This paper examines whether suburban communities can provide any useful conceptual tools for the examination of the prospects for community control in cities. Several propositions are advanced: First it is argued that the relevance of suburban community control to the poor in the cities is not diminished by the finding that those of high social status participate in politics more than the poor. Second, it is argued that the suburban experience is relevant to urban community control even if suburbs do not have consistently high rates of citizen participation or have less professional autonomy than cities. Moving from these assertions, it is argued that several models of citizen influence over educational governance can be discerned from the literature on suburban educational politics. These models are applicable with some qualifications to minority group communities. The third assertion is that each of these models has pay-off potential for the urban poor, although each brings certain drawbacks as well. It is argued that what is needed is that we develop community control models which incorporate the important features of each of the current models. The structural similarities between urban and suburban models of community control provide a useful starting point for defining an appropriate model for the cities. (Author/JM)
SUBURBAN AND URBAN MODELS
OF COMMUNITY CONTROL

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Introduction

Many individuals who are concerned over America's urban crisis have turned in the last decade to decentralization, citizen participation, and community control for possible solutions. It is surprising that neither these enthusiasts nor their critics have drawn upon the suburbs as a yardstick for judging the appropriateness of these tools among the poor in the cities. Yet it is a commonly accepted assumption that suburbs embody much of the participation and control which city municipalities have lost and wish to regain. It has become commonplace to observe that the growth of suburbs may be attributed in part to the search for community and for some measure of control suburban residents could not attain in the city.

In this paper I wish to examine whether suburban communities can provide us with any useful conceptual tools by which we may examine the prospects for community control in cities. Since my interest in this paper is in the institution of public education, I confine myself to that arena and avoid consideration of the broader suburban experience with municipal government. I do not wish to rule out the possibility that community control arrangements in the city should discard the autonomous approach to educational governance which now exists in both cities and suburbs, in which case the record of suburban municipal government would be relevant to our considerations. However, that topic would deserve another paper.

I wish to advance a number of propositions in this paper. First, I will argue that the relevance of suburban community control to the poor in the cities is not diminished by the finding that those of high social status participate in politics more than the poor. Second, I will argue that the suburban experience is relevant to urban community control even if suburbs do not have
consistently high rates of citizen participation or have less professional autonomy than cities. Moving from these assertions, I will argue that several models of citizen influence over educational governance can be discerned from the literature on suburban educational politics. These models are applicable with some qualifications to minority group communities in the core urban communities. My third assertion shall be that each of these models has payoff potential for the urban poor, although each brings certain drawbacks as well. What is needed, I shall argue, is that we develop community control models which incorporate the important features of each of the current models.

Participation as a Correlate of Social Class

Many studies of political participation have shown that the social status of an individual, e.g., his education, occupation, and income, affect his inclination to participate (Milbrath, 1965). Members of higher status groups participate more in the political process than do members of lower and working classes.

One might infer from this data that whatever channels of citizen participation exist in suburbs cannot be duplicated among the poor in our cities since suburbs are, by and large, middle and upper class. This conclusion would be valid were it not for several factors. First, it is obvious that not all suburbs are high status, and we shall cite evidence showing that it is the exceptions to the rule, namely low status suburbs, which provide a distinctive political culture from high status suburbs. These low status suburbs demonstrate considerable citizen participation into the governance process, albeit of a different variety from high status counterparts. We shall see that these low status suburbs provide an obvious basis for application to poor city communities.
Second, although high status suburbs have a considerable measure of community control over governance, this is not necessarily accomplished by high rates of citizen participation as measured by voter turnout. Also, while higher social class tends to bring more citizen participation, this correlation does not necessarily follow in all aspects of governmental affairs. Citizens may be able to achieve responsiveness to their interest through other means than direct participation in decision-making such as through responsive professional elites. And we shall argue that this is, indeed, the case in many high status suburbs.

Third, to the extent that suburban community control requires some higher levels of participation than is found in cities, low status is not an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of the poor in policy processes. Social status leads to participation through several mediating influences, primary among them being civic attitudes. As we will demonstrate, these civic attitudes are altered among the poor by their perceptions of the potential responsiveness of authorities and by their degree of group consciousness. Thus a change in policy processes and a change in certain cultural characteristics of poor communities can alter civic attitudes and thereby alter the usual association between class and participation.

Of course, I do not wish to argue that the data on social class and participation are irrelevant to my analysis. I only claim that these several factors—the special character of participation in low status suburbs; the exercise of substantial control without necessarily high participation in high status suburbs; finally, the importance of particular civic attitudes apart from social class—each of these makes it relevant to analyze suburban community control in spite of the data correlating social class and participation.
Participation and Autonomy in Suburbs

The theme of citizen participation has come to be an integral feature of many proposals for decentralization of city services, including education. It has also been a pivotal feature of Community Action Programs, Model Cities, and other efforts. The history of these developments is quite well known and needs no elaboration here (Cahn and Passet, 1971; Fantini and Gittell, 1973; Greenstone and Peterson, 1973; Marris and Rein, 1973; LaNoue and Smith, 1973).

The commonly accepted vehicle for citizen participation in cities has come to be formally constituted decision-making bodies in which clients render advice to professionals or are given policy-making authority. The analogue for this in the suburbs is probably either the board of education of the local school district or citizen advisory bodies. Community control in the city would entail many such community-based boards with policy-making authority. Thus, in comparing the suburbs with cities, one is inclined to use client representation on decision assemblies as the standard for citizen participation.

Of course, there are more conventional forms of participation in governmental affairs in both the cities and the suburbs. I refer here to electoral participation, communal activity in voluntary organizations, and personalized contacts with government officials (Verba and Nie, 1972).

Whatever yardstick of citizen participation one uses, he will find that most studies on suburban educational politics have found low citizen participation and a high degree of professional autonomy (David, 1973; Bloomberg and Sunshine, 1963; Kerr, 1964; Lyke, 1968, 1970). Moreover, Verba and Nie (1972: 235-36) have found that low levels of citizen participation appear to characterize suburbs and core cities as contrasted with rural areas, isolated towns, and isolated cities. Minar (1966b), however, found high levels of voter
participation in low status suburbs, although less participation in school-oriented voluntary organizations than in high status suburbs.

Yet the literature on suburban school politics also suggests that notwithstanding the relatively low volume of citizen participation in many communities, citizens nonetheless have significant influence over policy-making. It is possible to distill from the empirical literature three quite different methods by which citizens assert some degree of control over policy outcomes and policy processes in suburbs. I shall refer to these alternative paths as the consensual model, the representative bargaining model, and the protest model and introduce each of them briefly at this point.

The Consensual Model

Minar's (1966a, 1966b) seminal research revealed, as is well known, that high status suburban districts tend to have low levels of electoral participation but also low levels of electoral dissent. Boards of education in these communities give the superintendent of schools much administrative latitude and policy initiative. Minar characterizes the board as a consultative vehicle for the superintendent rather than a decision-making body. Also, it acts as a "shock and responsibility absorber" in interpreting the school system to the citizenry. Boyd (1973) and O'Shea (1973) both have confirmed the consensual nature of school board-professional decision-making in high status suburban communities. Boyd, for example, emphasizes that the political culture of these communities favors the articulation of demands purporting to represent the broad public interest rather than the defense of special interests within the community. Similarly, community norms favor the use of persuasive deliberation in the articulation of demands upon authorities rather than use of conflict techniques. In sum, citizens assert their influence in this setting by working cooperatively with professionals who, for the most part, share a common philos-
ophy and priorities with the community. While organized groups make their preferences felt to board members and the superintendent, these processes are highly structured and apparently yield satisfactory results.

The Representative Bargaining Model

The same authors have presented a starkly contrasting model operating in low-status suburbs. While voters may express their dissent through high levels of participation in school board elections and in bond referenda, communal organizational activity is quite low in these communities. Board members frequently operate in a relative vacuum. The board is more hostile to the superintendent and, as Minar (1966b: 178) puts it, casts him "in the role of shop steward rather than operating executive." Boyd describes the political culture as one where patronage and influence-peddling by board members and even professional administrators is not unheard of. Boyd and O'Shea, following Minar, find political parties to be the primary mechanism for recruitment of board members, whereas a caucus system exists in high status suburbs.

The political culture in these communities finds nothing wrong with the defense of partisan, self-interested platforms, and it would appear that the board of education becomes a bargaining arena through which board members attempt to legitimate particular interests and through which they attempt to win various concessions from the superintendent. We may refer to such a political system as an institutionalized bargaining arena; the self-interests of various actors are frankly acknowledged. Public deliberation becomes a negotiative arena in which competing interests are exchanged or compromised.

At the same time, it would appear that this bargaining arena falls somewhat short of the highly stable negotiative processes that often occur where there is a plurality of permanent groups whose interests must be reconciled. The literature would suggest that we find a poverty of interest-group activity
in these blue-collar suburbs or, at most, activity of a mercurial nature. Hence, the bargaining atmosphere is somewhat unstable, given to overlapping cleavages (although in some communities political parties do form a strong enough organizational framework to aggregate demands). The superintendent is cast into quite a different role from his counterparts in high-income suburbia. Here his job is to act as a broker for various viewpoints rather than as a disinterested technician pursuing an agreed-upon platform. Moreover, he finds that the community's distrust of expertise leaves him little autonomy to use his own discretion.

The Protest Model

The literature on suburban school politics also emphasizes a third route by which citizens effectively achieve their preferences through the school system's political structure. Where institutionalized channels of expression such as the electoral process and representative processes on the board are ineffective, then citizen groups turn to protest—heated verbal exchanges with authorities, large demonstrations, boycotts, lawsuits, and various other unconventional channels for expressing influence. Coleman's study (1957) of community conflict in various communities like Scarsdale, New York, Port Washington, Long Island, and others illustrates this use of open confrontations with school authorities. Dobriner (1963) describes the heated controversies in Levittown, New York and Gans (1967) uncovers less frequent examples of protest activity against the public schools in Levittown, New Jersey.

Suburban protesters view the professional as a potentially opposing, resisting force which must be contended with. Emphasis is placed on the articulation of partisan interests by various segments of the community and the mobilization of influence in order to hold professionals accountable. Whereas the professional operating within the consensual model concerns himself primarily
with mobilizing public support for the achievement of collective goals, the protest model shifts the authority's role to that of a conflict resolver who acquiesces to strongly articulated demands. Unlike the representative bargaining model, citizen power is asserted through open confrontation. And the various citations in the literature appear to suggest that suburban protesters frequently achieve their objectives.

The essential ingredients of each model are compared in Table 1.

**TABLE 1**

Suburban Models of Citizen Influence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept of public interest</th>
<th>Consensual Model</th>
<th>Representative Bargaining Model</th>
<th>Protest Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions regarding mutuality of interests between citizens and professionals</td>
<td>Common interests or reconcilable differences</td>
<td>Competitive interests</td>
<td>Incompatible interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional role</td>
<td>Proactive planner and problem solver</td>
<td>Interest broker</td>
<td>Conflict resolver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional autonomy</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary channels for citizen expression</td>
<td>Board of education and permanent citizen groups</td>
<td>Electoral process and board of education</td>
<td>Ad hoc groups and permanent citizen groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community role vis-à-vis objective desired by community</td>
<td>Partnership and ratification of professional plans</td>
<td>Competition, compromise or exchange</td>
<td>Confrontation, concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical change tactics used by community toward professions</td>
<td>Persuasion around commonality of goals</td>
<td>Competition or bargaining</td>
<td>Conflict and negotiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some of the above categories are adapted from Rothman (1968)
It is worth noting that these descriptive profiles probably do not account for all the variance in influence patterns in suburbs. Certain communities may mix patterns between these two extremes, and some communities may evolve from one into the other over time. Indeed, the consensual model may, from time to time, give way to conflict between citizens and professionals, and bargaining processes no doubt have developed some institutional channels for lay-professional cooperation. It is useful to view the consensual and representative bargaining models as ideal types in the Weberian sense. Clearly the models bear some close relationship to reality, for they grow out of the empirical literature on suburban educational politics. Yet the models are probably simplifications of reality, a problem we will later explore more fully.

**Urban Counterparts**

What is remarkable about these several models of suburban governance is that they closely parallel alternative paths for community control which are now being attempted in American cities among representatives of the poor. These urban models have recently become understood as alternative choices among students of social work and community organization. Although once again it is possible to cite many variants or mixed forms, here we will examine three essentially different models of community organization practice—locality development and social planning; internal adversary representation; and external adversary participation (urban protest).

**The Community Development-Social Planning Model**

According to Rothman (1968), locality (or community) development emphasizes cooperative problem solving between professionals and citizens to promote self-help and social cohesion; it attempts to treat what it sees as apathy and social disintegration. A cross-section of the community is brought into collaboration to communicate more effectively about community needs. Some
community development stresses more effective functioning of governmental institutions. In other cases the pendulum swings in favor of the development of alternative, indigenous institutions within the community such as economic development corporations. The professional's role is not supplanted in this form of community control; while his role remains dominant, the professional is expected to consult with citizens and to strive for consensus and commonality of interest.

The social planning model, which we will integrate with the above perspective, concerns itself with the solution of particular community problems rather than collaborative communication processes. Its emphasis is on collection and application of technical data and the refinement of service systems which respond to community needs. Professionals dominate this system, and little provision is made for the active involvement of citizens in social planning; laymen are viewed as consumers or recipients rather than participants (Rothman, 1968).

Two alternative emphases in the social planning model are worthy of mention. Advocacy planning, while not reducing the autonomy of the professional, does define him as focusing his services on the needs of a particular constituency rather than maintaining a facade of impartial neutrality (Davidoff, 1965; Peattie, 1968). Another variant seeks to achieve coordinated planning among professionals in various service sectors in order to give professionals a less fragmented, more realistic perspective on the problems they are attempting to solve. Both variants again place professionals at the core of the problem-solving process.

In recent years representatives of the poor have become increasingly disenchanted with the social planning model as a route to community renewal, preferring to redress their ills by direct participation. Although the social
planning model has lost its appeal for many leaders in poverty communities, it has acquired growing dominance in university programs of social work and urban planning. Even organizations who are interested in community development have found that social planning is a necessary ingredient in the creation of indigenous institutions or in the process of making existing institutions more responsive. As I will discuss presently, community development cannot easily be accomplished without a strong professional planning role which gives professionals a dominant place in the governance process. Consequently, we can appropriately amalgamate this model with the community development approach.

The Adversary Representation Model

One of the primary themes of O.E.O.'s Community Action Programs, and later of the Model Cities Program, has been the inclusion of the poor as clients on decision-making boards. This participation by the poor has been said to increase their skill in utilizing policy processes to their benefit at the same time that their presence makes professionals more sensitive to the needs of the poor. The adversary representation model seeks to institutionalize the access of the poor to governmental machinery, to integrate them into the political system as an articulate interest-group whose support has to be courted by authorities. Although much of the planning behind O.E.O. presumed that this deliberation would draw heavily on the expertise of professionals in precisely the way spelled out in the community development-social planning model, the adversary representation model also recognizes the importance of building bargaining strength, exchange, and various forms of political compromise. Adversary representation as a route to community control assumes that the participation by the poor in electoral or quasi-electoral politics at the local level is essential if they are to increase their brokerage power within the dominant power structure. It recognizes that even if a decentralized political
system allowed local communities to administer or substantially control policy making, there would have to be legitimate structures through which the poor interact with professionals and other community elites and through which they attempt to represent and protect the local community's interests. The representative bargaining model recognizes that the poor must become legitimate actors in policy processes before they can capture significant influence in their favor.

**The External Adversary (Urban Protest) Model**

The external adversary model is a route to citizen influence of public education became popular during the civil rights movement and later efforts favoring black power. Protest was also a secondary but important ingredient of the War on Poverty (Marris and Rein, 1973: 50, 67-70, 216) where it was assumed that the poor must sometimes use overt pressure and confrontation in order to achieve power. External adversaries view authorities as being in an hostile relationship to the interests of the poor. Urban protest therefore seeks to alter fundamental status and power relationships between the poor and their oppressors. It is viewed by its advocates (e.g., Alinsky, 1946, 1971; Himes, 1966) as a way of building the self-identity and solidarity of the poor. For Alinsky, protest provided a medium for educating the poor about their oppression and giving them a sense of power to alter their lives. In a word, protest seeks both to enhance the internal development of poor communities and to alter the responsiveness of governmental institutions and laymen. While the focus of protest can emphasize narrow, concrete demands such as improvement of deteriorated school facilities or new jobs, it can also focus on changing the authorities themselves (e.g., demands for minority group administrators) or the need to alter institutionalized power relationships (e.g., demands to give the poor formal representation on decision-making boards).
The orientation of the external adversary model can perhaps best be illustrated by contrasting it with the community development-social planning model and the adversary representation model. Unlike either of these perspectives, protesters view power holders as adversaries whose accountability to the community can be won only by coercion rather than cooperation, persuasion, or compromise. The dominant power of professionals and their defense of the status quo must be redistributed, and this can be accomplished by competition, confrontation, protest, and negotiation from outside the decision structure. While the urban protest model shares with these other approaches the attempt to restore some role for laymen, the models suggest quite different approaches. Community development-social planning calls for the citizen taking on a quasi-professional planning role alongside professionals, although nonetheless in a subordinate role. The adversary representation model would establish a leadership cadre in poor communities who would become actors within the authority structure attempting to make government more responsive to the poor as a legitimate interest group. The external protester on his side calls for citizen evaluation of governmental programs and priorities rather than ongoing involvement in their development and implementation. Unlike the community development approach he emphasizes mass intervention, not the incorporation of new elites into the political system.

Comparing Suburban and Urban Models

The reader may already have anticipated the parallels between the literature on suburban educational politics and these recent efforts toward urban community control. The correspondence between the two sets of models is summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Suburban and Urban Models of Community Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburban Models</th>
<th>Urban Counterparts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensual Model</td>
<td>Community Development-Social Planning Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Bargaining Model</td>
<td>Adversary Representation Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Model</td>
<td>External Adversary (Urban Protest) Model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The consensual model characterizing high status suburbs is very similar to the community development-social planning model in cities. Both see a unitary public interest and wish to minimize conflict in the governance process. Both view the professional's expertise as an ally of the layman. Both give the professional responsibility for anticipating community needs and accord him considerable deference and autonomy.

The bargaining model of low status suburbs speaks to the same needs addressed by the adversary representation model advanced recently in cities. While neither employs open conflict with the authorities, both view governmental institutions as relatively hostile to the community's needs. Both define the professional as a barrier to be reckoned with through the use of power within the governmental structures. Both models assume that the public interest will emerge from building power relationships among powerful contenders, each acting out of his self-interests. Each model views the problem of community control, at least from the citizen's vantage point, as a problem of maintaining an adequate bargaining position with other elites. Both stress the
accumulation of power through the use of positive inducements to alter behavior rather than negative inducements such as threats and violence. These positive inducements to behavioral compliance include use of favors, material perquisites, logrolling, and compromise. Citizen elites become skillful bargainers representing the community's interests.

The external adversary (urban protest) model likewise mirrors the suburban protest model. Each attempts to intervene in the governance process through unconventional methods in order to secure the compliance of authorities with their demands. Each uses organized collective action by overt pressure in order to enforce specific demands (Himes, 1966). Both believe that the role of local community leaders is to mobilize continuous discontent in order to insure that these institutions will serve the local community.

Because each set of models has emerged in different milieus and in response to somewhat different problems, we shall find some differences in constructing analogies. Yet the linkages are too obvious to ignore. Having laid out these points of commonality, I should like to explore in more depth the problems and opportunities of each model when applied to the urban poor, drawing on the suburban experience where it is relevant for comparisons.

Consensual Politics: The Community Development-Social Planning Approach

In comparing the consensual politics of high-status suburbia with its proposed counterpart in the cities, one is inclined to ask what it is about suburbia that permits a measure of community control. In turn, are these characteristics transferable to the cities?

There appear to be two key elements operating on the citizen's relationship to school professionals in that setting. One is the possibility of electoral or protest activity by the citizenry demonstrated in research.
conducted by Lyke (1968) and lannoccone and Lutz (1970). These two studies suggest two quite different mechanisms by which responsiveness to the public is maintained. When officials act in the hope of avoiding protest, they are subscribing to Dahl's (1961: 164) concept of indirect influence; according to this view, public officials keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents in mind in designing policies because they wish to win the support of the citizenry and to avoid conflict which might result in their loss of public office. By contrast, lannoccone and Lutz argue that even though boards of education act as Burkean trustees of the public interest, when they move too far away from public opinion, citizens remove board members from office. This purge then leads to the replacement of the superintendent. In either of the two cases we cite, the maintenance of responsiveness to public opinion is achieved by conflict or dissent with elected and appointed officials. While the normal course of affairs may be described as consensus-striving, it is the episodic breakdown of these norms, or their potential suspension, which allows citizen influence to be restored.

Yet if dissent and protest restore accountability, how do the politics of consensus in these suburbs normally achieve responsiveness to public wishes? Surely the mere absence of dissent does not itself necessarily suggest responsiveness to the public. The answer would seem to be that in high status suburban communities, professionals and laymen largely agree on educational ends and on how these ends ought to be institutionalized. A sufficiently large segment of the citizenry in these communities subscribes to Progressive, public-regarding values that have generally won endorsement by the educational profession as well (Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Callahan, 1962; Cibulka, 1973; Cistore and Hennessy, 1971; Karier, 1973; Tyack, 1969). In political systems where the citizenry selects professional elites to represent
them, it is not necessary for laymen to participate in the political process on a regular basis. In fact, when the values of citizens and professionals coincide, the problem of dissent is greatly simplified; complaints by parents are often registered personally with the superintendent, the principal, or with the teacher and are resolved promptly, both because each party assumes that an underlying agreement makes compromise possible and because the norm of consensus encourages a pragmatic, low-profile resolution of the problem. Also, voluntary communal organizations such as the P.T.A. enjoy regular access to policy processes. Contrasted with mobilized group protest, these kinds of citizen participation are less likely to engender defensiveness on the part of authorities (Deutsch, 1969), thereby increasing the possibility of mutual consent. Thus, we find in high status suburbs a high degree of elite-mass consensus. When this consensus is matched by potential for dissent, a professional's behavior is highly responsive to community preferences.

This closer examination of the operation of the consensual model in high status suburbs suggests that the community development-social planning model, if it were to operate effectively in cities, would have to achieve at least two prior conditions similar to the suburbs. First, professional elites would have to share the dominant educational values and regime values of the citizens of the community. Second, the potential for protest would have to exist so that these elites would remain accountable. This accountability might be achieved either through an electoral process in which professionals were themselves elected or through an elected local board in the community. In either case, the potential for dissent by the citizenry would have to be manifest either via the ballot box or through other forms of citizen expression such as mobilized

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¹By regime we mean agreement on values and broad general principles by which government is justified, consensus on procedural norms, and on the authority structure as well. See Easton (1965).
group protest or particularized contacts with officials.

On first consideration, neither of these requirements seems to be an obstacle in the cities. If there are professionals in suburbs responsive to suburban values and interests, there is certainly a similar pattern of responsiveness evident among many minority-group professionals. While there are those who question whether a new professional elite would be any more responsive to the needs of the mass of poor minorities (Cohen, 1969; Rustin, 1970), this danger would be mitigated somewhat if the citizenry possessed the potential to hold these elites accountable.

The Role of Efficacy

Whether it would be possible to sustain this potential for mobilized dissent in poor communities is not altogether clear, however. In high status communities, citizens have a sense of political efficacy and trust.² That is, they feel able to influence events (efficacy) and they feel that government officials are likely to be responsive (trust). The converse prevails in poor communities, where citizens feel incapable of influencing events (inefficacy) and government as hostile to their interests (distrust).

Two recent studies suggest alternative methods by which political efficacy can be created among the poor. Greenberg's research (1974) of political alienation and political expression in five poverty neighborhoods indicates that the condition creating the highest receptivity to participation (84 percent) in conventional political processes such as elections, voluntary groups, protest, etc. is strong policy dissatisfaction combined with a feeling that governmental officials are responsive to citizen overtures. These findings are somewhat troublesome for the community development-social planning model since the model assumes high responsiveness by governmental officials and satisfaction by the

² For discussions of efficacy and trust see Almond and Verba (1965); Campbell et al (1954; 1960; 1966); and Greenberg (1974).
citizenry. Put differently, to the extent that this model depresses dissatisfaction through consensual norms of governance, it also chokes out the potential for the development of efficacious behavior by the poor since that depends on some policy dissatisfaction. This difficulty does not occur in the suburbs because efficacy springs from factors extraneous to the political process itself. But in poor communities where the process of political development seems to depend on countervailing tendencies--disapproval and potential responsiveness--it is difficult for the consensual political process outlined in this model to accommodate both requirements.

Verba and Nie's study (1972) of political participation suggests that group consciousness among blacks may cut this Gordian knot, although we shall see that once again we encounter complications. There data show that blacks (the only minority group for whom they report data) who possess a sense of group consciousness (awareness of their own status as members of a deprived group) participate as much as whites in spite of their relatively lower socioeconomic status. The usual participatory gap, we have mentioned, derives primarily from the mean differences in educational, occupational, and income levels between the whites and blacks. Group consciousness provides a detour around the obstacles ordinarily presented by poverty status. While group consciousness apparently does not incline blacks to contact government officials, a form of participation which we have hypothesized is very prevalent in the suburbs, nonetheless voting moves to the level equivalent to whites, and cooperative communal activity actually exceeds that of whites.

Even when one demonstrates the correlation between participation and

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3 Verba and Nie (1972: 99) present data to show that personal contacting is relatively higher in suburbs than in cities, towns, and rural areas. Communal activity also is higher than in cities. Their sample did not include the large metropolitan cities, so while the suburban data are pertinent, the comparison with cities, for our purposes at least, may not be relevant.
group consciousness, the question still remains whether participation creates group consciousness or the reverse. Either line of causation again is persistently troublesome of the community development-social planning model. If participation creates group consciousness, then the success of the model hinges upon the ability to maintain high levels of participation, a necessity which is not present in the suburbs. Here it is relevant to draw upon the experiences of The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago which attempted to implement a community development-social planning approach to community control beginning in the 1970's (Fish, 1973). TWO's strength in protest activities in the 1960's had led to working relationships with a number of city agencies in Chicago. The focus of its activities gradually shifted from issues to projects as TWO acquired access to resources and the expertise and legitimacy of these agencies. Whereas the organization had maintained its reputation previously by raising issues, mobilizing a constituency, and successfully negotiating a settlement, now its success depended on its ability to influence these agencies and its skill in administering its own programs. The key actors in the organization came to be the professional planners rather than community organizers. The problems of management, ownership and administration had little to do with protest, and it became difficult for the layman in the community to see the importance of his participation toward achieving some end as it had in the past. TWO had to rely more and more upon employment to sustain its mass base of support.

The implication of the TWO experience is that the community development model, by placing the burden of technical decision-making upon the local community, discourages mass participation. The politics of expertise rarifies political discussion and confines its conduct to a relatively few actors; when a policy is defined only in technical terms, client participation decreases
(Gittell, 1967). Thus, to return to our earlier point, to the extent that we depend on this model to mobilize group consciousness through mass participation, and in turn to hold professional elites in check, we may be disappointed. But let us suppose that the achievement of participation is not necessary to build group consciousness. If the line of causation is reversed, and group consciousness leads to greater participation, we are once again left with the problem of creating group consciousness in the first place. Community control advocates ordinarily see use of conflict in the political process as a way of mobilizing the consciousness of the masses (Alinsky, 1971; Hamilton, 1969). Yet the consensual model preempts this opportunity. Group consciousness must be acquired in some other setting besides the political process, perhaps in the classroom. But here we would face a generational problem; the political efficacy of children and youth would not affect the political process until they became adults. In the mean time, adults themselves would not possess the requisite consciousness to pose a threat to professionals.

The Role of Community Elites

But if the development of group consciousness among most of the citizenry would be difficult under the community development model, the emergence of politically efficacious community elites might act as a viable substitute. Yates (1973) suggests that the structural characteristics of decentralization experiments influence the recruitment of particular types of community leaders and leadership styles. His typology of four styles of political leadership is reproduced in Table 3.
Community elites are either oriented toward generating service projects or creating power. Also, they may direct their efforts either at government or the development of the neighborhood. Entrepreneurs emphasize the solution of concrete problems such as garbage or vandalism through voluntary, collective action. Ombudsmen share this emphasis on specific governmental problems but look instead to making government responsive to the solution of these problems. On their side, community builders stress the need for restructuring power relationships in order to develop autonomous neighborhood institutions. The protester shares this more ideological, less segmented conception of community problems but attempts to restore power through ongoing bargaining relationships within the government.4

Yates found that decentralization experiments tend to attract entrepreneurs and ombudsmen and that these experiments increase the political efficacy of these service-oriented leaders. The opposite effect is felt by community builders and protesters, who have a power orientation; their participation in the various decentralization experiments studied by Yates inclined them to feel politically inefficacious. The importance of Yates' finding for

4 Hamilton (1969) offers a similar typology consisting of political bargainers, moral crusaders, alienated reformers and alienated revolutionaries. He asserts that the roles of all four must be linked, a position similar to the theme to be advanced in this paper.
our case is that the community development model is likely to attract community elites with an entrepreneurial or ombudsman orientation and these leaders would probably play a key role in the governance process. While they would be service-oriented rather than power-oriented, these leaders would remain sufficiently independent of professional elites to that they might conceivably act as checkmates on their power. Yates finds that this group of leaders is not inclined toward electoral office; consequently they would most likely thrive outside any role in elected community school boards, subjecting them to fewer pressures for cooptation than community elites who participate as legal agents in the decision structure. It seems, therefore, that the emergence of community elites outside the local government provides a route for approximating the suburban consensual model. We would expect to find both responsive professional elites and citizen elites who would provide the necessary potential for dissent when these professionals lost touch with community sentiments.

Population Changes

One final complication, although perhaps an auspicious one, which would operate on the consensual model in an urban setting is the greater population mobility in cities, particularly poor communities, when compared with suburbs. Population shifts associated with changes in the character of a community's neighborhoods complicate the operation of the consensual model. Where it is no longer easy for elites to identify the preferences of a homogeneous community, these leaders are presumably more inclined to use their own judgment as a criterion (Lyke, 1968). Verba and Nie (1972: 321), for example, found that concurrence on community priorities between leaders and citizens is generally higher in consensual communities (where participants and nonparticipants agree on priorities) than it is in nonconsensual communities. A low level of citizen participation achieves the same citizen-leader concurrence as does a high degree in nonconsensual communities. Moreover, the competitive nature of elites
in changing communities would tend to generate overt conflict and upset the consensual norms upon which the community development-social planning model is predicated. Providing that the conflict does not rip the local community's political system apart, this periodic turnover might provide a further check on professional imperialism since competition among elites tends to increase citizen participation (Jackman and Dodson, 1967; Crain and McWorter, 1967; Alford and Lee, 1948; Crain and Rosenthal, 1966; Dye, 1969; Minar, 1966a; Mueller, 1968). Whether this check would occur in the poorest ghetto, where populations are relatively encapsulated from the problems of heterogeneous communities, is unclear. We may simply say that the homogeneity so intricately woven into the consensual model in suburbia is not so easily operable in our large cities where racial and economic changes frequently affect neighborhoods. This instability may unravel the consensual model by stimulating competitive elite activity, which, in turn, will mobilize masses into the system within a competitive or conflict framework.

Suburban Adversary Bargaining and The Adversary Representation Model in the Cities

We have seen that it is helpful to superimpose the consensual model of high-income suburbia upon the community development model. Is the same comparison useful between the adversary model of low-status suburbs and the adversary representation model in the cities? In one sense the comparability is closer in this set; in each of these arenas low-status communities contend with professionals whereas the high-status consensual model has to be adapted to low-income city communities. Thus, we would expect the suburban adversary model to speak directly to many of the problems of the city's poor. While low-status suburbs may well be above the status level of their city counterparts, relevant comparisons can still be made.
Professional Values vs. Adversary Representation

Perhaps the biggest question one might pose about the relevance of the adversary model to the cities is that its application in low-status suburbs has not necessarily brought the same degree of community control of schools as high-status suburbs enjoy through the consensual model. Although more data for this assertion would certainly be helpful, Boyd's (1973) research suggests that professionals resist the political culture of these suburban communities in favor of public-regarding values which operate in middle-class, reform dominated settings. This gap in values between the world of the middle-class professional and the low-status suburbanite is expressed as much by different conceptions of the political process as it is through differences of educational philosophy.

One might predict that this problem would evaporate in the context of cities because there is already developing, as I have said, a professional cadre of minority group professionals whose orientation may be more hospitable to the political culture of overt partisanship and protest.

But whereas liberal/radical professionals might be very supportive of a community development-social planning role set out for them in that model, their hospitality to the representative model may be no greater than has been that of school professionals confronted with adversary bargaining in the suburbs. In the first place, an adversary system which attempts to legitimate norms of competition, bargaining, and conflict tends to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The use of the political process to build power relationships vis-a-vis authorities has interpersonal ramifications which erode cooperation and trust. As Walton (1965) has argued, a power strategy requires leaders to overstate their objectives rather than to deemphasize their differences with authorities. It requires stereotyping in order to build cohesion among one's
supporters rather than an accurate portrayal of one's adversary. The power strategy creates a need to emphasize the dependence of the authorities on the citizen and his vulnerability to coercion. It becomes essential to cultivate ambiguity of information and uncertainty rather than the predictability that would lead to trust. Threat prevails rather than conciliation. All these lead to what Deutsch (1969) calls destructive conflict; misjudgment and misperception make authorities defensive toward community demands. Thus, it is quite possible that even though minority group professionals share the same overall priorities as community participants, that the process of unregulated conflict could set up barriers to the realization of common interests. In any event, since the adversary representation model assumes an inevitable hostility between the political system and the community groups which press their claims upon it, we should not be surprised to find professionals confirming this prophecy regardless of the true extent of their sympathy with the citizenry.

Suburban blue-collar districts apparently have found ways of keeping conflict-norms within bounds, if Boyd's (1973) study of Chicago districts is at all typical. While controversy is an accepted fact-of-life in these communities and it is not frowned on for groups to present competing demands which represent their self-interest or the self-interest of their sub-community, conflicts of interest are also resolved by covert bargaining. In fact, political parties often serve as a source of recruitment of board members in suburban school districts, which Boyd explains as owing to the general weakness of the organizational networks in blue-collar districts. Patronage, influence-peddling, and the seamier side of politics are mechanisms for regulating competing interests, although norms in school districts are somewhat more prone to discourage these processes than is the case in suburban principal government.

The resident advisory boards of the Community Action Program provide
an interesting point of comparison with the operation of school boards in blue-collar suburbs, since both institutionalize bargaining among parties assumed to have competing interests. CAP, however, has sought to vertically integrate the poor into the city-wide political system and regional, state or national systems (Callahan, 1968). The bargaining arena for community-school boards, on the other hand, is the regulation of competing interests within the local community itself, particularly competing professional and lay interests; it emphasizes horizontal linkages among organizations and interests within the community. The representative model thus moves in two directions. At one side it seeks to develop institutional structures within the community which allow for the peaceful settlement of rival claims emerging from the citizenry. At the other side the representative model concerns itself with the interface between local needs and the larger political arena, where the poor shall also need effective representation even in a decentralized political system. It is useful to view the representative model in both senses when speaking of the urban poor.

Effectiveness and Accountability of Community Elites

A clear problem with the adversary model as it operates in both the cities and the suburbs is that it ignores the importance of making accommodative leadership accountable to clear constituencies. Yet the dearth of voluntary organizational networks in such communities, compared to high-status suburbs, makes such linkages difficult. Blue-collar board members in suburbia could no doubt be more effective in articulating their interests vis-a-vis professionals if they were accountable to mass based constituencies, or even if political parties from which they are recruited served as accountability devices. And research shows that adversary representatives within elected governmental structures are more effective when they are responsible to a
constituency; under these circumstances they are inclined to take a more active, influential role in policy making (Gilbert, 1968).

A closely related problem emerging from the lack of constituencies is the potential cooptation of community elites. Like the community development-social planning model, this model may also generate community elites operating outside the electoral process who would hold elected elites accountable. On the surface this model would appear to hold greater potential for avoiding cooptation because elites enter the policy role as adversaries. As we have suggested, however, without constituencies to hold them accountable, such boards are likely to develop norms which accommodate the internal maintenance needs of the group rather than the preferences and needs of the community. As a unidimensional model, the adversary representation approach provides no way out of this considerable danger of elite cooptation and manipulation by professionals. The extent to which blue-collar suburbs have avoided this dilemma is not altogether clear. In any case, poor communities may be even less sophisticated in avoiding professional seductions.

The suburban experience also suggests the dangers of disunity among representatives who sit on the policy board; Minar cites their poor organizational skills which inhibit clear structuring at both the demand-aggregating and decision-making levels (Minar, 1966b). Similarly, research suggests the importance of the client representatives becoming a cohesive, coordinated body in order for them to effectively manage controversial issues (Gilbert, 1968). Perhaps in the absence of controversy these skills are not as essential, but it is nonetheless apparent that this unity required for effective action simultaneously favors the regulation of competing interests. The need for unified, effective action will place a premium on compromising community differences. In this respect the adversary representation model is far superior
to standard mechanisms for advisory participation since these usually do not permit full expression of these conflicts between clients and agencies. Yet to the extent that conflicts are dealt with frankly and are resolved by positive inducements, these solutions require a consummate set of organizational-managerial skills most lacking among the poor. We would therefore expect that the adversary representation model will be hampered somewhat by the twin pressures for unity of direction and effective conflict resolution.

Suburban Protest and External Adversary Participation (Urban Protest)

The primary function of protest in the suburban setting is to win concessions from school authorities. The analogous model in cities also emphasizes its usefulness to build group consciousness among the poor as well. On the surface of the matter it is obvious that the protest model has greater potential for mobilizing group consciousness than does the community development model. Saul Alinsky understood this dynamic well. He never asserted that protest politics is as valuable a bargaining technique with authorities as it is a mechanism for building the consciousness and the organizational strength of the poor. While Alinsky believed that community organization could alter social conditions to make them more favorable to the interests of the poor, he used the external adversary model primarily to alter men's beliefs about themselves and to educate them to a better understanding of the sources of their oppression.

Even if one emphasizes the process goal of protest in increasing group solidarity and organizational strength, as does Alinsky, it is not possible to ignore the importance of task goals. Without concessions from the power structure, the efficacy of the poor cannot be built. Here, however, protest faces a dilemma. Its effectiveness as a tactic tends to be temporary
because it depends on negative inducements to change which must pose credible threats to authorities. It must have the psychological effect of appearing to withhold necessary support from the authorities. But the novelty effect is lost if protest occurs too frequently without disastrous consequences for the authorities.

A second difficulty with protest is that, in poor communities at least, authorities respond to protest by attempting to placate third parties rather than the protesters themselves (Lipsky, 1968). Since the protesters are relatively powerless, withdrawal of their support is threatening only insofar as the protest activates sympathetic publics upon whom the authorities are dependent for support—good-government interest groups, the metropolitan press and media, or whomever. Lipsky argues that it is relatively easy for authorities to neutralize these third parties by symbolic reassurances without dispensing appropriate rewards to the protesters themselves. Moreover, we would add that repeated protest dulls the offended sensibilities of third parties and thereby lessens the heat focused on authorities.

Another weakness of protest, frequently cited, is its reactive style and its marriage to visible benefits. Unlike the community development-social planning model, external adversary participation is not a good route toward identifying long-range solutions to community problems. It is too dependent on the energizing force of concrete concessions from the authorities in order to keep mass interest. Also, it tends to focus attention on unreasonable decisions authorities have made rather than the other face of power, the failure to make any decisions at all (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).

For these several reasons—the temporary effectiveness of protest threats, the susceptibility to symbolic concessions placating third party publics, and the incremental concessions it tends to focus on—protest tends toward routinization. Informal arrangements with governmental officials which
allow for the recognition of each party's legitimate interests becomes preferable to continuous conflict which yields diminishing returns.

Here again the TWO experience in Chicago provides a useful illustration of this phenomenon. Once TWO had entered partnership arrangements with the University of Chicago, Chicago's Department of Urban Renewal, the school system, and others, its previous strategy of protest as a route to power had to be sacrificed in order to avoid jeopardizing the legitimacy it had won. The TWO experience highlights the lures toward accepting an informal adversary bargaining role in the political system. Once TWO became a legitimate interest group in the bargaining arena, it became pressured to normalize its tactics. As Lewis Coser points out (1964: 121), conflict binds adversaries; they tend to take on like characteristics over time.

Thus, to the extent that group consciousness depends on conflict waged against hostile institutions, the protest model carries within it a dilemma. The ephemeral nature of protest leads to the institutionalization of bargaining power, yet protest is essential to develop the mass consciousness. In a word, the need to maximize one's support in the power structure necessitates deescalation of protest while the need to mobilize a constituency of the poor leads to precisely that conflict. The two cannot be had together easily.

Thus, the protest model as an antidote to poverty encounters a problem similar to that faced in suburbs. The building of organizational strength through mobilized mass dissent is not a satisfactory device for community control unless there are also channels for institutionalized bargaining. External adversary bargaining cannot sustain sufficient mass participation to redistribute power relationships. Moreover, Yates' study of leadership styles under decentralization suggests that decentralization experiments may actually lower the political efficacy of power-oriented leaders, given that their expectations cannot be matched by comparable accomplishments. The protest
model may, therefore, face a problem in attracting a consistent cadre of community leaders. Other studies have shown that as protest becomes less salient and routinized bargaining (similar to the suburban model) begins to dominate, a new cadre of self-recruited leaders emerges, accommodating individuals whose pragmatic, concessionary skills in a consensual arena would differ dramatically from their predecessors (Hines and Pierce, 1965; Jackman and Dodson, 1967).

Integrating the Three Models into a Multi-Dimensional Model

We have seen that each of the models has certain strengths and drawbacks, which we summarize in Table 4.

**TABLE 4**

Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Models of Urban Community Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>long-range planning for community needs</td>
<td>little collective mass action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Planning</td>
<td>internal development of community</td>
<td>no channels for holding professionals accountable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Representation</td>
<td>channels for regulating competing interests</td>
<td>cooptation of elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ineffectiveness without mass constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>possibility of community mis-directing discontent against itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Participation</td>
<td>mobilization of group consciousness</td>
<td>threats tend to lose credibility over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Protest)</td>
<td>method of winning concrete concessions from officials</td>
<td>susceptible to focus on short-range needs rather than long-term causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tendency toward cooptation of elites developing accommodative bargaining relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The community development-social planning model allows for long-range cooperative planning for community needs, particularly its internal development, but stimulates little collective action by the poor and may present a problem holding professionals accountable to the poor. Adversary representation provides channels for regulating competing interests, particularly between professionals and citizens but runs the risk of elites being coopted and, again, the problem of their ineffectiveness without clear lines of accountability to mass constituencies. It also faces the possibility that where mobilization of these constituencies occurred, the frank recognition of competitive interests among elites might cause the community to divide against itself rather than to mobilize its discontent against the authorities. Finally, the protest model, while most effective in holding professionals accountable for tangible concessions over the short-run, and best equipped to raise group consciousness and mobilize mass discontent, tends to break down into symbiotic ties with government officials and also runs the risk of diverting community attention from fundamental sources of oppression.

While these difficulties are perplexing, they are not so formidable that the three models are nostrums deserving no further support. If they were properly integrated in a political development model, the strength of one model would tend to compensate for weaknesses found in others.

Community development provides a problem-solving process which none of the other models do; it directs the community toward achievement of goals and consideration of alternative options. Adversary bargaining provides a regulative arena wherein, once their options are clear, the community can commit itself to particular policies and can structure discontent so that it can be resolved without crippling the community. Adversary bargaining also allows the local community to represent its needs and interests in broader political
arenas. Protest provides a route to energizing mass-based linkages to the community development process and the adversary representation process. It provides the potential for extending participation to other arenas (Levens, 1968). Particularly when protest leaders rely on ad hoc groups, the long-range evolution of protest into institutionalized bargaining need not be faced. Protest also holds accommodative elites associated with community development-social planning and adversary representation accountable.

The community development model also complements the adversary representation model. A major rationale of the community development-social planning model is that it will generate the necessary resources (knowledge, motivation, buying power, jobs, etc.) to buy political concessions from the society at-large. Adversary representation and protest provide ways of achieving this interface between internal development and external support. They allow the community to utilize new resources by translating them into power in the broader society. Skillful maintenance of external bargaining relationships and skillful protest directed at dominant social, political, economic, and religious institutions is essential to the community development process.

We would therefore propose that rather than opt for community development-social planning, adversary representation, or protest, what is needed instead is a multi-dimensional model which incorporates at least three elements emphasized in this paper: the achievement of cooperative participation within the local community focused on the development of its institutions; governance structures which facilitate the resolution of conflicts internally and vis-a-vis the larger society; the maintenance of channels for holding professionals and accommodative elites accountable, primarily through the maintenance of protest-oriented approaches. These are each in some ways separate functions calling
upon separate skills and different followings. It would appear that a
successful community control model for the cities would have to find ways of
accommodating all three dimensions.

Elements of each of these models exist simultaneously in many poor
communities today. But little effort has been made to conceptualize the pot-
tential complementary features of the models and to develop a coordinated
multi-dimensional strategy. Instead, at present advocates of each approach
tend to dismiss the effectiveness of others. Competitiveness would no doubt
continue to exist even if a coordinated strategy were developed. But what is
missing today is recognition of the need to build conscious linkages between
different approaches.

Conclusion

We have seen that there is no easy correspondence between community
control as we find it in suburbs and its appropriateness to urban problems.
Yet we have suggested that the three dominant styles of political expression
in suburban school districts parallel many of the assumptions found in three
major community control models. While none of these models by itself ap-
ppears to address all of the needs of the urban poor, when certain of their
major ingredients are combined, we gain a better understanding of the need
for a multi-dimensional community control model. Thus, the structural simi-
larities between urban and suburban models of community control provide a
useful starting point for defining an appropriate model for the cities.
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