which we induce from the works that we're given. To what extent do these things overlap?

Mills: I think that they overlap completely, as Freud would say about our dreams. For example, if you take what he considers to be the ultimate form of consciousness: the truth is in your dreams. There is a structure there, too, and we must agree that the consciousness itself has got a certain amount of structure implied in its perception of reality.

Bordwell: I grant the perceptual givens and the cognitive givens. What I'm wondering is when an artist works, to what extent do the conditions of the media and the conditions of a lot of things pressing in, not simply modify, but actually reconstitute a new level of consciousness which is what we get in an art work?

Mills: I think that happens. I have made a number of films myself, and I'm very conscious of the fact that from the script to the direction it becomes a new film; its new again on the editing table.

Bordwell: I'm wondering if what you say is really pertinent to what Fellini says about himself, because I think you're talking about two consciousnesses: that of the living breathing Fellini and that of the consciousness you abstract from the films.

Blonsky: We can conceive of both the living, breathing Fellini, and the consciousness mediated through--not only the media 'film' but the particular problematic that arose. And I think that that's a very interesting kind of pursuit, the question of the relationship between symbolizer and the symbolized.

Bershen: Eisenstein is a very good example because he wrote so much. I think one of the answers to the 'Intentional Fallacy' is to look at someone's artifacts, films, paintings, whatever, and their writing over a long period of time.

Bordwell: Again, you're assuming that his written essays are a direct translation of his consciousness.

Bershen: His written essays are his written essays.

Bordwell: I see, you're proposing a comparison of texts.

Bershen: I just finished doing this very thing with October and I can see that what he says is not always what he means.

Harpole: Aren't you, then, just reading into his consciousness the way someone else charged someone of reading into a film.
Bershen: There is my consciousness in the way of anything I do. Every critic's consciousness, every person's consciousness is in the way. You can't get rid of it; therefore, you have to be aware of it and make it explicit. There's no way you can get rid of it.

Blonsky: But there's another route you can take. You are proposing as flat a critical or analytical language as possible, in order to minimizes the mediation of your own language yourself.

Bershen: Flat?

Blonsky: Flat, in the sense that you are careful not to implant metaphors, and you're very careful to become jazzy, not to use a flamboyant rhetoric. Could I impose the possibility of re-writing the text (to table the possibility of non-mediated consciousness for a moment).

Bershen: You have to say that from the beginning, and then you can use, as in Eisenstein's case, many quotations. At least you're presenting his ideas in his own words.

Llewelyn: You're trying to talk about Eisenstein's consciousness, you're not saying that his works mean this and this and this. You're talking about Eisenstein.

Bershen: I'm saying that in looking at the film very carefully, and in reading Eisenstein's writing, I think I can see a coming together. I'm not trying to psychoanalyze him.

Mitchell: I don't think that when you say you're writing a paper about October, that it is October-the-creation you are writing about. It's sort of the interaction between the creation and the creator. I don't think that what you're doing is coming to conclusions about a specific work of art, you're coming to conclusions about interactions between consciousnesses, or interactions between creations and creator.

Lesage: I think we are in an elitist position, all of us in this room, and when we talk about works of art, we've been laying on 'culture', just precisely from the fact that most of us have reached the upper-middle class or are going to reach it if we finish school. So when we talk about culture, we talk about it as if it's a given; when we talk about a work of art, or Satyricon or read the New York Times, we see them as given. When you're talking about a filmmaker's consciousness, you have to ask what is the social purpose for which he is making films, that's the system in which he is making films, and who does he think his audience is going to be, and what does he think the audience is going to get out of this film? If you don't explicitly lay this out for yourself, or if you say the filmmaker didn't lay it out for himself, then it just means that you've accepted this standard means of producing culture and continuing culture without ever examining it.

Blonsky: I regard all of us—to use the distinction that the French make between 'écrivain' and 'auteur'—écrivains. That is to say, we're all socially useless. The 'écrivains' are a group of people in this country and elsewhere, at least in this part of the world, who are paid very often to work at universities—but who are also found often working for journals—and to work as extenders.
of texts. They’re not paid to alter proletarian consciousness or aristocratic consciousness; they’re paid to talk back and forth to one another. It’s a dialogue with one another; it’s a play. They are paid to play; they’re useless. Now, is there really another way to approach texts?

Lesage: I think so, and this is where intention comes to mind. I think if you say that the filmmaker has a certain social intention—which is true, for example, of Eisenstein (Eisenstein also believes in a certain psychology)—then the form of his films cannot be considered aside from the fact that he’s making films for a social reason. And when he talks about the structure of his films, he has a very definite social explanation of his films.

This is the point that is being raised. When I look at a film like Cut, I’ve got to ask myself the question: So what? I’m fascinated by it, I might look at it several times to see what kind of techniques are employed, but I’m thinking: Whom did he make that film for? What did he think he was going to get out of it? One more step up the museum ladder? etc. I think that at a certain point, when you’re concerned with a larger social perspective, you have to ask those questions.

Bershen: But you also have to find out what the relation is between the artist as he sees it and his social situation. Again, I think that’s very interesting because, as you say, he starts with a didactic purpose and he ends up with a formalist aesthetic. Someone asked at one point, what can we learn from a film. It seems to be that Eisenstein had a social and metaphysical situation to deal with. He came up with certain answers to his situation, and those answers are of use to other people. They can learn from it.

Tokar: I think you have to make a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. What I see in Cut is self-consciousness.

Belson: If it’s about art, it’s going to be somewhat self-conscious. An artist’s art today is about his self-conscious network. He’s making statements about his own material.

Gordon: I would just like to see if we could address whether or not self-consciousness reaches a point where it is masturbation. Then again, on the other hand, a film like Cut, having struggled through a few films myself, said things to me, and I can’t deny them. And yet I’m socially concerned. My question is: How important is self-consciousness? I’d be interested in seeing if you can see a film as important in the sense of its social significance and its relation to the revolution.

Henderson: I’d like to get back to the contradiction in its pure form between Ian’s interpretation and John’s remarks. I think there is definitely a contradiction in these two positions, one that we will be faced with throughout the conference. It seems to me that there are two approaches we should take in regard to this. One is to articulate the contradiction, developing all sides as far as possible, but also to apply a dialectical approach as a way of facing this contradiction. The contradiction is one that I’ve faced in my own work.

What I would like to see, in concrete terms, is a study of Fellini, that would first of all embody an approach like Ian’s, one which would be even more expansive than Ian’s in dealing with Fellini’s career and the history of his consciousness. At the same time it would root Fellini as a particular being in
a social class situation and regard his films in the totality of his life. It would study the society and economy in which he makes films and would regard all aspects of his filmmaking and audience response to his films.

I think Tokar's position was important for setting the dialectic--setting the contradiction in motion--but there are some questions I would have to ask him. Would he regard Fellini as someone worth studying? Why is it useful to study the history of an idealist in Bourgeois cinema, and if it is, what questions will we ask? How will we conduct our study? As an answer to the first question, I think we can't understand our own practice as film viewers or critics until we understand film history, since this history has shaped our film perception in every possible way. If it is John's position that this history is not worth studying because it is idealist then I would reject the position as being un-historical and as cutting us off from our own history.

To eliminate Fellini might be like taking a bad tooth out, but it would also deny Fellini's humanity. Even if his films do not transcribed bourgeois worldview, nevertheless, there is room in which his reactions transcend his situation.

Mitchell: You have to wonder if expression has to have social value. In other words does it have to have sociological value or can there be legitimate masturbation? Do we reject 'expression' as not being art because it has no social value?
There are some interesting new directions appearing in filmmaking today that are attempting to escape from traditional cinema and much of its entertainment-oriented, audience gratification. The attempts are encompassed by 'expanded cinema'—expanding, liberating itself from conventional modes. The term being tossed about with reckless abandon these days is 'synaesthetic cinema'. Including both the aesthetic, or "manner of experiencing something" and synaesthesia, or the harmonic synthesis, through artistic achievement of both experience and non-experience, synaesthetic cinema is basically film artistically trying to expand its audience's consciousness. It tries to reinterpret, in novel ways, experience and bring to us the psychical and the never-before experienced, the non-experience. It involves not only oceanic consciousness but cosmological consciousness. Synaesthetic cinema's so-called "task" is to expand our consciousness. Gene Youngblood talks about it as the expansion of human consciousness through the freedom granted by technology to experience art as the total life experience—the rise to cosmic consciousness.

A more recognizable description is simply this: synaesthetic cinema is film which tries to force the viewer to participate in the film in order to break down established modes of perception. This can include, in some cases, narrative styles, the breaking down and perversion of narrative styles, "moving picture films (films that present images only, without a particular plot) of which there are two types: those that employ pre-associative images such as landscapes, icons, people, etc.; and those that employ only non-associative images (somewhat analogous to non-objective or non-representational painting). The artist often uses computers or machines to generate the images of these films: cybernetic cinema. (Cybernetics is the comparative study of the control systems of the human brain and mechanical-electrical devices, so that cybernetic cinema is the transferral of the artist's visual concepts into realized visual designs through the use of computers or machines.)...It is this aspect of synaesthetic cinema I am concerned with in this presentation. Cybernetic films present some interesting questions which I will try to raise, but by no means will I pretend to answer them all.

Certainly an important aspect of cybernetic cinema is the breakdown of distinctions between form and content: its form is its content. The film presents us with moving, forming, and transforming patterns and designs like nothing we've seen before. The object is to experience the totally new, and I mean "experience" versus "viewing." Let us apply this to the definition of synaesthetic cinema, which is the entire filmic text syncretistically apprehended as an integral whole—conceptual and/or factual information working together to bring message to viewer that requires him to synthesize conceptual and sensory data. The message is the interaction of medium and form/content. Instead of employing plot and associative images to elicit stock responses from the audience, these films try to pull the viewer outside himself, to wrest him from the societal context he is "viewing" the film from, and force him to leave himself behind and become a part of the filmic experience. Rather than the digital brain processes of logic that are employed while viewing narrative
cinema, cybernetic cinema hopes to destroy the digital and make the audience rely on the analog or analogous brain functions: information bombarding the brain from all channels of neurons, from all modalities. This is why I emphasize "experience" versus "viewing." The art process becomes a dialectic, a dialogue rather than a monologue. One is drawn into being part of the film, one is involved, active, rather than passive. One must synthesize the entire experience which is bombarding all the sensory modalities. We arrive at synesthesia rather than synaesthesis or analogic rather than logic. In this way, cybernetic cinema, its proponents argue, will expand the participant's consciousness.

Ernst Kris, in his book Psychoanalytic Explorations of Art, argues that in order for aesthetic communication to occur between art and viewer there must be a sharing of psychic level between the two (artist and viewer). He contends that in inspiration and creation, there must be a regression of ego control in the artist to allow the id, the source of inspiration, to dictate to the artist the creation of the art. (Comparison with Jung's collective unconscious and archetypal symbols would seem productive.) Consequently, the audience must also put itself in the proper "state of mind" to receive the messages. He speaks of re-creation, by the audience, of the artist's mental states while creating:

Where ego control in the audience is high, the result is not re-creation but reconstruction. The experience is, in the common locution, "intellectualized." The aesthetic response is replaced by pedantic connoisseurship or historicism and the trained incapacity which knows all about art but doesn't know what it likes. On the other hand, when the psychic level of interpretation involves too little ego control, the meanings responded to are projective and lacking in integration. The aesthetic response is overwhelmed in blind raptures, the exasities of the "art lover." At best, the experience may be characterized in terms of Dewey's useful distinction—as one of enjoyment rather than appreciation.

Kris continues, mentioning psychic distance or over-distancing and under-distancing. In the former case, the audience's reaction is "philistine" and in the latter it is too "pragmatic," rather than the ideal—the aesthetic. But cybernetic cinema contends with Kris just on these points. It wants to make the distance negligible, it wants to completely minimize the function of the ego and aesthetic response. It seeks to destroy any defenses the viewer's ego erects: only by forcing him to react analogically with the id can cybernetic cinema hope to pull him outside himself. As I said, art becomes a dialectic between the art product and the viewer.

The question remains, does synaesthetic and cybernetic cinema succeed in these terms? Is it a dialectic or is it a masturbatory art form with value only for the creator? To quote Kris again, who makes some cogent remarks: "Aesthetic creation is aimed at an audience: only that self-expression is aesthetic which is communicated (or communicable) to others." He then continues by emphasizing that this does not imply that the message must be communicated. "What is made common to artist and audience is the aesthetic experience itself, not a pre-existent content...Communication lies not so much in the
prior intent of the artist as in the consequent re-creation by the audience of his work of art. And re-creation is distinguished from sheer reaction to the work precisely by the fact that the person responding himself contributes to the stimuli for his response."2

This is certainly in agreement with the theory of synaesthetic cinema: it does not want to act on a passive audience. The objective is to put the viewer on the same psychic level as that of the film—what I have called analogical unconsciousness, somewhat like the id or the collective unconscious level. The film starts here in order to expand the participant to "cosmic consciousness." But because of the radically new form of cybernetic cinema (combining form and content so as to make them indistinguishable), traditional ideas about communication must be revised. The audience cannot expect to be given a message on a silver platter. It may be that the message is no longer on the ego, logical level, but must be felt, intuited, experienced. Yet, I find that spectators react to cybernetic cinema only, as Kris puts it, "an blind rapture, ecstasies." It is possible that more ego control is required in cybernetic cinema. Although I tend to relegate that theory to more traditional forms of art—narration, representation, etc. However, I am not willing to exclude it. It is also possible that there has been a complete transformation of old cinematic codes (via a via semiotics) into a new codification the viewer is unable to intuit, as he does with traditional codes. Perhaps the id or collective unconscious (cybernetic cinema's use of non-associative imagery) is a psychic level we cannot yet communicate on, or will never be able to communicate on. Is synaesthetic and cybernetic cinema helping us to realize that capability?

The big advantage of synaesthetic cinema so often cited by its proponents is that it escapes the atrophying entertainment of commercial films—it does not gratify, it opens up awareness. I think this is certainly possible. But I see a threatening danger. As films come to be packaged and sold for home viewing on the televisions of the future, they could very possibly be treated as records or television shows now are treated. These films of beautiful, intricate, moving images will be easily reviewable. Just like the Beatles' "Abbey Road" has come to be favorite music, Jordan Belfon's Allures may become a favorite movie—for two reasons: Like the music, it gives us pleasure: we have a pleasant LSD experience and look forward to enjoying the same again. The favorite film will be turned on because pleasure seeking people want to be entertained. Also, like waiting for Saturday night to see the craze phase TV show of America, "All in the Family," viewers will begin to seek the expected gratification of "beautiful" films.

So instead of jerking audiences from the lethargy produced by pure entertainment, synaesthetic cinema may come to lull them back to sleep. Will it be "art" if it does? Should art be valuable and consciousness expanding? Is it art if it doesn't? Should we define a task for art? In the final analysis do we want creative artists or effective politicians? What happens to the individual consciousness film?

I think these questions are rather important. In order to attempt any answers it is necessary to use some basic definitions of "creativity" and "art". Art includes three aspects—the artist, the product and the viewer. Within this triad there are two viewpoints to be considered: that of the creator and that of the viewer.
Important to the individual consciousness art is the individuality of the artist. For this reason the creative is often defined as original presentations or productions, whether of old themes or new. Imitation is hardly creative and not very valuable, in fact it is the basis of pure entertainment. Originality or the unexpected or unthought of is what makes art consciousness expanding and therefore valuable. Must art (and therefore film) be valuable? It seems to me that all art, if it is truly creative, will be valuable.

It is precisely the danger I am worried about that the craftsman come to be accepted as the artist (if, indeed, he already isn't). A good computer filmmaker can produce a beautiful film that is labelled "art" by people just beginning to dabble in new areas and who are unaware of the real potential inherent in computer films. It will be the craftsman that produces the gratifyingly, reviewably, pleasurable films of the future.

But must the artist invest her work with a message in order to create art, or will it just have a message because she has artistically created an original work? I am leery of movements or directions or demands on art. Must synaesthetic cinema bring us out into the cosmos? With this maxim in mind, artists would become politicians, ranters who produce works with the right message. It may be that synaesthetic cinema will bring us into the cosmic age and does have much value but it is dangerous to demand that it do this or that.

We are confronted with an important conflict: is film a means of communication to effect a desired end or is it rather an end in itself? If it is just a means it becomes a political tool. Ideally it is an end that does communicate, that does expand awareness because it is art. When I say art is communication and yet it is not, I mean that there are two types of communication involved: one more or less implicit and one explicit. Ernst Kris clarifies: "Art...always consciously or unconsciously, serves the purpose of communication. We now distinguish between two stages: one in which the artist's id communicates to the ego, and one in which the same intra-psychic processes are submitted to others [audience]." We see that communication is inherent in art.

The individual consciousness work of art is important in two ways: to both artist and viewer. The individuality of the artist is invaluable. I think that man needs to be able to create his personal art--it is a psychological need and function. Inspiration has been described (see Vincent Tomas's "Creativity in Art" and Monroe C. Beardsley's "On the Creation of Art") as a perturbation within the artist that he must externalize, define for his own peace of mind. The creative process is the constant directing and redirecting of the path the work takes. The artist tries certain alternatives and discriminatingly accepts or rejects them. He does not know what the final product will be, his only goal is to arrive at a point where he is satisfied with the he has done, or at least can go no further. An artist must be a creator, not necessarily a craftsman.

With this definition in mind, it becomes obvious that an artist is no longer an artist if he succumbs to the demands of theorists or critics who, for example, say that synaesthetic cinema's task is to do this and therefore it is implicit that an artist should do this. Art mustn't DO anything but exist. The seeming dichotomy is resolved: art must not have a task but neither do we need to worry about art degenerating into entertainment: true art will be expanding, true art will be intuitively recognizable.
From the other point of view, the audience regards the film, and the filmmaker becomes inconsequential to the art product. The creative process and the artist's intent are in the realm of the artist himself and perhaps the interest of psychology, etc. Whether the artist succeeded or was satisfied with the work does not matter in this context. If it is creative, then it will have value for the audience. The work in its existential aspect only is to be interpreted, not in the context of the artist and success versus failure. It is the film that possesses the individual consciousness for the audience, not the creator of the film. The individual consciousness film exists only if the individual creator gave birth to it and the viewer will get the message if it is truly a personal consciousness interpretation—the creative or never experienced.

If synaesthetic cinema is in this way creative, then the question is Does it exist yet? I think a vast majority of the expanded cinema is just good craftsmanship—beautiful and that's all. In exceptional cases it is creatively artistic and therefore synaesthetic (while being the work of a good craftsman).

As part of synaesthetic cinema, cybernetic films provide material for some more interesting speculation. Computers are rapidly becoming a more and more important factor in not only art but daily living. In the next decade the trend of 70% computer hardware in use (that is, the processing computers themselves) versus 30% software usage (tapes, cards and input/output terminals for programming) will be reversed. Computers are being programmed to move about, develop attitudes and hold beliefs. New computers are operating one million times faster than the fastest digital computers. In the next years a computer will be able to do in five minutes what it now takes ten years for a computer to do. This is all the more incredible when one realizes that right now a digital computer can process information it takes a human brain seventy years to accumulate. The number of computers double every year and capabilities are multiplied by ten every two years. It's definitely possible that we will design a computer that exceeds our rate of information retention and processing, so restricted by brain size, life length and slow processing, that it is more intelligent in rate and capacity than a human brain. Herman Kahn in his book Year 2000 says:

If these factors were to continue unchecked until the end of the century, all current concepts about computer limitations will have to be reconsidered. Even if the trend continues only for the next decade or so, the improvements over current computers would be factors of thousands to millions...By the year 2000 computers are likely to match, simulate or surpass some of man's most 'human-like' intellectual abilities, including perhaps some of his aesthetic and creative capacities, in addition to having new kinds of capabilities that human beings do not have...

Some computer experts see innovative new ways to use computers in the artist's creative process. A.H. Noll, a computer filmmaker:
...the artist's emotional state could conceivably be determined by computer processing of physical and electrical signals from the artist (for example, pulse rate and electrical activity of the brain). Then, by changing the artist's environment through such external stimuli as sound, color, and visual patterns, the computer would seek to optimize the aesthetic effect of all these stimuli upon the artist according to some specified criterion...the emotional reaction of the artist would continually change, and the computer would react accordingly either to stabilize the artist's emotional state or to steer it through some pre-programmed course. One is strongly tempted to describe these ideas as a consciousness-expanding experience in association with a psychedelic computer...current technological and psychological investigations would seem to aim in such a direction.

But it seems to me that it is the computer that becomes the artist in this case and the so-called artist becomes the audience. His "consciousness" is expanded but he is not truly creating. The individual consciousness is no longer personal creativity. Robert Mallory, a computer scientist, talks of stages in the relationship between artist and computer: from the first stage where the computer just objectively presents proposals and alternatives, to the third stage where it makes autonomous decisions that are an integral part of the art work and fourth stage at which the computer makes decisions not in the program and therefore unanticipated by the artist. In the fifth stage the artist is no longer necessary and in the sixth he will have lost even the option to "pull the plug.'

In this case the artist no longer is an artist. Would he bother creating when his creations are doing it for him? Again A.H. Noll:

"...if 'creativity' is restricted to mean the production of the unconventional or unpredictable, then the computer should instead be portrayed as a creative medium—an active and creative collaborator with the artist...because of the computer's great speed, freedom from error, and fast abilities for assessment and subsequent modification of programs, it appears to us to act unpredictably and to produce the unexpected. In this sense the computer actively takes over some of the artist's creative search..."

But the computer is only a medium because it lacks one fundamental aspect of creativity: inspiration. Using Kris's theories, there can be no inspiration in the computer. They have no need to externalize id feelings; they generate "art" with a certain goal intended, to achieve a specific end. Instead of established goals, the human mind just creates as part of its necessary functions. It needs no external reasons.

Using the computer to propose alternatives is somewhat like the Surrealists' use of chance in their creative activity. In this way computers may be a legitimate tool in the creative process. But what happens when the computer comes to "create" better films than we can? Will we just sit back and enjoy or will we continue to create on our own? It is quite possible
that artistic creativity is a necessary function for our psychological well-being: we need to express the individual consciousness; perhaps it is a self assertion: we need an outlet for the id. How will we be affected when an entity incapable of error creates art? Is there, by definition, errorless creativity or art? Is there any error in art at all? It is not improbable that the artist-computer relationship will be completely reversed; instead of the active artist using the passive computer, the active computer will use the passive (undiscriminating) artist.

Certainly computers have forced us to realize that craftsmanship is not all important. By using computers, the artist becomes a pure conceptualist who realizes his ideas through the use of a machine. We no longer need rely on our technical ability. If only for this reason, computers will have value in the art realm. But it is vital to realize a distinction in roles the computer could play. It is a tool like a paint brush and easel; it can have therapeutic value in areas such as psychology if used in ways such as A.M. Noll suggests; but in no way should it be regarded as a creator in itself. It is a means only. Granted it is a means of vast possibilities. The test of the computer as an artist will be conducted on Ernst Kris's terms: can it communicate on a psychic level involving id, and ego regression? If it cannot, then it is not an artist. Therefore, do we relegate it to the role of "creator"? If so, then creativity must be redefined as pure chance productions of the unexpected and we realize that the Surrealists are correct in their theories. And further, it follows that inspiration is the factor that distinguishes between artist and creator.

For precisely this reason, I do not think human artistic productivity is due for obsolescence. However, it is quite easy to pervert it with agents such as computers or aesthetic theorists. But as much as I am opposed to shackling or limiting art in any way, by making demands of it, it may be dangerous to employ no control and approach each new work of art or direction in art with a sort of situation ethics. The happy medium seems most easily approachable through intuition and the re-directing of art by the artists themselves.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 254, 255.

3. Ibid., p. 51.


See also:

Youngblood, Gene; Expanded Cinema; Dutton; New York; 1970.
Weitz, Morris; Problems in Aesthetics; Macmillan; London; 1970.
Film Form: The Conspiracy

Once upon a time, out of an infinity of universal potential, was carved a single pregnant possibility. The darknesses parted and, in their stead, was created light...light projected in a rectangular shape against one white screen. Images recorded, synched to sounds, and shown at twenty-four frames per second ad infinitum. A shiny new reality was born, and it was called film.

Within moments after the Creation, the almighty trinity--Kodak, Hollywood, and Edison (divine butcher, baker, and candlestick maker)--looked down from their high places and they saw that it was good...and that it was profitable. And so they built theatres...mass-produced temples where this flickering demigod could be worshipped and great offerings brought. And they were so pleased that they sent out a decree to all peoples saying "The form is set, the dye cast; all direction is beyond question. Go ye therefore and make movies."

There were, however, lurking then in less reputable quarters of the land, a small but disrespectful minority with a penchant for skepticism. Not only did they question the trinity's inherent right to place restrictions on artistic expression, but they asked embarrassing questions about every single aspect of the arbitrarily prescribed form: Why a rigidly rectangular visual image? Why only one visual and one aural image? Why confinement to the very few available film stocks and processings? Why twenty-four frames per second? Why frames? Why film stocks? Why studios, labs, theatres, feature lengths, plots, narratives, soundtracks, division of tasks, buttered popcorn, or anything else indisputably associated with the medium? Why should interior style and content be the only controllable variables when the very forms of expression could be open to artistic discretion as well? Why an isolationist art form when film could be combined with live theatre, live dance, live music, tape recorded or synthesized sounds, lights, slides, videotapes, or any number of additional sensory stimulants to create ever new and evolving forms of aesthetic experience? Why, they asked, should tradition, economics, and technological efficiency determine questions of clearly artistic natures?

The filmic trinity, needless to say, did not have immediate answers to such questions (their customary response having always been a simple appeal for renewal of faith), but they did evolve some effective methods of dealing with the dissension. As each succeeding question was put forth, appropriate means were found of either co-opting or crushing the voices behind it. They had only to feel out each new negative vibration, ascertain its source, and then cleverly redirect its energy.

The first such solution was the creation of a new and inviting identity—that of the filmmaker. From its inception, this term offered:
status (both cultural and subcultural) of the archetypal artist and craftsman; the excitement of pioneering an institution still in its early stages of development, and of possibly achieving a position in that institution's personal history; the security of working within a clear-cut medium of largely fixed forms, goals, and vocabulary; and the ego satisfaction of producing permanent art products potentially accessible to millions both currently and in the future. Never before had a muzzle been so readily accepted by the creatures for which it was fashioned. Though sincere, most of the dissidents were also ravenous for self-respect and social identity, and could hardly be expected to pass up chances for instant fulfillment through mere association with a word.

The trinity's second solution—making film production an endeavor of fantastic expense—proved equally successful. It became necessary for any but the most wealthy to work exclusively on projects which guaranteed an adequate financial return on the investment. This meant sticking primarily to traditional film form and keeping the content as commercially oriented as possible. Profit became synonymous with distribution, which, in turn, became synonymous with a catering to pre-existing audience tastes. By the laws of economic natural selection, the most radically innovative were the least likely to survive, flourish, and (most important) have their work seen.

The third solution was very similar to the first. It took the structures of history and criticism, commonly associated with more-established art forms, and applied them to the latest victim of cultural rigor mortis—the motion picture. Suddenly there arose a need for those with the special talents of collecting, organizing revising, excluding, dissecting, relating, theorizing, and judging—verbally oriented egos to tame this new visual medium and reduce its elements to the enlightening point where filmic works could be studied, "understood," categorized, and filed away into appropriate positions of static societal value. And all one had to do to achieve this impressive leverage over both present and future aesthetic reality was to limit one's own thinking and writing to works created within the restrictive confines of established film form—tongues once aflame with fresh ideas were rapidly transformed into purveyors of revelation, debaters of relative significance, assigners of meaning, and molders of malleable future within frameworks of quick-frozen past. The film critic and historian softshoed into their flashy new roles. Validity was inherent with the positions...rigidity with the results.

The fourth and final solution grew naturally out of the other three. With filmic pretensions increasing daily, the faithful began calling for an organized means of preserving the common traditions and transmitting them to new generations. Hence the immediate establishment of film schools, film courses, film departments, and...especially...film students. Suddenly everywhere there were ambitious, young cinephils busily studying, quoting, and imitating "the masters," and consuming an unhealthy diet of names, dates, theories, and visual images packed with preservatives, and other artificial ingredients. The academic assembly line was abruptly supplemented with five new products: filmmaker, film critic, film archivist, film historian, and even film teacher.
Thus, after a long, hard day of becoming established, the cine-trinity—father, son, and Holy-wood—locked up the cash register, switched off the old moviola, and slipped into sweet-dreams of tomorrow’s movie-ocity. Their doctrine was now firmly entrenched in the human mentality, and a new art form had taken its place right up there with the big ones. As always, narrow myth proved more impressive than diverse reality, and ultimately replaced it.

II. A Spoonful of Cinema: Life in a Mediocracy

Once upon another time, somewhere within a blossoming human awareness, there was born an innocent, young reality. Now, this was no ordinary reality, like the ones you or I might relate to, but the boundless, valueless, devastating result of pure sensory perceptions. Original existence: unmuted by the filters of knowing, undistorted by systematic comprehension, precluding both explanations and expectations. It was reality based solely on the brilliant inner images of the first living, conceiving beings—an inestimable gift from the universe to its most promising offspring.

Humankind, however, was neither designed nor destined to handle so great a burden as perfection. Though granted the option to permanently benefit from this ultimate in perceptual realities, the first humans chose instead to satisfy their natural craving for forbidden fruit. This meant sacrificing their gift altogether in the fatuous quest for communication.

What began one sunny, primeval day as the sharing of a few mutual symbols, developed rapidly into the full-scale disaster of a common language. Initial efforts to organize reality into communicable forms were naturally accompanied by conceptions of logic, definition, and the known, and they in turn implied the frightening new motion of the unknown. The same reality, which had previously provided absolute comfort, clarity, and unmanaced involvement, suddenly was transformed into a disordered, uncertain kingdom where physical and mental survival stood continually in the balance. The world became at once a place to be studied, assorted, and adapted in the hope that all-illuminative knowledge could bring meaning and consistence to the formless, perilous universe to which humanity found itself confined. Human existence was tragically, incurably crippled.

The first major step into the existential abyss involved the invention of specific labelling words, each of which was designed to limit the scope of a selectively small portion of the natural universe. Each word became a name for a particular “real” object, being, action, or interaction; and every thing or event so labelled became simultaneously restricted (in the evolving human mentality) to the essence of the thing or event as comprehended when originally named. The results were fact-shattering.

Dazzled by this new system, which continued to expand in direct proportion to the constricting of human awareness, they went further still. The following step was to develop whole new sets of words whose antecedents were untraceable to the actual physical world. Concepts, diverse products of the purely mental realm, were devised along with accompanying labels,
adding yet another mist to the eye of the human beholder. Each word filtered off a few more natural possibilities and theoretically funneled universal madness into less threatening forms acceptable for logical consumption.

Now, most of those early subduers of reality were motivated simply by the innocent belief that survival necessitated their actions. There were, however, others more intelligent and less scrupulous who perceived additional personal benefits in a human condition centered entirely around organized delusion. What better way, they thought, to profitably exploit the peoples of the world, than to manipulate their realities—and what better way to do that than to manipulate the very words on which those realities were founded? What better means of subtly enslaving everyone everywhere than a calculated utilization of language—what better, that is, until a tool with even greater potential to exploit was developed.

Delving a little deeply into the mysteries of perception—not to mention moving another notch into Pandora’s irresistible legacy—human mind soon brought into being the most powerful method of regulating its own existence ever envisioned. From out of the vast technological sea, society fathered beautiful twin media children—Video and Cinema—male and female incarnations of ultimate communication, and electronic incubus/succubus seducers of human mind.

In return for the gift of life, the media twins held up to their impressionable human parents a distorted mirror image spiced with illusory ideals, desires, and behavioral prototypes. The spectre was, of course, false, but it proved so pleasing that the parents not only believed it, but patterned their own realities after the distortion (making it no longer false, but the newer truth). The hypnotic flickering of quicksilver screens replaced that of tribal fires, and flattering visual substitutes were found for the disharmonies of the three-dimensional physical world.

The ellipse of human development was at last completed. Videocy, the last new disease, inherited the remnants of human sensibilities, lulling them into painless, mindless cinemablism. The illness’s one noticeable symptom was an inexplicable belief in the freedom of individual thought and action, and its lone result was the absolute passivity of the entire earthly community. The screw of human history had been turned finally, firmly into place; the world ended with a freeze frame, not with a pan.

III Cinerarium (Sweeping up in the) Afterward A...

Fact 1: The expressions of the media artist are being channeled into restrictive forms and structures to the detriment of both personal and societal artistic growth.

Fact 2: Most current programs of film and media education merely train the aspiring artist to fill prescribed slots in a profit-motivated industry.

Fact 3: Film and videotape may very well be obsolete as viable means of expression by the time most “film” and “screen arts” departments are completely established.
Fact 4: A new form of art education must be developed in which students are opened to all the many media possibilities available to them; the "continual search" must be emphasized over the "series of finds," acknowledging that history is to be made and not retrogressively emulated; boundaries between the media should be crossed as a matter of course, filmic traditions violated out of moral obligation, and all structural limits to expression viewed as impositions not to be tolerated.

Fact 5: Film, ideally, should be but one pliant portion of the media artist's ever-expanding palette.

**Afterward B... (A Bill of Rights)**

Fact 1: In a mediacracy (a society where no one can exist untouched and unaffected by media) there are certain rights which the government must insure for all its citizens. These rights involve, basically, the ability of each individual to control his or her own destiny, in spite of the incredible pressures inflicted by the media.

Fact 2: All people must possess physical control over the media which touch them--they must have either the means of personally eradicating any media images (switching them off), or the mobility to remove themselves from the presence of the images: each person must have, at his or her reasonable disposal, the options of privacy, silence, and darkness...the complete absence of any exterior intrusion upon the senses. This can only be accomplished through intelligent environmental planning and design.

Fact 3: All people must possess mental control over media--they must be able to distinguish those media images having positive effects on them from those having negative ones, and then be able to mentally shut out the particularly harmful ones. This can only be actuated by instituting, in the public schools, a comprehensive program of media education for the masses...obligatory lessons for all in media self-defense.

Fact 4: All people must have both the ability and the opportunity to make media images of their own. In a mediacracy this right becomes even more essential than the ability to "read and write": we must destroy that situation wherein an overwhelming majority of media passivists consumes the unchallenged output of elitist media activists. This can only be achieved by a combination of general media education, and a decentralizing of media control.

Fact 5: Those who control the media, control humanity--all the Power to all the People!!!
Film should be studied against the backdrop of the metaphorical shift in the twentieth century. This can be done by unearthing the deeper structure of the agreed-upon fictions which serve as problem-solvers for new concerns. With this method, a course of study could be infinitely expandable. Since similar problems are being solved within the same metaphorical screen, such a course could include all aspects of the cultural convergence in art, philosophical thinking and human behavior attitudes. (I will exemplify this by examination of three figures in the modernist tradition--Ken Jacobs, Gertrude Stein and Samuel Beckett.)

Paradoxically, the major fiction in the twentieth century is the myth of metaphor.\(^1\) Since no cultural codes are isomorphic with the structure of the universe or of man's mental processes, the only way to approximate these structures is to pretent "as if" this were the way "it is." The pretense then, is to make believe that the world is like the way we think, feel, and see. This explains the concentration in the twentieth century on the mental processes of man -- his language, perception, and consciousness. If one accepts this paradigm, one can begin to appreciate the schemata of the modernist tradition.

There is a marked retreat from over-prescription (morality, didacticism, association of fact with value, the mistake of thinking of the metaphor as the model) and a movement towards the descriptive (reification and phenomenalism, that is, the desire to get closer to the referent, the obsession with the "naming of the object"; the reinforcement of perceptual data by the exploration of process; the reductive- "silence", minimalism and the meaninglessness of meaning).

The tension provoked is not between the way the world is and it should be, but the disparity between us and the way it is outside ourselves. As such, it strikes at the very roots of our concerns with the illusions of reality and with the ambiguities inherent in the self transacting with that reality and transforming it artistically.

From this then, objective criteria can be isolated, into which the art forms and epistemological thinking can be discussed as symptomatic of the tradition. The significant ones will strike at the radicalizing tendency -- the formal spatio-temporal discontinuities which continually test our illusionistic tendencies and come closest to imitating the parameters of human perception and consciousness.

Similar concerns led to the breakdown of the traditional forms in the twentieth century and accounts for the high rate of innovation and experimentation which took place. There were some major dissatisfactions--with words, with self-expression in art (with art as an aesthetic or religion) with vanishingpoint illusion of reality in Renaissance perspective...
and with sequential, linear progression of thought. The result was an art of extreme dislocations and transformations. Art was meant to be an irritant, and to frustrate, or how else to describe the disparities, to fill the gap between art and life, to suggest that our beliefs are only illusions of reality?

In literature, art and film, whole new areas were exploited—categories of codes without words and with only inner referenda, incorporation of the author's discourse on method or process, concern with memory and cognition, use of raw materials, disfusion of boundaries between the arts, a mixture of genres. It led to a new kind of rhetorical structure—the non-narrative.

In literature, for example, the loosened narrative mode, on one hand, imitated the working of the unstructured brain—jumpy, allusive, disconnected, non-verbal, with a tantrum prose that resembled the subconscious, the life of wordless emotion. On the other hand, there was an incorporation of non-literary discourse—a combination of legalese, Newspeak and assertive propositions—in order to abolish the emotive content. When the two extremes were combined, the sublime and the banal occurred together. Everything became potentially identifiable with everything in the world was happening at once. A series of flattenings were going on—time was flattened into a simultaneity of past and present. Sequence, climaxes were eradicated, causality abandoned. Art became operational, based on the relations of things acting together. The objective was always the same—to strip every code of its pretense, to question the critical assumptions, to upset the traditional orientations, to refer more closely to the way we think and try to know.

Film adjusted quickly to the century into which it was born. It dipped into the tradition, developing levels of referential codes, layers of extra-artistic concerns, and a mélange of genres. Along the spectrum, for example, of the infinite cinema (one is reminded here of Kenneth Burke's statement that a book is the elaboration of a single sentence), there are films that hark back to other films, those that allude directly or indirectly to other genres, those that superimpose prescriptions along with formal experimentation, those that define a tradition or remake one, those that preserve the facts of our forms of survival, our empirical reality—the natural codes of behavior, the socio-political concerns of a nation.

Northrop Frye has described the progress of genre—from translation of a previous convention to deliberate formation of a convention, to the turning away from the convention with irony, parody, and the final break into experimentation and new forms. Film operated this way, although not in any chronological sequence. It paraphrased the narrative tradition—the novel, the drama. In America especially, it pulsed from the folk oristic elements of the culture—the pastoral, comic strips, vaudeville, the frontier humor. Pornography, sadism and parody were elements in the conventional Western, the crime movie, and the slapstick comedy. The moralistic assumptions were always latently or expressly present. In Frye's terminology, the puny forces of the good
(derived from the Arcadian genre, the masque) opposed the gargantuan demonic forces (the vices of the antimasque), and moral justice usually prevailed.

It was the archetypal narrative of the experimental films, too, the early German expressionist movies, the Gothic personality nightmares of Bergman, futuristic films like Alphaville and 2001 Space Odyssey. In these films, however, the battle was fought inside the human mind and fragmented personality. Here one can see more clearly the tension provoked by contesting the axiomatic assumptions of illusion and reality. The parameters of time and space were distorted and fundamental problems of the human psyche—sanity, control over the environment, passage through cultural history as a paradigm of or contrast to the internal workings of the human consciousness—were explored.

With greater experimentation, the narrative fell away and there was a stronger emphasis on the denotative aspect of film. Film, as a code of communication, behaves like a language, and has its own grammatical set of rules and lexicon. The formal departures, the moments of transformation, help to identify the stylistic uniqueness of each artist. When allusions or genre conventions are referred to (such as Truffaut’s silent screen techniques, Bunuel’s slapstick scene in The Exterminating Angel, Warhol’s recreated Hollywood in Marlon or Kiss, Godard’s use of advertising slogans, modern painting or literature, Mekoven’s incorporation of political cartoon, old movies and documentary footage), their purpose is modal as well as semantic. Manipulative camera techniques, genre parody and defamiliarization serve as formal disjunctions to emphasize the polarities of fact, value and illusion.

Each ungrammatical device is the artist’s rhetorical means both for describing his frustration with the limitations of man’s innate structuring capacity and for defining more closely the elements of his structure. In film, he does it a number of ways—most pertinently by calling attention to the intersection of events in space and time with man’s mental processes which also exist in space and time. He is concerned with a continual transformation of the données of man’s human consciousness—his perception, memory, concentration, and emotional response. Both historically and modally, film appeared at the moment of extreme transformations in human consciousness. And so from the very beginning, film could upset the usual terminologies and categories of illusionism. More than any other code, film could rely more deeply on categories without words, that is because it could attract our attention—towards light, to movement, to depth, to sound—the stimuli to which we are most responsive in our environment. In form and meaning, film comes closest to approximating our visual thinking—that combination of perception and cognition. And it is coming closer. As Sitney says, "...this is a decade in which there are more attempts than ever before to fuse the vision of the eye with the vision of the mind."

Even at its most highly prescriptive level (as in Eisenstein’s propagandistic editing or the Griffith’s moral lessons), there is always the deeper surface of formal transformations. In his Caterpillar series,
Brekhage refers to Eisenstein as the artist of the "primordial dream" who introduced visual images before words were known and whose "form of transformation" became his style, his soul. "Neliea, whom he calls "George the Magician," was an early nullifier of the illusion of depth, whose "for A of transformations" became his "axle, his soul."

"Mends, whom he calls "George the Magician," was an early nullifier of the illusion of depth, by Renaissance shading and perspective. In Griffith too, ('David the Goliath'), he claims, one can extract important formal changes. To project Intolerance out of focus is to discover its "meaningful black-white counter-shapes and developed rhythms." This echoes Panofsky's view. To him, the filmic method is involved in "the dynamization of space" and "the spatialization of time," Panofsky recognized that beneath the trappings of the crime film, lay the "doubly charged sense" of space and time, of events that happened in the past and contain some predictions for the future.4, 5

Calling attention then, because it relates to our total responses and refers most directly to our ubiquitous "visual culture" (Balázs) is a significant feature of film. At one extreme, films force our attention (with assertive editing, dialocation, fragmentation, short disconnected shots, extreme close-ups, flicker effect, defocussing, superimpositions, jump-cuts, etc.). The camera functions, in Vertov's terms, as a "perfectible eye." At the other extreme, our attentions are challenged by minimal cinema, the camera laissez-faires, with long takes, widescreen lens, single tracks, deep space (as in Warhol, Antonioni, Dreyer, Bresson). Both poles are irritating and tension-provoking. Both test our pretenses, our metaphorical assumptions strenuously, by distancing, by elongating or contracting time, by insisting on the presence or absence of the filmmaker and/or the camera, by zooming in on "things," giving them an aura, an evidential quality.

The strongest emphasis is on perception, on seeing. An exercise could be to trace the symbolic or actual presence of the "eye" from the very beginnings of filmdom—from The Man with the Movie Camera to Dali's razor-blade cut, to the final sequences of 2001, McCabe and Mrs. Miller, Ionesco's Slime, not to mention the "violated vision of the bespectacled lady of the Odessa Steps and Dustin Hoffman in Straw Dogs. The writings of filmmakers too, refer obsessively to vision as a major form of attention, notably Vertov's Notes and Brekhage's Metaphors on Vision.

The purposes are consonant with the epistemological and artistic concerns of the modernist tradition—an attempt to thwart our anticipation, to break up our habitual responses, so that we pay attention finally, to our major truth, that all we know and think is fiction.

Some of the experimentation with the thresholds of consciousness can be examined by following the career of Ken Jacobs, the American filmmaker, who began with intentional formlessness and is now occupied with extreme attention to formal principles. His early films, which appeared at the time of the "happenings" in the late 50's, were zany, highly idiosyncratic, deliberately unskilled technically (anti-acting, anti-professionalism, anti-aesthetic, anti-movie). Wasteland imagery predominated—slum dwellings, leftover toys, fecal icons, suicidal pranksishness, black humor. In films like Little Stab at Happiness and Blonde...
Cobra, the narrative and theme were discontinuous. Unsynchronized sound, fast cutting interspersed with black leader and long endurance-testing passages served to disorient alternately with shock and boredom. But behind the apparent formlessness, there were a number of unities—place, characters, imagery. These constants were a juxtaposition of a soundtrack of nonsense and manic existential despair with garish circus-like color, urban settings, and a pre-warhol satirization of Hollywood eroticism (Jack Smith plays an infantile superstar trans-sexual).

In the 60's, Jacobs' mood changed and he created a series of abstract cine-poems. Done home-movie style, they are characterized by extreme manipulations of camera, light and 3-D effects. (The incorporation of old footage with new, which culminated in the remarkable Tom, Tom the Piper's Son was anticipated in 1965 when he juxtaposed a Mickey Mouse cartoon with a home movie, called Lisa and Joey in Conn: "You've Come Back! You're still Here." His films of this period are formal studies on the principles of filmmaking—an outline of process. He sets up an operational tension between recognizable images and their function as abstract forms. He does it through light—with blurred focus, shadow play, as in Airshaft or as in Soft Rain, where by maintaining a constancy of light, he forces us to see the relationship between the relationship between the representative objects and their formal properties—depth, occupying of space, and color. In Window, the light functions as a counterpoint between 2-D and 3-D space, as when the camera swings exposing a horizontal shaft of light topping a telescoping vertical slither of light. It becomes almost a metaphorical keyhole that opens out our perception and then introduces an eerie lyricism as the light gradually diminishes to nothing. Our eyes are coerced to follow violent movements, light openings, contrasting shapes and textures. Then it rests with softer elements, producing a fantasy of airy forms and heavy building blocks.

He does it through movement, by playing games with the camera. Its movements make inanimate objects appear to move (as in Window) or its fixity makes us conscious of the slightest movement (Soft Rain). Abrupt powerful movements reduce the shapes to abstract planes. The fixed stare sharpens our sense of the existential reality of representative objects. In Window, the camera is the auteur, operating almost autonomously with a variable amount of donnés. The material is reworked with zoomrips, complete pans or close-ups.

He does it through manipulation of space, by decomposing it and fragmenting it or reconstructing it into deep space (Tom, Tom and Window).

He does it through manipulation of time. In Window, the rate of change is rapid and disorienting. In Airshaft, the tantalizing emergence and disappearance of a sensuous object sets up a rhythm of anticipation and memory. In Soft Rain, time is slowed up to add to the controlled pace. The repeated minimal movements of this passive non-event tugs at our patience and our stick-to-itiveness.

Either he varies the technique by playing with a minimal amount of elements in a narrowly prescribed space (Window, Airshaft), or he unifies a number of unrelated elements by juxtaposing them which endows them with both a formal and a semantic meaning (Nissan Ariana Window), or he uses po
manipulations in order to emphasize their parts and supply a crisp index of their reality (Soft Rain). His interest is in a continual play of abstraction, representation and illusory mechanisms, either into metamorphosed parts or syncretized into a single perceptual field. He is involved in the aestheticization of actuality, the definition of space. For example, in Nissan Ariana Window, his paean to the household Gods and to creation (one could easily retitl e it "Being There"), he plays with shapes and their containers, how they break their containers, how we try to keep them contained or endure their breaking out. It is all done by fixed camera positions in a series of edited takes. He almost reifies inanimate shapes and reduces animate ones to shapes and forms by manipulation of light and shadows so that they become abstract or defamiliarized. The formal elements are reinforced by thematic ones--images of cleanliness, purity, birth, the naked vs. the clothed, beauty within its shape, things eluding their containers or the camera's eye. The film is a demonstration of Jacob's own view, that "Each work creates its own aesthetic"--in other words, each work is a fresh recreation of the world. Diverse and/or seemingly unrelated or non-cohering components create their own and new relationships with devices that complement, enhance and/or reflect on the process.

His method is a continual negation and affirmation of reality--movement from dark to light, extreme optical assault, series of flattenings, distention or a sudden unexpected focus on deep space. His major concerns are with perception and form. The film is the subject of the film, the camera is the actor who confronts the perceiver, using spatiotemporal disjunctions to reveal what is there, to emphasize unexpected relationships, to provoke tensions and uncertainties about the combination of facts juxtaposed. The camera assaults, destroying our optical expectations, disrupting our kinesthetic sense, or it lingers for a long time on an isolated part of an event, a fact or a view, disturbing it.

His films are exercises in perception. One could follow all the textbook properties of sensory psychophysics--analytical introspection, phi phenomenon, memory of past experiences to determine depth and space, Gestalt laws of organization--and discern them being willfully used in his films. Most particularly, this can be demonstrated in Tom Tom where he reconstitutes old footage, isolating parts of a pattern, changing the constituents of the whole configuration. New arrangements of light and shade, transformations in time and space (prolongation, flattening, superimpositions, etc.) sometimes distort, sometimes enhance the meaning. The film is process. Connotations are stripped away, an old genre is paraphrased, then parodied, then departed from, leaving all the arbitrary elements of film language exposed, a skeletal semiosis.

Similar preoccupations interested Gertrude Stein. One can see why so many avant-gardists were influenced by her. Both Brakhage and Cage refer to her repetitions as important functional devices. She was involved in stripping the English language of its rich complexity of connotations and multi-level meanings. Her method was ideogrammatic. The words became the objects they signified, tokens of themselves, shapes in space. Stripped of meaning, the words functioned as lists of objects, reaching an almost lyrical intensity. Subtracting subject matter, conveying her
obscure no-literature with the flat tones of grammar-school primers and English handbook exercises with its humdrum doggerel, with its a-logical interrelationship of events in which all things, objects and subjects relate to all things, she created a literature cleared of metaphor and simile. She constructs her anti-referential structure by giving all things equal importance, by using repetition to create volume. She could create a solid geometric figure out of the "essence" of personalities. In *Three Lives*, the recurrence of "brown" transforms it into a quality of personality. Brownness becomes an object in itself. The other techniques she used to maintain this ethos of stripped language were: the scientific technique of constant definition and hypothesis with endless propositions and their proofs to describe "types"; cataloguing effects which convey slow changes in character (much like the imperceptible change from one cinematic frame to the next); the use of the present participle to convey process, ongoingness, "continuous present", which gives the sense of watching the author in the midst of creation.

In *A Long Gay Book* of 1909, meaning begins to disappear. Logical connections break down in *The Portraits* of 1911. There is the emulation of painting and music as words are used to convey sound like color and emotion, color and shape like action and personality qualities. In *Tender Buttons*, she begins the earnest contemplation of things, folded in upon themselves (she subtitled the book "Object Food Rooms" in order to approximate "still life" painting), a purely abstract fragmented world independent of verisimilitude, in which words are wrenched from their meanings and non-sequitors abound in one-sentence definitions (e.g. "SALAD: It is a winning cake.") which convey the sense of the random and the accidental. The irrelevant merges with obscurity and language has been pressed to its limits. All kinds of heterogeneous things are put together—a day, a syllogism, buttons, a poem—in an attempt to fix a name, possess the object.

It is a language devoid of memory, of preconceptions. It is a literature where childlike word-play conveys the inarticulate sense of a word before it has an associative meaning. It is a cubism of unprepared, disconnected, recreated experience, the WORD made THING. Instead of a metaphorical interaction (a desire to change one idea into another) completely disconnected elements are juxtaposed in words that have their own existence divorced from syntactical relationships or semantic associations:

*COLD CLIMATE---* a season in yellow sold extra strings makes lying places.

Even "Toasted Susie is my ice cream" does not change Susie into toast or ice cream. Thus, the word and the thing have become *autonomous* and synonymous. Her own description of Cézanne epitomised this:

I came to Cézanne and there you were, at least there I was, not all at once but as soon as I got used to it. The landscape looked like a landscape that is to say what is yellow in the landscape looked yellow in the oil paint—i.e., and what was blue in the landscape looked blue in
oil painting and if it did not there was still the oil painting by Cezanne. The same thing was true of the people there was no reason why it should be but it was, the same thing was true of the chairs, the same was true of the apples. The apples looked like apples the chairs looked like chairs and it all had nothing to do with anything because if they did not look like apples or chairs or landscape or people they were apples and chairs and landscape and people. They were so entirely these things that they were not an oil painting and yet that is just what the Cezannes were they were an oil painting..."

Her lectures too, written in the same punctuationless, breathless run-on sentences express her Stanislavsky view of reality:

...slowly if you feel what is inside that thing you do not call it by the name by which it is known...
I began to wonder... just what one say when one looked at anything really looked at anything. Did one see sound, and what was the relation of color and sound, did it make itself by description by a word that meant it or did it make itself by a word in itself. All this time I was of course not interested in emotion or that anything happened... the word or words that made what I looked at be itself were always words that to me very exactly related themselves to that thing the thing at which I was looking, but as often as not had as a I say nothing whatever to do with what any words would do that described that thing.

Even periods came "to have a life of their own to commence breaking up things in arbitrary ways" as in the poem "Winning his Way" from Stanzas in Meditation, 1929-1933, in which periods came after each one or two words. No wonder Miss Stein enjoyed the Burma Shave ads on the American highways, their brisk staccato and successive cinematic images moving with the eye's movements:

One little piece on one board and then further on two more words and then further on two more words a whole lively poem."

In addition to her poetry, her ritualized plays choregraph things moving in space without discourse or metaphor or sequence of events and causes (e.g. "A Curtain Raiser"). They are a way of describing what she called in her Lectures "the essence of what happened." Meaning vanishes in a rite; traditional dramatic techniques of climax, tension, release, nuance, modulation are lost in a welter of directionless movement. The play becomes an abstract landscape, timeless and finally static.

Humanism disappears in the empty phenomenological world of Gertrude Stein. And yet, a lyrical intensity of emotion is often reached. Thematically, a metaphor of thisness emerges from her peculiarly unmetaphorical works. Part of that intensity is conveyed by the monosyllabic push
of the words, the remarkable ascetic quality of the basic English of her poems. In some way, clarity issues from obscurity, the clarity involved in a paucity of words used and in the saintly concentration on the value of the present moment as the moment of creation and time. It is as if she had followed Ogden's prescription of using as few words as possible to produce a strained effect. Through the recovered love of simple English and the re-awakened sense of the power of the single syllable as an instrument of emotional intensity, a kind of radiance of mind willing and desiring its own presence emerges.

I wish now to wish now that it is now
That I will tell very well
What I think not now but now
Oh yes oh yes now
What do I think now
I think very well of what now
What is it now it is this now
How do you do how do you do
And now how do you do now.
That which I think now is this.

Samuel Beckett must have teethed on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, or else, absorbed the ethos of his linguistic explorations. His philosophy, his theme, his style are reflections of the failure to define objective reality, except paradoxically, as Zero, Void Néant, Nothing. In his excellent dialogues with the French art critic, Georges Duthui, he describes the kind of panic that lies behind the epistemological struggles of all his characters. There is only, he says

...the expression that there is nothing to express
nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express. (*Transition*, 1949, p. 98).

This sounds like Beckett's anonymous character of The Unnameable whose last words indicate the impenetrable barrier of language that keeps us all from ever really KNOWING:

I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you
don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll
go on.

In order to move into the language of nothingness, in order to describe the nothingness of man in his relationship with all things which are also nothing, Beckett wrote in French. Like the advanced algebra and elemental vocabulary of Racine, Beckett found comfort in the more grammatically rigid French with its more denotative vocabulary and crystalline exactness. But no matter what language Beckett employs his desire is to approach that which language in all its pretense cannot say, in an endless cycle of self-defeat, in which language, art, and the
self must all be defeated. Thus, it is no accident that Beckett's characters are failures, clowns, self-imposed or other-imposed slaves and linguists. In the anguish of seeking meaning in a world where there is no meaning, his characters are preoccupied with naming things, trying to fix objects with words, trying to comfort themselves with definitions and disconnected memories, trying to quell their anxiety with logical syllogisms, numbers, and the accumulation of computer-like data. His characters are searching for the word that will keep away the terrifying nothing beyond the word. Watt, for example, learns at Knott's house that the infinite, the Silence can never be reached, that a ticket to the "further end of the line" only brings him to the beginning again. He is helpless in the asymptote of human thinking, the infinite diminishing towards zero or the inevitable irreducibility of $\sqrt{-2}$ or of the difficulty of discovering the Wattness of even a pot:

Looking at a pot... or thinking of a pot...it was not a pot, the more he looked, the more he reflected, the more he felt sure of that, that it was not a pot at all. It resembled a pot, it was almost a pot, but it was not a pot of which one could say, pot, pot, and be comforted. (Watt, p. 88.)

In the end, he abandons rationality and systematic language and descends into a cryptogrammatic non-sense, and inverted, monosyllabic hysteria. (This dwindling language is also used effectively by Beckett's prodigy, Harold Pinter. His hero in the Birthday Party is reduced by the constrictions of conventional society to a shrie. The nonsense and wrenched logic of Alice in Wonderland appear as sweet prattle compared to the reduced savages of Beckett's and Pinter's literary world.)

Although allusive like Joyce, as well as a remarkable punster, Beckett is strongly anti-metaphorical in his work and he uses many techniques to destroy metaphor in order to reinforce his theme of the anguish of language. He uses non-sequiturs, banal cliché, twisted quotations, scanty plot, lack of transitions or sequence, obsession with logical statement and scientific shuffling of data, endless incongruities, equality of all things (The Unnameable is an urn, Watt is a box), the lack of relationships between the world of phenomenon and language. He can go on for pages in a dull flat style of repeated elements with little permutations, written in a basic English with a strong monosyllabic stress;

Here he stood, here he sat. Here he knelt, here he lay. Here he moved to and fro, from the door to the window, from the window to the door, from the door to the window; from the fire to the bed, from the bed to the fire... (Watt)

As Molloy said, in Beckett's earlier novel of that name, "Saying is inventing". But, of course, nothing is ever invented since nothing can ever be said. In Malone Dies, Malone attempts to "live and invent", to 'live through inventing, to try to write others' stories, in order to
retreat from himself. Yet he is aware at the very beginning on page one that the "need for prettiness is gone" and the endless fables produce only tedium. *The Unnameable* rises to an intensity of helplessness in his long perorations in which he identifies himself with everything and the words that he uses to describe everything:

I'm in words, made of words, others' words, what others, the place too, the air, the wall, the floor, the ceiling, all words, the whole world is here with me. I'm the air, the walls, the walled-in one... where I go I find me, leave me, go toward me, come from me...

In his yearning for a new reality and a new language to describe the pronoun I he seeks, he reaches into the only language that becomes the ultimate language of the self, of the words, and of the things--silence. Through silence, one pierces the lies and obscurities of fiction, and through fiction, one reaches the truth of silence: "The discourse must go on. So one invents obscurities, Rhetoric..." Thus, one must discourses in order to end speech. He had wasted his time with the Molloys, the Murphys, and the Malones, all the fairytales invented, all the metaphors:

No, I must try not to think, simply utter. Method or no method, I shall have to banish them in the end, the beings, things, shapes, sounds and lights in which my haste to speak has encumbered this place.

Yet again in panic he begins to invent:

...I see myself slipping, though not yet at the last extremity, towards the resorts of fable."

But he catches himself later:

Dear incomprehension, it's thanks to you I'll be myself in the end. Nothing will remain of all the lies they have glutted me with.

Almost every line in *The Unnameable* can be quoted to indicate the striving towards silence, the search for the me, the anger at the lies of speech and thought, the desire to be identified with what is finally unnameable. In *Comment C'est*, the pitch rises to a scream, large cap words convey the intensity of emotion of never discovering HOW IT IS, because one must always start from the beginning of how it is and was, in order to discover how it is. (In seeking the How, Beckett's hero has dispensed with the What (of Watt that tried to reach the Nought of Knott's knot, what not).

In *Comment C'est*, the language becomes skeletally minimal as if the words themselves were things in a wordless universe. The novel itself is the void as thought reaches backwards and forwards into nothing and silence. The words are unpunctuated, syntax wrenched, the white spaces breaking the panting flowing of words, made gracelessly unmetaphorical. Everyman who is no-man is one with mud, merde and primordial slime. The novel is no-novel, diminished and sterilized.
In his pantomime *Act Without Words*, the no-drama acts as a forlorn ritual act, and in the frustration of trying to reach out to incorporate the self; fiction, lies, language, metaphor (as a means for man to exceed himself), knowledge, meaning and identity are all negated. There is not even the solace of Krapp who listens to the memory of his past on tape and who lingers over a favorite word, "spool."

In the overthrow of comforting schemata, art reflects man's whirlpool existence. As Percy Bridgman says in his "Introduction" to The Way Things Are, 1959, "we never get away from ourselves." We must use proofs outside of our present cognitive system in order to free ourselves from the contradictions inherent in our system, and yet, he says, "These new principles arenours, come from us and our associations."

Thus, we are forever engaging in metaphorical extensions beyond ourselves, in dippling and transferring meanings from one universe of knowledge to another, from the "analogical" universe (that "sphere from which familiar relationships and terminology are borrowed") to the "conceptual" universe (the universe "to which they are transferred") in order to create a "meta-universe" ("a comprehensive universe which includes the other two"). It is in this kind of "sort-crossing," as Gilbert Ryle calls it, that language and vision emerge as a "root-metaphor" (Stephen Pepper) or "submerged model" (Max Black) of our philosophical constructs. In going outside of traditional artistic techniques, and seeking analogies with the universe of non-discourse, the world of objects, a metaphorical, synesthetic transfer is created.

One is left with the supreme fiction of an aesthetic. No matter how obsessively one knocks at the door of illusion, one is still confronted with the referential, with an infinite regress from phenomenon. As Wallace Stevens said, moving "towards the Supreme Fiction," in order to find the real relationship between word and thing, is to become empty of content, without Orpheus, angels or myth, without "an evading metaphor." The essential irony in these apparent contradictions of using fiction to reach the real and to do it without fictional means is that in the end, a grand metaphor evolves. Even if one uses all the rigor, exactitude, and flatness of a Gertrude Stein or the frugality, scientific language and mood of hysteria or a Samuel Beckett, or the stripped minimal film grammar of the avantgarde filmmaker, in order to convey the desire for the Truth Out There, a metaphor occurs. The creative reader or viewer himself, with his chain of associations, his responses to the sensed emotions of the artist recognizes a whole new body of rhetoric.

CODA

Jacobs, Stein and Beckett are only three contemporaries concerned with the "intolerable wrestle." In my infinitely expandable course on modernism, there are manifold directions by which this century's underpinnings can be revealed.

Other filmmakers like Brakhage, Frampton, Snow, Cocteau, Deren, can be used to explore the elements of illusionism. The New Wave films are excellent demonstrations of what Truffaut calls "un éclatement de genres par un mélange de genres."
Pale Fire by Nabokov, Borges’ Ficciones, V. Woolf’s Between the Acts, James’ The Sacred Fount, any novel by Conrad, the novels of the French chosistes like Robbe-Grillet or Nathalie Sarraute, Pound’s Cantos, Wallace Stevens’ poetry in toto—the list of books concerned with method, with field theory, with Supreme Fictions, with the compulsion toward naming (the encyclopedia, the bibliographic, the evidential) with the contrast of sequential time with all-at-once time—is endless.

I believe I have indicated that there are no areas that cannot receive the treatment I have recorded here—behaviorism, social theory, linguistics, Levi-Strauss’ Structuralism, Kuhn’s book on scientific revolution, concrete poetry, latest developments in painting, sculpture and music, such as Rauschenberg’s "combines," John Cage’s duration-process music, Marce Cunningham’s task-performances, Raphael Ferrer’s conceptualist environments.


"Chess"

I

In their serious corner, the players move the gradual pieces. The board detains them until dawn in its hard compass: the hatred of two colors.

In the game, the forms give off a severe magic: Homeric castle, gay knight, warlike queen, king solitary, oblique bishop, and pawns at war.

Finally, when the players have gone in, and when time has eventually consumed them, surely the rites will not be done.

In the east, this war has taken fire. Today, the whole earth is its provenance. Like that other, this game is for ever.

II

Tenuous king, slant bishop, bitter queen, straightforward castle and crafty pawn--over the checkered black and white terrain they seek out and enjoin their armed campaign.

They do not realize the dominant hand of the player rules their destiny. They do not know an adamantine fate governs their choices and controls their journey.

The player, too, is captive of caprice (the sentence is Omar's) on another ground crisscrossed with black nights and white days.

God moves the player, he, in turn, the piece. But what god beyond God begins the round of dust and time and dream and agonies?

--Jorge Luis Borges
Borges' poem is propelled by a rapid shifting of contexts. Just as pieces on the chessboard are governed by the hand of the player, the player is, in turn, moved by the hand of an Other: 'God'. The poem ends with a question: Does 'God', too, have an Other? If so, who (or what) is that Other? Where does the expansion of context stop? The pieces, the players, the 'Gods' may all feel an autonomy, yet all are constrained in their actions by a greater context. Only within the 'rules' of their contexts can piece, player or God act. Borges tells us, "This game is for ever."

"Chess" can be 'read' as a metaphor for the multiplicity of human contexts, each context (or code) having a constitutive power over the messages within it. The poem, from this viewpoint, is a reaction against a reductionist epistemology which reifies discourse about behavior on one level, while ignoring the constitutive power of context in that behavior. Such a reification, Borges seems to say, is tantamount to thinking that chess pieces move themselves.

The reification that Borges challenges can be found in the current approach to the study of film. There is a prevailing orientation toward viewing film as an autonomous object, divorced from any relation to the non-filmic world. On the one hand, this orientation tends to grant an almost mystical power to film, while denying, on the other hand, film's actual functioning as a message in a discourse. The reduction of discourse in film study at the level of text-object is quite easily exemplified:

- **Citizen Kane** is the first motion picture to show a ceiling.
- **8 1/2** does not have a central unifying principle.
- **Little Murder** is only filmed theatre, not actual cinema.
- **Smiles of a Summer Night** makes the viewer feel both joy and sorrow.

While each of these examples represents a different facet of current film study, all view film as an autonomous object; all confine themselves to an intra-referential world of cinema.

The contemporary tendency toward divorcing film from its contexts can be compared to—and, to a great degree, is a product of—post-Cartesian epistemology as manifested in traditional modes of thought in literary criticism. Thus, we have Northrop Frye circumscribing a "game preserve" of literature (1957; 10), Tzvetan Todorov concerning himself with the 'laws of literary structure' (1969; 9), and the New Critics attempting to find purely formal criteria for the evaluation of literary texts. Each of these approaches have an affinity with the examples from film study presented above.

In the study of literature and film we can sense a desire to 'frame' the text(s), to divorce text from non-text, to isolate the text as an
analyzable object. It is the arbitrary, binary opposition of text/non-text (the 'frame' being the metaphorical slash between the two terms), as employed by the traditional ideology, that this essay seeks to reject.

This essay will argue that the prevailing concern with the filmic text as an object is potentially oppressive (to both society and the individual), and that film study should focus its attention upon film as it functions as a message within a systemic discourse. Such a re-orientation would not ignore the study of the individual filmic text, but would incorporate such study into a metacommunicative approach to the study of film.

The 'strategy' of this essay is three-fold:

1. to describe the epistemological basis of this essay,
2. to consider film as a message in systemic discourse,
3. to discuss the potential oppressiveness of the current objectifying approach toward film.

I. The Ecosystemic Model

Before it will be possible to discuss the relationship between film and its systemic contexts, we must first describe the model upon which our discussion constructed. It is necessary to explicate several concepts from the General Theory of Systems (as proposed by Von Bertalanffy) and their subsequent application--and enhancement--in a communicational perspective toward behavior. In this essay, we will employ a particular communicational system as a privileged metaphor: the natural ecosystem.

Thus, we shall first present the conceptual model employed in this essay; then, in the next section, we will attempt to show film's place within our schema.

Finally, it must be noted that the model employed does not claim to be an accurate description of 'the way things are'; it is seen as a useful digitalization of an analog continuum.

a) Open systems and communication

A system may be defined as "a set of units with relationships among them" (Hiller, 1965; 68). Employing this definition, we view the natural ecosystem as the most inclusive earthly system. Further, we must conceive of all such systems as composed of both elements and relationships.

Each system can be divided into sub-systems, as Hall and Fagen have noted (1956; 20). The species man-and-womankind is seen as a sub-system of the natural ecosystem; it functions within the context of the ecosystem. It must be emphasized that the discernment of sub-systems does not imply a 'break' between sub-systems--or between sub-system and system--but is only a particular punctuation of discourse.
Within our model, systems may be classified as 'open or 'closed'. What types of systems are considered 'open'? "Organic systems are open, meaning they exchange materials, energies or information with their environments (Hall and Fagen, 1956; 23)." Such exchanges can be termed 'communication'. All behavior, therefore, is communication. Open systems are in constant dialectical interplay with their environments. Man-and-womankind (as a species) and man-and-women (as skin-bound individuals) are seen as open systems in constant exchange with their environment (both social and biological).

While most of us are familiar with the terms 'matter' and 'energy', a definition of 'information' is necessary, as the term is employed differently in our model than in day-to-day speech. Information can be seen as a quantitative measure of organization, pattern or complexity. In short, information is negentropy, since it increase organization.

As stated earlier, all open systems are in constant communication with their environments. The environment for any organism--or any larger sub-system (such as mankind)--can be defined as "the set of all objects [and we should add, here, 'relationships'] a change in whose attributes affects the system and also those objects [relationships] whose attributes are changed by the behavior of the system" (Hall and Fagen, 1956, 20). As always, the distinction between organism and environment is a question of punctuation, of where one draws the line.

At this point, some diverse example of man-and-womankind communicating with its environment can clarify our notion of communication:

(1) the pollution of waterways
(2) gift giving practices (as observed by Marcell Mauss, for example)
(3) verbal discourse
(4) the face of Greta Garbo projected on a screen before an audience in a theatre.

In each case, there is communication. The first example is an exchange of matter-energy (at very likely information), while the second through fourth are primarily exchange of information (leading to 'work').

All information (such as the gift, the word, the image of Garbo) is carried by markers (a term coined by von Neumann): bundles of matter-energy encoded with information. The marker, then, conveys information between elements of a system and their environments.

b) Goal-seeking and adaptivity

All open systems are goal-seeking and adaptive. One can discern three types of goals: (1) instant gratification, (2) survival of the individual, and (3) survival of the entire system. Within the natural ecosystem, the third goal is of the highest order. As Gregory Bateson observes: 'The unit of survival is organism plus environment'. We are learning by bitter experience that the organism which destroys its
environment destroys itself (1972; 483)." Thus, we could say that the highest priority of any goal-seeking system is continued seeking.

Open systems adapt in order to survive (to keep seeking). Three types of adaptivity are of particular interest: homeostasis, homeorhesis, and morphogenesis.

Homeostasis can be defined as the maintenance of a steady state, an equilibrium, through time. Homeostatic adaptation allows the system to remain the same. In the political sphere, some conservatism can be said to have homeostasis as a model: "The Constitution says we have the right to bear arms. Let's keep it that way."

Homeorhesis, probably the most relevant type of adaptation, is diachronic, unlike homeostasis: it is change over time. Homeorhetic change (examples include physical growth, learning, etc.) is change which is constrained by the code of the system. All adaptation is constrained by the 'rules of the game'; the messages change, but the code remains the same. Just as conservatism desires homeostasis, liberalism desires homeorhetic change: "Sure we're destroying the ecosystem, suppressing women, blacks and the Third World, but if we work through the proper channels (the code) we will be able to solve these problems (change the messages)." The liberal affirms the necessity of changing the message while denying the possibility or validity of changing the code.

If homeorhetic growth becomes runaway growth, the system, in its attempts to survive, will either self-destruct or leap to a higher level of complexity. This leap, a code-changing adaptation, is termed morphogenesis; it bears strong resemblance to the Hegelian Aufhebung. The structure of the system (the code) is changed by the events (messages) within it. Using our political metaphor, it is the radical who advocates morphogenetic change. It is worth emphasizing that the morphogenetic change (the Event) is not predictable. As in-genetics, it is a form of mutation which 'takes'.

The limitations of the chess metaphor introduced earlier are clearly shown if we attempt to apply it to the three types of adaptivity we have considered. If applied to chess, homeostasis would mean that every game would be the same. Homeorhesis would allow for learning chess (even for possessing chess genius a la Bobby Fischer or Dr. Emmanuel Lasker), but only within the 'rules of the game'. In chess (and in Borges' conceptualization of it) there is no chance for morphogenesis, no changing the rules. For this reason, the chess metaphor is insufficient to present the notion of context developed in this essay.

To summarize: Systems are principally concerned with survival. The goal they seek is the seeking of their goal. We have seen three forms of adaptation which help the system to survive.
c) Constraint and meaning

Behavior in--and of--an open system is constrained, not simply caused. Traditional mechanistic models (such as Newton's) have utilized a notion of linear causality: If event \( p \) occurs, then \( q \) will follow, because of event \( p \). In such a model, for each action \( p \) there is only one possible \( q \). In an open system, behavior is 'chosen' (not necessarily 'willed') from a set of options defined by the context. For each \( p \) there may be a series of \( q \)'s.

The principle of equifinality (Watzlawick, Jackson and Beavin, 1967; 127-8) states that from any given point \( p \), a set of behaviors (constrained by the context) is possible, and conversely, from any number of points arrival at the same point \( p \) is possible. Thus, from any given point \( p \), there is a multiplicity of possible \( q \)'s. And if a morphogenetic change occurs, it is possible that the whole notion of \( p \)'s and \( q \)'s could be radically restructured. The concepts of morphogenesis and equifinality affirm the lack of predictability (on the level of both code and message) that is characteristic of the behavior of an open system. Man-and-womankind do not act causally, but by 'choice'.

When employing a concept of constraints rather than causes, we are forced to re-evaluate the traditional notion of signification, the belief in the communal granting of factuality to a message or code. The world of signification is a world of facts. From our perspective, the notions of signification and facts must be rejected. Bateson states our position quite succinctly: "There are, in a sense, no facts in nature; or if you like, there are an infinite number of potential facts in nature [my emphasis] (1972; 481)." The world of information is not a domain of facts, but a domain of difference.

The ecosystemic model emphasizes the role of context in selecting certain differences as more important than other differences. Using this emphasis as a stepping-stone, we can define 'meaning' (different from signification): the marking for future use of information by a context. Whereas signification implies a factuality in all contexts, 'meaning' is a function of a specific context.

Because of the multiplicity of contexts--and the constant communication between elements of a system--each 'bit' of information assumes a multivalent 'meaning' in relation to the systemic whole. Freud termed such multivalence 'overdetermination'. 'Overdetermination' of information implies that information is 'meaning'-less without a context; yet, depending upon the context, this 'meaning'-less information gains a multiplicity of 'meanings'. Context valorizes information.

Donald Barthelme's balloon (from a short story of the same name: "The Balloon") can serve as a metaphor for a 'bit' of information. One night a huge balloon was inflated, and by morning hovered over New York City: "The balloon then covered forty-five blocks north-south and an irregular area east-west, as many as six crosstown blocks on either side of the Avenue in some places." Although an inflated, almost amorphous,
blob of rubber, the balloon was given many 'meanings' depending upon the context which viewed it. Some people termed it 'interesting' (invalidating it); others jumped and frolicked upon it; still another thought it an imposter for the sky ("The big balloon sullied the otherwise clear and radiant Manhattan sky."); some considered it 'art' and criticized it formally ("conservative eclecticism that has so far governed modern balloon design"); "has unity been sacrificed for a sprawling quality?"). At the end of the story we learn that the balloon had a specific 'meaning' for the man who inflated it: "The balloon, I said, is a spontaneous autobiographical disclosure, having to do with the unease I felt at your absence and with sexual deprivation."

Each bit of information is much like the balloon in Barthelme's story. Both are dependent upon their context to give them 'meaning'. Western thought has traditionally utilized the premise that information signifies univocally. Rather than viewing information as a message in systemic communication (exchange), it has reified discourse at the level of isolatable facts. For such an epistemology, the concern is with the gift, not with the relationships in the act of giving. It affirms an Imaginary discourse. The concept of over-determined information 'fitting' a context, as a definition of meaning necessitates a re-orientation of our thinking towards consideration of context.

d) Paradox and human communication

Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not.

For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.

--Ludwig Wittgenstein

All human communication is paradoxical. As Wittgenstein argues in the quotation above, one can only talk about a totality from outside of it; if, however, one is part of the totality about which he is speaking, to step outside of it would be to make it no longer a totality.

Gödel made much the same point in his argument about the formal undecidability of mathematical proofs. He demonstrated that from within any formal system one could construct a sentence that was (1) valid within the 'rules' of the system, and (2) that was unprovable within the 'rules'. Only by incorporating the sentence into the rules of the system can the paradox be transcended: Only a metacomunication about the system can resolve the paradox. But this metacomunication, too, will yield a Gödelian sentence.

Human discourse is thus a series of systems, paradoxes within the system, metacomunication about the system, paradox within the metacomunication, and so on. It is the closure of discourse (as in a schizophrenic family, or a game of chess) which reifies discourse at a paradoxical level.
Paradoxes are generated by the digitalization of an analog continuum. It is impossible for any digital system ever to completely represent an analog continuum; 'gaps' will always remain. These gaps are the very heart of paradox in human communication.

To briefly summarize: Man-and-womankind is a goal-seeking, adaptive subsystem of the natural ecosystem. We are an open system in constant communication with our environment (both natural and cultural to employ Levi-Strauss' distinction). The individual human organism, too, is a subsystem in constant communication with its environment. Men and women, collectively and individually, function within a larger systemic context.

II. Film: A Message in a Discourse

The film is a marker in the communicational process known as human discourse. It is a mediator between subjects. Man and women communicate through film; the film is merely a system of communication. It is a highly complex system, involving analog and digital modes of communication. Christian Metz has discerned five basic cinematic codes (in the classical bourgeois narrative film alone): image, written words, spoken words, musical soundtrack and noise (1972;6). These five basic codes—multiplied almost infinitely by possible permutations and combinations therefrom—combine to make film a system of communication with perhaps more information-bearing potential than any other medium.

As a message in the discourse of man-and-womankind, film is inextricably bound to the relationships of the natural ecosystem and man-and-womankind's participation in it. Film relates to its context on every level. Thus, film is necessarily linked to ecology, politics, economics, psychology and sexuality.

It is important to consider briefly filmic communication as it relates to the model proposed in the first section. The communication between person and person, or man-and-womankind through film occurs on both conscious and unconscious levels. Although much communication is perceived consciously, a vast amount of communication is unconscious. Even if unnoticed, unconscious communication occurs. The current, 'I've got to see it to believe it' attitude toward the concept of unconscious communication does not mitigate the effects of such communication; it merely obscures them.

Like all information, the filmic message does not signify univocally. This is for two reasons. First, the film does not have the same 'meaning' in all contexts. Human contexts are composed of numerous personal, cultural and biological codes, whose messages are manifested in human organisms and societies. Human contexts are almost infinitely diverse. Stated simply, the filmic message can be placed in an almost infinite number of contexts. Yet, the issue is still more complex, for film, too, is the manifestation of a variety of codes it bears an overdetermined message.
It is the dialectical relationship between the codes and messages of film and the codes and messages of almost infinite contexts which shapes the 'meanings' of film. Thus, the variety of 'meanings' of film are as limitless as its potential contexts.

An example might prove fruitful. Jorge Sanjines' *Blood of the Condor*, a Bolivian film protesting the forced sterilization of Indian peasants by Peace Corps workers, raised such a hue and cry against the Peace Corps that they were asked to leave Bolivia. A leading Bolivian newspaper wrote: "The *Blood of the Condor* shows with expressive quality to what degree we shall not let ourselves be treated as laboratory rats (Presencia, 1969)." The film had a clear political 'meaning' for the people of Bolivia. When the same film was shown in a radically different context, to students at Oberlin College, it was viewed with what could be described as bemused condescension (although with admitted respect for the film's technique). Within two different contexts, the 'meaning' of the message differed.

The filmic message does not signify univocally for a second reason: Even within the same context a film can have more than one 'meaning'. Given the multiplicity of codes and messages in both a single film and a single context, communication occurs on numerous different levels. Since all human behavior is governed by constraints (not causes), the precedence given to any particular level cannot be predicted in any determinate fashion. An open system can 'choose' to give a film a 'meaning' from a set of options. The film can be 'marked' for future use in many ways.

Film, from our perspective, is a context-bound message in systemic discourse. It is the relationship between the filmic message and its context that we consider primary. Once film has been isolated from its context it becomes a 'meaning'-less mediator between hidden subjects.

### III. The Frame-Up: Objectivity and Oppression

It is astonishing that almost two hundred years, after Kant's self-proclaimed Copernican Revolution in philosophy (1929; 22), that film scholars are still utilizing the premise that our knowledge of texts conform to the texts themselves. In an attempt to make their knowledge conform to their object of study (the film), scholars and students are supposed to view the filmic text as an autonomous object, so that it can be viewed objectively. Although such 'objective' knowledge is thought to be 'Truth' in western society, it is in reality only the punctuation of discourse of a particular ideology. Such a viewpoint can be indicted for imposing closure upon discourse about film.

Current film study wants to 'know' what the film signifies. In its attempts to gain this knowledge of signification, it has adopted an empirical-analytical method for examining filmic texts: It 'frames' the text(s), freezes it in time, divories it from all context, and then claims the neutrality of the observer.
Two major objections to this viewpoint are raised in this section: (1) the concept of 'objective meaning' rests upon a misunderstanding of communication, and (2) the 'objectivist' viewpoint is oppressive to both society and individual.

The 'objective' approach to film criticizes texts divorces the film from its context in order to know what the text signifies. Such a divorce ignores the constitutive role of context in shaping the 'meaning' of any film. As stated earlier, we live in a world of 'meaning', not signification. Since 'meaning' is a function of context 'marking' overdetermined information for use, 'meaning' does not inhere within the text; but is the product of a communicational process that conforms to the laws of the trace. In a world of signification, chairs exist only to be sat upon. In a world of 'meaning', however, the way a chair is 'marked' for use is a function of the chair in relation to the context.

Roland Barthes, for one, recognizes the constitutive role of context in giving literature and film its 'meanings', and he relishes it. He claims that the viewing subject necessarily deforms all texts, necessarily implants metaphors, necessarily shapes the text to his or her own purpose. 'Je nomme, je denomme, je renomme,' is Barthes' simple formulation (1968, 17). In our terms, we could say that the context 're-writes' the text in giving it a 'meaning'. The process of fitting is a systematic deformation and regeneration of the text.

The isolation of text from context represents a fundamental misunderstanding of communication, and in particular, human discourse. Film has traditionally been viewed as an isolated signifying system (witness most film semiotics) rather than as a message in a discourse (an exchange of information). By neglecting the concept of communication as exchange, by not distinguishing between message and code, current film study has left itself with an untenable notion of transcendental, inherent signification; context has been ignored.

Although 'meaning' does not inhere within a text, the approach to film using such a premise has flourished. The potential dangers of such an approach are considerable. It is the voice of an oppressive Other that issues the command to 'view the text without its context'.

Any approach to film that punctuates its discourse at the level of the text (a non-contextual view) seeks to remove both text and observer from time and space, from the material world. Such an approach is a tacit acceptance of the prevailing context. Within the code of film study, the only change advocated is homeorhetic: 'Learn all you wish about film, but don't try to relate it to anything else'. One is allowed much knowledge of film and little knowledge of anything else. Such a code, with its emphasis on 'keeping to the world of film' is a vote of confidence for the prevailing ideology, urging the viewer to ignore the ideology.

The viewer is urged to devote a lifetime of work in an empty search for an illusory signification. Meanwhile... the actual 'fitting' for use occurs outside the viewer's field of enquiry. The viewer can become
the victim of communication: The context becomes the master, the ruling code, while the viewer becomes the slave, a 'spoken' message searching for ceilings in Citizen Kane. A scholar in Nazi Germany could have done a detailed formal analysis of Leni Reifenstahl's Triumph of the Will, searching for its intrareferential signification; but if he ignored its context—and his relation to its context—all the time he wrote of themes and mise-en-scene, its 'meaning' could have been created for him by the hidden context.

Anthony Wilden has written, 'Whoever defines the context or the code has control, . . . and all answers which accept that context abdicate the possibility of redefining it (Koch, 1971: 1).’ Insofar as current film study has divorced film from its context, it has accepted the prevailing context; by its institutionalization of an ideology it has enhanced the power of the code. Equally as bad, it has invalidated approaches to film which would relate the filmic messages to their code, which would act as 'noise' within the system. Film study is an accomplice in the oppression—and repression (in the strict Freudian sense of Vernichtung)—of the natural ecosystem, the Third World, racial minorities, and women. Rather than using film as a tool, film study 'speaks' a familiar message: "Let them watch films."
FOOTNOTES

1. Merely glancing at any course catalogue from any graduate school in cinema studies would suffice to document this point.

2. The example of Smiles of a Summer Night would, on the first face, seem to belie this claim. It appears that the author of this statement is concerned with audience response (has expanded his context beyond the text). But if we examine the example closely, we can discern that it posits a universal response (Shades of the 'objective correlative') to the film. Individual response is not considered, nor is any specific context; the affective power of the film is claimed to inhere within the film itself. Thus, this example confines itself to the world of film.

3. Although the communicational perspective adopted—and endorsed—by this essay is coming ever more to the public eye, Christian Koch must be specifically cited for his applications of an ecosystems perspective to media—and in particular, film—studies. Much of this essay is derived from an approach to film first presented to me by Mr. Koch in conversation and in the essay cited in the "References" section.

4. The terms 'digital communication' and 'analog communication' are drawn from the two types of computers (of the same name). The digital computer uses discrete quantities and discontinuous measures. That is, given a continuum, the digital computer will precisely identify points along the continuum, but will leave 'gaps' between the points. Such a computer works with arbitrarily imposed units which represent other units. A primitive example of such a computer might be the abacus.

In contrast, the analog computer works by way of analogy to that which it represents. It, thus, is a continuous computer: it does not leave 'gaps'. The analog computer presents the continuum that the digital computer breaks up. The ruler is a simple example of an analog computer.

In the realm of communication, the term 'digital' usually applies to verbal language (or other arbitrary signifying systems) while the term 'analog' applies to such phenomena as voice inflection, images, gestures, etc., and to the context in which communication occurs. Human communication can be seen as a combination of digital and analog communication.

Since in this essay we are describing a continuous system (the natural ecosystem) from a digital perspective, dividing the system into discrete elements. In that sense, we don't claim to be describing 'how things really are', but only a useful model for thinking about 'how things are'.

A useful description of digital and analog communication can be found in Watzlawick, Jackson and Beavin (1967; 60-67).

5. As closed systems are only applicable to inorganic systems, they have not been considered in this essay.

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FILM AND VISUAL PERCEPTION
or A GESTALT INTERPRETATION OF SILENT COMEDY

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Billed as "the most interesting and amusing invention of modern times,"1 the movies were given their first public showing November 28, 1895, in Berlin. The content of these first film strips was insignificant: dancing, boxing, gymnastics; but the pictures moved. As Panofsky said, "the primordial basis for the enjoyment of moving pictures lay in . . . the sheer delight in the fact that things seemed to move, no matter what things they were."2

Much has been written of the relation between film and other art forms. Film as a visual art, film as theatre, film a music, film as dance. Like the visual arts, the cinema uses images. Like theatre, the cinema involves drama. Like music, the cinema uses rhythm. Like dance, the cinema conveys motion. This last aspect, the motion, is the essential feature of the cinema, as its names indicate: motion picture, movies, moving pictures. Yet motion in the movies is so often taken for granted by film critics and theorists, that the implications of this quality are overlooked. Motion as a quality of the movies is ignored because motion is such an integral part of the content of the film. In a movie, when a man walks out of a room, the motion on the screen conveys precisely that and nothing more. Yet, in the history of film, such literal use of motion has not always been the case. Nor need it be in the future. Motion, as a quality of the movies, has been used and can be used stylistically to extend the content of the image.

Ever at the simplest level, the screen demands concessions to the composition of motion. As every film student learns, usually the hard way, motion within the frame is crucial to the information one wants to convey. This is particularly true in the basic rule of maintaining direction of movement on the screen. The camera angle must be chosen, not according to the "reality," but to sustain the direction of the motion from frame to frame. In a chase scene, for example, the two moving forms, the pursued and the pursuer, must always be presented as moving in the same direction in relation to the frame and as moving with comparable speeds. If the pursuer travels at the same speed or slightly faster than the pursued, a chase is effectively depicted. If the first form is seen to move significantly faster than the other, the impression is destroyed. In fact, it is not even necessary that the two forms be shown in the same shot, as long as the direction and speed of the motions are relative to each other.

In The General, Keaton elaborates on this scheme. The North is represented to the left of the screen, the South to the right. In his efforts to recapture a stolen train, all motion is from right to left. As the Western viewer, in reading, scans the page from left to right, the reverse motion suggests struggle or opposition. In Keaton's triumphant return to Georgia, the movement is the more natural one, left to right, as befits his success.
Not only does a motion series intensify the story line, but it can work on one's consciousness in defiance of the content. The ride of the Clansmen in *The Birth of a Nation* presents a contradiction for the modern viewer. Objectively, the viewer is not sympathetic to the Clan, but the moving images form such a powerful configuration that he is emotionally swept up in the Clan's success. The movies can thus affect the viewer above and beyond any objective content. And in the case of this particular film, perhaps it was this power and its use that led to threats of censorship upon its release.

The dynamics of a motion series can transform an otherwise impersonal event into a highly emotional one. An explanation sometimes given for this power of film as a medium has been the viewer identifies with the characters on the screen. Yet, in *Potemkin*, there are no such characters for the viewer to identify with. The hero of the revolution is the "people." This fact does not, however, prevent Eisenstein from making an impassioned film. The efficacy of the Odessa Steps scene does not lie in the visualization of violence. Movies today frequently show more realistic bloodshed without evoking the emotional impact Eisenstein achieved. The power of the Odessa Steps lies in its configuration of motion. The motion of confrontation, of chaos, and of disaster.

Perhaps it seems to obvious to mention that motion carries emotional content. Yet, movement on the screen is not necessarily composed so as to convey that meaning. The dynamics of an event are not directly given in a scene, but must be selected and constructed to convey the meaning intended. The flat surface of the screen demands a visual translation of the real event. A fist fight, in 3-D, effectively manifests the action. On the two-dimensional screen, however, it is necessary to break the action into lines of force: a close-up of the blow, a wider shot of the reaction. In such a manner, the viewer experiences, in his perception, the dynamics of the confrontation. The direction of motion in the two shots is similar, but the switch from close-up to wide shot involves the eye in the experience of the impact.

The relationships between moving forms are heightened by the reduction of the image to the single plane. The beauty of the Oceans Roll scene in *The Gold Rush* lies in the successful illusion that the fork and rolls form Chaplin's legs. Such an effect would be destroyed in three dimensions.

The cogency of a motion series is more easily seen when the movement on the screen is in conflict with the content. In the gun battles of *The Wild Bunch*, the visual configuration is lyrical: the motion is choreographed from one shot to the next. The content is violence: bodies set in motion by gunfire. The reality of the bloodshed is juxtaposed against the harmony in the motion itself and the effect is overwhelming. The viewer simultaneously experiences the horror of the content and the beauty of the form. The incompatibility is profoundly effective.

That one is affected by such a scene on two levels presupposes that perception functions independently of cognition. Cognition is based on memory, past experience, knowledge. Cognitively, the viewer experiences the bloodshed. Perceptually, he experiences the melodic overtones in the line of motion.
In perception, the array of light that reaches the retina is spontaneously organized into coherent forms. The processes or organization provide information about the environment that is not directly given in the retinal stimulation. On the retina, an object ten feet away is half the size of the same object five feet away. A white sheet of paper, under low illumination, is perceived as white; a black sheet of paper, in bright sunlight, is seen as black. Measured by a light meter, however, the white paper is darker than the black one.

Perceptual organization spontaneously processes information, not from the retinal image itself, but from the relations given in that array. Size is perceived consistently and correctly, not as it is given in the retina, but in the relation between retinal size and apparent distance. Brightness is perceived, not as objective illumination, but in the relation of one area in the visual array to another. It is important to realize that this is in no way a conscious calculation, but an immediate organization of the stimulus.

Many of these perceptual processes have been observed in infants at such an early age that it is unlikely these processes developed through learning. Furthermore, the consistency and lawfulness of such processes would suggest that, to some degree, they are innate. If perception merely developed according to one's experience with the environment, there should be great variation in perceptual response and this is not the case.

It happens, fortunately, that one's perception usually coincides with one's knowledge. Perceived size coincides with known size. In the optical illusions, however, perception functions in spite of cognition. One perceives the lines of the Mueller-Lyer Illusion as having different lengths and the process of measuring them in no way affects the percept. They are still seen as being of different lengths.

Spontaneous organization occurs in audition as well as vision. Objectively, the metronome produces sounds of equal intensity and pitch at equal time intervals and yet one can never perceive them as such. Instead, one hears the sounds as somehow different and as organized in a pattern. The pattern may, in the course of listening, vary, but the reality of identical sounds in equal intervals is never perceived. That one may have the knowledge in mind in no way affects the percept.

Similarly, moving forms are perceived, not as separate entities, but as organized in relations. Motion series have qualities that provide the viewer with information that is on an entirely different level than the objective content of the moving forms. Simple geometric forms at rest, circles and triangles for example, offer no more information than size and shape. In motion as Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel investigated, these shapes assume qualities far more complex. Depending on the movement relations between the forms, an entire spectrum of emotion and motivation is
perceived. Two forms moving simultaneously in various directions are perceived as dancing or playing. If one form slightly precedes the other, the entire configuration changes and is seen as a chase. Aggression is perceived if the speed is increased and the second form moves upon contact with the first. As it is nearly impossible to describe such a motion series in mechanical terms, it is not surprising that the subjects in the experiment gave physiognomic descriptions of the motion series. What is significant, however, is the similarity in the responses of different observers to a specific configuration.

It seems probable to assume that accurate perception of meaning in a motion series has been useful in man's evolution. Certainly, differentiation between an aggressive action and an amicable one is crucial to survival. The appropriate response to a situation depends on an accurate perception of it. That one distinguishes action perceptually, not cognitively, explains the consistency of response.

Even in the first weeks of life, a visual configuration of motion carries meaning. T. G. H. Bower recently demonstrated that infants only two weeks old exhibit defensive behavior when shown the image of a rapidly approaching object. "In our culture it is unlikely that an infant less than two weeks old has been hit in the face by an approaching object, so that none of the infants in this study could have been exposed to situations where they could have learned to fear an approaching object and expect it to have tactile qualities."4

Not only can the range of emotion from sympathy to hostility depend on perception of a motion series, causality, as well, is a perceptual phenomenon. It is conceivable that one realizes a knife slices bread because past experience has demonstrated that a knife performs this function. Albert Michotte, however, has shown that the impression of causality occurs in the absence of such cognitive cues and with such specificity and consistency as to indicate its basis in perceptual organization. Using moving squares, Michotte has determined the exact time and distance relations necessary to invoke the impression that one square causes another to move. As R. C. Oldfield said in the foreword to Michotte's book:

We do not see one billiard ball cause another to move either because we intuitively apprehend a fact of nature, or because past experience leads us to see the event in this fashion, but because the spatio-temporal organization is such that it directly unleashes this impression in us.5

In so far as film is a visual art, the film experiences involves the laws of perceptual organization. In narrative films, the perceptual configurations tend to coincide with the content. In visual comedy, the perceptual configuration often conflicts with the viewer's experience and with the content given in the film itself. Not only is causality perceived in the absence of cognitive cues, as Michotte has shown, but the impression of causality occurs despite cognitive cues to the contrary.
At a recent film screening, the audience exhibited such a perception of impossible causality. Just as the hero on the screen touched his lover's breasts, the aisle lights in the auditorium went on. The audience reacted with a burst of laughter. Perceptually, they experienced a casual relationship between the event on the screen and turning on of the lights. Cognitively, they knew the casual relation was impossible. Laughter resolved the conflict.

In fact, much of silent comedy derives from such a disjunction of perception and cognition. In Arthur Koestler's explanation of comedy, he states:

> The sudden bisociation of an idea or an event with two habitually incompatible matrices will produce a comic effect, provided the narrative carries the right kind of emotional tension.

Visual comedy works on the same principle, but in reverse. The comic effect derives from the sudden disassociation of two habitually compatible frames of reference, perception and cognition. In a sense, visual comedy works on the principle of the optical illusion.

The technique is to produce visually events that, as experience dictates, could not realistically occur. The spatial and temporal conditions for causality are presented in objects that cognitively could not produce such affects. If the event, in itself, is not impossible, a series of such events suspends the reality. Conditions for causality are established, only to have causality averted. The motion series of one context is applied to another. The percept is in constant collision with cognition.

The claim is not being made that the directors of these films understood the function of perception as such. But as perception is a psychological process, they certainly had intuitive access to its effectiveness. In the course of a battle scene in The General, Keaton himself displays the phenomenon of perceived causality. Wildly waving his sword in the air, Keaton sees that his men are being shot according to the direction of his gesture. Affected by this apparent cause and effect, he impulsively throws the sword away. As befits the Mad World, it lands in the back of the snipor who had been shooting his men.

In Grandma's Boy, Harold Lloyd, plagued by kittens licking his newly goose-greased shined shoes, reaches for a toy dog to scare them away. The audience laughs at the stupidity of the proposition, but when the object achieves the incended effect and the kittens are frightened off, the absurdity is increased. Causality is perceived that is cognitively impossible.

In Lights, Chaplin and the Millionaire struggle in vain to overcome forces that seem intent on causing them to fall into the rive. Every motion, from a rock falling Chaplin's foot to a simple handshake, causes further adversity. In Grandma's Boy, Harold Lloyd, in his
efforts to bring a tramp to the authorities, is beset by problems caused by the physical layout of his world. As the road curves, the tramp follows it. Lloyd, looking in the other direction, continues in a straight line and loses his man. In The General, a cannon is mounted on a flatcar behind Keaton's locomotive. Intending to blast the train ahead of him, Keaton lights the fuse. A series of calamitous events ensues and the car becomes disengaged from the train. Keaton finds himself directly in the line of fire, but a fortuitous curve in the tracks diverts the course of the flatcar and the cannonball and the disaster is averted.

In the Mad World of the silent comedies, the lines of force intersect, not indifferently as in the real world, but always with some effect, be it propitious or disastrous. A specific event, such as Harold Lloyd tripping over a rake, is not in itself, impossible. But as the causal events accumulate, reality is suspended. In City Lights, just as Chaplin is gaining consciousness after a fight a boxing glove falls from a hook and knocks him out again. Lloyd bends over just in time to avoid the path of his pursuer's bayonet. The cannonball Keaton accidentally sets off does not land indifferently but fortuitously breaks a dam and thwarts his adversaries. Frank Capra, gag writer for comedian Harry Langdon and later director, called this the "principle of the brick".

If there was a rule for writing Langdon material, it was this: His only ally was God. Langdon might be saved by the brick falling on the cop, but it was verboten that he in any way motivate the brick's fall.

Gravity, natural events, trajectories, presence of physical objects are known to be impersonal. When such events are perceived as producing effects, they take on qualities of intention and motivation. Inanimate objects become animate when they cause effects. In fact, the child lives in a similarly intentional universe. The reason it gets dark at night is so he can sleep. It rains to keep him indoors. Natural laws are understood, not as existing independently, but in relation to the way they affect the child. The adult does not see the forces of nature as intentional. When such forces seem to have effect, this is seen as distinctly different from the normal. A fortuitous intersection of forces is referred to as good luck, a miracle, etc.; the reverse is hard luck, misfortune. In the extreme, misperceived causality amount to paranoia.

The spatial and temporal conditions of causality can be used to set up the expectation of an effect. Perceptually, one expects causality and it is incongruous, and comic, when causality does not occur. As Chaplin moves back and forth to get a better view of a nude statue, the elevator shaft in the sidewalk behind him lowers. Just as he appears doomed for a fall, either steps forward or the elevator reaches the level of the sidewalk again. In Sherlock, Jr., Keaton, seated on the handlebars of a driverless motorcycle, miraculously averts a series of what appear to be certain collisions. In Modern Times, Chaplin shows off his skill by roller-skating blindfolded on a department store mezzanine, unaware of the unguarded edge. Each time he approaches the edge, the conditions of motion are such that catastrophe seems inevitable.
The persistent temptation of disaster is delightful, if somewhat breathtaking, to the extent that the viewer realizes this is not the real world. The silent film presents a world that, although realistic in some respects, is unquestionably, in the absence of sound, unreal. It is crucial to the appreciation of visual comedy that this distinction be made. The three year old who cannot make such a distinction may be terrified to see Harold Lloyd hanging precariously from buildings.

Another comic effect is achieved by distorting the time sequence of a causal event. In The General, the heroine moves the train in the wrong direction and knocks Keaton off a bridge. In the next shot, after some delay, he is shown falling into the river. The cause, being knocked by the train, is perceived; the effect is delayed. A causal event, not impossible in itself, is made comic by disrupting the time sequence.

Actually, a disruption of a motion series is noticed even by infants less than sixteen weeks of age. As Bower has found, if a moving object disappears behind a screen and reappears faster than the perceived motion would predict, an infant displays distress. No such reaction occurs if the object merely reappears in a different size or shape.

Delayed causality has dramatic effects as well. In Potemkin, the baby carriage is knocked several times before it rolls down the steps. Each time the cause occurs, anxiety about the effect is intensified.

When two forms assume similar and simultaneous motion, they are perceptually organized together and the configuration conveys affinity in the two forms. In Grandma's Boy, when Harold Lloyd and the butler turn and face each other at precisely the same moment, the similarity in their dress is magnified, as is Lloyd's embarrassment. Later, in a series of simultaneous motions, Lloyd and his rival suffer the mutual discomfort of having mistaken a mothball for a piece of candy. The absurdity of the situation is graphically shown in the perceptual similarity of the two antithetical characters.

In the homecoming scene of Birth of a Nation, simultaneous motion plays a dramatic role. The scene depicts a brother returning home from the war. His approach to the house is hesitant and awkward, the sister waits nervously. After a few moments of uneasiness, the brother and sister suddenly and simultaneously avert their eyes from each other. In that one motion, the audience realizes the similarity of their experience, that both brother and sister had known the tragedy of war. The closeness between brother and sister is visually established and the subsequent embrace is justified.

In the boxing match in City Lights, the motion series of one context is applied to another. Normally, a fight is composed of motions of impact and reaction. In this scene, with its simultaneous and regular motion, the configuration of a dance is presented. Chaplin, the referee, and the opponent move simultaneously around the ring. The referee steps aside, the opponent lunges, Chaplin ducks, they embrace, the referee steps
The introduction of an unexpected motion can transform the meaning of an entire configuration. In The General, two soldiers, approaching each other in military precision, appear merely to be changing guard. When they meet, Keaton knocks the other soldier out. The configuration of a benign approach is suddenly reversed. In Modern Times, Chaplin innocently picks up a flag dropped by a passing truck and chases after the truck to return it. The sudden appearance of striking workers behind Chaplin transforms the whole motion series. Chaplin now looks as if he is leading the strikers and the police arrest him.

The content of an object is transformed by the motion it assumes. In Cops, a ladder becomes the lever on which Keaton balances to evade his pursuers. In Grandma's Boy, Lloyd and his girl friend cross a stream on stepping stones. The last stone looks like the others but when they step on it, it moves. The pig walks away and they fall into the water.

An object in motion, apparently under its own force, takes on attributes of intentionality. In The General, the first car on which the cannon is mounted seems to "chase" Keaton. In North By Northwest, Hitchcock achieves a similar effect, on a more terrifying level, when an airplane relentlessly pursues Cary Grant across a cornfield. By not showing the pilot, Hitchcock imbues the machine itself with evil intention and the effect is all the more ominous.

James Agee referred to silent comedy as "Comedy's Greatest Era" and nostalgically regretted its passing. Although some visual comedy persisted in the sound era with Chaplin and, to some extent, Laurel and Hardy, it rapidly became a thing of the past. Comedies were more and more based on storyline and verbal gags, while visual comedy was left behind. Only remnants of visual comedy remain, as when Woody Allen, in Bananas, steps out of his car and falls into a pot hole. Yet this scene is distinctly out of place in the context of the film. In order to support visual comedy, the film must present a stylized, unreal visual world. Otherwise, delight in perceived causality becomes, instead, cruel slapstick. The "unreality" of the silent film provided a perfect vehicle for visual comedy, but the realism sound brought to the film severely altered the comic possibilities.

The realism of sound affected the style of motion in dramatic films as well. In the silents, motion could exaggerate and intensify a particular meaning. The realism of sound impedes such stylization. The image was confined to the dictates of a synchronous sound track. Expressive use of motion is rare in movies of today but its effectiveness is unquestioned.

Too often film theorists and critics neglect the fact that film is a visual art. Even when this aspect is dealt with, style in the movies is treated as a series of connected, but static images. The effect of
motion in the movies must be taken into consideration and the psychology of perception offers a way to begin. Psychology has been used in film theory, but, as Richard Griffith points out. "Freud and Marx, not Gestalt, have dominated our concept of the movies and guided our study of its power." It is clear that a study of the psychology of visual perception and the history of film will do much to illuminate the dynamics of the film experience.
FOOTNOTES


Studies in the humanities have traditionally claimed to educate the whole man, to sensitize him to the human condition, and to the universal needs and desires that bind all men beneath their cultural differences. However, what satisfactorily met the needs of humanistic studies a few generations ago must be seen today as part of a broader spectrum of experience and discovery. The print culture has been rendered obsolete by a technological revolution which renders "Big Brother" of 1984 a "fait accompli" rather than a debatable prediction.

My own rationale for engaging in film studies evolves from a real conviction that the only education worth my energies and those of my students is that which finds its basis in an exploration of the culture in which we live, the philosophical bases which inform that culture, and discussion of value systems which can both broaden the students' understanding of the world which shapes their destiny and furnish them with the resources to become self-dependent individuals whose daily life and behavior take their direction from fidelity to something transcendent to economic necessity and psychic survival. As Thoreau went to the woods to face life deliberately, so I see it as the foundation of humanistic education to guide students into contact with and confrontation of self in order that they will be in possession of that same self. While they cannot control or obliterate the many forces working upon them, they can develop a perception of the pervasive impact of cultural influences and thus live as controllers of, rather than slaves to, them.

Amid the futuristic theories, warnings, and prophecies that surround us, hope lies only with those people, scholars and practitioners alike, who lead us into the literature of our times in order that, by seeing how man has confronted self, society, and nature in a given situation, we may effectively, intelligently, and knowledgeably plan for that highly complex future with its potential for the destruction of human sensibility.

It can be argued that classical works of literature can effect the same value orientation. This is true, but not always with the same degree of efficacy, immediacy, or emotional stimulation.

As Gerald O'Grady puts it, "I was finding that film... was primarily a sequence of images which has the power to put us in touch with one of our most inner and basic modes of consciousness... there is no other artistic form which, by its very nature, relates itself so completely and 'outerly' to our whole world of culture, and not only to our traditional and popular culture, but profoundly and revealingly to our social and political culture."

It has been my experience that filmic art speaks more directly to, and evokes an immediacy of response from, students with but a minimum of instruction in film language. This only serves to support my belief that cinematic art
communicate intangibly and imperceptibly. It is our responsibility as film educators to create and understanding of what happens when consciousness and medium collide. Although men can defend against the existential experience and seek escape by a host of psychological mechanisms, they are ultimately confronted with their world. Responsible personhood demands an acceptance of what is a serious consideration: how the raw materials can be converted into life-giving and life-nurturing forces for future age.

The plastic arts of the 70's incisively penetrate the consciousness of modern man to reveal the alienation, valuelessness, lack of inner freedom, and corruption which characterize individuals and societies whose powers have often created forces greater than man, singly or collectively, can deal with. Perhaps among all the media, cinema has most fully and sensitively responded to its role as purveyor of culture and social critic. Television has gone the way of commercialism; videotapes are as yet beyond the reach of ordinary people. Film, in medium and message, confronts the real issues of our times, sometimes humorously (although a bit sadistically) as in "Brewster McCloud," sometimes fearlessly as in "2001" often disconcertingly as in Godard; violently as in 'Straw Dogs;' to our distress and disbelief, futuristically, as in 'Clockwork Orange.'

We are graced today with a host of talented, poetic, insightful film makers whose energies are directed toward an illumination of the present in terms of their vision. While a film may capture the frozen stillness of a person in time and in his times, it is simultaneously and subtly forcing the viewer to probe beyond the confines of the film as to implications for the future of society and the individual in light of this presentation of one experience.

In order to concretize the theoretical ideas presented in the preceding paragraphs, this paper will develop what I consider to be two of the concerns of film study if viewers are to approach film with probing and critical minds. These concerns are: first, that film as a medium of communication, demonstrates many of the properties associated with verbal language; second, that film, like verbal language, may take its meaning from the resources and comprehensions of the individual viewing it and internalizing it.

Roland Barthes, in the Elements of Semiology, distinguishes between language and speech. Language is a social institution, a collective contract which one must accept if he wants to communicate, made up of a certain systematized set of convention. Speech is necessarily an individual act of selection and combination, resulting in the actualization of thoughts.
Similarly, the language of vision is predicated upon the manipulation of elements and the expression of these elements in interrelationships. To use a visual medium artistically is to make the visual parts go well together: duration, harmony, contrast, proportion, rhythm are involved in this visual, dynamic organization. It determines, perhaps more subtly and thoroughly than verbal language, the structure of our consciousness. To see in limited modes of vision is not to see at all. Visual language uses material phenomena as its medium, proceeding from below -- the concrete -- to above -- the abstract. It explores physical data -- observable features -- and works up to a problem or belief.

Cinematography is the gathering of visually dynamic and meaningful elements which creative cutting combines into living entities. The stuff of film is the world chaos of reality which is offered by nature and experience. It is the task of the artist to give back, through the plastic medium, a sense of the ambiguity and continuum of that same reality. To do this requires a special eye for relationships among things, events, and persons, making the camera catch what the eye sees, at the same time rendering an affirmation of objective reality yet exerting a high degree of control over the material and its placement.

A grammar of the film can and does facilitate at least procedures for the beginner. The mature artist may modify them as his film making becomes more intuitive. Rules of cinema, unlike traditional syntax, however, remain generally flexible, their intention being not to dictate so much as to guide. The camera provides the artist with ready-made fragments of reality but it is in a knowledge of the rules of cinema, i.e., techniques, that he can transform reality and enable it to yield up its depths and multidimensional aspects. It is here that neorealism, insofar as it has not endured as a widely popular form in the present, may account for its failure. The artist cannot render only the surface of reality; rather through the application of principles of the art, he can, and, indeed, must, heighten or intensify the pictorial image to the point where the viewer moves from spectator to participant. In other words, the content ceases to be mere representation of formless world chaos; it takes on form and structure through the various processes of manipulation of space and time, use of color and sound, and the combination of verbal and visual elements.

The recognition, or better, the acknowledgment, that the film is a language with content, structure, and style does not thereby assure that it communicates either itself or some abstraction beyond itself. According to Bazin, "What is alive is not what's on the screen, but what is between the audience and the response." It is essential, then, not only to teach the elements of film language but also to explore viewer response as an integral component of the film experience. I would propose here a theory of viewer response derived from several theories of stylistics, particularly those of Roman Jakobson and Stanley Fish.

Jakobson's theory of poetics is predicated upon ambiguity as an intrinsic characteristic of any self-focused message. "The machinations of ambiguity are among the very roots of poetry." Accepting this as true, it would then follow that the viewer must be in possession of a code if he is to interpret a film.
Christian Metz maintains that film is indeed a language, but a language without a code. It is language because it has texts and there is meaningful discourse. But, unlike verbal language, it cannot be referred to a preexistent code. Thus, the image itself becomes the language.

If this is true, and the author is inclined to think so, then Fish's reader response theory would logically apply, i.e., that it is the experience of an utterance that is its meaning. Thus, the viewer is called into an active role in the cinematic process. He brings with him to the film all the experiences, traits, learned and intuitive knowledge of which he is in possession. He must watch the film, following the temporal flow of image upon image. At the same time, he must experience the images in a forming process. Thus, viewing cannot be passive. Rather it must be a creative act, a dynamic process of integration in which the viewer uses his own imagination to form a unified experience of the reality which the artist presents.

The perceptive viewer realizes that the artist has manipulated elements to achieve an illusion of reality and to influence interpretation. The viewer seeks not to believe that the image on the screen is faithful to reality but rather that it can be accepted with relative ease as reality in its own right. The impression it makes, therefore, is not so much perceptual as psychological and emotional.

At this point, then, Fish and Bazin merge in their theories. According to Fish, the temporal flow of words is monitored and structured by all the competences that the reader brings with him. The reader responds to word after word until he can reject the artifacts when he comes to intuition. This idea can be related to Bazin's theory of cinematic structure and response. "Films should be made, not according to some 'a priori' method or plan, but from fragments of raw reality, multiple and equivocal in themselves, whose meaning can only emerge 'a posteriori' thanks to other facts, between which the mind is able to see relations." If meaning in a film is to be predicated upon the viewer's reaction to its language, then it would seem impossible to construct a code, the possession of which would guarantee the viewer understanding. But film, being a plastic art, and, therefore, dynamic in itself, cannot or should not admit of only one interpretation. To do so would deny it the possibility of remaining relevant through changing eras. In addition, this would limit its audience and deny it the status of a universal language.

On the other hand, knowledge and understanding of the language of film can enable a viewer to have deeper appreciation of a film's message, to penetrate surface reality more readily, and to experience the immediacy of the language through a more rapid or quasi-intuitive apprehension of its deep structure or the abstractions upon which the content is based. Film, when, can be seen on various levels but these do not correspond to differing codes. Rather they develop from the sophistication of experience which the viewer brings to the raw material of the film. If the artist wants his intentions met exactly, he will have to control the coming-to-meaning process by using structural features that will be inescapable and unpredictable. But a film produced under such a theory would tend to be of the conventional gangster or Western type in which a standardized plot leads to a
standardized ending. The viewer has experienced escape but not aesthetic creation. He has not participated in the language process.

Film viewed as a creative act, then, becomes a dynamic relationship between the artist who shapes his content through use of various cinematic devices and the viewer who is (to borrow from McLuhan) massaged by the medium and moved to respond. Film, like any work of art, may have isolated elements but it does not have content until the viewer grasps it.

Film study courses in the 70's, then, can have validity if they seek to equip the individual for perceptive viewing of, and affective response to, the medium. Thus conceived, they provide wide exposure for the dissemination of film theory and its application to value-oriented education.

It is essential, however, to include both aspects: film language and viewer response. The study of visual language alone can become just one more science in the academic curriculum. On the other hand, intelligent response to a work of art requires a working knowledge of terminology to give foundation to critical judgment.

These theories have validity, however, only insofar as they serve some transcendent purpose in the experience of those engaged in their pursuit. In light of what was discussed in the early paragraphs, this theory of film study can be summarized in one sentence: we study film so that, seeing where we are through the vision of one man in touch with his times, we may more realistically plan where we are to go.
NOTES


7. Code is defined for present purposes as a system of symbols for meaningful communication.

8. Metz, Christian, as quoted in Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (London, 1969), p. 120.


10. Ibid., p. 138.

CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION IN THE SEMIOLOGY OF THE CINEMA

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In a recent graduate seminar on Semiology, I attempted a syntagmatic analysis of Robert Enrico's An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge based on Christian Metz' Signification in the Cinema. This analysis was both enlightening and frustrating, ending in somewhat of a stalemate because of my inability to deal with the connotative level of the film. In response, I began searching through Metz' work for some clue as to how the connotative level should be handled, if at all. While I found that Metz does discuss connotation, he does not consider it necessary for use in an analytical framework. This may be true for a syntagmatic (denotative structure) analysis, but not for a complete semiological analysis which must include a connotative level as well. Consequently, a semiological study may necessitate the use of additional sources which cover other levels of semiology.

While denotation may exist without connotation, connotation may not exist without denotation. After all, the first level occurrence which carries in it connotative meanings, must first be told (denoted). The filmmaker who makes use of and communicates most effectively through connotative meanings is the more powerful communicator. It is our greatest and most successful filmmakers that deal with symbolic and connotative expression. While Metz recognizes the existence of the connotative as essential in films, he chooses to analyze only the denotative. Although an analysis of the denotative structure is indeed valuable, it should be done in association with a connotative analysis. In so doing, the manipulation of the denotative elements will become much more meaningful and enlightening since it can be compared to the connotative communication which the filmmaker was attempting to achieve. Whether it be literature, drama, or film, the connotative meanings of a work must be analyzed as well as the style or manner which the artist uses on the denotative level.

Metz seems to acknowledge the interrelationship of connotation and denotation when he says:

If it is true that cinematic invention is inevitably a mixture of artistic inspiration and language-like fashioning, the fact remains that the film maker is always foremost an artist, and that it is through his endeavors to order the things of reality differently through his aesthetic intention and his strivings for connotation, that he is occasionally able to bequeath some eventually conventional form liable to become a "fact of language." If filmic denotation today is rich and diverse, as indeed it is, that is only as a result of the strivings for connotation in the past.
Although Metz sees connotation as an important element in the art of film, he still insists on using denotation as his only criteria for analysis. Metz' insistence on separating the two, then, mystifies me. He has noted and outlined some of these "conventional forms" of the denotative level and has organized them into a tentative "language." Rather than separating the connotative from the denotative, however, it is the relationship between the two which can be the most enlightening of all.

Metz further states:

Certainly, the total understanding of a given film would be impossible if we did not carry within us that obscure but quite real dictionary of "im-segni" which Pasolini talks about; if, to take a single example, we did not know that Jean-Clude Brialy's car in Les Cousins was a sports car, with all that this implies in twentieth century France, the diegetic period of the film. But all the same we would know, because we would see it, that it is a car, and that would be enough for us to grasp the denotated meaning of the passage.

Metz' emphasis on connotation's importance becomes misleading, then since he separates them nevertheless and considers denotation to be the "deepest mechanism of filmic intellection." Some explanation is shown, however, when he discusses connotation as "the major role in our comprehension of the particular images of particular films..." The key word here is particular.

I now believe that Metz is looking for "conventional forms," which appear on the denotative level of film communication in order to formulate a tentative "grammar of film," and does not really expect his analysis of denotive structures to be applied and imposed upon any particular film, but rather on filmic structures as a massive diverse body which nevertheless shows signs of commonalities and patterns even cross-culturally. Not that examples of certain categories would not be picked from various films, but that no one film could have all of its parts labeled and "diagrammed" on a chart. Further, I do not believe that Metz wishes to develop a formal "grammar of film," for the possibilities of filmic denotation are so infinite that formulation of a formal "grammar," as general "rules" of color, texture, or composition to produce a consciously desired effect, the filmmaker or critic may refer to Metz as a "guideline" rather than a fully developed grammar.

With this in mind, Metz can be applied with a new emphasis, and hopefully avoid such stalemates as reached in my analysis of Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge. Broad structural patterns may be observed on the denotative level, while connotative discussion will be possible within the particular film. This will make Metz more workable in two ways. First, Metz categories, when looking at a particular film, can be applied less stringently, allowing for minor variations from his definitions since film is so infinite in its possibilities that exceptions will always be found. Examples of "conventional forms" can be noted, yet small details and variations will not jam up the works. Secondly, this more expedient way of
applying Metz will allow the semiological analysis to progress two more steps—to a connotative analysis, then to an analysis of the relationship between the two. Further, the rough syntagmatic analysis obtained may become more and more refined as the second and third steps progress.

Louis Hjelmslev discusses such a connotative level in semiology in his book, *Prolegomena to the Theory of Language*. He describes "connotative semiotics" as

...a semiotic...whose expression plane is provided by the content plane and the expression plane of a denotative semiotic.4

Hjelmslev's "expression", "content", and "relationship" are synonymous with Metz' "signifier", "signified", and "signification". In other words, the entire denotative semiotic becomes only the signifier (the vehicle for expression) in the connotative semiotic. The connotative semiotic, then, has its own signified (content) and signification (the relationship between signifier and signified). The connotative meaning is found in this signification. This definition can be diagrammed as shown below:

\[
\text{Denotative: } \begin{array}{c}
\text{signifier} \\
\rightarrow \text{signification} \\
\leftarrow \text{signified}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\text{Connotative: } \begin{array}{c}
\text{signifier} \\
\rightarrow \text{signification} \\
\leftarrow \text{signified}
\end{array}
\]

Metz himself seems to describe this same relationship when he says:

Film can connote without generally requiring special (i.e., separate) connotators because it has the most essential signifiers of connotation at its permanent disposal: the choice between several ways of structuring denotation.5

Once again, Metz seems to be indicating the importance of connotation and its like to denotation. He describes further how connotation's signifier is the denotative level itself:

Cinematographic connotation is based on a visual or audio theme—or an arrangement of visual or audio themes—that once it has been placed in its correct syntagmatic position within the discourse which constitutes the whole film, takes on a greater value than its own, and is increased by the additional meaning it receives.6

By recognizing that a connotative "correct syntagmatic position" exists through a "choice between several ways of structuring denotation," Metz acknowledges that the relationship between the connotative signified and its denotated syntagmatic position is a vital one. The filmmaker cannot devise a denotative structure only in relation to the denotative content (signified) if his ultimate communication lies in the connotative signification. Conversely, the film's analysis must deal with the denotative structure, through a syntagmatic analysis, and the connotative
signified, through a connotative analysis, in order to gain any understanding of the relationship between the two—the connotative significance and the ultimate meaning of the film. Such an analysis could lead to the development of a connotative schema with which to study the connotative usage as actualized in a particular film. This would not be unlike Metz' denotative schema of syntagmatic types, which serves as a reference point or "grammar" of the denotative structure in the study of denotative "usage."

Metz' work is very important and useful, but a modification of its application is necessary in order to receive the full benefit of a filmic analysis. Metz has chosen to deal with only one element of the semiology of the cinema, denotative structures. A semiotic analysis must go beyond this important first step; it must include an analysis of the connotative level and, further, an analysis of the relationship between the denotative and connotative levels.
FOOTNOTES


5. Metz, p. 188

"We have no art. We do everything as well as we can."

A Balinese saying.

"Art is anything you can get away with."

-Marshall McLuhan 1967

"Art cannot be non-political."

-Mayerhold

"Understanding of Marxism is pleasant and useful."

-G. Plekhanov 1914

"The cinema is the most important of all the arts."

-Lenin 1929

"I look upon cinema as a pulpit, and use it as a propagandist; and this I put unashamedly because, in the still unshaven philosophies of cinema, broad distinctions are necessary."

-John Grierson

"When Marx undertook his critique of the capitalistic mode of production, this mode was in its infancy. Marx directed his efforts in such a way as to give them prognostic value. He went back to the basic conditions underlying capitalistic production and through his presentation showed what could be expected of capitalism in the future. The result was that one could expect it not only to exploit the proletariat with increasing intensity, but ultimately to create conditions which would make it possible to abolish capitalism itself."
The transformation of the superstructure, which takes place far more slowly than that of the substructure, has taken more than half a century to manifest in each area of culture the change in the conditions of production. Only today can it be indicated what form this has taken. Certain prognostic requirements should be met by these statements. However, these about the art of the proletariat after its assumption of power or about the art of a classless society would have less bearing on these demands than theses about the developmental tendencies of art under present conditions of production. Their dialectic is no less noticeable in the superstructure than in the economy. It would therefore be wrong to underestimate the value of such theses as a weapon. They brush aside a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery—concepts whose uncontrolled application would lead to a processing of data in the Fascist sense. The concepts which are introduced into the theory of art in what follows differ from the more familiar terms in that they are completely useless for the purposes of Fascism. They are, on the other hand, useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art.
may prove suggestive to some specific problems in the history of film
eaesthetics, and the question of the social function of art.

Since the Renaissance, the traditional methodological approach to art
or aesthetics has been to consider them as an exclusive, separate and
distinct entity. This fundamentally idealist approach has been historically
perpetrated on art since Plato and Aristotle; through scholasticism,
nominalism and realism. The historic inability of idealism to reconcile
mind and body, becomes transposed into the aesthetic question of the
possibility of a unity of content and form. This epistemological dualism
precludes any vision of reality as an organic totality. Aesthetics is
viewed as existing outside the influence of the interrelations and inter-
dependencies of social practice and reality. Correspondingly, there is an
exclusive preoccupation with the coherent operation of mind and form as
an end in itself. Any correspondence to historical-material realities
either are abstracted from their original context and meaning, or ignored
completely for contemplation of the variations between coherent parts of
a closed system.

The relatively short history of the film can legitimately serve as
a microcosm of the long cultural history of art. Within the short span
of the 20th century, many historical examples of the consequential cul-
mination of this epistemological-methodological problem may clearly be
observed. The most obvious example is the one in radical opposition to
this tradition, and which stands out in sharp contrast; in fact, almost in
high relief against the background of all the others. This society and this
individual successfully took the first steps toward full realization in
theory and practice, of a totally new epistemological-methodological
approach, and world-view. The society was Soviet Russia; the individual
was Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein; the epistemological-methodological
approach was historical-dialectical-materialism; and the world-view was
Marxist-communism.

The foundation for Eisenstein's great achievement in film rested on
his successful utilization of the methodological approach of historical
and dialectical materialism. It was through the unique use of this method
that Eisenstein was able to realize the means for the unification of con-
tent and form, through the theory and practice of dialectical montage.
"We wish to see the qualitative-absolute- the differentiated and atomized
individual- transformed into the qualitative- relative. We wish no longer
to oppose, qualitatively, science ('the speech of logic') and art ('the
speech of imagery'). We want to set them alongside each other quantita-
tively."* Eisenstein's conscious recognition of the need for a totalistic
aesthetic vision, logically leads him to the idea of the intention and
effect of art and its transcendant end; in fact, its actual transformation
to and for life. "This is the true contribution (for Eisenstein; 'intel-
lectualizing the kino'- 'dialectic montage of conceptions') which Soviet
art is making to the universal history of the arts. This will be the
contribution of our entire epoch to art- to art which has ceased to be art
and is on the way to become life."

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A. K. Coomaraswamy recognizes the consistent necessity of this same process but with a different end, quite literally, in mind. Coomaraswamy cites the Chinese author of the ChiLeh-Tzu Yuen, "When painting has reached divinity (shen) there is an end of the matter." Again in the Chinese story of the painter Wu Tao-tsú: "Who painted on a palace wall a glorious landscape, with mountains, forests, clouds, birds, men and all things as in Nature, a veritable world-picture; while the Emperor his patron was admiring this painting, Wu Tao-tsú pointed to a doorway on the side of a mountain, inviting the Emperor to enter, and behold the marvels within. Wu Tao-tsú himself entered first; beckoning the Emperor to follow; but the door closed, and the painter was never seen again." Coomaraswamy continues with another example and then makes a revealing statement: "A corresponding disappearance of the work of art, when perfection has been attained, is mythically expressed in other legends, such as those painted dragons that flew from the walls on which they were painted... Such is the perfection toward which art and artist tend, art becoming manifested life, and the artist passing beyond our ken."4

I think it is clear that Eisenstein was not referring to art or the artist disappearing "when perfection has been attained", nor the artist reaching the "divine", or any transcendental "passing beyond our ken". The implications of Eisenstein's statement would mean that the artist would necessarily now pass not beyond, but rather into or among "our ken."* For Eisenstein, art and the artist would necessarily cease to continue as exclusive finite categories; separate and unrelated to the common social needs of the society. In the future, the artist and his production would no longer be alienated from reality, his audience, or from himself. The conscious development and realization of common social needs and goals of the society as a whole, will replace the artists previous bourgeois preoccupation with individualistic self-expression.

Throughout his life Eisenstein struggled with the contradiction of "bourgeois residues" coexisting, both within the new Soviet society and in himself. This ideological tension continually served as a useful means by which Eisenstein could consciously redefine and more fully articulate and expand his social-aesthetic outlook. The method of "self-criticism" and the continual need for re-examination of theory and practice is dramatically seen in Eisenstein's analysis of the failures of "Beshin Meadow" (1937) and "Ivan the Terrible", Part II (1946).

In striking and often instructive contrast to Eisenstein's methodology and world-view, is the "eternalistic-spiritualistic world-view of A. K. Coomaraswamy. While Eisenstein continually struggled to distinguish the forest from the trees, Coomaraswamy always seemed content mistaking the forest for Heaven. Coomaraswamy distinguishes two different types of European art: "one Christian and scholastic, the other post-Renaissance and personal". It is significant that while Coomaraswamy embraces the former as his world-view, it does not provide him with an adequate method for understanding the reasons for the development of the latter. In fact,

*Other more typical alternatives of the 20th. century were for artists to "give up art" for "living artistically", or for playing chess- Piet Mondrian and Marcel Duchamp.
if Coomaraswamy was historical and empirical, it would contradict his "spiritualistic" world-view. Thus the validity of Coomaraswamy's world-view is dependent upon a coherence theory, in qualitative contrast to Eisenstein's correspondence theory and world-view. This is not intended to minimize Coomaraswamy's analysis, especially his many perceptive insights on "post-Renaissance personal art", but merely to make a point of the sources for his presuppositions of his world-view.

Coomaraswamy's criteria of excellence of a work of art is consistent with his "transcendental" world-view. "True art, pure art, never enters into competition with the unattainable perfection of the world, but relies exclusively on its own logic and its own criteria, which cannot be tested by standards of truth or goodness applicable in other fields of activity."8 The implications of this statement reveal most of the basic presuppositions of Coomaraswamy's world-view. This dualistic-transcendental system is a closed one, without need of the concepts of history or change. The operative concept of "intelligibility" in innate (a priori) and intuitive, and supports his ideas of the caste system, and the notion of permanence. "Aesthetic experience is thus only accessible to those competent".9 Coomaraswamy's final definition of art is: "Heaven and Earth are united in the analogy of art, which is an ordering of sensation to intelligibility and tends toward an ultimate perfection in which the seer perceives all things imaged in himself."10

Coomaraswamy's special brand of the "philosophia perennis" is often extremely rich in useful insights, even though his world-view as a whole is not. Some striking parallels in similar ideas can be drawn between the two men; though again it will become evident that these ideas are based on very different fundamental presuppositions. I have previously shown how both men realized the need for "art becoming manifested life"; and have pointed out how the different presuppositions of their respective world-views, would necessarily determine the means and ends of this transformation. The difference is in how this process would occur, and toward what end, and for whom, would it serve. Coomaraswamy's view calls for individual aspiration toward divine perfection; while Eisenstein's view seeks collective realization of common needs and goals for the society as a whole.

While discussing "scholastic qualities of Oriental art", Coomaraswamy cites the characteristics of "unanimous style and type" and "themes determined by general necessities and unanimous demand."11 Initially, these phrases appear to be in apparent continuity with Eisenstein's outlook; but this resemblance proves to be only superficial when the basic ends of Coomaraswamy's world-view are considered in their full context, and in relation to the ends of Eisenstein's world-view.

Reference has been made to Coomaraswamy's separation of European art into the categories of Christian-scholastic art and post-Renaissance-personal art. The presuppositions of Coomaraswamy's world-view necessitate that he reject the latter for the former. The religious and philosophic experiences of medieval European and Asiatic civilizations
are the examples which Coomaraswamy presents as "true" models of cultural excellence and value. In form at least, Coomaraswamy and Eisenstein both severely criticize general aspects of modern art. Coomaraswamy's general cultural criticisms of post-Renaissance-personal art are based on the ideological assumptions of a Vedantic-Christian world-view. Eisenstein's criticisms of bourgeois-democratic art are based on the world-view of Marxist-Leninism; Historical and Dialectical Materialism. From totally different points of view, both men criticize the commonly accepted notion of individualistic artistic expression, and the separation of content and form.

The lack of meaningful correspondence between the content and the form in a work of modern art, constitutes one of Coomaraswamy's definitions for "decadent art". "Decadent art is simply an art which is no longer felt or energizes, but merely denotes, in which there exists no longer any real correspondence between the formal and pictorial elements, its meaning as it were negated by the weakness or incongruity of the pictorial element." The corresponding preoccupation of experimenting exclusively with the formal and technical-structural possibilities of a medium, at the expense of considerations for content or theme, is viewed by Coomaraswamy as partially due to the "over-refinement and elaboration of apparatus in the arts... All these means at the disposal of the artist are the means of his undoing, except in the rare cases where he can still by a real devotion to his theme makes us forget them."

The phrase, "real devotion to his theme" perfectly characterizes Eisenstein's achievement both in his films and his aesthetic theories. Through Eisenstein's utilization of dialectical methodology in his use of montage, and the interdependent nature of the presuppositions of his world-view, often enabled him to realize a harmonious unification of content and form. This historic reconciliation of content and form, this totality of aesthetic-social vision was determined fundamentally by the presuppositions of the new Soviet society; Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialism. To this point Eisenstein said, "We should always bear in mind that it is the profound ideological meaning of subject and content that is, and will always be, the true basis of aesthetics and that will ensure our mastery of new techniques."

On the question of the role of "individualistic self-expression" in art, Coomaraswamy again recognizes the same problem as Eisenstein; but because of their different world-views, which were responsible for recognizing the problem in the first place, each man would solve the problem quite differently. First Coomaraswamy; "The painter's own shape comes out in the picture...but this is precisely why the painter himself must be a normal man, since otherwise his peculiarity might be reflected in his art. From the Scholastic and Indian point of view, any such reflection of the person of the artist in his work must be regarded as a defect; whereas in later European art, the trace of the artist's individual peculiarities coming to be regarded as a virtue in the art, and flattering the artist's pride, the way to aesthetic exhibitionism and the substitution of the player ("star") for the play were prepared. In the same way the history of artists has replaced the history of art." Coomaraswamy views the intervention of the individual artistic personality into the form of a work of art as disrupting the harmony of a traditionally ordered cultural pattern and hierarchy.
For Eisenstein, "individualism" in art meant the residues of "bourgeois individualism". The continual struggle against their stubborn influence both in art and social practice, becomes one of the primary functions of the Marxist method of self-criticism; the ongoing re-examination of theory and practice. Throughout his life Eisenstein consciously attempted to come to terms with and resolve this contradiction within himself. It is granted that at certain times he was more successful in this difficult task than at others; but more importantly was his conscious recognition of the need for this struggle if he was to consider himself an authentic participant and spokesman of the new Soviet society. On the difficult problem of combatting the influence of "bourgeois residues" Eisenstein stated, "We must master the Lenin-Stalin method of perception of real life and history to such a full and deep extent as to be able to overcome all remnants or survivals of former notions which although they have been banished from our consciousness a long time, are obstinately and maliciously attempting to infiltrate into our works as soon as our creative vigilance is weakened even for a single moment." Another manifestation of the struggle Eisenstein waged with this contradiction was his statement, "The Mistakes of Bezgin Lug" in 1937: "The mistake is rooted in one deep-seated intellectual and individualistic illusion, an illusion which, beginning with small things, can subsequently lead to big mistakes and tragic outcomes... The illusion that one may accomplish truly revolutionary work 'on one's own', outside the fold of the collective, outside of a single iron unity with the collective...But the tradition of introversion and isolation had already become rooted in me. I worked subjectively, within my own immediate group. I worked on a picture which was not one of flesh and blood with our Socialist reality, but was woven of abstract images of this reality" The importance of the qualitative re-examination of the philosophic and aesthetic presuppositions of one's creative methodology is reflected in the following remarks by Eisenstein: "To whom, however, should the mistakes be attributed? And can it be said that political error is the result of a mistaken creative method? Of course not. The mistakes in the creative method nest in an error of a philosophic nature. Philosophical errors lead to mistakes in method. Mistsakes in method lead to objective political error and looseness. I must seriously work on my own outlook, and seek a profound Marxist approach to new subject. Specifically, I must study reality and the new man... The subject of my new work can only be of one type: heroic in spirit, militant in content and popular in its style... In preparing the creation of such a film I see the way whereby I shall rid myself of the last anarchistic traits of individualism in my outlook and creative method." Eisenstein's conscious preoccupation with the development of philosophic and aesthetic methodology as the means to achieve a desired effect, and as a means for the persistent re-analysis of his own practice, also provided him with a comprehensive basis for a critical approach to the cinema of other countries; specifically, the bourgeois-democratic cinema of Germany and America.

In many respects, the social and economic conditions of post-World War I Germany were remarkably similar to pre-revolutionary Russia. The cultural values of the Weimar Republic eventually culminated in the rise
of Nazism and Hitler; while in Russia, a proletarian revolution established a Soviet-Socialist society. The historical movement of this process was documented in the Weltanschauung of the films of this period. It should be no surprise to discover how and why Eisenstein interpreted the outlook of these German films; as it represented the antithesis of the ideological-aesthetic presupposition of his worldview. From Caligari (1914) through Pabst and Murnau, to Lang's The Testament of Dr. Mabuse (1933); the attitudes these films reflected were saturated with mystical-psychological escapism and a deep prevailing pessimism. In sharp contrast, the new Soviet filmmakers dealt optimistically with material reality and often celebrated the collective achievements of their recent past. Eisenstein characterized the difference between the post-war German cinema and the young Soviet cinema in these words: "mysticism, decadence, dismal fantasy... The chaos of multiple exposures, of over-fluid dissolves, of split screens...reflected the confusion and chaos of post-war Germany. Our spirit urged us towards life - amidst the people into the surging actuality of a regenerating country. Expressionism passed into the formative history of our cinema as a powerful factor - of repulsion." 

The eventual tragic results of the national chaos of post-war Germany forced some artists to re-evaluate the question of the intention and effect of art in its unavoidable social and political implications. Concurrent with Eisenstein, the writers Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht addressed themselves to the social-aesthetic meaning of this problem and its corresponding consequences.

In 1934, Walter Benjamin recorded in a diary conversations between himself and his exiled friend, Bertolt Brecht. On this occasion Brecht offered penetrating and wide-ranging criticism of a Benjamin essay on Kafka. Brecht's criticism of Kafka raises serious questions, which are still pertinent, concerning the problem of aesthetic presuppositions and outlook, with their corresponding social implications. The year was 1934: July 6. "As a visionary, however, Kafka, as Brecht says, has seen what was coming without seeing what was there... Kafka, he says, had one and only one problem, and that concerned organization (no adequate world-view, my comment). What had shaken him was fear of the termite state: how men, by their ways of communal living become alienated from themselves. And certain forms of this alienation he had foreseen, as eg. the procedures of the GPU. He had however, not found a solution and not awoken from his nightmare. Kafka's precision, says Brecht, is that of an imprecise person, a dreamer. August 5. My Kafka essay, for example - it was concerned with Kafka solely from the phenomenal side - took the work as something grown by itself (and the man as well) and severed it from all context, even from its connections with the author. One must ask of Kafka: What does he do? What is his attitude? And there, above all, one must primarily look at the general rather than the specific. Then one can discover that in Prague he lived in a bad circle of journalists and pompous literati; in a world where literature was the chief reality, if not the only one. Kafka's strengths and weaknesses both derive from this view of things - his artistic value but also his manifold mischief. But then there were in fact, Brecht said, certain very interesting aspects. They could be elucidated; one would have to
imagine a conversation of Lao-Tse with the pupil Kafka.

Loa Tse says:

'So, Pupil Kafka, the organization, the leasing and economic structures
in which you live have become uncomfortable to you? — Yes. — You don't
feel at home in them any more? — No. » A share looks sinister to you? —
Yes. — And now you are asking for a leader to hold on to, Pupil Kafka.'

Of course this is reprehensible, says Brecht.

I reject Kafka, of course.

And he brings up the parable of a Chinese philosopher on the 'sorrows of
usefulness.'

In the forest there are different species of tree trunks. From the
thickest, ships' timber is cut; from the less thick but still
considerable cue's box tops and coffin panels are made; the very thin
ones are used for whipping rods; but nothing is made from the crooked
ones - they escape the sorrows of usefulness.

'In Kafka's writing one
must look around just as in such a forest. One will find a number of
very useful things. The metaphors are good, of course. The rest,
however, is mystification. It is mischief. It must be passed over.'

August 51.

...In his important critical essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin discusses the social background
and consequences of how a certain artistic outlook, with non-social pre-
suppositions may logically be consistent, and effectively employed to
serve Fascist ideology of modern man.
Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its Führer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values.

All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today's technical resources while maintaining the property system. It goes without saying that Fascist apotheosis of war does not employ such arguments. Still, Marinetti says in his manifesto on the Ethiopian colonial war: 'For twenty-seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as antiaesthetic....Accordingly we state:...War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dream-of metalization of the body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others.... Poets and artists of Futurism!...remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art...may be illumined by them!' This manifesto has the virtue of clarity. Its formulations deserve to be accepted by dialecticians. To the latter, the aesthetics of today's war appears as follows: If the natural utilization of production forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society. The horrible features of imperialistic warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production—in other words, to unemployment and the lack of markets. Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of 'human material,' the claims to which society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way.

'Fiat ars-pereat mundus,' says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of 'l'art pour l'art.' Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of
for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has
reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an
aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics
which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing
art.\textsuperscript{23}

The interrelational and interdependent nature of Eisenstein's world-
view made him intensely conscious of the importance of the social
responsibility of the artist. This fact also explains how the outlook
of the film directors, Mauritz Stiller and Victor Sjöström, F. W. Murnau,
Fritz Lang and others, could successfully be transplanted from Europe to
Hollywood, whereas Eisenstein could not. In 1947, Eisenstein characterized
the majority of American films as 'purveyors of spiritual poison'. It
should be noted that Eisenstein's severe ideological attack on American
cinema was not solely theoretical but based on the still bitter memories
of personal experiences that he suffered in Hollywood and Mexico. "The
ability to take any theme... and by means of exaggeration (or some other
means) to reduce it—slowly and smoothly to self-destruction and final
nothingness—this is probably one of the most cunning characteristics
of the American cinema.

Films of this type... give rise to a cynical inhuman attitude to
reality. The men behind Hollywood businessmen aim to deprive the average
American of all feelings of honour, to make them cynical and egotistical.
This is necessary lest a protest against the violation of laws and
justice occurring daily, hourly in America... Now all the filthy, dirty,
dark elements have come to the surface so that the muddy water obscures
the thought of everything fine, pure and progressive.

... As regards social problems America belongs not even in the nine-
teenth century, but rather to the period of the Middle Ages and the
crusades, whose bonfires twinkle so familiarly at the bonfires of the
lynch courts, fed with high quality petrol.

The skill, inventiveness and technical mastery of the American
cinema are used in the service of darkness and oppression fundamental
characteristic features of the cruelty and unjust system of imperialistic
society.

American films contribute actively to the consolidation of this
society by imposing upon the people.

Thus the most vital of arts—the cinema—is playing the most deadly
and destructive role...\textsuperscript{24} As Marie Seton points out, "Twenty years
before, Eisenstein had written a critique for Joseph Freeman and compared
the cinema of the Soviet Union and in America.\textsuperscript{25} The United States had
hardly changed at all; The Soviet Union had grown a great deal and matured.
In the process of change, Sergei Mikhailovich had suffered deeply, but
he still resolutely believed in the future of the one system and the
ultimate death of the other.\textsuperscript{26}

A continuity could be made to Marie Seton’s remark that in twenty
years "The United States had hardly changed at all"; by stating that in
the subsequent twenty-five years, the United States had hardly changed
at all. If anything, the conditions typical of American cinema which Eisenstein criticized have become even more obviously visible and extreme, as have all other aspects of the American society.

Seemingly in revolt against Hollywood's "good business style" of film production, a number of experimental and independent filmmakers have attempted to explore the more "creative" possibilities of film art. Most of these filmmakers have unconsciously created films in which the effect is not unlike that of the typical Hollywood production. Over-emphasis on formal-structural and perceptual problems at the expense of meaningful content is in its effect in direct continuity with Hollywood's systematic manufacture of unreality and illusion. Both are responsible for perpetuating the darkness instead of cutting through it and showing us what is really there. As John Howard Lawson has pointed out, "No other epoch in history has seen men so universally confronted with the possibility and necessity of change. Artists in capitalist societies may doubt the possibility, but they cannot question the need. Every important film produced by these societies from Intolerance to La Notte documents the failure of the social order." Perhaps the long-range possibilities of these experimental and independent filmmakers will in the future prove more significant, and with changes in the social order move outside its present small coterie of followers and assume a wider social base and outlook.

The film is potentially too powerful a mass medium in effectively depicting social realities and influencing attitudes and outlook: for the film-artist to remain naively unconscious of the presuppositions of his world-view and the implications of his social-artistic effect and his corresponding social responsibility.

With great optimism in the future of film and society, I would like to conclude with the words of Vachel Lindsay written in 1915, "As we peer-into the Mirror Screen some of us dare to look forward to the time when the pouring streets of men will become sacred in each other's eyes, in pictures and in fact."
The late Ananda K. Coomaraswamy with his view of the "philosophia perennis" was an outstanding representative of this tradition. His basic belief was that the philosophic and religious experiences of medieval European and Asiatic art, "were only slightly different dialects of a common universal language." Also see his Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art, (New York: Dover Publications, 1938).


3. Ibid., p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 22.


6. Ibid., pp. 460-463. See Appendix III.

7. Coomaraswamy, op.cit., p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 25.

9. Ibid., p. 50.

10. Ibid., p. 57.

11. Ibid., pp. 33-35.

12. Ibid., p. 25.

13. Ibid., p. 27.


16. Seton, op.cit., p. 463. See Appendix III.

17. Ibid., pp. 372-373., p. 376. See Appendix II.


28. Ibid., p. 359
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FOR A RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM OF FILM STUDY, FOR A RESPONSIBLE CINEMA

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INTRODUCTION

Film study, as it is covered in the film departments in the academic world, is still very much a study undertaken in isolation from the realities of our society. A glance at the general curriculum confirms this stubborn detachment. We are likely to find at the most 1 or 2 courses in the film departments that designate as content, the relationship of film to society. The rest is taken up by studies of film theory (that is, theories of the art form), film production (that is, the aspects of sound, lighting, etc. as they apply to actual film productions), study of film forms/genres, and film history.

Whether or not this is merely reflecting on the make-up of the film departments themselves (the faculty or the administration?) is hard to say, at this point. (That is, if it is to be believed that: "it is the students that make the schools"). But on the whole, film students are a very uninteresting bunch. In class discussions, very little of significance is uttered aside from the usual snickerings directed at other film-makers and/or theorists. (This is not to say that there are not some of the latter who do "merit" such a reception; at the same time that there are "pseudo's" a-plenty that remain happily at large.) Papers on the study of particular films as written by film students have demonstrated a low level in their mastering of the film medium, even only as an art form. The student films are seldom quality films whether in form or in content. As for their persons, the picture is even less promising. Socially dull persons, limited in their interest in things other than their own egos and their films, the narrowness in the range of their knowledgeability and awareness of things: these are the characteristics manifested in the student film-makers' inability to work with one another, their shallow personalities, and their isolation from society.

Now this unsympathetic criticism of the film students is not intended to "down" them as human beings. Rather, its purpose is to call attention to the dilemma arising from films being produced out of the narrowness of the "world" as lived by these film-students, as social beings alienated from the collective. It is a dilemma which has already had its precedence in that world of Hollywood films and which has yet to be resolved, because the cinema is a public art. And while the world of films is but the fictional world of the cinema, it is nevertheless a screen-world populated with people and things.

A WORLD IN TRANSITION

In the last 10 years alone, the social life of this country has undergone tremendous changes and upheavals in leaps and bounds, one thing following another; and the result has been a generally upward move in people's awareness
and concern of the workings of their society. All around us people are waking up to the reality of the relatedness of things in the social world of human activities as they become increasingly aware of the fact that nothing in the human world, and certainly not the problems we are still faced with, can be looked at or dealt with when isolated from other things; but that in fact all things are connected and in turn affect and shape one another. From the protest of the Vietnam war, to the enquiry into government programs abroad such as AID and the Peace Corps, as well as government spendings in general. From the Civil Rights movement to the riots in the ghettos, to the Third World liberation movements. From the Free Speech Movement to the demand for student control over their own education, to the many committee involvement of young students in the communities. Young lawyers have bypassed prestigious careers in law firms in order to serve the greater, and more justified too, needs of the poor and even engineers and scientists have taken it upon themselves to investigate and protest the nature of certain research projects eagerly "encouraged" by government funding; and then there is the rise of consumerism.

In the midst of this upsurge arising from the genuine good-faith that we have always had to depend on the young of each generation to come up with, films however are found to be lagging behind.

THE FILM STUDENTS & THEIR FILMMAKING

On the whole, Youth Culture remains the "scene" of the film students whose number has been on the increase since the '60's as a result of the interest in films generated by the discovery, on the American screen, of the New Wave from Europe with its enthusiastic affirmation that films can be very wonderful things after all -- and even more wonderful if you are the maker of films. Out of the wish to follow suit by making their own films, however, it is the pursuit of "aesthetics" that has become the reigning preoccupation (raison d'être) of these film students, so much so that content and clarity of exposition in the films would be sacrificed. True there have been the socially relevant themes of some of their documentary and/or narrative efforts. Yet the end-products have only confirmed the low levels of consciousness among these students in the understanding of their subject matter: the existing social realities. For one thing, the narratives are seldom beyond the Hollywoodian fabrications which, ironically, most young people have considered with good reason to be "plastic". (This comes through also in their film-writing efforts.) The documentaries made have been equally naive and superficial in their treatment of subject matter, be it the Cambodian crisis on most campuses so many springs ago, the city, or the ghetto. And yet it is not a matter of lack of experience because of their age. Unlike their own peer groups who have been active in the struggle for change in the social world, the film students have shown a general reluctance to participate to become involved, both on the emotional and the intellectual level, in keeping with their aloofness (which many continue to regard as being simply "Artistic") to social realities and an unwillingness to give up those ill-founded pre-conceptions originating from the vacuum of "ideas" of the contemplative artist alienated from his society, in favor of re-learning from the concrete situations of existing reality. The irrelevancy of their films is a common phenomenon among films produced by the film students.
Now, if films are reflections of the real world, then somewhere something must have gone terribly wrong.

There are those (shall we say, the majority?) who would blame it on the masses, the potential audience for the "consumption" of films, for the seemingly insurmountable difficulties faced by the truly concerned film-makers when it comes to producing the more serious films. Aside from the well-substantiated argument about the difficulty in obtaining financial backing, the popular hypothesis offered in explanation of the present lack of serious social films has been that the general film audience are bluntly rejecting the more serious cinema (witness the fact that most European films of the higher calibre do end up being distributed through the more specialized outlets of art houses and college campuses); that the average audience being of the middle-class "silent majority" simply can't give a damn about social relevancy of such serious cinema, that the masses seek only entertainment, pure and simple.

The validity of this line of argument, I think, is wearing thin; and in face of a rapidly changing world, it actually becomes thinner with each day. While it is true that the film industry's control over the mass consumption of films is still holding up quite well against possible challenges from outside, nevertheless there is increasing evidence that would necessitate a closer scrutiny of this line of defense as adopted by the usual frustrated film-artist or the still hopeful beginners, such as film students themselves.

As I have said, the last 10 years have strongly provided us with proof that people everywhere, and in particular the young people (and the young, dear Mr. "Here-I-am-another-artist-rejected-by-the-unappreciating-mediocre-Public", have been the majority among the paying movie audience everywhere!) are searching for a relevant relationship to the larger world of their community, nation-wide, world-wide. Furthermore, this high level of consciousness on their part has not been just rhetoric, but it is constantly being put into practice: action in the concrete.

Therefore, along with what my own experience has taught me in regards to today's film students and those horde of "creative artists" flooding the continents, my counter-argument is that the facts of daily living have clearly demonstrated the depth of genuine and sophisticated social concern and awareness of the people; in particular, their awareness of the real needs of their society. And if they continue to stay away from the more serious cinema that deals with the modern problems of our human world, it is because these films have not been able to bridge the gap between the intellectually aloof and seldom participating film-makers or script writers of this cinema on the one hand, and the mass of real-life working people on the other hand. It is because the world of these films is too much separated from their audience's immediate realities: the "language" of the films are not their language just as the world of the films' characters is not exactly their world. (Take for example "L Aventura". Is the world of Sando and Claudia that of the general movie-going audience? Or the world of Fellini's "8 1/2" for that matter?) On the other hand, the entertainment films that they seem to prefer by comparison bear closer resemblance to their daily life: at least the situations look familiar, the characters seem to talk...
more like the person in the street, even their personal problems are not the high-brow elitist ones arising from the clique of overly self-conscious intellectuals and "Artists." It seems that much as we find fault with the plastic over-simplified, in fact phony, representation of the world by the commercial film industry and its commercial productions, it is this very industry that has recognized more quickly and evaluated more correctly the collective wishes of the masses. And naturally, being what it is, this industry then proceeds to exploit them.

And so it is not so much that the general film audience is indifferent to a new social cinema that should speak directly to them, but rather the inability thus far of film-makers, by that cinema they wish to create, to meet these real needs of their society which accounts for the continuing success and subsequent influence of the Hollywoodian world of film.

FILM AND POLITICS

In face of all this, what is even more alarming is the indifference of film students to the political function that is by implication interior to the cinema, to every film -- the very object they themselves are in the act of making.

To quote Eisenstein and say: "No film is a political" is one thing to actually seek to understand it is something else.

The relationship of film to politics, the relationship of film to ideology, these have been subjects of much intensive investigation in the past (as in the studies in filmologie). And today as a result of upheavals and the subsequent rise in the political consciousness throughout much of Europe, such investigations and enquiry are once more being taken up, this time in a new direction that reflects our new awareness of the political nature of our social existence. (I refer, for example, to the debates going between such film literature circles as France's Cahiers, Cinéthique, La Nouvelle Critique.)

However, these various attempts at an understanding of the cinema through the dialectical materialist point of view have been practically ignored in this country whose Civil Rights Movement and student protests have spearheaded their parallels in Europe and elsewhere. And there has been little or no effort on the part of the film faculty and film study programs to bring it to the attention of those students engaged in the making of films. Perhaps it is the naive prejudice of those persons as generally constituting the faculty in film and the creative arts. While they never tired of lecturing on the power of films in shaping public opinion or the power of TV commercials (and once in a while even willing to concede to the argument that all films are propaganda), the prevalent attitude remains to be: "We don't want to get involved in politics."

And yet, has not the experience of the last 10 years been sufficient for us to realize that the world we live in is indeed a political world, and that we do live our lives as political beings?
And for those who are engaged in making cinema, or at least working toward that, can there be anything more irresponsible: to not engage themselves in an examination or re-examination of that which is their practice as a part of the social forces of production, to ask to know what exactly is that which they undertake to create -- people who, ignoring even the need for some re-thinking, continue nevertheless to make/produce films? And this is only putting it mildly. For we are social beings in a social world where no one can live isolated from the others or to be free from influence by them, or from influencing them in turn; and film-making is a public art, films do belong in the realm of mass media.

CRITICISM OF THE FILM DEPARTMENTS

At this stage, the brunt of such criticism is directed at the film departments for their failures to provide ground for the development of a new body of young film-makers who would be more ready and able to engage in the making of films in a more realistic and responsible context: as an act that is not just "artistic" in itself but is in fact closely related to the culture, the economy, and the politics of their society, and from there on to re-evaluate their own role, their own work, their own participation in that society.

The film departments are to be criticized, I think, because in the first place they have a choice. They have required us to take courses in film history, in film writing, film production, film theory (the film as an art form rather than as anything else). Supposedly this is so that we would be more equipped to produce good films, to create "Art", or at least to arrive at a better appreciation of films. But could it not also have required an equally-weighted study of the film as mass media, its role in culture and politics, and in the conditioning of people by the political system of their society, the function of film as a "vehicle of ideology"? I think it could. And isn't it at least the responsibility -- if it should not in fact be the purpose -- for those engaged in providing education to require just as proficient an understanding on the part of students of the very subject of their investigation/study? (And in the case of film, an understanding of the very processes of its re-production?) Hasn't the academic world wakened up sufficiently by now, or does it still need another of those belated jolts, to the just discontent of the young at the irrelevancy of the stuffs that schools are made of in relation to daily living?

While it may be true that students are relatively "free" to enroll in courses outside their own departments according to their particular interests, it won't do either for the film departments to point to this "freedom" in order to gloss over their own failures for not being equipped to provide those students wishing to pursue things within their area of study "to the deep", with that opportunity. For as persons whose primary pre-occupation is with film, we know very well that a thorough study of film can be carried to its fullest only within the film departments whose purpose for existence is precisely film. For one thing, the other departments, while offering courses perhaps relating the interests of these departments to the film medium, even with the best of intentions, will not be able to give enough emphasis to any intensive investigation by way of research since there is not the concentrated practice involving the film medium itself.
by the people, in particular the faculties, that make up those departments. Therefore, as persons who "handle" film, who do share a common "language" whether as students or teachers or simply film-makers, we are indeed in a better position to undertake the thorough re-examination of our chosen practice.

So I think the ultimate question to be posed at this point is: will it be the coming to terms with existing social realities or will it be a continued evasion on the part of those in charge of film study programs, to take on the responsible role of actively reaching out to meet up with the real world that everyone lives in?

CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

In conclusion then, I would like to propose that film study in the '70s be directed toward a re-constitution of the entire program in the film departments. That film study programs broaden their scope considerably to no longer limiting themselves to the artistic aspects of film, but to devote themselves equally--because of the actual greater needs--to the study of the psychology of film (as conscious or unconscious communication, the conditioning of mass behavior and thought patterns), the study of the relationship of film to politics (the interior workings of film, the films and their times, the use of films), and an open and thorough examination of the views on art and literature by the different political systems of the different societies within our epoch, and hence the role of the film-maker in society.

I make this proposal not only because I think a need for it exists and has to be met, but also because I feel it is not an impossible task to be undertaken, even if for practical purposes confined within the academic departments of film in the immediate future--but only temporarily. For beyond our practice of film-making is the greater responsibility for us, as people who "handle" films, to educate the public about the medium and its workings (in a way not unlike the goals of consumerism, though we must certainly go further than mere listing of ingredients when it comes to mass media). For if we should agree to a need for the de-construction of the cinema, in one way or another, whether in its form or its content or the workings of its various elements, we will need ultimately to rely on the masses to participate consciously in such efforts in order to carry it through. For it is by mass action that fundamental changes in any society are finally affected.
THE IMAGE OF WOMEN IN THE CINEMA

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(Edited text of presentation and discussion transcriptions)

Siah-Hwa Beh: It will be interesting to see how this presentation creates an effect. My presentation will be rather indiscreet. What I will do is make a few statements and everyone should feel free to interrupt for questions as I talk. The topic is "The Image of Women in the Cinema".

The cinema is a powerful and active agent of the male-dominated, capitalist, socialist, and communist societies, utilized to continue the repression and suppression of women by reinforcing female stereotypes and by preventing the woman's self-determination in the cinema by a series of political, psychological, economic, and social measures.

The stereotype roles played by women are many: child-woman, as in Lolita and Baby Doll; self-sacrificing, ambitious, aggressive and unscrupulous mothers, as in Stella Dallas, Hard, Fast, and Beautiful, and Little Foxes; good-hearted whores, as in Camille, The Last Run, Mae West films, and Nana (this last category also includes groupies, as in Mille's Trip to the Moon, Easy Rider, Big Faust and Little Halsey, Two-Lane Blacktop). There's a category of bad-hearted whores or cynical vamps in Theda Bara films like Tarnished Angels and Gun Crazy. You have the universally evil woman in Gilda and Lady from Shanghai. (In Gilda it's vary strange because in the film you keep hearing that the woman is dangerous and evil yet all through the film you don't know what she has done to be bad except look seductive and beautiful. I guess that's Rita Hayworth.) You have the 'good wife' in Cukor's Woman, the frigid career woman in Cukor's Wife and Woman of Distinction, the 'girl Friday's', as in Hawks' Girl Friday. And you have the liberated women in Adam's Rib, Baby Maker and Love Story, etc., etc., etc.

We could go on and on citing one-dimensional caricatures.

The proof or evidence of these stereotypes can be witnessed in plots, mise-en-scene, and in methods of film technique such as lighting, framing, lens-use, editing, and sound. After listening to Metz last night, I really hope that semiotists could demonstrate semiotically the abuse in the use of the image of women in cinema.

Let us consider the plot. The story usually has a male protagonist and the women are always in the periphery, no matter how much the story should not belong to the male protagonist. For example, The Last Picture Show is the story of a male protagonist who is incredibly insipid, inactive, and passive. Another such example is Slaughterhouse Five. Even in those cases where the male is passive and the female character is interesting and active, the male is still the protagonist.

The plots of Hollywood films in the forties had women as central figures, but they usually existed as powerful forces of evil, destined to die, to be won over, or to be controlled by men, even in such 'women's lib' films as Adam's Rib.

Concerning the mise-en-scene, woman usually occupy the background and other negative spaces. But most often, they are not even on screen because it's not their story that is being filmed. For example, in The Sorrow and the Pity, a 4 1/2 hour film dealing with the Nazi occupation of France, an occupation involving millions of woman as well as men, the whole film interview's only man. It is not
until the very end that a few minutes are spent with a woman. There is a big scene in the film where a woman was trying to talk—trying to say something very important—but she’s far in the background with men in front. The camera is reluctant to move an inch to let her talk; the camera movements are very patronizing, as if to say ‘Oh, for God’s sake, shut up so I can move back to the men.’ The woman was just screaming in the background all the time. Yet this is supposed to be a very good documentary.

But if the women should occupy the central space, it is usually a frontal shot, showing her as foreboding, cold, unscrupulous, impersonal, or about to be killed (as in Psycho). In Little Foxes, Hard, Fast and Beautiful, and the like, you see the woman as occupying central space, but only as an impersonal object. In Clockwork Orange, when the woman is to be raped, she does get central space; the close-ups are reserved for the woman’s sexual parts, but never the male’s genitals.

Turning to more specifically technical questions, we find the same thing in lighting. There are attempts to glorify the beauty of women, not for the sake of the women but for the greater art of individual, egocentric male directors in competition with each other. For example, Von Sternberg with Marlene Dietrich and Lubitsch with Greta Garbo. The beauty, or ‘look’ of a woman, is imposed by a male view of beauty, manipulated solely for his male aesthetic satisfaction.

We can consider types of lens usage. Diffusion, star filters, etc. are used as a trick to emphasize feminine softness and delicacy. The awkwardness is obvious when the camera cuts back and forth between the fuzzy, beautiful woman, and the well-defined man.

Editing seems to follow only one principle: Appeal to the male reaction. It is as if film is too expensive to be wasted on women’s reactions unless they somehow reaffirm the man ‘in some way. For example, in Love Story Ali McGraw humbly asks the husband to let her take a job just long enough to support him through school. His reaction is a sneering, ‘HO, HO, HO!’, but we do not cut back to see Ali’s response to that. The man seems to be given the ‘last say’ in every frame or in every sequence.

Then we come to sound, specifically the exploitation of women’s screams of horror, or the sounds of women’s pleasure, in sex. Never would we hear the sounds made by men in bed. (Laughter) This is a repressive fantasy. To digress for a moment, it seems to me that the way a woman is ‘laid’ in film seems to make it impossible for her to have any pleasure. Sometimes the man doesn’t unzip his fly before he jumps into bed. Such situations are also repressive to the man because he cannot express pleasure; this seems a small price to pay, however, for power and control.

It all adds up to the oppression and suppression of women as a lower caste. The movies become a dangerous vehicle of false values and sentiments when people begin to live by movie standards, cite movie characters as exemplary figures, and adhere to movie values for definitions of such notions as good, bad, love, hate, beauty, ugliness, marriage, patriotism, etc.

Women who aspired to look like Jean Harlow or Marilyn Monroe, to have 40 inch busts, though manufacturers are too practical to make 40 inch bras. Yet this is only a small detail out of numerous daily situations that lead many women to be labelled schizophrenic. The screen, supported by magazines, set up ideals impossible to imitate, while objective living calls for a more practical approach to life. When system-movie-image and system-movie-values are substitutes for real values, then schizophrenia, superficiality, perverted egocentricity, violence, and other neuroses become rampant.
The plot always preserves male integrity and sells women out, no matter how much of a 'liberated' look the film may have. For example, Adam's Rib is a very successful film until the end, when Spencer Tracy asks Katherine Hepburn, 'Can't you even admit that there is some difference between a man and a woman?' And Hepburn says, 'But of course,' And he says, 'Like the French say, Viva la différence!' And he pushes her into bed and closes the canopy. And that's the end of the scene. Another example is Forty Guns, where Barbara Stanwick was the strong character all along; yet, in the last shot, you have her running after the man on foot, dressed in a long skirt, while he is riding out of town. Or take Love Story. How liberal and hip Ali looks, but when she dies, we're not even concerned about her death, but about the reaction and tragedy of the man. And finally, The Baby Maker, which seems to argue that it is liberal to sleep around and have other people's babies. Such stereotyping does not allow a three-dimensional rendering of the character on the part of the actor.

Jean Renoir thinks that the one-dimensionality of the American film lies with the American preoccupation with technique, sacrificing the characters. I maintain that it is the mental attitudes toward stereotypes that cause a superficiality in the treatment of film character.

Film also manipulates women to be against themselves, to have internecine rivalries, just like colonizers do in their colonies. A lot of women directors in Hollywood make films agreeing with man's image of what women should be. They do not make films radically different from the men.

Cinema is a very sexist industry, almost completely closed to women. It is very hard for women to get jobs, even in the fields of editing and script-writing. If they are allowed into the industry, the only jobs they get are typing and other work. The studios are controlled by men. In Hollywood, the top echelon was Zukor, Fox, Mayer, Laemmle, Goldwyn, the Warner brothers, and Loew, all without exception petit bourgeois European immigrants, who created big monopolies and incredible wealth as business tyrants and con artists with artistic pretentions. They survived the cut-throat industrial wars and established destructively competitive patents in the film industry. These movie barons guaranteed an oppressive ideology, perpetuating false sentiments and values and reinforcing stereotypes. The top male stars, directors, and other male lackeys had it good as long as they conformed to 'system cinema'; so did a small handful of women.

Censorship boards are another method of oppressing women. While Hollywood ran rampant, the guardians of public morality and decency, in the form of censorship boards, set up extensive codes against obscene behavior, that is, behavior which could incite to crime or appeal to prurient interest or that might jeopardize the safety of the government. In Memphis there were codes against using any songs by Lena Horne, because there are plenty of good white singers. The film Curly was banned because it showed black children visiting a white school: "The South does not permit Negroes in white schools nor recognize social equality between races, even in children." While censorship boards everywhere were diligently maintaining public morality, decency, and system safety, they never even bothered about the derogatory stereotyped image of women. They never once agitated against the perniciousness of false values perpetuation of false sentiments, or misleading, superficial interpretations of Freudian psychology turned out by the dozen by hacks and directors.

Of course, the film institutes are also controlled by men, as are theatre chains, organized film festivals, and academy awards. Predominantly male film critics have promoted oppressive theories, while 'leftist' film magazines seem only to have concern for minority male groups in the Third World.
A lot of film history is incredibly incomplete because it does not cover women directors and women involved in the industry. For example, in Andrew Sarris', American Cinema, a 365 page book, he has only one page that is given over to women. And this is what he says: "Ida Lupino (1918- )" and then he lists the films. Underneath he writes, 'Ida Lupino's directed films express much of the feeling if little of the skill which she has projected so admirably as an actress. She is given three lines for having directed ten films. Bear in mind that this is a book grounded in 'auteur' theory and that Sarris talks about some male directors who have directed only one insignificant film. Sarris goes on to say:

But while we are on the subject: Lillian Gish, that actress of actresses, once directed a film (Remodeling Her Husband--1921), and declared afterward that directing was no job for a lady. Simon de Beauvoir would undoubtedly argue the contrary, but relatively few women have put the matter to the test. Dorothy Arzner, Jacqueline Audrey, Mrs. Sidney Drew, Lillian Ducey, Julia Crawford Ivers, Frances Marion, Vera McCord, Frances Nordstrom, Mrs. Wallace Reid, Lois Weber, and Margery Wilson come to mind as little more than a ladies' auxiliary. (The unwary historian might also include such certified males as Manta Bell and Marion Gering). A special footnote must be devoted to the widow of Alexander Dovjenko, particularly for such séance productions as Poem from the Sea and Years of Fire. A longer and considerably more controversial footnote would be devoted to Leni Riefenstahl, more for the relative objectivity of her Olympiad than for the blatant contrivance of Triumph of the Will. The jury is still out on Vera Chytilova, Shirley Clark, Juleen Compton, Joan Littlewood, Nadine Trintignant, Agnes Varda, and N" Zetterling.

What is to prevent Andrew Sarris from talking about them? Why should the jury be out?

Bazin states that the neo-realist films are good because they expose the good spiritual qualities of human beings. But at the same time what he actually posits is not a universal world view but a male world view. De Sica, in The Bicycle Thief, in the way he frames and the way he shoots, concentrates upon the man. Yet, if he is interested in the struggle of poor people, he would have showed the wife of the man who can't get a job.

And I think the most dangerous critic and theorist of all is Yves de Lauzot, since his entire theory of 'engaged cinema' rests upon a moral-ethic-philosophy favoring men. To quote de Lauzot: "Thus, if there is not American cinema of value, it is due not only to the lack of talented filmmakers, but primarily to the lack of filmmakers who are men.... Despite self claims, there is today in the U.S.A. literally not a single critic capable of positing values as a man."

Jim Linton: Hold it. 'Man' is 'mankind'.

Beh: I would like to take 'man' as 'mankind', but to be consistent with what he says, 'man' means 'man'.

Linton: Can you give us the context from which you take that statement? Could you expand the context so that we can see how the passage relates to a larger whole?
Beh: Let me read another quotation first. "A woman's liberation based on the first response begins where the popular writers on Women's Liberation leave off. It moves beyond the question of the liberation of women to the question of freedom for all. And as it transcends these media starlets—among others, Kate Millet, Betty Friedan, Shulamith Firestone, Germaine Greer, and, predictably, and appositely enough, Norman Mailer—it reveals that from the start, variously, and vigorously, they have been attacking a faux problème, a non-existent problem. For the lack of a political consciousness due to a moral void, to judge from their work, has blinded them to the ultimate courses of women's plights.

The end result of de Laurot's article is to say that women should not really be so self-indulgent as to think about Women's Liberation, but should think about other broader issues like the war in Viet Nam and the Third World and the oppression of minority groups. He seems willing to sell out half of the human population by being a dedicated revolutionary for a percentage of males of this world.

Linton: I don't think that the particular essay that you're quoting was included with our packets of materials.

Christian Koch: It was, unfortunately, inadvertently omitted, but one of Mr. de Laurot's women assistants is xeroxing the section right now. (Laughter)

Julie Lesage: I think, Mr. Koch, you defined the problem!

Linton: The point I would like to make is that it seems to me that the first letter that de Laurot prints in that article [reference is for series of articles by de Laurot appearing in the magazine Cineaste] was sent in by a woman who became disenchanted with Women's Liberation. Now it seems to me that you could take a couple of approaches to that latter. Either she has false consciousness or else she really has hit upon a lot of accurate points. It would seem that the Women's Liberation movement is also open to criticism.

John Llewelyn: There's a line here I'd like to read from one of Mr. de Laurot's articles: "There is, still even among revolutionaries, the paradox of a woman to become fully human, freely transcendent. To avoid being treated with either contempt or condescension, she has to become like a man."

Beh: One should think of women as the first caste ever to be colonized, before the colonialism of other countries and minority groups, even before black colonialism. And naturally there are many stages in such colonization, as Franz Fanon talks about in the Wretched of the Earth. During these stages, there is much false consciousness and the colonizer sets the oppressed against each other in order to keep them oppressed.

I would not be surprised if de Laurot, with his consciousness, did not publish these letters in their original form, but embellished them and turned them into script form. It's very pernicious.

Linton: The first letter, if I remember correctly, was published and not expanded.

Bill Nichols: Both letters have a style that is very similar to his own. (Laughter)

Linton: I'm not supporting him. He can support himself later on. What I'm saying is that Women's Liberation is a moral pronouncement and as such it is not above examination.
Lesage: That's the problem with de Laurot. He's speaking from a moral pronouncement, but maybe women are speaking from oppression. There's a difference.

John Tokar: You attributed the statement that for Fanon the woman was the first colonized group, but I think the first person who made that point was Engels in *The Family, Private Property, and the State*. He talks about women as the first exploited classes. I think that de Laurot's intention is to posit the responsibility for oppression in what he considers its actual circumstances and not to say that it is men, or man generically per se who is the oppressor, but the situation in which he is found.

Linton: In the letter de Laurot quoted, a woman explains why she left the movement. She claimed to have seen various sisters within the movement exhibiting jealousies against other sisters. There were personal problems there. Another idea she raised was her disagreement with the basic anti-man position as not being for the liberation of mankind but for the castration of the male.

Beh: The thing that I'd like to suggest is that it is part of the male defense mechanism to see the position of being anti-man as being castrating. They do not choose to see it as a political stand wherein you identify your enemy. The whole system may be corrupt, but there was a man behind the whole system. It was not created by women. Men, of course, suffer from their stereotypes, but it is not a great price to pay to suffer a stereotype that maintains your dominant and powerful position.

Tokar: You could take your position to its logical conclusion and dismiss all of Marx's analyses on the basis that he was a man.

Beh: There are many good things that can be taken from Marxism. I would simply say that Marxism is not prior--I think feminism has to come before Marxism.

Tokar: I think he said that himself.

Beh: And to keep both from being corrupt, anarchism should be the third to follow.

Richard Chalfen: I would say you're talking about socialization, really. You seem to be saying that children grow up and see the position of women on the screen and then grow up knowing how to live and behave. It seems to be a cause-effect relationship that you posit. I'd like to know how you substantiate that. I mean, an annual problem is the relation of television violence to real violence. Millions of dollars are going into the studies being done on the effect of violence on children. And I think we're coming to some agreement that there is no agreement: there is no direct proof one way or the other. And yet you've made the statement that there's something going on, in terms of cause and effect, relevant to the content of films.

Beh: I'm not saying that the cinema is the only thing that causes the shallow sentiments which lead to a very perverted life. But we are talking about the cinema as being an active agent whereby it reflects reality and then becomes reality itself and finally keeps it going. Cinema is not a passive thing hanging on to reality but is enmeshed with it in a complicated process.

Chalfen: If your comment about 40 inch bras had really been the case, the industry would have caught up with those people and would have started manufacturing 40 inch bras. That didn't happen.
Malcolm Gordon: Proving a cause-effect relationship between film and our society isn't really the question. It's really that our society affects film. It's a reinforcement. That's why the thing on cause and effect is sticky. I really agree with everything you have said Sieh-Nwa, but saying cause and effect is troublesome. I think if you would talk in terms of reinforcement you would be better off. The problem with trying to see if television violence causes real violence is that it is the other way around. It reflects what we want to see in our society.

Beh: It is a very curious fact that in numerous movies you have the movies themselves being conscious of their effect on people. For example, in Stella Dallas, Barbara Stanwick and her boy friend go to see a movie in which there is a final romantic kiss. And as she comes out of the theater she says: "How I wish I could be refined like those movie people.

Timothy Lyon: Going along with what Malcolm was just saying, you've implied, if not directly stated, that stereotypes exist a priori to the cinema or we wouldn't have them in the cinema, that the tradition of nineteenth century romantic kitsch is very much what the cinema grew up on, that the stereotypes had to exist or else cinema wouldn't have used them. Now if you take the view that stereotype in the cinema is actually social stereotype carried on one step further, and reinforced, then if you take your scene from Stella Dallas, the cinema is not really affecting society at that level, but merely visualizing something that occurs outside of the cinema. Hair styles outside of the cinema are not effectually connected to hair styles in the cinema.

Beh: It is not so much the hair styles themselves, but all the values that go into hair styles.

Lilton: You are working with both a reinforcing and reflecting agent when you discuss cinema. Cinema tends to limit the options that women see themselves as having.

Beh: The cinema does not give alternate life styles, or even suggest them.

Llewelyn: It doesn't give alternate life styles for anybody.

Participant: That is how it keeps politics at the status quo.

Doris Yue: I think it is ridiculous to go on and on about cause and effect because it becomes the chicken and egg debate. I think that Beh has presented the corrected viewpoint because she is emphasizing the responsibility that film must bear for the way it conditions women. Certainly there has been a historical development of sexism, but it is false to say that since cinema only began in the 20th century it is, therefore, not an agent of oppression.

We cannot deny that the mass media is so strong the world over that the cinema actually perpetuates oppression of women and reinforces the oppression and even creates the oppression. It has a heavy role and more powerful than ever role of creating and perpetuating this society.

Most of the people who work in writing films are men. The industry is owned by men and the directors are men. What kind of women have they come up with? Even the more sophisticated or intellectual portrayals of women in new films, such as the New Wave films, still defame the woman's image. The system
is encouraging women to be that way. How can we deny that the cinema is very, very guilt for those things. Somebody was saying that you can’t say men are the oppressors of women. Let’s make an analogy to the woman’s situation in this country, that of the situation of while versus black. Are you going to tell me that the cinema, as it has existed, must not bear a very heavy responsibility for perpetuating and encouraging racism?

Linton: I would like to know if you have some films to talk about that you feel do portray a cogent, realistic picture of women. I’m thinking particularly of Kate Millet’s *Three Lives*, a film by, if I may use the term, one of the mothers of feminism in America. I believe that the review that I read was written by a woman, and in it, she came down very hard on the images that were portrayed. Is purely the result of false consciousness?

Beh: Women can make very bad women’s films. I think a good film is the *Women’s Film*, made by Newsreel of San Francisco. But not only women make good women’s films. I find that Godard made very good films; in fact, I think that his bourgeois film period is much more political than his political period. Films like *Vivre sa vie* and *Contempt* are fantastic studies in the sexist problem.

In talking about Women’s Liberation, we are talking about the oppression of 51% of the human race. The women’s movements cuts across class lines, cuts across color lines, and national lines.

Llewelyn: In Sweden, one of the questions that has come up is a reorientation of the Women’s Liberation problem. And the way they label it is the 'sex role debate'. The liberation of women, it seems to me, is not just freeing women. The point is that we’re human beings that have to interact and it’s a question of how men treat women. How do men as human beings interact with other men? And it seems to me that the image of man as a human, rather than this sex identification, is very important.

In Sweden, they have a concept of the *hammåmen*, which is like a housewife, except it is a houseman. He stays home and takes care of the children while the wife goes out and makes a living. She has her career if she wants. They teach men to knit and to cook and the rest, in school now. And they are trying to make it a realistic part of the education. It may very well be that concrete alternative life styles should be proposed. If you are going to start talking about liberating women, it seems to me that you have to make a symmetrical relationship where men are concerned.

Beh: It is taken for granted in the women’s movement that feminism is a liberation of all these roles, all these myths, fantasies, etc. Of course, we have to identify as feminists because that’s where the oppression is the strongest at this point in history. And we cannot talk about ‘human beings’, in general because that again would be losing our position.

Tokar: To take that to its logical conclusion, you would make a distinction between North Vietnamese men and North Vietnamese women?

Beh: Oh, yes. For example, after the Algerian war, the Algerian women were sold out, although during the war they had been used in drastic ways. The same is true in Cuba.

Tokar: Do you feel they are being used in China, also?
Beh: I don't trust the Chinese position. They might be using women because they need them economically, as happened in North Korea. Americans killed such a large number of North Korean men that they needed women and children to help build up the society.

At the same time, you see that the only person in power right now in China is Chung Ching, Mao's wife. In a Chinese type of family system, the man usually trusts the wife more than he would a male opponent because she is his wife and he is on top of her, and he controls her.

Tokar: I think that's a curious analysis, and I would like to hear how you would respond to The Red Detachment of Women. How would you talk about the role of women in that situation, in that historical context?

Beh: The Red Detachment of Women is a very good film because, first of all, the technique and performance is superb.

Tokar: That's what Gene Kelley said as he was narrating the program on NBC.

Beh: They have made ballet, which had been dead a long time, a vital force, changing radically a lot of movements. For example, the toe shoe was invented in the courts of Louis XIV and given over to women, imposed upon women, to show the daintiness of women. But in the Chinese Ballet, it is used as a force of strength. Unlike most ballet, where the woman is dependent upon the man for the pirouettes, for the grande jetee, the leaps, the women do all the acrobatics alone and unsupported. And where women in traditional ballet have round arms to show a soft line, here the women have very strong hands, and a clenched fist. In the costume, instead of those tutti-fruitti type of outfits, they wear the Chinese dress of pants and military uniform.

Tokar: I generally agree with your analysis, but I think it's inconsistent with other things you have previously said about the role of women.

Linton: Maybe one of the problems is that we are set up in an adversary confrontation.

Tokar: How do you avoid that?

Linton: Her position, at least implicitly, is that man has no role to play in women's activism.

Tokar: That's what I can't understand. Apart from having a sex change operation, which I don't intend to do, I can't transcend biology. I can't understand the difference between the oppression of a North Vietnamese male and a North Vietnamese female who are equally being oppressed by United States bombers. How can you make an arbitrary decision like that?

Marshall Bionsky: There is a North Vietnamese saying that ten women are not worth one testicle. I don't know if it's in vogue... (Laughter)

Sollace Mitchell: I think we ought to pull this away from the politics of the Vietnam war back to the film context. No doubt film is a product of the society that created it, and, equally as doubtless, it defines both male and female roles. What I think is important is that if you have these sort of films that are perpetuating myths, then it's important that we expose them for what
they are and change the type of films that people are seeing today. I was wondering if you, Sieh-Hwa, had any specific goals for cinema. And what effect might it have if we dictate to the producers of cinema, "You've got to stop doing this. You've got to do that." What effect would that have on the artistic process that is involved in film?

Beh: Then women recognize their collective situation, they should organize into groups of Women for Equality in Media and Films. They should organize to picket, to sue, to make known their demands. The struggle begins on all fronts and we depend upon work in a women's political caucus which will have to topple the superstructure upon which oppression is based. Only when this political revolution occurs can cultural revolution take its place. I'm not against men, and I do not believe that no hope lies in their actions. In fact, I'm very surprised that men, who seem to know the woman's position, do not at once start organizing men's liberation groups. The reason that I'm not talking much about men is that I don't completely trust that they will carry out their part. Women are the only ones who can trust themselves.

There are two groups of human races living on this earth. Female culture has many things to identify it as a separate culture from male culture. When a woman talks to another woman there is a certain understanding. For example, a woman talking to another woman will admit to a lot of intimacies that a man talking to another man will not discuss because his ego is at stake. Women are more open in that way.

Yue: This session shouldn't be just a session where we talk about Women's Liberation. We're supposed to relate it to film. Thus, I would like to comment about what Beh said a bit earlier. She claimed that Godard has made good women's films. I disagree with that. Let's consider both One Plus One or Wind from the East. In these films he uses women in a very repressive way. If you look at One Plus One, Godard makes women into objects. Never do women have consciousness of their own.

Beh: I would like to divide Godard's work into what he calls his 'bourgeois' and 'political' periods. See you at Mao is the best of all his political films. In it a woman's crotch is shown for ten minutes. You are forced to see this thing which you have made into a sexual object. Now you are faced with the crotch you have always wanted to see. And the accompanying commentary is very good.

Wanda Bershen: I would just like to say that if we are going to talk about the image of women in film, one has to start by understanding the system of relations that exist in the world between women and men. Essentially, one of the great pitfalls of the Women's Liberation movement is that it ends up sounding like the same male, authoritarian competitive nonsense that we've had for the last two thousand years in Western culture. It would be a great mistake if women became equal to men in those respects. Simply isolating examples of exploitation of women by film is of little value. It is more important to understand the relations that cause the exploitation.
Charles Harpole: May I ask if it is possible to avoid exploitation and manipulation by one class or the other? In other words, if women were liberated right now, wouldn't it be the likely case that women would then become the exploiters? I'm wondering if it's possible to make a balance.

Beth: The first step of the liberation is to want to take revenge. But, I hope by the time we are liberated, we will have gone through a process that says we don't want revenge for its own sake, but that we want to live. In the fifty years that we have on this earth, I would like just to live well, and to be free.
THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS FILM: FROM THE DIGITAL TO THE ANALOG

Sollace Mitchell
Brown University

(Edited text from presentation and discussion transcriptions)

Sollace Mitchell: I’m going to discuss synaesthetic cinema. I’m not certain how many people are familiar with the term. There are, of course, different categories of synaesthetic cinema. I will begin on a theoretical plane, trying to define what is meant by the term 'synaesthetic cinema.' Then we can view Jordan Belson’s film Allures, which appears to be a computer film but is not. If time permits after the showing, I can concentrate specifically on cybernetic cinema and computer films, perhaps proposing a few specific questions.

Synaesthetic cinema is one aspect of the serious new direction film has taken in attempting to escape from the confines of traditional cinema and the entertainment/audience-gratification syndrome. Gene Youngblood terms these attempts 'expanded cinema' in a book of the same name, and he shows how the new films are endeavoring to liberate films from traditional modes of expression. Synaesthetic cinema is the product of filmmakers trying to expand their audiences' consciousness through a synthesis of harmonic opposites, synthesis through the artistic achievement of both experience and non-experience. The film stimuli include cybernetic cinema, computer films, and video experiments, such as those of Stan Vanderbeek. They try to reinterpret experience in novel ways and bring us the never before experienced—the non-experienced. They try to pull the audience away from viewing things in the social context of their existence, try to make one forget or transcend one’s prejudices. This involves not only the oceanic consciousness of individuals in society but a cosmological consciousness. In other words, when one speaks of synaesthetic cinema, one is speaking of the space age, expanding cinema out into the cosmos and expanding the viewer’s consciousness in the same direction. Youngblood speaks of it as the expansion of human consciousness through the freedom created by technology, enabling the viewer to experience art as a total life-experience—a rise to cosmic consciousness. The purpose of this cinema is not to have the viewer sit in a darkened room and have the film act and react upon him. It wants to pull the viewer into the experience of the cinema, make him synthesize and make decisions about the film. The film experience, ideally, becomes a dialectic between the film and the viewer.

At the beginning of the conference, some people were questioning whether this New American Cinema—including films like Cut—has any kind of value. Is it a dialectic between the art product and the viewer, or is it, as someone put it quite aptly, only masturbatory? Do these films only have value for the filmmakers themselves? Asking these questions, of course, necessitates a prior question: What are our criteria for evaluating these films?

Perhaps one reason that many people do not like these new films is because they are disoriented by the breakdown of narrative codes, or the transformation of those codes into new ones. Perhaps the 'de-illusioning' of narrative cinema—attempted by both Cut and Bleu Shut—destroy what we currently understand...
as the film experience. Perhaps these transformations, or deformings, draw
the viewer into a new contextual ground.

(Showing of Jordan Belson’s film Allures)

**Mitchell:** The object of synaesthetic cinema is to pull the viewer out of the
lethargy created by traditional films. It wants to destroy the vicariousness
of the film experience by pulling the viewer into the film. It wishes to ex-
and his consciousness out into the cosmos. With that in mind, the question
I would like to focus on is this: Forgetting normal ‘good-bad’ evaluations,
can we say that Allures succeeded in achieving the professed goal of synaes-
thetic cinema?

**Marshall Blonsky:** I believe that what I do when I watch that film is probably
the wrong thing. That is, if twenty years from now the only films that people
will see will be films like this, I am sure they would find my response horribly
primitive and crude. What I did when I watched the film was simply to describe
for myself the transformations that were taking place, and, by the way, taking
considerable pleasure in the rest spaces, hoping that following these black
spaces would come what you call ‘associative imagery.’

But of course I didn’t ‘get it,’ and I didn’t think I’d ‘get it.’ The
kind of thing that I was doing was describing in words the transformations in
the represented circle. When the process was completed, I had the sense of a
totalization. That’s the only code word I could use to understand the process.
A smaller unit aspiring to largeness had achieved its end. The more vivid
yellow had become exactly equal to the paler green. In that sense it had
totalized the prior text.

**Jeff Bacal:** I would say I felt 99% pure retinal pleasure. There were absolutely
no mental operations going on in my head whatsoever. In other words, there was
no new type of thought consciousness or thinking. It was not a logical thing;
it was purely an interesting retinal effect which was very much restricted to
the screen. I think there is an alternate way of responding to that film which
the conditions here minimize. The concern of the film was not only to be the
occasion for a retinal, visual trip but to somehow instigate a new dimension of
mental operation in the viewer.

**Ian Mills:** There is a potential for enlarging the individual consciousness
even though it hasn’t got a social, political purpose. Our appreciation of
beauty can be enhanced by watching this film: that automatically enlarges our
consciousness. When we come back to our own world, it helps us view it in a
better way.

**U. Claire Kolbenschlag:** The extent to which our own conditioning prepares us for
this film obviously has something to do with our reaction. For me, believe it
or not, it was primarily an auditory experience, largely because of an associa-
tion I had with a student a couple of years ago who did this very thing. I’m
not so sure what technique was involved here, but sounds were transferred into
colors and into images. I was extremely involved in the auditory part of
this. The retinal experience was fused with that.
John Llewelyn: I would like to say something that relates to that. I have had some contact with people through discussions about visual phenomena, talking about concepts of virtual space, line generated spaces, etc. One of the things that interested my mind was a play between what is the shape and the motion that is being formed, and another more crass consideration: How do they do it? Part of the interest is the abstract form itself, but another part of the interest is the very mechanical formative considerations.

Participant: I enjoyed it very much but my reaction was incredibly passive. Supposedly this film was supposed to produce some sort of active response on the part of the viewer. On that grounds I would call it a failure.

Mitchell: I think it is necessary for everybody here to realize that synaesthetic cinema is not totally comprised of films like this. Some of you may be familiar with Stan Brakhage's work, or Will Hindle's or those films which combine non-associative with associative imagery.

This film was shown at my university a while ago and the people mostly said, "Wow!" But they also echoed the sentiments of Youngblood about the film. He wonders, when watching Belson films, whether he was in the cosmos watching stars explode, or whether he was among atomic particles. To an extent, such films do seem to draw certain viewers into levels of the abstract. It seems quite comparable to Kandinsky's non-objective art.

The big advantage of synaesthetic cinema so often cited by its proponents is that it escapes the atrophying entertainment of commercial films. It doesn't gratify, it opens up awareness. That, of course, is open to discussion.

I see a threatening danger as films come to be packaged and sold for home viewing and people begin to look forward to movie/tv cartridges. When viewed on the televisions of the future, these films could very possibly be treated as records or television shows are now treated. They're certainly beautiful and they're intricate. The moving images are easily reviewable comparison to plot films. How many times can you see Doctor Zhivago? As with Muzac, Belson's Allures may become a favorite movies for two reasons. First, like the music, it gives us pleasure. We have a pleasant LSD trip or whatever and we look forward to enjoying the same thing again if we like it. The homeviewer's favorite film will be turned on the television because pleasure-seeking people want to be entertained. Viewers will begin to seek the expected gratification of beautiful movies just as they seek the expected gratification of Archie Bunker's put-down jokes. Instead of jerking audiences from the lethargy produced by pure entertainment, synaesthetic cinema may lull them back to sleep.

Stephen Duplantier: You said that synaesthetic cinema draws people to abstractions, but I think that's precisely wrong. It draws them to concertations although they are very feathery and light. It's important that we see 'movies of the universe.' It's something I'd like to see. This may be the closest thing we have to it.

Malcolm Gordon: It would seem to me that the films might tie in with social reality, breaking down ways of thinking and viewing and might lead us to
anarchy or revolution. That's one way we could go. Or we could go to fantasy and solipsism. Let me take a very strong position on this: I think this is going to lead to fantasy and solipsism. I think this is going to be 'Movie,' becoming solipsistic and leading to fantasy.

Wanda Bershen: One of the things to say about this film is that Belson is very involved in yoga. This film—and there are three or four others—are for his portraits of the stages of consciousness which he feels he is going through. In other words, he is involved in a spiritual quest which he takes very seriously. I think that explains a bit about the kind of astral stories, sky imagery, and centralized images. This is a yogic technique for going into one's center.

Mitchell: I've read statements about Belson's interest in yoga, and I think it's admirable. I think that raises another important question: Will this cinema have value only for the person that makes them as an externalization of what he feels within himself? If so, I think Belson succeeds in realizing this end. I think he thinks he succeeds, too. But would that be good for anybody else?

Bershen: You've quoted Youngblood, but he is extremely imprecise in his terms if he says that this film is intended to expand consciousness. I think one has to define what kind of consciousness you are talking about, what kind of expansion you're talking about. Otherwise you will have no criteria by which to judge it. One could say about New American Cinema that it attempts to put you in touch with your feelings so you can virtually feel them.

Ruth Perlmutter: I would like to ask Mr. Metz if this film doesn't answer in some way the semiotician's dream for the purely specific cinematic code.

Christian Metz: Not at all. For a semiotician it's easier to analyze this type of film because you have less things to analyze. This kind of activity does not correspond by any means to the ideal of the semiotician. Why should it?

Bacal: I think there's very little to analyze in this film at a semiotic level of trying to 'place' a sequence of images in terms of their relationship to an ongoing narrative (which by definition is sequential). That is why semiotics, at least in its present stage of development, cannot begin to tackle a film such as this. There are no syntagmatic categories in terms of ongoing sequential logic.

Bershen: But there are codes represented in this film. Mr. Metz, are these codes capable of being dealt with by semiotics?

Metz: But of course, it would be possible to deal with these codes. You can analyze very closely the different constraints shaping the occurrences of this shadow on that form, this light on that shape, etc.

Llewelyn: But is that semiotic analysis?

Metz: Of course, why not?
Llewelyn: In other words, it sounds as if semiotic analyses can be applied as well to certain types of painting.

Netz: Yes, of course. It's already been done. Yesterday I spoke about narrative films. It was my example. It does not mean that the semiotologist has only to deal with narrative codes. He has only to deal with codes, and, in this case, with no narrative codes. In this case, the codes concern visual forms and co-occurrences of visual forms with auditory sounds.

Perlmutter: Since we do analogize and since this is the way that we interpret our world, aren't we doing what Balazs claims? Even if there is no sequence don't we juxtapose and fuse or 'make-up' one? Don't we discover a sequence?

Netz: It depends on what you call a sequence. I think that in such a film as Allures, there are sequences, but not narrative sequences. 'Sequence' is not the same as 'narrative sequence.' And sequence is not only a film notion; there are sequences as well in spoken language and in painting and in all sorts of texts.

Blonsky: Professor Netz, if one were to do a semiotic analysis of the film we just saw, I wonder if you could suggest the way one might begin this work. How might one begin to isolate the codes of this film?

Netz: The same way as for all kinds of films. You see the film frame by frame, very slowly, thousands of times, and you list all the elements—and so you come up with paradigms. I mean 'blue versus red,' for example. And then you list the syntagms, the elements which succeed each other. And so you can achieve a table which recapitulates all the logic of all co-occurrences of elements within this film. You have then the textual system of this film.

Blonsky: But without doing that, if one really jumps in at a given point as I did, he is guilty of 'mapping' the language of another discipline onto this film. That's very easy to do; it's very easy to find totalisation in this film. It's very easy to import any language—other than the semiotician's language—and oppress, so to speak, the film with it. I think if one didn't do the kind of thing that you're talking about, and did what I did instead, he would be importing the language of structuralism (in the word 'totalization').

Baca: In the semiotic of a narrative film, one can do a structural analysis of the film, then relate the various types of structural analyses one has made of the film by using a sequential logic psychology, and then go on to relate that structural analysis to psychology. With a film like this, we can do a sequential analysis. But at our present level of psychological understanding, I don't think there's much room for employing a psychology of non-sequential formations.
BEYOND NOSTALGIA: HOW CAN A RE-MEMBERING OF THE PAST CONTRIBUTE TO PROJECTING THE FUTURE?

The Teaching of Film History as Contexts of Change

Brian Henderson
University of California, Santa Cruz

(Edited text from presentation and discussion transcriptions)

Brian Henderson: The specific question I want to talk about is that of the relationship between the radical film and film history and the relationship between the study, advocacy, and making of radical films and the study of film history. I see here a genuine contradiction in that most radical films understand themselves as negating film history, or at least the history of the bourgeois film. Thus, Godard, in many of his late films, refers to the 'imperialist' John Ford; in his content and form he is very much concerned with negating the bourgeois film. I want to explore various aspects of this contradiction, particularly with regard to the film critic or historian who aligns himself with the radical film and its purposes. I will be exploring this contradiction without hoping to overcome it or to resolve it.

But first, I think it's necessary to deal with some more general problems, those having to do with the value of film study and filmmaking generally, and of the possible and actual relationships between filmmaking and film study and social situations and actions. I think this is particularly necessary because some of these questions were raised late yesterday (correctly so) and put in substantial doubt.

I think it's also necessary to indicate what I mean by the radical film, which I take to be primarily a political question calling for a political answer, with formal questions subsidiary to the political answer. Thus, it's necessary to speak very generally of politics itself in order to make clear certain fundamental premises necessary for the study of the subject.

The world at present, and for the entire horizon of our lives, is characterized by the struggle between the bourgeois and ruling classes and the working classes of the industrial nations, as well as the classes of the Third World. It's hardly necessary to prove this condition exists. It's the horizon of our lives; we're surrounded by it. One would have to be more Cartesian than Descartes to really want to put the existence of this condition in doubt. The fact that this condition is the horizon of our lives, conditioning everything we do, means that we already stand in some relationship to it. The question we have to ask at every point is whether we will continue the current relationship or substitute some other relationship for it. That also involves a project of becoming aware of what our position is in regard to that conflict.

The political situation may be viewed historically or structurally: historically, as the result of material development and the development of classes and class struggle over many centuries; structurally, as a system for the reproduction of ideology—a system for the reproduction of its own social
power and for the reproduction of ideology which supports that power, or both. We have to want to take into account both historical and structural factors in accounting for the system, even though it may be that theoretical integration of these two approaches hasn't been achieved yet. Of course this contradiction of opposition is highly complex, taking many forms without ceasing to be fundamental or knowable. It's for this reason that Sartre says that Marxism is the 'indepossible' philosophy of our time. 'Indepossible' meaning that it cannot be overcome, superceded, or proven wrong by a subsequent philosophy because it is the philosophy which reflects, expresses, and embodies the fundamental historical conflict of the present. Until that conflict is resolved not only can there not be another philosophy or philosophical position, but it's impossible to predict what a subsequent philosophical position will be until that historical situation is resolved.

The question of film study and filmmaking locates itself within this context. All films and all writings take a stand in relationship to this political opposition. I take it as clear that film and other images reproduce the system and its ideology and the their function in doing so is a highly important one. I also am assuming that the radical film attempts to break this reproduction, that these films are consciously set against such reproduction, and that to some degree, at least they can break or refract the reproduction of ideology and make the viewer aware of the process of film and image structures as the reproduction of ideology.

The problem is highly complex. For one thing, there are no films that have yet been achieved that can completely break this system of reproduction. Perhaps it's impossible to do so; at least we don't know yet how far films can go in breaking it. Thus, it seems that radical films are of necessity constantly reinventing themselves and constantly examining themselves and their struggle to make themselves genuinely radical. The general point here is that films may be divided according to political questions, not primarily according to formal questions.

I would hold out for the political differentiation of films into those which identify themselves and commit themselves to the Third World and working class, and those which don't. Then, in each case, the formal question would also have to be raised. There are sort of maximums and minimums that establish themselves. The ideal would seem to be a radical film committed to the Third World and to the working classes which attempts consciously to break the code of bourgeois films and thereby to break the reproduction of ideology, or refract it in some way. Yet there is an upper limit on how far films can go in that direction as long as the social structure is not changed. On the other hand, in the bourgeois cinema, any bourgeois filmmaker who is an artist must refract or alter that reproduction of ideology in some way that reflects his own project of transcending himself as a man or a woman. Therefore, if there's no refraction whatever of the prevailing ideology, then it would be hard to imagine such a work being genuinely a work of art.

What I'm trying to do is make some connections between politics and the study of film, and, in so doing, to indicate why I think film study is valuable and important. I am also suggesting that making films and writing about films are acts of engagement whether these acts are understood as that or not.
What I primarily want to talk about, however, is a substantially narrower problem within the foregoing considerations. I want to explore some of the relationships between historical film study and the radical film. My basic position is that history is the axis which unites the history of film and its study and radical film and its study, that the project of making history (which is what is involved in making radical films or in writing about radical films) involves, necessarily, the study of history and understanding of history, and consequently, that the study of film history necessarily involves (1) the project of relating to the present and (2) taking a stand in the present. These two stances are dialectically necessary to each other. If you start with one and do an adequate job, you will end up at the other pole.

In general, the problem would be one of the union of subjective and objective factors and also the union of theory and practice, which is the problem that each of us must face in our own practice as film writers and as actors in history. The difficulties that people can get into—either historians of film who disengage from the present or radical filmmakers who attempt to disengage from history—is that in some way they are splitting subject and object. They are trying to keep these two apart or they are failing to unify the two in their own practice, in the specific sense that film history is the objective realm and filmmaking or film writing/critique of film is the subjective realm in which the subject pits himself against the objective realm. What this comes down to is that the film historian must confront present-day filmmaking and present-day political struggles and that the radical filmmaker must confront film history. This central thesis is really very simple.

First of all, the cultivation of historical study and historical skills may potentially weaken or distract one from the capacity to act or relate to the present, but this is not necessarily so. It seems that the historian who wants to seal off an area of film study and remain within that area—sort of erecting a barrier between his period and the present—is trying to make history into an object. He’s trying to analyze this object, this body of film, which he dissects from a detached position in such a way that he need not reveal his own clique position, his own activity. His own practice must not enter into that relationship. In making film into an object, he also makes himself an object. He denies his own subjectivity as an actor in history. He denies his own historicity, the fact that he is in history and is a maker of history himself. It seems to me that film history is the history of our own Becoming. Film history is not a remote, alien, objective body of work that has nothing to do with us. It has to do with our own practice as viewers of films, as critics, and as filmmakers because it’s the history of our own Becoming, of our own consciousness and awareness of film. Therefore, it cannot be treated as merely an object of study or analysis. The moment of analysis must be followed by a moment of synthesis in which the act of taking apart and studying films must be followed by a synthetic moment which re-places the parts of the film, integrates films with each other, and carries an historical dialectic forward into the present. Thus, the study of film history is not a retreat into the past, it’s a march forward into the present. If you study film history, you enter a dialectic which will carry you forward into your own practice as filmmaker or film critic and into your own relationship to present-day films. What that means is that a film historian, too, must take a stand in regard to radical films and he must also, of course, bring this perspective to bear on his own history, on his own work, on the study of the history of film.
From another point of view, the radical filmmaker cannot abrogate the history of film or the history of social and political institutions merely by the power of manifestoes. Many radical filmmakers, especially in America, speak as though their critique of film history were thereby an abolition of film history, or as though by critiquing it, they could free themselves from film history, or just cut it off and let it fall away. I think that is not possible. By doing that, the radical filmmaker and radical critic merely imprisons himself and actually cuts himself off from his own historicity, his own capacity to make history and to understand his practice as critic or filmmaker. If we don't face the history of our own becoming, the history of film will haunt our practice as filmmakers and as critics. Structures and modes of understanding film, of which we are not aware, will be repeated and will escape consciousness and criticism unless that history is studied and brought to consciousness. Just as an historian's engagement of studying history leads him to take a stand in history, the radical filmmaker--by his action in the present--is led to study film history in order to understand that action. In other words, he begins in the present but finds he must work backwards into film history in order to understand his own formation and practice. The two cannot be kept apart.

Now, I've been speaking as though there were a simple cut-off point between the bourgeois film and radical film. But things are not that simple; in fact, there are multiple histories, simultaneous histories, all involved in the entire enterprise whereby radical films coexist in time with the continuing history of bourgeois films. You could say that each individual filmmaker has a history of his own which overlaps with the object of history itself. For instance, any new Fellini film takes its place in Fellini's own history. In order to understand it, you have to go back to his early films from the early 1950's and to his roots in the neo-realist movement. Thus, Satyricon or The Clowns, or any of his other late films, have to be related to Fellini's own history and the history of the movement out of which he arises. But these films also occur in communal history. For instance, those two films were made during the Vietnam War, a war which Fellini has not acknowledged in any of his films. If we presume that film history is worth studying, then Fellini's films would have to be approached from a double perspective: as an act within his own history and as an act within a larger contextual history. In the case of the bourgeois film, like Fellini's, I would think one would want to ask, since Fellini is a human being somehow involved in the history of his times, if it is plausible to think that his development as a filmmaker doesn't reflect some reaction to the events of his time—for instance, his retreat into history with Satyricon. Perhaps this retreat shows an inability, or lack of desire, to relate to the current historical situation—the war, for example.

It seems to me also that there is perhaps a paradoxical position in which the radical film—and the radical critique of film history—make the discovery of film history possible in a different way. Thus, the radical film's attempts to break down the history of bourgeois narrative film make that history stand out more sharply. In other words, the classical bourgeois narrative film presents itself as universal cinema, whereas the challenge of the radical film makes it appear not as universal cinema but as a very particular cinematic existence—a product of a particular time and space. This allows us to gain an historical perspective.
Another paradox is that his challenge to the classic bourgeois narrative film has occurred before we have really understood and properly valued the body of work of bourgeois cinema itself. Let's consider the example of John Ford. Godard critiques Ford as being an imperialist. He is clearly right. It would be hard to argue that Ford isn't an imperialist or that he doesn't celebrate colonial values in most of his major works. It is also true, in my judgment, that Ford is one of the greatest film artists in the history of cinema. What this means is that the ideological critique of Ford has come before Ford's art itself has been fully studied and established in any fullness. And it seems to me that until Ford is studied completely, the radical critique of Ford is itself inadequate, and possibly even superficial. Both procedures must occur simultaneously. Ford must be acknowledged and critiqued as an imperialist artist, but we must consider that he made major films over four decades and was always a popular director, his films seen by millions of people. We should study Ford's art as a filmmaker and his importance as an artist in great detail, while at the same time giving a radical critique of Ford's art in its position in American society. The two of them must be integrated. Ford's style, his editing, his framing, his music, his scripts must be correlated with his imperial and patriotic themes, with his vision of America, etc. I think it's one proof of Ford's integrity as an artist that this correlation can be made in quite close detail. In other words, Ford is important as a film artist because he worked his vision of humanity and American through the details of the shooting, or conversely, that he arrived at his ideological vision of America through his filmmaking so that a correlation can be made.

Timothy Lyons: I find very disturbing the idea that any film historian has, or even can, disengage himself from the present. I think that is impossible. To condemn some historians for doing so strikes me as setting up a straw man. This 'barrierization' that Brian is talking about—and trying to condemn—to my knowledge has never occurred. Talking about film history in terms of objects seems to be very narrow. As I understand film history we are talking about both events and objects.

I must also challenge the notion that film history is not "a retreat into the past but a march forward." I think film history is definitely a retreat into the past, but in the present state of mind, since that is the only way the film historian is equipped to proceed. So there has to be, also, a march forward. The way I understand film history is that what is being done is a taking a look at levels of events over time and trying to elucidate the levels of causation underneath each event. I find that in this critique, which is justifiably narrow in terms of radical filmmaking, a very narrow amount of causation is being considered. So my very general comment would be that while this approach obviously can work, I believe that the study of film history can be much more than that, and that to narrow it down so greatly doesn't quite seem to take the whole field into consideration.

Participant: You say that you have to understand film history to know what codes to break away from. I would like to say that the study of film history can also tell us some of the methods of saying what you have to say in a film. You can analyze films of the past to understand more clearly what is involved in getting a message across.
Yue: Brian, what is it you mean by 'radical film'?

Henderson: It is a film that understands and presents itself as committed to, in some way, the struggle of the Third World and the industrial working classes against the prevailing system.

Yue: Within the context of this country?

Henderson: In other countries too I would say.

Yue: What exactly do you mean by bourgeois class, and what do you mean by 'the other side'? How does this relate to Marx's analysis of bourgeois versus proletariat?

Henderson: This is a difficult question. One place to begin is with history and to trace the development of the proletariat class and its opposition to the bourgeoisie. But I recognize that in industrialized countries, especially, the class lines become more difficult to determine and Marx's original categories may have to be modified to some degree. Thus, a more structural analysis might come from that which sees society as the reproduction of its own power and of itself, partly through ideology.

Yue: Those terms aren't difficult if your basis is Marxism, even in this country. I think the dividing line is quite clear. Let's just for one moment rest on the way you divide classes—bourgeois and, then, on the other side, the working class.

There are a lot of petit bourgeois and bourgeois artists who also would say that they have made a self declaration of commitment; yet they are still bourgeois. For example, you have the people who made Z, or Investigation of a Citizen Above Suspicion.

Henderson: I would just say that my division would help the critic orient himself in making his critique. The kind of critique he would make of Ingmar Bergman might omit the political question while a critique of Z would not.

I have no doubt that there are many films that present themselves as radical films which are far more dangerous, or even supportive of the prevailing ideology, than a really critical bourgeois film. I'm not making a value judgment; I'm just saying we can divide criticism into different kinds of approaches.

Jim Linton: It seems to me that there are two dimensions to what Brian has presented, and he has presented them implicitly. There are certain films that deal with politics and certain films that don't deal with politics—'politics' being defined quite restrictively as that which is concerned with the Third World and class-struggles. On the other hand, there is the form of films. There are either traditional films or innovative films. It seems these two dimensions give four categories which I've labelled (1) propagandistic—
politically oriented but traditional in form, (2) bourgeois--non-political but with traditional form, (3) artistic--non-political but innovative, and (4) radical or revolutionary--political and innovative.

M. Claire Kolbenschlag: Brian, when you say the film is committed to the Third World, I think there is another distinction which needs to be made, the distinction between the filmmaker and the audience. Are there really any films that are made for the Third World audience, or are they made for a certain literate, affluent, bourgeois audience?

Henderson: It is hard for me to conceive of a Western film that would be designed for a Third World audience that would not be self-involving.

John Tokar: I think that the point should be made that no art can ever be free of propaganda. One of the best examples of this is the American film since it possesses a most subtle and convincing ideology. It's been practicing and refining issues of bourgeois ideology ever since film began.

Kolbenschlag: My question is: How could a filmmaker actually be committed to the Third World and really make films? Wouldn't he be doing something else?

Tokar: He can only be a committed Third World filmmaker if he is a member of the Third World. Filmmaking, in Latin America, for example, is a matter of life and death, not an abstract and bourgeois activity of contemplation. You risk your life when you see these films.

Kolbenschlag: It's a kind of guerilla activity in art, then.

Julia Lesage: To respond to your question, Claire, I think we are all aware that our system of media distribution in the United States makes it highly unlikely that we will have either a radical broadcasting or filmmaking structure. But Brecht spoke to that point, saying that the artist cannot give up, he cannot say, "Well, all those forms of distribution are controlled by a tightly-knit industry so I'm going to be an artist outside of this corrupt form." He said, "If you are an artist outside those corrupt forms, then you are saying that although you are denied the means of communication, you accept this repression." I think this is true of the Third World struggles. It's not an easy battle, but it must be fought.

Tokar: It is hard to accept Brian's distinction between bourgeois and Third World ideology. Even in Latin America, the revolutionary filmmakers are from the upper classes. Historically, revolutionaries have always been so.

The whole notion of revolution is like instant coffee. It's currently very popular because it can be readily changed into something you can drink right away. It has become a co-opted concept, a fashion. It can be used for ends other than the purposes of revolution or the raising of consciousness. Historically, this idea of 'instant revolution' is prevalent in the writing of so-called radicals. The New Left is permeated with it, it's the ideological base of most of their theory, and this is why they are impotent.
Linton: They lack a sense of history.

Tokar: History shows you it's a false concept. This is why you can go to a Catholic Church in China today, or why you can see a non-objective painting in Cuba today. Eisenstein dealt with this problem in his own work, realizing that he was a bourgeois artist; yet he wanted to be an authentic spokesman for what was going on in his own country. He wanted to be a part of that, an authentic part. He had to be tremendously self-conscious of the bourgeois ideology that he possessed, brought along from before the revolution. He referred to it as 'bourgeois residue.' The cultural revolution in China was an attempt to deal with this very problem, to take care of, to deal with, a rise of a new 'revolutionary bureaucracy.'

Bill Nichols: If you read Irwin Silver in the Guardian—the film critic and cultural commentator—you get the impression that Hollywood is a monolith and that all Hollywood films are bourgeois, reflecting such an ideology. What the auteurist critics did was to find that Hollywood was not a monolith, but that one could find in it personalities. What Marxists might be able to do is find that Hollywood is not a monolith by finding the great range of ideologies present, some of which are more radical than others.

It is also important to raise the question of the relation between the superstructure and the economic base. It is easy to recognize but difficult to confront. We must be concerned with the mediations between the superstructure and the base. We then must consider the categories that Marcuse talks about, where co-optation can take place. What can the person studying film history say about mediations, and which ones are the most relevant? Can we simply say there are four types of art? Or are there extremely fuzzy boundaries that exist between radical and traditional form and radical and traditional content?

In talking about the artist, can we talk about—and situate a film within—the context of his films? To what extent do we also have to talk about Fellini as an individual, much as Sartre talks about Flaubert as an individual with an individual history relating to his art? If we take an auteur approach, how do we locate, or mediate between, the personality of the artist and his general history? On the other side, how is the personality as an individual mediated by the personality as revealed in his films?

Lesage: I think one of the possibilities in considering personal history is to concede as obvious that there are different personalities which affect a work, but that there are also certain choices open to a personality in a given period. Somebody who was a filmmaker in the forties had certain kinds of work available, ways he had to express himself. We could talk about those conditions which make auteur analysis almost the only way of finding something. And this is what the French have done. They have said, "Look, there are all these films made by the Hollywood system. Underneath the Hollywood system we can find auteurs." In addition to talking about the auteurs, we must also consider the context in which they operate.
Yue: Brian said that each individual filmmaker has a history of his own and also that he considered Fellini a bourgeois filmmaker. I was wondering on what basis this classification was made. I think Fellini's movement of his work through dream and fantasy, as in 8 1/2, with a complete lack of social engagement, indicates that Brian is right. Fellini seems totally concerned with problems of the self. He has retreated into myth and archetypes, not defining his characters in terms of social relationship but only in terms of personal fantasies.

Henderson: Maybe we could look at those four categories in Jim's distinction as what Sartre calls regatory ideas. What he means by that is that you cannot even approach a problem until you have certain regatory ideas, certain categories that get you into the problem. Once you enter the problem, you alter or discard your original categories. Maybe a classification like Jim's could be an initial or preliminary classification, as could calling Fellini a bourgeois filmmaker.

Linton: I think that one can see that Fellini was a bourgeois filmmaker at one time, based on the films he has made.

Henderson: But his whole history indicates some kind of social engagement, with a withdrawal from it. An essential question might be, "Why did Fellini involve himself at one time and not at another?" Or, "What was the nature of his involvement in social problems when he was involved?"

Wenda Bershen: It seems to me that part of the problem is that your definition of 'political' is entirely too narrow. Doris is right in suggesting that you are dividing film according to a purely content basis. Those films which use overt political content are not common. Your own distinction would have to deny, for instance, that the entire body of commercial television has no political importance.

Henderson: I agree with what you say entirely. Films locate themselves within political struggle, but I didn't mean to say that they aren't political.

Bershen: What John said is very true. Not only is all art propaganda, but it is also political. And even if it has no overt political content it may or may not be innovative, but any innovation is political.

Henderson: That's why I began by saying that all actions locate themselves within history, either consciously or unconsciously.

Bershen: But then to say that Fellini is bourgeois is almost meaningless. I question your saying that he retreats into history. I think his way of dealing with history is his way of dealing with social problems as he understands them.

Henderson: But then again, that is the sort of judgment we could only make after we had made a careful argument on the basis of the films of Fellini.
Christian Metz's work makes a distinction concerning films of the classical period, 1932 to 1955, particularly in the American cinema. These films present a discourse which does not understand itself as discourse. They do not call attention to themselves; they are not 'meta-films.' Maybe in regard to the political question you could regard films that are overtly political, or that overtly align themselves with the working class--and/or the Third World--as politically self-conscious in a way that most films are not. And, therefore, it might still be a useful distinction to draw in orienting criticism towards those two types of film. I'm certainly not saying that films that present themselves as political, or even aligned with political causes of the Third World, are therefore ideologically correct. I admit that the most effective bourgeois ideology might be films of that sort. But I'm saying that a different critical process is involved when you have to ferret out an implicit ideology in something that presents itself as not being ideological.

Yue: I think you are hoping, Brian, that a semiotic methodology would allow a person to talk about this period of American films that Metz deals with. You think one could talk about the tremendous impact of the ideological message that was going on in those films and the resulting consequences. What I'm saying is that Metz's methodology will not allow you to do this. He can say that he takes all this into consideration, but I don't think he is really interested in dealing with practical questions.

Henderson: Godard is bourgeois. He comes from bourgeois origins. I think he has attempted to analyze his own history to some degree. This is not to be accepted as necessarily correct, but he is a bourgeois who made what we call 'bourgeois films' for a decade and since then has sought to transcend his position, his own origin, by aligning himself with the working classes and the Third World. He is trying to do that explicitly in his films; he is struggling to transcend himself.

Tokar: It obviously shows up in all of his work. It's right there. You can see the man as a bourgeois artist trying to be revolutionary. It's an inherent contradiction that we all experience.

Henderson: I would say there is a horizon, sort of an unlimited or indefinite horizon toward which he is striving, through self-criticism and political engagement, and, above all, by not remaining an individual director. I think his attempts to form some kind of revolutionary filmmaking would be one crucial phase in his attempt to transcend himself.

Maybe you could say that the most a bourgeois artist such as Godard could do would be to destroy bourgeois art, destroy his own art. Perhaps that is the ultimate horizon of what he could do; therefore, his films are primarily referential things that set themselves against bourgeois art. Perhaps beyond that negation there is nothing he could do. I think that would be a significant act in itself, attempting the negation of a negation.

Linton: I think the topic we are discussing here is the relevance of film history to our own activities.
Yue: I asked Brian those questions because I wanted to see what he meant when he said 'history of a filmmaker'. Both Brian and Timothy have said that the study of film history is a 'step forward.' What is meant by that phrase? For whom is this a step forward? In which direction? Toward the revolution or toward the other way?

Henderson: Trying to locate ourselves as individuals in our own work, trying to locate our work within a political context, are both enhanced by the study of film history. Our individual practice as filmmakers, critics, and historians requires that we understand this so that we might clarify our own practice. To understand that our filmmaking or criticism is an act of engagement—whether understood that way or not, at the present—the one necessary way to clarify our practices is to become aware of the history of film, both in theory and practice. It would be an exaggeration to say that film history does not exist, but it exists in such a rudimentary, inadequate form that it is almost non-existent. Almost everything remains to be done. Who is going to write film history? Some of us most likely.

Timothy pointed to what he considers a limitation in what I said, that I was stressing the individual filmmaker rather than conditions or production or the history of cinematic technology. I was considering cinema as an art. The history of film is the history of an art; its subject is what is good or best in filmmaking. In any case, there are also other kinds of histories of film, utilizing different points of view, such as a social viewpoint. The ultimate history would be some type of totalizing history which would make use of all the different historical, sociological, and psychological studies of cinema.

Nichols: I want to go back briefly to the idea of mediations to suggest that one particular notion might clarify our discussion. The question of 'for whom' is, as a matter of principle, an extremely important question. When we talk about the Hollywood film, we talk about bourgeois versus proletariat. We also have to take into account the petit bourgeois and perhaps distinguish that from the bourgeois. Traditionally, the petit bourgeois has been a vacillatory class, and I think if you look at Hollywood cinema and talk about the individual artist within that context, and when you start to identify petit bourgeois elements, you also begin to recognize that many of them are what we take as manifestations of the radical or revolutionary element. If you take a film like Aldrich's Attack, there's a very deep subversive undercurrent of disaffection with authority and with people in authority. What you're really seeing is a petit bourgeois point of view in which something is mediating between the bourgeoisie, or the superstructure, and the base. The way in which it mediates is imperfect. It doesn't perfectly reflect the bourgeois viewpoint nor the proletarian one. The degree to which such a film will be revolutionary is very highly a function of time, place, and use—the way in which that particular film is used, who sees it, why they see it, when they see it, how they see it. The role of context cannot be escaped in our study of film history.
Lyons: Brian's statement was that film history is a step forward and I think the metaphor was well chosen considering his whole talk. My point is, the idea of talking about a film, especially an early Fellini film, as bourgeois seems more revealing of Brian than of Fellini. This is also true of Truffaut's study of Hitchcock, which is more a history of Truffaut than Hitchcock. The imposition of the historian on the events is the revelation of the historian's consciousness and not of a consciousness of the past, which we can't know. Since Brian and I could both take Samuel Fuller and use him in whatever way we wish and still be doing valid history, whatever I do is going to be valid because I'm doing it. And the same thing with what Brian does. There's something underlying all of these comments about locating bourgeois films in the past that bothers me. I think they're only bourgeois in the present since that is our only perspective. For me, the 'move forward' is an adding to the present by using the past.

Henderson: But that seems to emphasize the subject too much. When we study history, we interrelate subject and object. What comes about is a mixture of the two.

Lyons: I'm not convinced of the objectivity that you are balancing with subjectivity. Certainly there are historical facts, but the minute we use them their factual level is decreased tremendously. They no longer exist as facts.

Henderson: You could also say that we don't understand history if history is made an object over and against us. We understand it by our connection with it. That is what unites history to us and us to history—the fact that we are part of history and we recognize ourselves in it. History holds the process of our own becoming within it.