Authority relationships in American classrooms are mirror images of authority relationships in the larger society. These patterns originally developed out of the Western liberal tradition, where parental authority and authority of counsel (or wisdom) evolved into authority by force and bureaucracy. In either case the result was politically and socially repressive for the classroom and society at large. From the colonial period to the middle of the 19th century, conceptions of authority found their basis in ideas from the Enlightenment liberal tradition of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Proponents of these ideas translated into supporters of either elitist or democratic-elitist positions. In the elitist position, often supported by Federalists, there was no reference to education of the masses. Although the democratic-elitists, made up of both Federalists and Republicans, supported universal male education, they believed in the ascendancy of a natural aristocracy and rule by force if reason failed. The result was a nonegalitarian educational system that supported the status quo and failed to develop the creative individuality of the student. (DE)
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A major premise in the contemporary debate over education in the United States is that certain kinds of classroom experiences tend to mold a certain kind of citizen; other classroom experiences produce another kind of citizen. What kind of citizen? One who is compliant, unquestioning, obedient to authority? Or, one who thinks for oneself, is intellectually creative and independent?

The consensus appears to be that most schools in the United States produce the first type of citizen, most of the time. Most critics of our schools wish our educational institutions would provide environments where development of the latter kind of citizen is possible.

My own values propel me toward the latter preference. I would like to live in a society that exhibits more concern for the quality of life than the quantity of death; I would prefer that the potential for truly human relationships be maximized; I would like for our educational institutions to be places that encourage human development along these lines. I am not an anarchist; there is a necessity for legitimate authority and for government. But obedience to authority should grow out of a recognition that the authority is exercised justly, not only in the interest of individuals, but in the interest of the whole community. The danger is that too manycitizens, as Stanley Milgram has demonstrated in Obedience to Authority, are quite prepared to unquestioningly obey the instructions of any authority they recognize as legitimate.

Concern about the relationship between education and the state is not confined to the contemporary era. Such interest goes back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom wrote that "the citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of their state."

"Suiting"—or conforming to—one's state (or as we would say today, one's political system) is a theme that echoes and re-echoes throughout the history of educational and political thought.

In the United States, Horace Mann's argument in support of a public school system in Massachusetts was that in a republic "where the people are the acknowledged sources of power, the duty of changing laws and rulers by an appeal to the ballot, and not by rebellion, should be taught to all the children until they are fully understood." In our own time, V.O. Key has observed that "all national education systems indoctrinate the coming generation with the basic
outlooks and values of the political order."³

How does this indoctrination take place? A number of political socialization studies in recent years have attempted to answer this question. These studies have examined curriculum, attitudes and perceptions of government and leaders by age group, peer groups, and socio-economic differences. What they have not examined is an aspect of socialization that is crucial to the stability of any political system: the inculcation of the prevailing authority patterns of the polity.

Behavior within the parameters of legitimate authority is a fundamental expectation of every political system; hence, where and how citizens learn to accept the authority patterns they encounter is of great interest. Indoctrination of the coming generation, of necessity, includes learning to accept established authority. It is here argued that the schools are the primary agents of this indoctrination.

Authority relationships in the classroom have important consequences for sociopolitical relationships in the world outside that room. The reverse also obtains. The nature of the authority structure encompassing teacher and student effectively (whether intentional or not) prepares the latter for the kind of authority structure he or she will find in other settings. This is so because what happens in the classroom is by design reinforcing and by sociological necessity reflective of what happens in the society at large.⁴ It is reinforcing because schools, as Aristotle, Key, Mann et al, have pointed out, are always instruments of social policy, and are the primary institutions through which society develops new citizens to its liking. And classrooms are reflective because schools, more perhaps than any other of our social institutions are swamped by the cultural milieu.⁵

The thesis of this essay is that the authority relationships in American classrooms, being mirror images of authority relationships in the larger society, have one of two dominant qualities: either they are authoritarian or bureaucratic in character. In either case, they are, both politically and socially, repressive.

If we are to understand how authority patterns in the United States are both reflected and reinforced in American classrooms, we had better begin with an exploration of authority in the liberal tradition. In the pages that follow we will examine the American political culture and its ideological roots, in order to demonstrate that certain kinds of authority have been dominant at different times in our history.

First, categories of various possible attitudes of authority developed out of the Western tradition of political philosophy will be examined. These categories include parental authority, the authority of counsel (or wisdom), and command (or force).

The argument is directed to the conclusion that the conceptions of authority, taken from the American political and cultural environment and permeating American classrooms, are exercised in patterns taken from Thomas Hobbes and the Liberal, Protestant-bourgeois ethos. In order to trace Protestant-bourgeois ideas in the American setting, particular attention is given to colonial and early republican educational thought.
These patterns of authority were modified in significant ways with the industrial revolution in the last half of the nineteenth century. However, the extent to which the prevailing liberal ideology and its concurrent attitudes toward authority adapted itself to industrialization in the 1850–1900 period bureaucratization is beyond the scope of this paper. The focus herein, beyond the import of liberal theory, is with the early American political and educational tradition.
Concern with the problem of authority has been second only to preoccupation with the exercise of power in the minds of political philosophers through the course of history. Thinkers from Plato (who, singularly, may have been more concerned with authority than with power) to John Rawls have explored various forms of authority, upholding some and damning, explicitly or implicitly, others.

It is possible to distinguish four patterns of authority in the liberal tradition. These patterns include: parental authority, the authority of counsel (or wisdom), of command (or force), and bureaucratic authority.

In the American political tradition, all four kinds of authority have been, and continue to be present. It is argued, however, that the authority of command, and bureaucratic authority have successively dominated American political culture with the change beginning during the latter part of the nineteenth century. As this change occurred, the authority of counsel, or wisdom, which had always lost out to the authority of command, slid even further back in the scheme of things as bureaucratic authority arose and ultimately became dominant.

Parental authority, always important in any culture because it is the first form of authority the new generation encounters has, in itself, changed over time. As the traditional role of father as breadwinner and unquestioned patriarch has changed, so have the grounds on which his authority was based. While parental authority is not central to the concerns of this essay, it is important because the family became the primary agent of socialization in liberal society. As such, parental authority not only reinforces, but reflects political authority patterns in some important ways. I shall return to this point in my discussion of Locke.

The authority patterns that emerged in the formative years of the American Republic, while they may have assumed unique characteristics in a singular political setting, nonetheless may be traced back to earlier writings in western political philosophy.

It is important to note, however, that while the classics of the ancient world are everywhere in the literature of the Revolution...they are everywhere illustrative, not determinative, of thought. They contributed a vivid vocabulary but not the logic or grammar of thought, a universally respected personification but not the source of political and social beliefs. They heightened the colonists' sensitivity to ideas and attitudes otherwise derived.

More directly influential in shaping the thought of the Revolutionary generation were the ideas and attitudes associated with the writings of Enlightenment rationalism—writings that expressed not simply the rationalism of liberal reform but that of enlightened conservatism as well. The writings that had the most profound influence were those of Thomas Hobbes.
and John Locke. It is here argued that the political thought of Hobbes, by way of Locke, dominated American political thought and, by extension, the authority patterns that were developing in the young American polity in the eighteenth century.9

The influence of Hobbes was not acknowledged in eighteenth century America. Indeed, perhaps one of the more fascinating aspects of that period's writings is the universal condemnation of Hobbes, whom the pre-revolutionary polemicists linked with Robert Filmer, that defender of monarchical absolutism against whom John Locke railed in his First Treatise,10 and whom Rousseau disposed of in less than four pages.11

If Hobbes was so thoroughly dismissed, how is it possible to argue that the Hobbesian conceptions of authority had such a marked influence on the colonial authors? The answer to this question lies in recent scholarship which establishes rather conclusively that Thomas Hobbes is the philosophic progenitor of the liberal tradition12 and, as such, the original source of American constitutionalism.13

To the extent that philosophers have discussed the exercise of authority, it has been an exploration of the ideal exercise of authority—and what ought to be done if the ideal does not succeed in maintaining order. For Hobbes and for Locke, the alternative, however distasteful to the thinker, is force or repression.

Thomas Hobbes's political thought is constructed around the premise that human nature is malleable. It is not pre-determined. People do have passions that, in the absence of restraints, may bring them into conflict with each other. But people are capable of learning to control their passions. The purpose of civil society is not simply to provide the means by which passions are controlled (that is, through force), but more importantly to provide the means by which people may learn to control their own passions—through education.14 People can be trained, educated, and disciplined into good citizens. Hobbes does argue that in a populous state there will be a small minority who will not obey the law unless there is fear of reprisal.15 Because of these incorrigibles it is necessary that the state maintain a monopoly of coercive power. But what about those citizens who are "the most honest and fairest conditioned"? How did they get that way? Hobbes's answer is: education.

"Many things are required to the conservation of inward peace,"16 that is, the order and stability of the polity. Hobbes first suggests that arms, monies, and garrisons are among the necessities. But, he continues, there are some things that dispose the minds of people to sedition, and other things that motivate and quicken their actions once they are so disposed. Among the "things" that may lead people to engage in seditious activity the first is "certain perverse doctrines." And the means of overcoming this problem or of avoiding it altogether is through the inculcation of the appropriate doctrines:

It is...the duty of those who have the chief authority, to root those (perverse doctrines) out of the minds of men, not by commanding, but by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but against the errors themselves.17
Who bears the responsibility for insuring that the "right doctrines" are taught? The sovereign. It is his responsibility to see that "the true elements of civil doctrine (are) written," to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; ...and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published." It is against the duty of the sovereign "to let the people be ignorant, or mis-informed of the grounds, and reasons of...his (the sovereign's) essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him...."

It is vital that "the grounds of these rights" be "diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or terror or legal punishment." Once again Hobbes suggests that people are malleable; "the common people's minds," he says, "are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be imprinted in them."

He concludes from this that it is not difficult to instruct "the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty" as long as the power of the sovereign is intact; consequently, "it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion."

Where ought this instruction to take place? Hobbes provides two answers. First, it seems that there ought to be a general kind of political education that is on-going. The people should not take time from their ordinary labor for such sessions; however, it is appropriate that "some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together and... hear those their duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them laws."

But, obviously, the people who are appointed to carry out this indoctrination must first be educated themselves. Which brings us to Hobbes's second answer. Hobbes had criticized teachers in the public schools for implanting "perverse doctrines" in the minds of their pupils. He then suggests that the appropriate setting for the introduction of "sound doctrine" is in the academies or universities. "There the true and truely demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine are to be laid."

What then is the nature of the political education that Hobbes advocates? It is rigid, narrow, and repressive. Only those doctrines selected by the sovereign are to be taught; those doctrines are such that there is no room for questioning them; alternative doctrines are not tolerated or permitted a hearing.

So: it is clear from this discussion that the Hobbesian political system is one in which repression is the norm. This repression comes from two directions. Hobbes has designed a master plan for control of the population through an educational process. But, failing that subtle form of coercion, another much more direct form of repression exists: the raw, naked force of the sovereign. In the Leviathan the authority of the sovereign will be manifest in one of these two ways. Ideally, the exercise of authority will be subtle. But if the process of political socialization does not produce the appropriate results, or if there are people who are never socialized, then the exercise...
of authority will be direct and brutal.

It was suggested earlier that the influence of Thomas Hobbes comes to the American experience by way of John Locke. It is to this acknowledged philosophic forebear that we now turn our attention.

In a word, what John Locke did for the liberal tradition was to mollify Thomas Hobbes's blunt prescription for repression through a policing sovereign. Locke did this not by denying the need for repression or the potential need for force, but by casting the forms of repression into more subtle, socially acceptable molds, in particular, the family. Locke, like Hobbes, places great importance on education. However, there is an important departure from Hobbes. Locke does not assign the responsibility for education of the young to the sovereign; for Locke, that duty belongs to the parents.

The manifestations of authority are no longer direct. Citizens, or citizens-to-be, are not to be indoctrinated; it is no longer the sovereign or his appointees who carry out the indoctrination and censorship. In Locke's political world such overt, coercive tactics are unnecessary. If the parents carry out their responsibilities properly, their children, like themselves, will become reason(able), rational adults.

The context in which Locke discusses rationality leaves little doubt that a person who is governed by reason is a person firmly in control of himself. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education Locke first discusses the importance of keeping the body fit. Then he continues:

...The great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this: that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations and purely follow what reason directs as best, though the appetite lean the other way.

A more certain characterization of a repressed individual has perhaps not appeared outside the psychoanalytic literature. More immediately to the point, however, is the process by which one achieves this ideal (for Locke) level of rationality.

Locke insisted that the family-state analogy is inaccurate; family and civil society have different origins and different purposes; the powers of each are dissimilar, the grounds for obedience in the family differ from obligation to the state. Yet, the kind of family relationships Locke advocated and sought to justify were repressive in character, thus dovetailing nicely with the nature of authority in the political system that he was also attempting to justify in his political writings.

Just as authority in the state is absolute, so it is with authority in the family. Unlike the state, authority in the family is not shared; Locke's Thoughts Concerning Education is addressed to the father; and, although in the Second Treatise Locke speaks to the authority and responsibilities of the parents, he does so under the rubric of paternal power, ultimately charging the father with responsibility for the education of his male offspring.
Locke tells us that the father should waste no time in asserting his authority, and that the father will know he has established his authority when his son is "sensible that he depends on (the father) and is in (his) power." Being in the father's power involves maintenance of two contradictory qualities, love and fear. How these two qualities are to be simultaneously sustained Locke does not say; he simply tells us that "nature teaches parents better than I can." Locke recognized that a contradiction exists, for he soon admits that he who has found a way to keep up a child's spirit easy, active and free, and yet at the same time to restrain him from many things he has a mind to and to draw him to things that are uneasy to him...has, in my opinion, got the true secret of education.

And if this feat is not enough, all this should be accomplished so skillfully that the child is never aware of what is happening to him.

To the extent that this is accomplished with any child, it is done through the achievement of four educational aims: virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning—listed in order of importance. Virtue, as we have seen, "lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires where reason does not authorize them." The ability to repress one's appetites is the first mark of an educated person. Learning is the least important aspect of education; it is "subservient only to greater qualities." Locke minces no words in suggesting that unless one first learns virtue, wisdom and breeding, it is best that one not possess too much knowledge. Learning is beneficial "in well-disposed minds; but...in others not so disposed it helps them only to be the more foolish or worse men."

The means of accomplishing these educational ends is a subject to which Locke devotes much attention. His concern is not with the education of everyone, but with the education of "gentlemen," whose "calling...is to have the knowledge of a man of business, a carriage suitable to his rank, and to be eminent and useful in his country according to his station."

It is possible to argue that Locke was an early advocate of a truly "liberal" education, in the tradition that includes John Dewey. The subject matter that was to be included in the education of a young gentleman ranged over fields as diverse as the three R's, history, geography, languages, science, manual arts, physical education, and leisure activities. Yet, Locke's emphasis in designing this curriculum was utilitarian; his aim was not the acquisition of knowledge, but the training of the mind and character. Those who have looked to Locke as an inspiration for what we have come to define as a "liberal arts education" have overlooked the relationships and the priorities that Locke himself established.

Locke certainly was advocating a liberal education: an education that would cast the mind and the heart in a particular mold; a mold fashioned by the requirements of a liberal political system. It is therefore not surprising that he advocated gentle methods of training the young, but warned that should these methods fail, or should a child be disobedient, the rod should not be spared.
In spite of his efforts to distinguish between paternal and civil authority, Locke ultimately uses the paternal prerogative of bestowing inheritance to tie the two together. But this raises the question of what happens to authority, paternal and civil, when there is no property to bequeath or inherit. One can only conclude that (a) children who can expect no inheritance are not obliged to be obedient; (b) there is nothing in intra-family relationships that teaches the young a logic for obedience that is transferable to civil society. Locke does not demonstrate a rationale for the exercise of authority when there is no ownership of property.

It follows that the only adults who are apt to conform mentally, behaviorally (and cheerfully) to the authority of the state are those gentlemen who are the recipients of their fathers’ largesse. Others who reside within the state are also expected to conform, but only because they are physically within the jurisdiction of the civil society. They are in the civil society, but not of it; submission to the authority of the state does not, in itself, make them citizens.

These conditions help us to understand why, in Locke’s political thought, he, like Hobbes, advocates (indeed, prefers) the gentle (though repressive) exercise of authority on the part of the sovereign—but is quite prepared to employ the use of force should disorder erupt. Those persons who are not in the economic mainstream, as are property owners, have not had the benefits of the kind of education Locke espoused. Those in authority cannot expect that the uneducated have learned adequately to control themselves. Hence, the state must be prepared to do so when necessary.

In the sections that follow I will explore the extent to which these early liberal conceptions of authority and the role of education in society were adopted (and adapted) in the American polity. I will first focus on colonial American attitudes toward authority and follow this with an examination of early views toward education and the relationship between education and the political system.
It has been argued that parental authority, as well as the authority of command and of wisdom have roots deep in the liberal tradition. I have suggested that for both Hobbes and Locke authority assumed a repressive form, whether exercised subtly, as in the family, or overtly, as with the state's use of its monopoly of legitimate force. I have also suggested that in the American tradition, all three kinds of authority have been present since the earliest settlements.

In addition, authority has not been viewed as a means of maximizing individual liberty within the social order (as Rousseau understood) by defining the boundaries of human behavior but only as restricting individual freedom. This suggests that authority has been consistently viewed in American civilization as punitive and negative. It seems inevitable that the failure to understand or recognize that authority as a means of liberating rather than confining would contribute to the repressive exercise of authority in the political system.

In discussing development of the meaning of liberty in colonial America, Michael Kammen argues persuasively that liberty developed, "not so much in opposition to force but as a pattern of ways in which force was to be applied." Earlier Oscar and Mary Handlin had written that "the safeguards of liberty lay not in the denial of the use of force, but in the establishment of appropriate procedures for its use."

That repression should rather consistently triumph over wisdom was due not only to a limited perception of the role authority may play in a polity but also to the nature of that polity.

In 1775 Thomas Paine published a literary whimsy called "Hymen and Cupid." Hymen, the god of marriage, went behind the back of Cupid, the god of love, and arranged a marriage between a beautiful young maiden and a wealthy, real property owner. Cupid, upon learning of the match, was enraged and told Hymen to mind his own business. His job, said Cupid, was to legitimate unions arranged by the god of love, period. Whereupon Hymen, arrogant deity that he was, warned Cupid that the day would come when his services would no longer be necessary; Hymen would not only arrange all matches, but legitimate them.

Revolutionary euphoria, coupled with a history of self-government in the various colonies, contributed substantially to the nature of the articles of Confederation. This document, with its overt expressions of friendship among the newly independent states and their people (Articles III and IV) surely reflected the warmest aspirations of Cupid. Unfortunately for the Confederation (and for Cupid) the Articles, within a very short time, proved inadequate. Saddled with enormous debts following the War for Independence, Congress was unable to effect the collection of taxes necessary either to reduce the debt, or to consistently pay its current bills.

More importantly, the government was unable to maintain order. With increasing frequency in the 1780s moderate rebellions broke out as economic class interests clashed. Shay's Rebellion, for example, was ultimately put down by the Massachusetts Militia, the government of the Confederation lacking the power or the authority to do so.
The documents of this period reveal an increasing concern with order and stability, and for a government that could insure both. The writings of John Adams, George Washington, John Jay, James Madison, and other sons of the revolution, reveal nothing of the spirit of idealism, optimism and amity that informs the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, or the revolutionary essays of Tom Paine and Sam Adams.

The conflict between the farmers of central and western Massachusetts and their creditors in Boston, for example, prompted an exchange of letters between George Washington and John Jay in 1786. Jay, in Philadelphia, upon learning of the events in New England, wrote to Washington at Mount Vernon:

> Private rage for property suppresses public considerations, and personal rather than national interests have become the great objects of attention. ... The mass of men are neither wise nor good, and the virtue like the other resources of a country, can only be drawn to a point and exerted by strong circumstances ably managed, or a strong government ably administered.

To which Washington replied:

> We have probably had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our Confederation. Experience has taught us, that men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the best calculated for their own good, without the intervention of a coercive power.

At the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia these typically liberal views of human nature and the necessity for a strong, centralized government capable of maintaining order dominated the proceedings. The document that emerged in September, 1787, bore little resemblance to its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation. In place of fraternity and cooperation was an emphasis on justice, order, and retribution for wrongdoers.

The Constitution is suggestive of the mind-set of the Framers; in Article I, immediately after provisions are made for the division of Congress into two houses, the election of its members, and the establishment of rules of procedure (Section 1-4), conditions are set whereby wayward members may be punished or expelled. In Section 8 (the enabling section) two-thirds of the powers of Congress pertain to war, invasions, rebellions, and the like; the remainder, save two, relate to taxation and commerce. The idealistic Sons of the Revolution had become realistic Fathers of the Constitution. Hymen had triumphed.

The rout of Cupid was confirmed by The Federalist. Publius acknowledged that complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
The cause of this instability was, of course, factions which the government of the Confederation did not have the force to control. And the root of factionalism, Publius wrote, was "sown in the nature of man."54

Now, Publius was well aware that not only was a strong government necessary to control the people; but safeguards must also be included within government to protect it from itself:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men . . . you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.55

Cupid may have been routed, but was by no means silenced. There were alternative views present in the American polity both before and after the Constitution was drafted. We have seen a hint of these in Thomas Paine's adaptation of Roman mythology. Paine believed that human nature is basically good. "... Man," he remarks in his famous response to Burke's condemnation of the French Revolution, "were he not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and . . . human nature is not of itself vicious."56 The order which prevails among humanity is not the effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. It existed prior to government, and would exist if the formality of government was abolished.57 For Paine, people are naturally social beings, with a "natural aptness" to accommodate themselves to whatever situation they may be in.58

For these views of human nature, Paine derived his list of "natural" and "unalienable" rights:

The end of all political associations, is, the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression.

A public force being necessary to give security to the rights of men and of citizens, that force is instituted for the benefit of the community, and not for the particular benefit of the persons with whom it is intrusted.59

Tom Paine lived and died a revolutionist. "Society," he wrote in Common Sense, "is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil."60 Fourteen years later Paine revealed the consistency of his commitment to unrepressive government:

Government is nothing more than a national association; and the object of this association is the good of all, as well individually as collectively.61

When Thomas Jefferson received a copy of The Rights of Man, sent to him by James Madison, the aristocratic democrat from Monticello was jubilant. Fawn Brodie writes that Jefferson forwarded it to the printer who was to publish the American edition with an accompanying note that he was happy "something is at length to be publicly said against the political heresies which have spring up among us."62
The "heresies" to which Jefferson, then Secretary of State, referred, were the continual attacks on the French Revolution by Vice President John Adams. Adams, in 1790, had published a series of anonymous essays entitled Discourses on Davila. In them he had written that man is primarily motivated by "a passion for distinction . . . a desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved and admired . . . no appetite of human nature is more universal than that for honor." Adams went on to deplore the efforts of the French Revolution to impose equality and said bluntly that "every man should know his place, and be made to keep it."64

Like Paine, Thomas Jefferson held his revolutionary principles throughout his long life. Unlike John Adams, who believed men everywhere corrupt, Jefferson maintained a life-long faith in the common people. To be sure, Jefferson's "common people" were white, male and primarily rural and agrarian; he was never enamored of urban centers or their populations. In his time the overwhelming majority of the people were rural, but it did occur to Jefferson that the population distribution might change. He was enough of a realist to write, in 1781, that

In every government on earth is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption and degeneracy, which cunning will discover, and wickedness insensibly open, cultivate and improve.

But Jefferson, unlike Publius, continued:

Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories . . . If every individual which composes their mass participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe; because the corrupting the whole mass will exceed any private resources of wealth.65

As for government, Jefferson remained wary, philosophically at least, of its role. "An elective despotism," he wrote, "was not the government we fought for."

It is error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself. Subject opinion to coercion: whom will you make your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed by bad passions, by private as well as public reason. Any why subject it to coercion? To produce uniformity. But is uniformity of opinion desirable? No more than of face and stature.66

Upon receiving in Paris a draft of the Constitution from James Madison, Jefferson responded, praising many points but deploring the absence of a bill of rights. Admitting that he was not a friend of "a very energetic government," because "it is always oppressive," Jefferson suggested that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing.67

The third President, along with Paine and others, held to the belief that amity (Cupid), not wealth and governmental strength (Hymen), should triumph. But they all lived long enough to see, in political and social life, the defeat of the former and the victory of the latter.
The patterns of authority that had taken root in the early colonial period were firmly implanted in the political culture of the republic before the end of the eighteenth century. These patterns, by a process of osmosis, seeped into other social relationships in the polity, and ultimately, (an inevitably) into its educational institutions.

The next section will explore early attitudes toward education and views of the relationship between education and the political system from the revolutionary and constitutional periods into the nineteenth century. It will be seen that the philosophy of the Enlightenment exerted as profound an influence on educational views as it had on attitudes toward authority. It will also be demonstrated that by the nineteenth century these attitudes began to take on uniquely American characteristics.
The osmotic relationship between education and polity and the nature of authority in both spheres is apparent from the earliest years of colonial settlement onward. I have suggested that the nature of authority did not change; it was always repressive in character. But the overtly punitive exercise of authority emerged only in the early years of settlement; it was not imported along with colonization. This change in the exercise of authority is important, for it reflected profound changes in the process of socialization—changes that would help insure a uniquely American political and social system within two hundred years and an unparalleled emphasis on the role of education in society.

The structure of education and accompanying patterns of socialization present during the early years of colonization were identical with those patterns of the mother country. The family, as Locke envisioned, was at the core of the social and political structure, and was the most important agent in the transmission of cultural values, knowledge (that was almost exclusively utilitarian in nature), and authority. This core was supported by other, proximal agents: the kinship community, whose boundaries were often contiguous with the geographic limits, and the church which functioned not only as formal educator through learning institutions which it founded and staffed, but also as disseminator of spiritual values and community morals. One other institution, apprenticeship, also played an important educational role.

The new land, however, abruptly altered the historic socializing functions fulfilled by family, community and church. The relentless demands of the wilderness revealed that the young were adapting more easily and quickly to their environment than their elders; at the same time the need for all members of the family to engage in menial tasks so necessary for survival led to a decline in parental status—a status that evaporated altogether during the "starving periods" when large families were forced to break up into smaller, self-supporting units.

The disappearance of the traditional patterns of authority, and the sanctions that maintained them produced a remarkable response.

Within a decade of their founding all of the colonies passed laws demanding obedience from children and specifying penalties for contempt and abuse. Nothing less than capital punishment, it was ruled in Connecticut and Massachusetts, was the fitting punishment for filial disobedience. Relaxation of discipline was universally condemned, and parents and masters were again and again ordered to fulfill their duties as guardians of civil order.

The unity of family, community, and polity gave way, in the North American colonies during the seventeenth century, to a public-private split that would become sharper with the passage of time. This split, accompanied by the breakdown of authority, produced two changes of significance. One was that education became more and more a public concern; the other was that the responsibility for insuring that people behaved in accordance with societal
norms—both in public and in private—was increasingly assumed by the polity. Fears arose, especially among first-generation colonists, that the breakdown of the family, which they witnessed over their lifetime, would lead to chaos. Instead, the dissolution of the extended family led to a different familial arrangement and function. By mid-eighteenth century the core social grouping was the nuclear family and "traditional gradations in status tended to fall to the level of necessity. Relationships tended more toward achievement than ascription."

Of all the societal elements affected by this change, the education and socialization of the young were most profoundly affected.

In a setting of lively economic activity and oppressive theocracy the purpose of education was essentially two-fold: to preserve the religious faith, and perpetuate the existing economic and social order. These objectives were not new; they were carted across the Atlantic along with the other baggage.

Despite differences among the colonies, there were a number of important similarities. Rush Welter has suggested four social functions of colonial education, functions that were not confined to the colonial period, but have carried through American educational history with only a few significant changes along the way. All colonial education, Welter contends, was limited in scope, instrumental or utilitarian, hierarchical and authority-oriented.

Education was limited in scope in that it was only one of several means which colonial leaders would employ to accomplish their social, economic and political objectives. Education was not viewed as the primary instrument of social control that it would become in later years.

Education was seen as an "instrument of the Protestant Reformation," as well as a vehicle for social and economic well-being. It was necessary for children to become literate so that they could read the Bible and thus help insure their eventual salvation. It was also necessary that they become useful; indolence was not a virtue in colonial North America.

Education in the seventeenth century was clearly class-oriented. To be sure, there were free, universal public schools in early New England and charity-supported private schools elsewhere; nonetheless, there were basically two, even three, types of education in the colonies. One level served the gentry; the second served the common folk; the third level most starkly points up the class nature of education. Here I refer to the measures developed to take care of the very poor, off-spring of indentured servants and orphans. These children were bound out as apprentices, often at age four or five, sometimes as infants.

It is important to note that the establishment of various schools to serve the needs of a stratified society did not preclude the possibility of upward-mobility in that society. On balance, however, it seems of far greater relevance to a discussion of the relationship between education and society that the nature of the educational institutions both reflected and reinforced the hierarchical class divisions of colonial society. Its relevance is reinforced by the fact that education did not, in the colonial period—or later—accomplish what opponents of expanding educational opportunities said it would accomplish: break down those class divisions.
Finally, colonial education was authority-oriented. This had two implications. First, because it was instrumental to a stratified society, education consistently (and inevitably) supported the status quo. The schools were oriented to the demands and expectations of the political leaders, which insured that, even though the goals of education, curriculum and schools changed somewhat over time, they continued to play a conservative role in colonial society.81

Second, the pedagogy was authority-oriented. Curti writes that the emphasis was on "dogmatism, authoritarianism, and memorization." Welter notes that especially during the seventeenth century the student learned what his instructor taught simply because it was being taught, and in the manner in which it was presented. In the higher education this meant intensive formal drilling in traditional medieval disciplines, and discussion took the form of elaborate disputation but not genuine inquiry.82 The aim, in this period, was "to impose 'good order' by fear and physical brutality." The use of force was not restricted to schools for the lower classes, but indeed found its way into all levels and types of education.83

As the colonial era wore on, education continued to be limited in scope, instrumental, hierarchical and authority-oriented. This is not to say, however, that changes were not taking place. The focus of education continued, all through the eighteenth century, to be utilitarian in both an economic and religious sense. Yet during this time the control of the organized church was breaking down in some respects and changing in others. After 1700, there was no longer the domination of education and educational institutions by a theocratic government; there was no longer a theocracy. But denominationalism was breaking out all over the colonies and the various groups began to establish their own schools.84

During these years, too, there continued to be public schools of various kinds. The first evening schools, for example, made their appearance during this time.85 It was not until mid-century, however, after the books of the Enlightenment began making their way across the Atlantic, that alternatives to the character of colonial education began to make their appearance. Until this time, virtually the only answers to the question, "Education for what?" was: "To train children to be good, God-fearing Christians and to train them for useful occupations in the marketplace." And the universal means of enforcing authority in the classroom was with the hickory stick—or worse.

With the revolutionary and republican periods, alternative ideas about education and authority began to emerge. Some of these alternatives, as we will soon see, manifested themselves in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Others required more time before being adopted; still others have continued to exist only as ideals or have enjoyed implementation in only limited ways.

There are, of course, many similarities between the republican and colonial periods. Education continued to be limited in scope. There were few who, like Thomas Jefferson, thought education the "most legitimate engine of government"; most others were willing to concede that it was "only one among several engines."86
Education continued to be instrumental. Indeed, its utilitarian character became more pronounced, while the emphasis shifted from religious training to politics and economics.87

By the time the Fathers of the Constitution had finished their work, three perspectives on the role of education in society reflecting differing perceptions of the political system and the relationship between citizens and the polity had emerged. The positions may be labeled "elitist," "democratic-elitist," and "democratic."88

The elitist position, whose political correspondents were Alexander Hamilton and those of similar mind, was probably a widely-held position among the Federalists. I say "probably" because the writings of the period reflect, in only the most limited way, the elitist viewpoint. The primary reason for this is that the system of education which existed was quite to their liking and they therefore saw no reason to propose alterations or alternatives. There was also no need to defend their position; they simply maintained a deafening silence.

Hamilton permits us a glimpse of this position in two brief references to educational requirements of the new republic. His thoroughgoing utilitarianism and his concern for the economic advancement of the country are captured in the following statement:

...Science, learning, and knowledge promote those momentous discoveries and improvements which accelerate the progress of labor and industry, and with it the accumulation of that opulence which is the parent of so many pleasures and pains, so many blessings and calamities.

Hamilton was particularly concerned that the cities ought "to be attended to" and toward that end he proposed "academies, each with one professor, for instructing the different classes of mechanics in the principles of mechanics and the elements of chemistry."89

No where is there reference to education of the masses, the necessity for a literate people in a republican form of government, a notion of equal educational opportunity for all. These ideas, and others, did appear however—in the writings of the democratic-elitists and the democrats.

The democratic-elitists encompassed a broad range of the political spectrum, Federalists and Republicans alike. John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson are the most famous representatives of this position; lesser figures included Benjamin Rush, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Samuel Harrison Smith, one of the two winners of an essay contest sponsored by the American Philosophical Society in 1796 to solicit proposals for a national system of education, and Du Pont de Nemours who wrote a proposal of a similar nature in 1800 at the request of Jefferson.

The democratic position was reflected in the writings of only one person of note: Thomas Paine. There were, however, several other men in the late eighteenth century who advocated a truly democratic education: the second winner of the Philosphic Society's essay contest, Samuel Knox, is among these; others included Naaniel Chipman, Robert Coram, and James Sullivan.
Democratic-elitists and democrats held a number of beliefs in common, most of which had to do with the structural attributes of education and educational systems. All believed education should be universal (for males); supported by public funds; encompass primary school through college; be subject to some sort of centralized control, at least at the state level, more often at the national level through some form of national board of educators; non-sectarian, and utilitarian and pragmatic.

The differences between democratic-elitists and democrats were of a more substantive nature. There was disagreement over the continued religious emphasis in education; over the meaning of equal opportunity; on the extent to which new republican traditions ought to replace old, monarchical traditions; over the preservation of the new status quo and commitment to active change; whether education should be directed to the development of the good citizen or the whole person; whether education should indoctrinate politically or develop critical faculties; and, over the exercise of authority.
The differences between elitists, democratic-elitists and democrats may be summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELITISTS</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC-ELITISTS</th>
<th>DEMOCRATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN NATURE</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>malleable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECT OF</td>
<td>economically</td>
<td>good political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>productive</td>
<td>citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMOUNT OF</td>
<td>3 R's plus</td>
<td>3 R's for all;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>apprenticeship</td>
<td>advanced education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECESSARY</td>
<td>for the masses;</td>
<td>for natural aristocracy; only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>university education for elite.</td>
<td>brightest selected from masses for advancement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURE OF</td>
<td>mostly private;</td>
<td>3 or 4 level national system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL</td>
<td>no advocacy of national system.</td>
<td>open to all males; state support for brightest indigents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIZATION</td>
<td>assumed elites</td>
<td>very nationalistic; natural aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>properly socialized, prepared to rule; masses taught to obey.</td>
<td>prepared to rule; masses to participate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>Hobbesian</td>
<td>Lockean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three positions assumed that, if necessary, force would be used. But they differed in their assessments of the likelihood of such use, in the approach each would employ in an effort to prevent the use of overtly repressive measures.

assumed overt repression would have to be employed occasionally.

assumed overt repression might have to be used if reason failed.

assumed a humanistic education would render unnecessary the use of force.
It is interesting to compare the educational ideas of the early republican periods with contemporary practices. Two topics of particular concern. First, what was the fate of proposals for a national system of education? And second, to what extent, and in what ways, did attitudes toward the exercise of authority conform to actual practice?

The answer to the first question is a matter of historical record. No national university was chartered; no national system of education was implemented. The obvious question at this point is "Why?" I submit the reason is that the liberal nationalists (democratic-elitists) could not convince the conservative nationalists (elitists) to support such a scheme. The evidence for this assertion is both positive and negative. The negative evidence is that there is no record that the elitists took any position in regard to such a system. They did not actively oppose plans for a national system. They simply did not lend them support. To borrow a concept from modern political science, the elitists' behavior on this issue was a classic case of non-decision making. There was lack of agreement within the ruling class over an issue of national importance. The result was that Jefferson's and other proposals never were even introduced in the Congress.

The positive evidence lies in an exchange of letters between Alexander Hamilton and George Washington concerning the latter's last annual message to Congress and his Farewell Address. Hamilton served both as advisor and editor to Washington on the drafting of the latter's last annual message to Congress and on the Farewell Address. In this capacity, Hamilton was able to dissuade Washington from vigorously promoting either a national system of education or a project long dear to the first President's heart: a national university. The result was a mild reference to the latter in the last message and a general statement on the need for the "general diffusion of knowledge" in the Address.

The exercise of authority varied widely from ideas about the same. We have seen that no one advocated the use of harsh punishment as a matter of course; indeed, most thinkers explicitly said the rod ought to be used only as a last resort. In the school room however, a different situation often obtained. Teaching continued to be by rote and drill. "Encouragement was by the rod. Obedience (to God, parent and teacher) was the foundation rock for the mansion of learning." In Old-Time Schools and School-Books, first published in 1904, Clifton Johnson wrote that into the early nineteenth century

Severity was held to be a virtue in a teacher rather than the contrary. Some parents were uneasy if the master was backward in applying the rod, and inferred that children could not be learning much. The means the average schoolmaster employed to tame and discipline his pupils were extremely primitive. He depended chiefly on a ruler, or on what was called "the heavy gad," by which expression was designated five feet of elastic sapling. These two implements were applied with force and frequency.

One may imagine, with little difficulty, exactly how authority was exercised in a Sunderland, Massachusetts, schoolhouse, built in 1793. Set firmly in
the schoolroom floor was a whipping-post, to which offenders were tied and whipped in front of their peers.

Occasionally a teacher avoided physical force and resorted to humiliation or moral suasion. One such master, in Philadelphia, being something of a humorist, rarely applied his birch in the usual way

but was generally stuck into the back part of the collar of the unfortunate culprit, who, with this badge of disgrace towering from his nape, was compelled to take his stand upon the top of the form for such a period of time as his offence was thought to deserve.

Horace Greeley told of attending a New Hampshire district school about 1815, the teacher of which never struck a blow. "He governed instead by appeals to his scholars' nobler impulses." And when he departed, at the end of his second year, the parents turned out on his last afternoon to feast him with boiled cider and doughnuts. Apparently, this master was exceptional.

Another means of maintaining authority was through the imposition of fines. Boys and girls were fined for meeting together at any time other than meals or prayers; for absence from meeting Sunday or Thanksgiving; if they walked in the streets or fields, or visited Saturday night or Sunday; if caught playing cards, backgammon, or checkers in the building. Lesser fines were imposed for playing ball or other games near the building, for absence from rooms during study hours, for absence from prayers, and so on.

When authority was not being visited upon the pupils in direct ways, they were constantly being reminded of what behavior was appropriate through their school books. A classic example of the efforts to inculcate liberal morality is included in Noah Webster's *American Spelling Book.*

FABLE I.

Of the Boy that stole Apples.

An old Man found a rude Boy upon one of his trees stealing Apples, and desired him to come down; but the young Sauce-box told him plainly he would not. Won't you? said the old Man, then I will fetch you down; so he pulled up some tufts of Grass and threw at him; but this only made the Youngster laugh, to think the old Man should pretend to beat him down from the tree with Grass only.

Well, well, said the old Man, if neither words nor grass will do, I must try what virtue there is in stones; so the old Man pelted him heartily with stones, which soon made the young Chap hasten down from the tree and beg the old Man's pardon.

MORAL

If good words and gentle means will not reclaim the wicked, they must be dealt with in a more severe manner.
The moral of this little fable hearkens back to Locke: first try appeals to reason; but, failing that, do not hesitate to employ force.

Children were not even free from repressive lessons when studying the parts of speech. An 1829 edition of The Little Grammarian illustrates active, passive and neuter verbs in a most unique way:

![Diagram of verbs]

By mid-nineteenth century there was a great debate over appropriate methods of punishment. A growing school of thought held that corporal punishment would seldom, if ever, be required if proper examples were set for children by their peers. Another school of thought continued to hold to the traditional liberal notion that the rod should be reserved only for extreme offenses.

Horace Mann encountered the wrath of Boston school masters when he proposed that use of the rod be strictly limited in Massachusetts' common schools. He was attacked as a radical and charged with indulgence, among other things. Braxton Craven, a southern school reformer, announced his opposition to "punishments that mortify" (such as dunce caps and leather spectacles), use of the rod with but little discretion, and inadequate use of small "privations" of privileges and of "the great instrument of school order and obedience...moral influence." Through "carefully cultivating the nobler principles of the heart, and by avoiding occasions of offense," harsher punishments could be avoided "except in rare cases." Teachers were increasingly expected to act like enlightened parents.

"Cultivating the nobler principles of the heart" meant, in effect, that not only were appeals to reason to be employed by both parents and teachers, but also appeals to the child's conscience. One modern scholar has observed that where the new nurture was practiced, its enthusiasts seem shrewdly, if unwittingly, to have gambled that on the whole the inner penalty to the child for abusing the love and trust of the parents was a more effective control on his conduct than the memory or fear of a beating by a vengeful father or mother.
Once again we encounter the Lockean belief that the greatest virtue lies in self-control.

Educational opportunities expanded slowly during the early years of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the progress was so slow that one of the first issues on which early organizations of workingmen concentrated attention was the gross inequality in educational opportunities for different social classes. During the last years of the eighteenth century, William Manning, an unlettered farmer in Massachusetts, had written a letter to the Independent Chronicle in Boston proposing that the diffusion of knowledge be effected through a monthly magazine written in the interests of the working classes. Larning (he explained) is of the greatest importance to the seport of a free government, & to prevent this the few are always crying up the advantages of costly collages, national acadimyes & grammer schooles, in order to make places for men to live without work, & so strengthen their party. But are always opposed to cheep schools & woman schools, the ondly or prinsaple means by which larning is spread amongst the Many. (sic).

The editors of the Chronicle, a Jeffersonian organ, had refused to print Manning's letter and his rebuke to the democratic-elitists and elitists went unheeded.

By the late 1820's, however, Manning's lonely voice had become something of a chorus as workingmen in New England, New York and Pennsylvania took up his demands. By 1830 it was clear that if the protestations of organized labor were not exactly orchestrated, there was, at least, a certain harmony in their demands. In Boston, laborers formed a political organization and promptly took the position

5. That the establishment of a liberal system of education, attainable by all, should be among the first efforts of every law-giver who desires the continuance of our national independence;

6. That provision ought to be made by law for the more extensive diffusion of knowledge, particularly in the elements of those sciences which pertain to mechanical employments, and to the politics of our common country.

In the fall of that year workingmen in New York City gathered to nominate candidates for state office and announced that public education was their primary political objective.

One year earlier, in 1829, a Joint Committee of the City and County (workingmen) of Philadelphia was appointed by their peers to ascertain the state of public instruction in Pennsylvania, and to digest and propose such improvements in education as may be deemed essential to the intellectual and moral prosperity of the people.

Five months after it is charge the Committee reported that they are f ed into the conviction that there is great defect in the
educational system of Pennsylvania; and that much remains to be accomplished before it will have reached that point of improvement which the resources of the state would justify, and which the intellectual condition of the people and preservation of our republican institutions demand.

In spite of state law, enacted in 1809, providing for public instruction, only the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and the incorporated borough of Lancaster had established school districts; the remainder of the state was virtually "destitute of any provisions for public instruction."107

The Committee charged that "The provisions of this act...(were) incomplete and frequently inoperative, that they were but "partially executed," that corruption was rampant, with the elementary schools that did exist outside the cities run by persons "from mere motives of private speculation or gain." The Committee also charged that the teachers were incompetent and immoral.108

Following this indictment, the report proceeded to complain that no provision was made for day-care centers for the very young children whose parent(s) had to work in order to survive. They also complained that the existing system accomplished little more than a "tolerable proficiency in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and sometimes...a slight acquaintance with geography."109

The class-bias evident in the existing system, especially at the university level did not escape the Committee's attention either:

It is true the state is not without its colleges and universities, several of which have been fostered with liberal supplies from the public purse. Let it be observed, however, that the funds so applied, have been appropriated exclusively for the benefit of the wealthy, who are thereby enabled to procure a liberal education for their children, upon lower terms than it could otherwise be afforded them. Funds thus expended, may serve to engender an aristocracy of talent, and place knowledge, the chief element of power, in the hands of the privileged few; but can never secure the common prosperity of a nation nor confer intellectual as well as political equality on a people.

The Committee warned that "The original element of despotism is a monopoly of talent"; therefore, if the American people really did want a free government, it followed that "this monopoly should be broken up, and that the means of equal knowledge...should be rendered, by legal provision, the common property of all classes."110

The report concluded on a pessimistic note. They were aware, the Committee acknowledged,

that any plan of common and more particularly of equal education that may be offered to the public, is likely to meet with more than an ordinary stratum of opposition. It is to be expected that political demagogism, professional monopoly, and monied influence, will conspire as hitherto...they ever have conspired against every thing that has promised to be an equal benefit to the whole population.
The workingman's perception of who wielded power undoubtedly colored their view of the relationship between education and authority. Their conception demanded a form of popular education that would abridge, rather than enhance, the authority of the rulers. These democrats wished to eliminate infringements on popular liberty and protect the common people against additional political impositions. And, in the process of educating the people against existing evils, the workingmen also proposed to make the schools serve a new authority: the people. In short, democratic-elitist school systems were perceived as serving only people's needs; democratic schools, it was thought, would be more likely to respond to their wants.

The workingmen did not wish to enlarge the scope and authority of the government; indeed, they wished to reduce it, except for committing it to greatly increased expenditures on public education. In this, of course, they were not at all radical, but profoundly conservative. They placed ultimate faith in an awakened public mind that would bring pressure to bear upon elected representatives. But their faith was not vindicated. The ultimate establishment of a public school system was not the result of political pressure from the working class. It came about only when the ruling class recognized that a literate population was necessary for a stable and on-going political and economic system.

There would be other democratic refrains in the nineteenth century. One of the stronger voices would be that of Ralph Waldo Emerson. But it is categorically not true, as Rush Welter has maintained, that the development of a characteristically American attitude toward popular education took the form of a gradual substitution of essentially democratic models of education for essentially republican ones.

Welter argues that the distinction between the two models (which I have called, respectively, democratic and democratic-elitist) turns on the difference between a selective educational system geared to serving the needs of society by discovering, training, and elevating talented children to the positions for which they are most suited and an egalitarian educational apparatus intended to equip every child with the necessary minimum of information and character to enable him to take his place as an autonomous being in a free society governed by popular suffrage.

He acknowledged that the difference was, at most, only one of tendency and emphasis:

Democrats were not averse to rewarding talent, and their republican (democratic-elitist) predecessors were often eager to extend primary education to everyone. But the difference did exist, and the history of American education is in large part a history of the insistent democratization of every level of schooling.
One can argue that "democratization of every level of schooling" took place only if one defines "democratization" in terms of the increasing numbers of students who began attending schools as the nineteenth century wore on. But the schools never became the "egalitarian educational apparatus intended to equip every child with the necessary minimum of information and character." The conception of the individual as an "autonomous being" existed only in the minds of democratic reformers; it was never institutionalized, never became a part of the socialization process in the schools.

The schools developed in response to social pressure of various kinds, not as a result of the triumph of humanistic, democratic ideals. C.B. Macpherson has written that

The greatness of seventeenth-century liberalism was its assertion of the free rational individual as the criterion of the good society: its tragedy was that this very assertion was necessarily a denial of individualism to half the nation.116

The best educational thought in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century America held that a national system of public education would produce free, rational individuals for the best society yet devised by man. What happened instead, which is the domain of another study, was that the establishment of a national educational system led inexorably to ever-increasing bureaucratization within both school systems and classrooms--bureaucratization with its emphasis on hierarchy, rules, and following orders. And the ultimate tragedy was that this system led to a denial of individualism to untold numbers of Americans.
FOOTNOTES


15 Ibid., pp. 10, 167.

16 Ibid., p. 262.
17. Ibid. It is interesting to note that the method of rooting out perverse doctrines that Hobbes prescribes has never been implemented in liberal states, but is a matter of course in socialist countries like China and Cuba. In the latter case, the process of "reeducando" has been institutionalized, apparently with significant success. For an elaboration of the Cuban system of political re-education, see Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York: Vintage Press, 1969), chap. 6.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid., p. 248.

21. Ibid., p. 249.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 251.


25. Ibid.

26. The ideas in this paragraph were initially developed in conversations with Frank M. Coleman. I am grateful to him for this intellectual support.


31. Chap. 6, pp. 146-159.

32. Ibid., para's. 73-76, pp. 156-159.

33. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 52.

34. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

35. Ibid., p. 64.

36. Ibid., p. ...
Ibid., p. 45. Locke defines wisdom simply as "a man's managing his business ably and with foresight in this world" (p. 124); breeding has to do with the development of self-esteem, respect for others, and the expression of this respect through one's behavior (pp. 126-128).

Ibid., p. 130.

Ibid., p. 115.

Ibid., Part 9, pp. 186-234.

Ibid., pp. 184-185.

Locke, Thoughts, part 4, pp. 62-77.

Locke, Two Treatises, II, 73, p. 156. Emphasis added. See also 72, p. 156; 117, p. 180.


Should the Constitution itself raise doubts about this argument, the Federalist papers confirm it. In Number 16, Hamilton argues that the central government must hold a monopoly of legitimate force. And in the preceding essay Hamilton baldly states that government must be able to punish:

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a penalty or punishment for disobedience by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, The Federalist, (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), No. 16, p. 99; No. 15, p. 91.
31


53 Madison, No. 10, p. 54.

54 Ibid., p. 56.

55 Madison, No. 51, p. 337.

56 Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine, Reflections on the Revolution in France and The Rights of Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961.) Rights of Man, p. 445. Paine here is echoing Rousseau, who begins with the premise that people are naturally good. He acknowledges that "men are actually wicked" but this is only because they have been corrupted by social institutions. Emile, p. 106; "Political Economy," Contract and Discourses, pp. 273-274.

57 Paine, Rights of Man, p. 398.

58 Ibid., p. 399.

59 Paine, Rights of Man, pp. 350-351.

60 Writings of Thomas Paine, I:69.

61 Paine, Rights of Man, p. 434.


63 Works, vol. 6.


67 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed., Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), XII:342. Jefferson expressed similar thoughts in other correspondence with Madison and with Abigail Adams. Ibid., XI:93, 174; XII:356. Yet, Thomas Jefferson, perhaps more vividly and forcefully than any other American of his generation (or succeeding generations) embodied a fundamental contradiction or biformity between word and deed. Philosophically, it is probable that Rousseau exerted not a little influence on Jefferson's thinking. But when events necessitated action, Jefferson was ready to and did employ force in the classic Hobbesian sense. Through Jefferson's experience we see the results that both Hobbes and Rousseau warned of: if citizens are not properly educated, as a last resort force may have to be used. In 1825 a student rebellion at his beloved University of Virginia, which Jefferson helped quell, led him to change his mind from his original advocacy of self-government and minimal discipline for the students to a belief that stronger regulations were necessary. Brodie, Jefferson, p. 447.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "osmosis" as:
1: the flow or diffusion that takes place through a semi-permeable membrane...thus bringing about conditions for equalizing the concentrations of the components on the two sides of the membrane because of the unequal rates of passage in the two directions until equilibrium is reached; 2: a process of absorption, interaction or diffusion suggestive of the flow of osmotic action...as a: an interaction or interchange (as of cultural groups or traits) through a separating medium b: a usually effortless often unconscious absorption assimilation (as of ideas or influences) by a seemingly general permeation...." Both definitions are helpful in understanding the relationship between authority in education and in the political system.


Bailyn, Education, pp. 22-23.

Not only did sanctions traditionally imposed by families weaken or disappear, but efforts to enforce authority came to nought in a setting where the law was little known, the courts happenstance, and the means of enforcement both occasional and unreliable. Bailyn, Education, p. 23. Kammen, Paradox, pp. 33-39.


I noted earlier that "Locke insisted that the family-state analogy is inaccurate; family and civil society have different origins and different purposes...." It is interesting that Locke was writing this at the end of the seventeenth century; the family, in England, had undoubtedly undergone changes, although it is probably safe to suggest that the changes in the colonies had been more sweeping--and more wrenching. In any case, Locke was likely engaged in justifying the conditions as they existed, just as his whole effort in the Two Treatises was directed to a justification of the emerging liberal society.


"Theocracy" is not universally accepted as an accurate characterization of the colonial political systems. However, Parrington demonstrates that the ministers were, in fact, important political decision-makers--and the political culture was certainly dominated by theological norms. Colonial Mind, pp. 22-50.


I have listed these characteristics in ascending order of importance to this study.

Ibid., p. 18.


Curti, *Social Ideas*, p. 29; Welter, Ibid.


The political spectrum to which I refer is necessarily relative to that particular time. Jefferson was considered a radical in his day; yet, as we saw in the previous chapter his idea of democracy was limited by his belief in the existence of a natural aristocracy.

This suggests a general hypothesis: Whenever there is a lack of agreement on a national issue between different factions of the ruling class, any policy proposals associated with that issue die a quiet death. I am grateful to David Haight for spelling out the hypothesis, having been given all the facts.


95 Ibid., 41, 123.

96 Ibid., pp. 148-149.

97 Ibid., p. 95.

98 Ibid., p. 370. Reprinted with permission.


100 Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 139-144.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., p. 49.

103 Welter, Popular Education, p. 29.


105 Resolutions adopted at a meeting of "Workingmen, Mechanics, and others friendly to their interests," John R. Commons et al., eds., A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, 10 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio: A.H. Clark, 1910-1911) V:188.


108 Ibid., p. 35.

109 Ibid., p. 36.

110 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
Michael Katz convincingly demolishes the myth that "popular education...was an outgrowth of working-class aspiration," that it "started in a passionate blaze of humanitarian zeal," that it was a product of working-class demands. "Very simply," he concludes, "the extension and reform of education in the mid-nineteenth century were not a poppouri of democracy, rationalism, and humanitarianism. They were the attempt of a coalition of the social leaders, status-anxious parents, and status-hungry educators to impose educational innovation, each for their own reasons, upon a reluctant community." Irony of Early School Reform, pp. 1, 2, 218.

Emerson charged that American culture had "trucked to the times,—to the senses...We teach boys," he said, "to be such men as we are. We do not teach them to aspire to be all they can. We do not give them a training as if we believed in their noble nature. We scarce educate their bodies. We do not train the eye and the hand. We exercise their understandings to the apprehension and comparison of some facts, to a skill in numbers, in words; we aim to make accountants, attorneys, engineers; but not to make able, earnest, great-hearted men. The great object of Education should be commensurate with the object of life. It should be a moral one; to teach self-trust...."

The process by which this educational objective is to be achieved suggests that Emerson, like Rousseau, understood that authority may be exercised in such way as to maximize individual liberty within the social order by defining the boundaries of human behavior. The transcendentalist tells teachers to "Set this law up, whatever becomes of the rules of the school: they must not whisper, much less talk; but if one of the young people says a wise thing, greet it, and let all the children clap their hands...Nobody shall be disorderly, or leave his desk without permission, but if a boy runs from his bench, or a girl, because the fire falls, or to check some injury that a little dastard is inflicting behind his desk on some helpless sufferer, take away the medal from the head of the class and give it on the instant to the brave rescuer....Of course you will insist on modesty in the children, and respect to their teachers, but if the boy stops you in your speech, cries out that you are wrong and sets you right, hug him!" Emerson on Education, Howard Mumford Jones, ed. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), pp. 186, 210-211, 226-227.

Welter, American Writings, p. xlv.

Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 262.